ASEAS 1 (2),2008

Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies

Im Fokus - In Focus

(Un-)Gleichheiten in Südostasien
(In-)Equalities in South-East Asia

Zum Zitieren von Beiträgen aus dieser Zeitschrift verwenden Sie bitte eine der beiden Möglichkeiten:
For citing from this journal please use one of the below depicted options:

Autor: Titel, ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften, 1 (2), 2008
Author: Title, ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

Herausgeber / Publisher
SEAS Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften / Society for South-East Asian Studies
Vereinsstiege 4/14, 1090 Wien, Austria
ZVR Zahl 786121796
www.SEAS.at

Chefredakteur / Editor-in-chief
Alfred Gerstl

Redaktion / Editing Board
Christian Bothe, Julia Girardi, Belinda Helmke, Erwin Schweitzer, Christian Wawrinec

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat / Scientific Advisory Board
Karl Husa, Harold R. Kerbo, Rüdiger Korff, Susanne Schröter

Redaktionsanschrift / Editorial Office Address
ASEAS, Vereinsstiege 4/14, 1090 Wien, Austria
aseas@seas.at

Titelfoto / Cover Photo
Susilo Waluyo

Layout
Christian Bothe

ISSN 1999-2521 (Print), ISSN 1999-253X (Online)

Wien / Vienna 2008

Inhalt / Contents

Inhalt / Contents

Inhalt / Contents

Editorial

Belinda Helmke & Alfred Gerstl

ASEAS Redaktion / ASEAS Editorial Board

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

*Willkommen zur zweiten Ausgabe der **Österreichischen Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften**. Die Mehrheit der Beiträge in dieser Veröffentlichung sind das direkte Resultat der dritten alljährlichen Konferenz „(In)Equalities in South-East Asia" der Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften (SEAS). Die Präsentationen, die anlässlich dieser Tagung im Juni 2008 in Wien gehalten wurden, decken ein weites Spektrum an Themen und Ländern in der Region ab. Die Konferenz demonstrierte, dass der beherrschende Schwerpunkt in Südostasien weiterhin auf internen Angelegenheiten, wie wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, politischen und kulturellen*

*Welcome to the second issue of the **Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies**. The majority of contributions in this publication have resulted directly from the third annual conference of the Society for South-East Asian Studies (SEAS), entitled "(In)Equalities in South-East Asia". The presentations at this meeting in June 2008 in Vienna covered a wide spectrum of themes and countries in the region. The conference demonstrated that the dominant focus in South-East Asia remains on internal issues, such as economic, social, political, and cultural challenges. In addition, it also illustrated the need for transnational cooperation in different political spheres.*

Herausforderungen, ruht. Zudem wurde der Bedarf für transnationale Kooperation in den verschiedenen politischen Bereichen aufgezeigt.

Die gegenwärtig größte Herausforderung für die Länder Südostasiens liegt in der globalen Wirtschaftskrise und ihren potenziellen politischen und sozialen Auswirkungen. Das wirtschaftliche Desaster, welches im Herbst 2008 auftrat, zwingt regionale Organisationen weltweit dazu, ihre Politik in Bezug auf Handel, Bank-, Währungs- und Kreditwesen zu überdenken. In Südostasien ist die Idee einer regionalen Währungsunion, inklusive einer Zentralbank und eines Fonds zur Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskrise, vorgelegt worden. Die ASEAN-Mitgliedstaaten können sich nur allzu gut an die Ereignisse des letzten Jahrzehnts erinnern, als die Region schwer von der asiatischen Finanzkrise betroffen war.

Die momentane Krise zeigt, dass selbst wohlhabende Staaten nicht unbedingt immun sind gegen den groß angelegten wirtschaftlichen Kollaps. Rolf Jordan untersucht in seinem Artikel, wie Armut und steigende soziale Disparität selbst den wohlhabenden Stadtstaat Singapur betroffen haben. Ein fehlendes soziales Sicherheitsnetz in Form eines Sozialversicherungssystems ist immer problematisch, vor allem in Zeiten wirtschaftlicher Not. Soziale Ungleichheiten sind jedoch auch in anderen südostasiatischen Ländern ein Problem.

Currently, in South-East Asia the spotlight is on the recent core concern in the region: the global financial crisis and its potential political and social implications. The economic disaster which emerged in autumn 2008 is forcing regional organisations worldwide to rethink banking, trade, currency and credit policies. In South-East Asia the idea of a regional monetary union, including a central bank and a fund to counter the financial crisis, has been floated. ASEAN`s member states recall all too well the events of the previous decade when the region's economies were hit hard by the Asian financial crisis.

The current crisis shows that even wealthy states are not immune to large-scale economic meltdown. Rolf Jordan in his article examines how poverty and increasing social disparity have even affected the prosperous city-state of Singapore. A missing safety net in form of social security is always problematic, particularly in times of economic hardship. Social inequality, however, is also an important issue in other South-East Asian countries. The so-called urban revolution, including strong population growth and fast growing cities, has lead to numerous social problems.

Hannah von Bloh and Martin Noltze in their respective articles examine such social difficulties brought along by urbanisation in Vietnam. Von Bloh focuses on the inequality among local

Die sogenannte urbane Revolution mit ihrem starken Bevölkerungswachstum und schnellwachsenden Städten hat zu einer Vielzahl von sozialen Problemen geführt.

Sowohl Hannah von Bloh als auch Martin Noltze analysieren diese sozialen Herausforderungen am Beispiel der Urbanisierung in Vietnam. Von Bloh konzentriert sich auf die Ungleichheit zwischen lokalen AkteurInnen in den ländlichen Gebieten Vietnams. Sie argumentiert, dass kleine urbane Zentren gleichzeitig Entwicklung im ländlichen Hinterland fördern und die Ballungsgebiete entlasten und somit eine nachhaltige und gleichwertige Entwicklung fördern können. Noltze erforscht die Stellung von GastarbeiterInnen im Urbanisierungsprozess in Ho Chi Minh City. Er sieht die Förderung von alternativen Finanzierungsprogrammen für das Wohnungswesen als eine integrative Lösung für die Selbstermächtigung und Entwicklung der ländlichen EinwandererInnen in solch einer urbanen Gesellschaft. Beide Artikel zeigen, dass die Beteiligung „von unten" und intermediäre Institutionen Demokratie in dem nominell kommunistischem Vietnam fördern können.

Urbanisierung und Globalisierung stellen nicht nur große Herausforderungen für soziale Strukturen dar, sondern können auch grundlegende Änderungen für viele Arbeitsplätze mit sich bringen. Niklas Reese beleuchtet in seinem Beitrag das Phänomen

actors in the country's rural areas. She argues that small urban centres can simultaneously promote development in the rural hinterland and reduce the strain on urban centres, therefore enabling a more sustainable and equal development. Noltze examines the position of migrant workers in this urbanisation phenomenon, particularly with regard to Greater Ho Chi Minh City. He argues that the promotion of alternative housing finance schemes can be an integrative solution in supporting the empowerment and development of rural migrants in such an urban society. Both articles also demonstrate that grassroots participation and intermediary institutions can promote democracy in the nominally Communist Vietnam.

Urbanisation and globalisation have not only brought challenges to social structures but also tremendous change to many workplaces. Niklas Reese examines the phenomenon of transnational working places in form of international call centres in The Philippines. Employees in this industry work in line with North American time rather than their own, pulling them out of the social rhythm of their remaining society. Based on this case study Reese introduces the concept of a "glocalized intermediary class" and identifies the sense of citizenship which exists within the Philippine's globally exposed and connected middle class.

South-East Asia's potential for internal political unrest based on issues such as

des transnationalen Arbeitsplatzes am Beispiel internationaler Callcenter in den Philippinen. Die ArbeitnehmerInnen in dieser Dienstleistungsindustrie haben zeitlich synchron mit den USA zu arbeiten, was mitunter zur Folge hat, dass sie aus dem sozialen Rhythmus ihrer eigenen Gesellschaft gerissen werden. Basierend auf dieser Fallstudie führt Reese das Konzept einer „glocalized intermediary class" ein. Diesbezüglich zeigt er auf, welches Konzept von nationaler und gesellschaftlicher Zugehörigkeit sich Teile der philippinischen Mittelschicht schaffen, die über solche Arbeitsverhältnisse in internationale Kontexte und Kommunikationsstrukturen eingebunden sind.

Die Anfälligkeit Südostasiens für interne politische Unruhen aufgrund sozialer Ungleichheit, separatistischer Bestrebungen, fehlender staatlicher Autorität und politischer Machtkämpfe wird regelmäßig sichtbar, zuletzt in Thailand. Dennoch sind Sicherheit und Konflikt Themen, die von ASEAN oft gemieden werden. Eine Ausnahme stellt das ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) dar, dessen Gründung laut Alfred Gerstl nicht zuletzt als Reaktion auf Chinas wirtschaftlichen und politischen Aufstieg zu sehen ist. Laut Gerstl wird die Einbindung des weltweit bevölkerungsreichsten Landes in dieses Forum helfen, die existierende Ordnung in der Region zu stabilisieren. Die Bekräftigung mulitlateraler anstelle

social inequality, separatist aspirations, missing governmental authority and power struggles is regularly visible, most recently in Thailand. Yet, security and conflict are themes often avoided by ASEAN. An exception is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) whose creation was according to Alfred Gerstl not at least a reaction to China's economic and political rise. Gerstl argues that engaging the world's most populous country will help stabilize the existing order in the region. The endorsement of multilateralism, as opposed to unilateral approaches, is promoted as increasing the relative gains of all participants.

Despite of these important transnational issues, further contributions in this publication show that local concerns are of similar importance and cannot be neglected. Sebastian Koch, Heiko Faust and Jan Barkmann study local power structures and struggles regarding access to natural resources in Central Sulawesi (Indonesia). Also in Indonesia, Volker Gottowik examines the resurgence of religious activities and rituals in Bali, while Kristina Großmann analyses women activists in Aceh. All of the contributions in this issue show that in order to achieve stability, equality and prosperity throughout South-East Asia, the range of existing inequalities on a local, national and regional level must be addressed first.

Newly-created in this issue is our section

unilateraler Ansätze scheint zudem dem Nutzen aller teilnehmenden Staaten zu entsprechen.

Trotz all dieser wichtigen transnationalen Belange zeigen weitere Beiträgen in dieser Ausgabe, dass lokale Angelegenheiten oft ähnlich große Auswirkungen haben können wie nationale oder regionale Ereignisse und dementsprechend nicht vernachlässigt werden dürfen. Sebastian Koch, Heiko Faust und Jan Barkmann untersuchen die Regelung des Zugangs zu natürlichen Ressourcen in Zentralsulawesi (Indonesien) im Lichte lokaler Machstrukturen. Ebenfalls in Indonesien analysiert Volker Gottowik das Wiederaufleben religiöser Aktivitäten und Riten in Bali, während Kristina Großmann das Thema Frauenaktivistinnen in Aceh erforscht. Alle Beiträge in dieser Ausgabe zeigen, dass eine Vielzahl von existierenden Ungleichheiten auf der lokalen, nationalen und regionalen Ebene adressiert werden müssen, um Stabilität, Gleichheit und Wohlstand Südostasien-weit zu erzielen.

Neu in dieser Ausgabe ist unsere Rubrik „Forschungswerkstatt“, in der wir NachwuchswissenschafterInnen die Möglichkeit bieten, die Ergebnisse ihrer Diplomarbeit oder Dissertation einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit zu präsentieren. Am Beispiel des Konflikts in Aceh zeigt Robert Heiling die Grenzen wie Chancen externer Mediaton auf. Entscheidend für den Erfolg ist laut ihm, die Konfliktlösung

“Research Workshop”. Here we aim to offer young researchers the opportunity to present a broader public the results of their Master or Doctoral theses. Using the Aceh conflict as a case study, Robert Heiling shows the limits and chances of external mediation. According to him, it is crucial for the success to regard conflict resolution as stages of a process which must also include the concrete implementation. Bettina Volk describes her first hand experiences of social tensions between the small (Protestant) Dia’ang ethnicity and their neighbours in Pantar (Indonesia).

In the category “Forum South-East Asia”, Günter Spreitzhofer analyses the ambiguous effects of backpacking tourism in Khao San (Thailand). He points out how strongly “Lonely Planet” has changed its philosophy in the last 30 years - and how fundamentally this backpacker bible has changed Khao San.

Christian Wawrinec, one of our ASEAS editors, has interviewed the now Singapore-based sociologist Geoffrey Benjamin. Benjamin talks about his fieldwork in Malaysia in the early 1960s when he studied the Temiars. Not only anthropologists will find his stories about the (logistic) difficulties of his early fieldwork fascinating.

Unfortunately, our reviewers have to remain anonymous - yet not unthanked. Once again their contributions were tremendous. And as the authors will agree,

als mehrstufigen Prozess zu betrachten, der auch die konkrete Implementation beinhalten muss. Bettina Volk beschreibt dagegen ihre persönlichen Erfahrungen mit sozialen Spannungen zwischen der kleinen (protestantischen) Dia'ang-Ethnie und deren Nachbarn in Pantar (Indonesien).

In unserer Kategorie „Forum Südostasien" analysiert Günter Spreitzhofer den mehrdeutigen Effekt des Rucksacktourismus in Khao San (Thailand). Er zeigt auf, wie stark sich die „Lonely Planet"-Philosophie in den letzten 30 Jahren verändert hat - und wie fundamental diese Bibel des Rucksacktourismus im Gegenzug Khao San verwandelt hat.

Christian Wawrinec, einer unserer ASEAS-Redakteure, hat den nun in Singapur ansässigen Soziologen Geoffrey Benjamin interviewt. Benjamin spricht über seine Feldforschung in Malaysia während der frühen 1960er Jahre, in denen er bei den Temiars forschte. Seine Erinnerungen an die (logistischen) Schwierigkeiten früher Feldforschung werden nicht nur AnthropologInnen faszinieren.

the reviewer´s contributions resulted in an remarkable increase in quality regarding the first and final version of the submitted papers.

It is with great pleasure that we hereby can present the second issue of ASEAS.

Vienna, December 2008

Anonym müssen leider unsere RezensentInnen verbleiben - anonym, aber nicht unbedankt. Wieder einmal war ihre Mitwirkung ganz wesentlich: Wie die AutorInnen bestätigen werden, hat die Qualität der Endversionen der Beiträge dank des ausfuhrlichen Feedbacks stark zugenommen.

Mit großem Vergnügen dürfen wir hiermit die zweite ASEAS-Ausgabe präsentieren.

Wien, Dezember 2008

Small Towns as Interfaces for Interaction, Exchange and Transition in Vietnam

Hannah von Bloh[1]

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies II, University of Passau, Germany

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

Small towns present a critical link between urban systems and rural landscapes and are thus relevant for the understanding of regional development processes. In this context, an integrative analysis of the dynamics of interaction and negotiation on the local level and their correlation with higher-level structures and processes is insightful. The analysis draws on the concept of the social interface which is here applied to encounters between actors of various fields and levels within the arena of the small town. This approach is exemplified by an outline of processes of negotiation and mediation along political and economic interfaces in small Vietnamese towns. While the approach remains to be verified and elaborated in practice, it promises to provide a more complex and holistic view of current development trends.

Keywords: Small Towns, Vietnam, Regional Development, Social Interface, Urbanisation

Kleinstädte stellen eine entscheidende Verbindung zwischen städtischem und ländlichem Raum dar und sind somit wichtig für das Verständnis regionaler Entwicklungsprozesse. Hier verspricht eine integrative Analyse des Zusammenhangs zwischen lokalen Interaktions- und Verhandlungsprozessen und überregionalen Prozessen und Strukturen aufschlussreiche Einsichten. Die Analyse verwendet das Konzept der „gesellschaftliche Schnittstelle" (social interface) in Bezug auf Begegnungen zwischen Akteuren unterschiedlicher Bereiche und Ebenen innerhalb von Kleinstädten. Dieser Ansatz wird beispielhaft anhand von Interaktionsprozessen entlang politischer und ökonomischer Schnittstellen in vietnamesischen Kleinstädten skizziert. Dieser Ansatz bedarf noch einer Überprüfung und Ausarbeitung in der Praxis, verspricht aber eine komplexere und vollständigere Erfassung aktueller Entwicklungstrends.

Schagworte: Kleinstadt, Vietnam, Regionalentwicklung, Schnittstelle, Urbanisierung

1 Hannah von Bloh is research assistant and lecturer at the University of Passau. This article presents some initial thoughts from the author`s Ph.D. thesis.

Introduction: Small Towns, an Underrated Category of Regional Development

Current publications on global urban trends tend to emphasize an "invisible but momentous milestone" (UNFPA 2007: 1). This is namely the (now well-worn) fact that over 50 percent of the world population today lives in urban areas. A different fact, however, receives much less attention: the global urban trend is not restricted to the large metropolises. Today 52 percent of the urban population worldwide resides in urban centres of less than 50.000 inhabitants (UNFPA 2007: 9). Not only the size of the population living in such smaller urban centres indicates that their role is widely underestimated. The growth rate of these centres, too, suggests that there are dynamic processes on the local level which potentially have far-reaching consequences for regional development. Between the years 2000 and 2015, small and intermediate urban centres are expected to account for about half of the urban population growth (UNFPA 2007: 9). This population increase will be concentrated largely in low- and middle-income nations (Tacoli 2004: 2).

Small and intermediate urban centres are particularly important for regions undergoing rapid transformation. Due to their size and structure, such centres have the potential to deal with problems of urbanisation and development in a more flexible way than mega-cities. Given the necessary resources, they are, for example, more adjustable concerning territorial expansion, questions of decision-making, the usage of local resources and in using the advantages of their respective location to attract investment (UNFPA 2007: 10; Satterthwhaite & Hardoy 1986: 401).

While rural development projects require a longer time to have a visible impact on the living conditions of the target group, smaller urban centres are quick to take up impulses for development. Rapid urbanisation is then accompanied by accelerated economic growth and a change in lifestyle. Various new chances open up to the local population with regard to education, employment, health care etc. As increasingly important regional nodes of political, economic and social networks, the development of smaller urban centres in consequence has an impact on its rural hinterland. A focus of the discourse on smaller urban centres thus presents itself as a promising new approach for developmental policies.[2]

Small towns present a critical link between the progressively more interwoven rural and urban regions, engaging in regional and global flows of people, goods, finances and information (Hoang et al. 2005: 6). Secondary centres and their linkages are in consequence increasingly regarded as playing an important role for spatially even development, with the potential of making a substantial contribution to the creation of opportunities for poverty

2 This idea is present in recent publications of various institutions dealing with questions of development. See UNDP (2000), UNFPA (2007: 43), Pedersen (2003), Satterthwhaite & Tacoli (2003a), Tacoli (2004).

reduction, economic resilience and equal development (Douglass 2001: 5). By virtue of their intermediate position in the cities` system, the development of small towns can make these centres attractive alternative destinations for migrants, keeping them in their region and thus reducing pressure on larger urban centres. Small towns as a linkage between urban and rural worlds can promote the development in the rural hinterland by enhancing the integration of rural areas into the regional flow of resources. They play a crucial role in supplying their respective region with administrative, economic and social goods and services (Titus & Hinderink 1998: 212; Satterthwhaite & Hardoy 1986: 398). Small towns generate off-farm employment opportunities, on which an increasing number of rural households depend to secure their livelihood (Satterthwaite & Tacoli 2003b: 13). As a service centre for the rural hinterland, small towns also provide access to educational, health and administrative facilities which in turn allows for a more equal access to goods and services. In addition, small urban centres are politically relevant as nodes of exchange and encounter. They are places of decision-making, gathering of information and channels to voice local demands and interests. As small urban centres represent the local administrative level, they also play a key role in the processes of interaction and negotiation between the state and the people. On the local level, the state institutions and its representatives are commonly known in person. Such face-to-face encounters between citizens and state have far-reaching implications, not only concerning participation, but also with regard to the question of who will assert their interests and who will not. An analysis of local processes in small towns thus not only promises a better understanding of the dynamics of regional development, but also of processes of decision-making and power structures on a level which directly affects the everyday life of a large percentage of the population.

In the following, the article will provide a brief overview of the academic discourse on small towns before proposing a new approach to the analysis of secondary urban centres. In this context, the concept of the social interface will be introduced. The third part of the article will illustrate this alternative approach using the example of selected interfaces in small Vietnamese towns.

Small Towns in the Academic Discourse

Two approaches to small towns dominate the academic discourse. On the one hand, there are various studies with a macroeconomic or developmental thrust, discussing the role of small towns within a wider cities` system. Depending on the dominating development discourse, the

studies come to different conclusions concerning the character of small towns.[3] However, they all share a common perspective: they regard small towns as an object of external dynamics which is primarily shaped by external economic impulses and the repercussions of national politics rather than by local actors and resources (Satterthwhaite & Hardoy 1986; Titus et. al. 1998). The weakness of this approach is that it provides highly generalized statements based on a dichotomic view of urban and rural worlds. The approach does not account for the complex interrelations between actors of various levels and the increasingly blurred boundaries of urban and rural worlds. Furthermore, this perspective presents a static view of correlations between different units of a system and provides little insight into the on-going processes of interaction between and within the units.

A second set of studies approaches small towns from the sociological, ethnological or psychological angle. These studies focus on social stratification, patterns of behaviour and social interaction within selected western communities.[4] They provide valuable insight into structures and processes of interaction within communities. However, they do not take into account external factors, interdependencies with external structures or how the given community is imbedded within a larger context. The approach consequently does not offer insights into possible interrelations between local processes and larger-scale structures.

The author would like to propose a more integrative approach, linking local and regional perspectives in order to analyse the correlations between local dynamics within small towns and the centres´ role within regional development processes. In reference to A. Giddens` concept of the duality of structure, this approach is based on the assumption that local processes of interaction influence and are in turn influenced by developments outside the respective community (Giddens 1988: 215). An approach which enables the integration of structural and actor perspectives is the concept of the social interface. The train of thought which N. Long follows in introducing the concept can very well also be applied to the questions raised concerning small towns:

> *"A more dynamic approach to the understanding of social change is therefore needed which stresses the interplay and mutual determination of 'internal' and 'external' factors and relationships, and*

3 The modernization theoretical approach emphasizes the positive role of small towns as regional service clusters and growth centres. According to this perspective, innovations, services and other prerequisites of modernity spread through the urban hierarchy via small towns down to the rural areas due to a trickle-down effect (Rondinelli 1983b). A different approach in line with dependency theory, on the other hand, regards small towns as "parasitic islands of privilege in a sea of rural poverty" (Schatzberg 1979: 173). They are said to contribute to the urban bias, enforce the exploitation of the rural poor by political and economic elites and thus impede rural development (Southall 1979; Titus & Hinderink 1998; van Lindert & Verkoren 1997: 12; Tacoli 1998). More recent studies, in turn, avoid a generalizing statement concerning the role of small towns and focus on individual case studies (van Lindert & Verkoren 1997: 12). They consider these centres as territorial entities in their own right, whose role within the respective region depends on the given local conditions, resources and demands (Titus & Hinderink 1998; Satterthwaite et. al. 1986).

4 See Warner on "Jonesville"/ USA (Warner 1949), Warner and Lunt on "Yankeetown"/ USA (Warner & Lunt 1942), Laumann on "Altneustadt"/ Germany (Laumann 1976), Arensberg and Kimball on "Ennis"/ Ireland (Arensberg & Kimball 1968) and Elias and Scotson on "Winston Parva"/ Great Britain (Elias & Scotson 1990).

which recognises the central role played by human action" (Long 2001: 13).

Long regards social interfaces as a "critical point of intersection between life worlds, social fields or levels of social organisation where social discontinuities [...] are most likely to be located" (Long 2001: 243). Such interfaces are characterized by disparities regarding the distribution of resources and differences in lifestyles – attributes also applying to the intermingling of urban and rural life in small towns. The concept of interfaces can thus help grasp the impact of linkages between the small town and other centres within the urban system, these linkages being flows of people, money, goods or information (Hoang et al. 2005: 6). Whereas Long regards social interfaces primarily as "social situations", viewing small urban centres as interfaces also implies a spatial dimension (Long 2001: 241). Interfaces with and within small urban centres then become concrete in space as place, object and expression of interaction and power differentials.

In focus: Small Towns and Social Interfaces in Vietnam

Vietnam presents itself as a suitable location for an exemplary study on small towns. During the past two decades the country has been undergoing a rapid transformation. The challenges emerging from this situation and which, as has been argued above, make the role of small towns a particularly relevant question, are markedly visible here. Current policy debates in Vietnam concerning spatial planning also deal with the role of small towns within the cities' system. With the "Orientation Master Plan for Urban Development to 2020" of 1998, the Government of Vietnam set itself the goal "to manage rural migration by promoting economic development in secondary cities" (Coulthart et. al. 2006: 1)[5]. Steps towards more decentralization which grant the regions more autonomy and scope of action are part of this strategy (Coulthart

5 The planning of urban development processes involves various actors at different state levels. Spatial plans, one of the government's main planning tools, are drawn up at four levels of administration for the area the respective authorities hold responsibility for. These include "orientation plans" (national policy), "regional plans" (introduced in 2005), "master plans" (province or city), and "detailed area plans" (ward, industrial zone, or project) (Coulthart et al. 2006: ix). The development of "The Orientation Master Plan for the Development of Vietnam's Urban Centres until 2020" in 1998 was the result of an effort on behalf of the Government of Vietnam to formulate an integral national urban development strategy. The document states that "medium and small centres shall assume the functions of economic, cultural and service hubs of regions" and that "townships shall be economic, cultural and service centres for communes or clusters of communes in order to step up the process of rural urbanization and building of new rural areas" (Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Decision No.10/1998/QD-TTg, reviewed in Coulthart et. al. 2006). The master plan also formulates the objective "to manage rural migration by promoting economic development in secondary cities" (Coulthart et. al. 2006: 1). However, rather than establishing feasible and clear guidelines, the Orientation Master Plan appears in many ways to contain primarily the authorities' and planners' idealized visions. There are no detailed policies as to how the formulated objectives should be achieved. The task of working out detailed strategies is left to the administration at the regional, provincial and local levels, which, however, for the most part lack the necessary resources, capacities and authorities to realize the plan. In addition, in order to improve both skills and experiences, officials at the local levels would need to be taking on more responsibilities and tasks (Coulthart et. al. 2006). Presently, few organisations concern themselves with capacity-building at local level, one being the Association of Vietnamese Cities.

et. al. 2006: ix). For these government incentives to have the desired effects, however, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of small towns, their potentials, local dynamics and the factors which make them attractive sites for citizens and investors alike. Despite their potentially important role, there has not yet been much research on small urban centres in Vietnam and their linkages on local, national and regional levels. This problem is not uniquely Vietnamese. As stated by Satterthwhaite and Hardoy more than twenty years ago, but still valid today:

> *"There is a relatively poor understanding of, for instance, how public action can steer urban growth and development away from the major cities, of the very real limitation faced by governments in market or mixed economies in being able to do so, of what measures must be taken to stimulate the growth and development of small and intermediate urban centres, of the costs and benefits of doing so, and of who benefits from the proposed measures" (Satterthwaite & Hardoy 1986: 5).*

Vietnam is currently experiencing a swift urban transition. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) predicts an urbanisation rate of 3 percent annually for the years 2005 to 2010 (UNFPA 2007). Large urban centres benefit from the influx of capital and resources which currently accompanies the rapid economic development in Vietnam. However, the swift urban development and the inflow of migrants are placing the urban administration under increasing pressure. Non-registered migrants from rural areas currently pose 15 to 25 percent of the urban population in larger urban centres (Coulthart et. al. 2006: 6). The rural areas, on the other hand, are experiencing a drain of capital, manpower and other resources. Due to the promotion of mono-cropping, the rural livelihood is increasingly dependent on and vulnerable to external influences. All this contributes to the danger of spatially unequal development (Douglass 2001: 11; Hoang et. al. 2005: 5). Despite rapid economic development, the poverty rate in the countryside remains significantly higher than in the urban areas (General Statistics Office 2005). Presently, 70 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in Vietnam is generated in urban centres, although these only account for 27 percent of the country´s population (Coulthart et. al. 2006: v). The still comparatively low level of urbanisation in Vietnam[6], however, offers the chance for new policies to impact on geographic and demographic trends in favour of more sustainable and equal development.

The national classification system for urban centres[7] assigns small towns a key role as "provincial centre to promote the district and/or rural centre development" (Coulthart et. al. 2006: 58). According to official calculations, small urban centres of the category "Class

6 In comparison, the average degree of urbanisation in South-East Asia is currently estimated to be at 45 percent (UNFPA 2007).

7 The national classification system distinguishes six categories of urban centres based on criteria such as population size and density, structure of income sources, infrastructure as well as regional role of the centre. Small towns represent the category of the smallest urban centres or "Class V"-urban centres. These are centres of 4.000 to 50.000 inhabitants, a population density of more than 2.000 per km² and more than 65 percent occupation outside the agricultural sector.

V" represent the bulk of urban centres within the national classification system: 612 of the 703 recorded urban centres in Vietnam belong to this category. While small towns do not accommodate the mass of the urban population nor experience the highest urban growth rates, they are nevertheless, due to their wide dispersal and close proximity, crucial for the integration of the countryside – which still is home to 73 percent of the Vietnamese population. Hence in Vietnam, too, small towns are potential critical interfaces at which rural and urban life worlds, state and citizens meet and negotiate.

A highly relevant interface also with regards to transformations within the Vietnamese society is the encounter between the state and its citizens. The district level, on which small towns are located, represents the lowest level of jurisdictation. In accordance with their assigned administrative role, small towns, especially district capitals, feature a sizeable public sector. Local state representatives link local and national levels, translating and implementing many of the laws, programmes and policies issued by the central government. Due to their central position between the central government and the population in the exercise of state power, the local government is thus attributed "a significant level of influence" (Sikor 2004: 168). Historically,

> *"the district magistrate (tri huyen) was at the coalface of Vietnam´s monarchical system, expected to enforce quotas set by higher echelons, dispense local justice, monitor economic conditions, look for signs of unrest [...] (A) resourceful district magistrate made himself part of the local political scene, [...] cultivating allies, dispensing as well as receiving favours" (Marr 2004: 33-34).*

Today, civil servants and representatives of the Communist Party function as mediators between the local population (which they themselves are a part of) and the state (which they represent) (Sikor 2004: 189). They are in charge of developing programmes and policies according to local needs as well as implementing reforms (including the important task of allocating land use rights to rural households). In this context, they interpret government guidelines according to their own priorities and can thereby create space for personal interests (Sikor 2004: 189). Balancing personal, state and local interests becomes challenging when they conflict with each other. Whether local level or state interests are given priority in the case of conflicting interests depends on whether the horizontal linkages to the local level or vertical linkages to the central authorities are stronger. A common background or shared ethnicity, common economic and social interests or a shared view on legitimate authority can strengthen horizontal ties (Sikor 2004: 169). In sum, local state representatives and the population interact in what has been termed the "mediation space that exists in the penumbra of party-state domination" (Koh 2006: 15). Recent studies provide examples of such processes of negotiation between local authorities and the population[8].

8 One example is presented in a study conducted in a rural district in the Northwestern highlands. It describes

A second interface within small towns which qualifies for further scrutiny concerns encounters in the economic sector. The economic sector within small towns is crucial for their role as regional centres of production and distribution. Especially the small trade sector is an important source of off-farm income and thus vital for the economic development of small towns and the surrounding rural region. For much of the local population, off-farm employment is a necessity, rather than a way to increase profits (Rigg 1998: 502; Hoang et. al. 2005: 1). It is likely that participating in small trade requires access to key resources and at the same time makes available certain important resources. An analysis of the small trade sector can thus give insight in structures of power, distribution of resources and social organisation in small towns. The economic sector features both vertical linkages between central state, local authorities and citizens as well as horizontal linkages such as between the political (legislative and executive organs) and economic (suppliers, industrial consumers, local customers, kinship supplying capital etc.) sectors.

At social interfaces, those actors hold key positions which can make external knowledge available locally (Burt 2000: 1). Entrepreneurs are one group which qualifies for the role as mediator or broker. They rely on good networking in order to secure access to financial capital, labour, information and other strategic resources - resources, which appear to be particularly scarce in small towns (Long 2001: 135). The linkages entrepreneurs establish allow them to act as economic brokers between networks which link the local market to regional and national structures, local consumers to supra-regional producers (Long 1977: 121). Small enterprises and those in the informal sector often form clusters in order to secure their position on the market. Larger, supra-regional enterprises, on the other hand, revert to the local networks of small-scale enterprises to improve the distribution of goods and services (Pedersen 2003: 41). These linkages allow entrepreneurs to act as economic brokers between producers and consumers of various levels and destinations. This is particularly important for rural regions in which the majority of the population commonly lacks mobility and has few supra-regional links of its own to draw upon. If actors functioning as brokers along interfaces, e.g. entrepreneurs, are well-integrated in local social structures, they not only benefit from the social capital gained from their position between networks, but also from their position within local networks. As local actors with various social linkages to draw upon, these actors can also benefit from network closure, an important source of social capital (Coleman 1990). Network closure has the effect of facilitating sanctions, thus strengthening mutual trust and improving cooperation within the group (Burt 2000: 8). Network closure, however, also implies

how the People´s Committee of the district "reinterpreted" the guidelines of the province against logging (according to which larger areas where to be exempted from agricultural use) by excluding paddy from the regulation (Sikor 2004: 182). For further examples see Koh (2006) on mediation space at ward-level and Fforde (2004) on the interaction between farmers and rural planners/extension service.

the possibility of exclusion. As Elias and Scotson show, social cohesion can become an important local resource, when certain actors use this as an instrument of power to exclude others as outsiders from networks and the distribution of resources (Elias & Scotson 1990: 11; Coleman 1990). In this context, the structure of the economic sector in small towns points towards clear power differentials. The labour market in small urban centres is highly fragmented regarding qualifications, income, security etc. There is a strong competition for attractive positions, which are often distributed according to kinship relations, ethnicity or other criteria within a small elite (Titus & Hinderink 1998: 212). Socially marginalized households are at a disadvantage here, as the access to employment opportunities depends to a large extent on social networks. Actors who lack access to crucial social networks may be forced to engage in more unprofitable occupations and thus be excluded from the opportunities and benefits of regional development (Tacoli 1998: 10). Who remains outsider and is largely excluded from the distribution of key resources, may be based on various criteria. Groups may be excluded based on their ethnicity, education, income or duration of stay in the community etc. (Elias & Scotson 1990). These processes of interaction, exclusion and integration also impact on the surrounding region in so far as they determine how resources are distributed within the region, and how the rural population is integrated into the development.

Outlook

An assessment of the role and developmental potential of small towns should be an integral part of any comprehensive urban development strategy. This requires not only a closer look at present government policies and administrative structures, but also at the dynamics within the urban centres themselves and their relations with their hinterland as well as with national and regional levels. The analysis of power differentials and the distribution of resources in small towns can indicate challenges and potentials of regional development. This in turn may indicate a starting-point for development policies that can influence the given dynamics in favour of more equal, integrative and sustainable regional development. For this analysis, an approach is needed which can integrate both complex local interrelations as well as take into account the broader regional context. It should allow for the local particularities in processes of interaction but should still able to provide results of general validity. In this context, a promising concept is that of the social interface. How interaction along interfaces takes place has an impact on the distribution of resources and consequently power both within the urban centres and between the urban centres and their respective hinterland. In the analysis, rather than trying to grasp the complex dynamics and forms of interaction within small urban

centres as a whole, it makes sense to pinpoint a smaller field or node within a given centre for further scrutiny. This was exemplified here by a brief outline of local-level encounters along political and economic interfaces in Vietnam. Vietnam, in its current phase of rapid transition, provides a good example of the potentials and challenges inherent in small towns as a rural-urban link interface. In addition, changes in policies and on-going administrative reforms in Vietnam demand for a better understanding of local-level dynamics and how these are connected to higher-level processes and structures. This article presents only a brief sketch of possible correlations. Further research and in-depth studies with a more narrow scope will be necessary needed to validate the theoretical approach and deliver more concrete insights. In this context, a comparative study of conditions in China may be revealing.

References

Arensberg, C. M. & S. T. Kimball. (1968). *Family and Community in Ireland.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Burt, R. S. (2000). *Structural Holes versus Network Closure as Social Capital.* Chicago: University of Chicago and Institute Européen D'Administration D'Affaires (INSEAD). Retrieved Mai 5, 2008, from http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/ronald.burt/research/SHNC.pdf.

Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundations of Social theory.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Coulthart, A., Q. Nguyen and H. Sharpe. (2006). *Urban Development Strategy: Meeting the Challenges of Rapid Urbanization and the Transition to a Market Oriented Economy.* Hanoi: World Bank. Retrieved March 29, 2008, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPINFRASTRUCT/Resources/Urban.pdf.

Douglass, M. (2001). *Pathways of Urbanisation and Socio-economic Development in East Asia: Policy Research Agenda for Viet Nam's Urban Transition in a Global Era*. (Contribution of UNDP/UNCHS (Habitat): The first meeting of the Viet Nam urban forum [Hanoi, Viet Nam: 21 May 2001]). Draft paper, Department of Urban & Regional Planning, University of Hawaii. Retrieved March 9, 2008, from http://www.un.org.vn/undp/projects/vie00021/PDF/UrbanTrans1.pdf.

Elias, N. & J. L. Scotson. (1990). *Etablierte und Außenseiter.* Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.

Fforde, A. (2004). *'Old wine in new bottles?' Extension and service delivery organisations for small farmers in rural mountain regions of North Vietnam.* Melbourne: Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, University of Melbourne. Retrieved October 10, 2008, from http://www.aduki.com.au/AF%20extension%20paper%20v2.pdf.

Fforde, A. (2008). Informelle vietnamesische Bauernverbände: Diskurse und politische Konsequenzen. *Südostasien Aktuell,* 1/2008, 4-36.

General Statistics Office (GSO). (2005). *2002 and 2004 poor household rates by poverty line standard applied for period 2006-2010.* Retrieved October 10, 2008, from http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.

aspx?tabid=503&ItemID=2948.

Giddens, A. (1988). *Die Konstitution der Gesellschaft. Grundzüge einer Theorie der Strukturierung.* Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag GmbH.

Hoang Xuan Thanh, Dang Nguyen Anh and C. Tacoli. (2005). Livelihood diversification and rural-urban linkages in Vietnam's Red River Delta. *FCND Discussion Paper No. 193*. 05/2005. Washington: IIED.

Koh, D. (2006). *Wards of Hanoi.* Singapore: ISEAS.

Laumann, E. and F. U. Pappi. (1976). *Networks of collective action. A perspective on community influence systems*. New York: Academic Press.

Long, N. (1977). *An introduction to the sociology of rural development*. Suffolk: Tavistock Publications.

Long, N. (2001). *Development sociology - Actor perspectives*. New York: Routledge.

Lubell, H. (1984). Third World Urbanization and International Assistance. *Urban Studies,* 21, 1-13.

Marr, D. G. (2004.) A Brief History of Local Government in Vietnam. In Kerkvliet, B. J. T. & D. Marr, (pp. 28-53), (Eds.), *Beyond Hanoi - Local Government in Vietnam*. Singapore: NIAS Press.

Pedersen, P.O. (2003). *The implication of national-level policies on the development of SIUC*. Prepared for the Workshop "Integrating rural development and small urban centres: An evolving framework for the effective regional and local economic development. March 18-19 2003." Washington: World Bank. Retrieved January 12, 2008, from http://www.worldbank.org/urban/urbanruralseminar/papers/pederson.pdf.

Rigg, J. (1998). Rural-urban interactions, agriculture and wealth: A Southeast Asian perspective. *Progress in Human Geography,* 22 (4), 497-522.

Rondinelli, D. A. and K. Ruddle. (1978). *Urbanization and rural development. A spatial policy for equitable growth*. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Rondinelli, D. A. (1983a). *Secondary cities in developing countries. Policies for diffusing urbanism*. London: Sage.

Rondinelli, D. A. (1983b). Towns and small cities in developing countries. *The Geographical Review,* 73 (4), 379-395.

Satterthwaite, D. and J. Hardoy. (Eds.) (1986). *Small and Intermediate urban centres. Their role in national and regional development in the 3rd world*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Satterthwhaite, D. & C. Tacoli. (2003a). *A critical review of the role of small and intermediate urban centres in national, regional and local economies of low- and middle-income economies, with particular reference to rural development and poverty reduction. Section 3: The role of small and intermediate urban centres in regional and rural development*. Prepared for the Workshop 'Integrating rural development and small urban centres: An evolving framework for the effective regional and local economic development. March 18-19 2003.' London: IIED. Retrieved January 12, 2008, from http://www.worldbank.org/urban/urbanruralseminar/papers/satterthwaite-tacoli.pdf.

Satterthwhaite, D. & C. Tacoli. (2003b). The urban part of rural development. The role of small and intermediate urban centres in rural and regional development and poverty reduction. *Working paper Series on rural-urban interactions and livelihood strategies. Working paper No. 9*. London: IIED. Retrieved

January 12, 2008, from http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/9226IIED.pdf.

Schatzberg, M. G. (1979). Islands of privilege: Small cities in Africa and the Dynamics of class formation. *Urban Anthropology,* 2, 173-190.

Sikor, T. (2004). Local government in the exercise of state power. In: Kerkvliet, B. J. T. & D. Marr, (Eds.), *Beyond Hanoi - Local Government in Vietnam,* (pp. 171-200). Singapore: NIAS Press.

Southhall, A. (Ed.) (1979). *Small urban centres in rural development in Africa*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin.

Tacoli, C. (1998). Rural-urban interactions: A guide to the literature. *Environment and Urbanisation,* 10 (1), 148-166.

Tacoli, C. (2004). *The Role of Small and Intermediate Cities and Market towns and the value of regional approaches to the rural poverty reduction policy.* Prepared for the OECD DAC POVNET Agriculture and Pro-poor Growth Task Team. Helsinki Workshop 17-18 June 2004. IIED. Retrieved January 12, 2008, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/29/36562990.pdf.

Titus, M. & J. Hinderink. (Eds.) (1998). *Town and Hinterland in developing countries. Perspectives on rural-urban interaction and regional development*. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.

UN-Habitat. (1993). *Improving Rural Regional Settlement Systems in Africa: with Special Reference to Rural Service Centres*. Nairobi: Habitat.

UNDP. (2000). *Rural-urban linkages: An emerging policy priority.* New York: UNDP. Retrieved April 23, 2008, from www.ruaf.org/system/files?file=ab_rural_urban_linkages.pdf.

UNFPA. (2007). *State of world population. Unleashing the potential of urban growth*. UNFPA. Retrieved April 23, 2008, from http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/presskit/pdf/sowp2007_eng.pdf.

van Lindert, P. & O. Verkoren. (1997). *Small towns and beyond: Rural transformation and small urban centres in Latin America.* Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.

Warner, W. L. & P. S. Lunt. (1942). *The status system of a modern community.* Yankee city series Vol. II. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Warner, W. L. (1949). *Democracy in Jonesville. A study in quality and inequality.* New York: Harper.

Backyard Living – Integrative Policies Towards Migrant Workers: Housing Microfinance in Greater Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

Martin Noltze[1]

Department of Human Geography, University of Göttingen, Germany

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

The urban agglomeration of the Vietnamese southeast industrial driving force Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) has become the most outstanding beneficiary of the remarkable economic growth and foreign investments in the Vietnamese economy since the start of a comprehensive economic reform process in the mid 1980s. The notable development towards the foremost economic centre led to a high influx of migrant workers. In the course of an ongoing expansion process towards a megacity of tomorrow, the deficient provision of adequate housing remains one of the most challenging problems of rural migrants in Greater HCMC. However, a future-oriented sustainable megacity concept is strongly dependent on the successful integration of migrants into the urban society. Within this context, the housing market is considered to be a key aspect of comprehensive urban planning. Hereby, housing microfinance (HMF) will be presented as an alternative housing finance scheme meeting the demand of a noteworthy number of poor and low-income people. Thereby HMF can do both: focus on specific needs of migrants with respect to their current life situation and enhance its outreach to a potential target group.

Keywords: Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, Housing, Migrants, Microfinance

1 During the last years, Martin Noltze has researched urban development and social issues in Vietnam. He worked under the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research's (BMBF) funding programme "Research for the Sustainable Development of Megacities of Tomorrow" (research title: "The Balance of urban Growth and Redevelopment in Ho Chi Minh City/Vietnam – Sustainable Housing Policies for Mega-Cities of Tomorrow"). Contact: martin_noltze@yahoo.de

Die Metropolregion Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) hat seit Beginn umfassender Wirtschaftsreformen Mitte der 1980er Jahre enorme Wachstumsraten und Investitionen an sich gezogen. Das Wirtschaftszentrum Vietnams wurde dadurch zum Anziehungspunkt für eine stetig wachsende Anzahl von Arbeitsmigranten. Bisher konnte das rasante Stadtwachstum der vergangenen Jahre einer ausreichenden Wohnraumversorgung nicht entsprechen. Die hohe Nachfrage auf dem Wohnungsmarkt stellt eine besondere Herausforderung für ankommenden Migranten dar. Eine erfolgreiche Integration ländlicher Arbeitskräfte bildet jedoch die Grundlage für ein zukunftsorientiertes Megastadtkonzept. In diesem Zusammenhang wird der Wohnungsmarkt als ein Schlüsselaspekt für umfassende Stadtplanung gesehen. In der vorliegenden Abhandlung wird Mikrofinanzierung von Wohnraum als ein innovatives Finanzinstrument zur Wohnraumversorgung vorgestellt, mit dem es gelingen kann, dem Bedarf von Teilen der untersten Einkommensschichten zu entsprechen. Dabei kann sich dieser Ansatz sowohl auf die Zukunftserwartungen der Arbeitsmigranten beziehen als auch die Entwicklung des Mikrofinanzsektors insgesamt vorantreiben.

Schlagworte: Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, Wohnraum, Migranten, Mikrofinanzierung

Introduction

The year 2007 symbolises an important milestone on the scale of human settlements. For the first time the number of the urban population worldwide exceeds the amount of rural residents in total. The demographic analysts of urban development declared the new urban millennium (UN-Habitat 2006). This trend is dominated by the urban agglomerations' annual growth rates of 4.58 percent in Africa and 3.82 percent in Asia (UN-Habitat 2006: 4; World Bank 2006: 2). The so-called urban revolution is mainly due to an exploding development of urban agglomeration regions in developing countries (UN-Habitat 2003). Besides strong population growth, fast growing cities have to deal with urban poverty, social inequality, scarce housing, slum settlements, insufficient sanitation and missing waste collection services causing extreme environmental deficiencies.

Following global trends, the Vietnamese metropolis Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) is on its way to achieving the status "megacity of the early 21st century", facing all above-mentioned challenges. The prospering industrial region became the national spearhead of urban development. By the economic reform process (*doi moi*) and the opening up for foreign direct investments (FDIs) HCMC is pushed within the ongoing transition from socialist planning towards a market-oriented economy (cf. Nestor 2007). Nowadays, the basic export-led industrialisation strategy is accompanied by growing domestic consumption and investment spending. Although HCMC denotes the highest average income on a national scale, it also incorporates strong social polarisation and spatial fragmentation (Waibel, Eckert, Bose, & Martin 2007: 60). Both aspects are extremely visible within the housing market. Even though

Vietnam has achieved a remarkable decrease of overall poverty and confidently steps towards the fulfilments of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a recent increase in urban poverty could be revealed.[2]

Vietnamese urban growth is strongly related to rural-urban migration. Generally the field of housing symbolises a strong integrative aspect for migrants into an urban society. However, low incomes, remittances and fewer savings, as well as a restrictive registration system, make it extremely difficult for rural migrants to participate in the housing market, which is strongly characterised by high land and housing prices. Furthermore, the insufficient access to the formal financial system intensifies this incapacity, as the access to housing strongly depends on the access to financial services. This paper examines in how far the promotion of alternative housing finance schemes might be an integrative strategy to support the empowerment and development of rural migrants in an urban society.

Population Growth, Migration Dynamics and Urbanisation Processes

Dynamic migration streams and permanent re-distribution of population are deep-rooted characteristics of the Vietnamese history (N. Dang 2005). Within the last two decades new migration phenomena are appearing in the course of the overall market-oriented social and economic reform process. At the same time the policy agenda constitutes a notable shift from previous ideologically motivated anti-urban policies to an ongoing urban-centred economic development (Jenkins, Smith, & Wang 2007: 282) (cf. Table 1). Following the new strategy, HCMC claims the national pole position.

*Table 1: **Urbanisation Trends in Vietnam Since the Beginning of the Doi Moi Reform Process****

Year	1986	1990	1995	2000	2003	2005	2015**
Number of urban spaces	480	500	550	649	656	-	-
Urban population (in million)	11,87	13,77	14,94	19,47	20,87	22,44	30,50
Urban population (in percent)	19,3	20,0	20,8	24,7	25,8	26,4	31,6

* Data related to national definitions
** Data on the basis of the average deviation of extrapolation

Source: P.N. Dang (2005); UNDP (2007)

2 According to CIEM (2006: 91) the urban poverty rate increased from 6.6 percent in 2002 to 10.8 percent in 2004.

Within the last two decades the population of HCMC grew by 60 percent from 3.92 million in 1989 (NIURB 1994: 19) to 6.24 million in 2005 (Statistical Office of HCMC 2006: 17). Additionally, it is estimated that more than 1.9 million temporary migrants currently reside in the inner-urban districts and surrounding provinces (VET 2005: 31; Hiep 2005: 1). The ongoing population pressure is mainly a result of the potential employment opportunities in various industrial and export processing zones. These industrial areas are primarily located in the rural-urban fringe and cause remarkable growth rates in suburban districts. The high increase in population doubled the size of the settlement area from 1986 to today. Taking the industrial corridor of the adjoining provinces Dong Nai, Binh Duong and Ba Ria – Vung Tau into calculation, a mega-urban region with more than 10 million inhabitants is already in existence (Waibel et al. 2007: 61). Suburbanisation is predominantly pushed by urban upgrading programmes in the city centre and eviction processes in previous slum settlements. Furthermore, an overall transformation of living space into business space in the inner city intensifies population movements to suburban districts.[3]

Generally the considerable celerity of population growth hinders comprehensive investments into consistent urban development. This is mostly visible in a lack of technical and social infrastructure. These circumstances are causing conflicts with sustainable housing policies in the course of ongoing urbanisation processes. The disregard of these fields by public authorities has dramatic consequences for the economic, administrative, social, cultural and ecological livelihood of all city dwellers, especially for the poor. The deficient supply of housing remains one of the most challenging problems for poor and low-income people in urban HCMC (Martin & Kennel 2006: 1).

Migrants' Life in the "New Urban Context"

The financial perspective of higher incomes is the primary motivation of rural migrants who seek employment in one of the multiple factory compounds. On site, so-called boarding houses are the leadoff destination for migrants in the new urban context. Boarding houses are rental and sharable informal housing units which are located close to industrial zones at the backyards of local landlords, nearly invisible from the street front. This type of housing is characterised by a standardised architecture, cheap construction material and lack of technical infrastructure. Thereby most housing units violate all construction laws. Furthermore, boarding houses are generally overcrowded and very expensive. Residents find themselves in precarious living

11 From 1999 to 2005, the suburban District 12 (+77 percent), Thu Duc (+64 percent) and Binh Tan (+58 percent) registered the highest rates of population growth (Gurby & Huong 2002: 9; Statistical Office of HCMC 2006: 17).

conditions where drug abuse, prostitution and strong environmental impacts are common. Thus boarding house agglomerations are considered to be the new slums of Greater HCMC (Waibel & Thanh 2007: 11). The nation-wide 2004 Migration Survey of the General Statistical Office (GSO) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) marked the housing situation in Vietnamese cities as the most pressing problem for migrants. In either case boarding house units lead to strong exclusion effects and spatial segregation.

Two-storey boarding house building in the province Binh Duong in front of an industrial compound (north of HCMC) (Photo by M. Noltze, 2007)

Rural migrants who enter the urban context are primarily young, single and female. However, chain migration phenomena can be perceived in workers' accommodations. Chain migration processes enable migrants to use prearranged paths of previous migrants and primary social networks to enter the urban context (MacDonald & MacDonald 1964: 82). Whole village communities find themselves within the same boarding house units, bringing parts of their families and cultural idiosyncrasies into the urban society. In this regard, migrants are involved in strong networks. Although higher income perspectives are the major pull effect for migration processes in Vietnam, especially in Ho Chi Minh City migrants do have considerably lower incomes in contrast to non-migrants (GSO & UNFPA 2005: 5). In addition to the insufficient financial power, the Vietnamese *ho khau* registration system does not allow non-permanent residents (KT3, KT4) to participate fully in the real estate market until they have achieved a permanent residency (KT1, KT2).[4] Generally, the *ho khau* policy restricts migrants' access to basic social and technical infrastructure including education, health care, jobs and financial

4 The residential system is divided into four nation-wide categories from KT1 (officially registered permanent residents with all rights a Vietnamese citizen has at his home-place), KT2 (permanent registered residents who do not live in the district where they are registered and who have full rights), KT3 (families who are considered as migrants and do have a residency for 6 to 12 months and who have very restricted rights) and KT4 ("floating" migrants who live in guesthouses and temporary dwellings and who have the least rights within the *ho khau* hierarchy).

services. Consequently migrants use informal ways to achieve land property. They rely on non-professional and doubtful financial services provided by private moneylenders, relatives, friends or neighbours. Nevertheless, a rethinking of the restrictive registration system by the authorities can be detected in recent times. This is mostly noticeable in the 2007 New Law on Residency, which softens previous restrictions.

Rural-urban migrants constitute a significant share of the Vietnamese poor, even though it is nearly impossible to document this by absolute figures as migrants are generally not registered in nation-wide statistics. Although migrant workers are not considered to be the poorest of the poor, they are facing an extreme risk to fall below national and international poverty lines[5]. Insecure employment contracts, hard working conditions and a heavily polluted environment are reasons for seasonal unemployment, health risks and stress. The average monthly incomes exceeds 60 USD. However, high expenditures lower potential savings and remittances. The foremost expenditures include high rents, exceptional rates for water, electricity and waste collection services. Recently these circumstances are additionally accompanied by high inflation rates in overall Vietnam. The restrictive *ho khau* hierarchy intensifies the financial disparity between permanent and non-permanent residents. Besides the inability of migrants to enter the state-owned economic sector they do have considerably lower payments for equal work in contrast to non-migrants (ADB 2006: 6).

Boarding house in the backyard of local landlords in the urban district Thu Duc (Photo by M. Noltze, 2007)

Boarding houses are the physical manifestation of the socio-economic exclusion of migrants. High taxes for basic infrastructure and a gap between the demand and the supply of public services intensify their deficient living conditions. According to the 2004 Vietnam Migration

5 The international poverty line includes the One-(or Two-)Dollar-a-day definition by the World Bank, national poverty lines by the GSO measure poverty by the proportion of household expenditures and a daily food consumption basket and vary due to regional differences between urban, rural and mountainous regions.

Survey, 40 percent of migrants stated a worsening of their living situation compared to their place of origin (GSO & UNFPA 2005: 4). Additionally, of all social groups, migrants have the least access to social security such as health insurance. Furthermore, gender-related differences are detectable. Especially the group of migrant women suffer from exhausting working conditions in labour-intensive industrial employments (ADB 2006: 6).

Housing Microfinance (HMF)

The United Nation´s declaration of 2005 as the "Year of Microfinance" and the awarding of the 2006 Nobel Price for Peace to Mohammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, underlined the impact of microfinance as a successful tool within the general development debate. Microfinance means the provision of financial services to the "unbankable" poor, who are traditionally excluded from formal finance schemes. Today microfinance is not only about (micro-)credit anymore. It includes a wide range of various financial instruments and is on its way to becoming an "inclusive financial system" implementing the integration into the formal financial system and expanding its outreach to large numbers of poor and low-income people (cf. Helms 2006). The group of microfinance clients predominantly range from the "unbanked" poor to the vulnerable non-poor. Within the last decades world-wide approaches have proven that banking for the poor is able to achieve both financial independence as well as institutional sustainability.

