The emergence of Salafi Islam within Indonesia has shifted the imaginary boundaries of Islamic identity. Although relatively small in numbers, Salafis propagate a religious discourse linked to scholars in Saudi Arabia. While it cannot be regarded as merely a type of 'Saudization', the kingdom is frequently exemplified as a model for a pious society as well as pragmatic solutions on how to deal with contemporary issues ranging from justice to terrorism. Indeed, Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal part in the Salafi imaginary, balancing a historical Islamic past with a modernist religious present and future. Based on fieldwork conducted from 2011 to 2012 in Yogyakarta, this paper builds upon this premise, offering both a description and an analysis of the importance of the kingdom as a source of educational sponsorship but also, more interestingly, as a source of religious authority and social ideals, articulated within contemporary religious literature and the movement's study sessions (kajian). More pointedly, I argue that actors use Saudi Arabia to construct an imaginary ideal through which social and religious issues are contemplated and compared to apparent Indonesian 'social corruption'.

**Keywords:** Indonesia; Religious Renewal; Salafism; Saudi Arabia; Social Imaginaries


**Schlagworte:** Indonesien; Religiöse Erneuerung; Salafismus; Saudi-Arabien; Soziale Vorstellungen
INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Salafi Islam within Indonesia has, for its adherents, shifted the imaginary and ethical boundaries of Islamic identity. Although relatively small in numbers, Salafis propagate a religious discourse linked to scholars and educational institutions in Saudi Arabia that they believe emulate the Salaf al-Salih (which they interpret as the first three generations of Muslims). While it cannot be regarded as merely a type of ‘Saudization’, the Land of the Two Holy Mosques plays a pivotal part in the Salafi imaginary, balancing a historical Islamic past with an ideal religious future. Frequently exemplified, Saudi Arabia is not only the caretaker of Islam’s most holy sites, but provides a model for an imagined pious society (compared to the perceived immorality of Indonesia) as well as pragmatic solutions on how to deal with contemporary issues from justice to terrorism.

Based on fieldwork conducted from 2011 to 2012 in Yogyakarta, this paper explores the importance of the Saudi kingdom among Salafis as a source of educational and financial sponsorship, but also, more interestingly, as a place of religious authority and ideals. I approach the subject through a focus on religious literature and study sessions (kajian) prevalent in Yogyakarta. My line of enquiry does not relate to a singular foundation or group, but rather looks more widely at a variety of agents active under the label ‘Salafi’ within the religious landscape. In doing so, I maintain that Salafism is a broad, translocal, multi-layered, and multi-stranded social movement that encapsulates a variety of different actors, institutions, and foundations. It is sustained not through any singular organizational structure, but through the lived experiences, divergences, and multiple ways in which it is ‘enacted’ within a given locale. In Yogyakarta, its proponents include (but are not exclusive to) Wahdah Islamiyah, the Yayasan Majelis At-Turots al-Islamy (At-Turots al-Islamy Foundation, At-Turots), and Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary (YPIA, al-Atsary Islamic Education Foundation). These actors often differ and disagree in the modes and methods through which they promote Salafi teachings, not shying away from contention in relation to religious practice. Yet, they nevertheless share similar global linkages and utilize Saudi Arabia in remarkably similar ways. Indeed, the use of Saudi sources and imaginaries in order to promote specific religious practices is perhaps a crucial overarching characteristic that conjoins a variety of ‘Salafi’ strands throughout Indonesia.

Through a description of the ways Salafi doctrine ‘travels’ (Said, 1983) and is ‘framed’ (Benford & Snow, 1986), I argue that the image of Saudi Arabia is used by actors to construct an imaginary ideal through which social and religious issues are reflected. For Salafis, any religious decision must find its legitimacy in Saudi sources. Further, Saudi society itself is utilized as a model of piety that adherents should strive towards. Yet, while this imaginary is built on real links and experiences, it fails to move beyond a normative set of values and look at the complexities and nuances of Saudi society itself. Moreover, as Salafism is not based on any unifying organizational and hierarchical ‘center’, its spread depends as much on global linkages as it does on the ability of local agents to adapt religious resources to a given context. Consequently, the need to recompose global sources at the local level inevitably requires a level of adaptation that creates a degree of distance from any idealized image of Saudi
Arabia. This does not render the image ineffectual, but rather, for Salafis, it becomes part of an ‘emancipatory desire’ constantly insisted upon, even if impossible to enact.

**FRAMING SALAFISM AND RELIGIOUS LEGITIMACY**

Prior to analyzing the modes through which particular socio-historical images of an Islamic society and Saudi Arabia penetrate Indonesian Salafi discourse, a descriptive account as to what I mean by the term Salafism (and Salafism in Indonesia, more specifically) is needed. The phrase derives from the phrase as-salaf, referring to ‘those who came before us’. It is commonly utilized in Islamic thought to denote the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and, generally, those who believe they follow the examples of these early generations (Hassim, 2010). Indeed, despite its recent popularity as a ‘catch-all’ phrase to label a variety of conservative Islamic groups with significant theological differences (for example, see Fradkin, 2008), the importance of the term Salafi can be traced to earlier periods of Islamic history. Hassim, for example, states that it was commonly used in the Abbasid era to distinguish ‘guided’ Muslims from those that deviated from the orthodox creed, although he also stresses that it was used before this period (Hassim, 2010). Steeped in Islamic historical significance, ‘Salafi’ thus resonates among Islamic advocates and has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been applied to a variety of factions claiming to uphold Islamic traditions. In Indonesia, for instance, the organizations Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (PERSIS, Islamic Unity) have often been referred to as having ‘Salafi’ elements due to their use of the turn-of-the-nineteenth-century reformist ideas of the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh and his colleagues – also popularly denoted as the Salafiyya (Hassim, 2010).