During the last two decades adapted HMF schemes turned into a noteworthy tool in order to upgrade living space and to fight overall housing shortage in rural and urban contexts, especially in developing countries (Serageldin 2000: 25). The potential market segment for microfinance institutions differs significantly from traditional home lenders and the public sector. The former focus predominantly on high income groups, the public sector gives substituted loans to federal employees. In order to meet the demand of poor and low-income people it is necessary to integrate diverse financial proposals of various actors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), governmental authorities and microfinance institutions. According to Mitlin (2003: 11), (1) NGOs concentrate most on communal activities, infrastructure and housing programmes, (2) governmental institutions are relevant for the provision of land of moderate prices supported by housing programmes for poverty reduction and (3) microfinance institutions do focus on the provision of microcredits. Besides financial instruments, it is particularly necessary to integrate aspects like land tenure, the supply of basic infrastructure and the official registration process into the concept. In distinction to other traditional microfinance instruments HMF implies high sums (on average 500-5,000 USD) over

long periods of time (3 to 10 years). In this regard HMF implies high risks for both the donor and the borrower hence there is a requirement for financing securities. These instances illustrate the reasons for the limited worldwide appliance of today's HMF. Furthermore, traditional mortgage loans are only partly accessible for the poor. As a consequence mechanisms of social control obtain importance. Thereby the strong involvement of individuals within networks guaranty group pressure and social solidarity. Generally the logic of microfinance relies on group-based approaches. It uses social structures as a guarantee. In the field of HMF this can only be applied partly, but land tenure is also a sustainable foundation for neighbourhood relations.

Innovative HMF approaches include financial aspects as well as social, communal and economic development components. Two basic approaches can be distinguished: (1) The neo-liberal approach which assumes spill-over effects from loans for income generating activities towards housing, and (2) the advocacy approach which concentrates on the representation of interest of poor people regarding the access to land tenure, basic services and infrastructure facilities (cf. Serageldin 2000). The first one implies a strong connection of living space and business space and focuses primarily on traditional microfinance schemes[6]. The second one strongly concerns community development and socio-political emancipation.

Housing Microfinance in Vietnam

Even though experience from worldwide application of HMF shows high potentials in meeting the demand of the poor, microfinance remains a neglected topic within Vietnam. The formal financial system is dominated by huge state-owned commercial banks, which claim more than 70 percent of the total market share (Trinh 2007: 13; World Bank 2007: 25). Further shares are held by diverse Joint Stock banks. Within the course of the *doi moi* process the banking sector renewed its outreach and diversification. This development follows the liberalisation of interest rates and the enhancement of the general legal framework. Since the overall breakdown of the credit-cooperatives in the mid 1980s new banking forms have been developed. In comparison to other South-East Asian countries microfinance plays only a minor role in the Vietnamese context so far. The sector is dominated by state-owned suppliers such as the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP)[7]. Today VBARD can be seen as the most important microfinance institution in

6 The so-called *shophouses* are one of the most visible housing forms in Vietnam, they include both living space and business activities. In this regard this approach is extremely capable in the Vietnamese context.

7 VBARD includes more than five million borrowers with an average loan size of 405 USD, VBSP more than three million borrowers with an average loan size of 125 USD (Doan 2005: 5).

Vietnam. However, both do not exclusively target the poor. The formal providers are generally supported or enhanced by political mass organisations such as the Vietnamese Women Union (VWU), which also acts as a microfinance institution itself. The semi-formal market is characterised by a few regional organisations such as the Capital Aid Fund for Employment of the Poor (CEP) in HCMC or international NGOs[8]. At last informal actors like the Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCA), friends, family and neighbours do play an important role for the poor, but do not officially count as microfinance institutions on the basis of their informal and insecure capacity. It can be assumed that the limited legal outreach of semi-formal institutions, which are not coercively owned by the state, is pivotally depending on the comprehensive market-control-strategy of the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of Vietnam. So far international and domestic microfinance institutions are only allowed to provide financial services exclusively in cooperation with political mass organisations or state-owned agencies. This aspect reflects the political dimension of financial services in Vietnam. On the one hand local authorities want to operate as much as possible through state-owned institutions to maintain social control and power relations. On the other hand the deep-rooted networks within the socialist system of Vietnam can be used as a solid foundation for group-based microfinance schemes by all actors. A future-oriented development of the Vietnamese microfinance landscape will require a dialogue between the government, institutions in the sector, donors and the national mass organisations. Especially the formal microfinance industry and huge parts of the semi-formal sector are strongly dependent on subsidised lending.[9] This is mainly related to poverty reduction programmes of the Vietnamese government and inefficient structures of institutions. Thus market-orientated and demand-driven providers face high competitive pressure. In this process highly subsidised state-owned market supply hinders the development of a sustainable microfinance landscape.

The banking system within the financial market is pivotally responsible in how far investments are distributed and who has access to capital. The national capital stock of Vietnam is quite tight, which means that institutions have only limited capital available. This has extreme consequences for the capital-intensive real estate market. So only the most lucrative and high-end projects get financed by the formal sector, including business space, high standard hotel rooms and luxury apartments. In this situation banks focus on the high end of the market and HMF has a good chance of dealing successfully with the potential poor and low-income segment. However, there is only very limited information about the outreach and the demand available. It can be assumed that specialist housing finance products for the poor are almost non-existent. So far, mostly semi-formal institutions focus on housing finance

8 For example Save the Children/US, World Vision International or Habitat for Humanity International Vietnam.

9 The VBSP offers below-market interest rates, on average 6 percent per annum (Doan 2005: 7).

for the poor. In Greater HCMC, the World Bank, CEP and Habitat for Humanity International Vietnam provide housing finance instruments for specific target groups. However, these semi-formal institutions face considerable constraints due to their status within the Vietnamese financial landscape and have only limited outreach.

"Microfinanced" housing in HCMC (by the CEP)[10] at the "sites & services" project site of the PMU 415/ Belgium Technical Cooperation in Binh Hung Hoa, Distrikt Binh Tan (Photo by M. Noltze, 2007)

Even though HMF in HCMC might be able to prosper in the near future it is still a neglected topic in Vietnam. Only a few pilot projects are run by microfinance institutions so far. These projects mainly focus on target groups who emerged from eviction processes in the course of urban upgrading programmes. The national microfinance industry focuses predominantly on income generation activities. However, especially in Vietnam both fields are strongly related to each other and it is unclear in how far business loans are already constantly transferred to housing matters. The lack of available data regarding the demand of the poor for housing aggravates the immature market situation. Institutions need to conduct their own analyses which are generally quite costly. But the lack of data does not imply a lack of a potential demand. Furthermore, there is a need for the integration of saving products to complement housing loans. This aspect requires strong financial institutions but supports the economisation of existing systems. Innovative approaches promote a step-by-step construction procedure[11], combining construction cycles and loan rounds which make both aspects more suitable for the poor.

10 In the course of the Tan Hoa – Lo Gom (THLG) canal upgrading project, funded largely by the Belgian Technical Cooperation, 57 households were resettled to the pilot project site. The "sites & services" included hook-ups for electricity and water and access to roads. Resettled households could use their compensation to purchase a plot at 60 percent of the official market value. For house construction they could get a long-term loan of up to 22 million VND at 10 percent interest per year, provided by the CEP.

11 For example the first loan round is linked to the construction of the core housing unit (including walls and roof), the second loan round to the construction of different rooms (kitchen, bathroom, etc.).

Migrant Workers – City Dwellers of Tomorrow?

The hard working conditions in industrial zones accompanied by low income-expenditure ratios, a restrictive registration system and a lack of adjusted future-orientated policies hinder the socio-economic integration of migrants in Greater HCMC. Even though migrants achieve higher incomes compared to where they come from, many of them fail to leave poverty relations. Hereby migrants are the expression of the urbanisation of poverty (Jenkins et al. 2007: 293). Industrial zone workers in HCMC contribute significantly to the fast growing economy but cannot fully make use of the outcomes and advantages of the prospering development. The apparent awareness of this gap is lately expressed by an increase of strike-waves and high fluctuation of employees on the run for better working conditions.

Regarding financial markets, migrants in HCMC are extremely excluded from services. Consequently, they rely on informal networks, particularly family and friends. Although high expenditures lower their net incomes, migrant workers are thoroughly able to have remarkable savings. Comparably high savings are mainly a result of their current abstemious life situation. Therefore a high demand on financial services does exist for both remittances to the places of origin to support families and for personal investments or savings for their life in HCMC. Potential savings make migrants highly creditworthy. Furthermore, migrant workers in HCMC are not immigrated individuals but rather embedded in strong social networks. This makes them extremely qualified for microfinance approaches, which deal predominantly with group based systems. Additionally, their housing related future aspirations are considerably realisable with HMF approaches in Vietnam, including low plot sizes (M=40m^2), standard services and basic infrastructure.

Even though a significant share of migrant workers will return to their places of origin after a period of time, it can be expected that many of them will try to stay in HCMC. The long-term access to the city is strongly dependent on the registration status and the bureaucratic formalisation process. Only a permanent residency guaranties full social welfare for young migrants and their children. For this purpose migrants need the reliance of local landlords and authorities. Furthermore, the individual future plan will depend on the economic prosperity or failure. On the one hand the labour-intensive export sector employments are particularly linked to the well-being of the world economy. On the other hand low wages are facing current domestic price storms. Both aspects make migrants extremely vulnerable. Considering the obvious gap between current living circumstances and future aspirations it can be assumed that migrants with stable incomes will leave the industrial backyards of today and move into the urban society of tomorrow. Many of them will try to find new business opportunities in

the inner-city. In the face of the impressive number of migrant workers who are currently employed in the industrial zones and factory compounds of HCMC, integrative strategies for this specific target group are urgently required to guarantee the future well-being of all city dwellers. Thereby the field of housing is seen as the most important aspect of sustainable integrative policies. HMF in HCMC can do both, strengthen its outreach to the potential target group of the poor and assist migrants' entry into the urban society. Even though today this might only be possible for a very limited number of people.

Conclusions

The relationship of migrants and non-migrants in the urban context of Greater HCMC is strongly characterised by high inequalities. It can be expected that this gap might even widen in the near future as migrants face high barriers to prosper socially and economically. Thereby inequality has a strong spatial dimension. Workers' accommodations are mostly located in the backyard of local landlords in close proximity to industrial zones in suburban areas of the agglomeration region. The exclusion from public services and urban neighbourhood underline the impact of the rural community. Within these circumstances, migrants conserve rural lifestyles and traditions. The social dimension of inequality is mostly visible by the constraints given by the law on residency that aggravates further emancipation and hinders comprehensive development. However, new residential policies are coming up and constraints seem to diminish. Thereby the adherence to the *ho khau* hierarchy can be seen as a constitutive element of transitional Vietnam. Even though strong inequalities still exist, it can be assumed that a significant share of migrant workers will apply for a permanent residency in the near future, declaring HCMC to their new home.

Although migrant workers are not the poorest of the poor, their current living situation is strongly characterised by poverty. The insufficient access to formal financial services intensifies this instance, as migrants are dependent on informal and insecure networks. On the one hand migrants can be seen as a potential target group for microfinance institutions. On the other hand microfinance institutions in HCMC are potentially able to provide financing schemes to migrant workers. Thus HMF enables migrants to leave boarding houses, which are the physical manifestation of poverty. Notwithstanding these facts, more crucial questions need to be addressed including land use rights, infrastructure and basic services. Regarding this aspect, microfinance institutions have to link up with international NGOs, domestic institutions and local authorities to develop comprehensive concepts. The expansion process of microfinance in HCMC does strongly rely on the general development of the Vietnamese

banking system. Thereby the ongoing reform process and the admission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 2007 open new opportunities for microfinance providers and NGOs to contribute to the Vietnamese financial market. Furthermore, it can be expected that the microfinance industry will flourish in the near future as latest policies[12] only lack implementation. However, the financial intermediation concerning migrants is estimated to lag behind this development. So far only a few providers are disposed to focus on this specific target group. The expansion of depth and outreach of microfinance in Vietnam requires strong reform processes of both the overall banking system and the microfinance industry itself. The transformation of the Vietnamese microfinance industry towards a sustainable market has to overcome the microfinance-as-charity approach of today in favour of a demand-driven regular financial landscape of tomorrow.

In order to develop a prospective city concept, it is strongly recommended to raise attention to migrants' lives and their potential for a sustainable urban development of HCMC. Considering the fact that deficits in urban planning are strongly related to the ongoing expansion process of the megaurban region and that the deficits cross administrative borders, it is necessary to improve the cooperation of HCMC and its surrounding provinces. A successful integration of migrants into the urban society is pivotally dependent on the access to affordable housing. The reduction of the significant housing deficit can only be advanced through various approaches, such as the integration of housing supply by means of industrial zone planning or the further promotion and development of alternative housing finance schemes. Thereby all actors have to concentrate on the demand of the poor. Furthermore it is necessary to implement and enhance the 2007 New Law of Residency, which offers new opportunities to reduce inequalities between migrants and non-migrants. After all it is required to continue the Vietnamese banking sector reform process to develop comprehensive strategies especially for the non-state sector. In regards to the above-mentioned challenges, microfinance institutions have to expand both outreach and depth of their services for all poor and low-income people in order to reduce inequalities within Vietnamese society.

12 Since 2005, the Decree 28/2005/ND-CP of the Vietnamese government regulates the transformation of current semi-formal providers into regular microfinance institutions. The requirements are quite high for small organisations, including minimum capital, compulsory savings, etc. (cf. World Bank 2007: 36).

References

Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2006). Vie: Poverty assessment. Strategy and Program Assessment. n.p.: Author.

Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) (2006).: V*ietnam's Economy in 2005 (a Reference Book)*. Hanoi: Author.

Dang, N. (2005): Viet Nam Internal Migration. Opportunities and Challenges for Development. Regional Conference on Migration and Development in Asia. Lanzhou, China. 14-16 March 2005. Hanoi.

Dang, P. N. (2005). *Environmentally Sustainable Urban Development in Vietnam (1)*. University of Civil Engineering (Vietnam). Science Council of Asia, May 12th, 2005.

Doan, A. T. (2005). Vietnam's New Law on Microfinance: On the Way to an Enabling Environment. *Essays on Regulation and Supervision*, No. 17. College Park, MD: IRIS Center.

General Statistical Office of Vietnam (GSO)/United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2005). *The 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey: Major Findings*. Hanoi.

Gurby, P. & Huong, L. T. (2002). *Ho Chi Minh City: a Future Megacity in Vietnam*. Bangkok.

Helms, B. (2006). *Access for All. Building Inclusive Financial Systems*. CGAP. World Bank. New York.

Hiep, N. V. (2005). *The track records and challenges of housing problem in Ho Chi Minh City at present up to 2010.* Ho Chi Minh City.

Jenkins, P., Smith, H. & Wang, Y. P. (2007). *Planning and Housing in the Rapidly Urbanising World*. New York.

Martin, V. & Kennel, K. (2006). Die Balance von Stadterneuerung und Stadtentwicklung in Ho Chi Minh City - Nachhaltige Wohnungsbaustrategien für Megastädte von morgen. *Forum der Forschung,* 19, 171-176.

MacDonald, J. S. & MacDonald, B. D. (1964). Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation and Social Networks. *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* 42, 82–97.

Mitlin, D. (2003). Finance for Shelter: recent history, future perspectives. *Small Enterprise Development,* 14 (1), 11-20.

Nestor, C. (2007). *Foreign Direct Investment in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1988-2000. Geographical Perspectives*. Göteburg.

National Institute for Urban and Rural Planning (NIURP) (1994). *Data Book Ho Chi Minh City*. Hanoi.

Serageldin, M. et al. (2000). *Housing Microfinance Initiatives. Synthesis and Regional Summary: Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa with Selected Case Studies*. Harvard: Centre for Urban Development Studies, Harvard University Graduate School of Design.

Statistical Office of Ho Chi Minh City (2006). *Statistical Yearbook of Ho Chi Minh City 2005*. Ho Chi Minh City.

Trinh, Tamara (2007). *Vietnam verstehen. Ein Blick hinter die Zahlen und Fakten*. Deutsche Bank Research. Frankfurt am Main.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2007). *Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Devided World*. New York.

UN Habitat (Ed.) (2006). *State of World's Cities 2006/7. The Millennium Development Goals and Urban Sustainability: 30 Years of Shaping the Habitat Agenda*. Nairobi.

UN Habitat (Ed.) (2003). *The Challenge of Slums. Global Report on Human Settlements 2003*. Nairobi.

Villes en Transition Viet Nam (VET) (2005). *Impacts of Existing Residence Registration Policy on Urban Poverty Alleviation. Two Case Studies in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City*. Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

Waibel, M., Eckert, R., Bose, M. & Martin, V. (2007). Housing for Low-income Groups in Ho Chi Minh City between Re-Integration and Fragmentation - Approaches to Adequate Urban Typologies and Spatial Strategies. *ASIEN*, 103, 59-78.

Waibel, M. & Thanh, L. V. (2007). *The Balance of Urban Growth and Redevelopment in Ho Chi Minh City. Sustainable Housing Policies for Megacities of Tomorrow. Action Field 4. Housing Market and Provision*. Second Interim Report. April 30, 2007.

World Bank (Ed.) (2006). *Housing Finance in East Asia*. New York.

World Bank (Ed.) (2007). *Vietnam: Developing a Comprehensive Strategy to Expand Access [for the Poor] to Microfinance Services. Promoting Outreach, Efficiency and Sustainability*. Volume I: The Microfinance Landscape in Vietnam. New York.

"We are Living in a Different Time Zone" Transnational Working Places and the Concept of a "Glocalized Intermediary Class"

Niklas Reese

University of Bonn, Germany

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

The article would like to make a proposition on how to amend the underdifferentiated way social stratification within the "global society" is usually theoretized. In the dominant discourse there seems to be only one global class, the "winners of globalization". Critics of this narrative, which I call the cosmopolitan delusion, make the "losers" of neoliberal globalization visible. But the "vulnerable" (Robert Castel) and precarious are usually not included in such a dualistic two-class-approach. If the middle class(es) within societies of the Global South again are mentioned, this is usually done in simplified way. I would like to introduce the concept of a "glocalized intermediary class" (GIC) to better capture the social location of transnational class positions in between societies of the Global North and the Global South. The GICs can be considered to be part of the (service or white collar) proletariat of the North but at the same time to be part of the middle class in the society of their origin (in this case: the Philippines). If the middle class(es) can be understood as a "contradictory class location" (Goldthorpe), this is even intensified for GICs working and living in between the worlds and the class positions. The exploratory theory of a "glocalized intermediary class" is exemplified by the agents working at international call centers in the Philippines. They are working at transnational working places and can be considered sociocultural migrants.

Keywords: Transnationalism, Social Stratification, Middle Class, Habitus, Postcolonialism

Der Artikel möchte einen Vorschlag machen, wie eine unterdifferenzierte Theoretisierung der Sozialstruktur innerhalb der Weltgesellschaft erweitert werden könnte. Im dominanten Diskurs scheint es in ihr nur eine Klasse zu geben: die "GlobalisierungsgewinnerInnen". Kritiker dieses Ansatzes machen auch die VerliererInnen sichtbar. Die "verwundbaren" (Robert Castel) Zwischenpositionen werden in der Regel jedoch nicht berücksichtigt. Und wo Mittelklassen im globalen Süden Berücksichtigung finden, wird dies meist in einer vereinfachten Weise getan. Ich möchte das Konzept einer "globalen Zwischenklasse" (Glocalized Intermediary Class/GIC) vorstellen, um die soziale Lage dieser Zwischenpositionen besser fassen zu können. Die GICs werden als Teil des (Dienstleistungs-)Proletariats im globalen Norden wahrgenommen, gleichzeitig aber auch als Teil der Mittelklasse in ihrer Heimatgesellschaft (hier die Philippinen). Wenn Mitteklasse(n) als „widersprüchliche Klassenlage" (Goldthorpe) verstanden werden, so wird dies für GICs, die zwischen den Welten leben und arbeiten, noch verstärkt. Die heuristische Theorie der "globalen Zwischenklasse" wird anhand der TelefonistInnen, die in den internationalen Call-Centers in den Philippinen arbeiten, ausgeführt. Sie arbeiten auf transnationalen Arbeitsplätzen und können als soziokulturelle MigrantInnen verstanden werden.

Schlagworte: Transnationalismus, Sozialstruktur, Mittelklasse, Habitus, Postkolonialismus

Preliminary Remarks

Studying societies of the Global South – esp. the Philippines – for more than a decade now, I got more and more dissatisfied with how social stratification within globalized societies is theoretized. I think that an important group of people from the South is only scantly covered by it. The article takes its starting point in two perceived deficiencies of the theory of social stratification within the "global society". Not only in mainstream media, but also in much of the literature social differences let alone inequalities are not problematized. Here the impression is created that only one global class exists, the "winners of globalization". If again the "losers" of neoliberal globalization are noticed this usually leads to a dualistic two-class-approach. The middle class within societies of the Global South is hardly taken into consideration and if it is, this is usually done in an underdifferentiated way. Secondly, the "container approach" of clearly cut country societies (or nation states) still prevails in social analysis.

This article aims to introduce the concept of a "glocalized intermediary class" (short: GIC)

as an attempt to better catch the "social location" respectively the social condition (*soziale Lage*) of a "class in between": being a transnational class in between the societies of the Global North and the Global South and being vertically an intermediary class in between contradicting class locations. The GICs can be considered as part of the (service or white collar) proletariat of the North but at the same time as part of the middle class in the society of their origin (in this case: the Philippines). If the middle class(es) can be understood as a "contradictory class location" (J. Goldthorpe), this is even intensified for GICs working and living in between the worlds and the class positions. GIC is a heuristic term and a work in progress. Developing this concept is part of a longer research project, which wants to identify the sense of citizenship within the globally exposed and connected marginal middle class in the Philippines. The notion of citizenship I want to draw on expresses itself in (a) political agency and (b) a sense of entitlement to social and public services. It is not necessarily linked to a sense of nationalism and a clear identification with one nation state.

The first step in this research is to identify this globally exposed and connected marginal middle class in the Philippines. This article serves as a first step to do so. For now I am focusing on four groups which possibly are GICs: Overseas Contract Workers with a professional educational background (teachers, doctors and nurses, technical training etc.), call center agents in international call centers, local staff of foreign and transnational companies active in the Philippines and possibly even people working at foreign-funded NGOs - in case one considers the "aid industry" to cater to the philanthropic and political needs of the middle classes of the North (as well), which would turn these NGO workers to service providers of the First World. In November 2007 I did a research project on international call centers in Manila and Davao, conducting semi-structured interviews with 12 call center agents and several expert interviews (Reese 2007). Many of my theoretical assumptions took off from the case of this "transnational working places". Therefore they will serve as major example to empirically ground my theoretical concept, even though they probably will not be the central focus of the further research (for reasons see below). In July and August 2008 I discussed the first draft of this article with several people in the Philippines (Reese 2008) and I will try to include the outcomes in this presentation.[1]

1 I like to thank all the persons who found the time to review this article and share their thoughts with me. Maraming Salamat! I have been working for an information office on the Philippines in Germany (www.philippinenbuero.de) for several years and as lecturer for Philippines Studies at the Universities of Passau and Bonn. The insights I gained during more than ten "field trips" to the Philippines ranging from 4 weeks to 6 months between 1998 and 2008 shape much of my assumptions as well. Last but not least I like to mention the more than insightful Master thesis of the Filipina sociologist Aya Fabros on which I draw more than once during the article.

I. International Call Centers in the Philippines

Before deliberating on my assumption that international call centers typify 'transnational working places' let me give a short overview on international call centers in the Philippines.

International call centers are one of the fastest growing industries in the country. The boom is due to the fact that there is a redirection of business process outsorcing from India to the Philippines by US-clients (see in detail Fabros 2007). Especially in an industry close to the customer like the call centers there have been regular complaints from American customers that they can hardly understand the (British coloured) English of the Indian agents. A market gap for the former American colony Philippines, which like India, possesses a well-trained and computer-literate population and in addition has one of the largest English-speaking populations in the world. Due to the colonial past and the neo-colonial present Filipinos and Filipinas are more familiar with US-culture, particularly with American expressions and places, than other English-speaking low-wage economies. Labour costs are even slightly below those in India. In the Philippines companies must pay only about a fifth of what they are paying their employees in the US. At the same time the payment is what is mentioned first when asked for the motivation to work in an international call center. One earns much more in an international call center in Manila than in local jobs which college graduates can take up. A teacher e.g. earns about 10,000 to 13,000 Pesos (150 to 190 Euro) a month, while even a newbee call center agent earns at least 15,000 to 18,000 (215 to 245 Euro). This is if graduates find a job at all! The unemployment rate is especially high for young people and for college graduates. According to the Labour Force Survey, 37.6 percent of the unemployed in 2006 had at least a college level education. Getting a job in the public sector is a tedious affair. Applying for a government job usually takes several months to get approved, requires in many cases job experience and often one only gets one of the scant jobs with a *padrino* using his or her connections and who even in awhile asks to be bribed for this "service". Getting a job in a call center in contrast formally does not even require a college degree and allows immediate hiring. It promises "fast money" if one is in need of cash as Psyche Fontanilla explained, who worked several months in a call center (Reese 2008). In a country where social mobility is significantly restricted, going abroad or working for foreign clients is a not to be underestimated avenue for upward mobility. The lack of job prospects for Filipinos with ample education fuels the migration of highly skilled workers like nurses (or doctors applying to be a nurse overseas) teachers or even law graduates and engineers. (It seems however, that call centers do not serve as an alternative to migration but more as a deferment of and preparation for migration.) Call center companies unlike many other companies furthermore offer social security contributions which are really remitted to the social security system

(SSS). Some even offer an extra health insurance supplementing the only basic payments of the mandatory health insurance Philhealth.

All of this makes the jobs attractive even for graduates of the country´s elite universities. When asking my interviewees whether they minded getting paid only a fifth of what their American counterparts received for the same work I received the following reply: "They're losing their jobs; we don't" (Reese 2007). The working conditions on the other hand do not belong to what makes the call center jobs attractive. Many of the problems call center agents encounter during their work resemble those of a factory job: high work speed and frequently changing shifts are just two of several bad conditions. This work routine has resulted in various health problems for agents. Furthermore they encounter job-specific impertinences like frequently disrespectful and racist insults on the part of the person they are talking to. As a good portion of the accounts in the Philippines are outsourced from the USA and Canada, most shifts are in line with North American day time. The 8-12 hour difference translates to peak working hours from 6pm to 6am Manila time. Adding to the changing shifts night work implicates that agents can hardly plan their week and are pulled out of the social rhythms of the remaining society due to the differing working hours. "The day-to-day lives of agents begin to revolve around call center production, strictly limiting outside, private activity and interaction with significant others. Family life and friendships suffers much from it", says Fabros (2007: 262), who spent six months as a call center agent during the research for her Master thesis. They then develop new friend networks which are composed usually of colleagues. The commonalities with the transnational family lives of Overseas Contract Workers (OCWs) seem compelling (see Fabros 2007: 150 for an example). But call centers do not seem to be considered life-time jobs. Many agents drop out after a while. "If one would be offered a day time job with comparable remuneration, probably everyone would accept it", says Rosen, a 34-year old call center agent (Reese 2007). "Someday we want to have a normal life as well." In the long term most are frustrated too that they do not advance in career terms. "I did not study to be a better telephone lady forever", says an agent from Bicol. Only for those, whose tasks are within range of what they have studied (IT-consultants e.g.) call centers are a job location where they find personal fulfillment.

II. Pinoy by Day, Kano by Night – Transnational Working Places

The assumption I want to develop in the second part of my article is the following: International call centers typify transnational working places, which are globalizing and localizing at the same time. "Transnationalism" is a term which tries to express the increase

of economic, cultural and social interaction world-wide, coming along with the loosening of the significance of national borders. Social interconnections are created which transverse and lay across geographical borders (Pries 2001). "Transnational", however, is not equivalent to "cosmopolitan" – a normative and sometimes even ideological term propagating the idea that all of humanity belongs to a single moral community, which implies that borders (geographical, but social and cultural as well) are of only little significance. At the same time "transnational" is not equivalent to the term "multicultural" which rather assumes the idea of a peaceful coexistence of different cultures (which people can easily and unequivocally be associated to), which only marginally influence each other. Instead (at least) dual loyalty is a central characteristic for transnational existences: people have religious, cultural or political ties to societies other than the country of their origin or residence. Saskia Sassen has described the urbanities which are in this sense transnational as global cities (e.g. Sassen 2001).

I believe that international call centers can be considered such "transnational working places" as they are situated in a "space" which transverses national borders in respect to time and culture even if they are clearly situated within a specific country. Fabros identifies a "spatiotemporal reconstitution": "In order to reach the customer, agents have to submit to temporal cycles of others. Call center production requires agents to reorder their day-to-day routines according to the cycles of the time zone they service" (2007: 61). The clocks on the floor of call centers usually show the time zone they service. "We are living in a different time zone", therefore says Rosen, an agent from Manila (Reese 2007). Fabros (2007: 61) says that agents are forced to reorder their life according to imperatives that are not situated in the physical space they occupy nor the common social space they share with significant others. Barbara Adam even calls the synchronization of agents´ shifts with Western customer servicing hours a "colonization with time" (Fabros 2007: 134). Agents are compelled to live in at least two "places" at once and at the same time they are held responsible for managing and reconciling these contradictory lives on their own. They are Pinoy (a colloquial term for Filipino) by day and Kano (a colloquial term for American) by night. It seems agents have to live a "second life": What is real around them is irrelevant for the virtual space they inhabit. They have to "defy time and space" (Fabros 2007: 60): Should there be a natural calamity in the Philippines like a typhoon which is a frequent occurrence, operations go on as scheduled and agents have to act as if it was an ordinary day. Agents have to deliver their performances, business as usual. American callers have no idea that they are calling a place being ravaged by a storm or threatened by a coup. National holidays in the Philippines are ordinary working days for the agents, not allowing them to spend these very social days with their relatives and their beloved ones. At the same time they take on American holidays like Thanksgiving, which have no real meaning in their everyday lives. Therefore Fabros does

not consider transnational existences like the mentioned call center agents to be merely "deterritorialized" (as Appudarai would do) but more than that, to be "disembedded" from the society surrounding them (Fabros 2007: 61). Call center districts like Eastwood in Metro Manila could be described as outlets or franchises of the USA, inhabited by onlookers[2] consuming Western products in the branches of Western coffee house chains thanks to higher purchasing power in comparison to the rest of the society around them. They have at least got hold of a place in the standing room. These districts could be understood as Western theme parks, which are not merely simulations of the West as they develop their own distinct reality. Some agents not only work but also live in these disembedded global cities which take the form of artificial islands amidst of the squatter areas of Metro Manila, places again other agents live in and so cross the "border" every day. Fabros considers this to create a "social-jetlag that requires no physical displacement" (2007: 61).

Making Extraterritoriality Homelike

Conventional service delivery usually requires physical proximity. To make up for this "default" and to close the gap to the temporal approximation to the customers´ world alone is not enough. To "manufacture proximity" (Aya Fabros based on Reese 2007) not only the spatiotemporal gap has to be bridged but the social and cultural gap also has to be closed as far as possible[3] and in market logic this is at the expense of the service provider. The logic of "service wage labour" with its motto "The customer is the king" leads to a neo-colonial appropriation of the "periphery" by the metropolis. "Closing the gap" requires the performance of considerable social and cultural labour and the neo-colonial subjects are the ones to move and to adapt.[4] They have to bear the burden of producing respectively constructing proximity and they are the ones who have to cope with with the resulting disembeddedness and their alienation.[5]

---

2 The German term "Zaungast" even grasps the phenomenon more clearly: Literally it means guest on the fence, making him a second-class guest who can only watch and hardly participate unlike a fence sitter who is free to go to either side.

3 To manufacture proximity may even be of higher significance in a non-view-business as it can create the necessary trust for a continued patronage.

4 I will omit at this point for reasons of space that the social production by the agents goes beyond closing these gaps. In a capitalist service economy in general it includes a lot of emotional work on the side of the (alienated) service provider demonstrating that "the customer is valued", "is always right" and has to be understood no matter how weird s/he behaves. "Whatever the case may be, the agent is expected to establish rapport, empathize, deliver customer care, and ensure customer satisfaction." (Fabros 2007: 58) "The companies force us to be a kind of sponge which absorbs the anger of the customers" says the 26-year old agent Leslie from Davao (Reese 2007).

5 Interestingly enough Fabros believes that Filipinos and Filipinas have learnt coping with disembeddedness over the centuries: "Particular social trajectories of Filipinos can be traced back to a long, historical process of disjunction and contradiction. […] The 'training' of Filipino call center agents have (*sic!*) taken place long before the first call center arrived, embedded in the particular socialization of the Filipino. I do not just refer to the "Westernized" or "Americanized" sensibility of the Filipino, but a particular ethos that allows the Filipino to thrive and straddle contradictions, whether economic, political, social or symbolic […]. For Filipino agents raised by

Agents are required to slip into a more "westernized" identity and perform the attitudes and persona that the interaction under neo-colonial circumstances demands. Ideally they have to pass themselves off as "locals" and act as if they are talking to the customer just from some place in the USA (although the Ateneo based industrial sociologist Regina Hechanova indicates that agents are less forced to deny that they are based in the Philippines than in earlier times - Reese 2008). Customers are to be presented with the reality that the call center encounters are still taking place 'at home'. ("Let them feel at home" as a trainer from a call center training course expresses the aim of the trainings.) In a very literal sense these are white lies.

Various Ways of Manufacturing Proximity are Pursued to Establish a Homelike Reality:

1. Agents are "instructed" to speak English with an American intonation. Training facilities advertise their courses by summoning the prospective agents to "learn the right accent". Up to now only five to ten applicants out of hundred are accepted although the need is substantially larger due to a lack of "excellent" English speakers. On the floor, agents are required to follow an "English Only Policy."
2. Agents have to acquire "local knowledge": During trainings they are taught US history, culture and geography, have to be proficient in their knowledge about Superbowl and Thanksgiving - and they have to be able to pretend they go skiing in Aspen (even if most Filipinos have never in their life experienced snow).
3. Agents are required to be up to date with events in the US: They are factually forced to live virtually in the US as they are told to watch CNN or CBS news as well as American sitcoms and sports shows (which many of them do anyway). They have to know what the weather is like at their alleged current location as it "helps to establish rapport if you can do small talk about the weather or the game the night before", as one trainer says (Fabros 2007: 176).
4. In several cases agents are even required to change their names which are more familiar to their American callers.
5. Finally "manufacturing proximity" even requires a "mentality training": Agents have to adjust to attitudes different from their own. For instance American (or European)

---

the ethos of Sesame Street and MTV […] inhabiting the call center lifeworld the new capacity to accumulate the symbols and lifestyle this engenders, is essentially a validation of the self. This explains the ease at which Filipinos predisposed to consume images and assume roles that resonate an inner inscribed logic of contradiction, assume this new vocation despite the seemingly dramatic transition it requires" (Fabros 2006). In a personal interview she explained to me: "We have always lived in contradictions, we are even socialized in contradictions; that is what makes it easy for us to inhabit that place" (Reese 2008).

> callers tend to be more demanding and assertive, clarifying that it cannot be them who made a mistake. Filipinos on the other side believe in "smooth interpersonal relationships". Filipino consumers are believed to be more 'understanding' and less confrontative.

All this brings Fabros to the conclusion, that "the worker in effect bridges the global distance that offshored accounts have straddled" (2007: 178). The anger they encounter when a customer realizes the deception also has to be absorbed by the agent.[6] Taking this setup into consideration one may regard call centers not to only be a (temporary) alternative to physical migration but in fact another form of migration – "a different form of migration, one that is social and temporal, rather than spatial" as Fabros says (2007: 150). While the workplaces are offshored to the Philippines physically, the call center agents are mentally offshored as much as possible to the USA. Their body in contrast must remain in the Philippines, because of the iron fences around the Fortresses in the North and as their reproduction requirements can be remunerated much cheaper in a Third World country.

III. The Concept of the "Glocalized Intermediary Class"

The second part of my article described the working places of the call center agents as "in between the worlds". The third and final part shall try to describe their social position "between the worlds" as well. I believe that what is said about call centers is true in one way or another for the other GIC-groups as well (e.g. migrants). In my research project on citizenship I will even concentrate more on people with migration experience as this is still the big business in the Philippines. One million are said to leave the country a year and there are only around 160.000 call center agents in the country.[7]

Before that a brief overview is needed of how the social structure of global society is usually depicted. The most common description of "global society" one encounters in mass media and mass culture is one which I call a "cosmopolitan deception". It does not visualize social differences let alone inequalities and solely focuses on the winners of globalization. The

6 But it should be noted that "manufacturing proximity" can also have a protective meaning to the agents. Several of the ones I interviewed told me that acting this way makes customers ask less questions and therefore makes it easier to finish the calls within the prescribed handling times. They can also evade the emotional work explaining to their customers why they are not "only Filipinos" (Reese 2007).

7 Additionally I believe that developing a sense of citizenship (a positive one or a negative one as I could witness in many interviews I conducted in 2008) needs a longer experience with the state and the public sphere and reflection on these experiences resulting in a more sustainable sense of citizenship. Call center agents are usually only 20-26 years old. I will therefore focus in my qualitative research more on respondents of 30 years and above, whose "sense of citizenship" seems to be more 'reliable' to me. Furthermore the call center culture may be as much a product of youth culture as of glocalization. Avoiding this pitfall leads me to lesser rely on them as respondents.

marginalized if at all only appear as objects of charity of these winners, privatizing welfare to be a part of the lifestyle of a "socially conscious citizen". I call this narrative "communication society" and consider its motto to be the Microsoft slogan "Where do you want to go today?"[8] There seems to be only one global class (as there has been only one really human being before enlightenment and during colonialism which was the [socially established, Western] male – all the others being insufficient deviations of him and most of the time simply kept invisible) and this is the "executive class" of neoliberal globalization. It includes (a) the (often expatriate) transnational capitalist class and the corporate expatriates which are at least upper middle or even upper class and (b) the (mainly indigenous) "global middle class without location" (*globale ortlose Mittelklasse*). This class is economically networked and culturally connected (by Internet and cyber society), socially established and secured. Following Goldthorpe, these people therefore could be categorized as "global service class". They have at least one thing in common: They fulfil, intentionally or unintentionally, the (flexibilized) functional requirements of global capitalism. Leslie Sklair says: "The transnational capitalist class […] is transnational in at least three senses. Its members tend to have global rather than local perspectives […]; they tend to be people from many countries, more and more of whom begin to consider themselves 'citizens of the world' as well as of their places of birth; and they tend to share similar lifestyles, particularly patterns of luxury consumption of goods and services" (Sklair 1995: 71). This/These class/es appear most often only as actors of the "communication society" narrative, which tells the story of a cultural synchronization of world society in form of a global culture, which is patterned after the Western or even American way of life and suggests or better mocks an unlimited (*grenzenlos*) freedom for each and every citizen of this society "to go where s/he wants today".

The narrative of the global communication society - spread by media and the advertising industry - consists of communities, which seem to develop independently of national and language borders, a kind of global off-shore society, in which the e-mail address in Tokyo and the chat partner in Sydney are much closer to one than the unemployed mother next door. This model is probably most purely embodied by those who Anne Meike Fechter (Fechter 2007) calls "young global professionals" in her research on expatriates in Indonesia: They are young, flexible and unattached, maintain an international lifestyle and are globally mobile. They differ from the earlier generation of expatriates by the fact that they do not consider their stay in a foreign country as a burden but as vocational challenge and as a desired part of their career. Their social networks are more international than those of the corporate expatriates. They have de-nationalized themselves culturally and due to their global attitude,

8 Insofar it is what Ernst Bloch calls an "ideology" as it deletes the contradictions and presents the drama of a fulfilled humanity, but not by transcending the realities (which would make it an utopia) but by denying them.

their mobility and their international network they call themselves "the new global tribe".[9] One of Fechters interviewees explains "Home is where my email is" (Fechter 2007: 139). The narrative of the global communication society is accompanied by rhetoric free of class and gender contradictions; the peasant of the remote Bondoc Peninsula has the same right to follow the developments at the stock exchange as the CEO in the main financial district of Makati or the broker at the Frankfurt stock exchange does. However, "gated communities" are just the most manifest sign of the formation of communities based on similar values, interests and economic as well as cultural capital, which come along with the walling-off of the winners in exclusive areas (in clubs, private schools up to whole city districts) usually resulting from the gentle form of a higher purchasing power.

Going back to Fechter´s "new global tribe", she says they are living in a parallel society (the German *Parallelgesellschaft* could mean ghetto society as well) which she marks as Western international bubble. Belonging to the group of the young global professionals is not explicitly based on ethnic criteria as Fechter observed in the case of corporate expatriates. Nevertheless, the majority of the locals (here: Indonesians) is excluded from this group as they lack the necessary economical and cultural capital. In effect locals can only belong to this group if they are rich, have studied abroad and work themselves in multinational companies, meaning to say they have the necessary economic and cultural capital at the same time (Fechter 2007: 128 et sqq.).[10] The critics of the medially hegemonic communication society narrative try to overcome its blindness by making the other class(es) produced by neoliberal globalization visible: the "global proletariat" like the workers in the free trade zones and "the displaced, superfluous and excluded" like the slum dwellers, the peasants or indigenous people. Taking off from this dichotomization Zygmunt Bauman (1997) considers "globalization" to be an ambivalent process and considers it rather to be a "glocalization": globalization for the ones coincides with localization for the others. This kind of "glocalization" expresses itself especially in the polarization of mobility. "While the 'global class' lives in the time as spatial distances for them are bridgeable and therefore insignificant, the others are stuck in the restriction of space. They lack the resources for moving" (Bauman 1997: 323 - translation by the author). The counterpart of the "global citizen" (*Weltbürger*) is the "global villager", who is required to create profit "while his mental horizon does not exceed the immediacy of his existence" (ibid.).

9 I like to acknowledge my student Nina Benischke, who discovered Fechters book and explained the concept and the adjoining groups very clearly in her presentation on "expatriates as migrants" in my seminar on migration in South East Asia and Latin America at the University of Passau in the winter term 2007/08. In explaining the concept I follow the written version of her presentation (unpublished).

10 Part of my further research will be to distinguish if this is true for its Philippine counterpart the "Makati crowd" too. Can they be understood as onlookers and bystanders and not less important: do they experience themselves this way? Is the financial district of the Philippines, seemingly the most global place in the country inhabited by first- and second-class citizens in this as well?

Transcending Dichotomy: The Three-Layer-Approach

In my eyes this purely dichotomical and dualizing model of global class society (of winners and losers, of competitive and superfluous) in the tradition of Marxism is too simple and should at least be amended by an intermediary stratum the way Robert Castel (Castel 2000: 336 et sqq.) does this for Western work societies: he observes a division of the European labour societies (*Arbeitsgesellschaft*) into three main zones.[11] (A) a "zone of integration" with protected standard employer-employee relationships (the winners of modernization; Castel calls them "the integrated"). (B) Opposite to them Castel places "the zone of decoupling", inhabited by groups, which are more or less permanently excluded from regular wage labour. They are the superfluous or as Castel calls them "the excluded". (C) In between we can find intermediate zone(s), which Castel calls the "zone of precarity", a bundle of heterogeneous zones which are determined by employment conditions, which not permanently secure ones livelihood and are therefore "vulnerable". Castel consequently calls the group(s) found there "the vulnerable".

The two most important categories, which decide on membership and belonging to either zone, are the usefulness as worker as well as state citizenship as Helga Cramer-Schäfer believes. While the superfluous must be kept in check in order not to simply knock down the pawns, the precarious are governed in a different way: who is still needed, must not only be kept at it, but shall follow the intensified mobilization imperative - at best voluntarily.

As "from the perspective of liberalism the direct rule over the subject turns out to be unproductive" (Opitz 2004) and neoliberal policy can reach its political aims more 'economically' and 'efficiently' through individual self-realization respectively self-exploitation, it is pivotal for neoliberal governing to delegate the responsibility and liability from formal state government to the individual subjects. Ulrich Bröckling calls this "responsibilization". To govern under a neoliberal regime means to activate the commitment ("mobilization") and the will of the individual to make decisions under the sign of individual responsibility, independence and individual initiative ("empowerment"). The figure of the "enterprising self", making "a project out of himself" represents the role model of neoliberal subjectifying (Reese 2007a; Bröckling 2007). In addition to that: where not primarily rights, but purchasing power is determining the satisfaction of ones needs, the interests and demands of the "purchasing powerful" - the

11 In the sociological description of Southern societies the tripartition is usually a different one. While a significant middle class seems missing, there is a two-fold bourgeoisie (or upper class) making up for three classes in addition to "the poor". The upper (middle) class is depicted as being split into a traditional (often national) bourgeoisie, (which are mainly the groups Evers and Schiel call strategic groups) which forms the old elite and a new (globally connected and even comprador) new bourgeoisie, which mainly form the "new rich" as described in Pinches (1999) and the other articles of the compilation "Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia" and its sibling books.

"modernization winners" - are to what society and goods production are oriented to and whom the precarious have to serv(ic)e. Castel developed his model for Europe - I believe however, it can be translated to "global society" (where this exists). Scholz (2001) sees a concurrence of integrating and fragmenting processes on the global scale leading to a tripartition into (integrated) "global places", (precarious) "globalized places" and (redundant) "segregated rest world".

The "Glocalized Intermediary Class"

One of the groups inhabiting the global zone of precarity (or in Scholz' words a globalized place) is the Cinderella sibling of the "global service class", which I call for now "glocalized intermediary class" (GIC) – following it up in the mentioned three year research project.

As already mentioned taking the case of the Philippines I am focusing on four groups which possibly are GICs: overseas contract workers with a professional educational background, call center agents in international call centers, local staff of foreign and transnational companies active in the Philippines and potentially people working at foreign-funded NGOs. I think it to be adequate to call these professional groups not only a stratum but a "class in the making" (see Thompson 1963: 9) as they have (a) central characteristics in common [e.g. similarities in education, capabilities or income] and (b) like for Goldthorpe`s "service class" the different "locations" or "occupations" could be accessible and interchangeable for all different GICs undergroups. All occupational locations I consider to be part of this GIC require at least a college degree and serve as (restricted as well as qualified) job options for them. Individuals could pass between one location and the other (although it seems that at least the call center jobs are not an alternative but a "stepping stone" or a preparation for migration [two respondents; Reese 2008]). In how far this is a "Klasse an sich" and also leads to a "Klasse für sich" or at least lifestyle communities (milieus) meaning similar values and tastes, friendship networks and intermarriages and even shared associational memberships is still to be seen. Initial research showed that the GICs share lifestyle: the places they patronize, the books they read, the movies they watch. What unites all of them is that they do not only dream of "joining the global" but are already part of it. Considering that "if you have a foreign friend or you work with foreigners, that gives you a certain distinction, a level up from the other people" (Yasmin Quitan-Teves following Reese 2008), to me this "asset" or "status symbol" seems a pivotal issue for understanding social stratification in the Philippines.

Let me give some evidence that the GICs belong socioeconomically and culturally to what is commonly called "middle class". The "middle class" is less a class than a stratum of

different social or class locations which is why I find the term "intermediary" more helpful. "Middle class" with Wright (1985: 42—57) can be defined as an ambiguous, contradictory social location as the classes within this stratum usually swing between bourgeois and proletarian actions and attitudes. It is especially an income beyond survival (disposable income) and a sense of aspiration which makes someone belong to this intermediary stratum. And I consider the GICs to be one (not the!) class within a differentiated even fragmented middle stratum, located at its lower end. So it is similar to what Bautista calls "marginal middle class", a class which is no longer working class but does not belong to the established middle class (Bautista 2001).

a) Socioeconomic (Materialistic Dimension)

Looking at the features usually attributed to the middle class, the GICs have acquired a higher education (degree). In addition, they have an income beyond the threshold of necessity (a discretionary respective of a disposable income) - but only in their society of origin. Knowledge and skill (or at least the credentials imputing skill and knowledge) are the most significant "capital" the GICs command over. Therefore, according to Barbara Ehrenreich (1989) they can be considered part of the professional middle class. Ehrenreich regards all those people to be "professional middle class" "whose economic and social status is based on education, rather than on the ownership of capital or property", which distinguishes them from petty bourgeoisie or executives and managers. Then again most GICs occupy only proletarian job locations in the global economy (which is less true for the local staff of transnational companies and even more for the ones working at the foreign funded NGOs). In the global society property rights and bureaucratic assets which allow the controlling of the labour of subordinates are not with them and even for the foreign funded NGOs the issue of "ownership" is at least ambivalent. Nevertheless no matter which work they are doing the GICs have a sense of being professionals.

b) Habitus (Cognitive Dimension)

The mindset of the GICs shows another pivotal trait of middle class belonging. They show aspiration and advancement orientation and are willing to follow the mobilisation command.[12]

12 "The true member of the middle class denies this fixity to which both upper and lower are committed. Life depends, not upon birth and status, not upon breeding or beauty, but upon effort" (Margaret Mead according to Ehrenreich 1989: 75).

In addition, it seems that they also show significant distinction. Following Bourdieu`s "Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste" it is characteristic for intermediate classes to show behaviour of distinction towards the ones below them in the social ladder – and simultaneously to display a sense of "pretension" (or imitation) towards the classes above them (Bourdieu 1987). How true is this for the GICs? Not only trade union organizers told me that call center agents have a very derogatory way of treating the simple service personnel in the global coffee shop branches. Especially the younger ones consider themselves to be something better as they speak English more fluently and have a lot more money than "the normal population", the common *tao* (Reese 2007). Similarly, Christ (2008: 30) reports from Dubai that "Filipinas working in the low-pay-sector see people from South Asia on a much lower level than themselves".[13] This behaviour - well proven in research for the petty bourgeoisie and for social climbers - may be a result of their vulnerable social position which leads to applying a strategy of dissimilarity.[14]

And finally the fact that their income transcends the "necessary", motivates GICs to invest it into conspicuous goods which can be seen as demonstrative consumption. Gehrke considers this to be a "part of the class formation process [as] the production of lifestyle is not just a personal matter; it is also directed towards the establishment of social boundaries and structures of exclusion, in order to establish a 'collective' identity" (Gehrke 2000: 149). He furthermore argues that "consumption becomes a symbolic act signalling 'modernity' and membership in the ascriptive category 'middle class' "(Gehrke 2000: 145).[15] Earning in local comparison relatively high salaries they "find themselves with the purchasing power to consume goods and services that affirm and validate the identities they construct for themselves: for instance by drinking coffee at Starbucks" (Fabros 2007: 250).[16]

13 But then again the derogatory behaviour is not specific to any middle class person in the Philippines. All my respondents (Reese 2008) have found it (to different degrees) an overgeneralization if Niels Mulder describes the attitude of the Filipino middle class towards the underclass this way: "[Their culture] centers overseas, far away from anything that reeks of common natives, mere tao. […] They are not offended by the poverty of the majority of the common people. It is clear why the latter are poor: they are indolent and lazy, wasting their scant resources at fiestas, in cockpits, and during irresponsible drinking sprees. […] It is not poverty that is the problem. The problem is that there are so many poor people. These latter are basically a nuisance (Mulder 1997: 51).

14 Looking at the middle class employed in Europe and America this strategy shall lessen the "fear of contamination" and at the same time legitimate the own better position. By stressing the dissimilarity between them and the unemployed they try to suppress the fear of failing (Ehrenreich 1989) and to keep up the illusion of controlling the own risk of losing the job by well-behaving (see Newman 1996).

15 This consumption demonstrating middle-class membership is not even linked to a disposable income. As Gehrke (2000) says, 'membership' is not necessarily dependent on income but can be defined through social behaviour and lifestyle, which can give ones life a middle-class 'touch'. She class this kind of behaviour "lifestyling", which makes a middle class even there where it is not socio-economically present – and helps this symbolic middle class to distinguish itself from the ones it consider socially below itself even if they have a similar socio-economic location. For Indonesia Gehrke observes that "lower-ranked bureaucrats with a monthly income similar to that of the lower class would not identify with those of similar class positions such as small-scale businessmen, lower-ranked members of the military and other wage workers. Instead, they would identify with higher-ranked members of the bureaucracy and attempt to imitate whenever possible the latter's lifestyle (2000: 151; see as well Thompson 1999). In Marxist terms one could call this a "false class consciousness" going along with a high occupational group consciousness.

16 Similar to what is stated about call centers in Delhi one can observe that a call center culture came into existence by the purchasing power, the night-shifts and the contact with the 'Western world'. The experiences

IV. A Glocalized Social Location

If it is characteristic for the middle class(es) to be in a "contradictory class location", this location is even intensified for GICs as in the global economy they are merely considered to be "service workers" (or white collar proletariat), but "at home" they are considered and consider themselves to belong to the middle class.

"Be a Part of it" – The Global Middle Class as Orientation Model

Coming back to Bourdieu´s critique of taste, middle class(es) are 'pretentious' meaning they orient themselves to a "legitimate culture" defined and exemplified by the upper class. Is there any "legitimate culture" the GICs follow and if yes which culture is it? 350 years of colonialism and more than 60 years of a neo-colonial relationship to the West make many believe that "the colonial mindset" accompanied by an inferiority complex towards the West is deeply rooted in the country. The omnipresent whitening applications, English as the language of education and status, the awe a "Joe" (as all white foreigners are called here) and the admiration of their not that flat noses creates or the great relevance attributed to today´s US-culture here are just some hints for that. White people are considered by many people to be more independent, tolerant and of course generally rich.[17] 'Qualifications' like "Expat" or "Caucasian" are highly appreciated and looked for at friendship portals like Filipino Friend Finder.

> *This could lead to the assumption that the cultural orientation (not only) of the GICs is embodied by the "global (professional) class" or the "universal middle class" (Ehrenreich 1989: 19). It can be assumed that what Brian Owensby says regarding the Brazilian middle class can be said similarly for the Filipino middle class: "The experience of being modern was mediated by the image of an idealized modernity located outside Brazil. Through newspapers, books, magazines, advertisements, radio shows, photographs, and movies, a growing number of Brazilians from the nineteenth to the twentieth century came into contact with the idea of what it was to be modern. It was an idea that took life from the visions of modernity issuing from New York, Paris, London, and Los Angeles, where it was supposed the modern had already been achieved. And since by the 1920s the celebratory middle-class storyline had become normative for modern societies, middle-class Brazilians could not help but conduct their lives in tangled relation to the middle-class ideal. Amidst the commotion and swirl of rapid change, they, perhaps more keenly than other Brazilians, experienced modernity*

of the new proletarianized middle class generation are characterised by a call centre job straight after school or university, the night shifts, the technological control and general pressure, the shared flats, the purchasing power, the expensive food in the neighbouring shopping malls, the long hours in cabs, the frequent job changes, the more open gender relations at work, the burn out, the difficulty to keep the perspective of an academic career or to find jobs as academics" (Anonymous 2006).

17 Probably like in Indonesia white people are considered by the new middle class as "uniformly modern and are seen as carriers of the modernising spirit into (..) social life: As the carriers of superior civilisation, high technology and modernity they are looked up to culturally" (Heryanto 1999: 161).

> *through the incongruity and dissonance of trying to live by an ideal they could never quite live up to" (Owensby 1999: 8).*[18]

None of my respondents questioned the existence of this orientation. Most even believe that "colonial mindset" and "inferiority complex" remain strong in the Philippines. This seems to me to be a pivotal issue for understanding a weak sense of citizenship in this country. It comes along with a (purely) "negative narrative" which downgrades what is going on in the Philippines and romantizes the West and its political system and its workings. This narrative seems to be a stumbling point for developing a sense of citizenship (which I do not equate with nationalism or patriotism per se).