As important as this is, I do not wish to delve too deeply into the nuances concerning the variety of theologians and movements who lay claim to the phrase. Rather, returning to the topic at hand, this brief description underlines not only the significance of the term, but also the importance in qualifying to whom one refers when applying it (and indeed what they themselves mean when engaging with the term). My description thus utilizes ‘Salafi’ fairly narrowly in reference to a broad social movement that entered Indonesia during the 1980s and has links to several scholars who studied at Islamic universities in the Saudi kingdom. Referring to itself as a particular manhaj (methodology), the movement aims to ‘literally’ apply Islamic principles in order to emulate the Salaf al-Salih (by which they specifically refer to the first three generations of Muslims – the Sahabah, Tabi‘un, and Tabi’ al-Tabi’in) in every aspect of one’s life. Following a rigid adherence to tawhid (monotheism) as well as to the athari aqida (creed) (while most Indonesian Muslims traditionally followed the ash‘ari aqida), Salafis condemn any ‘contextualization’ of Islamic practice as well as any custom that may taint one’s absolute commitment to God – such as celebrating the prophet Muhammad’s birthday or visiting the graves of Islamic saints. In its place, they believe in a need for rigid adherence to the Qur’an and Sunnah, although it is notable that the way they study hadith is unique given the importance of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–1999), who questioned the authenticity of approximately 990 ha-

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1 The use of the term Salafiyya represented Abduh’s ideal of re-engaging with Islamic texts by going back to the main ‘sources’ of the Qur’an and Sunnah in order to find an Islamic synthesis with concepts of modernity.
dith considered authentic by most scholars (Kamaruddin, 2004). It is, moreover, what Mahmood (2005, p. 81) describes as a “post-madhab” form of Islamic religiosity that believes one cannot solely follow a particular ‘tradition’ or school of jurisprudence but, rather, must engage personally with Islamic principles and practice.

Socio-historically, Salafism emerged from the University of Madinah during the 1960s, particularly among the followers of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, who taught at the university’s Faculty of Hadith Studies. Although sharing similarities and quickly building bridges with several other global movements – such as the Ahl-e Hadith in South Asia – the Saudi roots of contemporary Salafism have led several observers to link it to the ‘Wahhabism’ of the kingdom’s religious elite (Al-Rasheed, 2007; Roy, 2004). While correct in pointing out a similar set of historical references and socio-conservative values between the two, we must remember that conflating Salafism and Wahhabism ignores the level of contention within the Saudi religious ‘field’, often between the institutionalized ‘Wahhabism’ of the aimat al-Da’wa al-najadiyya (religious notables of Najd) and those who propagate a variety of other religious positions – including Salafism (Lacroix, 2011). Indeed, the rise of Salafism occurred much to the ire of the Wahhabi elite at the time; they even successfully conspired to deny al-Albani an extension of his visa in 1963 after he criticized Muhammad Bin Abd’ al-Wahhab’s (the āl-Shaykh) reading of hadith. Al-Albani’s followers, referred to as the Ahl al-Hadith movement, who later grew into the Jama’ah Salafiyyah Muhtasiba (loosely translated as the Salafi jama’ah (group) that practice hisba, or the commanding of right and forbidding of wrong) thus began to promote a set of beliefs that challenged several tenants of Wahhabi thought, including, but not limited to, their approach to hadith as well as adherence to the Hanbali madhab.

In this light, Salafism is perhaps best thought of as a reconstituted Wahhabism (Hasan, 2010), sharing several socio-conservative and theological similarities in relation to aqida, but also decoupled from the historical-scholastic lineage of the aimat al-Da’wa al-najadiyya and traditional fiqh (jurisprudence). They have fallen in and out of favor with the religious and political elite of the kingdom, most notably during the 1970s when the Jama’ah Salafiyyah Muhtasiba was subject to state repression, especially after some of its former members laid siege to the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. Yet, Salafism was also fortunate enough to benefit from influential support, especially due to the intimacy between its followers and the influential Bin Baz, who was a senior member of the Majlis Hay’a Kibar al-Ulama (Council of the Committee of Senior Ulama) and became grand mufti from 1993 to 1999. Bin Baz, the first grand mufti not to originate from the family of Muhammad al-Wahhab, was well respected among Wahhabi scholars, never fully aligning with any religious ‘camp’ but rather mediating between religious factions within the kingdom. It was often at his behest and intervention that activists formerly involved in the Ahl al-Hadith and Jama’ah Salafiyyah Muhtasiba received light treatment from Saudi authorities during several periods of political repression (Lacroix, 2011).

By the 1980s, Bin Baz’s influence led many Salafi ulama to engage with – and sit on – a variety of Saudi-sanctioned Islamic institutions including the Council of the Committee of Senior Ulama. Not only did this provide space for Salafi religious scholars, but it also endowed them with funding through which to facilitate religious programs, sermons, and social initiatives, often with little state oversight (Lacroix,
It also coincided with a marked increase in funding for international religious programs. Shaken by the challenge of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in the same year, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi authorities augmented their drive to dress themselves in religious colors abroad (Al-Rasheed, 2008). Although Salafi scholars initially suffered from repression given the involvement of some of their former followers in the seizure of the Grand Mosque, their collusion with and loyalty to Saudi Arabia in relation to the war in Afghanistan brought them back into the fold (Lacroix, 2011).

This inevitably allowed activists to build bridges, provide scholarships, and construct mosques throughout the world—a process well documented in the work of Meijer (2009), but also within analyses pertaining to Salafism in Germany (Wurger, 2013), Ethiopia (Ostebo, 2011), and Yemen (Bonnefoy, 2011). Underlining the aesthetic and referential similarities amongst Salafis—all of whom reference similar religious scholars and sport either jalabiyaa (robes), beards, or the niqab (full veil) if they are women while avoiding isbal (trousers beyond the ankle)—such studies emphasized the commonalities and shared imaginative power of a ‘global umma’ utilized by a variety of actors throughout the world. Yet, they also highlight how the spread of Salafism is not the result of an organized state-based campaign, but has often circumvented direct state institutions and embedded itself in a variety of landscapes by transforming and recomposing itself in relation to the necessities of a given locale. Indeed, its increased global appeal had as much to do with Saudi Arabia’s greater financial power as it did with wider global social transformations—mass urban migration, increased education, the ‘failure’ of Cold War ideologies, and the advent of mass communication tools, all of which led to a qualitative shift in religiosity both globally (Mandaville, 2007; Roy, 2004) and in Indonesia (Effendy, 2003; Feely & White, 2008; Hasan, 2006; Sidel, 2006).

The resurgence of Islamic identity from the 1980s onwards was, as studies have shown, not linked to any established form of Islamic authority, but came to rely on an individual’s ability to reflexively think of oneself as primarily Muslim and to consider what this meant vis-à-vis the state, one’s peers, the wider community, and market forces. Consequently, this presents a challenge to delineating a coherent Salafism. For example, from a social movement perspective, ‘resource or political mobilization’ (for example, see McAdam & McCarthy, 1996) is, given Salafism’s frequent lack of explicit political mobilization, inadequate. The movement, rather than having a specific framework for engaging state and society, is based on what Hassim (2010) labels a particular ‘paradigm of thought’ that leads to a set of discursive practices drawing on a similar theological and socio-historical disposition. It remains a social movement, however, one that does not have clear-cut boundaries or objectives, preferring to be enriched through multi-layered and multi-directional characteristics, representing an enmeshment of people and lived experiences. In adopting such a definition, I borrow from the work of Lehmann and Siebzeheiner (2006) who, through their study of the Shas (Sephardic ‘orthodox’ religious political party in Israel), highlight how a multi-directional religious movement can reshape the intricacies and the very boundaries of a religio-ethnic community. Social movements often do not have specific objectives or even a defined set of ideas, but rather exist as the object of allegiance by individuals, whose own actions, built upon what Bayat (2005, pp. 891–908)
terms “imagined solidarities”, endow the movement with new debates, programs, and strands.

This approach allows us to encapsulate a variety of Salafi ‘strands’ in our analysis that, while varying in their scope and nuances, can be tied together through similar linkages, both real and referential. Moreover, if we were to ‘epidemiologically’ trace their history in Indonesia, we could see several similar roots such as the founding of the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for Arabic and Islamic Knowledge, a branch of the Riyadh-based Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University) in Jakarta in 1980, an increase in scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia through the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), an influx of Saudi-trained scholars, and a crisis in Islamic authority linked to political repression by Suharto’s New Order. Indeed, for many young Muslims who, through rapid urbanization and access to educational facilities, neither identified with the belief system (Islamic or otherwise) of their parents’ generation nor the official Pan-casila ideology of the state, Islam provided an ideational reference point through which one could embody a modern identity. This process not only led to a form of religiosity that Fealy (2008, p. 15) believed penetrated further into social, cultural, and political life than ever before, but also an influx of scholastic works linked to ‘global’ movements including – but not exclusive to – Salafism.

Prior to continuing, it is important to point out that the emphasis on the Hejaz and Middle East more broadly – a key part of Salafi discourse – is not new to Indonesian Islam. Indeed, the requirement of every able Muslim to undergo the Hajj points to the importance of the region for the religion as a whole. For Muslims in Southeast Asia, moreover, the Hejaz has constituted a marked source of scholarly work and religious legitimacy, with people, resources, and ideas continuously flowing from one to the other (see, for example, the collection edited by Tagliazucco, 2009). Ahmad Dahlan and KH Hasyim Asy’ari, the founders of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, respectively, both studied in Mecca. It was also in Mecca that the Sumatran scholar Ahmad Khatib became the Great Imam of the Shafi’i madhab at the Haram mosque in 1876 and taught many would-be reformist Southeast Asian Muslims – who would later become pivotal actors within the anti-colonial religious movement in the Dutch East Indies (Djamal, 1998). In this light, the Hejaz was not only a source of spiritual and intellectual inspiration, but was also entwined with a variety of religious reform movements within the Southeast Asian archipelago.

Yet, for many Indonesian religious organizations, the twentieth century also witnessed a shift in importance away from the region and towards the archipelago itself. The creation of new religious organizations – most notably Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama – alongside the emergence of an Indonesian nationalist project, shifted the political and religious focus to one concerned primarily with defining the position of ‘Islam’ within the new nation state (for example, see Effendy, 2003). Notably, this also occurred at a time when the Saudi kingdom was consolidating its rule and promoting the religious principles of the aimat al-Da’wa al-najdiyya, whose social conservative and puritanical pretenses were at odds with the theology and/...
or social concerns of Indonesia’s religious organizations. Indeed, although Abdulaziz ibn Saud held a pan-Islamic conference in Mecca in 1926 in order to confer some ‘global’ legitimacy to his rule of the Hejaz, this was of little significance to Islamic mobilization during 1920s Indonesia – despite the fact that Nahdlatul Ulama had to an extent been created to provide representation to ‘traditional’ Islamic scholars at this very conference.

The emergence of Salafi thought in 1980s Indonesia, which re-engaged with the imaginary potential of the Hejaz and a ‘global umma’, correlated with a crisis of legitimacy within established religious organizations whose need to align with New Order policy and Indonesia-centric focus appealed little to a generation looking for a ‘pure and universal’ Islam. Wahdah Islamiyah – whose Yogyakarta branch forms part of this case study – provides a case in point as it emerged from university students in Makassar who were traditionally aligned to Muhammadiyah. Breaking away from Muhammadiyah in 1984 after the organization was forced to adopt Pancasila as its founding principle, these students established their own foundation (Jurdi, 2007, 2012; Nisa, 2012). Benefiting from LIPIA scholarships and funding links to Saudi institutions and donors (facilitated through old Muhammadiyah and DDII contacts), these students were able to study abroad as well as set up a propagation program that disseminated Salafi texts amongst university and high school students before finally establishing the Wahdah Islamiyah community organization (organisasi masyarakat/ormas) in 2002. It is more politically nuanced than most Salafi foundations (as it has an agreement with the Indonesian Department of Social Affairs to provide social welfare to remote areas in parts of Indonesia) and also, unlike the majority of Salafi bodies, has a national structure with an extensive caderization system and approximately 70 branches across Indonesia.