Five caveats, however, can be formulated:

1. The colonial mindset may not be that strong and universal as some people assume following the negative narrative mentioned, which seems to me very common especially among intellectuals these days. This might be a result of their quest for systemic change which leads them to "describe the present without salvation" as Jude Esguerra from the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) thinks (Reese 2008).
2. The longing for the West has not only cultural, but also economic reasons. A life in overseas (or as in the case of the other GIC-locations in service of overseas) is equated with escaping scarcity, social and political insecurity and living a decent life. Usually economic reasons are considered as nearly the only reason for migration. This seems to me to be as much a simplification as only blaming the colonial mindset as sole reason why it is "mabuti pasa sa Amerika" (good to go to America) and why people believe everything is better abroad.
3. Even if the Western culture functions as the cultural orientation (*Leitkultur*), that does not imply that middle classes of the South simply copy Western lifestyles. There is a considerable "indigenisation" (which is what Robertson calls glocalization) of Western lifestyle like the fast food chain Jollibee or Pigeon languages like Taglish (the lingua franca of the lower middle class) creating words like "mag-enjoy" (to enjoy) today. During the independence struggle against the Spanish the Western educated *Illustrados* are an example for this, bringing ideas from Europe but rooting them in the Philippine society and culture.
4. There is a considerable desire for being cosmopolitan and having a global mindset amongst the educated middle class worldwide, not only in former colonies. This does not equate with just longing for the West but is expression of their sense of aspiration

18 See Lakha 1999 for the Indian example of orientation towards the Western middle class.

wanting to transcend the well known, exploring the new and exotic, tasting the options. *Plus ultra*![19]

5. Finally, being accommodating and hospitable (*mapagbigay*) is part of the self-understanding of the Filipinos. It remains to be seen if this is indeed a special cultural trait of the Filipinos which must not be confused with simple subservience or if instead mapagbigay is mainly a form of indigenization of the colonial mindset.

How entrenched the colonial mindset is still in the Philippines and in how far it effects the decision of the GICs to "join the global" (by applying for call centers or even more relevant by going abroad) is one of the pivotal points I want to follow up in the further research project.

By now it seems to me that unlike the metropolitan counterpart described by Bourdieu the (new) middle classes of the globally exposed periphery is at least less subject to the hegemonic control of the indigenous dominant class. Michael Pinches e.g. states for the Philippines that an "increasing normative weight is being placed on the ideas of industry achievement and merit" (Pinches 1999: 288) and that "many new rich reject or only conditionally accept the high cultural authority of the old elite. Indeed, like the younger generation of that elite, they are also subject to global fashion trends whose main arbiters are located outside the Philippines" (ibid: 295). "The fundamental weakness in the high-culture claims of the old elite is their association with economic backwardness and national humiliation" (ibid: 295). This questioning of the cultural authority of the old elites could be a result of the Western middle-class merit myth (*Leistungsmythos*) transmitted by a professional education that stresses the benefits of achievement and entrepreneurial merit as well as the ubiquitous middle class role model in the Western movies et al. To restrict the relationship between middle class and upper class in the periphery to a merely pretentious behaviour of the middle class and a merely distinctive one of the upper class (as Bourdieu does for the French Society) would be far too simple. Rather the globalized middle class shows distinctive behaviour towards the lower and the upper classes.

An assumption that could be made from these observations is as follows: The new middle class (in this case the GICs) is trying to participate in the "global culture" conceived to be more progressive and hip than the culture the old middle class is offering and distinguishes itself from the other classes by that.

19 The pivotal question to distinguish cosmopolitan orientation from an inferiority complex seems to me: Is spatial and "mental" migration done to leave the Philippine realities behind as they are considered to be stagnant and below average – or is it done to enrich the own culture to give it a "new blend".

Participating in the Global

My research came to the conclusion that call center agents understand themselves as part of the "global crowd", Fechters "new global tribe", and are proud if customers do not recognize that they are Filipinos (Fabros 2007: 178). Fabros further observed a "certain pride […] that agents derive from working in the frontlines of a transnational corporation or a Fortune 500 company and dealing with foreign customers" (2007: 250). Agents told me they appreciate working in such an "efficient" environment (Reese 2007). Speaking English very well is a central means of production for status and distinction and can be converted into other forms of capital. "To speak English is equated with being intelligent. And for a lawyer this is very important", says one respondent who will be a lawyer one day (Reese 2008). Many young people are tempted to work in a call center for these reasons.[20] Then again I do not want to belittle the relevance income and job security have as reasons for people to work in call centers or to migrate. In stressing the cultural reasons I want to make a point as I think the economical motivation is often overemphasized as sole reason. Especially for the middle class the cultural reasons (the global outlook as Josua Mata from the Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL) calls it – Reese 2008) may be of explanatory relevance other than for migrants from the lower classes who may just escape poverty and are not (that) strongly motivated by the desire for the overseas as Mata believes.

Distinguishing Oneself from the Local

My (still too much *prima facie*) assumption is that GICs not only orient themselves to the lifestyles of the global middle class, but also understand themselves to be superior to not only the underclass but also to the traditional upper class. This would be a major difference to what Bourdieu stated for the French society.[21] Living up to a "professional" working style (see below and Owensby 1999: 68), promoting a model of democracy following Western examples (in case of the NGO-workers) or planning to leave the Philippines behind in looking for greener pastures not only for financial reasons may be done in the self-conception to be "missionaries of 'modernity' as well as trend-setters of a new way of life […] [and] providers of symbolic goods of 'modernity'", as Gehrke (2000: 146) stated this for the Indonesian middle

20 Like the 27-year old Psyche, who worked seven months as an agent after finishing her law studies and in the meantime working in a political NGO. "For a time this work is fun, you get into touch with people from other cultures. It is something different and you can learn something. […] Next to the improvement of my English I also learned to be more patient and disciplined. […] And it was improving my self confidence" (Reese 2007).

21 But in the same line there are authors who question the validity of the purely hierarchical model of taste for Western societies which Bourdieu proposes. Lofgren and Frykman for instance state that "the middle class claims superiority for its lifestyle and attempts to impose it on other classes" (following Ockey 1999: 231).

class. I assume that drinking coffee at Starbucks or going out at Greenbelt or Serenada (the most popular places in Metro Manila nowadays) at night is for young, educated, middle class, professional, urban Filipinos at the same time a matter of pretension (towards the Western middle class) and of distinction towards the common Filipinos. The same could be considered true for the growing patronage of organic products, an idea which mainly comes along as a cultural import of the West and expresses a global, although alternative lifestyle.

"Just a Filipino" – The Localization of the GICs

Media and employers promise the GICs to be part of the "global" drawing on the narrative of communication society. The call center industry for example instrumentalizes these desires quite explicitly. The promise to belong to the 'communication people' plays a central role in the job ads: Self fulfilment, creativity, "aiming high" or "rising above the rest" are highlighted there. "While jobs are designed like a production line, the image projected by the call center, with its global accounts, high-tech work places, posh work environments and cosmopolitan clienteles, coincides with signs and symbols that relate with agents' middle class [and Western oriented N.R.] identities (Fabros 2007: 249). Sooner or later, however, GICs are reaching limits and make experiences that remind them that they are more service personnel and second rowers than full citizens of "communication society". Overseas Contract Workers can hardly escape these experiences as they suffer derogatory and racist treatment by their employers and the citizens of their host countries in a regular and structural manner. Call center agents may find it easier to deny their being second-rate (*Zweitklassigkeit*) although they have a similar experience in their interaction with US-colleagues and customers, who from time to time openly consider them to be "only a Filipino". Agents are told "I cannot understand you" and customers demand "to speak with an American". Most probably NGO-workers are the ones who least experience being pushed back into the inferior, on the one hand as it does not fit into the "partnership culture". Northern funders claim to cultivate with their recipients, on the other hand exactly this culture has a blinding effect as one tends to believe that "it cannot be what may not be" (C. Morgenstern). There is, however, enough evidence of unequal treatment of Southern NGOs which does not come up to the claim of partnership.[22] GICs seem to be neither really integrated here nor there and live in an intermediate world in between the global north and the Global South. Agents as well as OCWs seem to be

22 One of the examples I heard from some NGO workers I interviewed during my second field trip for this research project (Reese 2008) is the fact that Skype conferences which involve participants from the South and the North are usually scheduled in a way convenient to the participants from Europe and America even if most participants are from Asia.

considered something special in their home country, but at the lower edge of society in the societies they serve. GICs cannot be completely part of the global middle class. Overseas travel, which is regarded as the 'ultimate symbol of distinction' amongst the middle class (Lakha 1999: 258), is beyond their means. NGO-workers and the local staff of the transnational companies do fly abroad once in a while, but only if their employer or their funders ask them to do so. Even if they had the necessary means to travel abroad they would encounter major difficulties due to the "wrong" colour of their passport. They are limited to remaining referred to the local place, while the global class easily crosses the borders of nation, race and class, as their American, German and other "Expat" bosses or partners in the case of NGOs do. Lakha believes that the Southern middle class is confined to emulating middle-class consumption through the consumption of inferior copies (1999: 258). Coming back to the call center districts like Eastwood, the agents there remain restricted to a simulacrum of the West - the "town center" being a kind of Disneyland version of the (imagined) West - placed amidst a typical third-world urban environment.

Managing Contradiction: Symbolic Consumption and the Discourse of Professionalization

There seems to be a gap between the class position given to the GICs in the global society and the position they give themselves. There is an attempt to bridge this gap in a two-fold way. One of the ways is compensating their working class-like occupational position with a middle class-like symbolic consumption (see above).

The second strategy of managing the intensified contradictory class location GICs are in seems to be a discourse of professionalization. In short, it contains a reconstruction of the work situation which apparently is factory-like to be well done only in a professional manner and by professionally educated people. GICs (re-)construct their work as demanding, prestigious and relevant much more so as from the global perspective their work is commonly perceived as proletarian. This is especially the case for call center agents and professionals turning to be service workers as a consequence of overseas migration. "Being 'professional' strikes deeply into the heart of agents as it allows them to reconcile the conditions of repetitive, routinary, 'no brainer' work with their skills and educational background" (Fabros 2007: 192). "It comes with the construction of a work ethic, standards, commitment, competence, efficiency and 'getting the job done'" (Fabros 2007: 239).[23] There is the attempt to reconstruct a work

23 This again is used to govern the agents: "Control and discipline is exacted in a way by tapping into the agent´s 'sense of duty' and 'professional ethos' developed through their particular educational and discipline training" (Fabros 2007: 192). This meets with the neoliberal governementality of self-guidance (Foucault) and at the same time resembles the production of docile bodies which was typical for the "making of workers" at the beginning of the industrial age.

which is considered especially by other professionals as a "no brainer job" as intellectually demanding.[24] An agent quoted by Fabros lets her know: "Call center work is not easy, in a sense that, though the work may look easy, there are so many hidden challenges to overcome" (Fabros 2007: 111). Professional is who knows to get along with the given circumstances in a seemingly intelligent and witty way (see Fabros 2007: 169, 192). One reason for that is to meet up with their own self-image of a middle class using their main asset, their credentials, for achievement. The possession of credentials serves as the key distinction marking the "boundary" between themselves and "deskilled workers". This is how I explain myself merely receiving smiles when asking what the agents think about the characterization of call centers as "air-conditioned hubs for exploiting workers" by the leftist labour center KMU. Even if repetitive, even robotic mode of working lets call centers appear like factories, at least the agents make something out of it. "Agents would always affirm their sources of distinction such as their fine background and good education. The constant reference to good schools, background, and education can also be viewed as an assertion that Filipino agents are trying to make, as they distance themselves from the image of call center work as dead end, no-brainer 'mcjobs'" (Fabros 2007: 233). Nevertheless this strategy of beautifying the seemingly unavoidable does only seldom lead to the glorification of call center work as dream jobs!

Distinguishing oneself from the working class may also be an important reason why one can observe "everyday resistance" (e.g. Scott 1990) against unfavourable working conditions amongst call center agents but collective organization in trade unions and alike is nearly completely absent. The latter is considered to be underclass behaviour and joining a trade union is seen by middle class members (real or imagined) as inconsistent with their status and a threat to their hope of rising or at least of remaining a part of the respectable middle class (Owensby 1999: 175 et seq.). "Immersed in this rich, symbolic space, agents do not necessarily consider themselves oppressed. Rather, they are 'stressed out'" (Fabros 2007: 250).[25]

Distinction Within the Transnational Zone

Distinctive behaviour is also applied when the educated middle class of the South ends up serving the everyday man of the North – be it as migrant worker or as call center agent, performing work which may contradict with the worker's sense of self, for instance in the

24 Within the Philippines the reputation of call center work is ambivalent. While most admire the agents for their good English and the amount of money they apparently earn, which they apparently earn, agent turned college graduates of the elite universities are asked by their fellow students now active as attorneys or other established middle class professions: "Why does someone like you work in a call center?", as two graduates from the University of the Philippines told me (Reese 2007).

25 See Fabros (2007: 189-247) and Reese (2007b) for a lengthy description of resistance in international call centers.

case of teachers becoming domestic workers, engineers becoming construction workers or professionals working as clerks. "These 'contradictions' in relations force workers to continuously construct their location within the exchange. Previous social axes of class and status are in a way subverted and challenged by the global distance. This situation demands for new symbolic systems to be created or for strategies to re-assert old meaning systems", says Fabros (2007: 231). They distance themselves to be considered merely drop-outs by their American customers (which the agents believe call center agents in the USA are, underestimating the precarious situation many middle-class members in the global North are exposed to in the meantime as well). "Caught between two competing symbolic systems [race and class – NR] agents play up symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige to reconstitute their position in the exchange" (Fabros 2007: 226). Customers are cursed as stupid people, dull-witted or even white trash, while the agents consider themselves as knowledgeable, bright and university educated. While this downgrading of customers can also be understood as keeping one´s dignity (and therefore a form of everyday resistance), similar distinction strategies are also played towards their main competitors, the Indians: Indian agents are mocked for their thick accents and their "formal" (British) English, characteristics that are then played up as signs of 'incompetence' or 'ineptitude' in doing the job. "Speaking with the proper accent becomes a measure of skills and status, which Filipino agents claim they possess more than their counterparts" (Fabros 2007: 233).

Are the GICs taking pride in being able to adapt successfully to the "global culture" and are using their flexibility as a weapon in global competition? This would indeed be a very efficient way of self-leadership and responsibility, which the Governmentality studies referring to Foucault consider to be the aim of neoliberal government. I elaborated on this very extensively in an article on how Filipinos and Filipinas cope with social insecurity (Reese 2007c) and simply hope that this notion can be at least modified when going on with the research on "the sense of citizenship within the globally exposed and connected marginal middle class in the Philippines".

References

Anonymous (2006). Callcenter in Delhi. *Prol-Position News #7*, Retrieved July 11, 2008, from www.prol-position.net/nlF2006/07/delhi.

Bauman, Z.(1997). Schwache Staaten. Globalisierung und die Spaltung der Weltgesellschaft. In Beck, U. (Ed.), *Kinder der Freiheit*, (pp. 315-332). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Bautista, C. (2001a). Composition and Origins of the Philippine Middle Classes. In Hsaio, H.-H. M. (Eds.), *Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia; Program of Southeast Asian Area Studies,* (pp. 91-150). Academica Sinica. Taipei.

Bröckling, U. (2007). *Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Castel, R. (2000). *Metamorphosen der sozialen Frage*. Konstanz: UVK.

Ehrenreich, B. (1989). *Fear of falling - The inner life of the middle class*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Fabros, A. (2007). *Social production of outsourced selves: A view of call center regimes and experiences in the Philippines*. Master Thesis (unpublished), University of the Philippines: Diliman.

Fabros, A. (2006). Deterritorialized Objects, Disjunct Spaces, Disembedded Selves. *ISA paper presentation. Junior Sociologist Conference of the ISA Congress in Durban, South Africa*, July 2006.

Fechter, A. (2007). *Transnational Lives - Expatriates in Indonesia*. New York: Ashgate.

Gehrke, S. (2000). Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: the New Indonesian Middle Class. In Beng-Huat Chua (Ed.), *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and identities,* (pp. 135-158). London: Routledge.

Heryanto, A. (1999). The years of' living luxuriously. Identity politics of Indonesias new rich. In Pinches, M. (Ed.), *Culture and Privilege In Capitalist Asia,* (pp. 159-187). London: Routledge.

Lakha, S. (1999). The state, the globalisation and Indian middle-class identity. In: Pinches, M. (Ed.), *Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia,* (pp. 251-274), London: Routledge.

Mulder, N. (1997). *Inside Philippine Society.* Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

Newman, K. (1996). *Falling from Grace: The Experience of Downward Mobility in the American Middle Class*. New York: Vintage Books.

Ockey, J. (1999). Creating the Thai middle class. In Pinches, M. (Ed.), *Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia,* (pp. 230-250). London: Routledge.

Owensby, B. (1999) *Intimate Ironies. Modernity and the making of Middle-class Lives in Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Opitz, S. (2004). *Gouvernmentalität und Postfordismus. Macht, Wissen und Techniken des Selbst im Feld der unternehmerischen Rationalität*. Hamburg: Argument.

Pinches, M. (1999). Entrepreneurship, consumption, ethnicity and national identity in the making of the Philippines' new rich. In Ibid. (Ed.), *Culture And Privilege In Capitalist Asia,* (pp. 275-301). London: Routledge.

Pries, L. (2001). The approach of transnational social spaces: responding to new configurations of the social and the spatial. In Ibid (Ed.), *New Transnational Social Spaces,* (pp. 3-33). London: Routledge.

Reese, N. (2008). Field notes – Discussing the concept of GICs and the issue of citizenship with several experts, Manila and Davao in July and August 2008.

Reese, N. (2007). Field notes – Interviews with 12 call center agents and several experts, Manila and Davao in November 2007.

Reese, N. (2007a). Strukturanpassung schadet ihrer Gesundheit – Neoliberale Gesundheitspolitik in den Philippinen. In Husa, K., R. Jordan und H. Wohlschlägl (Eds.). *Ost- und Südostasien zwischen Wohlfahrtsstaat und Eigeninitiative. Aktuelle Entwicklungstendenzen von Armut und sozialer Unsicherheit, (pp. 75-92).* Wien: Institut für Geogaphie und Regionalforschung der Universität Wien.

Reese, N. (2007b). Manila am Apparat. Internationale Call Center in den Philippinen. In: *Südostasien,* Jg. 23, Nr. 4, 74 - 76.

Reese, N. (2007c). Stehaufmenschen – Umgang mit sozialer Unsicherheit in den Philippinen. In Husa, K., R. Jordan und H. Wohlschlägl (Eds.). *Ost- und Südostasien zwischen Wohlfahrtsstaat und Eigeninitiative. Aktuelle Entwicklungstendenzen von Armut und sozialer Unsicherheit, (pp. 217-232).* Wien: Institut für Geographie und Regionalforschung der Universität Wien.

Sassen, Saskia (2001). *The global city*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Savage, M. et al (1992). *Property, Bureaucracy and Culture. Middle-Class Formation in Contemporary Britain*. London: Routledge.

Scholz, F. (2001). Nachholende Entwicklung: Kein Entwicklungsparadigma mehr im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. *Entwicklungspolitik*, 11, 35-37.

Scott, James (1990). *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Sklair, L. (1995). *Sociology of the Global System*. London: Prentice Hall.

Thompson, E. (1968). *The making of the English working class*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Wright, E. (1985). *Classes*. London: Verso.

Differences in Power Structures Regarding Access to Natural Resources at the Village Level in Central Sulawesi (Indonesia)

Sebastian Koch[1], Heiko Faust[2] & Jan Barkmann[3]

University of Göttingen, Germany

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

*The mountain forests of the Indonesian province of Central Sulawesi include core areas of the global Wallacea biodiversity "hotspot". Remote sensing data indicated that deforestation rates around Central Sulawesi's Lore-Lindu National Park differ more strongly between villages than could be explained by differences in the individual characteristics of the village households as assessed by quantitative village censuses. This setting provided the background for a study into inter-village differences in power structures regarding access to natural resources. Our results are abstracted from 3*10 semi-structured, qualitative interviews with key informants from the leading groups of autochthonous and migrant households of three contrasting villages. In village A, nearly feudal power relationships are exerted by a group of local "first settler" families that dominate formal village leadership as well as the influential Council of Traditional Leaders (Lembaga Adat), and that restrict deforestation and land transactions. No such institutional restrictions exist in village C. Traditional power relationships are replaced by economic power based on petty capitalist-type production of the international agricultural commodity cocoa. Deforestation is much higher in village C. In village B, traditional institutions and power structures still appear in place although land transactions are less restricted than in village A, resulting also in high deforestation rates. While contrasting problematic social effects, our study highlights the potential efficacy of traditional institutions in the regulation of access to resources.*

Keywords: Deforestation, Common Pool Resources, Village Institutions, Indonesia

1 Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Environmental and Resource Economics & Institute of Geography, Human Geography, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany; corresponding author; Contact: skoch@gwdg.de.

2 Institute of Geography, Human Geography, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany.

3 Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Environmental and Resource Economics, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany.

*Die Bergregenwälder Zentralsulawesis sind Teil des globalen Wallacea-Biodiversität-"Hotspots" und beheimaten viele endemische Tier- und Pflanzenarten. Die Entwaldung im Bereich des dortigen Lore-Lindu Nationalparks unterscheidet sich zwischen umliegenden Dörfern stärker, als dies durch quantitative Haushaltsdaten zu erklären ist. Darauf aufbauend untersuchten wir Unterschiede in den Machtstrukturen bezüglich des Zugangs zu natürlichen Ressourcen zwischen einzelnen Dörfern. Unsere Ergebnisse basieren auf 3*10 halbstrukturierten, qualitativen Interviews mit Schlüsselinformanten und Führungspersonen der autochthonen und der hinzugezogenen Bevölkerung aus drei sich unterscheidenden Dörfern. Untersuchungsdorf A ist gekennzeichnet durch feudale Machtstrukturen ausgehend von einer Gruppe autochthoner Familien, die nahezu alle Positionen der formalen Dorfführung und des traditionellen Dorfrats (Lembaga Adat) innehaben und die Entwaldung und Landverkäufe begrenzen. Solche institutionellen Restriktionen bestehen im Untersuchungsdorf C kaum. Die traditionellen und formalen Machtverhältnisse wurden hier weitgehend durch ökonomische Machtverhältnisse ersetzt, welche sich wiederum auf den Erwerbsanbau der internationalen Handelsware Kakao gründen. Die Abholzungsraten sind hier deutlich höher. Im Dorf B sind die traditionellen Machstrukturen oberflächlich noch vorhanden, Landverkäufe sind aber weniger stark begrenzt - und die Abholzungsraten ebenfalls recht hoch. Zusammenfassend belegt die Studie die relative Effektivität traditioneller Institutionen, den Zugang zu natürlichen Ressourcen zu regulieren, deckt jedoch auch deren problematische soziale Auswirkungen auf.*

Schlagworte: Entwaldung, Allmendegüter, Dorf-Institutionen, Indonesien

Introduction

In spite of more than three decades of scientific discussion amongst environmental and resource economists, the driving forces of tropical rainforest conversion continue to be a matter of debate (Barbier & Burgess 2001; Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Barraclough & Ghimire 1995). In addition to large-scale deforestation, for example, for timber extraction and palm-oil plantations, small-scale forest conversion accounts for a significant proportion of current deforestation (Sunderlin & Resosudarmo 1996). Institutions play a decisive role in the sustainable or non-sustainable utilization of many natural resources (Acheson 2006; Stern et al. 2002; Ostrom 1990). Institutions are defined as any form of constraint that shapes human interaction (North 1990: 4). Formal institutions include laws, official regulations, and administrative procedures while informal institutions include private conventions, non-codified norms and modes of behavior, customs and traditional values. One institutional

arrangement affecting tropical deforestation is an ill-defined property rights structure which rewards individual resource exploitation while damaging overall resource availability (Mishan 1969).

For cases of a non-sustainable exploitation of common pool of resources ("Tragedy of the Commons"; Hardin 1968), local self-governance is frequently cited as a potential solution at the institutional level. Here, the resource needs to be considered as subject to common property rights instead of as an 'open-access' good which may be exploited by anyone (Acheson 2006; McKean 2000; Bromley 1992; Ostrom 1990). Numerous case studies have examined design principles for an effective governance of common pool resources suggested by Ostrom (1990). These studies generally support the soundness and effectiveness of the suggestions (Quinn et al. 2007; Gautam & Shivakoti 2005).

However, the propagation of local self-governance has its critics. Empirically, it is not clear, yet, to which degree positive findings concerning resource conservation can be extrapolated (Barraclough & Ghimire 1995). Furthermore, the cultural and human dimensions of effective, but often very restrictive local resource management regimes are frequently ignored (Cooke & Kothari 2007; O'Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann 2002; Campbell et al. 2001). For a more comprehensive view of local self-governance of common pool resources, a close investigation of the interaction of population characteristics and the environment is required at the local level (Gibson et al. 2000: 3). These analyses should include an observation of the effect of power and status on resource access (Agrawal 2003: 258). Against this background, our systematic case study explores institutional inter-village differences, with a special focus on the driving forces of natural resource utilization and on imbalances of power between "village elites" and dependent smallholders.

The study took place in three villages in the vicinity of Lore-Lindu National Park (LLNP) in Central Sulawesi (Indonesia), which contains extensive forest areas and provides conservation core areas for the Wallacea biodiversity "hotspot"[4] (Myers et al. 2000)[5]. We used results from census analyses as well as informal interviews with key informants in order to select households that appeared likely to belong to the village elite considering land holdings/wealth, prominent social position in the village community, and perceived success in agriculture. With the heads of these 3*10 households, qualitative interviews were conducted in 2007.

The outline of this paper is as follows: first we will briefly review the general literature on natural resource exploitation. Second, a background on common pool resource management

4 The concept of biodiversity "hotspots" was originally developed by Myers (1988). A hotspot is a biogeographic region with a significant reservoir of biological diversity which is threatened by destruction. According to Myers et al. (2000), it must contain at least 0.5 percent or 1,500 of the world's 300,000 plant species as endemics. The Wallacea biodiversity hotspot encompasses the central islands of Indonesia east of the Wallace Line (mainly Sulawesi, the Maluku Islands and Nusa Tenggara) but west of Papua.

5 The research is part of DFG-funded collaborative research center SFB 552 – STORMA "Stability of Rainforest Margins in Indonesia". We would like to thank DFG and Otto Vahlbruch-Stiftung for funding.

and their relation to social and environmental justice will be given. After a short description of the three study villages in the LLNP area, methods and data collection are explained. Next, our empirical results on local power structures and access to natural resources in the three contrasting villages are presented. We close with a critical discussion of our findings, and some possible policy recommendations.

Natural Resource Exploitation

The conversion of tropical rainforests into arable land can be viewed as a highly degrading utilization of a precious natural resource. Thus, the search for appropriate management institutions is a highly important challenge at present (Berkes 1989; McCay & Acheson 1987). Garrett Hardin (1968) explained the economic rationality behind a paradigmatic type of natural resource overuse involving a pasture and local herders in his influential article "The Tragedy of the Commons"[6]. From the perspective of a self-interested individual, it appears as a promising resource use strategy to use as much as possible from the pasture to grow one´s own sheep or cattle. While the profits from intensive utilization of the pasture accrue completely to the individual, possible negative effects on the quality of the pasture (externalities) must be born by the whole community of users of the pasture. If such behavior is wide-spread, it easily leads to over-exploitation and final depletion of the pasture – with negative long-term effects for everyone (Hardin 1968). This divergence between individual rationality and group rationality was customarily explained after Hardin with the specific attributes of many natural resources as common pool goods (Berkes & Folke 1998: 6).

*Table 1: **Type of Good, by Physical Characteristics***

	Exclusion Easy	**Exclusion Difficult or Costly**
Rivalry in Consumption	*Private Goods* (trees, sheep, fish, chocolate)	*Open Access Goods* (forest, pasture, fishery)
Non-rivalry in Consumption	*Club or Toll Goods* (cable TV, festive atmosphere at a party)	*Pure Public Goods* (N2 in air, national defense)

Source: slightly modified according to McKean (2000: 29)

6 Hardin built up his theory on former thoughts of William Forster Lloyd (1833) "Two Lectures on the Check to Population", who analyzed medieval village land holdings and population growth. However, the origin of the theory dates back to Aristotle.

From a systematic perspective, common pool resources share characteristics with private goods and with open-access goods (Table 1). Open-access goods are defined by rivalry in consumption and non-excludability (Gibson et al. 2000: 6). Rivalry in consumption means that a unit of the resource "consumed" by one user cannot be consumed by another. Non-excludability means that it is very difficult or prohibitively costly to exclude a potential user of the resource from actual consumption. Rivalry in consumption and excludability are necessary categories to classify goods because a simple differentiation between public and private goods is not sufficient for the characterization of natural resources (McKean 2000: 28 et seq.). Pure public goods (no rivalry, non-excludable) and (pure) private goods (rivalry in consumption and excludable) are only two extreme cases of a 2x2 matrix of types of goods (Table 1). Many forests, pastures, or fisheries are managed as common pool resources, and display rivalry in consumption while potential users are difficult or just very costly to exclude – if no institutional mechanisms exist that effectively govern access and use of the resources (McKean 2000: 29). Thus, it was claimed that the establishment either of private property rights or of government control are crucial to a sustainable use of natural resources (Demsetz 1967; Smith 1981).

However, several studies published over the last two decades concluded that neither privatization nor government control necessarily lead to sustainable resource use because the establishment of effective control remains a challenge for goods for which users are structurally difficult to exclude (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom et al. 1999). In contrast, there is growing evidence that certain types of joint local management institutions with clearly defined rules can be successful in averting the tragedy of the commons (see next section).

Local Self-Governance of Common Pool Resources – Effectiveness Versus Justice?

Along the lines of resource economic analysis, the research tradition on common pool resources started with questions on the sustainability of resource utilization (Stern et al. 2002: 457). Particularly in low income countries, however, concern on the sustainable use of a particular set of natural resources is only one of several socio-ecological and socio-economic concerns. Consequently, there is criticism that strictly enforced common property rights regimes may lead to social destabilization and fragmentation, and may exclude and marginalize at least parts of the local population (e.g., Agrawal 2003; Bardhan 2001). In fact, many respective institutions emerged from conflicting claims about common pool resources, but not from concern of sustainability (McCay 2002: 372). Thus, an overview of the effectiveness of local self-governance of common pool resources needs to be complemented by an overview of such

human dimension issues.

Resource Conservation Effectiveness

Based on intensive research on sustainable governance of natural resources, policy makers turned away from mainly "expert"-driven top-down approaches to natural resource management towards the inclusion of local communities as central actors (Agrawal 2003). Key arguments for this paradigm shift were provided by the seminal analysis of resource management institutions by Ostrom (1990: 90). She points out that the successful long-term management of common pool resources by local communities is historically characterized by certain design principles, among them (1) resource extraction monitoring, (2) graduated sanctions in case of violations of local resource use regulations, (3) minimal recognition of rights to local resource governance. More than thirty design principles have been identified ever since (Agrawal 2002: 65). More abstractly speaking, institutions need to be established that manage access to the resources in order to alleviate the rivalry in consumption problem by suitably limiting overall resource extraction (Berkes & Folke 1998: 5et seq.).

Furthermore, if such institutional arrangements are applied by traditional communities, the complexity of property right structures is often striking. Property rights can include distinct use rights, rights to exclude others, management rights, and rights to sell (Aggarwal 2006). The rights can be exercised by privileged individuals but are mostly held by the local community (Bromley 1992: 4; Gibbs & Bromley 1989: 31). The diversity of potential institutional arrangements and their differing effectiveness suggest that intermediate forms of resource access may exist between common pool resources and open access resources (cf. Campbell et al. 2001).

Agrawal (2003: 248) points out, that even the three most important works on the Commons, Ostrom (1990), Wade (1994) and Baland & Platteau (1996), "pay relatively little attention to features of resources that affect sustainable governance". Also, a thorough integration of impacts of demographics, market access or technology adoption – which are central topics of classical agro- and development economic analysis (e.g., Barbier & Burgess 2001; Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Shively 2001) is still missing (Agrawal 2003). These are potentially relevant influences also for the LLNP area in Central Sulawesi, where Maertens et al. (2006) documented that technology adoption can increase forest loss. In sum, local self-governance of common pool resources appears as a promising approach to an effective natural resource management, although the robustness of current prescriptions in the face of adverse external factors is unclear (Agrawal 2003; Agrawal 2002: 71).

Social Aspects

Humans depend vitally on the provision of environmental goods and services, particularly those who live in rural areas of low income countries or emerging economies. For the rural poor, natural resources such as forests, rivers, or fisheries often play decisive roles for their livelihood strategies (Bardhan 2001: 281). According to the theorists of the Commons, the emergence of strong and effective local institutions is central for sustainable resource management (see key-principles above). However, successful enforcement, tends to be coercive, and in reality often constrains mostly those with the least power (Agrawal 2003: 257). But even during the establishment of the resource management regime, it can be expected that institutional choices are predominantly influenced by the most powerful local groups disadvantaging marginal and less powerful groups. In consequence, strict enforcement secures an unequal allocation of natural resource benefits. Such a domination of institution building by local elites tends to result in social fragmentation, and impedes social progress (Bardhan 2001: 281 et seq.).

Although literature has long highlighted the importance of participation in the design of institutions governing common pool resources (Stern et al. 2002: 470), it is still a moot topic how participation really works (e.g. Cooke & Kothari 2007). Theoretically, participation aims at an equal appraisal of the voices and interests of all affected individuals in a practical discourse free of domination (Habermas 1992). In fact, participative processes often only maintain or even reinforce existing status, power and patronage relationships perversely justifying them by recourse to (formal) participation (Hailey 2007: 94).

With respect to customary law as a typical form of local natural resource management institutions, Hodgson (2004: 86) writes:

> *"Another risk regarding customary law is that it is often taken to be inherently democratic, egalitarian, equitable and therefore to deserve support in contrast to formal law and regulations issued from distant capitals, which are not. This kind of romantic view is false. There is ample evidence that customary law frequently reflects unequal power relationships in local communities. Such relationships greatly affect the ways in which land and water are distributed and managed."*

Similar to customary law, "local knowledge" may be impregnated by the views, values and interests of those locally in power (Hildyard et al. 2007: 56ff; Mosse 2007: 19).

In sum, a socially critical analysis of local self-governance of natural resources from a justice and equality point of view is as much a pressing issue as the concern for the sustainable use of the resource itself (cf. Agrawal 2003). The relative lack of empirical research on these broader human dimension issues guides our specific investigation of power relationships in three contrasting villages in the vicinity of Lore-Lindu National Park (LLNP).

Study Area

Located in the humid Tropics in Central Sulawesi (1° 03'- 1° 57'S, 119°57'- 120° 21'E), Lore-Lindu National Park covers some 2,290 km^2 of montane, cloud and monsoon forests from ~200-2,610 m a.s.l. (Figure 1). The LLNP area is characterized by rift valleys and a steep rainfall gradient from 500 to 2,500 mm per year. First established as an UNESCO Man & Biosphere reserve in 1978, it was declared a National Park by the Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture in 1982. However, until 1993 LLNP was not officially recognized, and its permanent borders were not fixed until the end of the 1990s.

Approximately 136,000 citizens, mainly agricultural smallholders, live in 119 villages within the study area of 7,220 km2 around LLNP (Erasmi et al. 2004; Maertens 2003: 22 et seqq.). Central Sulawesi is one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia, and the LLNP area is – similar to other remote upland regions – considered as a distant, disadvantaged place with fragile ecosystems and poverty stricken villages (Li 1999: 34; Li 2007).



Figure 1 (continues next page)



Figure 1 (continued from last page)

As one of the first activities of the Indonesian-German research center Stability of Rainforest Margins in Indonesia (STORMA)[7], 12 villages were selected for intensive socio-economic research by stratified random sampling with population density, share of migrants of the village population, and distance to the road as stratification criteria (Zeller et al. 2002). These 12 villages encompass great variation in ecological conditions, as well as land-use patterns, socio-cultural and socio-economic conditions. The three contrasting villages used in our study were identified on the basis of household surveys conducted in the 12 villages as well as additional qualitative research on cultural landscape change, migration, ethnicity and ethnicity impact on land-use (Weber 2006; Faust et al. 2003). A census in the three villages later documented a gradient of migration intensity and, consequently, ethnic composition. With respect to migration dynamics, the villages were categorized as traditional, transitional and post-transitional (Weber & Faust 2006). In the following, we refer to these villages as village A, B, and C.

Village A represents a relatively static, traditional village type with low immigration, and a high share of autochthonous ethnics (~68 percent[8] although several different ethnic groups are present). The village is one of the oldest settlements in the LLNP area and has a strong emphasis on traditions. In addition to a Council of Traditional Leaders (*Lembaga Adat*), an indigenous women's organization is active here since the 1990s (*Organisasi Perempuan Adat Ngata Toro*/OPANT). It fosters the traditional use of natural resources in the sense of a conservation agenda in collaboration with the village government. Land use is characterized by a large amount of wet rice fields at the valley bottom. Additionally, seasonal mixed cropping and agroforestry systems (mainly coffee and cacao) are widespread. Village A is almost an enclave inside LLNP. Free and accessible land is limited as access to land and all

7 See www.storma.de

8 This calculation includes one hamlet (Dusun V), located at the main road approximately five kilometers away from the village center. It is officially part of village A. Differing from the main village hamlets, however, Dusun V is mainly inhabited by Rampi ethnics from South Sulawesi. Dusun V inhabitants participate only little in village A community activities. The percentage of autochthonous inhabitants is much higher in village centre.

forest resources was officially suspended in 1982 with the declaration of the national park (Fremerey 2002: 13; Burkard 2002: 9 et seq.). As the result of negotiations with the national park administration, Village A was granted far-reaching self-governance rights to about 23 km^2 of forest land in 2001. In this community forest, village authorities monitor and regulate forest resource utilization.

Village B is less static and traditional than village A. It was relatively recently established at the southern end of the main asphalt road west of LLNP. Because of the less suitable topography, wet rice cultivation is of little importance while agroforestry dominates village agriculture. The population of village B doubled within the last ten years displaying high demographic dynamics with a significant proportion of migrants particularly from southern Sulawesi Buginese. Thus, village B is a representative of a transitional village type, in which immigration has started to impact village life but is not dominating it.

Village C is a young post-transitional village, located in the dynamic region of the Palolo valley at the northern edge of LLNP. Local migrants from surrounding villages were the most important group of first settlers before and during the 1970s when the Palolo valley was sparsely populated in contrast to the lower Palu valley (see Figure 1). The local migrants cleared the existing lowland forest for the establishment of wet rice fields. At the onset of the cacao boom in Central Sulawesi the 1980s (*revolusi cokelat*; Sitorus 2004), Palolo was a favorite destination for a high influx of regional migrants, mostly Buginese well versed in cacao cultivation, which has a longer tradition in South Sulawesi. Today, village C's agriculture consists predominantly of intensive cacao plantations.

The census data had also indicated strong differences in average land acquisition patterns of the single households between the three villages (Koch et al. 2008). The census data show that 29 percent of all agricultural plots are bought in village A, whereas 55 percent are inherited, and 6 percent are cleared from primary forest inside LLNP. In village C, in contrast, 56 percent are bought, only 18 percent are inherited and 13 percent are cleared from forests inside LLNP. In village B, 35 percent are bought, 41 percent are inherited and 14 percent of the plots are cleared from community forest close to but outside LLNP. High levels of forest conversion (villages B, C) are related to the sale of land by locals to Buginese migrants ($p<0.01$).

Methods and Data

In the three villages, a household census (n=898) focusing on household characteristics including livelihood strategies, resource access and social position in the village was conducted in 2004.

Based on extensive background analysis including the census data, the first author conducted informal interviews with key informants in the villages to select ten households per village that appeared likely to belong to a village "elite". Without a formal definition (see Dasgupta & Beard 2007, for example), we considered land holdings/wealth, prominent social position in the village (member of formal or traditional leadership), and perceived success in agriculture as criteria to select "elite" households. With these 3*10 households, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted from March to June 2007. The interviews followed a "problem-centred interview" (PCI) approach (Witzel 1989: 227fet sqq.) focusing on natural resource use patterns. They included questions on village-level institutions and the related power structures that govern infra-village resource access and use decisions.

The 2004 census had already generated quantitative estimates on issues such as household forest conversion and land transactions. For this study, we chose a qualitative research methodology as a complement as the capacity of quantitative surveys to obtain meaningful information on potentially sensitive topics such as (technically illegal) deforestation is limited due to standardization requirements (cf. Berg 2007; Miles & Huberman 1994). Furthermore, we hoped that a qualitative approach would provide us with deeper insights into processes and background influences on village level resource management.

The interviews were structured by a flexible interview guide allowing, e.g., for non-standardized comments and explanations, as well as the incidental coverage of additional aspects when deemed necessary by the interviewer. All interviews were either conducted in Indonesian (or in rare cases in a local language) supported by an Indonesian assistant. The interviews were recorded in full. In a second step, the complete material was transcribed and subsequently translated into English. We are aware that any translation results in a loss of information. However, we were primarily interested in processes and structures in the village community that can be described in very plain language. A more in depth analysis onto underlying psychological factors behind resource use decisions may have required different observational and interview techniques. Furthermore, shortly after finishing an interview, relevant outcomes and the circumstances of the interview situation were jointly discussed with the assistant and documented. Unclear parts of the interview or potential misunderstandings were immediately clarified.

Since we are interested in specific issues with regard to natural resource use patterns, a rule-guided systematic coding following Mayring's (2007) qualitative content analysis approach was applied. "For a content analysis to be replicable, the analysts must explicate the context that guides their inferences" (Krippendorff 2004: 24). Therefore, the coding system was developed based on an interplay of inductive and deductive procedures (Witzel 1989: 233).

Results

In the traditional village A, all interviewed individuals highlighted the strong influence of local institutions mainly exerted by the Council of Traditional Leaders (*Lembaga Adat*). A clan of families belonging to the first settlers in village A dominates almost all positions in the formal village leadership. Besides the *Lembaga Adat*, its members also occupy the positions of the village head (*Kepala Desa*) and the custom institution (*Badan Perwakilan Desa*/BPD). To be a member of the village government, i.e. factually one of the three institutions, candidates must be indigenous. "[…] the members of village government should be the indigenous of Kulawi" (teacher; indigenous, village A). Although the village head and the traditional leaders are elected, positions are often passed from one family member to another. This is particularly true for the members of the *Lembaga Adat* that has a strong role in village A (see below). Furthermore, only the indigenous people are allowed to participate in the elections. Generally, the others are merely informed about the results. These power inequalities are also reflected in land holdings. Members of the village government, often stemming from the families of the first settlers, possess large land holdings – some of them even more than they are able to cultivate.

These local institutions are effectively in control of access to local natural resources, i.e. mainly to the forest resources assigned to the village. If a household has too little land to cover its basic needs, the head of the concerned household will appear at a *Lembaga Adat* meeting, explain his/her cause, and hope for the appropriation of a forest plot. In addition to access to land and forest plots, the *Lembaga Adat* grants permissions for the extraction of timber and non-timber forest products (NTFP) such as rattan or dammar. Regularly, punishments are imposed by the formal village leadership if villagers violate *Lembaga Adat* resource use regulations.

The same procedures apply principally to migrants intending to settle in the village. Poor, recent migrants are discriminated against, however. This is most obvious in cases of smaller land appropriations, or more restricted access to other forest resources: "[…] some people are being pressured not to take forest products while others were allowed to do. So sometimes I intend to ask where the justice is!" (migrant, village A). In addition to the inability to acquire a position in the traditional leadership, some respondents also report that migrants are discriminated against by restrictions in the use of public spaces in village A.

The land assigned to households in need stems from a community forest located inside LLNP for which the formal village leadership negotiated "traditional" – restrictive – use rights from the LLNP administration. Since there is no "free" land any more, the community forest serves as the only source for land expansion. As a result of land scarcity and land use restrictions,

some villagers already moved to other places in search of land. The community forest is divided into six zones. In one zone, for example, cultivation is strongly prohibited because it serves as a habitat for scarce flora and fauna and as a water source. In a traditional use zone, shifting cultivation with up to 25 years of fallow can be practiced.

Immigration by members of other ethnic groups is strictly discouraged by very restrictive regulations on land purchases. The village government hinders villagers in obtaining private land titles – which are seen as a prerequisite for land purchases by the most successful regional migrants, the Buginese. Differing from other villages in the research area, land transactions must be reported in advance to the *Kepala Desa*. Together with the *Lembaga Adat*, the village head will decide whether any proposed land transaction will be allowed or not. Furthermore, the size that could be sold is restricted by the *Lembaga Adat*. Finally, it is not allowed to resell formerly purchased plots to others except to the erstwhile owner.

Village B is to some degree similar to village A. Traditional institutions and power structures appear to be still in place. The *Lembaga Adat* serves as the guardian of the customary institutions. It grants access to a community forest outside LLNP only to autochthonous households. Also village regulations concerning natural resource use and designed by village head and *Lembaga Adat* exist. The regulations do not exist in written form, and are not fully implemented. Notwithstanding rules and regulations, there is a lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in the village. Therefore, fines and punishments are rarely imposed.

Similar to village A, migrants are completely excluded from any kind of position in the formal village government. "[For] migrants it is impossible to be involved in traditional leadership" (village official, local, village B). However, some economically successful cacao farmers who are migrants were invited to participate in village meetings on agricultural development. This was done because several local farmers were also interested to turn from subsistence agriculture to market-oriented cacao cultivation. Most local cacao farmers adopt cultivation technologies from successful Buginese migrants well-versed in more intensive cacao cultivation.

Since timber trade is officially prohibited in the Lore Lindu area, only fuel wood and timber for private construction purposes – but not for sale – are allowed to be extracted. The regulations forbid agriculture on steep slopes >45° because of the possibility of landslides and to preserve the headwaters to secure the village's water provision. However, land scarcity induces some poorer local households to extract forest products, such as rattan, as an important source of cash income.

In contrast to village A, land transactions are not restricted in village B. Because migrants are not allowed to convert forest into new agricultural plots, Buginese migrants – as well as

better-off autochthonous households – acquire land via purchase from poorer, local households. Groups of autochthonous, partly land-stripped households (15-20 persons) collectively prepare new agricultural land via conversion of uphill (primary or secondary) forest. This is mostly done in the area of the community forest located outside of LLNP. In combination with the absence of effective monitoring and sanctioning of perpetrations of formal and customary law, this two step conversion patterns results in high rates of forest conversion and natural resource depletion.

Although excluded from traditional leadership positions, migrants are not as discriminated against as in village A. According to the former village headman, differences between autochthonous and migrants should be diminished in favor of a unified village community: "The one from Ujung Pandang or Toraja, never [should] think that they are Buginese, Torajanese [; they should] claim themself as Lempeleronese" (former *Kepala Desa*, local, village B).

In migration dominated village C, traditional power relationships are replaced by economic power structures dominated mostly by Buginese migrants from South Sulawesi who are substantially more prosperous than the autochthonous households due to more effective cacao cropping. The village headman and the BPD are the formal governance organizations, and even a *Lembaga Adat* exists. However, neither the formal nor the customary institutions are as powerful as in villages A or B. It appears completely possible for migrants to hold a position in the formal village government (*Kepala Desa*, BPD). The low importance of these institutions is reflected by the fact that formally important legal village representatives (BPD) are not even known by many inhabitants of village C, be they migrants or locals.

Autochthonous as well as Buginese interviewees agree that a widespread laissez-faire attitude on natural resource use prevails. Every household is regarded as responsible for itself. No specific written village regulations exist to date. "There are no regulations about the use of the forest and its products in this village" (*Kepala Desa*, village C). Rules and regulations with regard to the national park exist only at the regional and national level. Locally, neither monitoring nor sanctioning is established. The BPD and the village headman drew up some regulations about natural resource use. For example, an extraction fee for rattan and timber of 25.000 IDR/m^3 materials was envisioned to be paid to the village government. However, these regulations are only partly enforced. In addition, there are attempts to dissuade smallholders from farming steep slopes inside LLNP. In absence of forest resources and "free" land outside LLNP, these regulations are disregarded more often than honored.

Virtually without institutional restrictions, Buginese migrants – as well as some better-off local households – acquire land via purchase from poorer, local households. The land-stripped local households, in turn, acquire new land by illegally clearing primary forest inside LLNP. These new plots are of inferior land use quality, and of a highly precarious tenure status.

In contrast to village A or B, newly converted plots are reported to the *Kepala Desa* only after establishment because permissions from the village leadership are not needed[9]. "It is common here that everybody goes to the forest without permission" (local, village C). Furthermore, while our respondents report that fines and punishments were imposed in the past, this is not the case today.

Table 2: Social and Resource Conservation Aspects Regarding Village Institutions

	Village A	Village B	Village C
Resource Conservation Aspects	*Enforced common pool resources*: Local institutions strongly preserve natural resources in LLNP (low forest conversion rate)	*Partly enforced common pool resources:* Local institutions only prevent migrants from conversion of community forest outside LLNP (high forest conversion rate)	*Factual open access resources:* Neither official legal nor local customary institutions protect LLNP forests (high forest conversion rate, landslides & floods)
Social Aspects	Feudal, traditional power relationships	Traditional power structures in transition	Economic power structures
	Strong & effective discrimination against migrants incl. land transactions	Partly-effective discrimination/ exclusion particularly; not effective regarding land transactions	Progressing socio-economic exclusion of poor locals after land sell-off

Source: own compilation

Discussion & Conclusion

In this concluding section, we first synthesize the results from the three villages with a special emphasis on the questions, how the differences in local resource governance between the three villages influence their effectiveness, and their social impact. In the introduction, we singled out three characteristics of historically successful resource management regimes: (1) resource extraction monitoring, (2) graduated sanctions in case of violations of local resource use regulations, (3) minimal recognition of rights to local resource governance. Although more characteristics may be important, we will focus on these three to determine if an ineffective

9 In order to minimize land conflicts within the community, the Kepala Desa usually issues a letter that documents the establishment of a certain plot for a small fee.

open access situation or a potentially effective common pool situation with respect to access to forest land dominates.

Village A is ruled by a group of families relying on local and traditional institutions for controlling natural resource access. All three of the above characteristics are in place in order to render the – rather restrictive – regulations effective. Villagers must ask the local village leadership for permission for any natural resource extraction, particularly for the assignment of forest land, and perpetrators are punished. The local institutions – as well as the exclusive use of rights in favor of the village A community – are acknowledged by the (national level) national park authorities. Although it is unclear if the negotiated use rights inside LLNP are actually compatible with official national park law, the agreement with the village government is honored by the Central Sulawesi national park administration. This has enabled the leadership institutions of village A to exercise a relatively effective monitoring of their common property rights with respect to outside settlers and resource extractors as well as with respect to locals. One "objective" effect of the combination of restrictive procedures for granting access and a reasonably effective monitoring is the low forest conversion in comparison to villages B and C. Only 6 percent of all plots covered by the census in 2004 were cut by their owners from the original forest. From an effectiveness point of view, village A can be regarded as a relatively successful case of local self-governance of natural resources.

At first glance, the situation appears similar in village B from an institutional point of view. Also, traditional institutions (*Lembaga Adat*, local regulations for land access) are in place. As in village A, migrants are denied access to forest land. Because the village possesses a community forest outside LLNP, there was no need, however, to negotiate restrictive use rights from the national part administration or other state or province authorities. As a result, local smallholders enjoy relatively open access to the land of the community forest. In this situation, there is no immediate need for strict monitoring or for imposing sanctions against locals who illegally use LLNP land on part of the village government. While higher level administrations acknowledge village B´s rights to their community forest, the village is not responsible for LLNP land. Although migrants are effectively excluded from the conversion of forest land in the community forest, it is a small difference in local land regulations compared to village A that additionally fosters forest conversion: Locals are allowed to sell their land to agronomically often more successful migrants. Because locals possess the social capital – i.e., here, a little restricted access right – to covert new forest, they have an incentive to improve their short-term lot by selling their land and acquiring new forest plots that are cleared. These circumstances explain the high percentage of 14 percent of all plots being cleared from original forest.

In contrast to villages A and B, no traditional village-level institutions limit access to natural

resources and forest land in village C. After local flooding and increasing land slides, there are recent attempts by the official village leadership (*Kepala Desa*, BPD) to establish some restrictions on the utilization of LLNP land, for example on the steepest slopes. However, implementation of monitoring is weak, and perpetrators are not punished at present. In face of the massive intrusion into LLNP land (13 percent of all land cleared from original forest), it is doubtful if the LLNP administration will back any local claim to the self-governance of natural resources including access to forest land. As in village B, land transactions from locals to migrants with more highly developed cacao cropping technology are not inhibited, and locals enjoy nearly open access to new forest. Legally, access is not open of course. But the LLNP administration does not muster the repressive force that would be necessary to substantially halt or even revert deforestation. In sum, all highlighted institutional preconditions for a successful self-governance of natural resources are missing in village C.

As suggested for woodland management in Zimbabwe (Campbell et al. 2001), the differentiation between common pool resource and open access resources is useful for explaining some differences in the sustainability of resource use (village A versus village C) but not all: In spite of a common property community forest, deforestation rates are very high in village B. If looking in detail at the resource use institutions of the three villages, further differences regarding the existence of monitoring, sanctions in case of violations, and recognition of rights to local resource governance become obvious (Ostrom 1990). Our case study documents how the interplay of these three factors can differ in adjacent villages at the margin of the same national park. Although the differences in the percentage of agricultural plots cleared from original forests is certainly also influenced by other factors, our analysis clearly documents the decisive role that such local institutions play for resource conservation effectiveness. The question who establishes and/or maintains the local resource use institutions leads to the second main research question of this paper. Is successful local self-governance of natural resources associated with problematic social impacts, particularly under equality and exclusion aspects?

In none of the three investigated villages, we encountered substantial participatory or democratic processes that justified or legitimized existing (or non-existing) local resource access institutions. In fact, it appears justified to describe this aspect of village governance as being nearly completely dominated by the respective village "elites". Their importance for local natural resource governance in the project area was also highlighted by Burkard (2002: 38). He investigated villages at the eastern margin of LLNP. Until very recently, village leaders had the power to distribute resources as they liked. This is partly an inheritance of Suharto's New Order Era policies during which village leaders could behave like "Little Gods" (Faust et al. 2003: 13; Tsuyoshi 1989). They could allocate land at their own will, and

rather freely take financial advantages of their position. Studies from Java (Indonesia) show, however, that such elite capture depends on the structure of a community (Dasgupta & Beard 2007). Communities where both elite and non-elite households participate in self-governance demonstrate an ability to reduce elite capture.

The village elites are structured differently, and local resource use institutions as well as social outcomes differ strongly. In village A, nearly "feudal" power relationships enforce strict limitations regarding access to natural resources including land conversion. This power is exerted by a group of autochthonous "first settlers" forming a traditional village elite that makes use of a highly influential Council of Traditional Leaders (*Lembaga Adat*) besides formal leadership structures. Through denying villagers full property rights even to their existing non-forest land (strongly limited fungibility), a key process that enhances forest conversion and immigration is substantially tamed: Very little land is sold to economically successful migrant cacao farmers. In concert with this restriction, (poor) migrants particularly from non-autochthonous ethnic backgrounds are severely discriminated against in terms of land appropriation, access to leadership positions, and general integration into the local community.

In village B, also traditional institutions and exclusive leadership structures are in place, and migrants are not allowed to clear land in the community forest. Still, strong recent migration occurred which was facilitated by lacking restrictions of land sales by locals. In effect, agronomically successful migrants are increasingly recognized as valuable members of the village community. This transition is reflected by statements from within the local village elite that favors a united village community spirit. As of now it is unclear if the situation will develop into full equality of the autochthonous population and migrants, or if tensions will rise when the group of successful migrants starts to demand equal rights.

In contrast to villages A and B, all traditional power relationships appear replaced by economic power based on petty capitalist-type production of agricultural commodities in village C. While it would be possible in village C for a (better-off) migrant household to convert forest land inside LLNP, the economically powerful migrant households prefer the purchase of better land at the valley bottom for which land titles can also be issued. In effect, the two-step conversion forest process also described from village B is likewise operating in village C – however converting forest inside LLNP. Although no traditional or local institutions are effectively in place, poor local households are spatially and socially marginalized.