In Yogyakarta – the primary geographical focus of my fieldwork – it was the activities of Abu Nida (full name Chamsaha Sofwan) that provided a foundational foothold for Salafi thought. Born in East Java and educated at the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh, he arrived in the city in 1985 and, through the assistance of the DDII, began to lecture to students at Gadjah Madah University (UGM). Becoming popular among students, these lectures quickly expanded to the campuses of the School of Middle Technology and Yogyakarta State University. Yet, during the 1990s, when Suharto’s administration enacted a policy of rapprochement to non-political forms of Islamic organization that Salafis embedded themselves permanently within the locality. In 1992, Abu Nida invited several scholars including Jafar Umar Thalib, Muhammad As-Sewed, and Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas to join him and together they established a mosque in Degolan, Sleman (northern Yogyakarta, Central Java). This was to become a Euclidean point for religious learning, although no sooner had Salafism imbibed itself within Yogyakarta than a rift among its adherents emerged. Jafar Umar Thalib, a charismatic preacher who had spent time in Yemen, became highly critical of several of his cohorts including Abu Nida, believing their cooperation with non-Salafi student groups and donors (such as DDII) was contrary to the ‘purity’ of the movement. In the course of the 1990s, these strains became increasingly intractable, dividing the movement to this day (Hasan, 2006; International Crisis Group [ICG], 2004). Jafar’s brand of Salafism, and its rise to national prominence after the fall of Suharto, has received much attention by regional and international
social scientists (Hasan, 2006; ICG, 2004; Wahid, 2006). Indeed, Hasan (2006) has expertly documented the way Jafar Umar Thalib mobilized his followers into the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama`ah and Laskar Jihad, who then partook in sectarian violence in Maluku. Yet, a topic that has been less frequently visited is the expansion of the opposing strand of Salafism represented by Abu Nida and his Majelis At-Turots al-`Islamy as well as that of Wahdah Islamiyah (notable exceptions are ICG, 2004; Jurdi, 2004, 2007; Nisa, 2012a, 2012b). Indeed, similar to Jafar, Abu Nida’s At-Turots underwent efflorescence during the 1990s, opening several educational institutes, such as the Ma’had Jamilurrrahman As-Salafi and building a ‘Salafi’ village in Wirokerten, Yogyakarta (of which the Ma’had Jamilurrrahman As-Salafi is the centerpiece). Unlike Jafar, however, the At-Turots maintained strong financial links to the Arabian Peninsula and, after the fall of Suharto, was able to utilize these not to mobilize politically but to focus on propagation. The group has grown dramatically, establishing the pesantren Islamic Centre Bin Baz (ICBB), a hospital, medical training facility, several housing complexes, a radio station as well as an expansive propagation program that its adherents claim stretches all the way to Sorong, West Papua (anonymous informant, personal communication, Jakarta, 6 July 2011 & Yogyakarta, 13 November 2011).

The ICBB – which consists of a kindergarten, primary and high school and includes students from Malaysia, Timor-Leste, and Australia – has become a nodal point not only for At-Turots, but also for a wider network of Salafi actors within the city. Activists linked to the ICBB have played a pivotal part in establishing and assisting in the creation of other Salafi foundations, including the Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary (YPIA). Although it became an official foundation in 2007, YPIA’s roots lie in kajian organized by and for students at UGM in 2000. Notably, this was an era of increased Islamic mobilization and anxiety (Sidel, 2006), marked by the rise not only of new Islamic political parties, but also increasing ‘sectarian’ conflicts in Maluku, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (especially Poso). For many of the initial participants of these sessions, a ‘pure’ or ‘non-political’ Islam not privy to the mass Islamic political mobilization, formation of religious political parties, and sectarian conflicts was an important part of the appeal of this strand of Salafism. Consequently, YPIA grew into a more organized body that offers structured Islamic classes, provides boarding and accommodation, runs a radio station and several websites, and produces several weekly bulletins it disperses throughout the city. By 2006, Wahdah Islamiyah also made inroads into Yogyakarta after participating in a Salafi conference concerning the evils of Shi’ism. Quickly gaining a following among the city’s students, it was not long before an official branch office was opened and Wahdah Islamiyah initiated an Arabic language course, an after hours educational program for adults, a student hall, and a coordinated lecture program. It also aligned itself with several Salafi preachers linked to the Pesantren Al-Madinah Nusantara (established in 2001). The school, founded by Ridwan Hamidi, trains Da’i (preachers) who then preach throughout rural Java and has become a pivotal part in the Wahdah Islamiyah rubric.

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3 Given the political sensitivities revolving around the concept of Salafism, I have kept all interviewees anonymous to reduce any intended risk towards them as well as, from a methodological standpoint, to remain true to a ‘do no harm’ research framework.
EDUCATIONAL AND FINANCIAL NETWORKS

The Salafi groups briefly described above are independent from each other despite scholars frequently moving between different foundations and occasionally working together. They exemplify the loose and multiple ways through which Salafism has entered the religious landscape and the multivariate ways through which it can be ‘enacted’ in Indonesian society. Yet, these activists share a commonality in the way they utilize Saudi Arabia within their discourse and propagation. It is also important to note that despite the ‘imaginary’ power the kingdom has in Salafi discourse, such networks share real funding and scholastic linkages. Indeed, while Salafis linked to Jafar Umar Thalib (who believe themselves to be ‘purists’) refuse ‘organized’ funding streams, the donor bodies of Jam’iyah Ihya’ At-Turats Al-Islami (Kuwait) and Jam’iyah Darul Birr have provided support for Abu Nida’s At-Turots as well as Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar (Mujahid, 2012). Several of these Indonesian foundations have become adept at soliciting donations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to build religious facilities. For example, Wahdah Islamiyah recently opened a new office and mosque complex in Yogyakarta through the financial assistance of a private donor in Kuwait while At-Turots received a donation towards its ICBB from the Saudi embassy in early 2013 after the ambassador visited the foundation.