The majority of scholars on the commons assert that (local) communities will manage their natural resources in a sustainable manner, ensure egalitarian access and equitable distribution among their members (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Feeny et al. 1990). This paper gives additional weight to critical voices that claim that local self-governance of natural resources

does not necessarily result in egalitarian access and equitable distribution (Agrawal 2003; Hodgson 2004: 86), particularly if institution building is strongly influenced by local elites as in our case study villages (cf. Bardhan 2001: 281 et seq.). In village A, it can be observed that successful enforcement tends to constrain some of those with the least power (Agrawal 2003: 257). Similar trends were found in Nepal where the poorest inhabitants benefited less from common property forest than less poor inhabitants (Adhikari et al. 2004). However, the absence of effective self governance in the project region (village C) displays a complementary social problem: the socio-economic marginalization of poor autochthonous households who – not hindered by non-democratic institutions – sold out their land to economically successful migrants.

In conclusion, we find a very complex reality even at the level of only three adjacent villages that provides evidence for both positions:

- Local self-governance of natural resources can be an effective means of sustainable resource management if some essential design characteristics are implemented.
- Local self-governance of natural resources may have less egalitarian and pro-poor outcomes that envisioned even if effectively implemented.

Additionally, we document that already a small loophole in traditional institutions (village B) can be sufficient to jeopardize the success of a principally well-'designed' set of local governance rules. With regard to the specific situation in Central Sulawesi characterized by cash-crop driven smallholder encroachment and deforestation, the fungibility of land (or its restrictions: autochthonous inhabitants may not sell land to migrants) turned out to be a decisive factor.

With regard to practical implications of our study, we can address only one point here. The governance situation has generally improved with the introduction of the new village constitution (BPD) in Central Sulawesi in comparison to the Suharto era. Our results show, however, that the introduction of the BPD does not result necessarily in more legalistic, participatory or democratic resource management procedures. In fact, the BPD system is too weak to prevent deforestation in villages B and C, and too weak to prevent undemocratic social exclusion based on ethnicity in village A and partly village B. In fact, local elites based on traditional and/or economic power decisively influence access to natural resources and social cohesion. Such power structures should not be ignored, e.g., by development institutions (Hailey 2007: 98). In particular, participatory approaches in community-based common pool management – as well as idealistic market solutions –, should not naively ignore the existing power inequalities.

References

Acheson, J. (2006). Institutional Failure in Resource Management. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 35, 117-134.

Adhikari, B., S. Di Falco & J. C. Lovett (2004). Household characteristics and forest dependency: evidence from common property forest management in Nepal. *Ecological Economics,* 48 (2), 245-257.

Aggarwal, R. M. (2006). Globalization, local ecosystems, and the rural poor. *World Development*, 34 (8), 1405-1418.

Agrawal, A. (2002). Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability. In Ostrom, E., T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich & E. Weber (Eds.), *The Drama of the Commons,* (pp. 41-85). Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Agrawal, A. (2003). Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and Politics. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 32, 243-262.

Baland, J. & J. Platteau (1996). *Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Barbier, E. B. & J. C. Burgess (2001). The Economics of Tropical Deforestation. *Journal of Economic Surveys,* 15 (3), 413-433.

Bardhan, P. (2001). Distributive Conflicts, Collective Action, and Institutional Economics. In Meier, G. & J. Stiglitz (Eds.): *Frontiers of Development Economics - The Future in Perspective,* (pp. 269-290). New York: Oxford University Press.

Barraclough, S. & K. Ghimire (1995). *Forests and Livelihoods - The Social Dynamics of Deforestation in Developing Countries*. Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd.

Berg, B. (2007). *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. Boston: Pearson.

Berkes, F. (Ed.) (1989). *Common Property Resources - Ecology and Community Based Sustainable Development*. London: Belhaven Press.

Berkes, F. (2002). Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the Bottom Up. In Ostrom, E., T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich & E. Weber (Eds.), *The Drama of the Commons,* (pp. 293-321). Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Berkes, F. & C. Folke (1998). Linking social and ecological systems for resilience and sustainability. In Berkes, F. & C. Folke (Eds.), *Linking practices and social mechanisms for building resilience,* (pp. 1-25). Cambrigde: Cambridge University Press.

Bromley, D. (1992). Common Property as an Institution. In Bromley, D. (Ed.), *Making the Commons Work - Theory, Practice, and Policy,* (pp. 3-16). San Francisco: ICS Press.

Burkard, G. (2002). Natural Resource Management in Central Sulawesi: Past Experience and Future Prospects. *STORMA Discussion Paper Series* No. 8, Göttingen and Bogor.

Campbell, B., A. Mandondo, N. Nemarundwe, B. Sithole, W. De Jong, M. Luckert & F. Matose (2001). Challenges to proponents of common property resource systems: despairing voices from the social forests of Zimbabwe. *World Development,* 29 (4), 589-600.

Cooke, B. & U. Kothari, (Eds.) (2007). *Participation - The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books Ltd.

Dasgupta, A & V. Beard (2007). Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia. *Development and Change,* 38 (2), 229-249.

Demsetz, H. (1967). Towards a Theory of Property Rights. *American Economic Review,* 52 (2), 347-379.

Dietz, T., E. Ostrom & P. C. Stern (2003). The Struggle to Govern the Commons. *Science,* 302 (5652), 1907-1912.

Erasmi, S., A. Twele, M. Ardiansyah, M. A. & M. Kappas (2004). Mapping Deforestation and Land Cover Conversion at the Rainforest Margin in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. *EARSeL eProceedings,* 3 (3), 388-397.

Faust, H., M. Maertens, R. Weber, N. Nuryartono, T. van Rheenen & R. Birner (2003). Does Migration lead to Destabilization of Forest Margins? *STORMA Discussion Paper Series,* No. 11, Göttingen and Bogor.

Feeny, D., F. Berkes, B. J. McCay & J. Acheson (1990). The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later. *Human Ecology,* 18 (1), 1-19.

Fremerey, M. (2002). Local Communities as Learning Organizations - The case of the village of Toro, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. *STORMA Discussion Paper Series* No. 6, Göttingen and Bogor.

Gautam, A. P. & G. P. Shivakoti (2005). Conditions for Successful Local Collective Action in Forestry: Some Evidence From the Hills of Nepal. *Society & Natural Resources,* 18 (2), 153-171.

Gibbs, C. & D. Bromley (1989). Institutional Arrangements for Management of Rural Resources. In Berkes, F. (Ed.): *Common Property Resources - Ecology and Community Based Sustainable Development,* (pp. 22-32). London: Belhaven Press.

Gibson, C., M. McKean & E. Ostrom (2000). Explaining Deforestation: The Role of Local Institutions. In Gibson, C., M. McKean & E. Ostrom (Eds.), *People and Forests - Communities, Institutions, and Governance,* (pp. 1-26). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1992). *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*. 2nd ed. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Hailey, J. (2007). Beyond the Formulaic: Process and Practice in South Asian NGOs. In Cooke, B. & U. Kothari (Eds.), *Participation - The New Tyranny?* (pp. 88-101). London: Zed Books Ltd.

Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science,* 162 (3859), 1243-1248.

Hildyard, N., P. Hegde, P. Wolvekamp & S. Reddy (2007). Pluralism, Participation and Power: Joint Management in India. In Cooke, B. & U. Kothari (Eds.), *Participation - The New Tyranny?* (pp. 56-71). London: Zed Books Ltd.

Kaimowitz, D. & A. Angelsen (1998). *Economic Models of Tropical Deforestation - A Review.* Bogor, CIFOR.

Koch, S., H. Faust, J. Barkmann, & R. Marggraf (2008): Influence of Informal Institutions at the Village Level on Land Acquisition and Forest Conversion around LLNP in Central Sulawesi (Indonesia). In Stadler,

J., F. Schöppe, & M. Frenzel (Eds.), EURECO-GFOE 2008 "Biodiversity in an Ecosystem Context", p. 818, September 15-19, 2008, *Proceedings - Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft für Ökologie*, Band 38, Leipzig.

Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Li, T. M. (Ed.) (1999). T*ransforming the Indonesian Uplands - Marginality, Power and Production*. Amsterdam: OPA.

Li, T. M. (2007). *The Will to Improve - Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Maertens, M. (2003). *Economic Modeling of Agricultural Land-Use Patterns in Forest Frontier Areas - Theory, Empirical Assessment and Policy Implications for Central Sulawesi, Indonesia*. Ph. D. Thesis, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Germany.

Maertens, M., M. Zeller & R. Birner (2006). Sustainable agricultural intensification in forest frontier areas. *Agricultural Economics,* 34 (2), 197-206.

Mayring, P. (2007). *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse - Grundlagen und Techniken*. Weinheim: Beltz.

McCay, B. (2002). Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Context, Situations, and Events. In Ostrom, E., T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich & E. Weber (Eds.), *The Drama of the Commons,* (pp. 361-402). Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

McCay, B. & J. Acheson, (Eds.) (1987). *The Question of the Commons - The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.

McKean, M. (2000). Common Property: What Is It, What Is It Good for, and What Makes It Work?. In Gibson, C., M. McKean & E. Ostrom (Eds.), *People and Forests - Communities, Institutions, and Governance*, (pp. 27-55). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Miles, M. & M. Huberman (1994). *Qualitative Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mishan, E. (1969). The Relationship between Joint Products, Collective Goods, and External Effects. *The Journal of Political Economy,* 77 (3), 329-348.

Mosse, D. (2007). 'People's Knowledge', Participation and Patronage: Operations and Representations in Rural Development. In Cooke, B. & U. Kothari (Eds.), *Participation - The new Tyranny?* (pp. 16-35). London: Zed Books Ltd.

Myers, N. (1988). Threatened biotas: 'hotspots' in tropical forests. *Environmentalist,* 8 (3), 187-208.

Myers, N., R. A. Mittermeier, C. G. Mittermeier, G. A. B. da Fonseca & J. Kent (2000). Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities. *Nature,* 403 (6772), 853-858.

North, D. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Riordan, T. & S. Stoll-Kleemann (2002). Deliberative Democracy and Participatory Biodiversity. In O'Riordan, T. & S. Stoll-Kleemann (Eds.), *Biodiversity, Sustainability and Human Communities - Protecting beyond the Protected,* (pp. 87-112). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E., J. Burger, C. B. Field, R. B. Norgaard & D. Policansky (1999). Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges. *Science,* 284 (5412), 278-282.

Quinn, C. H., M. Huby, H. Kiwasila & J. C. Lovett (2007). Design principles and common pool resource management: An institutional approach to evaluating community management in semi-arid Tanzania. *Journal of Environmental Management,* 84 (1), 100-113.

Shively, G. (2001). Agricultural Change, Rural Labor Markets, and Forest Clearing: An Illustrative Case from the Philippines. *Land Economics,* 77 (2), 268-284.

Sitorus, F (2004). "Revolusi Cokelat": Social Formation, Agrarian Structure, and Forest Margins in Upland Sulawesi, Indonesia. In Gerold, G., M. Fremerey & E. Guhardja (Eds.), *Land Use, Nature Conservation and the Stability of Rainforest Margins in Southeast Asia,* (pp. 105-118). Berlin et al.: Springer.

Smith, R. (1981). Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by creating private property rights. *Cato Journal,* 1 (2), 439-468.

Stern, P. C., T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, E. Ostrom & S. Stonich (2002). Knowledge and Questions After 15 Years of Research. In Ostrom, E., T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich & E. Weber (Eds.), *The Drama of the Commons,* (pp. 445-489). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Sunderlin, W. D. & I. A. P. Resosudarmo (1996). Rates and causes of deforestation in Indonesia: towards a resolution of the ambiguities. *CIFOR Occasional Paper 9.*

Tsuyoshi, K. (1989). Different Fields, Similar Locusts: Adat Communities and the Village Law of 1979 in Indonesia. *Indonesia, 47,* 89-114.

Wade, R. (1994). Village Republics: *Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India.* Oakland: ICS Press.

Weber, R. (2006). *Kulturlandschaftswandel in Zentralsulawesi.* Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen.

Weber, R. & H. Faust (2006). Kulturelle Aspekte der Landnutzung in Indonesien. *Geographica Helvetica,* 61 (4), 237-245.

Witzel, A. (1989). Das problemzentrierte Interview. In Jüttemann, G. (Ed.), *Qualitative Forschung in der Psychologie. Grundfragen, Verfahrensweisen, Anwendungsfelder,* (pp. 227-256). Heidelberg: Asanger.

Zeller, M., S. Schwarze & T. Rheenen (2002). Statistical Sampling Frame and Methods Used for the Selection of Villages and Households in the Scope of the Research Programme on Stability of Rainforest Margins in Indonesia (STORMA). *STORMA Discussion Paper Series,* No. 1, Göttingen and Bogor.

Armut im Wohlstand
Zunehmende soziale Disparitäten in Singapur

Poverty in a State of Wealth
Social Disparities in the City-State of Singapore

ROLF JORDAN[1]

Universität Kassel, Deutschland & Universität Wien, Österreich /
University of Kassel, Germany & University of Vienna, Austria

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

Der folgende Beitrag zeigt, ausgehend von der aktuellen sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Situation, wichtige Aspekte sozialer Ungleichheit in Singapur auf und diskutiert die seit Jahren sich verschärfenden Einkommensdisparitäten vor dem Hintergrund der nur unzureichend entwickelten sozialstaatlichen Strukturen. Die Argumentation wird dabei von der These geleitet, dass die fehlende oder nur mangelhafte soziale Unterstützung wesentlich zu den sozialen Problemen eines wachsenden Teils der Bevölkerung in dem von großem Wohlstand geprägten Stadtstaat beitragen und ein Ausbau sozialstaatlicher Strukturen eine Voraussetzung darstellen sowohl für die Lösung der aktuellen sozialen Probleme als auch für eine längst überfällige Demokratisierung Singapurs.

Schlagworte: Singapur, Armut, Ungleichheit, soziale Sicherheit

Singapore is the wealthiest nation in South-East Asia today. But behind its high-rise buildings and modern shopping malls rising social disparities and a growing number of poor households cast a shadow on an otherwise successful economic development. Shrinking incomes and rising prices for housing and energy have increased the number of those who are struggling life in one of the most expensive cities in Pacific Asia. The situation is further complicated by a just rudimentary social security system that is not adequately designed for the needs of poor households. The following paper gives a brief insight into the current state of economic and social development in Singapore and its impact on the social fabric of the Singapore society. The lack of an adequately structured social security system for those households and the lower end of the income strata in general contribute most to the rising social disparities is what characterises Singapore's social development today.

Keywords: Singapore, Poverty, Disparities, Social Security

1 Rolf Jordan ist promovierter Politikwissenschaftler und arbeitet seit Jahren zu sozialen und politischen Entwicklungen in Singapur, Malaysia und anderen Staaten Südostasiens. Forschungsschwerpunkte: politischer Wandel und Demokratisierung, zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung, Migration, Stadtentwicklung. Lehrtätigkeiten an der Universität Kassel sowie an der Universität Wien. Außerdem im Vorstand der Südostasien Informationsstelle und des Asienhaus Fördervereins. Kontakt: rojordan@uni-kassel.de.

Einleitung

Mit seinen modernen Einkaufszentren und weithin sichtbaren Wolkenkratzern markiert Singapur das reiche, wohlhabende Extrem in einer Region, die von scharfen (Entwicklungs-) Disparitäten gekennzeichnet ist. In kaum einem Land der Region wird der eigene Reichtum so sehr zur Schau gestellt wie hier, und nirgends hat der wirtschaftliche Erfolg der letzten Jahrzehnte zugleich so sehr die Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung geprägt wie im Stadtstaat Singapur. Doch hinter den glitzernden Fassaden der Tropical City of Excellence[2] bleiben die auch hier bestehenden sozialen Ungleichheiten und die Armut einer nicht geringen Zahl von Menschen zumeist verborgen – auch weil dies eben nicht ins (Selbst-)Bild einer prosperierenden Metropole passt.

Erst auf den zweiten Blick lässt sich erkennen, was sich an sozialer Differenzierung und Disparität hinter der Erfolgsgeschichte des Stadtstaats verbirgt: eine große Zahl von Haushalten mit niedrigem Einkommen, eine wachsende Zahl von Menschen ohne dauerhafte und sichere Beschäftigung und ein sich nicht zuletzt in Folge demographischer Veränderungen verschärfendes Problem der Altersarmut. Waren es vor wenigen Jahren noch – als verspätete Folge der Asienkrise – sinkende Einkommen und zunehmender Arbeitsplatzabbau, die zu einer Verschärfung sozialer Ungleichheit und einer Zunahme von Armut geführt hatten (Jordan 2007), so sind es aktuell vor allem rapide steigende Lebenshaltungskosten und eine anhaltend hohe Inflation, die besonders einkommensschwachen Haushalten das Leben und Überleben in Singapur erschweren.

Auch für den flüchtigen Beobachter sichtbare Hinweise auf das Problem wachsender Armut im reichen Singapur finden sich auf den Märkten der vor allem älteren Housing Estates, wo seit Jahren einzelne Garküchen und Marktstände vergünstigtes Essen für sozial Schwache anbieten. In solchen Angeboten für einkommensschwache Bevölkerungsgruppen werden jene sozialen Probleme sichtbar, die den Stadtstaat besonders seit Ende der 1990er Jahre kennzeichnen, als in Folge der Asienkrise auch hier immer mehr Arbeitsplätze nicht nur im Industriebereich, sondern auch in den Dienstleistungssektoren verloren gingen. Mehr und mehr Menschen sind seither von Arbeitslosigkeit, von Unterbeschäftigung und von niedrigen Löhnen betroffen (Jordan 2007).

Der folgende Beitrag zeigt, ausgehend von der aktuellen sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Situation, wichtige Aspekte sozialer Ungleichheit in Singapur auf und diskutiert die seit Jahren

2 Die Tropical City of Excellence gehört seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre zu den zentralen Begriffen der staatlichen Entwicklungsplanung, wie sie etwa von der Urban Redevelopment Authority in einer ihrer Planungsentwürfe 1991 entworfen wurde (URA 1991).

sich verschärfenden Einkommensdisparitäten vor dem Hintergrund der nur unzureichend entwickelten sozialstaatlichen Strukturen. Die Argumentation wird dabei von der These geleitet, dass die fehlende oder nur mangelhafte soziale Unterstützung wesentlich zu den sozialen Problemen eines wachsenden Teils der Bevölkerung in dem von großem Wohlstand geprägten Stadtstaat beitragen und ein Ausbau sozialstaatlicher Strukturen eine Voraussetzung darstellen sowohl für die Lösung der aktuellen sozialen Probleme als auch für eine längst überfällige Demokratisierung Singapurs.

Steigende Lebenshaltungskosten verschärfen die Armut

Nachdem in den letzten Monaten die Zahl jener Menschen gestiegen ist, die karitative Angebote in Anspruch nehmen müssen, erfährt das Thema „Armut“ nun auch eine verstärkte Aufmerksamkeit in den lokalen Medien des Stadtstaats. Dazu beigetragen hat der Umstand, dass seit einigen Wochen immer mehr Menschen täglich zur Singapore Buddhist Lodge kommen, um die kostenlosen Mahlzeiten der Einrichtung, die sich im Zentrum Singapurs befindet, zu nutzen. Waren es nach Angaben des Tempels Ende letzten Jahres noch etwa 3.000 Menschen täglich, die dieses Angebot in Anspruch nahmen, ist ihre Zahl mittlerweile auf mehr als 5.000 angestiegen (AFP 2008a). Und auch andere Tempel und kirchliche Einrichtungen verzeichnen mittlerweile einen deutlichen Anstieg der Zahl deren, die ihre Angebote einer günstigen Versorgung mit Lebensmitteln nutzen. Solche Initiativen sind ein deutlicher Hinweis auf die zunehmend prekäre Situation, in der sich viele Haushalte in Singapur befinden.

Eine wesentliche Ursache für die für viele Haushalte derzeit sehr angespannte finanzielle Lage ist in dem seit Beginn des Jahres auch in Singapur zu beobachtenden drastischen Anstieg der Lebenshaltungskosten zu sehen. Im ersten Quartal des Jahres verzeichnete der Stadtstaat nach Angaben der Statistikbehörde des Landes eine Inflationsrate von mehr als sieben Prozent und damit den höchsten Preisanstieg seit mehr als 25 Jahren (Reuters 2008). Besonders der enorme Anstieg der Energiekosten und die Preissteigerungen bei Lebensmitteln tragen zu dieser Entwicklung maßgeblich bei (Associated Press 2008). Schon zuvor waren auch die Preise auf dem Wohnungsmarkt angestiegen, so dass die anhaltend hohen Kosten längst die finanziellen Möglichkeiten einer großen Zahl von Haushalten übersteigen. Bereits in den letzten Jahren hatte die Zahl der überschuldeten Haushalte deutlich zugenommen und die jüngste Teuerungswelle verschärft die Situation weiter.[3]

Während anhaltend hohe Energiepreise weltweit zu einem Anstieg der Lebenshaltungskosten

3 Entsprechende Hinweise auf einen Anstieg bei Privatinsolvenzen fanden sich unter anderem Ende 2002; so in Meldungen von AFP (vom 3. Oktober 2002) und Associated Press (vom 2. Dezember 2002).

führen, wird die Lage in Singapur zusätzlich verschärft, da der Stadtstaat in vielen Bereichen von Lieferungen aus den Nachbarländern abhängig ist. Vor allem aus dem benachbarten Malaysia bezieht Singapur einen Großteil seiner Lebensmittel, aber auch Teile seiner Wasser- und Energieversorgung. Während es in den letzten Jahren gelungen ist, die Abhängigkeit von Wasserlieferungen aus dem Nachbarstaat zu verringern, bleiben Lebensmittellieferungen aus Malaysia für die Märkte in Singapur weiterhin von elementarer Bedeutung. Doch in Malaysia ist es zuletzt zu einem rapiden Anstieg der Treibstoffpreise gekommen, nachdem die Regierung in Kuala Lumpur angesichts der hohen Rohölnotierungen einen Stopp der staatlichen Treibstoffsubventionen verkündete.[4] Seither steigen in Singapur die Preise für importierte Lebensmittel und Baumaterialien aus dem Nachbarland noch weiter an.

Nicht viel besser ist die Situation im südlichen Nachbarland Indonesien, wo die Einstellung staatlicher Subventionen für Treibstoff mittlerweile zu gewaltsamen Protesten führte. Auch hier schlagen sich steigende Energie- und Lebensmittelpreise direkt in steigenden Lebenshaltungskosten in Singapur nieder, die – wie in den Nachbarländern auch – vor allem die Haushalte mit niedrigem Einkommen treffen. Marktexperten vermuten, dass die hohen Preise etwa für Lebensmittel – allein beim Reis verzeichnete der Stadtstaat zuletzt einen Preisanstieg von mehr als 50 Prozent – auch in den nächsten zwei bis drei Jahren Bestand haben werden.

4 Der Stopp staatlicher Subventionen durch die Regierung führte in Malaysia Anfang Juni zu einem sprunghaften Anstieg der Treibstoffpreise um mehr als 40 Prozent. Durch den Stopp erhofft sich die Regierung Einsparungen in Höhe von umgerechnet 4,3 Milliarden Dollar (Reuters 2008).

Armut im Wohlstand und die Zunahme von Ungleichheiten

Offizielle Statistiken weisen seit Beginn der Asienkrise 1997 ein Absinken der Durchschnittseinkommen um nahezu drei Prozent aus, und besonders bei den unteren Beschäftigungsgruppen ist nach Informationen der oppositionellen Singapore Demoratic Party (SDP) ein Rückgang auf nahezu die Hälfte des vormaligen Verdienstes festzustellen.[5] Seither sind immer mehr Bevölkerungsschichten von stagnierenden oder auch sinkenden Einkommen betroffen. Diese Entwicklung ist selber Folge veränderter ökonomischer Rahmenbedingungen, die sowohl zu einer Verlagerung vor allem arbeitsintensiver Produktionsbereiche in andere Länder der Region, als auch zu einem erhöhten Druck auf die Löhne in den unteren Beschäftigungsbereichen geführt haben, die durch ein niedriges Qualifikations- und Produktivitätsniveau gekennzeichnet sind. Vor allem zwischen 2000 und 2004 wurden im Industriesektor mehrere 10.000 Stellen abgebaut und ganze Produktionsbereiche der Computerindustrie ausgelagert. Am stärksten betroffen waren vor allem niedrig qualifizierte Beschäftigte, die auch von der angestrebten Restrukturierung der Wirtschaft, etwa durch den seither staatlich geförderten Ausbau im Biotechnologiebereich, kaum profitieren konnten.

Niedrige Lohnkosten zeichnen den Industriestandort zwar schon seit den späten 1960er Jahren aus, doch seit der Asienkrise ist es besonders für Menschen mit nur geringer Bildung immer schwieriger geworden, noch ein adäquates Einkommen zu erzielen – wenn sie überhaupt noch eine Beschäftigung finden. Trotz dieser Entwicklung werden Forderungen nach einer Mindestlohnregelung aber seit Jahren von der Regierung immer wieder abgelehnt (Asher & Rajan 2000). Zwar beträgt die Arbeitslosenrate nach Angaben der Regierung derzeit lediglich zwei Prozent, nachdem sie zwischenzeitlich Höchstwerte von nahezu sieben Prozent erreicht hatte, doch hinter den Statistiken verbergen sich vielfältige Formen der Unterbeschäftigung, unsichere Beschäftigungsverhältnisse und sinkender Einkommensmöglichkeiten für einen wachsenden Teil der Bevölkerung. Nach Ansicht des regierungsunabhängigen Think Centre lag gerade in manchen älteren Anlagen des öffentlichen Wohnungsbaus (HDB) die Arbeitslosenrate zeitweise bei fast acht Prozent.[6]

Arbeitslosigkeit und der Rückgang der Realeinkommen gerade in den unteren Beschäftigungsbereichen haben nach Ansicht vieler BeobachterInnen zu einer weiteren Spreizung der Einkommensschere in Singapur geführt. Die Verteilung des Wohlstands, den ein über Jahrzehnte hinweg hohes Wirtschaftswachstum möglich gemacht hat, erfolgte dabei auch schon vor der Asienkrise sehr ungleich und hatte bereits in den 1990er Jahren zu einer

5 Vgl. hierzu die unter www.singaporedemocrat.org von der SDP zusammengestellten Informationen.
6 Vgl. hierzu die vielfältigen Diskussionsbeiträge unter www.thinkcentre.org.

Zunahme sozioökonomischer Disparitäten geführt (Davidson, Drakakis-Smith 1997; Rodan 1997). In den letzten Jahren ist der Gini-Index[7] für Singapur jedoch immer weiter angestiegen und verweist mit einem Wert von derzeit 48,5 (AFP 2008b) auf eine weiterhin zunehmende Ungleichverteilung des gesellschaftlichen Wohlstandes.[8]

Nach Ansicht vieler KritikerInnen der sozialen Situation in Singapur ermöglichen die Einkommen von nahezu einem Drittel aller Haushalte keinen angemessenen Lebensstandard, und bereits die Volkszählungsdaten des Jahres 2000 zeigten, dass etwa jedem achten Haushalt weniger als S$1.000, umgerechnet etwa 472 Euro, im Monat zur Verfügung stehen (Jordan 2007). Zugleich lagen in weiten Bereichen der Wirtschaft die Durchschnittseinkommen so niedrig, dass lediglich ein Drittel aller Beschäftigten Lohn- und Einkommenssteuer zahlte (Asher & Rajan 2000). An dieser Situation hat sich seither nur wenig geändert und aktuelle Statistiken zeigen, dass Haushaltseinkommen von S$700 im Monat zur sozialen Realität in einem Stadtstaat gehören, dessen durchschnittliches Pro-Kopf-Einkommen mit knapp S$53.000 im Jahr angegeben wird.[9]



7 Statistische Kennzahl zur Messung von wirtschaftlicher Konzentration, besonders in den Bereichen der Einkommens- und Landverteilung. Der in der Regel zwischen 0 und 100 – in einigen Publikationen auch zwischen 0 und 1 – liegende Wert zeigt den Grad der Abweichung der Einkommens- oder Landverteilung von der völligen Gleichverteilung an, wobei der Wert (bzw. 1) dessen vollständige Ungleichverteilung signalisiert.

8 Während der Anteil der reichsten 20 Prozent am Gesamteinkommen der Gesellschaft nahezu 50 Prozent beträgt, entfallen auf die ärmsten 20 Prozent der Gesellschaft weniger als drei Prozent des Gesamteinkommens (Chan 2002).

9 Zur Situation der Bezieher niedriger Einkommen siehe u.a. den AFP-Artikel vom 4. Mai 2006; Angaben zum Pro-Kopf-Einkommen: Statistics Singapore (www.singstat.gov.sg).

Von einiger Bedeutung sind in diesem Zusammenhang seit jeher Fragen der unterschiedlichen Entwicklung der Einkommen zwischen den ethnischen Gruppen, die immer wieder zu öffentlichen Diskussionen über die ungleiche Verteilung des Wohlstands und der sozialen Kosten der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Singapurs geführt haben und auch weiterhin führen. Vor allem in den 1970er Jahren, einer Phase rapiden Wirtschaftswachstums, kam es zu einer deutlichen Ungleichverteilung der Durchschnittseinkommen zwischen der chinesischen und der malaiischen Bevölkerungsgruppe. In diesem Zeitraum stieg der Anteil der Bezieher von niedrigen Einkommen bei den malaiischen Haushalten auf zwei Drittel an, während er bei den chinesischen Haushalten auf weniger als die Hälfte zurückging. Aufgrund ihres insgesamt schlechteren Bildungsniveaus fanden sich Malaien wesentlich häufiger in den schlechter bezahlten Beschäftigungsbereichen der Industrie und des Dienstleistungssektors, als dies bei Chinesen der Fall war (Davidson, Drakakis-Smith 1997).

An dieser Situation hat sich bis heute nur wenig geändert, und so zeigen auch neuere Daten, dass Malaien noch immer überdurchschnittlich häufig in den unteren Einkommensgruppen anzutreffen sind. Lag das durchschnittliche monatliche Haushaltseinkommen malaiischer Familien Anfang der 1990er Jahre noch bei ca. 73 Prozent des durchschnittlichen Einkommens aller Haushalte in Singapur, so ist dieser Wert seither weiter zurückgegangen und beträgt mittlerweile nur noch etwa 64 Prozent, wie die letzten Volkszählungsdaten zeigen.[10] Öffentliche Auseinandersetzungen über soziale Disparitäten zwischen den unterschiedlichen ethnischen Gruppen, wie sie zuletzt etwa in Malaysia zu gewaltsamen Zusammenstößen zwischen Demonstranten und Polizei geführt haben, bleiben in Singapur aber weiterhin tabu.[11]

Staatliche Unterstützung bleibt die Ausnahme

Die jüngste Entwicklung verdeutlicht einmal mehr, dass die Kluft zwischen sinkenden Einkommen und steigenden Lebenshaltungskosten zunimmt und dass sich die Lebensbedingungen für immer mehr Menschen in Singapur zunehmend verschlechtern. Trotz der sich seit Jahren verschärfenden sozialen Probleme, von denen ein wachsender Teil der Bevölkerung betroffen ist, versteht sich Singapur nicht als Wohlfahrtsstaat, der seinen Bürgern staatliche Unterstützung in sozialen Notlagen garantiert. Weder weisen die wenigen bestehenden Sicherungssysteme Mechanismen der Umverteilung des gesellschaftlichen Wohlstands zwi-

10 Angaben nach: Census of Population 2000. Statistical Release 3: Economic Characteristics; publiziert vom Singapore Department of Statistics, 2001.

11 Im November 2007 organisierte die Nichtregierungsorganisation HINDRAF in Kuala Lumpur eine Demonstration, um auf die sich seit Jahren verschlechternde sozioökonomische Situation der indisch-stämmigen Bevölkerung Malaysias und ihre nur schwache Repräsentation in den politischen Institutionen des Landes aufmerksam zu machen. Die Protestveranstaltung wurde von der Polizei mit Gewalt aufgelöst und fünf führende Mitglieder der Organisation wurden verhaftet.

schen den verschiedenen Einkommensgruppen im Staat auf, noch existieren Rechtsansprüche auf Angebote sozialer Grundsicherung (Williams 1996). Angesichts fehlender oder nur geringer staatlicher Unterstützung sind viele Menschen vor allem auf die Hilfe ihrer Familie angewiesen, die noch immer die wesentliche Instanz sozialer Absicherung in Singapur darstellt.

Offizielle Statistiken weisen einen konstant niedrigen Anteil der staatlichen Sozialausgaben am Bruttoinlandsprodukt aus, und ein Großteil der Ausgaben für soziale Sicherheit wird weiterhin direkt von den Beschäftigten selber getragen (Asher & Rajan 2000; Kwon 1998).[12] Gleichzeitig steigt im Gesundheitssystem die Zahl jener, die im Krankheitsfall nur noch unzureichend abgesichert sind. Steigende Kosten im Gesundheitswesen auf der einen und eine in Teilen unzureichende finanzielle Absicherung auf der anderen Seite haben dazu beigetragen, dass eine nicht unerhebliche Zahl von Menschen nur noch eingeschränkten Zugang zu den vielfältigen Angeboten der Gesundheitsversorgung hat oder im Krankheits- und Behandlungsfall mit ernsten finanziellen Problemen konfrontiert wird. Auch bei der Altersversorgung, dem Herzstück der sozialen Sicherung in Singapur, führen sinkende Einkommen und steigende Ansprüche einer auch hier von Alterungsprozessen gekennzeichneten Gesellschaft zu einer unzulänglichen Absicherung immer größerer Teile der Bevölkerung. Vor allem jene niedrig qualifizierten Arbeitnehmer, die in den wirtschaftlichen Boomzeiten Singapurs in nur schlecht entlohnten Bereichen der Fertigungsindustrie und den unteren Segmenten des Dienstleistungssektors beschäftigt waren, liegen heute mit ihren Rentenbezüge oftmals kaum über den Existenzminimum, und viele von ihnen sind auch noch im hohen Alter gezwungen, einer kleinen Beschäftigung nachzugehen, um überleben zu können.

Deutlich wird der niedrige Grad sozialstaatlicher Absicherung der Bevölkerung auch daran, dass trotz einer sich seit einigen Jahren abzeichnenden strukturellen Arbeitslosigkeit bei jenen Bevölkerungsgruppen, die nicht über ausreichende Qualifikationen verfügen, die Einführung einer Arbeitslosenversicherung von der Regierung weiterhin strikt abgelehnt wird. Dies drängt nach Ansicht von Kritikern vor allem niedrig Qualifizierte in Beschäftigungsverhältnisse mit schlechten Arbeitsbedingungen und niedriger Entlohnung. In diesem Beschäftigungssegment ist daher seit Jahren, zusätzlich verschärft durch eine hohe Zahl niedrig qualifizierter ArbeitsmigrantInnen, die Arbeitsplatzkonkurrenz besonders hoch.[13]

Es ist jedoch zugleich festzuhalten, dass auch in Singapur der Staat – trotz aller gegenteiligen Rhetorik – seinen Bürgern in sozialen Notlagen eine, wenn auch minimale, Unterstützung

12 1997/98 betrug der Anteil der Sozialausgaben am Bruttoinlandsprodukt 6,3 Prozent und stieg bis 2000/01 auf 6,9 Prozent an. Drei Viertel der Ausgaben entfallen dabei auf Arbeitnehmer- und Arbeitgeberbeiträge zu gesetzlichen und privaten Sozialversicherungen, und lediglich ein Viertel der Ausgaben entfällt auf Haushaltsmittel der Regierung (Asher & Rajan 2000: 235).

13 Bereits im letzten Herbst vermeldeten die Behörden, dass mittlerweile mehr als eine Million ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Singapur beschäftigt sind – und damit mehr als ein Drittel aller Beschäftigten stellen. Bei einem Großteil der MigrantInnen handelt es sich um niedrig qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte aus süd- und südostasiatischen Staaten, die in den unteren Beschäftigungssegmenten der Industrie und des Dienstleistungssektors Arbeit finden (Jordan 2007).

gewährt. Entsprechende Leistungen auf der Grundlage des Public Assistance Scheme zielen jedoch auf eine sehr begrenzte Zahl von Bedürftigen und beinhalten in der Regel nur Maßnahmen zur Linderung unmittelbarer Not (Ramesh 2000). Hierzu gehören vor allem von Armut betroffene Ältere, Behinderte und chronisch Kranke, für die nicht mehr durch die Familie gesorgt werden kann, aber auch jene Familien, die nach offiziellen Kriterien unterhalb der Armutsgrenze leben (Williams 1996). Dagegen bleiben andere Bevölkerungsgruppen von staatlichen Unterstützungsleistungen zumeist ausgeschlossen oder finden nur sehr bedingt staatliche Hilfen. Das Public Assistance Scheme sieht dabei nicht nur eine sehr strenge Prüfung der Bedürftigkeit der Empfänger staatlicher Unterstützung vor, sondern gewährt im jeweiligen Fall auch nur sehr geringe Leistungen. Für Alleinstehende betragen sie nur etwa S$200, und auch für eine vierköpfige Familie reichen sie kaum über S$500 hinaus. Diese von Ramesh (2000) in seiner Studie zur sozialpolitischen Situation in Singapur angeführten Unterstützungssätze liegen dabei deutlich unter jenen S$950, die von der Regierung als Existenzminimum angesehen werden.

Dabei bleiben auch diese geringen Unterstützungen eingebettet in ein enges Netz sozialer Kontrolle, mittels derer die regierende People's Action Party (PAP) ihren Herrschaftsanspruch bis in den Alltag der Menschen hinein deutlich macht. Die Gewährung von Unterstützungsleistungen an soziale Bedürftige erfolgt durch Einrichtungen und Institutionen, die aufs engste mit der Regierungspartei verbunden sind. Über die staatliche People's Association (PA) werden die Anfragen nach sozialer Unterstützung an Constituency Secretariats im jeweiligen

Wohnumfeld weitergeben, wo Mitglieder der PAP-Wahlkreisbüros gemeinsam mit Vertretern anderer Basisorganisationen über die zu gewährende Unterstützung entscheiden. Eine endgültige Bewilligung von Leistungen erfolgt schließlich durch das jeweils zuständige Citizen's Consultative Committee (CCC) und damit im direkten Wohnumfeld der Bedürftigen (Asher & Rajan 2000). Das Verfahren entbehrt nicht nur der Transparenz hinsichtlich der Bewilligungs- oder Ablehnungsgründe, sondern setzt die um Unterstützung bittenden Menschen auch der direkten Kontrolle ihrer sozialen Situation und der ihrer Familie durch ihre Nachbarn aus.

Staatliche Unterstützung kann zugleich auch über eine Reihe freiwilliger Wohlfahrts-organisationen erfolgen. Neben Unterorganisationen des Gewerkschaftsdachverbandes NTUC zählen eine Reihe von Selbsthilfegruppen und kleinere, zumeist ethnisch oder religiös orientierte Wohlfahrtsorganisationen zu diesen so genannten Voluntary Welfare Organizations (VWO). Da die Zahl dieser Organisationen jedoch nur sehr gering ist, erreichen sie nur etwas mehr als ein Fünftel der bedürftigen Haushalte in Singapur. Während auch diese Unterstützungsleistungen oftmals vollständig auf staatliche Mittel zurückgreifen, erfolgt die ebenfalls strenge Prüfung der Bedürftigkeit und die mögliche Ablehnung der Hilfe durch die Wohlfahrtsorganisationen selbst, so dass staatliche Stellen hier nicht offen in Erscheinung treten (Ramesh 2000). Freiwillige Wohlfahrtsorganisationen spielen damit gleichzeitig eine wichtige Rolle in den Bemühungen der Regierung, soziale Unterstützungsleistungen von Rechtsansprüchen auf staatliche Leistungen zu entkoppeln.

Eine wesentliche Folge dieser seit Jahrzehnten nahezu unveränderten politischen Situation ist das Fehlen einer eigenständigen Verbändestruktur, wie sie etwa für europäische Wohlfahrtsstaaten in unterschiedlicher Form charakteristisch ist. Weder der Gewerkschaftsdachverband NTUC noch die durchaus existierenden Wohlfahrtsorganisationen verfügen als Institutionen über Mitsprachemöglichkeiten im (sozial-)politischen Raum. Die Menschen treten ihnen ähnlich wie den wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Einrichtungen des Staates im Bereich des Wohnens, der Bildung und der Gesundheitsversorgung einzig als KundInnen gegenüber, die spezifische Dienstleistungen in Anspruch nehmen, nicht aber als BürgerInnen, die über diese Institutionen zugleich Einfluss auf die Ausgestaltung sozialpolitischer Programme und damit auch auf grundsätzliche Fragen der (Um-)Verteilung gesellschaftlichen Wohlstands nehmen können (und dies auch tun). Die Organisation und Artikulation von Interessen in unterschiedlichen Sozialverbänden stellt ein wesentliches Element politischer Partizipation und damit demokratischer Entwicklung in den westlichen Industrienationen dar, das in Singapur nahezu gar nicht anzutreffen ist und dessen Herausbildung von den politischen Eliten auch weiterhin unterbunden wird.

Fazit

„You get what you pay for“ – das ist die unmissverständliche Botschaft, mit der die Regierung Singapurs ihre Ablehnung umfassender sozialstaatlicher Strukturen untermauert. Die ökonomische Absicherung der Beschäftigten und ihrer Familien – eine Folge der rapiden wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der letzten vier Jahrzehnte – geht nicht einher mit einer für Wohlfahrtsstaaten westlicher Prägung noch immer charakteristischen „sozialen Solidarität“ (Kwon 1998). Für Ramesh (2000) begründet dies das zentrale Dilemma der allenfalls formal demokratischen Strukturen des politischen Systems Singapurs. Während die Regierung auf der einen Seite ein umfassendes und auf Rechtsansprüchen basierendes sozialstaatliches System ablehnt, greift die regierende People’s Action Party (PAP) immer wieder zu einzelnen staatlichen Sozialprogrammen für soziale Schwache, um sich eine breite Unterstützungsbasis in der Bevölkerung zu sichern. Dies wurde zuletzt bei den Parlamentswahlen 2006 deutlich, als die Regierung im Vorfeld der Wahlen neue Programme zur Aus- und Weiterbildung für niedrig qualifizierte und von Arbeitslosigkeit betroffene Arbeitskräfte mit einem Finanzvolumen von nahezu einer Milliarde Singapurdollar ankündigte (Associated Press 2006).[14]

Fehlende Absicherung der Beschäftigten im Fall von Arbeitslosigkeit, rudimentäre staatliche

14 Die Fördermittel von umgerechnet 473 Millionen Euro waren Teil einer Kampagne des seit Sommer 2004 amtierenden Premierministers Lee Hsien Loong, der sich 2006 zum ersten Mal zur Wahl stellte.

Unterstützungsleistungen in sozialen Notlagen und eine Alters- und Gesundheitsversorgung, die nahezu ausschließlich auf den individuellen Einkommensmöglichkeiten der Versicherten beruht, dies alles verweist auf einen deutlichen Widerspruch zwischen dem erreichten Entwicklungsstand und Wohlstand, der den Stadtstaat heute auszeichnet, und dem – auch im internationalen Vergleich – niedrigen Grad an sozialpolitischer Absicherung der Bevölkerung Singapurs. Selbst in den wenigen Fällen, in denen Menschen in sozialen Notlagen finanzielle Unterstützung gewährt wird, ist die Regierung darum bemüht, diese als einmalige Hilfe erscheinen zu lassen, aus denen keine Rechtsansprüche auf staatliche Unterstützung abzuleiten sind (Ramesh 2000).

Noch ist offen, wie die Regierung auf die aktuelle Situation reagieren wird, und ob es angesichts der sich für eine wachsende Zahl von Menschen verschlechternden sozialen Bedingungen zu einer Ausweitung sozialstaatlicher Maßnahmen kommt. Wahrscheinlicher ist jedoch, dass sie auch im aktuellen Fall eher auf einmalige, die akute Problematik aufgreifende Hilfsangebote zurückgreifen wird, die jedoch weder zur dringend notwendigen Umverteilung gesellschaftlichen Vermögens zugunsten einkommensschwacher Haushalte, noch zur Herausbildung verbindlicher wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Ansprüche seitens sozial Schwacher führen werden. Es ist nicht zu erwarten, dass sich Singapur in naher Zukunft in einen Wohlfahrtsstaat verwandeln wird, der den bestehenden sozialen Disparitäten mit einer aktiven Sozialpolitik zu begegnen bereit ist.

Bibliographie

AFP (2008a). Longer queues for free food in wealthy S'pore: charities. Singapur, 14. April 2008.

AFP (2008b). Free meals salvation for poor in wealthy Singapore. Singapur, 4. Mai 2008.

Asher, Mukul; Rajan, Revathi (2000): Social Protection in Singapore. In Adam, Erfried; von Hauf, Michael; Marei, John (Hrsg.). *Social Protection in Southeast & East Asia,* (S. 231–268). Singapur: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Associated Press (2006). Singapore proposes S$1 billion package for low-wage workers. Singapur, 12. Jan. 2006.

Associated Press (2008). S'pore inflation hits 26-year high in March on food, oil. Singapur, 23. April 2008.

Chan, Raymond K. H. (2002). The Welfare System in Southeast Asia: Development and Challenges. In Chan, Raymond K. H.; Leung, Kwan Kwok; Ngan, Raymond M. H. (Hrsg.), D*evelopment in Southeast Asia. Review and Prospects,* (S. 131–162). Aldershot: Ashgate.

Davidson, Gillian; Drakakis-Smith, David (1997). The Price of Success: Disadvantaged Groups in Singapore. In Dixon, Chris; Drakakis-Smith, David (Hrsg.), *Uneven Development in Southeast Asia,* (S. 75–99) Aldershot: Ashgate.

Jordan, Rolf (2007). *Singapur. Globale Stadt und autoritärer Staat*. Bad Honnef: Horlemann Verlag.

Kwon Huck-ju (1998). Democracy and the Politics of Social Welfare: a comparative analysis of welfare systems in East Asia. In Goodmann, Roger; White, Gordon; Kwon Huck-un (Hrsg.), *The East Asian Welfare Model. Welfare Orientalism and the State,* (S. 27–74). London & New York: Routledge.

Ramesh, Mishra (2000). The Politics of Social Security in Singapore. *The Pacific Review*, 13 (2), 243–256.

Reuters (2008). S'pore not in recession, but high prices to stay. Singapur, 9. Juni 2008.

Rodan, Garry (1997). Singapore: Economic Diversification and Social Divisions. In Rodan, Garry; Hewison, Kevin; Robison, Richard (Hrsg.). *The Political Economy of Southeast Asia. An Introduction,* (S. 148–178). Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) (1991). *Living the Next Lap – Towards a Tropical City of Excellence*. Singapur.

Williams, Jeremy B. (1996). Rapid Economic Development in Singapore and the Future of the PAP. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 26 (2), 164–179.

The Barong Wants to go out Again
Krisis moneter and the Resurgence of Rituals in Indonesia[1]

VOLKER GOTTOWIK[2]

Goethe-University Frankfurt/Main, Germany

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

The economic and monetary crisis (krismo) at the end of the nineties has changed Indonesia in many respects. While the political transformations in the wake of Suharto's step back seem all too obvious, changes in religious activities are seldom taken into account. This paper refers to the impact of krismo on ritual performances connected with the famous Barong figures in Bali. These impacts are twofold: the democratization of Indonesia led not only to a revival of cultural activities of ethnic Chinese of which the reappearance of Barongsai dance troupes after more than 30 years of oppression is only one feature; the economic crises also raised the demand for new Barong masks on the side of the local Balinese people and finally caused a boom of ritual activities connected with these sacred figures. Against this background it will be demonstrated that krismo led not only to a revitalisation of the Barong cult in Bali, but also became itself a topic of particular Barong performances. Therefore it is argued that economic events have religious impacts and vice versa. But how is krismo as a topic taken up by ritual discourse and what kinds of message do the local actors disseminate through the medium of Barong?

Keywords: Religion, Bali, Masks, Chinese, Representation

1 This is a slightly extended version of a paper given on the third South-East Asia conference in Vienna on June 13, 2008, organized by the Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaft (SEAS).

2 Associate Professor ("Privatdozent") at the Institut für Historische Ethnologie, Goethe-University in Frankfurt/Main.; field research in Indonesia (16 months) and Ghana (6 months); Guest Lectureships in Denpasar (Indonesia), Trenton/NJ (USA) und Accra (Ghana); Chair of the South-East Asia section of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerkunde (DGV); applicant and member of a DFG-sponsored scientific network for the investigation of the religious dynamics in South-East Asia.

This paper reflects on – what in general terms could be called – the relation between religion and society. I would like to demonstrate that religion is not an obstacle to social development and economic growth. I will rather argue that religion and ritual activities are means to deal with social conflict and economic crisis (cf. Hornbacher/Gottowik 2008). The relation between religion and society is, however, not a one way road as the saying "Armut lehrt beten" ("poverty teaches to pray") seems to suggest. Ritual activities also have an impact on the social and economic level. But only if one depicts religion as a symbol system – as Clifford Geertz (1966), Victor Turner (1982) and Mary Douglas (1970) among others have demonstrated – its dialectic relation to society comes to the fore.

In spring 1998 – all of a sudden – prices started to rise in Indonesia. Everything became more and more expensive and no end of inflation was in sight. At this time, I was for my third time in Bali and could follow in detail what the later so called *krisis moneter* meant on the local level and for the local people. When I arrived in the village in Southeast Bali, where I used to stay, my landlord took me directly to the market in the city of Gianyar. There he directed my attention to the explosion of living costs in Indonesia: prices for food had increased about 300 percent; eggs and chicken were even more expensive and already unaffordable for the majority of people. Therefore many people had to restrict themselves to two meals per day, sometimes consisting only of plain rice or soup. The elders continued to go to their favourite food stall (*Warung*) in the evening like they always did. But most of them came only for a chat (not for a drink) since they could not afford the amount of 500 Rupiah (the equivalent of 5 Euro Cent) for a cup of tea or coffee anymore.

The situation in Bali was depressing and tense. From other parts of Indonesia came news about riots and violent clashes between different social and ethnic groups and finally – on May 14, 1998 – Suharto, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, had to step down. His resignation from power happened on the peak of violence with hundreds of victims – most of them of Chinese origin. Chinese women in particular became victims of mass rapes in Jakarta and other major cities in Indonesia (cf. Haubold 1998). These violent acts caused hundreds of Chinese families to escape to places, where they felt secure. And they escaped to Australia, Singapore or – Bali.

But what is it that makes Bali a rather secure place for the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia? Why is the relationship between Chinese and Balinese different when compared to other ethnic groups in Indonesia? Against this background, I would like to direct the readers' attention to a Balinese mask, which represents a Chinese woman. The Balinese entertain – in other words – a mask that represents a female Chinese character. And my research guiding question

in this context is as follows: What is this mask able to tell us – on a symbolic level – about the social relationship between the Balinese and Chinese communities on Bali? Or to say it in other words: even when this paper deals with masks, my interests are not in masks, but in the interethnic relations that are represented through the medium of masks (cf. also Gottowik 2006). First of all, let me give you some details about these masks:

Jero Luh (without headdress) as displayed in the office of her ethnographer, August 2008

Jero Gedé, the consort of the white lady (all photos by Volker Gottowik)

The Chinese woman or Putri Cina who is represented by a white mask never makes her appearance never alone. She is always accompanied by a black male fellow. Therefore we can say that she is part of a couple that is not only heterosexual, but also interethnic or – if you prefer – biracial: it is a black-and-white partnership.

The lady is known as Jero Luh, the guy as Jero Gedé. Together – as a couple – these two masks are called Barong Landung. What does this name indicate? Barong is a generic name for powerful magic masks on Bali of which Barong Ket (a mixture of dragon and lion) is probably the most famous; but the origin of the word Barong is unclear (cf. Zoete/Spies 1938, Belo 1949). And Landung is Balinese and means high. Barong Landung-figures are high, since the Balinese wear these masks not in front of their faces, but as head masks of giant puppets which they lift upon their shoulders. These giant puppets have a powerful magic and appear on different ritual occasions (details about the ritual contexts of Barong-figures are given in Gottowik 2005).

More interesting for our purpose are the different myths and legends that are connected with these figures. Only few Balinese know about these stories. Therefore one has to look for experts. But if you ask – let us say – five experts about Barong Landung, you will receive at

least four different versions of these myths and legends. Yet all versions clearly indicate that the white lady is of Chinese origin.

The identity of her black companion is – on the contrary – less obvious: According to some experts he is a prince from India; according to others he is a Balinese king (*Raja*); and according to others again he is a demon from Nusa Penida, a small island offshore Bali. But all versions indicate that the beautiful white lady and the ugly black guy were married. Most versions also indicate that she was a Buddhist, while he was a Hindu. And according to some experts – but not according to all – she was not only older than him, but also unable to give birth to a child (anymore). Therefore she is also called "the barren lady" or "Dewi mandul".

Procession with Barong Landung, March 1998

According to my interpretation, this unequal and contradictory couple indicates two things at the same time: First of all it indicates that since historical times Chinese and Balinese, Buddhists and Hindus belong together – like a married couple. On the other hand, it indicates that Balinese and Chinese should stay apart, since this particular marriage has a strong stigma or defect: there are no offspring – and childlessness is one of the worst bad blows a Balinese couple can imagine.

Therefore I would like to conclude, that the major characteristic of this unequal couple is ambivalence: it is – to use Clifford Geertz' notions – a model of and a model for interethnic

relations between Balinese and Chinese (cf. Geertz 1966). But if this exemplary couple is a model of a successful partnership (that was able to overcome all obstacles, even childlessness) or a model of a failed partnership (that was unable to produce descendants and regulate succession properly) is open to debate.

And indeed, there is a kind of ongoing debate; there is discourse and counter discourse and what could be called politics of interpretation: When I did research on this white lady and her rustic consort, it became clear, that different ethnic and social groups in Bali prefer different versions and interpretations of this mixed couple. These differences were expressed on the level of stories (myths and legends) told by different social and ethnic groups; but after the fall of Suharto it also became obvious on the level of performance (ritual and theatre).

The Resurgence of Barong Activities

When Suharto had to withdraw and the Republic of Indonesia turned itself in breathtaking velocity into a democratic political system, a lot of discriminating laws against the Chinese minority were confiscated. Already under the new presidents Habibie and Wahid, the Chinese were allowed again to organize themselves and to celebrate cultural events like the famous Chinese New Year's Day in public. As a result, for the first time after 30 years the barongsai dragon dance was performed again in the streets of Jakarta, Medan and other major cities in Indonesia.

But it was not only the Chinese minority in Bali that contributed to a resurgence of Barong activities; under the impression of *krisis moneter*, the Balinese themselves directed their attention again to Barong figures which were well known for their protective power. Old masks almost fallen into oblivion were reactivated, and new masks were ordered after years of a steady decline – as Bali's most famous mask carver, Cokorda Raka Tisnu from the village of Singapadu, confirmed. In other words: many new Barong masks were ordered in these days of political and economic insecurity.

The resurgence of Barong activities is also reflected on the level of performance: At the beginning of the 1990s members of the Art College in Denpasar (*Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia*/STSI) began to collect the myths and legends about the beautiful white lady and her black companion in order to create a play or drama out of theses stories; this play, which was finally called "Sendratari Dalam Balingkang", was performed at least two times on the "Bali Arts Festival" in Denpasar. And immediately after the fall of Suharto a Chinese cultural organisation (*Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia*/PSMTI) also created its own version of the story that is connected to this mixed couple. And the differences were striking: while

the performance of the Balinese artists (STSI) emphasized ambivalence (in the way I described it at the beginning), the performance of the Chinese artists (PSMTI) tried to give this story a particular meaning. This was clearly expressed in a review of the Chinese performance in "The Jakarta Post" form July 15, 2001:

> *"The main message of the show was indeed about the brotherhood of mankind. That two different ethnic groups living harmoniously together is not an unreachable dream, or beyond human capability. King Jayapangus [the Balinese king] and Kang Ci Wie [his Chinese wife] had demonstrated it, and all the people who were involved in Sendratari Legenda Balingkang proved it once again" (Juniarta 2001: 2).*

This statement about "the brotherhood of mankind" has to be seen against the background of violence and mass rapes that happened only two years before in many parts of Indonesia. The Chinese actors referred to this Balinese king and his Chinese wife – to use Geertz' terms again – as a model of and a model for: as a model of a successful interethnic partnership from the past and as a model for a successful interethnic partnership for the future. Against the background of violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia this model became highly significant again. As a result of its new significance, not only new masks were ordered and theatre performances with these masks created for the first time ever. This violence as well as the economic decline connected with krismo also became a topic on the level of ritual.