These linkages extend to a variety of educational institutions including the LIPIA in Jakarta as well as facilities in Yemen or Saudi Arabia. The most predominant of these is the Islamic University of Madinah, Wahdah Islamiyah claims almost 60 of its members have studied there (anonymous informant, Wahdah Islamiyah, personal communication, 17 December 2011) while several ustadz (preacher) working with At-Turots and YPIA have also attended the university. The Islamic University of Madinah also plays a more intimate role; it offers accreditation for religious schools that meet a certain standard of religious learning. In Yogyakarta and Central Java these include ICBB, but also the Pesantren Iman Bukhari in Solo and Pesantren Islam Al-Irsyad in Salatiga. Accreditation is not merely a ‘rubber stamp’ legitimizing the Salafi credentials of a school, but consists of a thorough examination of the curriculum and facilities in order to ensure a certain degree of competency (many Salafi schools have not reached this level). Receiving accreditation is an issue of pride that holds resonance not only amongst Salafis, but also very often within wider educational circles.

Quantitatively, however, the number of persons able to study in Saudi Arabia remains small and so for those wishing to continue their religious studies but unable to go abroad, the online Al-Madinah International University (MEDIU) provides a ‘virtual’ alternative. Originally founded in Madinah in 2004, the university has been relocated to Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia and received official accreditation from the Malaysian government in 2007. At present, MEDIU provides a variety of degrees up to doctoral level in both Arabic and English through online classes and test centers located across the globe. Accreditation by the Malaysian government may create the impression that MEDIU is part of some wider ‘global’ phenomenon, but this is far from the case. Saudi shareholders and academics remain both in financial and managerial control as all seven shareholders and five of the seven board members originate from the kingdom. Nevertheless, for Salafis throughout Yogyakarta, the institution provides an important ‘virtual’ place of study.
The facilitation of links with Saudi Arabia is further assisted through Indonesians physically located in Saudi Arabia. It is not uncommon for Indonesian religious students to organize Islamic talks for their fellow co-patriots in the kingdom. One informant provides an interesting example here. Fluent in English, he used to work in the tourism industry, living in Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia as well as working at the Hyatt hotel in Jeddah. While in Jeddah, he was invited to Islamic lectures held by Indonesians (as he spoke little Arabic). It was here that he slowly began to reassess his life and ‘chose’ Salafism. Moreover, through the Indonesian Salafi magazine As-Sunnah – which is available in Saudi Arabia – he was able to find an advertisement for a religious training program in Solo (anonymous informant, personal communication, Solo, 4 April 2012). He provides an interesting example of reversion outside of – but linked to – Indonesia, something catalyzed by Indonesian religious students based in Saudi Arabia who can provide such classes for their compatriots.4

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE RELIGIOUS IDEAL

The abovementioned linkages between Saudi Arabian religious institutions and religious actors in Indonesia, maintained through personal, professional, and even virtual ties, are thus integral in augmenting the importance of the Arabian Peninsula among Indonesian Muslims interested in the movement. Not only do they increase the resonance of Salafi claims to represent an Islam in line with the practices of Islam’s most holy places but also, logistically, they increase access to funding and private donations from abroad. Yet, such connections are reified through the dissemination of Salafi scholastic works. Publishing houses frequently translate and distribute the works of Muhammad Bin Abd’ al-Wahhab, Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Abd al’ Aziz Bin Baz, Muhammad al-Uthayim, ‘Abd Allah bin Jibrin, and Salih al-Fawzan. Initially, these translations were circulated by the LIPIA, although it has now spread to an insurmountable number of publishers scattered across the archipelago. The International Crisis Group has listed 24 prominent publishers, although the number is a lot higher when one takes smaller operations into account (ICG, 2004). For example, At-Turots, YPIA, and Wahdah Islamiyah all publish major works by Saudi scholars despite the sometimes small scope of their operations. These works, distributed through a network of religious bookstores and fairs as well as outside of mosque complexes, are an important part of any course or syllabus. YPIA, for example, runs several structured courses for students that include the work of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Abd al’ Aziz Bin Baz, and Muhammad al-Uthayim (Lembaga Bimbingan Islam al-Atsary, 2006).

The distribution of the works of Arabian-based ulama also provides insight into the modes through which Salafi Islamic authority is constructed in Indonesia. With few notable exceptions (like Wahdah Islamiyah), Indonesian Salafi scholars do not

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4 I refer to one becoming Salafi as ‘reversion’ rather than ‘conversion’ on two accounts. Firstly, it refers to the fact that, while perhaps lax in the observance of religious principles, this informant acknowledged he was born a Muslim. Secondly, Salafi propagation differentiates between bringing lax Muslims back to the fold and getting non-Muslims to convert (mualaf). They emphasize different points in their da’wa depending on one’s religious affiliation. More so, those who are already considered Muslims do not undergo any official ‘conversion’ ceremony or the need to officially declare Islam their religion, unlike those who mualaf.
issue *fatwa* (religious judgments) of their own, but rather refer to the works, rulings, and *fatwa* of their Arabian-based cohorts. Consequently, Indonesian scholars often spend much time learning not only the Qur’an and hadith, but also cross-referencing *fatwa* by the abovementioned ulama in order to find adequate answers to the concerns of their constituents. For example, in the magazine *As-Sunnah* No. 7 XV November 2011, a woman writes to the editor to ask whether it was permissible to get dental braces in order to correct her teeth. The unnamed *ustadz*, who replied on behalf of the magazine stated that, according to a similar question asked to al-Fawzan (and recorded in a collection of his *fatwa al-Muntaqa min Fatawa Syaikh Shalih al-Fauzan*), this is permissible as long as one’s teeth are abnormal and such dental surgery is not done to ‘beautify’ oneself (‘Hukum Merapikan’, 2011). A reader who asked whether one is allowed to eat crocodile meat provides a further example. In this case, the *ustadz* replied that, according to a *fatwa* given by the Saudi Permanent Committee for Research and Fatwa (*Fatwa* No. 5394) and signed by Bin Baz, eating crocodile meat is permitted (‘Hukum Makan’, 2012). Indeed, out of the 10 issues of *As-Sunnah* published between October 2011 and September 2012, there were 44 questions printed, 29 of which were answered by direct reference to Saudi Arabian shaykhs, most predominantly Bin Baz, Al-Abani, al-Uthayim, and al-Fawzan.

The use of Middle Eastern scholars is not extraordinary for Indonesian Muslims in itself. Yet, contemporary Salafism differs from the majority of Indonesian scholars as it also refers to specific twentieth century shaykhs who lived within the era of the modern Saudi state. Moreover, the heavy reliance on the rulings of Arabian ulama has led to a division of roles between these Salafi scholars and their Indonesian contemporaries, whose primary task seems to be transplanting and framing such teachings within the archipelago. By relinquishing a responsibility to directly issue *fatwa* or deal directly with the issues of constituents without foreign references, Indonesian scholars are not ‘shirking their duties’ but rather reifying a discursive position at the heart of the movement. Indeed, one of the notable appeals of Salafism is a unique clarity as to where one can find and access religious works dealing with all sorts of issues (as the question concerning the consumption of crocodile meat above attests to). Indonesian scholars play a primary part in transplanting religious concepts into Indonesian contexts and social environments, both by socializing the rulings of ulama (often in very intricate ways) and underlining their relevance (and meaning) to Indonesians as Muslims.

Importantly, this moves beyond the purely religious and taps into wider issues of what a modern and progressive society should look like. Saudi Arabia, not limited to a center of religious learning, also becomes part of a ‘deeper’ religious imaginary, providing pertinent examples of correct social practice Indonesia could learn from. Contrasting Indonesia with Saudi Arabia, Salafi preachers frequently lament the ‘backwardness’ and ‘social corruption’ of the former in comparison to the piety, social advancement, and modernism (all linked together) of the latter. While not explicitly referencing any civilizational dialectic (for example, the ‘West’ vs. ‘Islam’), the use of Saudi Arabia builds an alternative idea of Islamic modernity that contains the advances of ‘Western’ sciences without any of their apparent social or moral decay. Indeed, Saudi Arabia, with its alleged religious observance and apparent economic wealth, represents a social model they believe Indonesian society can emulate in or-
der to enact a ‘progressive’ future still in line with the principles of an Islamic past.

One pivotal example in this regard is offered when examining the issue of Islamic terrorism, something Salafis show a particular sensitivity to given accusations that they are synonymous with terrorism (for example, see Idahram, 2011). Tackling the issue head-on, one article written by Ustadz Anas Burhanuddin describes the severity of rebelling against the state and the chaos it has caused in Indonesia. While the state has done much to curb it, terrorism is a political issue that, he argues, can only be addressed in a serious yet ‘Islamic’ manner. He thus elaborates that Saudi Arabia provides a useful insight that could be implemented within Indonesia to combat Jama’ah Islamiyah and religious violence more generally. Going into minute detail, he outlines how the kingdom combated threats of terrorism in 2003–2004 through a media campaign, which included Friday sermons and religious lectures as well as providing religious knowledge to those involved in anti-terror actions so they did not circumvent Islamic ideals. When extremists were captured, Islamic scholars were dispatched to run de-radicalization classes and bring them back to the ‘true’ way of Islam, a technique Burhanuddin writes was successful given the rapid fall in terrorism. He thus concludes that this example is not only useful for Muslim states like Indonesia, but those of kafir (non-Muslim) nations too. As he states, “what has already brought results in practice for Saudi Arabia will, Insya Allah, also produce results for Indonesia” (Burhanuddin, 2011, p. 41).

A further example is evident in an article written by ustadz Erwandi Tarmizi concerning corruption in Indonesia and how to deal with such cases according to Islamic law. Corruption is an extremely pertinent issue within the Indonesian public sphere. Tarmizi approaches the topic from a religious disposition analyzing where corruption would stand in relation to Saudi Arabia’s fatwa committee. He refers to rulings by the fatwa committee in order to assess whether corruption could be classified as theft and so subject to the hudud that allows one’s hand to be cut off. After careful consideration, however, he concludes that corruption and theft differ and so, under Islamic law, there would be no grounds to implement hudud against corrupt persons. His reasoning follows the line that, as Indonesia has a functioning and legitimate government, one must respect the laws in place. Tarmizi’s article provides an interesting example of how an Indonesian contemporary issue is viewed by referencing Saudi Arabian shaykhs. While he concludes that cutting of one’s hand or caning is not allowed in this case, he does not rule them out as legitimate punishments (Tarmizi, 2012). Furthermore, his final argument that one must respect the decision of the Indonesian government is somewhat representative of the political quietist approach taken by Salafis not aligned with Jafar Umar Thalib immediately after the fall of Suharto. This position is remarkably similar to the political line espoused by contemporary Salafis in relation to Saudi authority.

The two examples underline how Saudi Arabia is more than a base for learned scholars and networks; the country itself provides an evident example as how to best implement Islamic law in relation to topical concerns. The imaginary potential goes much deeper, however, as it also provides an example of modern society that Salafis refer to in order to build a bridge between the ‘evils’ of contemporary Indonesian society and the idealized Islamic society of the Salaf al-Salih. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the public kajian given by ustadz within Yogyakarta. These
speak, many of whom have studied in the Arabian Peninsula, frequently refer to the region in order to emphasize what Indonesians should aspire to. In a process that perhaps 'thickens' how an Islamic ideal would be actualized, such preachers have become adept at utilizing Saudi Arabia as a resource to emphasize their message.