Libation in front of Barong Landung, September 1997

Krismo as a Topic on the Ritual Level

On April 15, 1998, only few weeks before violence in Jakarta and other major towns in Indonesia demanded the life of approximately 1.200 people, most of them of Chinese origin, I could witness a dialogue spoken through the masks of the white lady and her black companion. They referred to a popular folk story about a young man, his name is Sampik, who has fallen in love with a beautiful girl called Ingtai. This love was unhappy and Sampik suffered tremendously. Against this background, the white lady that everybody identifies as a Chinese character, asks her black companion: "Is it possible that Sampik stopped eating and lost weight, not only because of his unhappy love. May be there are other reasons why he looks now like a dried frog?" – And the black guy answered: "Yes you are right, maybe Sampik has nothing to eat anymore, maybe he starves because of this economic crisis we are all confronted with." And then he added: "But we should not allow our thoughts to be occupied by this crisis too much. Let's focus our energy to overcome this crisis together."

This dialogue, spoken between these two masks on ritual occasion, reminds me very much on the great French anthropologist Emil Durkheim. According to Durkheim (1912), not God speaks through rituals and masks to the people, but the society to its members. In this particular case, masks that represent a multiethnic couple reminded in a situation of crisis everybody on particular virtues and ideals of society. And these ideals have to do with solidarity – as the only way to overcome this *krisis moneter*.

That the ideal of solidarity was emphasized in dialogue with a mask that refers to a Chinese character gives this message a particular significance. A similar message comes across when on other ritual occasions the Chinese character reminds the Balinese on principles of their religion. One particular principle is called Tatwam Asi. It derives from Sanskrit and is translated in different ways; but in general, the Balinese translate it as "Aku adalah kau", as "You are as I am". This message transmitted by the white mask, which refers to a Chinese character, has some remarkable implications: It reminds everybody that cultural and linguistic differences characterise mankind only at the surface; in the end, when we face god, we are all equal.

Veneration of Barong Landung in a house temple, April 1998

This is not to say, however, that Barong Landung-figures have a particular message or meaning. I only want to emphasize, that on the peak of krismo in 1998, they reminded the Balinese on equality and solidarity. But in general, they are – as I tried to highlight at the beginning – ambivalent and morally neutral. They are used as a medium for internal communication and could – even when it actually appears unlikely – also be employed for social segregation and apartheid.

Finally it remains unclear, what the white lady and her black companion did in 1965/66, i.e. after the military coup against Suharto, when a witch-hunt broke out against everything communist and Chinese. According to eyewitness accounts the worst massacres against the Chinese minority took place in Bali. Between 40.000 and 80.000 people were killed, shops ransacked and their owners chased away: “Some towns in which the Chinese were dominant became deserted overnight, like Nevada ghost towns” (Hughes 1967: 200).

Even when the last quote refers to Java, the situation in Bali was similar if not worse and puzzled everybody familiar with the people on this island. How could this massacre happen? Unfortunately, we do not know what kind of message the Barong Landung-figures disseminated under these historical circumstances. Since up to the present day, no research has been done on these black and white masks. They were only mentioned in some ethnographic classics from the 1930s, and a detailed description of their appearance is given in “Dance and

Drama" by Beryl de Zoete and Walter Spies (1938). But even these ethnographers conducted no systematic research on Barong Landung-figures: They did not observe them in different ritual occasions, they did not collect the myths and legends related to them and they did not even translate the songs and dialogues performed by them in public. They only stated, that the white mask appeared to them "like an English maiden aunt in her garden" and that her particular outlook gives her "a very Chinese air" (Zoete/Spies 1938: 275).

If the Balinese shared this interpretation, if the white mask appeared to them as Chinese too, remains completely unclear. This lack of knowledge is a pity, considering the significance that at least this paper gives to Barong Landung-figures as a model of and a model for the right attitude towards the Chinese minority in Bali. What is simply missing are early ethnographic reports "from the native's point of view" that would allow to analyse historical shifts in the symbolic meaning of these figures for the Balinese. Only such an approach would be able to find out, if the trauma of the 1965/66 massacre finds its symbolic expression in the current message of Barong Landung.

Conclusion

As a reaction to krismo, violence and mass rapes in Indonesia, Barong figures on Bali went through resurgence on at least three different levels: first, the confiscation of discriminating laws against the Chinese minority brought Barong and Barongsai dance troupes back into the public; second, against the background of violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the myths and legends related to Barong Landung gained significance and were performed as theatre plays on stage level for the first time ever; third, on the village level, the Balinese ordered new masks and used them for internal communication; the message on the peak of krismo was, not to look for scapegoats but to overcome this crisis in solidarity.

With this example, I tried to demonstrate that economic events like krismo have impacts on ritual activities and vice versa. Economic crisis and political violence lead to an increase of ritual activities; and these activities reminded all participants how this crisis should be managed. That there was violence against the Chinese all over Indonesia, but not in Bali, indicates that the Balinese have understood the current message of the white lady and her black companion.

References

Belo, Jane (1949). *Bali: Rangda and Barong*. New York: Augustin.

Douglas, Mary (1970). *Natural Symbols. Explorations in Cosmology*. London: Barrie & Jenkins.

Durkheim, Emile (1912). *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. Paris.

Geertz, Clifford (1966). Religion as a Cultural System. In C. Geertz (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (pp. 87-125). New York: Basic Books.

Gottowik, Volker (2005). *Die Erfindung des Barong. Mythos, Ritual und Alterität auf Bali*. Berlin: Reimer.

Gottowik, Volker (2006). Vergegenwärtigte Ahnen: Zur symbolischen Ordnung der Masken auf Bali. In Patrick Eiden et al. (Eds.), *Totenkulte. Kulturelle und literarische Grenzgänge zwischen Leben und Tod* (291-312). Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus.

Haubold, Erhard (1998). „Weil Du eine Chinesin bist, mußt Du vergewaltigt werden." Indonesien setzt sich mit seiner jüngsten Vergangenheit auseinander. Das tiefe Trauma einer Minderheit. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of July 21, 1998.

Hornbacher, Annette und Volker Gottowik (2008). Die Transformation des Religiösen. Südostasiatische Perspektiven. *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie,* 133 (1), 19-30.

Hughes, John (1967). *Indonesian Upheaval*. New York: David McKay.

Turner, Victor (1982). *From Ritual to Theatre. The Human Seriousness of Play*. New York.

Zoete, Berly de & Spies, Walter (1938). *Dance and Drama in Bali*. London: Faber and Faber.

Agents of Change - Frauenaktivistinnen in Aceh

Agents of Change - Women Activists in Aceh

Kristina Grossmann[1]

Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main, Deutschland / Goethe-University Frankfurt/Main, Germany

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

Aceh befindet sich seit der Dezentralisierungspolitik Indonesiens Ende der 1990er Jahre, der Tsunamikatastrophe 2004 und der Unterzeichnung des Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)[2] 2005 in einer politischen, kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Transformation. Die Situation der Frauen in Aceh ist geprägt durch Repressionen aufgrund der Einführung der Scharia, durch Einflussnahme von internationalen Hilfsorganisationen nach dem Tsunami und durch die Neuordnung der Region Acehsseit den Autonomieverhandlungen. Der Transformationsprozess bringt große Herausforderungen für die Frauen in Aceh mit sich und beinhaltet zugleich die Chance zur Mitgestaltung. So entwerfen Frauenaktivistinnen innerhalb des Spannungsfeldes islamische Religiosität, traditionell-kulturelle Strukturen und westliche Wertevorstellungen, Positionen und Strategien, um ihren Wunsch nach Geschlechtergerechtigkeit durchzusetzen. Mein Artikel beleuchtet die Frage, welche Rolle Frauenaktivistinnen innerhalb des Transformationsprozesses einnehmen und welche Chancen, Möglichkeiten und Hindernisse es gibt, um Einfluss auf politische und gesellschaftliche Prozesse zu nehmen.

Schlagworte: Indonesien, Aceh, Gender, Partizipation, Islam

Aceh, Indonesia's westernmost province is in a process of political, social and cultural transformation, which is caused by three main factors. First, the process of decentralisation, launched by the government of Indonesia starting from the end of the 1990s and as a consequence of the implementation of sharia bylaws since 2001, second, the tsunami calamity 2004 and third, the peace process starting with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 2005 between representatives of the Government of Indonesia and the Acehnese freedom movement GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). Today's situation of women in Aceh is influenced by repressions due to a conservative interpretation of Islam, by the impact of international aid organisations, which entered Aceh after the tsunami and by the political, social and cultural reconstruction of Aceh since the beginning of the peace process. The transformation process causes huge challenges for women and at the same time provides a

1 Die Autorin ist Doktorandin am Institut für Ethnologie und im Exzellenzcluster „Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen" an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main.

2 Am 15. August 2005 wurde das MoU in Helsinki zwischen Vertretern der Regierung Indonesiens und der acehnesischen Befreiungsbewegung GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) unterzeichnet und ein Friedensschluss besiegelt.

wide range of opportunities for participation and modelling the new province Aceh. In this vibrant atmosphere, where tensions between Islamic religiosity, traditional-cultural structures and Western values are immense, women activists design positions and strategies to aim their desire of gender justice, equity and women's rights. The present impact of the multiple efforts of women activists to take influence in the political and socio-cultural area can be described as opening a window of opportunities. They could benefit from emancipative objectives of international organisations and from the national and international monetary funds. Women activists could develop capacity and raise their bargaining power through the networks with international organisations. Hurdles in the long-term success of implementing the aims of woman activists are the short time-frames of the aid-programmes and the top-down approach of most programmes. The power of the political elite in Aceh and of religious leaders is strong and the agendas of woman activists are constrained by socio-political and religious acceptance.

Keywords: Indonesia, Aceh, Gender, Participation, Islam

Einleitung

Acehnesischen Frauenaktivistinnen, die sich, züchtig mit Kopftuch bedeckt, für Geschlechtergerechtigkeit und Frauenrechte einsetzen sind für westliche Beobachter befremdliche Bilder. Obwohl Indonesien das bevölkerungsreichste muslimische Land ist, steht der moderate Islam im multikulturellen Indonesien für Toleranz und Synkretismus mit lokalen und westlichen Werten. So gab Indonesien stets ein Bild von vielfältigen Kleidungs- und Lebensstilen ab, unter denen orthodox islamische Lebensentwürfe nur einer von vielen war.[3] Das hat sich in einigen Gebieten stark verändert. In den letzten Jahren sind in über 60 Städten und Distrikten Rechtsprechungen gemäß der Scharia eingeführt worden. Aceh[4] ist die erste Provinz, in der seit 2001 eine Rechtsprechung gemäß der Scharia angewendet wird. Die Pflicht zu züchtiger Kleidung entsprechend orthodox islamischen Vorbildern ist seitdem unter Androhung von Strafe auferlegt und wird von ortsansässigen Moralhütern überwacht. Zu ihrem eigenen Schutz, so argumentieren Befürworter der Scharia, dürfen Frauen nach Einbruch der Dunkelheit nicht mehr auf der Straße unterwegs sein.[5]

Die Einführung der Scharia ist aber nur eine Herausforderung, mit der sich acehnesische

3 Das Kopftuch im arabischen Stil, d. h. unter den Kinn geschlossen, ist erst seit den 1990er-Jahren in Schulen offiziell erlaubt.

4 Aceh ist die nördlichste Provinz der Insel Sumatra. 98 Prozent der Bevölkerung gehören formal dem Islam an. Die konservative islamische Identität der Bevölkerung in Aceh nährt die Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen gegenüber der Nationalregierung in Jakarta.

5 Diese Einschränkung ist vor allem für den großen Teil an berufstätigen und weniger gut verdienenden Frauen prekär und verdrängt sie zunehmend aus der Öffentlichkeit. Der Weg von oder zu der Arbeitsstätte, sei es das Reisfeld, der Markt oder die Fabrik, wird oft zu Fuß oder mit öffentlichen Verkehrsmitteln in der Dunkelheit zurückgelegt.

Frauen konfrontiert sehen. Der 30-jährige Unabhängigkeitskampf und die Folgen des Tsunami 2004 zerstörten die Lebensgrundlage vieler Acehnesen und Acehnesinnen. Die anschließende Befriedung des sezessionistischen Kampfes brachte Erleichterung und Hoffnung. Frauenaktivistinnen sehen Chancen und Möglichkeiten, bei der politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Neuordnung Acehs mitzubestimmen und setzen sich in vielfältiger Weise für mehr Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit ein. Dabei bewegen sie sich zum einen im Rahmen des orthodox islamischen Moralkodex und argumentieren gemäß dem islamischen Katechismus, um ihre Glaubwürdigkeit und ihre Einflussmöglichkeit nicht durch den Vorwurf von Apostasie und „Verwestlichung" zu verspielen. Andererseits orientieren sich Frauenaktivistinnen an internationalen Normen, wie den allgemeinen Menschenrechten und die Konvention gegen Diskriminierung von Frauen, welche 1984 von Indonesien ratifiziert wurde.

(Un-)Gleichheit der Geschlechter

Die Gesellschaft der Acehnesen hat traditionell eine matrizentrische Sozialstruktur, in die der Islam integriert ist. Das Machtzentrum von Frauen liegt demnach im informellen Sektor, d.h. im Familienklan und in der Dorfgemeinschaft. Acehnesische Frauen sind Eigentümerinnen von Haus, Grund und bewirtschaftbaren Feldern und leben in Subsistenz, Männer verdienen traditionell hauptsächlich Geld durch Handel in Städten oder im Ausland (*meurantau*). Die Familie wird durch eine männliche Person, meistens den Bruder der Frau (*mamak*), rechtlich nach außen vertreten. Traditionell ist das Geschlechterverhältnis in Aceh symmetrisch (Siapno 2002), da die besetzten Machtfelder und der Zugang zu zentralen dörflichen Institutionen, zum Beispiel zu streitschlichtenden Instanzen (*tuah empat*) in der Balance sind. Seit der niederländischen Kolonialisationszeit ist das traditionell symmetrische Geschlechterverhältnis in Aceh im Wandel begriffen. Die bürokratische Organisation der Kolonialherren verlangte eine Umwandlung der matrizentrischen und somit auf Klanbesitz basierenden Sozialstruktur in kleine Einheiten einer Kernfamilienstruktur mit männlichem Haushaltsvorstand. Das System von Privatbesitz entsprach der niederländischen Besteuerungspolitik und war leichter zu kontrollieren (Siapno 2002). Während der autokratischen Regierung Suhartos von 1966 bis 1998 wurden Frauen systematisch entpolitisiert und in den häuslichen Bereich zurückgedrängt. Mit dem Konzept *kodrat wanita* wurde Frauen, gemäß ihrer „natürlichen Bestimmung", die Rolle der sorgenden Hausfrau und unterstützenden Ehefrau zugeteilt. Frauenorganisationen wurden kooptiert und konnten nur als verlängerter Arm der Staatspartei Golkar agieren (Blackburn 2004).

Die Staatspropaganda und die autokratische Regierung Suhartos untergruben den Einfluss

von lokalen, traditionellen Sozialstrukturen, indem zum Beispiel Entscheidungen und Beschlüsse gemäß der ortsüblichen Rechtsprechung *adat limbago* nicht anerkannt wurden. 1976 gründete Hasan di Tiro die „Bewegung freies Aceh" (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*/GAM. Die anfänglichen Ziele waren eine größere kulturelle, politische und ökonomische Autonomie Acehs gegenüber der Nationalregierung, später forderte GAM die Unabhängigkeit Acehs von Indonesien; ab den 1990er Jahren wurde der Konflikt massiv militarisiert. Neben der Enttäuschung einer zentralistischen Politik der Nationalregierungen Indonesiens zuungunsten der Idee eines föderalen Staates war der Ausschluss di Tiros bei der Vergabe von Förderlizenzen großer Gasfunde in Aceh der Initialfunke für den bewaffneten Untergrundkampf (Sulaiman 2006). Innerhalb des Unabhängigkeitskampfes gegen den indonesischen Nationalstaat waren nur wenige Frauen am aktiven Kampf beteiligt oder Mitglied der politischen und militärischen Elite. Acehnesische Frauen hatten jedoch im informellen Bereich machtvolle Positionen als Versorgerinnen, Reproduzentinnen, Informantinnen, Unterstützerinnen des passiven Widerstandes und in informellen Verhandlungen mit dem Militär. Die Rolle von acehnesischen Frauen während des Bürgerkrieges als Versorgerinnen und Reproduzentinnen ist nicht nur im materiellen und biologischen Sinne zu verstehen, sondern fand auch auf der symbolischen Ebene Anwendung. So wurden Frauen als physische und kulturelle Reproduktionskraft und als Protektorinnen der nationalen und ethnischen Identität dargestellt. Die Strategie der GAM-Kader, acehnesische Kultur und Ethnizität zu betonen und Symbole einer glorreichen acehnesischen Geschichte wiederaufleben zu lassen oder zu erfinden, fand auch Eingang in das Geschlechterverhältnis. Männer als tapfere Kämpfer für die Unabhängigkeit und Frauen als reproduktive Unterstützerinnen – das waren die von der GAM propagierten dichotomen Stereotype. So wurde erst 1998 ein Frauen-Bataillon ins Leben gerufen. Nach Aussagen von Frauenaktivistinnen verschiedener Organisationen lebten, während des Unabhängigkeitskampfes, mehr als 50 Prozent des GAM-Kaders in polygynen Ehen.[6] Acehnesische Frauen trugen maßgeblich zur Bildung einer kollektiven acehnesischen Identität gegenüber der Regierung in Jakarta bei und fungierten als Metapher für kulturelle Authentizität und Integrität. Der seit den 1990er Jahren zu beobachtende Druck auf Frauen, eine züchtige Kleiderordnung einzuhalten, ist im Zusammenhang mit dem Erstarken einer acehnesischen islamischen Identität in Abgrenzung zu einem moderaten Islam des Nationalstaat Indonesiens zu sehen. Die Schaffung einer ikonisierten, guten Muslima, die sich für die Unabhängigkeit Acehs einsetzt, drängt Frauen in die Passivität und politisiert Geschlechterverhältnisse.

6 Manche Aktivistinnen sprechen sogar von über 70 Prozent polygynen Ehen währende des Unabhängigkeitskampfes. Vor dem Friedensschluss 2005 lag die Zahl von polygynen Ehen in der Provinz Aceh bei etwa 12 Prozent. Heute liegt die Zahl bei etwa 25 Prozent.

Scharia als fehlgeschlagene Konfliktlösungsstrategie

Mit dem Dezentralisierungsgesetz 1999 sind in einigen Distrikten und Provinzen lokale Bestimmungen bezüglich religiösen und kulturellen Angelegenheiten erlassen worden, die islamischem Recht größere Geltung verschafft. Die Einführung einer lokalen Rechtsprechung, die sich an der Scharia orientiert (*qanun*), ist ein Ausdruck des staatsimmanenten Konfliktes zwischen islamistischen und laizistischen Kräften in Indonesien. Aufgrund eines Erlasses zur Sonderautonomie für Aceh 2001 wurde dort eine regionale Rechtsprechung gemäß der Scharia eingeführt.[7] Die indonesische Regierung versuchte auf diese Weise erfolglos, den sezessionistischen Konflikt im mehrheitlich muslimischen Aceh beizulegen. Vertreter der GAM wiesen die Formalisierung der Scharia als ungewolltes Geschenk der Zentralregierung zurück, unternahmen aber, trotz ihrer Beteiligung an der Provinzregierung, keine fruchtbaren Schritte, um die lokalen Gesetze zu entschärfen.[8] Obwohl Entscheidungen über Religionsangelegenheiten der Zentralregierung zugewiesen sind, ist in Aceh eine lokale Rechtsprechung entstanden, die oft im Gegensatz zur nationalen Gesetzgebung steht. Gegenüber diesem Rechtspluralismus stellt sich die Nationalregierung jedoch blind. So konstatiert Khairani Arifin von der Frauenorganisation „Freiwillige Frauen für Humanitäre Aktionen" (*Relawan Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan*/RPuK) in Aceh, dass eine Klage an das Oberste Verfassungsgericht in Jakarta bezüglich des Urteils eines Scharia Gerichts in Aceh zurückgewiesen wurde. Als Begründung wurde angeführt, dass die zeitliche Frist zur Einreichung von Verfassungsklagen nicht eingehalten wurde.

Die Inhalte der Scharia Gesetze orientieren sich an konservativen islamischen Werten und Normen und betreffen die Bereiche Verhaltens- und Kleidervorschriften und Bekämpfung der Kriminalität. Die Hoffnung, dass die Implementierung der Scharia zur Lösung der multidimensionalen ökonomischen und sozialen Probleme in Aceh beitragen kann, wurde aufgrund der konservativen und symbolträchtigen Umsetzung durch islamische Autoritäten enttäuscht. So sind bei Verstößen gegen die Scharia-Gesetze Demütigung, gewalttätige Übergriffe und Benachteiligungen vor allem gegenüber Frauen im öffentlichen und privaten Bereich zu beobachten. Die rigorose Durchsetzung islamischer Verhaltens- und Kleidervorschriften betrifft Frauen unverhältnismäßig stark. Vor allem im urbanen Raum ist zu beobachten, dass, bezugnehmend auf den Koran, die Autorität von Männern im Haus in den Vordergrund rückt, Frauen aber keinen Machtzuwachs in anderen Bereichen haben.

7 Neue Institutionen, die die neuen Regelungen formulieren und für deren Umsetzung sorgen, sind Scharia-Ämter (*Dinas Scharia*), ein beratender Ulama-Rat (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama*) und Scharia Gerichte.

8 Irwandi Yusuf, seit 2006 Gouverneur von Aceh und der ehemaligen GAM nahestehend, versprach bei seinem Amtsantritt, bestimmte diskriminierende Passagen innerhalb der *qanun* zu überarbeiten und zu revidieren.

Frauenorganisationen, die durch die Umsetzung der Scharia-Gesetze die Menschenrechte verletzt sehen, antworten mit dem Angebot von Rechtsbeistand und dem schwer umsetzbaren Versuch, bei den Formulierungen der lokalen Gesetzgebung mitzubestimmen. Offene Kritik an der Umsetzung der regionalen Scharia-Gesetze ist für Frauenaktivistinnen in Aceh jedoch selten möglich, weil die Angst vor dem Vorwurf von Blasphemie und unrespektvollem Verhalten gegenüber dem Islam groß ist.

Tsunami als Katalysator

In Folge der Tsunamikatastrophe 2004 kamen viele internationale Organisationen nach Aceh. Die Wiederaufbau- und Förderprogramme infolge des Tsunami waren mit großen finanziellen Budgets ausgestattet[9] und hatten zeitlich eng gestrickte Zielvorgaben. In kurzer Zeit entstanden zahlreiche Kooperationen mit lokalen Organisationen, um die Hilfsprogramme zu implementieren. Lokale NGOs, die sich für Frauenrechte einsetzten, wurden finanziell unterstützt und etablierten sich strukturell und personell. Genderspezifische Forderungen konnten somit auf die internationale Bühne gehoben und erfolgreicher durchgesetzt werden. Der genderspezifische Aspekt innerhalb der Soforthilfemaßnahmen nach der Tsunamikatastrophe wurde von westlichen und lokalen Organisationen als wichtig erachtet, anfänglich aber stark vernachlässigt. So wurden die Waschräume in den Behelfsunterkünften erst nach den Forderungen lokaler Frauenorganisationen nach Geschlechtern getrennt und Frauen verstärkt in die Planung von neuen Wohnräumen einbezogen. Nach der Zerstörung durch den Tsunami wurde in vielen Fällen das Eigentum von Haus, Grund und Feldern auf Männer übertragen und Hilfsgelder an das offizielle, also männliche Familienoberhaupt vergeben. Dies lässt sich durch die schwache rechtliche Position von Frauen und der traditionell festegelegten Vertretung in der Öffentlichkeit durch männliche Familienangehörige begründen. Der Enteignung von Frauen wurde mit Programmen zur Einbeziehung von Frauen in Entscheidungsgremien, die bei der Neuordnung von Grundeigentum in zerstörten Gebieten mitbestimmen, entgegen gesteuert.

Durch die Hilfsprogramme der internationalen Organisationen wurden Ziele der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit transportiert, die im Westen entwickelt wurden und sich an den Vorstellungen der Vereinten Nationen von Geschlechtergleichheit orientieren. Gender Equity, Gender Mainstreaming und Woman's Empowerment tauchten in den Programmen der acehnesischen Frauenorganisationen auf, die Wege suchten, diese Begriffe im acehnesischen Kontext umzusetzen. Durch die systematische Entpolitisierung von Frauen während der Ära

9 Insgesamt wurde 4.9 Milliarden Euro an Hilfsgelder bereitgestellt. Ungefähr ein Drittel von der indonesischen Regierung, ein Drittel von internationalen Geldgebern und ein Drittel von Nichtregierungsorganisationen. Ende 2007 waren bereits 90 Prozent der Hilfsmittel vergeben (Kleine-Brockhoff 2007).

Suhartos und der stärkeren Einflussnahme eines patriarchal ausgelegten Islam wurden die Machtfelder von Frauen und ihr Zugang zu Institutionen reduziert. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Frauenaktivistinnen vor die Herausforderung gestellt, Programme zu entwickeln, die Frauen unterstützen, ihren Machtbereich auf informeller Ebene wieder zu erweitern und sich Zugang zu formellen Einflussebenen zu erschließen.

Die Internationalisierung und finanzielle Förderung von genderspezifischer Arbeit in Aceh hat die Auseinandersetzung über Geschlechterbeziehungen auf eine breite öffentliche Bühne gehoben. Diskussionen über Gender und die Rolle von Frauen finden nicht nur in den Büros der Organisationen statt, sondern haben auch vor allem unter der jungen Bevölkerungsschicht einen großen Stellenwert bekommen. So gibt es z.B. lebhafte Diskussionen, welchen Vorbildern acehnesische Frauen folgen sollen, den Heroinnen aus einer glorreichen acehnesischen Vergangenheit, wie Cut Njak Dhien oder den als emanzipiert und fortschrittlich geltenden Frauen aus westlichen Kulturkreisen. Innerhalb der kurzen Zeit nach 2004 ist es lokalen Frauenorganisationen zwar nur ansatzweise gelungen die Bedürfnisse von Frauen an der Basis zu eruieren und spezifische Strategien zu ihrer Durchsetzung zu entwickeln, jedoch sind erste Schritte hinsichtlich der Verschiebung der Frauenrolle von passiven Bürgerkriegsopfern zu aktiven Mitgliedern der Zivilgesellschaft getan. So entwerfen Frauenaktivistinnen innerhalb des Spannungsfeldes islamische Religiosität, traditionell-kulturelle Strukturen und westliche Wertevorstellungen, Positionen und Strategien, um den Wunsch nach Geschlechtergerechtigkeit durchzusetzen. Die Forderungen und Ziele von Netzwerken, Kongressen und Workshops zeigen emanzipative Positionen, die sich an westlichen Vorstellungen von Geschlechtergerechtigkeit orientieren (Crisis Management Initiative 2006: 18; Kamaruzzaman 2004) aber auch den besonderen acehnesischen traditionell-kulturellen Werten und Normen und der islamischen Religiosität Rechnung tragen (Blackburn 2004: 108; Parawansa 2002: 72). Zum Beispiel ist öffentliche Kritik an der Umsetzung der regionalen Scharia Gesetze für Frauenaktivistinnen in Aceh nicht möglich, da die Aktivistinnen diffamiert und als unglaubwürdig abgestempelt werden (Crisis Management Initiative 2006).

„Agents of Change“ im Transformationsprozess

Die genderspezifische Betrachtung von Transformationsprozessen ist in der wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung lange vernachlässigt worden, gewinnt jedoch zunehmend an Bedeutung (Derichs 2005; Waylen 2007). Frauenaktivistinnen als zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure werden als wichtige change agents innerhalb von Transformationsprozessen angesehen und haben aufgrund ihrer Perspektive, ihrer Handlungsmöglichkeiten und ihrer Erfahrungen eine wichtige Rolle in

Systemveränderungen (Derichs 2005: 1; Mulligan 2005; Ng, Mohamad, & Tan 2006; Waylen 2003, 2007). Ihre Rolle besteht darin, Ideen zu entwickeln und zu verbreiten und als Kritikerin, Vorbild und gesellschaftliche Anwältin Einfluss auf staatliche Handlungen und den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Diskurs zu nehmen (Derichs & Heberer 2006). Die Einbeziehung von Frauen in den Friedensprozess in Aceh wird als wichtig erachtet und vielfach eingefordert (Gender Working Group 2007; Kamaruzzaman 2000; UNIFEM 2005). So können sie als Multiplikatorinnen im Topdown-Prozess, als wichtige Verbündete im Monitoring des Friedensprozesses, als Hoffnungsträgerinnen und als Vermittlerinnen zwischen Identitätsgrenzen fungieren (Crisis Management Initiative 2006).

Während des Unabhängigkeitskampfes

Während des Unabhängigkeitskampfes von 1976 bis 2005 war die Arbeit von Frauenaktivistinnen schwer durchführbar. Das Hauptziel des Engagements war der Kampf für Frauenrechte als Menschenrechte und die Hilfe für Kriegsopfer. Die Versorgung von Kriegsvertriebenen und die Unterstützung und rechtliche Beratung von Betroffenen sexueller Übergriffe waren die hauptsächlichen Betätigungsfelder. Ein großes Problem der Frauenrechtsarbeit war, von den Kriegsparteien anerkannt zu werden. Das indonesische Militär und die GAM betrachteten die Aktivistinnen als Spione der jeweils anderen Seite und gewährten oft keinen Zugang zu Betroffenen. Khairani Arifin erzählt, dass sie sich oft vorkam, wie zwischen den Stühlen zu sitzen und dass wertvolle Zeit und Energie durch die Verhandlungen mit dem Militär und der GAM verloren gingen. 1990 bis 1998 wurde Aceh zum „Speziellen Militärischen Gebiet“ (*Daerah Operasi Militer*/DOM) erklärt. Innerhalb der Militäraktion „rotes Netz“ (*Jaring Merah)* wurde der Konflikt stark militarisiert und Menschenrechtsverletzungen von beiden Seiten verübt. In dieser Zeit entstanden viele Frauenorganisationen, die vor allem Kriegsflüchtlingen halfen. Nach dem Sturz Suhartos 1998 verschärfte sich die Situation weiter. Die *Reformasi* 1999 und die Abspaltung Ost-Timors von Indonesien gaben den Bestrebungen nach Unabhängigkeit in Aceh neue Nahrung. Die Erwartung gegenüber Frauen, sich als gute Muslima für die Unabhängigkeit einzusetzen, stieg und erhöhte den Druck, sich einer züchtigen Kleiderordnung zu unterwerfen. Zwischen 1999 und 2004 fanden Razzien statt, im Rahmen derer die orthodox islamische Kleiderordnung kontrolliert wurde, sogenannte *razia jilbab*. Die Agenda der Frauenaktivistinnen konzentrierte sich auf die Durchsetzung von Frauenrechten als Menschenrechte. Suraya Kamaruzzaman, die Leiterin der international bekannten Frauenorganisation „Flower Aceh“ nahm ihr Kopftuch als Protest gegen die verstärkte Diskriminierung von Frauen auf der Basis des Islams ab und verurteilte die Politisierung von Religion. Aktionen von zivilem Ungehorsam

sind in Aceh jedoch schwer umzusetzen und haben Ausgrenzung aus familiären und sozialen Zusammenhängen, Bestrafung von Seiten der Scharia-Polizei (*Wilayatul Hisbah*), öffentliche Diffamierungen und einen Verlust der Glaubwürdigkeit zur Folge. Meistens wird von Frauen, die keinen Jilbab tragen möchten, ein Kompromiss bevorzugt, zum Beispiel ein Tuch, das locker um Kopf und Schultern geworfen wird (*Slendang*), um keine Angriffsfläche zu bieten.

Nach dem Tsunami und dem Friedensschluss

Infolge des Tsunamis 2004 und nach Beendigung des Unabhängigkeitskampfes 2005 stieg die Anzahl von Nichtregierungsorganisationen und die Tätigkeitsbereiche von Frauenaktivistinnen erweiterten sich. Durch die Internationalisierung der Konfliktregion Aceh wurde eine finanzielle und ideologische Basis geschaffen, auf der es Frauen vermehrt möglich war, sich für Frauenrechte einzusetzen. Die Einbeziehung von Frauen in den Friedensprozess in Aceh wird international als wichtig erachtet und von Regierungen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen vielfach eingefordert (Gender Working Group 2007; Kamaruzzaman 2000).

Die Unterzeichnung des Memorandum of Understanding zwischen der acehnesischen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung GAM und der indonesischen Zentralregierung 2005 beendete den 30-jährigen Bürgerkrieg in Aceh und öffnete die Tür zu einem Friedensprozess mit offenem Ausgang. Die jüngsten Attentate auf Ramos-Horta, den Präsidenten des seit 2002 von Indonesien unabhängigen Ost-Timors, sind Ausdruck der instabilen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Lage von Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaften.

Die Frage nach der politischen und ethnoreligiösen Positionierung Acehs vor dem Hintergrund des Nation-Building-Prozesses Indonesiens, welches das Konzept der „Einheit durch Vielfalt“ propagiert, gewinnt erneut an Bedeutung (Schröter 2007). Im Zuge der aktuellen politischen und ethnoreligiösen Neuordnung Acehs haben Frauen, die aus dem Kontext der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung GAM kommen, 2006 die Frauenorganisation *Liga Inong Aceh* (Lina), die Frauenliga Aceh gegründet. Sie fordern aktive Mitbestimmung beim Wiederaufbau, bei der Rehabilitation und bei der Ausrichtung der ethnoreligiösen Positionierung Acehs und suchen Wege aus ihrer passiven Rolle. Die Nähe zur derzeitigen politischen Elite Acehs, die sich aus GAM-nahen Funktionären bildet, vergrößert zum einen die Einflussmöglichkeiten dieser Frauenaktivistinnen, begrenzt zum anderen ihre Ziele im Sinne der Konformität zur politischen Patronage.

Mit der Ausfertigung des Autonomiegesetzes „Law on the Governing of Aceh“ (LoGA) im August 2006 wurden die Grundlagen für eine Selbstregierung Acehs geschaffen. Die politische und gesellschaftliche Neuordnung eröffnet Frauen die Möglichkeit, aktiv bei der Neugestaltung

Acehs mitzubestimmen und die passive Rolle abzugeben. Die Netzwerke „Woman's Policy Network" (JPuK) und „Woman's Peace Network" (JPuD) beteiligten sich an der Erstellung einer Liste mit 15 Forderungen zur Geschlechtergerechtigkeit, die bei der Erstellung des LoGA Berücksichtigung finden sollten. Sechs dieser Punkte wurden miteinbezogen (Crisis Management Initiative: 2006). Im Juni 2005 fand, mit internationaler Unterstützung, der „All Acehnese Woman's Congress" statt. 400 Frauen aus repräsentativen Positionen versammelten sich und gründeten den „Aceh Woman's Council". Dieser Beirat reichte Forderungen bezüglich der Förderung und des Schutzes von Frauen bei der acehnesischen „Behörde für Wiederaufbau" (*Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rekreasi*/BRR) ein. Eine Forderung liegt im Bereich capacity building und betrifft den Wiederaufbau und die Pflege von „Häusern für Frauen" (*Balai Inong*) in denen Frauen sich versammeln, zusammen arbeiten und sich informieren können. Eine weitere Forderung ist der Aufbau eines Rechtshilfesystems bezüglich Besitz- und Landrechten und bei unrechtmäßigen Verurteilungen gemäß den Scharia Gesetze.

Die Bildung von zivilgesellschaftlichen Institutionen ist wichtig, da Frauen in politischen Strukturen stark unterrepräsentiert sind. Im aktiven Wahlkampf der Direktwahlen des Gouverneurs im Dezember 2006 spielten Frauen eine untergeordnete Rolle. Nur zwei von 22 Kandidaten für das Gouverneursamt waren Frauen, sie wurden im Vorfeld der Wahl disqualifiziert, weil sie einen für die Registrierung benötigten Test, den Koran richtig zu zitieren, nicht bestanden (Holthouse 2007). In dem 69 Abgeordnete zählenden Provinzparlament sind lediglich zwei Frauen vertreten (Dinkelaker 2008). Bei der Besetzung der Distriktvorsteher und Bürgermeisterposten war nur eine Frau erfolgreich, 37 weitere Posten nahmen Männer ein. Die stellvertretende Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Banda Aceh, Illiza Sa'aduddin Djamal, genießt die tatkräftige Unterstützung ihres männlichen Mitkandidaten Mawardy Nurdin und musste sich nach eigener Aussage gegenüber Kritik von Frauengruppen verteidigen, die Bedenken anmeldeten, ob eine Frau in der Lage sei, eine Stadt zu führen (DED 2007). Illiza Sa'aduddin Djamal wird unter anderem von dem Deutschen Entwicklungsdienst (DED) beraten und unterstützt. Sie steht für eine gemäßigte Gender-Mainstreaming-Politik und möchte die Rechte von Frauen durch Gesetze und capacity building stärken. Ihr persönliches Ziel ist der Aufbau eines Informationszentrums für Frauen, in dem sich Frauen über Themen wie Familie und Haushalt, Aufbau von Kleinunternehmen oder politische Betätigungen informieren können. Acehs Bürgermeisterin setzt die Befolgung von religiösen Grundsätzen und der Gesetzgebungen gemäß der Scharia als Grundlage für den Aufbau einer neuen Gesellschaft in Aceh voraus, betont jedoch die Befolgung eines „reinen Islams" (*Islam murni*), zu dem sie z.B. auch die Pflicht zählt, gegen Korruption vorzugehen (DED 2007).

Hürden im Friedensprozess

Ein wichtiger Aspekt eines nachhaltigen Friedensprozesses beinhaltet die Aufarbeitung von Kriegsverbrechen. Systematische Vergewaltigung als strategische Mittel zur Demoralisierung und die Umsiedelungspolitik in den 1990er Jahren führten zu massiven Frauenrechtsverletzungen. Frauenaktivistinnen, Menschenrechtsorganisationen und Opferverbände klagen an, dass noch keine wesentlichen Schritte unternommen wurden, um die Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Aceh systematisch aufzuarbeiten. Sie fordern die staatliche Menschenrechtskommission KOMNAS HAM auf, sich engagierter für eine regionale Wahrheitskommission einzusetzen, doch die indonesische Nationalregierung kommt ihrer politischen und ethischen Verantwortung nicht nach. Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen und Rechtsexperten appellieren an die Provinzregierung in Aceh, ein regionales Gesetz für eine regionale Wahrheitskommission zu erlassen.

Auch die Reintegration von ehemaligen GAM-Kombattanten und die materielle Entschädigung der Konfliktopfer laufen schleppend und intransparent. Mangelnde alternative Erwerbsmöglichkeiten für ehemalige Guerillakämpfer und die Schwierigkeit, sie in gesellschaftliche Strukturen zu integrieren, führen zu einem Anstieg von Raubüberfällen ehemaliger GAM-Kämpfer. Zur Entschädigung der Familienangehörigen verstorbener Opfer wurde durch die Nationalregierung Indonesiens ein Programm zur Wiedergutmachung eingeführt. Die Angehörigen der Opfer bekommen von der Regierung ein Blutgeld von 350.000 Rupiah, was etwa 30 Euro entspricht, und sollen im Gegenzug den Tätern vergeben. Bestimmte Gruppen sind jedoch von der Rehabilitation und den Kompensationszahlungen ausgeschlossen, was den Unmut und somit die Gewaltbereitschaft von Personen dieser Gruppen fördert. Weibliche Ex-Kombatanten, Nicht-Kombatanten, z.B. Sex-Arbeiterinnen und zivile Opfer haben bis jetzt wenig oder keine Entschädigung bekommen.

Dieses eindimensionale und mangelhafte System der Entschädigung entspricht nicht den Bedürfnissen der Opfer nach Wahrheitsfindung, Entschuldigung und gerichtliche Verfolgung der Täter massiver Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Die Organisation RPuK entwickelte ein Konzept des „Community Memorandum of Understanding“, um den Prozess der Wiedergutmachung in Gang zu setzen und kriegsbedingten Traumatisierungen einen ersten Ausdruck zu ermöglichen. Dieses Konzept beinhaltet ein Treffen von Vertretern der GAM, des indonesischen Militärs und der Dorfgemeinschaft, um Forderungen nach Wiedergutmachung zu artikulieren und Lösungsmöglichkeiten zu suchen, die den Bedürfnissen der DorfbewohnerInnen zugute kommen. Partizipative Schritte der Kriegsbewältigung und Prozesse der Wiedergutmachung, in denen Traumatisierungen benannt und zumindest ansatzweise aufgefangen werden können, sind

wichtig, um eine Gesellschaft zu fördern, die stabil genug ist, Alternativen zu der gewohnten Spirale der Gewalt entwickeln zu können.

Ausblick

Das Ende des offiziellen Wiederaufbaus Acehs 2009 wird den Rahmen des komplexen Transformationsprozesses verändern. Der Abzug internationaler Hilfsorganisationen und die Beendigung von nationalen Programmen entlassen die Provinz einen Schritt mehr in eine Autonomie, die für viele Freiheitskämpfer einen Kompromiss darstellt. Inwieweit die politischen Machtspiele in Aceh, vor allem die fehlende personelle Veränderung innerhalb der einflussreichen Elite und die vorhandenen sezessionistischen Bewegungen, den Friedensprozess destabilisieren werden, wird sich in Zukunft zeigen. Die nationalen, regionalen und lokalen Parlamentswahlen Mitte 2009 werden als Indikator für eine Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Aceh gesehen. Die neu gegründete lokale Frauenpartei „Partei der Volksallianz Acehs für Frauenangelegenheiten“ (*Partai Aliansi Rakyat Aceh Peduli Perempuan*/PARA) hat die Voraussetzungen für die Zulassung zur Wahl 2009 nicht geschafft. Grund hierfür ist ein Mangel an personeller und finanzieller Kapazität. Es war PARA nicht möglich, genug regionale Büros mit Repräsentantinnen und Repräsentanten aufzubauen. PARA wurde aufgelöst und die Mitglieder haben sich auf andere Parteien, die zur Wahl zugelassen worden sind, aufgeteilt.[10]

Da der politische Wille der Entscheidungsträger in Aceh bezüglich der Umsetzung von Frauenrechten und einer geschlechtergerechten Demokratie weiterhin fragwürdig bleibt, ist die Stärke und die Einflussnahme von zivilgesellschaftlichen Institutionen von zentraler Bedeutung.

Die starke gesellschaftliche und politische Ausgrenzung während des sezessionistischen Unabhängigkeitskampfes und unter der Ära Suhartos drängte Frauen in die Passivität und beschränkte ihre Machtfelder auf den informellen Bereich. Die orthodoxe und patriarchale Auslegung der Scharia-Gesetze durch konservative Autoritäten schlagen in dieselbe Kerbe und enttäuschten die Hoffnung auf die Verbesserung der angespannten sozio-ökonomischen Lage in Aceh. Die Agenden der Frauenaktivistinnen sind immer noch abhängig von ihrer sozio-politischen und religiösen Akzeptanz. Trotz dieser Hindernisse haben Frauenaktivistinnen ihre Chancen wahrgenommen, um ihren Forderungen Lautstärke zu geben. Durch die Hilfsprogramme nach dem Tsunami und den Systemwechsel nach der Unterzeichnung des MoU konnten Frauenrechtsorganisationen ihre Kapazitäten ausbauen und öffentliche Diskussionen über

10 Insgesamt haben sich neben den nationalen Parteien 20 lokale Parteien in Aceh gegründet. Nur sechs davon konnten die Zulassungsbestimmungen erfüllen. Insgesamt treten 43 Parteien, also 37 nationale und 6 lokale zur regionalen und lokalen Wahl an.

Geschlechterverhältnisse anstoßen. Die Ergebnisse von frauenspezifischen Kongressen, Tagungen und Netzwerken stellen einen wichtigen input bezüglich politischer und gesellschaftlicher Prozesse dar. Im Rahmen des sich konsolidierenden Demokratisierungsprozesses in Aceh wird zu sehen sein, wie sich der Output in Form von verbindlichen Zusagen der politischen Elite an zivilgesellschaftliche Gruppen gestaltet und vor allem, welche Outcomes, das heißt, welche konkreten Auswirkungen bezüglich Geschlechtergerechtigkeit festgestellt werden können.

Bibliographie

Blackburn, S., (2004). *Woman and the State in Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge: University Press.

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) (2006). *The Aceh Peace Process*. Helsinki.

DED (2007). *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Entwicklungsdienstes*, 44.Jahrgang. Bonn.

Derichs, C. & Heberer, T. (Hrsg.) (2006). *The power of ideas. Intellectual input and political change in East and Southeast Asia*. Copenhagen: NIAS.

Dinkelaker, S. (2008). Frauen in Aceh, Tsunami – Friedensprozess – Scharia. *SUARA* 1/2008.

Gender Working Group (2007). *Evaluation on Woman in Aceh in 2006,* Entwurf.

Holthouse, K. (2007). Aceh Election. *Inside Indonesia* 2/2007.

Kamaruzzaman, S. (2000). Woman and the war in Aceh. *Inside Indonesia* 4/2000.

Kleine-Brockhoff, M. (2007). The shadows of the past. *Asia Pacific Times*. Dezember 2007. Eingesehen, 18. Dezember 2008 unter http://www.asia-pacific-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=538&Itemid=17.

Schröter, S., 2007: Acehnese culture(s). Plurality and homogeneity. In Graf, A., S. Schröter, & E. Wieringa (Hrsg.). *Aceh. Culture, history, politics*. Singapur: ISAS, (im Druck).

Siapno, J., A. (2002). *Gender, Islam, Nationalism and the State in Aceh. The Paradox of Power, Co-option and Resistance*. London: Routledge.

Sulaiman, M. I. (2006). From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical Evaluation of the Acehnese Nationalist Movement. In Reid, A. *Veranda of Violence*. Singapore: NUS Press.

Waylen, G., (2007). *Engendering transitions: woman´s mobilisation, institutions and gender outcomes*. Oxford: University Press.

The China Factor in Regional Security Cooperation The ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

ALFRED GERSTL[1]

Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

This article argues that regional security cooperation in South-East Asia, mainly promoted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is a response to China´s economic rise. Although China is not regarded as a military challenge, Beijing's ascension threatens to undermine the regional balance of power. The emerging insecurities threaten the stability of the regimes whose power is based on output legitimacy. Cooperation, the thesis states, can reduce these uncertainties. Yet, whereas collaboration in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) offers Beijing incentives for the strengthening of its "enlightened" multilateralism, regional cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will not change China's behaviour. The reason is that this cooperation is based on Realpolitik motives. Offensive Realism seems therefore well suited to analyse the Central Asian power relations. Even though the dimension of cooperation has not been included in John Mearsheimer's approach, this article demonstrates that it can conceptually be integrated into offensive Realism without contradicting its core theses. For this, however, its adherents must accept two assumptions: First, that the domestic political logic - in case of Beijing the output legitimacy of the Communist Party - must be integrated. Second, that there exists no automatism in international politics. Otherwise one would have to speak of the tragic of offensive Realism: Policies, based on this perception, does not offer China sufficient incentives to further pursue multilateralism.

Keywords: Regionalism, Regional Cooperation, Security, China, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, Shanghai Cooperation Organization

1 Dr. Alfred Gerstl, MIR is lecturer and researcher at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Sydney, and ASEAS editor-in-chief. This article discusses some of the results of his research project on the effects of China's rise and the US security policies on regional cooperation in East Asia. The project is financed by Macquarie University's New Staff Research Grant Scheme.

In diesem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass die regionale sicherheitspolitische Integration in Südost- und Nordostasien, primär von der südostasiatischen Staatengemeinschaft ASEAN vorangetrieben, eine Reaktion auf Chinas wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg verkörpert. Dieser droht das regionale Kräftegleichgewicht zu untergraben, wodurch er Unsicherheiten weckt und damit eine Gefahr für die auf Stabilität angewiesenen Regime darstellt, die ihre Macht auf Output-Legitimation gründen. Kooperation, so die These, kann diese Unsicherheiten reduzieren. Doch während die Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Pekings Außenpolitik Anreize zur Stärkung seines aufgeklärten Multilateralismus bietet, sind entsprechende Verhaltensänderung von der regionalen Zusammenarbeit in Zentralasien nicht zu erwarten. Dies weil die Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) nach wie vor rein auf realpolitischen Motiven basiert und weshalb offensiver Realismus bestens zur Analyse der Machtverhältnisse Zentralasiens geeignet scheint. Die Dimension Kooperation ist in John Mearsheimers Ansatz zwar nicht vorgesehen, wie dieser Aufsatz zeigt, kann sie jedoch konzeptionell in den offensiven Realismus integriert werden, ohne dessen Kernthesen zu widersprechen. Allerdings müssten VertreterInnen des offensive Realismus dafür zwei gedankliche Erweiterungen akzeptieren: Zum einen, dass die innenpolitische Logik im Falle Pekings die Output-Legitimation der Kommunistischen Partei integriert werden muss. Zum anderen, dass es keinen Automatismus in internationaler Politik gibt. Andernfalls müsste von einer Tragik des offensivem Realismus gesprochen werden: Politik, basierend auf dieser Anschauung, bietet China nicht genügend Anreize, um weiterhin eine multilateralen Kurs zu verfolgen.

Schlagworte: Regionalismus, regionale Kooperation, Sicherheit, China, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, Shanghai Cooperation Organization

1. Introduction

After the first decolonisation wave in the 1950s and early 1960s, the newly independent nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America were, at least verbally, committed to strengthening their economic and political cooperation with their neighbours. Similar to Europe, regional collaboration was driven both by internal and external rationales, though the negatively defined security motives dominated. Hence regional collaboration was regarded as a strategic means to secure the survival of the fragile new regimes by reducing external interferences in the processes of nation-building and socioeconomic development. Wary of protecting their sovereignty and usually distrusting their neighbours, cooperation was – despite the overarching security goals – limited to economic, technical and cultural affairs. Even integration advocates agreed to this cautious, evolutionary approach as many of them regarded limited functional collaboration as the first step in the direction of (sub-)regional political unity. Thus from the 1960s on, regional cooperation was formalised and institutionalised throughout the Third World through regional treaties and intergovernmental organisations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and on sub-

regional level (e.g. the Economic Community of West African States or the Andean Pact). Regional economic cooperation was en vogue in the 1960s, though very limited, due to the complimentary character of the involved economies and the dominance of import-substitution industrialization (Bhalla & Bhalla 1997: 1–9).

In one region, though, regional cooperation has been elusive ever since: in North-East Asia, which lacked multilateral structures till the early 1990s (Ikenberry & Tsuchiyama 2002: 70). Even in South-East Asia, though, till the late 1980s it was more appropriate to speak of regionalization – transnational and regional collaboration promoted by the market forces, especially multinational companies, or transnational active ethnic networks – rather than of regionalism, i.e. the deliberate political steering of regional cooperation in different political spheres (Fawcett 2004: 431–434; Dent 2003: 121). Only in the late 1980s did the South-East Asian governments, organized in ASEAN, respond proactively to the external security and economic challenges with a deepening of their integration efforts. Nevertheless, ASEAN was on the forefront of the second wave of regionalism that gained momentum in the mid-1980s. Fuelled by the rising economic interdependence, the fears of (Western) trade blocs and globalization, this new regionalism tends to be open, non-discriminatory and inclusive (Liu 2003a: 13; Bhalla & Bhalla 1997).

Since the early 1990s ASEAN is the key promoter of regional cooperation, even in the sensitive realm of security, and this both in South-East and North-East Asia. What has not changed, though, is the domestic logic of regional collaboration: the governments regard it as a means to mitigate external influences that could endanger economic development. As the legitimacy of the semi-democratic or authoritarian regimes in South-East Asia is primarily based on their ability to deliver economic benefits to their citizens rather than on respect for due democratic processes – output instead of input legitimacy –, an economic downturn could be a direct threat to their survival (cf. Cheng 2006: 91). To secure a stable regional political order is therefore a *conditio sine qua non* for economic growth, trade, foreign direct investments and tourism.

The main thesis of this article argues that due to the political primacies of output legitimacy and regional stability, regional security cooperation in South-East and North-East is a reaction to today's single most crucial challenge for stability and the balance of power in South-East and North-East Asia: China´s economic, political and military rise to a great power. Yet, the argument is, that China's rise does not raise fears of a military dominance in East Asia. Rather Beijing´s ascension still causes feelings of uncertainty in regard to China´s perceptions and strategic long-term intentions (Chung 2008: 172; Ong 2007: 721; Dillon & Tkacik 2005). In order to diminish these uncertainties, ASEAN attempts since the mid-1990s to engage and even "socialize" Beijing through multilateral cooperation.

The research question asks, first, whether regional security cooperation in East Asia has altered China's diplomatic behaviour. Secondly, it will be assessed if offensive Realism (Mearsheimer 2003) is conceptually able to explain regional security collaboration. Therefore ASEAN´s (Chapter 2) as well as China´s motives for cooperation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will be analysed, examining Beijing's adoption of multilateralism in the mid-1990s (Chapter 3). In addition, the reasons for regional security collaboration in East Asia will be compared with the cooperation logic in the Central Asian Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Chapters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). It will be demonstrated that, unlike in the SCO, the China factor or the "China threat" played a decisive role for the creation of the ARF.

Despite the focus on two multilateral institutions as promoters of regional collaboration offensive Realism rather than liberal institutionalism (Dunne 2008; Keohane & Martin 1995) will be applied (Chapter 3.2). The reason is that neorealist approaches seem best suited to explain the competitive strategic landscape both in East and Central Asia. Yet while offensive Realism is a realistic approach to conceptually frame China's rise, it is analytically limited to examine great power relations. In addition, it regards cooperation only as a tool for the governments (Mearsheimer 2003: chap. 2). As regional collaboration is a reality both in East and Central Asia, it will be asked if the dimension of cooperation can be added to the conceptual frame of offensive Realism, without contradicting its basic theoretical assumptions.

2. Regional Cooperation in South-East and North-East Asia

2.1 External Motives in ASEAN's Integration Process

After the end of the ideological and military superpower rivalry in 1989/91, the perspective of a political power vacuum – and in particular the perception that Japan or China might aim to fill it – threatened security in the Asia-Pacific. Moscow, after the demise of the Warsaw Pact, lacked the political will as well as the financial and diplomatic resources for pursuing an active East Asia policy. Washington, the hegemonic power since 1945, downgraded its political engagement (Gershman 2002: 60–61). Among certain Asian nations this gave rise to the perception of a strategic retreat of the US (Leifer 1999: 34). After the terror bombings of September 11, 2001, when the new Bush administration started to view South-East Asia as the second front in the war on terror, Washington once again intensified its strategic commitment. Yet, its focus on security issues and bilateral cooperation with key allies conflicts with "the region's priorities of domestic economic development and political stability" (Economy 2005: 411; cf. interviews in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, December 2008).

The looming power vacuum was especially dangerous in North-East Asia, as in this region multilateral collaboration was the exception, not the rule (Liu & Régnier 2003). The South-East Asian nations were since the 1960s used to cooperation in a broad area of policy fields, although the collaboration was not deep reaching till 1992. Like in other world regions, cooperation has been mainly driven by external factors and domestic logics: The primary motive for Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Manila for establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967 was to reduce outside interferences into their socioeconomic development and nation-building, be it from their ASEAN partners, East Asian or outside actors (Kahler 2000: 551). At this time, ASEAN's main external threats were the negative security impacts of the Vietnam war and communist infiltration. With two security orientated initiatives, the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, ASEAN subsequently aimed to insulate itself "from great power maneuverings" (Garofano 2002: 514). Moreover, the TAC was also a proactive attempt to order South-East Asia according to the principles of the "ASEAN way" and the start of closer cooperation with the US, Japan and the United Nations to resolve the Indochina crisis. Facing the common threat posed by Vietnam, in the early 1990s ASEAN's diplomatic conflict resolution approach in Indochina proved highly successful, also due to Hanoi´s new *doi moi* policies and superpower détente. However, even at this time ASEAN was divided whether Vietnam or China should be regarded as the bigger security threat (Leifer 1999: 30).