Ridwan Hamidi, a Wahdah Islamiyah preacher, offers a case in point. Holding weekly kajian at UGM's campus mosque, Ridwan lectures on Qur’anic and hadith studies over the course of 1 and a half hours. Attended by roughly 100 participants, these sessions offer intense lectures of Islamic knowledge and its application/use in everyday life. Ridwan, who completed his Bachelor's degree at the Islamic University of Madinah’s Dakwah and Ushul ad Din faculty (1998) before receiving his Masters in Fiqih and Ushul Fiqih at the Muhammadiyah University Surakarta, is currently completing a further Master's in Fiqih Sunnah at the Medina International University (MEDIU) while teaching at the technical-electrical department at UGM. His experience in Saudi Arabia has given him a unique resource that he utilizes within kajian at the campus mosque in order to emphasize the seriousness of Qur’anic studies and what they could mean in socio-political terms. For example, he once lamented that many Indonesian ulama did not have sufficient Islamic knowledge nor set a good example, comparing them to people who had a good motorbike but could not ride it properly. He contrasted this to Bin Baz who, despite his prestige, was always humble and replied to every individual who wrote to him. In fact, he continued, his experience in Saudi Arabia was exemplary in highlighting ideal religious morals. Mosque attendance was 'luar biasa' (out of the ordinary) as they were always full. He compared this to Indonesia, where many people avoided attending the mosque and there was a lack of morality among Indonesian women. His style, while talking of this experience and concern, was one of lament and reflection, urging his audience to learn from Saudi Arabia and, if possible, to visit it for study.

Ridwan was not unique in this instance but utilized a common tool through which preachers actualized an idealized world by referencing Saudi Arabia. Abu Muslim, who gives a weekly kajian at UGM's medical studies faculty, provides a further example. Having studied in Yemen and visited Saudi Arabia several times over the course of four years, Abu Muslim currently teaches at the ICBB while also conducting campus kajian in conjunction with YPIA. His lectures at the medical faculty are, compared to Ridwan’s classes, aimed at a smaller audience (approximately 12 males and an unknown number of females) and cover more basic and foundational issues of Islamic learning. The main string of argumentation throughout these lectures consisted of the need for Islamic learning and introspection in order to save oneself from eternal damnation and the immorality prevalent in (Indonesian) society. Indeed, when the wider student community was involved in demonstrations against a planned government fuel hike, he argued that such worldly concerns only help cause friction among the umma.

He further elaborated (on several occasions) that the Indonesian campus, while an integral place of learning, was also one of corruption that through the mixing of the sexes caused zinah (illegitimate relationships) and desires that distract men (and women, presumably) from not only their studies but from religious duty. This in turn allegedly contributed to a wider breakdown of society. In Saudi Arabia, however, people took time to respect religion and, as such, society lived by a higher standard.
of morals. On one account, he recollected a personal experience where after Friday prayers he was invited back to the homes of strangers to eat together. This, he lamented, could never happen in Indonesia, not only because society was riddled with selfishness but also because Friday, a day that should be reserved for Muslim prayer, was a workday. He continued that, with the exception of several schools in Indonesia such as ICBB, people abided by a work calendar linked to Christian worship, an issue made all the worse as people were ignorant of this fact. What was needed, in Abu Muslim's opinion, was greater emphasis on religious learning and social codes, and Saudi Arabia and Yemen provided not only a feasible model to follow but also emphasized the positive social results this would create.

**TRANSPLANTING THE LAND OF THE TWO HOLY MOSQUES**

The use of Saudi Arabia in such instances offers an insightful example into the methods of recomposing, transplanting, and, more specifically, ‘frame bridging’ exemplified in social movement theories. The concept of framing offers a cognitive tool for interpreting experience and how a certain ideological position can receive meaning. Actors produce, arrange, and disseminate a particular ideological bearing in order to achieve a certain amount of resonance among constituents (Benford, Rochford, Snow, & Worden, 1986). At its most basic level, it represents the art of communicating in specific ways, selecting issues and symbols that are of concern to those one wishes to reach. For example, Wiktorowicz (2004), in his study of intra-movement framing contests between Salafi jihadist and non-jihadist groups, highlights how different factions within a movement can compete for legitimacy through specific techniques, as well as how popular intellectuals contextualize such framing for followers. By emphasizing the perceived knowledge, character, and logic of its message, a movement attempts to assert its authority and resonate its message among potential constituents.

In our case, the frame shifts between the global and the local 'scale', in a way where globally available resources take on local meaning. Framing in such an instance is complex as the movement both consumes existing cultural materials but also produces new ones influenced by global resources and networks. To offer a global frame, these movements need to internalize global symbols for domestic use and diffuse modes of contention from the global to the local and back (Tarrow, 2005). Yet, this is far from straightforward, but must contain a degree of adaptation, institutionalization, and representation dependent on the given locale. Ideas and concepts must travel and undergo a process of transplantation, adapting to new contexts and facing challenges different from an idea's point of origin (Bonnefoy, 2011; Said, 1983). In relation to our enquiry, Ridwan and Abu Muslim act as mediums bridging Indonesian social issues and a religious ideal through the credibility of their own experiences in Saudi Arabia. This moves beyond religious references, but also includes many 'contemporary' allusions of a modern and pious (Saudi) society. In doing so, they aim to move beyond religion as a scholastic and scriptural pursuit to one that becomes a living dialogical discourse concerned with all matters of life and society.

In this regard, a focus on contemporary concerns or on the suggestions to follow Saudi models against terrorism or corruption can play an important part in form-
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imagining the religious ideal Salafis strive for. I would go even further to say that through such references we can see the modes by which Salafis attempt to recreate an ideal society based on the first generations of Muslims. It is pivotal to the Salafi imaginary in terms of balancing an idealized and selective account of an Islamic past with a modern present and future. For several constituents, it provides solutions to social concerns, highlighting how following Islamic scripture can enact an apparently just and fair society. Thus, it is not uncommon for Salafis – even those who have not been to Saudi Arabia – to praise the kingdom as an ideal society. For example, one interviewee who had never been to Saudi Arabia stated that the kingdom was an example all Muslims should follow as well as a bastion of stability within a region that had become unstable due to events in Syria and wider ‘Shi’a’ subversion. When asked how this compared to Indonesia, the interviewee replied that Indonesia certainly was not a pious society but nevertheless it had potential, as Muslims were free to practice as they wished (anonymous informant, personal communication, Yogyakarta, 28 February 2012). In such instances, the Land of Two Holy Mosques is used as an implicit socio-political example of how governmental decisions should be made and relate to religion. Salafis highlight their political quietist position, stating the need to respect and follow a legitimately based government and so criticize Hizbut Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood over their concerns with political power (Arif Fathul Ulum bin Ahmad Saifullah, 2011). Yet, despite remaining explicitly apolitical, the utilization of Saudi Arabia or Saudi-based scholars in order to assess Indonesian policy does imply a political stance, where all decisions must be filtered through the works of religious scholars in order to judge their legitimacy.