The end of the superpower rivalry, though, also questioned ASEAN's *raison d´etre*. In dire need of a new political purpose, ASEAN decided at the Singapore summit in 1992 to use economic tools to deepen its integration (Capie 2003: 154–155). The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was a response to the European Community's Single Market project and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) but also a symbol for ASEAN's inability to agree on a common security policy able to address the new transnational security menaces (cf. Antolik 1992: 144 and 147–151).

In 1997, though, the Asian Financial crisis uncovered the deficiencies of ASEAN's cautious integration approach. The institution seemed politically paralyzed and lacked the authority to enforce the AFTA commitments (Dent 2007: 24). Accusing Washington and the Western dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF) of prescribing the wrong cure, many East Asian politicians turned to Beijing for support. Indeed, China played a positive role in resolving the crisis (Cheng 2006: 94), in particular in ASEAN plus Three which connects ASEAN institutionally with China, Japan and South Korea. Initially limited to financial collaboration, ASEAN+3 evolved into the most important multilateral forum in East Asia, covering strategic, political and economic issues (Beeson 2003, Stubbs 2002). However, as the logic of regional cooperation is an economical one (Wanandi 2005: 324), it comes as no surprise that the main achievement

of this comprehensive collaboration is economical: the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA). Yet there is also a crucial psychological and political outcome: an increase of mutual trust. In initiating CAFTA and, in particular, offering the lesser developed ASEAN partners significant economic concessions ("early harvest"), improved its image and credibility in South-East Asia (cf. interviews in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, December 2008).

In retrospect, the financial and political crisis of 1997 was also a catalyst for deeper integration. Acknowledging the limits of the "ASEAN way" (ASEAN Eminent Persons Group 2000), in 2003 ASEAN announced its ambitious plans for an Asian Community by the year 2015, based on an economic, security and socio-cultural pillar (Bali Concord II). Yet, these objectives remain to be filled with concrete policies.

Overall, regional cooperation in South-East Asia – a region that has always been successful in accommodating external influences (SarDesai 2003) – can till the early 1990s be best described as "reactionary regionalism" (Beeson 2003: 251). Although economic motives dominated, the notion in South-East Asia has always been that mutual economic progress facilitates a stable and peaceful regional order. In the early 1990s, though, the regional political and economic dynamics did profoundly change (Shambaugh 2005: 64), with China´s perceived quest for regional dominance being the core strategic challenge for North-East and South-East Asia (Collins 2000: 133). ASEAN's strategic and institutional response – its initiative for creating the ASEAN Regional Forum – symbolizes the adoption of a more proactive approach.

*Table 1: **Periodization of ASEAN's Integration Process***

Period	Type of Regionalism	Driving Forces	Overall Orientation
1967–1975	Reactionary or negative	external: security	domestic
1976–1992	Limited, "diplomatic"	security; market	domestic, increasingly regional
1992–1997	Neutral, "bandwagon"	trade, security	domestic and regional
1997–2002	Cautious proactive	economics, "Asianness", China's rise	regional
2003–	Proactive	China's rise, output legitimacy, "Asianness"	pan-regional

Source: Own compilation.

2.2 The ASEAN Regional Forum: Dialoguing, Socializing, Befriending

In the 1990s, there was – and still is – no shortage of unresolved disputes in East Asia. Inter alia, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the Sino-Taiwanese relations or the island disputes in the South Chinese Sea could escalate into a regional military conflict. On the other hand both abstract and concrete transnational threats have increased. These include, for instance, piracy, illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and people, social inequalities, the spread of mass diseases or environmental degradation (Rüland 2005). The main fear in the 1990s, though, was that a vague feeling of insecurity in the region, rooted in mutual distrust, could hamper the national socioeconomic development processes. This in a region where the legitimacy of the majority of the governments is based on their ability to create and distribute wealth (Cheng 2006: 91).

Even though many governments in East Asia acknowledged the need for multilateral regional security cooperation after 1989, the priority for sovereignty and non-interference, the unresolved conflicts among many nations and the lack of a clearly definable common threat overshadowed all hopes for a big institutional bang such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) mechanism (Acharya 1997: 321). The creation of the ARF in 1994 thus reflects a compromise – and the fairly moderate expectations of the governments in regard to security collaboration. Yuen Foong Khong's pointed summary of Michael Leifer's (1996) "line of reasoning" still sums up best the intentions of the ARF: "(t)o keep (a) the United States in, (b) China and Japan down, and (c) ASEAN relevant and safe (…)" (Khong 1997: 290). In addition, the new security structures should provide possibilities for regular meetings, exchange of information, dialogue and confidence building measures to decrease mutual distrust and uncertainties through the acquaintance with different ways of strategic thinking (Kawasaki 2006; ARF 1995).

Accordingly, the focus of the loosely institutionalized ARF is, unlike in the highly institutionalized Western security institutions, on cooperative, not on collective security. Security is defined in comprehensive terms, including traditional as well as non-traditional threats. Regarded as an honest (Asian) broker, the other East Asian nations allowed the political and military comparatively weak ASEAN to take the leadership role in institution-building in East Asia. Basically, the ARF is an extended multilateralized version of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) that ASEAN holds with key dialogue partners after its foreign minister meetings. Hence the guiding ASEAN principles of non-interference, non-discrimination, pragmatism, voluntarism, informal and consensual rather than rule-based majority decision-making – the (in-)famous "ASEAN Way" (Acharya 2001: 172–179; Acharya 1997: 328–333; Kawasaki 2006: 222–223) – are reflected in the ARF. Chaired by ASEAN, it is

also the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta that oversees the work of the ARF which has no own bureaucracy. Overall, as Amitav Acharya (2004: 259) puts it: "The ARF imitates ASEAN's organizational minimalism." In many senses, not only ASEAN and the ARF but also the ARF and the broad Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) can be regarded as twins.

Notwithstanding the justified criticism, the establishment of the ARF reflects a major political breakthrough, as in 1994 both Beijing and Washington were committed to a bilateral rather than multilateral approach. In addition, the short- and mid-term focus of ASEAN as the ARF architect was fairly ambitious: to install a process of dialogue and confidence-building that both broadens and deepens over time. Only after the institution has reached a more mature stage, an evolution into a more robust conflict resolving institution seemed political feasible for ASEAN (ARF 1995). And in fact, since 1994 the security organization has gradually progressed institutionally and normatively: Annual ministerial meetings evolved into more frequent senior official and military expert meetings, and the civil society participation in the "track two" mechanism has been strengthened, as have the confidence building measures.

Highlighting the political logic behind the ARF process, Chien-peng Chung (2008: 172) writes: "The essential idea behind the ARF is that the process of dialoguing should lead to socialization of member states' behavior, which in turn ought to result in the dissolution of conflicts of interests." Overall, the ARF approach combines the balance of power concept, the principle of inclusive regionalism, the notion of conflict resolution together with, not against certain countries and the idea of socializing or even befriending the partners (cf. Acharya 2001: 173).

Although the ARF is today the only organisation in East Asia with an exclusive security focus, it is politically far from resembling a regional security system. The prospects for the evolution into a "security community" in Karl W. Deutsch´s sense remain even more remote (Rolfe 2008: 106–107; Wanandi 2005). This the case due to severe political obstacles such as the exclusion of the Sino-Taiwanese and the North Korean dispute but also because of the restricting "ASEAN" diplomatic values (Acharya 2001: 178; Khong 1997: 292). The next step in the ARF´s evolution would be to go behind confidence building and adopt preventive conflict resolution.

Overall, in its present form the ARF cannot resolve ASEAN's main concern: While the ASEAN members do appreciate China's new multilateralism, they remain skeptical in regard to Beijing's true long-term intentions and ambitions. All these shortcomings raise serious questions in regard to the ability of the ARF to contain or assimilate the rising China. Though this is, according to John Mearsheimer, a political necessity. The strategic regional – and global – impacts of Beijing´s possible strive for hegemony in East Asia have been conceptualized in his theory of offensive Realism.

3. Beijing's New Multilateral Credentials: Engaging in the ARF and the SCO

3.1 China´s Rise and its New Multilateral Credentials

In 1978, Deng Xiaoping succeeded in the post-Mao internal power struggles of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Replacing the economic principles of self-reliance and inward-orientation with the market principle and integration into the world market, the new momentum of the Chinese economy elevated China´s position in the regional and global distribution of economic and political power. In the first phase, the regime focussed on achieving economic growth, accepting tremendous social inequalities especially among rural and urban citizens. Politically Beijing opened up to the outside world too: Having played a "destabilizing and negative" (Limaye 2007: 459) role in East Asia after 1949 (e.g. support for Communist insurgents), China started to redefine its political and economic relations with North-East and South-East Asia (India discovered its East Asian neighbourhood only in the late 1990s). Though, in accordance with Deng's credo, it kept a low profile in regional (and global) politics (Wang 2005: 675). Till the mid-1990s, it pursued its interests bilaterally. Once diplomatic relations has been established with Jakarta and Singapore in 1990 and Seoul in 1992, China´s trade with the respective countries boomed. From 1991 on, Beijing and ASEAN gradually improved their relations too, starting with scientific, educational, trade and economic collaboration (Lijun 2003: 2). The new charm offensive in East Asia was not at least a strategic response to the diplomatic isolation China faced in the Western world after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989.

Acknowledging the demise of the Communist ideology as the main source for its legitimacy, the CPC leadership, divided in the aftermath of "Tiananmen", adopted the concept of a rational-authoritarian order and technocratic leadership (Guo 2003: 11–16). It started to increasingly base its legitimacy on its ability to furthermore ensure socioeconomic development, i.e. output legitimacy (National Intelligence Council 2008: 28–29; Wang 2005: 681–686). Subsequently, as the domestic aims of the Chinese reform policies have become logically increasingly connected to the foreign policy sphere, the fears of social and political unrests at the domestic front triggered a fundamental change in Beijing´s foreign policy: already in the mid-1990s, it reduced its bilateralism in favour of multilateralism (Qinggong & Wei 1997). The "fourth generation" under Hu Jintao, in charge since 2002, has further embraced multilateralism – and pragmatism: the party has realized that a favourable ("harmonious") regional and global environment, created through multilateral collaboration, is the *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of a modestly rich, harmonious society with a more just income distribution Hu Jintao envisions (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

2005: chap. V). Such a middle class society would also be a political insulator against possible nationalist sentiments that could trigger a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy.

Yet exactly because of its burgeoning economic power its neighbours – and the world in general – remain skeptical in regard to the true intentions of the CPC. The Chinese leadership, though, knows that it must reduce this distrust. Thus in 2004 the then Prime Minister Wen Jiabo claimed China would never seek regional hegemony (Xinhua News Agency 2004; cf. Li Zhaoxing 2006), painting the picture of a status quo power. Overall, the new doctrine from 2003 states that Beijing´s rise is peaceful (*heping jueqi*) – and beneficial for the whole world. For its socioeconomic development China needs the world (Zhang 2008: 16–17; Ong 2007: footnote 13), in particular secure access to raw materials in South America, Africa, Central Asia or Australia. But, as the self-assured leadership adds, the world also needs China. In this view, China's peaceful rise offers a win-win situation for humankind. Accordingly, under Hu the CPC has officially further embraced multilateralism and "is using a sophisticated blend of trade, confidence building measures, and even development assistance to establish itself as an important regional leader" (Economy 2005: 413).

Paradoxically, the more Beijing increases its multilateral credentials, the more the Chinese leadership is confronted with a strategic and political dilemma: while the West demands clear words and actions from China, notably where it clearly yields political influence, such as in Burma, North Korea or Sudan (cf. Rice 2008), the CPC's response to the distrust if faces is to keep a low profile in global politics (Shi 2008: 25–26). China´s conceptual answer is to project the image of a soft power which is engaged in multilateral cooperation and abstains from the use of force. As this concept stresses the non-military, especially the economic and cultural abilities of a state to influence international politics, it is theoretically an ideal political response of the CPC to the "China threat" perceptions of the outside world (cf. Yu 2007: 118–119; Yang 2007). Yet, while the soft power label seems an adequate description of the potential and the limits of the European Union in international politics, it gravely underrates China's current political and military might: Beijing has already developed into a powerful smart power.

3.2 Theoretical Conceptualization of China's Rise: Offensive Realism

Responding to the fundamental structural changes after the demise of the stable Cold War order and the perceived limits of Kenneth Waltz´ (defensive) Neorealism (Mearsheimer 2004: 109–112), John Mearsheimer developed a security orientated approach that has become popular in International Security Studies. Contradicting defensive realist assumptions that due

to the anarchic international system states aim to increase their security, yet aspiring only an "appropriate" amount of power that does not lure others in an arms race, Mearsheimer believes that the great powers must seek as much power as possible. He poses that this is a rational response of the governments which, undisturbed by domestic logics, simply "read" the "objective" incentives and constraints of the international system, but can never trust the (future) intentions of other nations. Similar to a classical Greek play, tragedy is inescapable: the more power one of the great nations acquires relative to others, the more pressure do the others face to maximize their might (Mearsheimer 2003: 35).

Global dominance, though, Mearsheimers believes, is not feasible anymore because geography still limits global power projection. Being rational actors in a self-help world, it is thus wise for (potential) great powers to strive for regional hegemony. Furthermore, Mearsheimer (2003: chap. 2) postulates that great powers must check rising nations in other world regions too – otherwise they would rather sooner than later see themselves challenged in their very own hemisphere by their opponent (Mearsheimer 2003: 2 and 41). China's rise, he claims, fits into this classical great power pattern. Consequently, it is only a question of time until Beijing starts to translate its economic might into military and political power, aiming to dominate East Asia. Yet, based on his solely structural reading of the international system, Mearsheimer predicts that

> *"It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries (…)" (Mearsheimer 2005: 14).*

As the Chicago professor deliberately limits the scope of his theory to great power relations he necessarily views Washington as the only counterweight. Believing that many other East Asian nations fear Beijing's increasing power, he claims they would join a US-led attempt to contain Beijing and slow down its economic growth (Mearsheimer 2003: 402; Layne 2008: 16–17).

Logically, in Mearsheimer's worldview, the prospects for cooperation are limited. Collaboration is an instrument for the great powers to counter-balance their rivals, for smaller nations to either bandwagon or join a counter-alliance of one of the great powers (cf. Snyder 2002: 164–167 and 172). Mearsheimer stresses the neorealist belief that relative gains consideration and cheating undermine all cooperation efforts (Mearsheimer 1995: 12; but cf. Keohane & Martin 1995: 43–46). Another crucial obstacle for him is the impossibility of governments to judge the true (future) intentions of their counterparts. Possible positive incentives of the domestic systems for international cooperation are also excluded in Mearsheimer's approach, so are prospects for policy-learning, based on successes and rewards achieved through absolute gains cooperation. Institutions, in the neoliberal institutionalist

view quasi-independent facilitators for state cooperation, are regarded as dominated by governments, reflecting their national interests (Mearsheimer 1995: 13).

Yet, I believe, that the dimension of cooperation can be conceptually included into offensive Realism, without contradicting its fundamental assumptions. Mearsheimer's theory is pessimistic, yet it does not necessarily stipulate an automatism that leads to war. Containment like during the relative stable Cold War era is a possibility. Though, the containment strategy in Europe was based on a multilateral political, economic and military cooperation, even an alliance between North America and Western Europe. Furthermore, despite Moscows predominance and the character of forced cooperation, even the Eastern Block nations collaborated in a depth that exceeded the classic counter-alliance or bandwagon concepts. Due to the economic interdependence and superpower détente, from the 1970s on the two blocks used multilateral negotiations, in particular the confidence-building CSCE process, as means to decrease their tensions. Overall, this cooperative security mechanism did not end the regional and global rivalries of the superpowers but it contributed to a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in Europe.

One of Mearsheimer's key assumptions, however, would be challenged if it could be demonstrated that cooperation can change the behaviour of states, for instance, to make them more inclined towards peaceful multilateral cooperation or towards the notion of sharing the economic or security benefits with their neighbours. The next chapters will examine whether China has really embraced regional cooperation in East and Central Asia.

3.2.1 China's Rationales for its Engagement in the ARF

To engage China in the ARF was a tremendous achievement for ASEAN, yet without Beijing´s explicit will to become a player in ARF, ASEAN would not have succeeded. Thus it has to be asked why the Chinese leadership – till the 1990s not used to multilateralism – has commited itself to the ARF process.

Fearing the internationalization of the Taiwan conflict or of the territorial disputes in the South Chinese Sea and the institutionalisation of the US dominance in East Asia, Beijing viewed the ARF very skeptical initially. It feared that ASEAN, during the Cold War regarded as a Western dominated, anti-Communist institution would promote Washington´s interests. In the mid-1990s, due to intensified relations, China quickly learned that regional cooperation is not directed against Beijing. It increasingly acknowledged ASEAN´s role as an honest (Asian) broker that embraces similar diplomatic values such as sovereignty, non-interference and consensual decision-making (cf. interviews in Singapore, December 2008). Moreover, Beijing

and ASEAN share the notions of output legitimacy and comprehensive security, and both reject the Western advocacy of human rights and democracy. The Chinese leaders could therefore regard the ARF, inter alia, as a tool to counter-balance the United States and Western influences in general (cf. Cheng 2004: 260–261). Another motive for joining the ARF was its institutional weakness – its lack of power to sanction members in case of misconduct suited Beijing.

As the ARF strengthened its confidence building measures, thus increasing mutual trust through dialogue and transparency, Beijing deepened its commitment. The concrete work in the ARF required an adaption of the Chinese foreign policy and military experts who were not as familiar with multilateral diplomacy as their East Asian partners. In the late 1990s certain observers (Johnston 1999; Foot 1998; cf. Heller 2005: 141–142) noticed a transformative effect of China's participation in the ARF, reflected not only through a "tremendous change" (Ba 2003: 622) in the Sino-ASEAN relations since 1989 but in Beijing´s new commitment to multilateralism in general. For instance, in 2002 China signed the TAC and in 2003 agreed to multilateral cooperation to resolve the territorial disputes in the South Chinese Sea (yet notably the conflict with Vietnam remains) and transnational threats such as health, environmental degradation, migration or drug trafficking (Economy 2005: 417–418 and 421–423). Hence it is no coincidence that at the same time as Beijing multilateralized its policies in East Asia, it also started to actively promote regional cooperation in Central Asia.

3.2.2 China's Rationales for its Engagement in the SCO

Strategically located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, Central Asia has always been a theoretical paradise for realist International Relations scholars: already in 1904, Halford J. Mackinder has in his Heartland Theory postulated the global dominance of the power that controls this region. National interests and the attempt to create spheres of influence – in other words: power politics – can still explain the regional dynamics in this resource rich region. Since the 18th century under Russian control, the decline of Moscow´s power after the end of the Cold War has led to a power vacuum in this former buffer zone. Both Washington and Beijing were eager to fill this void, deepening their political, military and economic relations with the newly independent nations. Initially focusing on securing their access to oil and gas fields, because of 9/11 and the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan the United States increased its military presence; for instance, it rented military bases in Uzbekistan.

Moscow, on the other side, has in the last years reclaimed its place in its "near abroad". Hence the logic of offensive Realism seems striking: Both China and Russia, two longstanding

rivals, need to become the regional hegemon in Central Asia at the other´s expense, whereas the United States attempts to prevent the regional ascendancy of both countries. Accordingly, cooperation can only be applied selectively and as a tool for achieving hegemony, for counter-balancing or bandwagoning. Subsequently, it will be tested whether this instrumental view can explain the evolution of intergovernmental collaboration in a region that has once again become geostrategically and geoeconomically vital.

Like in East Asia, multilateral collaboration started only in the mid-1990s with the Shanghai Five mechanism at its core. In 1996 the Shanghai Five provided a forum for resolving longstanding bi- and multilateral border conflicts among the members China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as for strengthening their border control mechanisms to tackle illegal trafficking of people, drugs and weapons. As the traditional security cooperation has proven surprisingly successful, in 2001 the Shanghai Five members agreed to let it spill over into other non-traditional security affairs and transformed the mechanism into a cooperative security institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The collaboration, though, remains strictly intergovernmental and under-institutionalized, because the SCO members deliberately do not envision supranational integration (Bailes & Dunay 2007: 4–5; cf. Chung 2006). The governments thus control the cooperation processes – the secretariat is weak and the national parliaments lack control rights –, and the objectives are based on their national security interests. The dominant players, of course, are the two great powers, while the smaller nations are at best partially successful in influencing China or Russia in siding with one of them against the other. Still, they are strategically better off in a situation in which they can deal in a multilateral forum rather than bilaterally with these two key players.

While the security definitions of the SCO and the ARF are very similar, the collaboration in the SCO is far more concrete. For the SCO, security encompasses socioeconomic development, energy and environment and includes complex, yet very real transnational non-traditional risks such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking of people, weapons and drugs, the latter in particular via Afghanistan (Cornell & Swanström 2006). Also in a reaction to the war in Afghanistan, China and Russia, both suspicious of Washington`s military engagement, promoted stronger common counter-terrorism efforts, loosely institutionalized in the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). The SCO members also agreed to insulate the subregion from the spread of democracy, enabling them to individually and collectively dismiss even legitimate claims for democratization and autonomy as separatism or terrorism.

The main difference between China`s participation in the ARF and the SCO is that from the beginnings of the Central Asian cooperation, China has been in the driver's seat. The "Shanghai spirit" of cooperation, albeit compatible with the "ASEAN way", is clearly a "Chinese" one. China initiated the Central Asian cooperation because it recognized that the main non-

traditional security menaces can best be resolved in a multilateral manner. In general, Beijing needs a peaceful Central Asian neighbourhood to achieve its energy security objectives and to develop its vast Western province. It also succeeded in regionally outlawing the Uighur separatist movement, notably the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), thus ending the support the ETIM has allegedly received from its Central Asian neighbours.

In regard to the evolution of the SCO, Beijing is far more ambitious than Moscow: Whereas the Chinese side promotes a deepening of trade and economic collaboration, Russia is reluctant, as it regards the SCO primarily as a means to pursue energy security (Cohen 2006: 2). This because it already posses forums in Central Asia that it exclusively dominates, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). And not at least does Russia`s distrust of China limit collaboration. Among many Russian politicians and scholars Beijing is not only perceived as a strategic rival but, for the first time in centuries, as more powerful than Moscow, raising fears that Russia is becoming dependent, possibly even China's vassal (Mohanty 2007: 255).

Despite the shared goal of reducing Washington's influence in this crucial region and fighting separatism and terrorism, the strategic rivalry between China and Russia reduces the prospects of a deepening of cooperation in Central Asia (Li 2007: 484–487). Accordingly – and notwithstanding the increased Sino-Chinese military cooperation that includes Russian weapons sales to China and even military manoeuvres –, the prospects of the evolution of the SCO into an authoritarian Central Asian NATO that strongly opposes Western influences and values are dim. Rather it will remain a surprisingly successful forum for discussing and even resolving some of the most dangerous transnational non-traditional security risks in Central Asia on a case by case basis. Whether the SCO can develop into a reliable regional security institution that interlinks Central Asia politically and institutionally with the existing trans-Atlantic, South, South-East and North-East Asian organizations (cf. Lanteigne 2007: 620–622; Luzyanin 2007) will depend on the future Sino-Russian relations as well as on the general Western - Russian and Western - Chinese relations. To sum up, national interests and power politics – and thus Neorealism – still explain best the successful but limited collaboration in Central Asia. The SCO members have never intended to use collaboration as a tool to change their diplomatic values or behaviour.

4. Conclusion

Regional cooperation in South-East Asia has always followed economic rationales and been externally and in particular security driven. Consequently, the emergence of the China factor

as a new external driving force for increased cooperation is not a new phenomenon per se. Fundamentally new, though, is that Beijing's economic, political and military rise to a great power undermines the hegemonic position of the United States, thus changing the traditional balance of power in East Asia. Aiming to engage China and keeping the United States involved in order to stabilize the existing regional order, ASEAN succeeded in establishing the ARF, a broad security forum in regard to the membership and the security topics covered. In the mid-1990s all ARF participants accepted ASEAN´s leadership. Though, today in order to remain the key institutional driving force in East Asia with the regional powerhouses China, Japan and India, ASEAN has to deepen its own integration (Wanandi 2005: 330).

Just like in North-East Asia, regional collaboration is a recent phenomenon in Central Asia. While in the case of the ARF the "China threat" is a "negative" driving force, in the SCO China is the active leader that engages the other great power Russia and the smaller Central Asian nations in a successful cooperative security mechanism. Similar to the ARF, the SCO is strictly intergovernmental and based on a comprehensive definition of security and an evolutionary approach. However, unlike in the ARF, the collaboration is focused on concrete projects and has already yielded results (the resolution of border disputes, energy and infrastructure collaboration, increased economic relations). Nevertheless, the cooperation in the SCO still follows the principle of power politics and, consequently, has not altered the diplomatic attitudes and the actual behaviour of the SCO members. A prediction based on offensive Realism suggests that cooperation will only prevail as long as the governments regard it as useful.

The case study of the ARF has demonstrated that regional security cooperation promoted by an alliance of smaller nations is feasible and viable. The main insecurity the South-East and North-East Asian nations have to cope with is that they cannot predict whether China`s rise will remain to be peaceful. Through multilateral cooperation in the ARF, but also in ASEAN+3, they can get insights into the strategic and diplomatic thinking and perceptions of their Chinese counterparts who today seem to have embraced multilateralism. For China, cooperation clearly has an instrumental value – a peaceful regional order facilitates its socioeconomic development. Moreover, multilateral collaboration is also a strong political message against Washington's unilateralism.

Overall, one can speak of an enlightened multilateralism Beijing´s pursues, in particular in East Asia. Though does cooperation also has an intrinsic value for the Chinese leadership? Referring to constructivist, sociological and neoliberal institutional approaches, certain scholars believe in China`s new multilateralism (Heller 2005: 141–142; Johnston 1999; Foot 1998), even that it sticks to the "ASEAN way" (cf. interviews in Singapore, Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur, December 2008). Others dismiss the notion that Beijing has truly embraced multilateralism

(Mearsheimer 2005; cf. Economy 2005: 413). They see a pattern of hegemonic aspirations in the Chinese history (Ong 2007: 721) or remain cautious, claiming that it is still too early to judge whether China´s socialization in the ARF has been successful (Chung 2008: 172). Yet time is not the sole crucial variable. Social science approaches in general struggle to explain how and why decision-makers view the world in a certain manner and are why some are more inclined towards cooperation than others.

Scholars and politicians who regard the Chinese foreign policy through the lense of offensive Realism can logically never be convinced of Beijing´s multilateral commitments. Offensive Realism postulates the inability of states to demonstrate their peaceful aims, as other governments can never be sure of their true beliefs and future plans. Would this approach consider domestic political logics – the CPC`s output legitimacy requires a stable regional order for China`s socioeconomic development – and the Asian "ideology" of pragmatism, it would see that Beijing clearly has inducements for multilateral collaboration.

To conclude, cooperation can be included without contradicting the core assumptions of offensive Realism. For this, however, offensive Realists have to accept that there is no structural automatism or tragic script the world leaders have to follow. Cooperation certainly has the potential to alter perceptions as well as the actual behaviour of states, though Mearsheimer`s approach is conceptually not suited to prove this thesis. And therein lies the tragic of offensive Realism and similar neorealist concepts: May they be based on theoretical assumptions that either postulate a tragic automatism in international politics, on approaches that are conceptually not interested in acknowledging policy-learning or simply on ideologies disguised as scientific theories: perceptions that a priori discard any possible change of behaviour induced through active cooperation are scientifically unsound – and politically dangerous. The resulting policies may offer China or other rising powers not enough political, economic or security incentives to further pursue multilateral cooperation, both regionally and globally.

References

Acharya, Amitav (2004). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, *International Organization*, 58(2), 239–275.

---- (2001). *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. ASEAN ant the problem of regional order*. London and New York: Routledge.

---- (1997). Ideas, identity, and institution-building: from the 'ASEAN way' to the "Asia-Pacific way'?. *The Pacific Review*, 10(3), 319–346.

Ackeret, Markus (2008). Russland isoliert sich auch von seinen östlichen Partnern. Kein Verständnis in China und Zentralasien für das Vorgehen im Kaukasus. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 29. August, 1.

Antolik, Michael (1992). ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit? *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 15(3), 280–291.

ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (2000). *Report of the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on Vision 2020 – The People's ASEAN*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

ASEAN Regional Forum (1995). *The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper.* Jakarta.

ASEAN Secretariat (2005a). ASEAN and SCO Secretariats Sign Agreement for Substantive Cooperation. Jakarta, 21.4.2005. Retrieved Aug 17, 2008, from www.aseansec.org/17442.htm.

ASEAN Secretariat (2005b). *Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Secretariat) and the Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO Secretariat)*. Jakarta, 21. April 2005.

Ba, Alice (2003). China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century Asia. *Asian Survey*, 43 (4), 622–647.

Bailes, Alyson J.K., Pál Dunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy (2007). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17*. Stockholm: SIPRI.

Beeson, Mark (2003). ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 25(2), 251–268.

Bhalla, A.S. and P. Bhalla (1997). *Regional Blocs. Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?* Houndsmills: MacMillan.

Capie, David (2003). Rival Regions. In Jim Rolfe (Ed.), *The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition* (pp. 149–165). APCSS: Honolulu: APCSS.

Cheng, Joseph Y.S. (2006). Broadening the Concept of Security in East and Southeast Asia: the impact of the Asian financial crisis and the September 11 Incident. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 15(46), 89–111.

Chung, Chien-peng (2008). The role of Asia-Pacific organizations in maintaining regional security. *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 20(2), 169–185.

------ (2006). China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 53(5), 3–14.

Cohen, Ariel (2006). The Dragon Looks West: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Heritage Lectures*, No. 961 (3 August). Retrieved Aug 17, 2008, from www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/hl961.cfm.

Collins, Alan (2000). *The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia*. London and New York: MacMillan and St. Martin's.

Cornell, Svante E. and Niklas L.P. Swanström (2006). The Eurasian Drug Trade. A Challenge to Regional Security. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 53(4), 10–28.

Dent, Christopher M. (2007). The international Political Economy of ASEAN. Economic Integration and Bilateral FTAs. *Südostasien aktuell*, 26(1), 15–50.

---- (2003). Northeast Asia. Developmental political economy and the prospects for regional economic integration. In Liu and Régnier 2003, 119–137.

Dillon, Dana R. and John J. Tkacik, Jr. (2005). China and ASEAN: Endangered American Primacy in Southeast Asia. *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, No. 1886 (19. October), 1–6.

Dunne, Tim (2008). Liberalism. In Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (Eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations,* (pp. 108–122), 4th edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Economy, Elizabeth (2005). China's Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14(44), 409–425.

Fawcett, Louise (2004). Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism. *International Affairs*, 80 (3), 429–446.

Foot, Rosemary (1998). China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought. *Asian Survey*, 38(5), 425–440.

Garofano, John (2002). Powers, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. A Security Community for Asia? *Asian survey*, 42(3), 502–521.

Gershman, John (2002). Is Southeast Asia the Second Front? *Foreign Affairs*, 81(4), 60–74.

Guang, Pan (2007). A Chinese perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17*, 45–58.

Guo, Baogang (2003). Political Legitimacy and China's Transition. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 8(1 and 2), 1–25.

Goh, Evelyn (2004). The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy. *The Pacific Review*, 17(1), 47–69.

Hänggi, Heiner (2003). Regionalism through interregionalism. East Asia and ASEM. In Liu and Régnier 2003, 197–219.

Heller, Dominik (2005). The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 27(1), 123–145.

Ikenberry, John G. and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (2002). Between balance of power and community: the future of multilateral security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific. *International Relations in the Asia Pacific*, 2(1),

69–94.

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (2005). *China's Peaceful Development Road*, Beijing, 12. December. Retrieved Sept 6, 2008, from www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/152684.htm.

Johnston, Alastair Ian (1999). The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In Haftendorn, Helga, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (Eds.), *Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space*, (pp. 287–324). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kahler, Miles (2000). Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case. *International Organization*, 54(3), 549–571.

Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi (2006). Neither skepticism nor romanticism: the ASEAN Regional Forum as a solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game. *The Pacific Review*, 19(2), 219–237.

Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. *International Security*, 20(1), 39–51.

Khong, Yuen Foong (1997). Making bricks without straw in the Asia Pacific? Review article. *The Pacific Review*, 10(2), 289–300.

Krishnamra, Nadhavathna (2003). Regionalism and subregional cooperation. The ASEAN experience. in Liu/Régnier 2003, 85–99.

Lanteigne, Marc (2007). *In Medias Res:* The Development of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization as a Security Community. *Pacific Affairs*, 79(4), 605–622.

Layne, Christopher (2008). China's Challenge to US Hegemony. *Current History*, 107(705), 13–18.

Leifer, Michael (1999). The ASEAN peace process: a category mistake. *The Pacific Review*, 12(1), 25–38.

----- (1996). *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security*. Oxford and London: Oxford University Press and International Institute for Strategic Studies. Adelphi Paper No. 302.

Li, Chenghong (2007). Limited Defensive Strategic Partnership: Sino-Russian rapprochement and the driving forces. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 16(52), 477–497.

Limaye, Satu P. (2007). United States – ASEAN Relations on ASEAN´s Fortieth Anniversary: A Glass Half Full. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 29(3), 447–464.

Lijun, Sheng (2003). China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and Strategic Motivations. *ISEAS Working Paper Series*, *International Politics & Security Issues*, No. 1, Singapore.

Liu, Fu-Kuo (2003a). East Asian regionalism and the evolution of a fragmented region. A conceptual approach towards the political sector of security. In Liu and Régnier 2003, 71–84.

----- and Philippe Régnier (Eds.), *Regionalism in East Asia. Paradigm shifting?* London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Luzyanin, Sergey (2007). Central Asia in Trilateral Cooperation: Regional Potential. *China Report*, 43(2), 237–243.

Mackinder, Halford J. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. *The Geographical Journal*, 23(4), 421–437.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2006). Conversations in *International Relations:* Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I). *International Relations*, 26(1), 105–123.

----- (2005). The Rise of China will not be peaceful at all. *The Australian*, 18. November 2005, 14.

----- (2003). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. 2nd edition. New York: Norton.

----- (1995). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5–49.

Mohanty, A.K. (2007). A Russian Understanding of China's SCO Policy. *China Report*, 43(2), 245–257.

National Intelligence Council (2008). *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*. Washington: US Government Printing Office.

Ong, Russel (2007). "Peaceful Evolution", "Regime Change" and China's Political Security. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 16(53), 717–727.

Qinggong, Li and Wei Wei (1997). The world needs a new security concept. *Jiefangjun Bao*, 24. December, 5. Retrieved Sept, 6, 2008, from www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/china/jiefangjun-new-security-971224.html.

Rice, Condoleezza (2008). Rethinking the National Interest. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(4), 2–26.

Rüland, Jürgen (2005). The Nature of Southeast Asian Security Challenges. *Security Dialogue*, 36(4), 545–563.

Rolfe, Jim (2008). Regional Security for the Asia-Pacific: Ends and Means. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 30(1), 99–117.

SarDesai, Damodar R. (1997). *Southeast Asia. Past & Present*. 4th edition. Boulder: Westview Press.

Sawant, Ankush B. (2006). Tracing the Evolution of African unity. *African Quarterly*, 46(3), 14–20.

Shambaugh, David (2005). China Engages Asia. Reshaping the Regional Order. *International Security*, 29(3), 64–99.

Shi, Yinhong (2008). China's Peaceful Development, Harmonious World and International Responsibility: Achievements and Challenges. *International Review*, (Spring), 18–28.

Snyder, Glenn H. (2002). Mearsheimer's World – Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security. A Review Essay. *International Security*, 27(1), 149–173.

Stubbs, Richard (2002). ASEAN Plus Three. Emerging East Asian Regionalism? *Asian Survey*, 42(3), 440–455.

Wanandi, Jusuf (2005). Towards an Asian security-community. *European Journal*, 3(3), 323–332.

Wang, Fei-Ling (2005). Preservation, Prosperity and Power: what motivates China's foreign policy? *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14(45), 669–694.

Xinhua News Agency (2004). Wen: China Will Never Seek Hegemony. 28. June. Retrieved Sept 6, 2008, from www.china.org.cn/english/international/99594.htm#.

Yang, Jiemian (2007). China's Perspective on International System: Soft Power and Public Goods. *International Review*, (Winter), 94–112.

Yermekbayev, Nurlan (2008). ASEAN and SCO: Opportunities and perspectives of interaction. *RIA Novosti*. Retrieved Aug 17, 2008, from http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080115/97149978.html.

Yu, Xintian (2007). The Role of Soft Power in China's External Strategy. *International Review*, (Winter), 113–127.

Zhang, Youwen (2008). New Themes of Opening-up Policy. *International Review*, (Spring), 1–17.

Zhaoxing, Li (2008). *Speech given at the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the 10+3 Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur*, 26 July. Retrieved Aug 14, 2008, from www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/dqzzywt/t265670.htm.

Interviews

Hanoi, September 2008.

- Hai Do Thanh, Institute for International Relations (IIR), Research Fellow.
- Dr Khong Thi Binh, IIR, Research Fellow.
- Ayumi Konishi, Asia Development Bank, Vietnam Resident Mission, Country Director.
- Assoc.Prof.Dr Pham Quang Minh, Department of International Studies, Vietnam National University (VNU).

Kuala Lumpur, December 2008:

- Farizal Mohd Razalli, Khazana Nasional and University of Vienna.
- Assoc.Prof.Dr Madya Ruhanas Harun, School of Politics & Strategic Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM).
- Dr Stephen Leong, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Assistant Director-General.

Singapore, December 2008:

- Assoc.Prof.Dr John Harrison, S. Rajanatnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
- Ong Keng Yong, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Director, and former Secretary General ASEAN.
- Ike Reed, US Embassy in Singapore, Chief o Section Economic and Political Affairs.
- Dr Ian Storey, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Visiting Fellow.
- Takonai Susumu, Embassy of Japan in Singapore, First Secretary (Political).
- Dr Yeo Lay Hwee, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Fellow.
- Harm Zebregs, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Resident Representative Asia and Pacific Department.

Forum Südostasien / Forum South-East Asia

Zwischen Khao San und Lonely Planet
Aspekte der postmodernen Backpacking-Identität in Südostasien

Between Khao San and Lonely Planet
Aspects of Postmodern Backpacking Identity in South-East Asia

GÜNTER SPREITZHOFER[1]

Universität Wien, Österreich / University of Vienna, Austria

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

This paper is an attempt to highlight some aspects of postmodern backpacking, which has come to be more appreciated by South-East Asian governments as a development tool after the decrease of package tourist arrivals due to terrorism, diseases and natural disasters. Special focus has been put on backpacking performance, perception and transformation within the region, where the accumulation of youthful travellers has been obvious for more than three decades, when the first underground guidebook for independent travellers was published in the 1970s. Special attention has been given to the increasing commercialization (Lonely Planet) and the booming urban infrastructure (Khao San) of this "anti-tourist" travel style, which seems to attract a new comfort-, shopping- and fun-oriented backpacker clientele rather than the ideologically-minded anti-consumerism backpackers of the early 1980s. However, apart from regional development opportunities and disparities, backpacking offers a wide range of personal development chances for postmodern mobile professionals, who seem to be more interested in western lifestyle traveller enclaves and self-fulfillment than in exploring and understanding foreign cultures.

Keywords: Backpacking, Alternative Tourism, Lonely Planet, Khao San Road, Lifestyle & Transformation

1 Mag. Dr. Günter Spreitzhofer, Lehrbeauftragter am Institut für Geographie und Regionalforschung (Universität Wien). Arbeitsschwerpunkte: Südostasien; Tourismus, Urbanisierung, soziokultureller Wandel, Umwelt und Ressourcen. Kontakt: guenter.spreitzhofer@univie.ac.at

Im Mittelpunkt dieses Beitrages steht eine Diskussion von Aspekten des Rucksacktourismus („Backpacking"), den zahlreiche südostasiatische Staaten als Entwicklungsmotor entdeckt (und akzeptiert) haben, nachdem die Zahl der Pauschaltouristen aufgrund von Terrorangst, Umweltkatastrophen und regionalen Seuchen drastisch gesunken ist. Besonderer Schwerpunkt wurde auf die regionale Manifestation und Perzeption von Backpacking an der Wiege des Rucksacktourismus gelegt, wo die erste einschlägige Reiseliteratur seit den 1970ern die anfangs anti-touristischen Reiseströme bündelte. Die zunehmende Kommerzialisierung der Backpacker-Infrastruktur in den Quellländern (Fallbeispiel: Lonely Planet, ein Reisebuchverlag) und Zielländern (Fallbeispiel: Khao San Road, eine Backpackerenklave in Bangkok/Thailand) wird ebenso thematisiert wie der Rollenwandel der einst anti-konsumorientierten Billigreise zum fun-orientierten Lifestyle-Event vor exotischer Kulisse, das persönlicher Selbstfindung und egozentrierter Wellness- und Adventure-Hype Vorrang vor der Befassung mit fremden Kulturen und Gesellschaftsformen gibt.

Schlagworte: Rucksacktourismus, Alternativtourismus, Lonely Planet, Khao San Road, Lifestyle & Transformation

„Die Khao San ist [...] erste Anlaufstelle für Rucksackreisende, Globetrotter, Individualtouris, Hippies (und deren Enkel) in Bangkok [...]. Das Treiben auf der Road wirkt bisweilen wie eine große Uniparty unter dem Motto: ‚Wir spielen Asien', die etwas aus dem Ruder gelaufen ist [...]. Das wahre Asien, das wahre Thailand (gibt's das?) fangen einen oder auch ein paar Tausend Kilometer weiter an. Einen Kulturschock bekommen Neuankömmlinge allenfalls, wenn sie das Refugium der Road verlassen [...]" (www.thaiminator.de, 2.3.2008).

1. Zwischen Selbstfindung und Selbstwahrnehmung: Einführende Überlegungen zu (k)einem neuen Phänomen

Das stetige Erstarken des Individualtourismus in Südostasien (Siebert 2002) wird heute weder von Reiseveranstaltern noch von lokalen Behörden weiter ignoriert, die über Jahrzehnte Pauschaltourismus als Devisenbringer bedingungslos hofiert (Erb 2000; Hall 1997; Hampton 1998; Loker-Murphy & Pearce 1995) und „andere" Reiseformen bestenfalls geduldet, nicht aber goutiert haben – diese waren „at best tacitly ignored, at worst actively discouraged in official tourism planning" (Hampton 1998: 640).

Seit dem Erlahmen der regionalen Tourismusdynamik Ende der 1990er Jahre (WTO 2006) wurden jedoch gerade Individualreisende zum Hoffnungsanker einer schwächelnden

Wirtschaftsbranche, die durch zahlreiche – teils medial dramatisierte – Schlüsselereignisse gesundheitlicher (SARS, Vogelgrippe), naturräumlicher (Tsunami: Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesien, Thailand 2004; Vulkanausbrüche: Indonesien 2006; Zyklon: Myanmar 2008) und politischer Natur (Terroranschläge in Indonesien, regionale Unruhen in Südthailand und auf den Philippinen, u.a.) dramatische Einbußen vor allem im Pauschaltourismus verzeichnet, während der Boom des Rucksacktourismus nahezu unvermindert anhielt.

Romanverfilmungen wie „The Beach" (Garland 1997), eine Backpacker-Saga ohne Happy-End, trugen das Ihre dazu bei, die Thematik Ende der 1990er einer breiten Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen und – nicht zuletzt dank Hollywood-Stars wie Leonardo di Caprio – Einblicke in das südostasiatische „Traveller"-Leben zu vermitteln, die bis dahin gruppenzugehörigen Insidern vorbehalten waren.

Der folgende Beitrag versucht eine kritische Analyse eines umstrittenen Konzeptes im definitorisch schwer fassbaren Schnittbereich von (jugendlicher) Mobilität, „Billigleben", „Selbstfindung" und „Völkerverständigung", das sich in frühesten Anfängen auf die Grand Tour der Adeligen und die Walz der Handwerksburschen vergangener Jahrhunderte zurückführen lässt und in rasantem Wandel begriffen ist. Sind immer noch Bildung & Arbeit, oder doch eher Fun & Sun die Reisemotive postindustrieller Twens (Welk 2003)? Ist die Mehrzahl der Rucksackreisenden des 21. Jahrhunderts tatsächlich noch von Verweigerung der Konsumwelt geprägt, von neuen (alternativen) Lebenskonzepten und anti-touristischen Visionen abseits massentouristischer Erscheinungen, wie bereits vor langem antizipiert wurde (Butler 1990)?

Die Rolle des Rucksacktourismus als Wegbereiter des Pauschaltourismus wird seit Jahrzehnten diskutiert (Butler 1990; Loker-Murphy & Pearce 1995; Richard & Wilson 2004, Tüting 1978; Westerhausen 2002; u.a.), ist mittlerweile unbestritten und wird in diesem Beitrag nicht weiter ausgeführt. „'Travellers' are thus often the spearhead of masstourist penetration of an area", argumentierte Cohen bereits vor zwei Jahrzehnten (1989: 134), die „Wegbereiter demokratischer Massenströme" (Mäder 1987: 132) sind sich ihres Einflusses auf lokale Wertesysteme und ihrer soziokulturellen Vorbildwirkung jedoch weiterhin selten bewusst.

Anspruchslose „Drifter" (auf der Suche nach sich selbst) werden vermehrt zu Komfort suchenden „Travellern" (auf der Suche nach Shopping, Events und Entertainment), wie anhand der Entwicklung der prototypischen Travellerenklave Khao San (Bangkok/Thailand) belegt werden soll. Die individualtouristischen Trampelpfade durch Südostasien wiederum ergeben sich nicht zufällig, wie am Beispiel des Medienriesen Lonely Planet aufgezeigt werden soll, der seit über drei Jahrzehnten die Reiseströme durch die Region lenkt und seinen Informationsgehalt gezielt neuen Backpackergenerationen und veränderten Nachfragemustern anpasst. Fragen der Motivstruktur, der Kritikpunkte am Ferntourismusaufkommen sowie der

soziokulturellen Auswirkungen auf die Zielländer wurden in früheren Arbeiten des Autors ausführlich behandelt und werden nur exemplarisch angeschnitten.

Die lange regionale Travel-Tradition Südostasiens hat zunehmende Integration auf sozialer wie transnationaler Ebene bewirkt, neue (informelle) Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten geschaffen und dennoch die idealisierte Völkerverständigung nicht erbringen können. Spätestens die jüngsten Terroranschläge (2002, 2005) in Kuta (Bali/Indonesien), einer der vielen Enklaven westlicher wie billigtouristischer Lebensweise im Großraum Südostasien, haben aufgezeigt, dass idealisiertes und weitgehend einseitig angestrebtes Verständnis für die Lebensweise der Einheimischen kein harmonisches Zusammenleben zwischen „Host" und „Guest" (= arm versus reich) bewirken muss, das die Väter des Alternativtourismus in den 1970er Jahren propagiert haben. Der Rucksack allein, Namensgeber besagter „billiger" (?) Reiseform, kostet – damals wie heute – oft genug den Jahreslohn der Bereisten und führt die hehre These der Völkerverständigung („gleich trifft gleich") nach wie vor ad absurdum.

Die anfängliche Romantisierung der meist jugendlichen „Abenteurer" fernab der Standardrouten des internationalen Tourismus ist längst kritischer Betrachtung gewichen, die ihrerseits in einen weitgehend entemotionalisierten, nüchternen Diskurs überzugehen scheint (Conlin 2007, Westerhausen 2002). Rucksacktourismus zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts ist längst eine etablierte Reiseform für sich, Spiegelbild der gesellschaftlichen Individualisierung der Gegenwart und Chance für Einkommen und Entwicklung auf „grassroots level" (Baskin 1995).

2. Vom Alternativtourismus zum Backpacking: Die Transformation einer Identität

2.1. Drifter oder Explorer, Elite- oder Off-Beat-Touristen? Eine soziologische Annäherung

Cohens Touristentypologie, die den meisten soziologischen Abhandlungen zum Wesen des Rucksacktourismus bis heute zugrunde liegt (vgl. Binder 2005), beinhaltete 1972 neben massentouristischen Ansätzen erstmals auch „non-institutionalized tourist roles", offenbar eine Reaktion auf die Hippiebewegung der späten 1960er Jahre. Während in Cohens vierteiligem, auf dem jeweiligen Kommerzialisierungsgrad beruhenden Konzept der „organized" und der „individual mass tourist" die institutionalisierten Rollen übernehmen, stellen „drifter" und „explorer" die individualtouristischen Gegenspieler dar. Drei Jahrzehnte später gilt Cohens Typologieansatz nach wie vor als Basis der vorhandenen empirischen Untersuchungen: Während der „explorer"-Typ Reiseorganisation und Fortbewegungsart selbst bestimmt und arrangiert, stellt er gleichzeitig Mindestansprüche an Komfort, hofft auf Routine, Regelhaftes

und Bekanntes (z.B. Essen) und verfügt über einen fixen Zeit- und Routenplan. Im Gegensatz dazu zeigt der „drifter"-Typ verstärktes Interesse am Lebensstil der bereisten Kulturen/ Regionen, den er zu teilen versucht. Aus der Mittel- oder Oberschicht stammend, gilt er als unpatriotisch und ideologieverachtend, der Reiseantritt als freiwillig, bei vorherrschenden Fluchtmotiven neigt er zu Anarchie und Hedonismus (zit. nach Riley 1988: 315).

Einen weiteren Kategorisierungsansatz bietet Cohen auf der Grundlage touristischer Erfahrungswerte. Unterschieden wird zwischen „recreational", „diversionary", „experiential", „experimental" und „existential" (Cohen 1979: 185-192). Dieser Gliederung zufolge sind Alternativtouristen – in Stohrbecks (1990) Übertragung – als Experimentier- und Existenztypen definierbar: Erstere suchen „nach alternativen Lebensentwürfen und Wertvorstellungen, [...] geben sich nicht damit zufrieden, (scheinbar) authentisches Leben in anderen Kulturen und Gesellschaften zu beobachten, sondern versuchen vielmehr für einige Zeit in andere Kulturen integriert zu werden" (Stohrbeck 1990: 336); die zweitgenannte Gruppe wiederum hat ihre optimal-adäquate alternative Lebensweise bereits gefunden, kann sie jedoch nur auf der Reise verwirklichen.

Andere Typologien basieren auf der Touristenzahl und ihrer Anpassung an lokale Normsysteme (vgl. auch Smith 1977: 11ff). Für die vorliegende Fragestellung von Bedeutung scheinen vor allem die Konzepte des „Elite-Touristen" und der „Off-Beat-Touristen", die „durch die Benutzung lokaler Verkehrssysteme, Unterkünfte und Gaststätten kaum soziokulturelle Überformung" (Krippendorf 1984: 59) bewirkten – zumindest vor Beginn der „Vermassung" (Cohen 2003: 98) individueller Reiseströme, die in ihren Wurzeln auf den ersten punktuellen Freakzentren der Hippie-Ära der späten 1960er fußen, deren zeitresistente Bedeutung als Hochburgen des Individualtourismus bis heute unbestritten ist.

2.2. Globetrotter oder Backpacker, Trekker oder Traveller? Eine perzeptionelle Annäherung

Seit Beginn der 1980er Jahre ist der Begriff Alternativtourismus Inhalt und Schwerpunkt zahlreicher Publikationen, die jedoch weitgehend die Sichtweise der Reisequellstaaten dokumentieren. Adäquate empirische Studien aus den südostasiatischen Zielgebieten des Rucksacktourismus fehlen weitgehend, was die langjährige Negation dieses Phänomens durch staatliche Behörden wie wissenschaftliche Institutionen vor Ort zu unterstreichen vermag. Allgemeine Übereinstimmung besteht in der Tourismusliteratur nur über Ambiguität und Vieldeutigkeit dieses Konzeptes, das als Schlagwort und Zauberformel die Tourismustheorie über Jahrzehnte beherrschte (vgl. Tüting 1978, Welk 2003, u.a.).

Insgesamt schien sich jedoch allmählich ein Synonymisierungseffekt zu Rucksacktourismus

(Backpacking) durchzusetzen (Freyer 2001). Einige Autoren forderten sogar explizit die Ersetzung des Begriffes Alternativtourismus durch Rucksacktourismus (Kienecker 1987: 328) bzw. Hybridtourismus (Rotpart 1995: 27ff), um das Scheitern der Illusion eines „anderen" Tourismus auch terminologisch zu untermauern. Gemeinsamer Nenner sämtlicher Begriffsannäherungen ist die Abgrenzung zu (massenhaftem) Pauschaltourismus: „... no social group is more snobbish and dismissive about tourists ... The worst thing that can be said about a place is that it is too touristy", argumentierten Turner und Ash (1975: 257) bereits vor Beginn jedweder Massenhaftigkeit von Rucksacktourismus, der damals wie heute als Übergangsritual von der Jugend in das Erwachsenenalter interpretiert wird (Cohen 1973 und 2003).

Verbindend für diese inhomogene Gruppe scheinbar „anders" Reisender war stets die völlige Ablehnung der touristischen Rolle (Scherrer 1986: 76) auf der Suche nach authentischen Erlebnissen, eine terminologische Begleiterscheinung zur ausgeprägten Opposition zu massentouristischen Erscheinungsformen. Mowforth und Munt (1998: 135) betonen die Arroganz betont anti-touristischer „ego-tourists", die sich über soziale Normen hinwegsetzen und – im Hochgefühl anonymer Freiheit – westliches Verhalten leben (Noronha 1999): „This seems to be a problem particularly in backpacker ghettos or enclaves, places where large numbers congregate to experience home comforts (from good phone and internet services to familiar foods, such as the ubiquitous banana pancake) and the company of tourists of similar mind" (Scheyvens 2002: 147f).

2.3. Mittelschicht, männlich und massenhaft mobil? Eine sozioökonomische Annäherung

> *„[…] contemporary backpackers are engaging in a self-centered form of poverty-tourism, traveling around shrouded from the 'real Third world" by the backpacker ghettos which provide the major stepping stones along their well-trodden route" (Scheyvens 2002: 150).*

Zahlreiche Feldforschungsaufenthalte des Autors auf den Spuren der Backpacker-Pfade durch Südostasien erbrachten seit den frühen 1990ern Einblicke in den sozioökonomischen Hinter-grund der Reisenden, ihre Reiseziele und -routen sowie in die (informelle) individual-touristische Infrastruktur, die lokale Anbieter vor Ort offerieren. Mit Hilfe teilnehmender Beobachtung, Tiefeninterviews und kartographischer Erhebungen von einschlägigen Backpacker-Enklaven ist das heterogene Bild zumindest der „long-term budget traveller", Langzeitreisenden auf Billigbasis, auf einige grundlegende Charakteristika eingrenzbar, die hier lediglich bezüglich ihrer Aktualität und Relevanz nach der Jahrtausendwende genannt werden sollen, da sozioökonomische Aspekte, politische Akzeptanz, Routing und Aspekte der interkulturellen Begegnung schon in früheren Arbeiten ausführlich diskutiert wurden (1995b,

1996a, 1998, 2004).

Die Ergebnisse der jüngsten Erhebungen lassen vermuten, dass Rucksacktourismus in Südostasien weiterhin durch die Dominanz west-, mittel- und nordeuropäischer, nordamerikanischer, australischer, neuseeländischer und israelischer (überwiegend männlicher) Traveller gekennzeichnet ist, deren Durchschnittsalter von knapp unter 30 Jahren deutlich höher als in südosteuropäischen Zielländern (Griechenland, Türkei) zu liegen scheint (vgl. auch Loker-Murphy & Pearce 1995: 832). Die führenden Quellstaaten des auf Südostasien gerichteten Rucksacktourismus unterscheiden sich hier offenkundig von den offiziellen Daten der Welttourismusorganisation, die Japan und Taiwan – ostasienweit ist Pauschaltourismus die traditionell-etablierte Reiseform – quantitativ deutlich voran sehen (WTO 2006). Die kontinuierlich steigende Zahl (süd-)ostasiatischer Backpacker ist eine junge Entwicklung der späten 1990er Jahre, die das Aufkommen zahlungskräftiger Mittelschichten und die Übernahme westlicher Freizeitmuster dokumentieren (Uthoff 1998).

Auch der überdurchschnittlich hohe Ausbildungsstand der befragten Rucksackreisenden – etwa zwei Drittel haben zumindest Matura (Abitur), studieren oder haben ein Studium abgeschlossen – deckt sich tendenziell mit ähnlichen Studien (Dearden & Harron 1994; Malam 2003; Riley 1988). Rund die Hälfte der Befragten hat (oder wurde) vor Reiseantritt gekündigt. Neben persönlichen Krisensituationen schienen Aspekte der Selbstverwirklichung die Hauptrolle für die (meist) mehrmonatige, seltener mehrjährige „Flucht“ zu sein, die vorwiegend alleinreisend erfolgte. Die Wahl von Reisepartnern auf Zeit – zur Kostenreduzierung, als moralische Stütze – erweist sich jedoch nach wie vor als gängige Praxis.

Die Untersuchungsergebnisse zum Informationsverhalten schienen die Dominanz informeller (mündlicher und digitaler) Informationsquellen zu belegen. Persönlicher Erfahrungsaustausch mit „fellow travellers“ (Geheimtipps!), meist in Traveller-Enklaven mit einschlägiger, eurozentrierter Billiginfrastruktur (Guest Houses mit englischsprachigen Videovorführungen; Restaurants mit westlicher Menupalette; Message-Boards mit Schwarzmarkt- und „Schnorrer“-Tips; Traveller-Chat-Plattformen), garantierte den Befragten weitgehende Aktualität (vgl. auch Adkins & Grant 2007: 188ff). Als Basisinformation schlechthin dienen jedoch weiterhin einschlägige Individual-Reiseführer, wobei die Quasi-Monopolposition des australischen Verlages Lonely Planet augenscheinlich ist.

3. Die Infrastruktur des Rucksacktourismus: Quellstaaten und Zielregionen

Die folgenden Fallbeispiele dokumentieren exemplarisch die Verfestigung der oben genannten Trends. Der (punktuell und allmählich linear beobachtbare) rucksacktouristische

Massentourismus der Gegenwart kulminiert in zumeist urbanen Traveller-Enklaven, die als Ausgangspunkt für Informationsbeschaffung und Streifzüge in die südostasiatische Peripherie dienen (Murphy 2001: 61f): Diese sind ihrerseits durch entsprechende Reiseliteratur weitgehend strukturiert und gelenkt, womit von Selbsttätigkeit und unverhoffter Begegnung oftmals keine Rede mehr sein kann.

3.1. Backpacking-Kommerz, Teil 1: Lonely Planet und Co

> *„We've been an influence in some of these places, but people would go there anyway. I worry about it in some respects but I don't lose sleep over it […]" (Tony Wheeler, zit. nach Gray 1998).*

> *„[...] von den Idealen der Alternativtourismusbewegung wird man nicht satt", kommentierten Fahrenholtz und Lorenz (1986: 136) bereits vor zwei Jahrzehnten die Heranbildung einer spezifischen Alternativtourismusindustrie in den westlichen Quellstaaten des internationalen Tourismus. Zumeist von (ehemaligen) Travellern initiiert und organisiert, ist das florierende Geschäft mit dem Rucksack heute keineswegs mehr Ableger und Mitläufer etablierter Unternehmen des Massentourismus, sondern ein eigenständiger Marktsektor mit einem Anteil von 5-10 Prozent am gesamten Reisemarkt (Freyer 2001: 395).*

Symptomatisch für den rasanten Wandel vom Insiderverlag für billigreisende Traveller zum Reiseführer für alle Reisestile und -budgets ist die Entwicklung des australischen Verlages Lonely Planet: „Across Asia on the Cheap", eine (teils in Bangkoks Khao San Road, vgl. Kap. 4.2.) maschinengetippte Beschreibung des Überlandweges von England nach Australien, wurde 1973 zum Prototyp von praxisbezogenen Reiseführern im Allgemeinen und zum Vorläufer des weltweit meistverkauften Individual-Reiseführers im Besonderen.

„Southeast Asia on a Shoestring", die „gelbe Bibel" (Verlagsdefinition) der Backpacker und Billigtouristen, wurde zum ersten Bestseller des Verlagsgründers Tony Wheeler und geht seit ihrer Erstveröffentlichung (1975) bereits in die vierzehnte (aktualisierte) Auflage (März 2008; 988 Seiten). Anfangs noch Familienbetrieb (Eigenrecherchen, Eigenpublizierung) beschäftigen „Lonely Planet Publications" heute ein internationales AutorInnenteam aus über 150 Mitgliedern. Dominierte in den Anfangsjahren noch die „shoestring"-Serie (Informationsgehalt ausschließlich auf Billigtouristen ausgerichtet), die mehrere Länder(gruppen) überblicksmäßig erfasst, so gewannen in den 1980er Jahren die länderspezifischen „travel survival kits" vermehrte Bedeutung, die zusätzliche Information für finanzkräftigere Klientel bieten konnten.

Seit einigen Jahren ist die Differenzierung zur Gänze entfallen. Billigstinfrastruktur, einst Kerninhalt der einschlägigen Reiseliteratur der Anfangsjahre, wird mittlerweile nicht mehr erwähnt: Eine Reaktion auf das Nachfrageverhalten neuer Reisender, die Rucksacktourismus nicht mehr unbedingt mit absolutem Billigreisen gleichsetzen? (vgl. The Flashpacker

2006). „Lonely Planet ... aim to inspire people to explore, have fun, and travel often. […] Travel can be a powerful force for tolerance and understanding. As part of a worldwide community of travellers, we want to enable everyone to travel with awareness, respect and care“ (www.lonelyplanet.com; 7.5.2008) – die Kluft zwischen hehren Ansprüchen und realer Nutzermentalität ist frappierend.

Mit bislang fast einer Million verkaufter Exemplare war der nunmehr quantitativ und qualitativ wesentlich erweiterte Südostasien-Reiseführer Zugpferd des prosperierenden Medienriesen, dessen Verlagsprogramm derzeit bei über 600 Büchern liegt (1992: 100), die mittlerweile vielfach auch in Deutsch, Französisch, Italienisch oder Koreanisch übersetzt wurden und die Erde flächendeckend erfassen. Eigene TV-Serien, Bildbanken, digitale Informationsplattformen (Thorntree Forum) und multimediale Websites runden das Bild eines Travel-Imperiums ab, das mit seinen Anfängen wenig gemein hat. Mit jährlichen Wachstumsraten von 20 Prozent und knapp drei Millionen verkauften Büchern per anno kann von alternativer Reiseliteratur kaum mehr gesprochen werden: „Even well-heeled Americans, who wouldn't be caught dead with a backpack, now tuck them in their designer luggage“, konstatierte Gray (1998: 2) bereits vor einem Jahrzehnt.

3.2. Backpacking Kommerz, Teil 2: Khao San Road

Dass der Vorspann zu Alex Garlands Backpacker-Saga „The Beach“ in Thailands Hauptstadt Bangkok angesiedelt ist, erscheint angesichts der langjährigen Bedeutung ihres touristischen Billigviertels als wenig verwunderlich. Die Khao San Road (auch Kao San oder Kao Sarn), seit den 1970er Jahren mit anderen urbanen Traveller-Enklaven (Singapur: Beach Road; Jakarta: Jalan Jaksa; u.a.) Wegbereiter und Metapher für individualtouristische Erschließung in Südostasien, symbolisiert den Wandel von alternativer Gegenwelt zum hedonistischen Partyzentrum der Gegenwart.

In unmittelbarer Nähe des thailändischen Königspalastes gelegen, nimmt die genannte Straße (und die Straßenzüge im Stadtteil Banglampoo rundum) hinsichtlich Homogenität und Ausprägungsgrad backpackerspezifischer Nachfragepräferenzen eine uneingeschränkte Spitzenposition im Raum Südostasien ein. Begünstigt durch die zunehmende Bedeutung Bangkoks als internationaler Flugknotenpunkt war der Bedeutungsaufschwung zur Schaltstelle des überregionalen Individualtourismus im Lauf der letzten Jahrzehnte nur eine Frage der Zeit.

Anfang der 1980er Jahre in der einschlägigen Reiseführerliteratur als eines von insgesamt drei Billigquartiervierteln Bangkoks nur kurz erwähnt (vgl. Wheeler 1982: 372ff), fand die

fortschreitende Konzentration des Billigtourismussektors auf den Bereich Khao San Road bereits in den nächsten Ausgaben der „gelben Bibel“ ihren Niederschlag. Banglampoo gilt bereits kurz danach als führende Travelleragglomeration (Wheeler 1989: 585ff):

> *„Khao San Rd. is an amazingly cosmopolitan place these days. Back in the old Asia overland days of the early 70s there were the three 'Ks' - travellers' 'bottlenecks' where you were bound to meet up with anybody travelling trans-Asia. These days you could substitute Khao San for Kabul to make it three with Kuta and Kathmandu. All along the road there are little signs indicating it's a travellers' 'hangout' - countless small guest houses, restaurants with fruit salad and muesli on the menu, at night they spill out first across the sidewalk and then right into the street. Loud rock booms out from the cassette sellers, clothes are sold from shops and sidewalk stalls, books are bought and traded, travel agents offer cheap tickets and fake student cards, there are places to store your baggage or wash your clothes, buses and taxis seem to come and go constantly, disgorging one band of backpackers and picking up another, who are patiently waiting with their packs by the roadside. This one block of intense activity is definitely the travellers' centre of Bangkok."*

Seit 2004 ist die Khao San Fußgängerzone, informelle Straßenhändler sind nur mehr zu bestimmten Tageszeiten geduldet, und die konsumorientierte Kommerzialisierung hat eine neue Ausprägungsqualität erreicht. Die Angebotspalette ist vielseitig und reflektiert den Bedarf individualreisender Backpacker.

Abbildung 1: Khao San Road/Banglampoo (Bangkok)
Quelle: www.thaiminator.de; 7.5.2008

Neben Leistungen in den Bereichen Unterkunft und Verpflegung bietet das System Khao San eine abgeschlossene Welt in sich, ausschließlich ausgerichtet auf Erwartungen und Bedürfnisse westlicher Billig- und Billigstreisender, die aus verschiedensten Motiven Station in Banglampoo machen: gemeinsames Bindeglied ist ohne Zweifel die attraktive Vielfalt von Angebot und Leistung am unteren Ende der Budgetpyramide (Piadaeng 2002), die spätestens Mitte der 1990er qualitativ und quantitativ adäquates westliches Erwartungsniveau erreicht haben.

Die Fluktuation unter den Anbietern ist naturgemäß groß; bei Mietpreisen von 8.000 bis 20.000 Baht/m^2/Monat und erdrückender Konkurrenzsituation wird die Abwanderung von Anbietern der ersten Stunde verständlich. Der verstärkte Zustrom von ortsfremden Händlerschichten ist ein unübersehbares Phänomen. Filialen etablierter Ketten aus Textil- und Schmuckbereich prägen zunehmend das Straßenbild und geben der ursprünglichen „Undergroundkultur“ mit Tausch- und Second-Hand-Kaufcharakter reiseessentieller Güter (Zelt, Schlafsack, Kamera) ein völlig neues Gesicht. Die Khao San Road war bereits Anfang der 1990er Jahre auf dem Weg zu einer Shoppingstraße europäischen Zuschnitts. Diese umfasste 2006 über 150 Betriebe (exklusive mobile Stände und Guest Houses), die großteils im Besitz von drei chinesisch-thailändischen Investorengruppen standen (www.thaiminator.de; 4.12.2007), was in krassem Widerspruch zum idealisierten Mythos der Verdienstmöglichkeiten für private Kleinunternehmer durch Individualtouristen steht.

Abbildung 2 gibt einen Einblick in die gegenwärtige Branchenstruktur der Khao San Road, die seit den ersten Untersuchungen des Autors (1995a,b; 1996b) eine rapide Transformation zur Party-, Fun- und Shopping-Zone erkennen lässt, welche ihrerseits die (alternativ-)touristische Billiginfrastruktur der frühen 1990er Jahre weitgehend verdrängt hat.

Die aktuelle lokale Entwicklung scheint symptomatisch für den Wertewandel im Reiseverhalten Individualreisender (Spreitzhofer 2004). Die Feindbilder und Kontrapunkte der anti-konsumorientierten Alternativtourismusszene der 1970er Jahre waren bereits in den 1990er Jahren in billigtouristischen Schaltzentralen präsent und akzeptiert (Spreitzhofer 2002a: 27ff); ein Beweis für weitgehende Neuorientierung und zunehmende Verwestlichung, was das Gros der Bangkok-Backpacker allerdings zu goutieren scheint. Die (zumindest vorgegebenen) Reisegründe der Alternativtouristen der ersten Stunde, nämlich Flucht vor der westlichen Konsum- und Leistungsgesellschaft, sind zu Reisegründen ihrer Nachfolger geworden, die Konsum (Shopping, Fun, Events) nicht nur nicht scheuen, sondern aktiv anstreben. Billigreisen und gleichzeitiges Billigeinkaufen, von Designerhemden zu Maßanzügen, ist kein Widerspruch mehr. Auch Rafting-Touren (vgl. Laos, Thailand), Trekking (Thailand, Laos, Vietnam) oder Tauchkurse (vgl. Thailand, Vietnam) werden verstärkt von Backpackern nachgefragt und über Agenturen in der Khao San oder vor Ort zu Preisen gebucht, die für lokale Interessenten wohl vielfach unerschwinglich wären – ‚Live as the locals do’, Credo der alternativtouristischen

Anfangsphase, ist nicht mehr die Hauptmotivation der Mainstream-Backpacker in Südostasien, die zwar keine Pauschaltouristen sein wollen, aber backpackerspezifische pauschaltouristische Angebote in Travellerzentren dennoch vermehrt wahrnehmen – ein Indiz sowohl für vermehrte Verflechtungstendenzen auf (über-)regionaler Individualtourismusebene wie auch des offenkundigen Perzeptionswandels im eigenen Reisestil. So sind Langstreckenfahrten im Netzwerk der Backpacker-Reiseveranstalter der Khao San Road nach Nordthailand (Chiang Mai; Trekking), Südthailand (Krabi, Ko Samui; Strand) oder Kambodscha (Angkor Wat; Kultur) nicht nur problemlos buchbar, sondern auch vielfach billiger und komfortabler als öffentliche Transportmittel.

Der einstige Geheimtipp der 1980er Jahre ist längst digital präsent: Ergaben sich auf der Suchmaschine Google im Jahr 2004 bei Eingabe „Khao San Road“ 316 Treffer (Zugriff: 20.3.2004), so hat sich die Zahl der Einträge seither auf 69.100 (Zugriff: 2.11.2005) bzw. 201.000 (Zugriff: 10.6.2006) und 1.480.000 (Zugriff: 24.5.2008) vervielfacht; dass der Khao San längst auch auf www.wikipedia.org ein Kapitel gewidmet ist, erscheint somit nicht weiter verwunderlich. Seit 2004 besteht eine eigene Website (www.khaosan.com) für die größte Traveller-Agglomeration Südostasiens, die neben zahlreichen anderen Sprachen auch in deutscher Version zugänglich ist, Online-Buchungen ermöglicht und die gesamte Bandbreite billigtouristischer Nachfragemuster abdeckt.

Abbildung 2: Khao San Road: Geschäfte(macher) für Billigtouristen? Quelle: www.thaiminator.de; Zugriff: 7.12.2007

Sextourismus spielt hier nach wie vor keine relevante Rolle (Bly 2000) und ist, im Gegensatz zu einschlägigen Stadtvierteln Bangkoks (Patpong, u.a.), kein Hauptmotiv für Aufenthalt und (männliche) Unterhaltung. Die Geheimtipps der Backpacker werden längst digital verbreitet, Aspekte der persönlichen Befindlichkeit und Spartipps geben ein bezeichnendes Bild für die Reisemotivation vieler Rucksackreisender, denen Begegnungen und Kontakte mit ihresgleichen bedeutsamer erscheinen als die Konfrontation mit Neuem.

4. Rucksacktourismus und seine Auswirkungen

4.1. Völkerverständigung und interkulturelle Kommunikation? Das lange Scheitern einer Illusion

„Travellers being primarily concerned with relaxation, drugs and having a good time in their own company, rather than with the native people and their culture“ (Cohen 1989: 132) – der Vorwurf fehlender Völkerverständigung und authentischen interkulturellen Kontakts, erklärtes (theoretisches) Ziel und Grundlage individualtouristischen Reisens, wird in den späten 1980er Jahren zum Kernpunkt tourismuskritischer Literatur aller Lager. Die heutige Massenhaftigkeit der anfänglich durchwegs links-alternativem Gedankengut verpflichteten (kleinmaßstäbigen) Traveller-Szene führt nach Becker (1990: 587) bereits Ende der 1980er Jahre zur Überlastung der gerade aktuellen alternativen Reiseziele, zum Durchsetzen des eigenen Lebensstils, zur Ausbeutung traditioneller Gastfreundschaft sowie zur Kommerzialisierung und Veränderung der Dorfstrukturen.

Wie würden Becker, Riley, Tüting und andere der ersten Skeptiker dieses Reisestils wohl die Weiterentwicklung der Szene goutieren und heute kommentieren? Trifft dieser Kritikansatz in vollem Ausmaß zwar nur auf die urbanen Travelleragglomerationen und einige periphere Subzentren des Untersuchungsraumes zu, so scheinen Verbindung und Übergang zu massentouristischen Erscheinungsformen auch für die „explorer“-Formen nur eine Frage der Zeit. Lokal/regional begrenzte Geheimtipps wurden früher oder später (etwa durch Leserzuschriften und digitale Reiseplattformen) Bestandteil der einschlägigen Reiseführerliteratur und Programm von Pauschalreiseveranstaltern. Als Beispiel sei die Insel Ko Samui, idyllischer Geheimtipp der Rucksackszene der 1970er, genannt, die längst über einen eigenen Flughafen verfügt und zur internationalen Massentourismusdestination geworden ist. Die Backpackerszene zog sich daraufhin auf die nördlich anschließenden Inseln Ko Phangan und Ko Tao zurück und begründete dort ein subkulturelles Insiderzentrum. Die Vollmondparties vor Ort sind legendär: „… [a] carnivalesque space, where intense interactions between Thais and tourists often occur, particular opportunities opened up for exploring the intertextualities of space, identity and power“, befindet Malam (2003: 3) in ihrer Untersuchung zum Rollenverhalten thailändischer Beach Boys in Backpackerenklaven.

Gefordert wird vermehrte Einsicht in Travellerkreisen selbst, die bis dato großteils kritiklos (sozio-)kulturellen Entwicklungen in den Dritt-Welt-Zielländern gegenüberstanden (Murphy 2001) und ihren Teil zur „Coca-Kolonisierung“ (Krippendorf 1984: 182) auch peripherer Regionen beitrugen. Ludmilla Tüting, Tourismuskritikerin der ersten Stunde, schätzte 80 Prozent der Rucksackreisenden als gewöhnliche Länderkonsumenten ein, „die völlig unreflektiert vor

allem Entwicklungsländer abhaken und genauso wie Pauschaltourismus zu den negativen Auswirkungen des Massentourismus beitragen“ (zit. nach Kienecker 1987: 330).

4.2. Positive Beiträge zur Regionalentwicklung? Die Möglichkeiten der Partizipation

Die Hippies sind Vergangenheit, geblieben sind die Backpacker. Seit Ende der 1990er Jahre wird zumeist nicht mehr über die Unmoral der ersten Alternativtouristen lamentiert, sondern vielfach das Potenzial des Individualtourismus diskutiert, der – anders als Pauschaltourismus – keine rückläufige Tendenz erkennen lässt. Trotz Terrorangst, SARS und Vogelgrippe blüht das Geschäft mit den Rucksackreisenden, die sich von der derzeit reiseunfreundlichen Grundstimmung nicht von Reisen nach Südostasien abhalten lassen. Bereits zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre war jeder sechste international Reisende zwischen 15 und 29 Jahren alt; über 50 Prozent der Trekker in Nordthailand sind individuell unterwegs (Dearden & Harron 1994).

Längst wird langhaarigen Männern nicht mehr die Einreise nach Singapur oder Malaysia verwehrt wie noch in den 1960er Jahren, doch der positive Beitrag dieser Art von Tourismus (zumindest) zur ökonomischen Entwicklung dringt erst allmählich ins Bewusstsein der politischen Entscheidungsträger, die diesem Reisesegment – das sie weder steuern noch stoppen können – bislang wenig abgewinnen konnten. So war Individualtourismus in Indochina (Kambodscha, Laos, Vietnam) bis in die späten 1980er völlig tabu, in Myanmar wurde seit Mitte der 1990er FITs (Foreign Individual Tourists) bei der Einreise ein offizieller Zwangsumtausch (zu regierungsfreundlichem Wechselkurs) von US$300 abverlangt, vor dem Pauschaltouristen verschont blieben.

Individualtourismus ist stetig im Wachsen begriffen und deshalb auch quantitativ von Bedeutung (Hall 1997, Westerhausen 2002). Doch weder gibt es einschlägige (aktuelle), von regionalen Institutionen erstellte empirische Studien zu potenziellen Zusammenhängen zwischen Backpacking und Lokalentwicklung, noch lassen sich oft mehr als bloße Absichtserklärungen und Signale – etwa weitgehende Aufhebung (Lockerung) der Visapflicht für Staatsbürger touristischer Quellländer – der politischen Entscheidungsträger erkennen, um individuelles Reisen zu fördern.

Internationale Fallstudien zeigen eine Reihe (möglicher) positiver Auswirkungen von Rucksacktourismus auf: Holden (1995) und Malam (2003) betonen die informellen Verdienstmöglichkeiten der Lokalbevölkerung, während Baskin (1995) und Loker-Murphy und Pearce (1995) die Streuung der Einkommenseffekte für periphere Regionen hervor streichen, etwa durch die Nutzung lokaler Unterkunftsmöglichkeiten (Wall & Long 1996). Backpacker kaufen eher lokal produzierte Produkte als Pauschaltouristen, nicht zuletzt aufgrund höherer Aufenthaltsdauer (Hampton 1998; Wheeler 1999). Tabelle 1 listet exemplarisch Ansätze und

Chancen für ökonomische und außerökonomische Entwicklung auf, die – zumindest abseits der urbanen Traveller-Ghettos – auf das (oft gering geschätzte) Wirtschafts- und Kaufkraftpotenzial durch Backpacking zurückzuführen sind, dem auch potenzielle positive Transformationsimpulse auf soziokultureller Ebene nicht völlig abzusprechen sind.

Tabelle 1: ***Rucksacktouristen und ihr Beitrag zur Entwicklung***

Ökonomische Entwicklungskriterien	**Nicht-ökonomische Entwicklungskriterien**
• Längere Reisedauer erbringt höhere Ausgaben	• Lokale Kontrolle durch kleindimensionierte Unternehmen im Eigenbesitz
• Einkommensquelle für marginalisierte Sozialgruppen und periphere Regionen (Gewinnstreuung)	• Erhöhtes Selbstwertgefühl der Lokalbevölkerung
• Geringe Nachfrage nach Luxus bewirkt verstärkte Nachfrage nach lokalen Produkten und Leistungen (Unterkunft, Verpflegung, Transport)	• Möglichkeit der gezielten Förderung von Lokaltourismus („Community Power“)
	• Verringerte Abhängigkeit von internationalen Veranstaltern
• Geringer Kapitalaufwand und Know-How („Learning on the job“)	• Revitalisierung von kulturellen Traditionen
• Multiplikatoreneffekt	• Geringer Ressourcenaufwand

Modifiziert nach: Scheyvens 2002: 152

4.3. Eine Chance zur persönlichen Entwicklung? Soft Skills und Mobile Professionals

Viele der Langzeitreisenden stehen nach ihrer Rückkehr vor dem materiellen Nichts und einem Neubeginn auf beruflicher wie persönlicher Ebene – schon aus Gründen der (unbewussten) Selbstrechtfertigung wird die Reise vielfach glorifiziert, der psychologische Erfolgszwang des „Positiven“ der Reise zwingt zur Verdrängung negativ empfundener Begebenheiten im Reiseverlauf.

Doch die Wiederaufnahme eines geregelten Berufslebens muss nicht traumatisch enden, was mit einer allgemein veränderten Haltung zu Leben und Reise einhergeht. Die in Südostasien angestrebte Gegenwelt der frühen Alternativtouristen ist für die heutigen Traveller kaum mehr von Bedeutung. „Actually, the clear-cut identification of explorer types and drifter types does not seem to be applicable any more, since the backpacking of the late 1990s appears to

be no longer a phenomenon of a minority of well-defined hippie dropouts on the one hand and bourgeois adventurers on the other“, weist Scheyvens (2002: 147f) auf die veränderte Anwendbarkeit der oben angeführten terminologischen Konstrukte hin.

Cohen (2003: 107ff) zufolge ist die Entwicklung des Rucksacktourismus ein Spiegelbild von Entwicklungsprozessen und Lebenshaltungen der postindustriellen Zeit. Die gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen und die Reaktionen auf sie haben sich jedoch seither massiv verändert: Die westliche Lebenswelt ist mit neuen Strukturen der Arbeitswelt konfrontiert. Die Motivation des Driftens – mit offenem Reiseausgang und Reiseziel – per se ist nicht völlig obsolet, wenngleich der Großteil der Backpacker des 21. Jahrhunderts gegenteilig unterwegs ist. Für viele ist die Reise nach Südostasien ein einmaliges, geplantes Ereignis zwischen zwei Lebensabschnitten: „Das Driften ist terminiert, begrenzt und hat seinen festen Platz in der individuellen spätmodernen (Erfolgs-)Biographie“, resumiert Binder (2005) das Sich-Treiben-Lassen und spielerische Umgehen mit temporären neuen Herausforderungen in räumlich und zeitlich limitierten Wahrnehmungsbereichen:

> *„Driften […] stellt eine Möglichkeit dar, mit den Konflikten umzugehen, die Gegenwartsgesellschaften ausmachen, sowie sich auf dem Arbeitsmarkt neu zu positionieren. […] Der homogene Hintergrund, dem die meisten Rucksacktouristen entstammen, […] ermöglicht ein relativ einfaches […] Einfügen in die (jeweiligen) Gruppe(n), ohne dass gleichzeitig aus dem gemeinsam entwickelten, adaptierten Lebensstil langwierige Verpflichtungen entstehen würden, denn das Projekt Reise ist auf Flexibilität, Mobilität, Innovationskraft und Spontaneität ausgerichtet“.*

Softskills, die Fähigkeit sich flexibel auf neue Situationen einzulassen, werden vermehrt als essenzieller Bestandteil der persönlichen Weiterentwicklung betrachtet (vgl. auch Caprioglio-O’Reilly 2006, Pearce & Foster 2007). Gewonnene persönliche Erfahrungen stellen Qualifikationen dar, die für viele Berufsprofile der gegenwärtigen Arbeitswelt von großer Bedeutung sind. Backpacking erfüllt demnach zwei Ziele: Qualifizierung, die einen Wiedereinstieg nach der Reise in bestimmten Berufsfeldern eher erleichtert als erschwert, und Selbstverwirklichung. Cohen selbst bezweifelt in neueren Arbeiten, dass soziale Ungebundenheit zu größerer Experimentierfreudigkeit führt: „the ‚freedom’ pursued by backpackers does not lead to personal individualisation of travelling styles [...] rather, the freedom most backpackers desire is that of unrestrained permissiveness found in the enclaves, which enables them to pursue similar hedonistic enjoyment, experimentation and self-fulfillment under relatively simple (and affordable) circumstances“ (Cohen 2003: 102).

Driften scheint – in soziologischer Betrachtung – als Auszeit von der Ernsthaftigkeit des Alltags darstellbar, der durch zunehmende Individualisierung gekennzeichnet ist (Murphy 2001: 52ff). Risiko, in Form von Grenzerfahrungen, wird demzufolge mit Bereicherung gleichgesetzt, da es zu keinem (persönlichen) Versagen kommen kann. „Rucksacktourismus stellt einen Umgang mit spätmodernen Lebensformen in komplexen, reflexiven Gesellschaften dar, mit

gleichzeitiger Qualifikation für diese […]. Dabei ist es insgesamt von peripherer Bedeutung, ob sie „die Fremde" wirklich kennen lernen oder nicht, bzw. ihr subjektives Erleben ein standardisiertes Massenphänomen ist oder nicht […]", kommentiert Binder (2005) die Ignoranz zahlreicher Traveller, deren Reisestil mit nachhaltigem Tourismus wenig gemein hat.

5. (Budget) Travel is trendy – ein Resumee

Rucksacktourismus in Südostasien erweist sich zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts zumindest punktuell als zunehmend massentouristische Erscheinung, begünstigt und gesteuert durch boomende Alternativindustrien (Reiseliteratur, Outdoor-Shops) in den (westlichen) Herkunftsländern und adäquate Infrastruktur in den Zielländern (Restaurants, Beherbergung, Transportnetzwerke). Die konsumverachtenden Ideologien der Hippie-Ära sind lange schon Vergangenheit: Rucksackreisen heute reflektieren den Trend zur Individualisierung von Lebensformen in postindustriellen Gesellschaften. Das einstige Postulat der Völkerverständigung scheint obsolet und wird in der einschlägigen aktuellen Literatur auch nicht mehr thematisiert.

Die Flucht vor persönlichen Krisensituationen ist weiterhin hintergründiges Reisemotiv nahezu aller Backpacker, deren Reisedauer erheblich höher ist als die Pauschalreisender ist. Egozentrierte Motive der Selbstbestätigung und -findung prägen nach wie vor das individualtouristische Tun. Die Länder des Südens werden zumindest für Langzeitreisende zur Spielwiese der Selbsterfahrung, Einheimische scheinen zur Kulisse degradiert und werden – in der Funktion informeller Verkaufs- und Vermittlungstätigkeit – nicht selten als störend wahrgenommen.

Traveller statt Tramper, Shopping statt Drugs – für die bereiste Bevölkerung bleiben sowohl terminologische Diskussionen (Drifter versus Explorer versus Off-Beat-Tourist versus Existenztyp, u.a.) ebenso entbehrlich wie unerheblich, solange die außereuropäischen Enklaven westlicher (Jugend-)Kultur zum Schauplatz der Initiationsriten zum – mittlerweile weitgehend akzeptierten und nicht mehr grundsätzlich abgelehnten – Berufsleben danach darstellen. Der Rites-of-Passage-Ansatz ist damals wie heute unverändert (Cohen 2003: 105ff), auch etablierte Grundtypologisierungen (vgl. Kap. 2.1.) scheinen weiter anwendbar. Adaptiert auf Transformationsprozesse, die postindustrielle Gesellschaften durchlaufen, ist lediglich der Gegenwelt-Ansatz aus Hippiezeiten modifiziert zu betrachten.

Der Anspruch der Mainstream-Backpacker scheint sich in Richtung „Explorer" (vgl. Kap. 2.1.) zu verlagern, „Drifting" einer Minderheit vorbehalten zu sein – nicht zuletzt eine Folge der nahezu flächendeckenden Erschließung der Region durch adäquate Infrastruktureinrichtungen,

die nicht nur (zeitlich) neue Generationen, sondern auch (sozial) neues Zielpublikum bindet, das weder prioritär Reisen an ungeplante (und unplanbare) Erlebnisse koppelt, noch vorrangig komfortarm und „billig" reisen will wie seine Vorväter. Die Preiswahrnehmung „billig" verlagert sich zunehmend auf den Vergleich mit anfallenden Kosten in den Herkunftsländern und hat mit Billigreisen nach den Maßstäben der Zielländer wenig mehr gemeinsam.

Die Nachvollziehbarkeit von Rucksackreisen wird vielfach zum prestigeträchtigen Muss, ist entsprechend aufbereitet und vorgefertigt (Reiseliteratur und Internet-Informations-Plattformen), stützt sich auf (meist urbane und distributiv agierende) zentrale Backpacker-Enklaven und ermöglicht größtmögliche Freiheit vor (scheinbar) authentischer exotischer Tropenkulisse auch in Peripherregionen Südostasiens, wo Lonely Planet mit seinen quasi-monopolistischen (zwangsläufig subjektiven) Hotel-, Restaurant- und Transportempfehlungen seit Jahrzehnten einen Beitrag zu disparitärer Regionalentwicklung leistet.

Aus soziologischer Sicht scheinen zumindest viele Traveller die Profiteure der (interkulturellen) Begegnung zu sein; aus entwicklungspolitischer Betrachtung bleibt die Kluft zwischen „Host" und „Guest" unverändert, wobei die zunehmende Massenhaftigkeit des Rucksacktourismus durchaus vermehrte Einkunftsmöglichkeiten für größere Teile der Bevölkerung zu schaffen vermag als bisher. Dass die häufigere Konfrontation mit Elementen der westlichen Spaßgesellschaft zu verstärkten soziokulturellen Spannungen führen wird, scheint jedoch kaum zu bezweifeln: Fun & Friends stehen vor der Befassung mit dem Fremden, heute vielleicht noch deutlicher als in den 1970er Jahren.

Die anhaltende elitäre Selbsteinschätzung von Travellern als Anti-Touristen scheint somit kaum haltbar. Auch die aufgeklärten, überdurchschnittlich gebildeten, globalisierten Rucksackreisenden der Gegenwart sind „nur" Touristen, die Drittwelt-Gesellschaften unbewusst vielfach nachhaltiger zu prägen imstande sind als organisierter, punktuell begrenzter Pauschaltourismus, der vergleichsweise an Bedeutung verliert und als Entwicklungsmotor in den Hintergrund tritt, während das Postulat der individuellen Freiheit und grenzenlosen Mobilität um jeden Preis die Postmoderne prägt. Lonely Planet, der einsame, unerschlossene und unschuldige Backpacker-Planet, ist südostasiatische Historie.

Bibliographie

Adkins, B. & Grant, E. (2007). Backpackers as a Community of Strangers: The Interaction Order of an Online Backpacker Notice Board. *Qualitative Sociology Review,* 3 (2), 188-201.

Baskin, J. (1995). Local Economic Development: Tourism - Good or Bad? In *Tourism Workshop Proceedings: Small, Medium, Micro Enterprises* (S. 103-116). Johannesburg: Land and Agriculture Policy Center.

Becker, C. (1990). Entwicklung und strukturelle Bedeutung neuer Formen des Tourismus. In D. Stohrbeck (Hrsg.), *Moderner Tourismus. Tendenzen und Aussichten.* Materialien zur Fremdenverkehrsgeographie, Heft 17, Trier.

Binder, J. (2005). Projekt: Driften. Rucksacktourismus als Reaktion auf spätmoderne Anforderungen. *parapluie,* Zugegriffen am 16.April 2006, 2006, auf http://parapluie.de/archiv/driften/rucksack.

Bly, L. (2000). *Khao San Before Leonardo DiCaprio*. Zugegriffen am 12.September 2002, auf http://www.usatoday.com/life/travel/leisure/2000/ltl103.htm.

Butler, R. (1990). Alternative Tourism: Pious Hope or Trojan Hope? *Journal of Travel Research,* 28 (3), 40-45.

Caprioglio-O'Reilly, C. (2006). From Drifter to Gap Year Tourist Mainstreaming Backpacker Travel. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 33 (4), 998-1017.

Cohen, E. (1972). Toward a Sociology of International Tourism. *Social Research,* 39 (1), 164-181.

Cohen, E. (1973). Nomads from Affluence: Notes on the Phenomenon of 'drifter'- tourism. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 14 (1-2), 89-103.

Cohen, E. (1979). A Phenomenology of Tourist Experiences. *Sociology,* 13, 179-201.

Cohen, E. (1989). 'Alternative Tourism' - A Critique. In Singh, T.V., Theuns, H.L., & Go, F.M. (Hrsg.), *Towards Appropriate Tourism: The Case of Developing Countries* (S. 127-142). Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.

Cohen, E. (2003). Backpacking: Diversity and Change. *Tourism and Cultural Change,* 1 (2), 95-110.

Conlin, J. (2007). In Transit. Traveling to the Ends of the Earth, at Ground Level, *The New York Times*, 11.2.2007.

Dearden, P., & Harron, S. (1994). Alternative Tourism and Adaptive Change. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 21, 81-103.

Erb, M. (2000). Understanding Tourists: Interpretations from Indonesia. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 27, 709-736.

Fahrenholtz, H., & Lorenz, H. ([2]1986). Auf alternativen Pfaden. In Aktion Dritte Welt (Hrsg.), *Klar, schön war's, aber ... Tourismus und Dritte Welt* (S. 128-140). Freiburg/Breisgau.

Freyer, W. ([7]2001). *Tourismus. Einführung in die Fremdenverkehrsökonomie*. München: Oldenbourg.

Garland, A. (1997). *The Beach*. London: Penguin.

Goodwin, H. (1999). Backpackers GOOD, Package Tourists BAD? *Focus (Spring),* 12–13.

Gray, D.D. (1998). Backpackers' 'bibles' now mainstream travel guides. *The Washington Times*, 8.Februar 1998, E2ff.

Haigh, R. (1995). Backpackers in Australia. *Occasional Paper 20*, Canberra: Bureau of Tourism Research.

Hall, C. M. (1997). *Tourism in the Pacific Rim: Developments, Impacts and Markets*. Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman.

Hampton, M.P. (1998). Backpacker Tourism and Economic Development. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 25, 639-660.

Harrison, D. (Hrsg.) (1992). *Tourism and the less developed countries*. London: Belhaven.

Holden, P. (Hrsg.) (1995). Tourism Development: A People Oriented Approach. *Contours,* 7 (6), 35-40.

Kienecker, A. (1987). *Fahrt - Tour - Reise. Selbstbestimmte horizontale Mobilität im sozialhistorischen Kontext. Eine Strukturgeschichte*. Dissertation Universität Wien.

Krippendorf, J. (1984). *Die Ferienmenschen*. Zürich: Orell/Füssli.

Loker-Murphy, L., & Pearce, P.L. (1995). Young Budget Travelers: Backpackers in Australia. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 22, 819-843.

Malam, L. (2003). Performing Masculinity on the Thai beach scene. *Working Paper 8*. Department of Human Geography, The Australian National University.

Mäder, U. (1987). *Vom Kolonialismus zum Tourismus - von der Freizeit zur Freiheit*. Arbeitskreis für Tourismus und Entwicklung, Zürich.

Mowforth, M., & Munt, I. (1998). *Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World*. London: Routledge.

Murphy, L. (2001). Exploring social interactions of backpackers. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 28, 50-67.

Noronha, F. (1999). Culture Shocks. *Focus (Spring),* 4-5.

Pearce, P., & Foster, F. (2007). A "University of Travel": Backpacker Learning. *Tourism Management*, 28 (5), 1285-1298.

Piadaeng, N. (2002). Urban transformation and Backpacker Tourism: a Case of Khaosan Road, Bangkok. Zugegriffen am 9.Juni 2005, auf http://www.ud.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/members/m99/niramon/niramon.html.

Richards, G., & Wilson, J. (2004). *The Global Nomad: Backpacker Theory in Travel and Practice*. Channel View Publications, 80-91.

Riley, P.J. (1988). Road Culture of International Long-Term Budget Travelers. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 15 (3), 313-328.

Rotpart, M. (1995). *Vom Alternativtourismus zum Hybridtourismus: der postalternative Wandel im Individualtourismus und die Macht der Reisehandbücher im Dritte-Welt-Tourismus am Fallbeispiel der Philippinen*. Linz: Trauner.

Scherrer, C. (1986). *Dritte Welt-Tourismus. Entwicklungsstrategische und kulturelle Zusammenhänge*. Berlin: Reimer.

Scheyvens, R. (2002). Backpacker Tourism and Third World Development. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 29, 144-164.

Siebert, R. (2002). Wenn Golfplätze wieder Reisfelder werden – Tourismuskrise in Südostasien. Zugegriffan am 25.Mai 2003, auf http://www.asienhaus.org/publikat/soa.

Smith, V. (Hrsg.) (1977). *Hosts and guests. The anthropology of tourism*. Oxford.

Spreitzhofer, G. (1995a). *Tourismus Dritte Welt: Brennpunkt Südostasien. Alternativtourismus als Motor für Massentourismus und soziokulturellen Wandel*. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.

Spreitzhofer, G. (1995b). Alternativtourismus in Südostasien. Rucksackreisen als Speerspitze des Massentourismus. *Internationales Asienforum,* 26 (3-4), 383-397.

Spreitzhofer, G. (1996a). Auswirkungen des Tourismus in Südostasien. *Asien,* 58 (1), 26-39.

Spreitzhofer, G. (1996b). Alternativtourismus in Südostasien. Touristische Billiginfrastruktur im urbanen Vergleich. *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik,* XII (1), 5-29.

Spreitzhofer, G. (1998). Backpacking Tourism in South-East Asia. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 25, 979-983.

Spreitzhofer, G. (2002a). Kann denn Rucksack Sünde sein? *Praxis Geographie,* 32 (10), 26-29.

Spreitzhofer, G. (2002b). The Roaring Nineties. Low-budget Backpacking in South-East Asia as an appropriate alternative to Third World mass tourism? *asien, afrika, lateinamerika,* 30 (2), 115-129.

Spreitzhofer, G. (2004). Low-budget backpacking in Southeast Asia: Spoiler or saviour of local development? *Proceedings of SEAGA 7, 2004 (Southeast Asian Geography Association), International Geography Conference*, Nov. 11 – Dec 2, 2004. Khon Kaen, Thailand.

Stohrbeck, D. (Hrsg.) (^{2}1990). *Moderner Tourismus. Tendenzen und Aussichten. Materialien zur Fremdenverkehrsgeographie*, Heft 17. Trier.

"The Flashpacker: A New Breed of Traveler", *Hotel Travel News*, 24.März 2006.

Tüting, L. (1978). Ferntourismus aus der Sicht eines Globetrotters; Abenteuerreisen: Urlaub oder Lebensphilosophie? *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch,* 28 (3), 56-61.

Turner, L., & Ash, J. (1975). *The Golden Hordes. International Tourism and the Pleasure Periphery*. London: Constable.

Uthoff, D. (1998). Internationaler Tourismus im ostasiatisch-pazifischen Raum. Die Asiatisierung des Asientourismus. *Praxis Geographie,* 28 (9), 34-38.

Wall, G., & Long, V. (1996). Balinese Homestays: An Indigenous Response to Tourism Opportunities. In

R. Butler & T. Hinch (Hrsg.), *Tourism and Indigenous Peoples* (S. 27-48), London: International Thomson Business Press.

Welk, P. (2003). *On a shoestring. Constructions of Backpacker Identity*. Bangkok: White Lotus.

Westerhausen, K. (2002). *Beyond the Beach. An Ethnography of Modern Travellers in Asia,* Bangkok: White Lotus Press.

Wheeler, T. ([4]1982; [6]1989). *Southeast Asia on a Shoestring*. Victoria: Lonely Planet.

Wheeler, T. (1999). In Defence of Backpackers. *Focus* (*Spring)*, 15-16.

World Tourism Organization (WTO) (2006). *Yearbook of Tourism Statistics*. Madrid.

Forschungswerkstatt / Research Workshop

Religion und Identität bei den Dia'ang auf Pantar, Indonesien: Eine ethnographische Fallstudie eines gewalttätigen Konflikts[1]

Religion and Identity Among the Di'ang on Pantar, Indonesia An Ethnographic Case Study of a Violent Conflict

Bettina Volk[2]

Museum für Sepulkralkultur in Kassel, Deutschland / Museum of Sepulcral Culture in Kassel, Germany

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

Anfang 2007 brachen auf der Insel Pantar im Osten Indonesiens Unruhen zwischen zwei Ethnien, den Mauta und den Bara aus. Durch die betroffenen, aber nicht beteiligten Dia'ang wurden diese Ausschreitung als religiös motiviert gedeutet. Diese Interpretation spiegelt die Angst der Dia'ang wider, aufgrund ihrer christlichen Konfession Opfer von Angriffen zu werden. Diese Deutung zeigt, wie fragil das scheinbar friedliche Zusammenleben zwischen Muslimen und Christen auf Pantar ist und welche tiefen Spannungen hinter dieser idyllischen Fassade bestehen.

Schlagworte: Identität, Ethnizität, Konflikt, Indonesien, Pantar

At the beginning of 2007 a violent conflict broke out between the Mauta and the Bara, two ethnic groups of the Pantar island in Eastern Indonesia. The not involved but by the consequences affected Dia'ang interpreted this into religious motivated riots, which reflects their fear of being attacked because of their Christian religion. This reinterpretation shows how fragile the seemingly peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians is on Pantar and how deep the tensions behind this image are.

Keywords: Identity, Ethnicity, Conflict, Indonesia, Pantar

1 Soweit nicht anders gekennzeichnet, beruht dieser Artikel auf Daten, die ich während meines bisher 18-monatigen Feldforschungsaufenthaltes in Muriabang erhoben habe. Mein Forschungsschwerpunkt liegt hierbei auf den lebenszyklischen Ritualen und nicht auf Konflikten. Der vorliegenden Artikel erhebt daher keinen Anspruch auf eine theoretische Einbettung in die Konfliktforschung.

2 Nach Abschluss ihres Magisterstudiums der Ethnologie begann Bettina Volk 2005 die Arbeit an ihrer Promotion an der Universität Passau. Zur Produktion von indigener Moderne in den Totenritualen der Dia'ang forschte sie bisher 1,5 Jahre stationär auf Pantar in Indonesien.

Einleitung

Die Insel Pantar im ostindonesischen Alor-Archipel ist noch immer ein nahezu weißer Fleck auf der ethnographischen Landkarte. Nachdem 1932 Ernst Vatters berühmtes Buch „Ata Kiwan“ über seine Reise durch die ostindonesischen Archipele erschienen ist, wurden nur noch wenige Artikel zu Pantar veröffentlicht[3]. Ethnologischen Feldforschungen wurden auf Pantar bis in die 1990er Jahre, als Susanne Rodemeier in Munaseli forschte, überhaupt nicht durchgeführt. Als ich 2005 meine eigene stationäre ethnologische Feldforschung[4] in Muriabang auf Pantar begann, stand mir also nur wenig Hintergrundwissen speziell zur Situation im gewählten Forschungsgebiet zur Verfügung. Meine Anfangsannahme zum Verhältnis der AnhängerInnen von Islam und Christentum zu einander, die auf persönlichen Gesprächen mit Susanne Rodemeier sowie der vorhanden Literatur zu Pantar und den umliegenden Inseln beruhte, war, dass es zwischen den MuslimInnen und ChristInnen des Alor-Archipels, im Gegensatz zu der Situation auf den Molukken oder Flores, zu keinerlei Spannungen aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Religionen komme. Ganz im Gegenteil leben sie friedlich zusammen, heiraten häufig untereinander, wobei die Konversion eines der Partner zur Religion des anderen keine Konflikte zwischen den Familien hervorrufe (vgl. Pampus 2006; Rodemeier 2006). Schon in der Anfangsphase meiner Feldforschung wurde deutlich, dass dieses idyllisches Bild nicht auf die Dia’ang und ihre Nachbarn zutrifft. Vielmehr herrscht hier ein tiefes Misstrauen zwischen den AnhängerInnen beider Religionen, das im Alltag hinter einer Fassade scheinbar harmonischen Zusammenlebens verborgen ist. Diese Spannungen sind so ausgeprägt, dass sie in bestimmten Situationen zu gewalttätigen Konflikten führen können. Im vorliegenden Artikel soll einer dieser Konflikte vorgestellt werden, der Anfang 2007 ausbrach und bis jetzt schwelt.

Zur Ethnographie der Dia’ang

Die Dia’ang sind eine kleine ethnische Gruppe, der etwa 1000 Menschen angehören. Sie leben größtenteils im Muriabang-Gebiet im Bezirk Pantar Mitte (Kecamatan Pantar Tengah). Pantar ist eine der ärmsten Regionen Indonesiens. In Muriabang gibt es bisher weder asphaltierte Straßen, noch Strom oder fließendes Wasser, Telefon oder Mobilfunk. Die hygienischen Bedingungen sind genau wie die medizinische Versorgung[5] schlecht. Es gibt keine Geschäfte,

3 Zum Forschungsstand und zu Publikationen zu Pantar bis 1992 vgl. Rodermeier (1992).

4 Neben der teilnehmenden Beobachtung arbeitete ich hauptsächlich mit narrativen und teilstrukturierten Interviews sowie Gruppeninterviews.

5 Die erste Krankenstation (Puskesmas) in Maliang, einem der beiden Hauptdörfer Muriabangs, wurde 2006 eröffnet.

lediglich einige kleine Kioske und wöchentliche Märkte, um die Menschen mit den nötigsten Dingen für den täglichen Bedarf zu versorgen. Die tägliche Ernährung besteht aus Mais, gekochten Bananen oder Süßkartoffeln, seltener aus Reis. Gemüse und Obst sind selten, Fisch für die Dia'ang, die selbst nicht angeln, teuer und daher selten. Fleisch gibt es in der Regel nur auf Festen. Gerade bei Kindern sind Folgen dieser Mangelernährung häufig. Malaria ist endemisch.

Die Dia'ang sind Bauern, die eine erweiterte Subsistenzwirtschaft betreiben. Sie produzieren also hauptsächlich für den eigenen Bedarf, verkaufen jedoch eventuellen Überschuss auf den wöchentlichen Märkten. Saisonal verkaufen sie Kopra, Cashewnüsse sowie Lichtnüsse.

Das soziale Leben der Dia'ang ist durch eine ausgeprägte geschlechterspezifischen Rollen- und Arbeitsaufteilung ebenso geprägt, wie sie auf dem Prinzip der Seniorität, Primogenitur und dem patrilinealen Verwandtschaftssystem beruht.

In den dreißiger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts wurden die Dia'ang missioniert und traten, nahezu kollektiv, zum Protestantismus über. Dies hatte jedoch zunächst nur wenig Auswirkung auf ihr indigenes Glaubenssystem, das unter anderem mit Ahnendienst einhergeht, an dem sie weiter festhielten. Erst in den 1960ern, als die meisten von ihnen aus ihren Bergdörfern an die Küste zogen, wo sie zwei neue Dörfer – Maliang und Tamakh– gründeten, begann der Protestantismus die traditionelle Religion mehr und mehr abzulösen. Heute ist das Christentum eines der Hauptcharakteristika ihrer Identität[6], obwohl sie sich in Krisensituationen nach wie vor der indigenen Religion zuwenden. Während das traditionale Glaubenssystem oft mit Rückständigkeit in Verbindung gebracht wird, steht das Christentum für die Dia'ang ebenso für Moderne wie für ihre muslimischen Nachbarn, die Bayang und die Bara, der Islam.[7]

Ethnische Identität der Dia'ang

Auch wenn es sich bei den Dia'ang nur um eine kleine ethnische Gruppe handelt, haben sie doch eine ausgeprägte ethnische Identität, die in der oralen Geschichte und in Mythen definiert wird und sich auf ihre eigene Sprache – das *Dia'ang Tra* –, ihr eigenes Territorium – das Muriabang-Gebiet –, ihre eigenen Traditionen – *adat* – und ihrem Christ-Sein gründet. Diese Gleichsetzung von Dia'ang-Sein[8] und Christ-Sein geht so weit, dass ein Dia'ang, der zum Islam konvertiert, quasi aus der Ethnie ausgeschlossen wird. Zwar wird dies niemals so

6 Susanne Schröter beschreibt Ähnliches auch für bestimmte Regionen Sumatras (Schröter 2006: 366) und für die Ngada auf Flores (Schröter 2002: 37).

7 Diese Verbindung der traditionalen Religion mit Rückständigkeit und der Weltreligionen mit Modernität ist nichts Pantar-spezifisches, sondern in weiten Teilen Indonesiens der Fall (vgl. Sakai 2002).

8 Im Folgenden werde ich mich bei allgemeinen Aussagen zu den Dia'ang auf die männliche Form beschränken, weibliche Dia'ang sind, soweit nicht anders gekennzeichnet, in diese einbezogen.

ausgesprochen, doch im Alltag zeigt sich dies deutlich. Normalerweise kommt es aufgrund einer interreligiösen Heirat zu einem Religionswechsel. Dieser geht als äußeres Zeichen nicht nur mit einem Namenswechsel einher, bei dem die betreffende Person ihren christlichen Namen ablegt und einen muslimischen annimmt, sondern auch mit einem Wohnortwechsel, da das Paar nach der Hochzeit bei der muslimischen Familie leben wird. Dies bedeutet oft ein Verlassen des Territoriums der Dia'ang. Für einen Mann hat der Übertritt zum Islam noch weitere Konsequenzen: Seine Nachkommen werden in der Regel nicht in die Genealogien, die jeder männliche Dia'ang auswendig kennen sollte, aufgenommen, so dass sein Familienzweig in den Stammbäumen ausstirbt. Hiermit stirbt seine Familie im Gedächtnis der Dia'ang aus und er hat keine Chance, ein Ahne zu werden.

Interreligiöse Interaktion zwischen den Dia'ang und ihren Nachbarn

Die Dia'ang leben in enger Nachbarschaft mit den christlichen Mauta und den muslimischen Bayang – alle drei Ethnien habe einen gemeinsame Mythos über die Ankunft auf Pantar und den Ursprung bzw. die Manifestierung verschiedener Ethnien, lange bevor Islam und Christentum Einzug auf Pantar hielten. Während es zwischen den Dia'ang und den Mauta kaum zu Spannungen kommt, sind Misstrauen und Konflikte zwischen den Bayang und den Dia'ang ebenso häufig wie zwischen den Bayang und den Mauta. Gleiches lässt sich zur Koexistenz mit den muslimischen Bara feststellen, die ebenfalls in der Nachbarschaft der Dia'ang leben. Diese Spannungen zeigen sich besonders in Stresssituationen, sind aber auch im normalen Alltag deutlich zu spüren.

Im ganzen Gebiet herrscht eine große Furcht vor schwarzer Magie. Man hat Angst, mit Fremden zu essen, zu trinken oder Betelnüsse zu teilen, wenn diese von dem Fremden zu bereitet oder gereicht werden, da sie als Vehikel für schwarze Magie genutzt werden könnten. In der Regel wird es als unbedenklich angesehen, mit Fremden der eigenen Religion Speisen, Getränke und Betelnüsse zu teilen. Man geht davon aus, dass man sicher ist, weil man als Angehörige/r der eigenen Religion keinerlei schwarze Magie verwendet, so etwas tun nur die AnhängerInnen des anderen Glaubens. Es wird also von beiden Seiten mit einer starken Unterscheidung zwischen „wir" und „den Anderen" gearbeitet, wobei „die Anderen" jeweils als ein unkalkulierbares Risiko angesehen werden, die noch an den alten Mächten festhalten, die heute mit Satan in Verbindung gebracht werden.[9] Wenn ein Mensch schwer erkrankt oder eine andere Katastrophe eintritt, wird dies oft mit schwarzer Magie in Zusammenhang gebracht,

9 Oberhofer (2006) betont, dass Hexerei bzw. Schwarze Magie nicht nur innerhalb einer ethnischen Gruppe relevant für das Zusammenleben ist, sondern gerade auch für den Umgang von Ethnien untereinander.

die jeweils von „den Anderen" ausgeübt wurde. Schwarze Magie kann von den Opfern entweder in Träumen[10] oder durch einen traditionellen Heiler bzw. eine Heilerin erkannt werden und dann von diesem bekämpft werden. Bestimmte Menschen können besondere Gebete sprechen, die Heilung bringen und den Weg für weitere magische Attacken verschließen (tutup jalan). Diese Angst vor schwarzer Magie erschwert die Kommunikation zwischen ChristInnen und MuslimInnen in Muriabang erheblich, da jede ernsthafte Konversation durch gemeinsames Trinken und Kauen von Betelnüssen eröffnet werden sollte.