However, concepts and imaginaries remain just that. They may offer examples and suggestions, but do little in the way of stating exactly how such programs could be implemented or enacted within Indonesia (besides through an increase in piety). The use of Saudi Arabia, consequently, fails to move beyond complementing the normative set of values they set out to enact in the first instance. Moreover, their imaginary element not only lies in their suggestive nature of how Indonesian society should act, but also in the fact that they rarely move beyond an idealization of Saudi society and entwine with the socio-political realities and religious complexities of the kingdom. For example, little mention is made of the plight of Indonesian and foreign workers in the kingdom, nor of a series of diplomatic spats throughout 2011 and 2012 concerning the beheading of an Indonesian woman that led to protests outside the Saudi embassy in July 2011 and a government embargo on sending maids to Saudi Arabia. Underlining their detachment from these issues, Salafis remained quiet, even actively ignoring such issues when brought up. The same interviewee mentioned above, when asked about his opinion concerning this controversy (as it was in the news), became dismissive, stressing how hotheaded Indonesians could be and then quickly ended the conversation (anonymous informant, personal communication, Yogyakarta, 28 February 2012).

The ability of such imaginaries to move beyond the normative is further inhibited by the fact that actors do not exist in a religious vacuum, but have to contend with a variety of religious agents, both old and new. Salafism, far from being either a decontextualized movement or form of ‘Saudization’ is, borrowing Hepp’s (2009) use of the term, translocal. As Hepp argues – and I have attempted to emphasize through the
idea of framing and transplantation – the local remains important, as it is the place where the availability of global resources is reflected in the form of locally appropriated cultural codes and meaning. Localities do not dissolve but provide a reference point for ongoing globalization processes, highlighting the increasing connectivity between different spaces all over the world (Hepp, 2004 in Hecker, 2010, pp. 325–339). What Salafism thus represents is the recomposition of religious resources that disarmed themselves from any singular territory before recombining within the localities of Indonesia through the work of grounded actors. The imaginary element of Saudi Arabia is thus part of the global resource utilized by activists in order to frame a contemporary problem and social issues and a ‘perfect’ Islamic society of the past.

While I believe this implies that actors gear many of their activities towards the local, this does not render the ‘imaginary of Saudi society’ as irrelevant or merely contradictory. I believe the use of such examples attests to a method of embedding a set of values based on transcendental salvation within the temporal and geographic landscape in which agents work. References to Islam’s geographical heartland, and the institutions of study and religion within them, provide Salafism with a degree of legitimacy in their claim to represent ‘correct tradition’. It is part of a meshing of Salafi networks, actors, texts, and other non-Salafi forces that sustain the ideals of ‘piety’ in a variety of different contextual settings. In Indonesia, its agents thus put forward the idea of a modern religious society at odds with the ‘moral decay’ and ‘backwardness’ of Indonesia. Yet, this ideal itself is (and has to be) continually disrupted given that it is refracted through the local – responding to concerns of potential followers, opponents, with wider forces of public opinion and governance – to a point where the imaginary ideal can never be fully actualized. Saudi Arabia, or the idealized image of it, rather plays the part of a utopic goal, an aspiration (if only everyone followed religion properly) that is never realistically attainable. This perhaps mirrors Derrida’s (2006) affirmation of a group’s need for an “unpredictable future to come” where, despite knowing what an idealized future may hold or what the blue print for it should be, exactly when and where it can be established in the “here and now” remains an uncertain aspiration. Indeed, as Derrida states, “not only must one not renounce the emancipatory desire” but “it is necessary to insist on it more than ever” (p. 94).

The examples of a ‘perfect society’ built upon personal piety and social values – imagined through reference to Saudi Arabia in opposition to Indonesian social ills – forms part of this “emancipatory desire”, an image constantly insisted upon but never fully reachable. However, obtaining the goal is not the point. Rather, the utilization of Saudi Arabia as a worldly utopia provides an earthly face that pious individuals can strive towards. One should therefore not view the fact that there is no ‘decontextualized’ or perfect Salafism (based on an idealized Saudi example) as testament to its failure. The examples highlighted in this paper point to the useful reference and role Saudi Arabia plays in providing an imagined but ‘real’ solution to how piety should be enacted. Consequently, this gives Salafis a unique point upon which to build claims of legitimacy and underscore the temporal rewards for religious exactitude.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The relationship between Salafi religious discourse and the imagined ideal of the Arabian Peninsula provides an interesting case study of both socio-political imaginaries and contemporary religious movement. Representing a broad multi-layered social movement enriched through the lived experiences and debates of its agents, it is difficult to talk of one singular unifying Salafism. It has spread throughout the world, defined by its adherents as a search for religious ‘purity’. Yet, despite the multivariate ways it has been enacted and embodied, there is a high level of coherency in terms of drawing from similar scholars and institutions within the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, as is the case in Yogyakarta, the kingdom is more than an institutional heartland; it becomes an imagined ideal through which socio-political solutions and a picture of a perfect religious community are described. Juxtaposed against the ‘social ills’ of Indonesian society, such as corruption and terrorism, it forms a pivotal resource through which preachers stress the importance and benefits of correct religious behavior. However, while Saudi Arabia may give such Salafi imaginary values a nuance of physical resonance, these same imaginaries often ignore the complexities of the Saudi religious field or political developments within the kingdom. Yet, providing an accurate account of Saudi Arabia is not the point. Rather, it remains an image utilized as a resource not only to ‘thicken’ descriptions as to what an embodied piety would mean socially, but also to provide Salafi discourse with a greater degree of proximity to Islam’s holy sites. It thus becomes a desire, constantly insisted upon if impossible to enact.

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