In beiden Fällen von interreligiöser Heirat, die während meiner Feldforschungsphase auftraten, kam es über die Frage, wer zu welcher Religion konvertiert, zu ernsthaften Konflikten zwischen den Familien. Die Heiraten wurden von allen beteiligten Familien abgelehnt und in beiden Fällen durch die Schwangerschaft der jungen Frauen erzwungen. In einem Fall kam es sogar zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzung und dem Einschreiten der Polizei. Zwischen den Anhängern beider Religionen besteht eine grundsätzliche Einigkeit darüber, dass man innerhalb der eigenen Religion heiraten sollte.

Wenn über die jeweils andere Religion und deren Anhänger gesprochen wird, werden immer die Unterschiede betont. Die Religion wird als identitätsstiftend und Mittel zur Abgrenzung gegenüber anderen Gruppen wahrgenommen. Eine andere Religion wird häufig auch als Erklärung für moralisch verwerfliches Handeln angesehen.

Dennoch schaffen die Dia'ang, Bayang, Bara und Mauta einen äußeren Schein von harmonischen Zusammenleben und guten nachbarschaftlichen Beziehungen in der täglichen Interaktion. Dies zeigt sich etwa, wenn ChristInnen ihren muslimischen Nachbarn bei der Renovierung ihrer Moschee helfen oder sie gegenseitig zu den Trauerfeiern erscheinen, selbst wenn der Verstorbenen/die Verstorbene der jeweils anderen Religion angehörte.

Der Konflikt aus Sicht der Dia'ang

Im Januar 2007 brachen zwischen den muslimischen Bara und den christlichen Mauta gewalttätige Unruhen aus. Aus Sicht der Dia'ang stellte sich der Konflikt folgendermaßen dar[11]: Eine junge Muslima war auf ihrem Weg nach Hause von Flores nach Baranusa. Bei einem Zwischenstopp der Fähre mit Landgang verbrachte sie ihre Pause nicht etwa mit ihren Freundinnen, sondern entschied sich mit einem jungen Mauta auf seinem Motorroller zu einem

10 Man kann die Bedrohung schon im Vorfeld in Träumen erkennen, die dann durch einen oder eine Traumdeuter/in (dukun tapsir) gedeutet werden müssen. Der Bedrohung kann man dann entgehen, indem bestimmte Menschen Gebete sprechen, die den Weg für den magischen Angriff versperren (tutup jalan) und diesen unmöglich machen.

11 Die nachfolgende Version des Ursprungs des Konflikts beruht auf den Erzählungen aus Muriabang. Bei den Mauta in Puntaro, wo Gary Holton zur gleichen Zeit eine sprachwissenschaftliche Forschung durchführte, weicht die Version in Details ab. (Persönliche Kommunikation im August 2008) (vgl. Volk 2008).

Imbissstand zu fahren, um etwas zu essen zu kaufen. Da der junge Mann angetrunken war, vergaß er den Weg zum Imbissstand. Die junge Frau geriet in Panik, da sie dachte, er nehme den falschen Weg, um sie zu vergewaltigen. So sprang sie vom fahrenden Motorroller, brach sich den Arm und zog sich schwere Verletzungen im Gesicht zu. Wieder auf der Fähre, rief sie ihre Familie in Baranusa an und berichtete, was geschehen war. Als die Fähre in Baranusa anlegte, hatte sich ihre Familie schon im Hafen versammelt und verprügelte den jungen Mauta, als er die Fähre verließ. Die Schlägerei war noch in vollem Gange, als ein Verwandter des jungen Mannes vorbei kam, ihn erkannte und daraufhin die Angreifer wüst beschimpfte, woraufhin auch er verprügelt wurde. Als man in den Dörfern der Mauta hiervon hörte, versammelten sich sofort die Männer, bewaffneten sich mit Macheten sowie Pfeil und Bogen. Bevor sie sich auf den Weg nach Baranusa machten, um Rache zu nehmen, beteten sie zusammen für den Sieg und führten ein altes Ritual durch, das ihnen Glück im Kampf geben sollte. Auf ihrem Weg nach Baranusa trafen sie auf ein Ehepaar aus Baranusa, das Fisch verkaufen wollte. Sie schlugen sie zusammen und zerstörten ihren Motorroller. In Baranusa angekommen, begannen sie Häuser nieder zu brennen, ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass sich in ihnen noch Personen befanden. Glücklicherweise konnten sich die Menschen retten. Es kam zu Straßenschlachten, bei denen etliche Personen verletzt wurden, und zu Auseinandersetzungen mit der Polizei. Jeder Versuch, die Beteiligten zu beruhigen und die Situation zu entschärfen, scheiterte. In den folgenden Tagen kam es immer wieder zu gewalttätigen Zusammenstößen zwischen den beiden Gruppen. Schließlich errichtete eine der Konfliktparteien nachts Straßensperren, so dass die Straße von Baranusa nach Muriabang nahezu unpassierbar wurde. Der Bootsverkehr, der normalerweise Muriabang mit Baranusa verbindet, wurde eingestellt. Dies bedeutete für die Dia'ang, die so zwischen die Fronten geraten waren, dass sie keine Möglichkeit hatten Muriabang bzw. Pantar zu verlassen, und dass sie auch keinen Nachschub für ihre Kioske erhielten, so dass es innerhalb kürzester Zeit kein Öl für Lampen, Benzin, Reis etc. zu kaufen gab. Auch kamen die Bara nicht mehr, um Fisch zu verkaufen, und die Wochenmärkte wurden für fast zwei Monate geschlossen.

Reaktion der Dia'ang auf den Konflikt

In Muriabang reagierte man mit Panik auf die Unruhen, die sich über Wochen hinzogen. Die Männer bewaffneten sich, Pfeile wurden hergestellt, nachts patrouillierten die jungen Männer durch das Dorf, Frauen und Kinder wurde verboten, ohne Begleitung die Häuser zu verlassen, und die Arbeit auf den Feldern, die Richtung Baranusa liegen, wurde eingestellt. Nachdem es neben immer wieder aufflammender Gewalt bei – gescheiterten – Friedensverhandlungen zu

einem Angriff auf den Bezirksvorsteher (*camat*) und dessen Frau gekommen war, verstärkte sich die Angst der Dia'ang, in diesen Konflikt hineingezogen zu werden, weiter. Die wenigen jugendlichen Dia'ang, die sich an den Unruhen beteiligt hatten, waren vorsorglich sofort nach Alor geschickt worden, damit es nicht zu einer Eskalation zwischen den Bara und den Dia'ang käme. Zu groß war die Angst vor Ausschreitungen wie etwa auf den Molukken. Es ging das Gerücht um, dass die Bara an einem bestimmten Datum das Gebiet der Dia'ang überfallen würden, um alle Dia'ang zu töten, da sie ChristInnen seien. Einige Männer schickten daraufhin ihre Familien in die Berge in die alten Dörfer, bis die Gefahr vorüber wäre. Weiter bestärkt sahen sich die Dia'ang und auch die im Muriabang lebenden Mauta durch die bekannten religiösen Unruhen auf den Molukken, Flores und anderen Gebieten Indonesiens. Man begann, die muslimischen Nachbarn im Dorf möglichst zu meiden, und forderte gerade die Kinder und jungen Erwachsenen immer wieder auf, vorsichtig im Kontakt zu sein. Auch als der festgelegte Tag des angenommenen Massakers vorüber war und niemand das Gebiet angegriffen hatte, legte sich die Angst nicht völlig, sondern war noch immer spürbar, als ich im August 2007 Pantar verließ.

Nachdem die Dia'ang zwei Monate lang fast vollständig von der Außenwelt abgeschlossen waren, wurden die Straßensperren entfernt, der Bootsverkehr wieder aufgenommen, und schleppend liefen auch die Wochenmärkte wieder an, die allerdings bei meinem Verlassen der Insel immer noch nicht wieder ähnlich gut besucht waren wie vor den Ausschreitungen. Zwar wurden immer wieder Versuche gemacht, offiziell Frieden zwischen den Mauta und Bara zu schließen. Nach mehreren gescheiterten Anläufen verlegte man sich darauf, diesen nach dem *adat* mit einem *lego-lego*[12] zu beschließen, doch im August 2007 war es hierzu noch nicht gekommen.

Schlussbetrachtung

Obwohl es aus der oralen Geschichte und auch in der näheren Vergangenheit etliche Zusammenstöße zwischen den Mauta und den Bara bekannt sind, reinterpretierten die Dia'ang diesen Konflikt, der ja letztlich auf einem Missverständnis beruhte[13], in religiöse Unruhen.[14] Hierbei sehen sie die muslimische Bara als die ersten Aggressoren an und sind überzeugt, dass

12 Lokale Form des Rundtanzes bzw. eines Festes mit dem genannten Tanz.

13 Nach der Version des Konfliktes, die in Muriabang erzählt wurde.

14 Hierbei handelt es sich nicht um eine religiöse Rhetorik, die zum Zweck der Mobilisierung der Massen in nicht primär religiös motivierten Konflikten eingesetzt wird, wie Schröter (2006) für andere Gebiete Indonesiens beschreibt. Ganz im Gegenteil wollten die Dia'ang möglichst nicht in den Konflikt hineingezogen werden, auch wenn sie ganz klar Partei für die Mauta ergriffen. Nicht nur sind sie durch Allianzen mit einzelnen Klanen der Mauta verbunden, sondern sie handeln so auch genau nach den gleichen, oben beschriebenen, Strategien, die sie auch in alltäglichen Situationen im Umgang mit Muslimen an den Tag legen.

diese sich mit allen anderen Muslimen in der Gegend verbünden werden, um die ChristInnen auf Pantar auszulöschen. Hierbei lassen sie den tatsächlichen Auslöser des Konflikts, nämlich den vermeintlichen Angriff eines jungen Mauta auf die Ehre einer jungen Bara, völlig außer acht. Ebenso wenig ließen sie sich von den MuslimInnen, die in Muriabang leben, beruhigen[15], die einen religiösen Hintergrund immer bestritten haben, ebenso wie die Bara, mit denen ich im Laufe des Konflikts sprechen konnte. Diese Interpretation der Ausschreitungen zeigt nicht nur, wie tief die Angst vor ähnlichen Ausschreitungen (vgl. Schröter 2008) wie auf den Molukken, auf Flores oder vielen anderen Orten Indonesiens sitzt, sondern auch, dass die These des spannungsfreien Zusammenlebens von Anhängern beider Religionen für Muriabang falsch ist. Die idyllische Fassade der friedlichen Koexistenz der beiden Religionen ist stattdessen ausgesprochen fragil und kann schnell in offenes Misstrauen, Angst und Gewalt umschlagen. Hiermit unterscheidet sich der Bezirk Pantar Mitte deutlich von Alor und Ternate, aber auch von Munaseli auf Pantar. Rodemeier beschreibt für Munaseli auf Pantar einen völlig spannungsfreien Umgang mit religiösen Unterschieden und interreligiösen Heiraten (Rodemeier 2006). Wellfelt berichtet über Alor, dass „instead of being a cause of conflict, religious diversity is presented as a benefit“ (Wellfelt 2007: 4). In ihrer Arbeit zu Ternate kommt Wellfelt zu dem Schluss, dass im Gegensatz zum öffentlichen Diskurs, interreligiöse Heiraten zwar zu Spannungen zwischen den betroffenen Familien führen, diese aber nicht eskalieren. So führe Religion auf Ternate zwar auch zu Abgrenzungsprozessen, die aber über eine Definierung der eigenen Identität als einheimischer Ternates aufgefangen würden. So sehen sie adat als wichtiger als Religion an (Wellfelt 2007).

Warum diese Strategien bei den Dia’ang keine Anwendung finden und warum hier religiöse Unterschiede so stark gewichtet werden, hat seinen Ursprung vermutlich in der lokalen Geschichte der Dia’ang und ihrer Nachbarn. In jüngster Vergangenheit kam es etwa in den 1960ern zu Ausschreitungen zwischen Bara und Dia’ang, als die Dia’ang aus den Bergen an die Küste umsiedelten. Nach den Dia’ang wollten die Bara ihnen ihr Land streitig machen. In der oralen Geschichte der Dia’ang finden sich außerdem immer wieder Ereignisse, die sie als Angriff der muslimischen Nachbarn auf ihre christliche Identität interpretieren. So etwa Berichte über Konvertierung ganzer Familien zum Islam oder von Menschen, die sich geweigert haben, das Christentum aufzugeben. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind sicherlich die Geschichten, die sich um ihren letzten König ranken, der einige Jahre in Baranusa in einer Art Gefangenschaft lebte. Es wird berichtet, dass man ihn schon fast zermürbt hatte und er zum Islam übergetreten wäre, wenn nicht in letzter Minute eine seiner Ehefrauen ihn davon abgehalten hätte. Er besann sich und konnte nach Muriabang zurückkehren. In der oralen

15 Eine direkte Kommunikation zu diesem Thema zwischen den Dia’ang und ihren muslimischen Nachbarn fand nicht statt.

Geschichte der Dia'ang spiegelt sich, dass sie sich im Hinblick auf ihre Identität als ChristInnen nicht nur während der beschriebenen Unruhen von ihren muslimischen Nachbarn bedroht fühlen, sondern dies schon lange der Fall ist und Anfang 2007 lediglich einen neuen Höhepunkt fand.

Bibliographie

Oberhofer, M. (2006). *Hexerei und Ethnizität. Das Beispiel der Jāana und ihrer Nachbarn in Burkina Faso*. Mainz: Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz.

Pampus, K.-H. (2006). Sieben Tage auf Pantar. Eine Erkundungsreise auf Ernst Vatters Spuren. *Paideuma*, 52, 127-156.

Rodemeier, S. (1992). *Lego-lego-Platz und naga-Darstellung. Jenseitige Kräfte im Zentrum einer Quellenstudie über die ostindonesische Insel Alor.* Unveröffentlichte Magisterarbeit. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.

Rodemeier, S. (2006). *Tutu kadire in Pandai - Munaseli. Erzählen und Erinnern auf der vergessenen Insel Pantar (Ostindonesien)*. Münster: Lit-Verlag.

Sakai, M. (2002). Modernising sacred sites in south Sumatra: Islamisation of Gumai ancestral places, (S. 103-131). H. Chambert-Loir & A. Reid (Hrsg.) *The potent dead. Ancestors, saints and heroes in contemporary Indonesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Schröter, S. (2002). Jesus als Yams-Heros - Die Aneignung des Katholizismus in einer indonesischen Lokalgesellschaft. *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen* 146, 36-41.

Schröter, S. (2008). Religiöser Pluralismus in Indonesien (S. 1-22). In F. Schulze & H. Warnk (Hrsg.). *Religion und Identität: Muslime und Nicht-Muslime in Südostasien*. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz.

Schröter, S. (2006). Politisierung von Religion und Sakralisierung von Politik. Lokale und nationale Konflikte zwischen Moslems und Christen in Indonesien, (S. 357-374). In M. Franzmann, C. Gärtner & N. Köck (Hrsg.). *Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt. Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religionssoziologie*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Vatter, E. (1932). *Ata Kiwan. Unbekannte Bergvölker im tropischen Holland. Ein Reisebericht*. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut AG.

Volk, B. (2008): *Lokale Interpretationen eines gewalttätigen Konfliktes auf Pantar, Ostindonesien*. Pacific News, forthcoming.

Wellfelt, E. (2007). *Diversity & shared identity. A case study of interreligious relations in Alor, Eastern Indonesia*. Master Thesis. Göteborg: School of Global Studies. Göteborg University.

Forschungswerkstatt / Research Workshop

Conflict Resolution in Aceh in Light of Track One and a Half Diplomacy

Robert M. Heiling[1]

University of Vienna, Austria

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

This paper analyzes the role of mediators in the resolution of the Aceh conflict within the framework of a three-step process. Two separate mediation efforts, one conducted by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue from 1999 until 2003 and a second one led by Martti Ahtisaari and his Crisis Management Initiative in 2004/2005, attempted to solve the Aceh conflict. The author shows that beside contextual factors such as ripeness of the conflict and advantageous relations between and characteristics of the conflict parties, the success of Ahtisaari's engagement can be further explained by procedural factors. These include mediator behaviour and mediation strategies. Furthermore the mediator's ability to use contacts with official track one actors was crucial in securing the signing as well as the implementation of the present peace agreement.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Mediation, Track 1.5, Aceh, Indonesia

Der Artikel analysiert die Rolle von Mediatoren in der Lösung des Aceh Konflikts mittels eines drei-Phasen Modells von Konfliktlösung. Zwei voneinander unabhängige Mediationsverfahren, jenes des Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue von 1999 bis 2003, und ein weiteres geleitet durch Martti Ahtisaari und seiner Crisis Management Initiative in 2004/2005, zielten darauf ab den Konflikt zu lösen. Der Autor zeigt, dass neben kontextuellen Faktoren wie einer "ripeness" des Konflikts sowie günstigen Veränderungen auf Seite der Konfliktparteien, prozedurale Faktoren für den Erfolg Ahtisaaris entscheidend waren. Diese Faktoren beziehen sich auf das Agieren und die Strategien des Mediators. Die Fähigkeit des Mediators, Kontakte zu offiziellen "track one" Akteuren aktiv während des Mediationsprozesses zu nutzen, bildete einen Schlüsselfaktor darin einen Friedensschluss und im weiteren Verlauf eine weitgehend erfolgreiche Umsetzung des aktuellen Abkommens zwischen den ehemaligen Konfliktparteien zu erreichen.

Schlagworte: Konfliktlösung, Mediation, Track 1.5, Aceh, Indonesien

1 Robert M. Heiling is currently a Magister candidate at the University of Vienna. The present article is based on findings of his diploma thesis, titled "Track One and a Half Diplomacy in Aceh", which deals with mediation efforts in the Aceh conflict. Robert M. Heiling is expected to finish his Magister studies in early 2009.

Introduction

This paper seeks to outline and analyze the contribution of mediation processes to the resolution of the Aceh conflict. Despite the fact that a few researchers have already dealt with various aspects of the resolution of this longstanding conflict, the author believes that there has not been enough attention paid to all stages of conflict resolution as a whole. Therefore the author intends to elaborate on the periods of pre-negotiation, negotiation, and the stage of implementation. The author also believes that the concept of track one and a half diplomacy presents a particularly useful concept to describe the role of mediators in the resolution of the Aceh conflict. This concept helps in highlighting qualities of this process of conflict resolution that have been neglected in previous analyses.

After a brief elaboration on the historical roots of the conflict, the author will compare two separate mediation initiatives which took place in Aceh by drawing on the subsequent stages of a conflict resolution process. Among others, Walter (2002) has pictured conflict resolution as a three-step process. According to this view on conflict resolution, it is particularly important to include the stages of reaching an agreement as well as its following implementation when analyzing conflict resolution alongside the conflict parties' decision to start or participate in negotiations.

Theories on mediation and conflict resolution shall be applied to these stages of conflict resolution. Looking at the pre-negotiation stage, these shall be theories on the timing of mediation (ripeness), as well as on characteristics of conflict parties. During the following stage of negotiation, ideas on mediation strategies will be considered. At this point the procedural factors of mediation – the behaviour and characteristics of the involved mediators – in contrast to contextual factors like the ripeness of conflict, shall be analyzed. Finally the author will look at the characteristics of the two mediation initiatives as processes of track one and a half diplomacy.

The paper concludes that besides contextual factors, like a ripe moment as well as advantageous developments on the side of the conflict parties, procedural factors, in the shape of mediator activity, played a major role in bringing about peace in Aceh. Alongside an efficient mediation strategy, Martti Ahtisaari and CMI's successful involvement can further be explained due to their usage of contacts to official state actors. Thus, the author interprets conflict resolution in Aceh as a track one and a half conflict resolution process. In the course of this process, private, informal non-state actors, as well as official state actors shared responsibility through the course of their engagement

History of an Intractable Conflict

The conflict of Aceh is a long-time secessionist conflict, fought between the Free Aceh Movement, commonly referred to as GAM[2], and the Indonesian state, over the independence of the north-most Sumatran province of Aceh. The root causes for the conflict date back to Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Unlike other regions in Indonesia, which gradually became part of the Dutch East Indies from the early 17th century on, Aceh remained an independent Sultanate with substantial regional influence until late 19th century. The territory was incorporated into the Dutch East Indies through the Netherlands' most violent and costly war in Dutch colonial history, and violence in Aceh remained at a high level for the duration of Dutch rule (Reid 2006). Nevertheless, Aceh played an active and important role in the Indonesian war for independence. Its leaders, however, were alienated by its outcome. The subsequent merger with North Sumatra into a larger province and the set-up of Indonesia as a quasi secular, centralized state caused upheaval and led to the formation of an Acehnese rebellion. Under the leadership of Acehnese governor Daud Bereuh the rebels formally joined the Darul Islam movement of West Java. Its goal was the transformation of Indonesia into a federal Islamic state. The rebellion was soon to be crushed by Jakarta (Aspinall 2006).

Rebellion in Aceh broke out again in 1976 under the banner of GAM, this time fighting not for the transformation of the current national political system of Indonesia, but for complete independence from it. Causes for the rebellion included further increased grievances due to worsened centre-periphery relations between the resource rich province and Jakarta in the context of the even further centralized development regime of Suharto (Kell 1995: 51-59). Since then the movement was led by Tengku Hasan di Tiro, a US-educated businessman and grandson of a well-known Acehnese *ulama*. GAM started as a small guerrilla movement comprised mainly of intellectuals, which was soon to be defeated by the Indonesian military (TNI)[3]. The movement's leadership fled, forming an exile government in Sweden. In the early 1980s the rebellion broke out again with the help of Libyan trained guerrilla fighters, this time gaining wider support among the population due to repressive actions by the TNI. Again the rebellion was to be defeated officially, only to re-emerge in the late 1990s (Schulze 2004: 4-5). After the fall of Suharto and the steady growth of democratic and free conditions in Indonesia, the frame of the conflict changed significantly. A wide civil society movement emerged in Aceh of which many groups supported GAM in its claim for independence. GAM likewise changed its strategy, calling for a referendum concerning the future of the province,

2 Indonesian acronym for *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*.
3 Indonesian acronym for *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*.

inspired by the recent breakaway of East Timor from Indonesia. GAM adopted the so-called East Timor Blueprint as its main strategy, aiming at gathering support from the international community to pressure Indonesia on Acehnese independence. The following years saw a significant increase of GAM control over Aceh as well as the involvement of new political leaders on the Indonesian side (Schulze 2006: 225-244). Renewed outbreak of the conflict led to two sequential but separate international mediation efforts, the first international involvement in the history of the conflict. The two initiatives, both conducted by private non-state actors, differed decisively in approach, style, strategy and, last but not least, outcome. The mediation process of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)[4] from 1999 to 2003 achieved only temporary mitigation of the conflict, followed by a backlash of violence. The effort by Martti Ahtisaari and his Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) on the other hand was initiated in 2004 just prior to the occurrence of the Tsunami which devastated Aceh among other regions in the Indian Ocean. This mediation attempt finally led to a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement, the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which is still in effect today. Although the two mediation efforts can be regarded as one long process, since HDC started a process of internationalisation and because CMI had the advantage of drawing on the experiences of its predecessor, for the purpose of analysis it is fruitful to look at the two efforts as separate processes in a comparative manner.

Moment of Ripeness?

The way the two organisations got involved in the Aceh conflict could not be more diverging. For HDC Aceh was the first case for the young organisation ever to deal with. Its engagement in Aceh thus represented its first step onto the international arena and was based on the conclusion of a fact-finding mission to Indonesia, with the aim of spotting a possible area of involvement[5] (Huber 2004: 20). Ahtisaari and CMI on the other hand were not actively pursuing involvement in Aceh but were contacted by a Finnish businessman on behalf of the Indonesian government (Kingsbury 2006: 15-21). These decisively divergent methods of involvement can already be seen as an indicator for what was to come. Moreover, the situation on the ground had changed between 1999/2000 and 2004 and thus HDC and CMI faced slightly different conflict environments.

4 HDC was founded as "Henry Dunant Centre", later the organisation adopted the official name of "Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue". The organisation however is still commonly referred to by the acronym of HDC, which will be used in this paper as well.

5 This fact-finding mission took place during the crisis in East Timor and was encouraged by debates over a possible break-up of Indonesia. HDC decided to engage in the Aceh conflict due to an already large number of humanitarian actors involved in East Timor. Furthermore, in comparison to other conflict torn regions like Papua or Maluku, in the case of Aceh the mediator was able to deal with clear representatives on the side of the rebels.

One prominent theory of conflict research focuses on the question of timing for the involvement of a third party in an intractable conflict. Zartman (1991) has brought forward the concept of ripeness, calling for a mediator to recognize the moment of ripeness when starting a mediation initiative. He concludes that a political or military stalemate between conflict parties can constitute such a moment that he labels as mutually hurting stalemate. This originates from the parties' exhaustion; thus, the lifespan of the conflict is decisive as well. One central aspect of a mutually hurting stalemate is that both conflict parties actually perceive their situation as such a stalemate. A mutually hurting stalemate leads to a moment where both conflict parties realize that they cannot achieve their aims through confrontation anymore. As a result the adversaries develop a "conciliatory mentality" in contrast to a "winning mentality" and decide to enter negotiations (Zartman 2000: 226-229). On the characteristics of the conflict parties researchers agree that balanced power relations between them, as well as an internal cohesion of the adversaries, are advantageous contextual factors for mediation of a third party (Bercovitch & Houston 1996: 20-22). As a result of balanced power relations or power symmetry, similar to the idea of a mutually hurting stalemate, conflict parties will not enter negotiations if they perceive themselves to be in a superior, advantageous position. Internal cohesion of conflict parties on the other hand is important to reduce the chance of spoiler activity. The situation prior to HDC involvement in Aceh in 1999/2000 can be interpreted as a military stalemate, yet not as a mutually hurting stalemate as defined by Zartman. Neither of the conflict parties had been able to defeat their adversary militarily, nor had they been able to achieve their political goals through military means. However for GAM maintaining a costly confrontation for Indonesia already meant success in itself and GAM was further encouraged by the emergence of a civil society in Aceh, which supported GAM in its claim for independence (Schulze 2005: 32). Thus GAM did not perceive its situation in 1999/2000 as a stalemate. The Indonesian side on the other hand was marked by retreat, while GAM increased its control over the province (Schulze 2005: 35-36). The picture that evolves is one of a near power symmetry between the two adversaries. The reasons for the conflict parties entering negotiations in 1999/2000 can be found elsewhere. For GAM participating in talks which were mediated by an outside third party meant that it was able to expand its strategy of internationalisation. The negotiations were thus functioning as a tactical interlude, and GAM was not ready to compromise on its main goal of independence (Mortif 2007: 115).

Until 2004 the situation, however, had altered. After the collapse of the HDC brokered cessation of hostilities agreement (COHA) in 2003, the Indonesian side had launched its largest military operation in Aceh with the aim of defeating GAM once and for all. Although not reaching their ultimate goal, the operation had caused severe damage to the military structure of GAM (ICG 2005b: 4-6). In addition to this military aspect, by 2004 GAM found itself isolated

on the international stage – in comparison to 2000 (Mortif 2007: 119). Since the end of the first mediation effort in 2003, the international community withdrew its interest in the Aceh case, while in 2000 Indonesia had been given extensive international attention due to its shaky transition from Suharto rule and the breakaway of East Timor. Thus, the balance of power between the two opponents had shifted between 2000 and 2004 with a grown asymmetry.

While in 2000 the situation was marked by a near symmetry, in 2004 the asymmetry between GAM and the Indonesian side had grown decisively with GAM being in a weaker and defensive position (ICG 2005a: 1-2). Nevertheless, in both cases the conflict parties decided to engage in mediated negotiations. In addition to the new power relations between the two sides, one of the parties had changed in composition and cohesion. GAM remained united throughout both mediation processes, and loyalty to the GAM exile government in Sweden remained intact despite approaches by the Indonesian government to offer honeymoon deals to local GAM military commanders (Mortif 2007: 122). The Indonesian side, however, saw a change in terms of cohesion from 2000 to 2004. Indonesian presidents faced a complex situation in Jakarta, with outspoken opposition to a non-military approach among their own ranks coming especially from TNI. This concerned both President Abdurrahman Wahid, who endorsed HDC-facilitated negotiations with GAM as a means of conflict resolution, as well as his successor Megawati Sukarnoputri, who set an end to the negotiations mediated by HDC by declaring martial law (Aspinall & Crouch 2003: 13). The succeeding government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly referred to as SBY) however not only understood the necessity of keeping spoiler elements in Jakarta in check, but also succeeded in doing so. By 2004 the control of the government over the Indonesian armed forces had increased. Thus it can be argued that the SBY administration represented a far more unified Indonesian actor than the previous governments (Mietzner 2006: 51).

The situation in 2004 cannot by any means be described as a stalemate between the conflict parties and thus the ripeness model of Zartman of a mutually hurting stalemate does not apply. However the situation in 2004 showed a different kind of ripeness, since both sides developed something close to a conciliatory mentality, which Zartman sees as a necessary element of ripeness. On the GAM side this was caused by its weak military position while on the Indonesian side elements within the government favouring the negotiation option were strengthened by the election of the SBY administration. Even though the Tsunami did not play a role prior to the conflict parties' decisions to enter negotiations (the adversaries actually decided to participate in talks days before the Tsunami occurred) this event certainly added a ripeness to the conflict, which did not exist before. The massive response by the international community by providing relief and reconstruction aid, and the involvement of UN organisations, international NGOs and donor countries, first of all led to an opening-up of the

province. Since the conflict posed a serious threat to relief and reconstruction work, donors and international NGOs were aware that a resolution of the conflict was crucial. Thus this "humanitarian context" put significant pressure on both the Indonesian government as well as on GAM to resolve the conflict (Sukma 2005: 9). Even though this was not the driving force in bringing the conflict parties to the negotiating table, as many commentators stated after the signing of the MoU[6], this context had a major effect during the stage of negotiations by urging the conflict parties to take the upcoming negotiations seriously.

Both in 1999/2000 and in 2004 the international situation was favourable for mediation efforts. Before 1998 criticism against Jakarta's Aceh policy only came from human rights organisations, whereas the international community remained indifferent about the conflict. Yet with the fall of Suharto and the East Timor crisis, international attention shifted to Aceh (Heiduk 2006: 21). This resulted in support for the HDC-facilitated mediation by several countries, in particular the United States. Since the early 1990s US-Indonesian relations were strained by US Congressional restrictions on military cooperation, due to human rights violations committed by TNI (Sukma 2006: 225). However after 9/11 the US gradually began to re-establish military ties with Indonesia. Indonesia became a major ally in the war on terror and the US thus asserted less pressure on the government to resolve the Aceh case peacefully (Martin 2006: 86-88). After the COHA agreement failed the international community again withdrew interest in Aceh. Yet with the occurrence of the Tsunami at the end of 2004 international attention nonetheless shifted back to Aceh, preparing the ground for a second mediation attempt (Heiduk 2006: 21).

Negotiations Under Mediator Auspices

Since the concept of ripeness focuses on the timing of mediation entry only, it is necessary to take a closer look at the subsequent stages of conflict resolution. As Zartman himself admits "ripeness is only a condition: it is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing. It must be seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, through persuasion of a mediator" (2000: 227). There exist a large number of definitions for the term "mediation". A general definition by Bercovitch describes mediation as "a form of conflict management that involves an outsider, or third party, who is not directly a disputant" and further involves "various forms of assistance and facilitation, short of judicial or coercive steps, designed to help parties reach an acceptable outcome" (1991: 3). Writing on the discussion on the controversial question of the need of mediator impartiality, Smith has distinguished between two main types of mediation,

6 See for example Time Magazine: The Light that came from Darkness. 01.08.2005.

depending on the variables coercive potential and the mediator's stake in the outcome (1994: 446). Smith is drawing on Fisher and Keashly who distinguished mediation or pure mediation, which basically constitutes a facilitating, rather passive form of mediation, from mediation with muscle or power mediation, where the mediator is using carrots and sticks (1991: 33). Other distinctions among mediation types, for instance by Touval and Zartman (1985) or Kressel and Pruitt (1989), follow similar distinctions, depending on whether mediators try to influence negotiations through less coercive means like the improvement of communication and procedures, or whether mediators use a more directive, power based strategy. The former type can particularly draw on trust and confidence-building measures. Both being non-state actors, the mediation efforts by HDC and CMI belong to the group of less-coercive forms of mediation. HDC's strategy was based on humanitarian aspects, which Griffiths described as "New Humanitarianism" (Martin 2006: 75). The main idea of this strategy was to combine elements of both humanitarian and conflict resolution approaches. This new style of third party intervention is explained best by Griffiths' professional background. Prior to building up HDC, Griffiths had gained experience in various UN organisations such as UNICEF, and in humanitarian NGOs as well as in the British Foreign Service. Griffiths' style as a mediator was further characterised by his attempt of building up a personal relationship with the representatives of the conflict parties (Martin 2006: 85).

As a first step, HDC aimed at reaching a ceasefire, decreasing the violence in Aceh and thus preparing common ground for the political solution of the conflict based on trust-building measures. This approach, however, led way to the exclusion of fundamental political disagreements from the early stages of the mediation process, left only to be addressed at a later occasion. This further caused the two conflict parties to interpret a possible final outcome of the ongoing mediation process according to their own aspirations. While the Indonesian government saw the mediation process as a confirmation of its view of Aceh remaining an integral part of Indonesia, GAM regarded it as a track in the direction of independence (Djalal & Djalal 2006: 70-74). Additionally, it seems that HDC's open, long-term approach, aimed at building trust between the conflict parties, had indeed the opposite effect, providing space for spoilers to act, in particular for groups from both TNI and GAM that benefited from an ongoing conflict. As Mortif points out, the ongoing negotiations from 2000 to 2003 rather "created a legacy of suspicion more than a foundation for enduring peace" (2007: 115).

Besides HDC's humanitarian approach, Griffiths pursued a strategy of empowerment. This strategy, which aims at strengthening the weaker conflict party, is common yet likewise controversial among mediators (Ropers 1995: 20). HDC for instance supported GAM in transferring itself into a political party, and organised meetings for GAM members with politicians abroad (Kay 2003). By doing so HDC was clearly not acting neutral and became

vulnerable to criticism from the Indonesian side. Thus in the long run HDC lost its very legitimacy as a neutral mediator. On the other hand, Ahtisaari and CMI's approach differed significantly from HDC's. Ahtisaari's personal mediation approach was very much characterised by his own professional background, which primarily lies in the Finnish Foreign Service, in the United Nations and in his former capacity as President of Finland. Ahtisaari met the negotiators during talks often with brusque directness, but showed clear preferences for state actors as it became obvious at the start of the negotiations. Also regarding mediation strategy Ahtisaari's approach differed. Instead of preparing the ground for a comprehensive final agreement by first reaching agreements on ceasefire and on cessation of hostilities, Ahtisaari made it clear from the first round of the Helsinki talks that CMI's direction was going the opposite direction. This very approach was marked by Ahtisaari's phrase "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" (Kingsbury 2006: 26). The negotiations mediated by CMI were not about reducing violence in Aceh alone but were headed toward a complete and final political agreement. Additionally they took place in a rapid fashion and were concluded after only six months. Although the Tsunami of December 2004 had altered the situation in Aceh and made a resolution of the conflict even more urgent – thus putting pressure on both parties – it seems that TNI operations against GAM continued until the Helsinki MoU was signed by both the Indonesian government and GAM in August 2005.[7]

At the beginning of the negotiations it was Ahtisaari asserting pressure on GAM to give up its claim for independence (Kingsbury 2006: 23-27). By doing so, Ahtisaari as a mediator left the sphere of neutrality in the course of his engagement, like Griffiths before. Yet he did not pursue a strategy of empowerment of the weaker party but instead supported Indonesia in its insistence on Aceh remaining an integral part of the country. In a way he exploited the grown asymmetry to keep negotiations on track. At this point the negotiations nearly collapsed. However Ahtisaari did not solely put pressure on GAM to give up its claim for independence but chose flexibility in terms of agenda setting. This allowed GAM to bring forward the concept of "self-government" (Kingsbury 2006: 79-80). By discussing self-government as a political solution for Aceh, the negotiators were able to steer the way between "special autonomy", as initially insisted upon as a precondition by the Indonesian government, as well as GAM's well-known demand for complete independence. In fact, the concept of self-government was to serve as an empty cartridge in which to fill with content only in the course of the negotiations. This allowed GAM to develop a type of autonomy that went beyond the highly sensitive term "special autonomy" without using the actual term (Kingsbury 2006: 31-45). As a result the former win-loose situation, characteristically for secessionist conflicts, was transferred into a win-win situation.

7 Confidential Interview, May 2008, Banda Aceh.

Negotiators frequently pointed out that the formula of nothing is agreed until everything is agreed developed its very own dynamic during the negotiations. The negotiating teams frequently put issues aside where no common ground could be found in order to focus on others. Soon the participants realized that on 70 percent of all political issues, compromises had been reached easily. This had the effect that, when negotiations nearly collapsed just prior to the signing ceremony, GAM members agreed that in the face of how much had been achieved in the duration of the talks, it would have been irresponsible to drop the whole effort for just one remaining disagreement.[8] Moreover, in the case of CMI negotiations, the two conflict parties were engaged in direct talks. These circumstances had the effect of functioning as highly efficient trust building measures during the negotiations. The mediation style of Ahtisaari and CMI differed fundamentally in two further ways from the Griffiths/ HDC approach. Ahtisaari had far more substantial influence on the content-related outcome of the negotiations. At many points Ahtisaari refused to discuss issues which were not put on the agenda. On the other hand he is responsible for the inclusion of several other issues. Furthermore, at various occasions in the course of the talks Ahtisaari threatened to leave the negotiations. This was, for instance, the case at the beginning of the negotiations when the question of autonomy vs. independence constituted a major obstacle for the continuation of the talks (Awaluddin 2008). Therefore it can be said, that Ahtisaari showed a much higher degree of coercive potential as well as stake in the outcome as defined by Smith (1994). It can further be argued that in comparison to Griffiths and HDC, Ahtisaari applied directive strategies, whereas the former were limited to communication and procedural strategies. The fact that a private, non-state mediator like Ahtisaari possessed these powers is closely related to a higher political leverage that Ahtisaari brought in.

Implementation of Agreements

It is particularly important to include the stages of reaching an agreement as well as its subsequent implementation when analyzing conflict resolution beside the conflict parties' decision to start or participate in negotiations. Thus, as a third step, conflict parties have to decide for and perhaps be supported in implementing the signed agreements, for instance through security guarantees provided by a third party (Walter 2002). It is the concluding phase of conflict resolution where the weakness of the HDC's and the strengths of the CMI's efforts become especially obvious. When the conflict parties signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in early 2003, HDC transformed itself from a pure mediation organisation into an

8 Interview with GAM negotiators Bakhtiar Abdullah and Nur Djuli, May 2008, Banda Aceh.

organisation responsible for implementation and related security issues. Apart from problems deriving from human resource difficulties, the institutions that were built up in accordance with the implementation plan, in particular the Joint Security Committee (JSC), were lacking the enforcing mechanisms to support the implementation of the COHA. Consequently, after more than three years of negotiations and the signing of two ceasefire deals, as well as an agreement which foresaw the starting of a political dialogue, the HDC mediation effort broke down in the end. A structural weakness of the JSC combined with an increasingly powerful role of spoilers within the ranks of the conflict parties caused the collapse (Huber 2004: 30-40). In the case of the Ahtisaari/CMI engagement on the other hand, the mediator was able to commit the European Union (EU) to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki MoU. Among EU member states the question of an eventual European involvement was controversial due to the risky nature of peace processes and because of the minor importance of the Aceh conflict for the EU. "But the 'tsunami effect', the desire for the EU to play a political role, institutional competition and the persuasive power of Ahtisaari translated into new political momentum", says EU policy director Antje Herrberg from CMI (Herrberg 2008). With the quick commissioning of the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) a vacuum between the signing of the MoU and the implementation of its security-related regulations was avoided. International and local observers agree upon regarding AMM as highly successful, especially concerning its responsibilities on decommissioning and redeployment of GAM and TNI troops. In comparison to the HDC's implementation structures, AMM also provided far stronger institutions and brought in much higher political leverage in this highly sensitive and thus equally important concluding phase of conflict resolution. Furthermore AMM together with CMI functioned as the supreme authority in a case of dispute, unlike in the case of HDC where a final authority was missing. This condition led to the avoidance of deadlocks on disputes between the conflict parties in the stage of implementation (Schulze 2007).

Mediator Involvement as a Process of Track One and a Half Diplomacy

Further distinctions of mediation types focus on the level where mediation takes place, whether among official state or private actors. According to McDonald Joseph Montville coined the term track two diplomacy in 1982 in order to define the latter form.[9] Track two diplomacy usually refers to an informal approach which aims at dealing with the underlying roots of conflict. Official state diplomacy on the other hand is called track one. Mapendere

9 See http://imtd.org/cgi-bin/imtd.cgi?page=msg (retrieved on 08.06.2008).

has elaborated on the concept of track one and a half diplomacy[10], which was originally brought forward by Susan A. Naan, describing a mode in between track one, comprised of official actors, and track two diplomacy. He defines track 1.5 diplomacy as "peacemaking activities undertaken by non-political third parties between high political representatives of warring groups, or governments" (Mapendre 2000: 66). Track 1.5 diplomacy is supposed to combine the positive aspects which both track one and track two diplomacy have to offer. In general it is applied by private, unofficial, third party actors who provide connections to the track one level and use these connections in the course of their engagement. According to Mapendre advantages of track 1.5 diplomacy are to be able to "fill the gap between the two tracks" providing "diplomatic agility" and facilitating communication where no communication links exist. Last but not least track 1.5 diplomacy can give leaders an "honourable way out of their problems" since a mediator operating in a track 1.5 sphere brings in prominence and trustworthiness while lacking real political power (Mapendre 2000: 72-73). As an example for an actor, Mapendre mentions the Carter Center, which describes itself as an organisation working in the sphere of track 1.5 diplomacy. However, beside Mapendre's definition, others see track 1.5 diplomacy as a process that distinguishes itself from track one diplomacy merely by its informal character, not by the type of mediator (see Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2007). In the course of this analysis, nonetheless, we shall draw on Mapendre's definition.

The two mediation efforts in Aceh both fit under the label of track 1.5 diplomacy. Both were conducted by a private third actor and both initiatives utilised connections to track one actors during the mediation process. Apart from this common ground, the two efforts differed decisively concerning their usage of track one contacts for the sake of the peace process. HDC certainly had backing from the International Community. Apart from financial support, this became especially obvious through the engagement of prominent outside experts in 2001, the so-called three wise men. The main purpose of their involvement was to give political leverage to HDC, which, as it was becoming more and more obvious, the young organisation was lacking. As Griffiths however admits it was not the organisation itself suggesting the involvement of the three wise men, but the US State Department (Martin 2006: 85-86). Despite the fact that HDC received support by the international community and by the US, this very example shows that it was not HDC making usage of their contacts to the track one level, but the organisation being driven by the interests of a state actor.

Ahtisaari and CMI by contrast were able to use their contacts to official actors actively and at the right moment in time. CMI stayed in close contact with EU representatives from an early stage of the negotiations on. The EU further began to fund the negotiations itself. By bringing in the EU to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki MoU, Ahtisaari secured

10 Due to practical reasons the notation "track 1.5" will be used in this paper.

an efficient way of providing security guarantees for the conflict parties. By agreeing on an EU led monitoring mission as early as halfway during the talks, the leverage of the mediator himself was strengthened in the process of negotiations. Thus, besides the primary function of AMM to monitor the implementation of the agreement, the prospect of an EU led mission also supported the mediator in the course of the negotiations.

In the case of HDC, a relatively small and inexperienced NGO was responsible for the whole process of conflict resolution: from starting the negotiations to reaching agreements to finally implementing them. In the case of CMI a different kind of (and as it seems the right kind of) actor was in charge at all three stages. During the prelude to negotiations one willing conflict party, the Indonesian government with the support of private citizens was the driving force. The fact that one of the conflict parties initiated the peace talks can be interpreted as a sign of sincerity of this particular actor. The negotiations then were mediated under auspices of an experienced, influential and aspiring private mediator, Ahtisaari and CMI. In light of the dramatic occurrence of the Tsunami, talks mediated by a private and prominent mediator like Ahtisaari presented the perfect opportunity for both conflict parties to solve the conflict without losing face. Besides only an informal actor would have been able provide the discrete environment for talks necessary at this stage of conflict resolution. Finally, implementation of the outcome of the negotiations was monitored by an external regional body, the European Union, being a track one actor and therefore providing capacity, essential political leverage and necessary security guarantees. As the previous attempts by HDC have shown, the involvement of a track one actor at the final period of conflict resolution seems to be a highly precious and most necessary condition for succeeding in implementing a reached peace agreement.

Conclusions

Contextual factors were crucial in preparing the ground for a possible mediation initiative in 2004. On the one hand the conflict showed internal ripeness already prior to the Tsunami, such as governmental change on the Indonesian side. Alongside a grown power asymmetry between the conflict parties that proved favourable for mediation, despite the common assumption that an asymmetry has the opposite effect. On the other hand, by shifting attention of the international community to the conflict after the occurrence of the Tsunami, the conflict showed international ripeness as well. Beside these significant contextual factors however, procedural factors played a major role in successfully reaching an agreement and in implementing it. These procedural factors are comprised of Ahtisaari‘s successful mediation

style, consisting of the nothing is agreed until everything is agreed formula as well as of applying directive strategies in the course of the negotiation, by asserting pressure on the conflict parties, in particular the weaker one. They are further comprised of Ahtisaari's access to influential track one actors, which were ready to guard the implementation of the agreement reached under CMI mediated negotiations.

Others have already elaborated on implications of the successful resolution of the Aceh conflict. The former AMM head of mission Pieter Feith has pointed to the EU's positive role opening a new dimension of effective European Common Foreign and Security Policy (Feith 2007). Mortif (2007) on the other side has highlighted the implications of the peaceful resolution of the conflict for the process of democratisation in Indonesia. Yet the author believes that the success in Aceh should cause further incitement concerning the role of mediators. Due to its successful outcome, Ahtisaari and CMI's involvement in Aceh, in partnership with other involved third party actors, in particular the European Union, can be regarded as an interesting example of a Track One and a Half Mediation and Implementation Process. Both track one and informal tools have been applied at the right stage of the peace process and thus full use was made of all the advantages which formal and informal diplomacy have to offer. One should elaborate further on the question of whether the partnership concept as conducted successfully in Aceh, between a private organisation like CMI and an official actor like the EU, sharing responsibility in the course of conflict resolution, can be adapted and applied on similar conflicts.

References

Aspinall, E. (2006). Violence and Identity Formation in Aceh under Indonesian Rule. In A. Reid (Ed.), *Verandah of Violence. The Background to the Aceh Problem*, (pp. 149-177). Singapore/Seattle: Singapore University Press/University of Washington Press.

Aspinall, E. & Crouch, H. (2003). The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed. *Policy Studies* (1), East-West Center. Washington.

Awaluddin, H. (2008). Why is Peace in Aceh successful? Retrieved Oct 10, 2008, from http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/aceh/success.php.

Bercovitch, J. (1991). International Mediation. *Journal of Peace Research* 28 (1) 3-6.

Bercovitch, J. & Houston, A. (1996). The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence. In J. Bercovitch (Ed.), *Resolving International Conflict. The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, (pp. 11-35). London: Boulder.

Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (2007). Track 1.5 Approaches to Conflict Management: Assessing Good Practice and Areas for Improvement. 'Lessons Learned' Retreat, Schloss Hueningen, March 4-6,

2007. Protocol. Retrieved Nov 02, 2008, from http://www.berghof-peacesupport.org/publications/Documentation_Hueningen_ Retreat.pdf.

Diamond, L. & McDonald, J. (1996). *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Djalal, H. & Djalal, D. S, (2006). *Seeking lasting Peace in Aceh.* Jakarta: Centre for Strategic International Studies.

Smith, J. D. D. (1994). Mediator Impartiality: Banishing the Chimera. *Journal of Peace Research* 31 (4), 445-450.

Feith, P. (2007). The Aceh Peace Process. Nothing Less than Success. *Special Report* 184. United States Institute of Peace.

Fisher, R. J. & Keashly L. (1991). The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention. *Journal of Peace Research* 28 (1), 29-42.

Heiduk, F. (2006). Conflict Analysis Aceh/Indonesia. *Series of Country-Related Conflict Analyses*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Herrberg, A. (2008). The Brussels 'backstage' of the Aceh peace process. Retrieved Oct 10, 2008, from http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/aceh/backstage.php.

Huber, K. (2004). The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation. *Policy Studies* (9), East-West Center. Washington.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005a). Aceh: A new Chance for Peace. *ICG Asia Briefing* No. 40.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005b). Aceh: So Far, So Good. *ICG Asia Briefing* No. 44.

Kay, K. (2003). The "New Humanitarianism": The Henry Dunant Center and the Aceh Peace Negotiations. WWS Case Study 02/03. Retrieved Nov 11, 2007, from http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cases/papers/newhumanit.html.

Kell, T. (1995). *The Roots of the Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992*. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. Ithaca/New York: Cornell University Press.

Kingsbury, D. (2006). Peace in Aceh. A Personal Accord of the Helsinki Peace Process. Jakarta/Singapore: Equinox Publishing.

Kleiboer, M. (1994). Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion? *Journal of Peace Research* 31 (1), 109-116.

Kressel, K. & Pruitt, D. G. (1989). *Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Mapendere, J. (2000). Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks. Culture of Peace Online Journal, 2(1), 66-81. Retrieved May 29, 2008, from www.copoj.ca/pdfs/Jeffrey.pdf.

Martin, H. (2006). *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War. The Untold Story of Peace-Making.* London/New York: Continuum.

Mietzner, M. (2006). The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia. *Policy Studies* (23), East-West Center. Washington.

Mortif, M. (2007). The Road to Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia's Democratic Development. *International Negotiation* 12, 111-143.

Reid, A. (2006). Colonial Transformation: A Bitter Legacy. In A. Reid (Ed.), *Verandah of Violence. The Background to the Aceh Problem,* (pp. 96-108). Singapore/Seattle: Singapore University Press/University of Washington Press.

Ropers, N. (1995). Friedliche Einmischung. Strukturen, Prozesse und Strategien zur konstruktiven Bearbeitung ethno-politischer Konflikte. *Berghof Report* Nr. 1.

Schulze, K. E. (2004). The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organisation. *Policy Studies* (2), East-West Center. Washington.

Schulze, K. E. (2005). Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: freedom fighters or terrorists? In. *RSC Working Paper* No. 24: Aceh under Martial Law: Conflict, Violence and Displacement. Oxford, 29-44.

Schulze, K. E. (2006). Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Strategy and the Aceh Conflict, October 1976-May 2004. In A. Reid (Ed.), *Verandah of Violence. The Background to the Aceh Problem*, (pp. 225-271). Singapore/Seattle: Singapore University Press/University of Washington Press.

Schulze, K. E. (2007). *Mission Not So Impossible. The Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons learned for the EU.* International Policy Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Sukma, R. (2005). Resolving the Aceh Conflict: the Helsinki Peace Agreement. *Background Paper* 4a. CSIS Jakarta.

Sukma, R. (2006). Indonesia and the tsunami: responses and foreign policy implications. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60 (2), 213-228.

Touval, S. & Zartman W. I. (1985). Introduction: Mediation in Theory. In Touval, S. & Zartman W. I. (Eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, (pp. 7-20) Boulder: Westview Press.

Walter, B. (2002). Re-conceptualizing Conflict Resolution as a Three-Stage Process. *International Negotiation* 7, 299-311.

Zartman, W. I. (1991). Conflict reduction. Prevention, management and resolution. In Deng, F. M. & Zartman, W. I. (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, (pp. 299-319). Washington: Brookings Institution.

Zartman, W. I. (2000). Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond. In Stern, P. & Druckman, D. (Eds.), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, (pp. 225-250). Washington: National Academy Press.

Im Dialog / In Dialogue

An Interview with Geoffrey Benjamin[1]

Christian Wawrinec

University of Vienna, Austria & ASEAS Editorial Board

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

Geoffrey Benjamin received his PhD (Social Anthropology) from the University of Cambridge. His academic employments have been at the University of Singapore (1967-76), the Australian National University (Canberra, 1976-81) and the National University of Singapore (1981-2000). Since 1999 Geoffrey Benjamin is Associate Professor in the Division of Sociology at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore. He has also held visiting appointments at (among others) the CNRS (Paris, 1985) and the IIAS (Leiden, 1997). Geoffrey Benjamin has conducted research on various Orang Asli groups, Malay, Singaporean and Indonesian society, as well as on Mon-Khmer and Austronesian linguistics. In 2002 he co-edited with Cynthia Chou a collection of papers named "Tribal Communities in the Malay World".

1 The interview took place at Prof. Benjamin's office (Division of Sociology, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University) in Singapore on 11 June 2008. Some questions and answers have been slightly edited for improved clarity. Christian Wawrinec would like to acknowledge the financial support (Forschungsstipendium FNr.180) by the University of Vienna.

Christian Wawrinec: For those readers who do not know yet about your research in South-East Asia – could you give some information on your academic background? In your curriculum vitae you mention that you did your BA in both the natural and the social sciences.

Geoffrey Benjamin: Well, my first degree was in biological sciences (botany, zoology, biochemistry). Then I switched to social anthropology with linguistics. Finally I went straight to a PhD in social anthropology.

CW: What were the reasons why you did not continue within the biological sciences?

GB: I did not particularly enjoy the laboratory work. If I had continued I would probably have gone into animal behaviour. Although I went to university intending to become a biochemist, that interest dried up after a while. But I discovered while I was there that anthropology contained a lot of things I was interested in, although those topics (linguistics and ethnomusicology) were rather peripheral in terms of what was taught in Cambridge. However, after studying the subject a little – especially with Edmund Leach, who was my supervisor – I really got interested in the central areas of social anthropology too.

CW: Why did you decide to do your research in South-East Asia?

GB: Two reasons, I think. First of all, Edmund Leach himself. He was my tutor in Cambridge and he was a long-time South-East Asian specialist who worked in different parts of the region. As an undergraduate I took the course on South and South-East Asia that he taught, with just one other student attending. The second reason is that an expedition of the old-fashioned kind was arranged to go to Malaysia, by a Malaysian student studying at Cambridge, and I agreed to go along as the ethnologist. It never took place, but by then I already had begun reading up the little material there was at that time. Edmund Leach and I thought that one particular group, the Temiars, would make a good topic. There was initial work on them done in the 1930s and Edmund Leach himself had thought of continuing that. The Temiars seemed to exhibit several of the things that were interesting in anthropology at that time. One was swidden farming, another was cognatic kinship structures. (It later turned out that they had something that Edmund Leach denied existed, namely cognatic descent groups.) The added interest for me was their Mon-Khmer language, which gave me a chance to actually do some linguistic fieldwork and get the grammar and vocabulary. It worked out because I had also been a student of John Lyons before he became well-known as a linguist. I had not been in South-East Asia before and in those days – these plans were taking place in 1963 – you could

not fly there unless you were extremely rich. I went there by ship and came back by ship at the end of the fieldwork. That is how I got started.

CW: Your initial fieldwork took place between 1964 and 1965. Could you tell me about your memories on those days?

GB: Recently, I have written some of this up because NUS Press is planning to publish two books of mine based on my work – one on Temiar society (Benjamin forthcoming a) and one on Temiar religion (Benjamin forthcoming b). In the Foreword I have tried to provide some of the background. I was working in a very remote area – indeed, so remote that I had to go in by helicopter and my food had to be literally parachuted in once a month by courtesy of the various military agencies then operating. This was during the Vietnam War and my research area was in a part of Malaysia where the communist emergency had not in fact ended. It was a tightly controlled area. There was a flying doctor service, so once a month I could get letters out, but it took many weeks to receive a reply. Nowadays you can drive into this area in a normal car, but I was really isolated in those days. It was two days' walk to the nearest town, Gua Musang, which was then only on the Malayan railway, not on the road. Now it is a big town on the highway. Things have changed a lot. I did not speak much Malay in those days but it was my contact language. Within six weeks I forced myself to switch to Temiar, which is completely unrelated to Malay. After about three months I got reasonably fluent, but it was two or three years before I finally correctly phonemicised the language. It took a long time.

CW: So what exactly were your tasks during this first year of fieldwork?

GB: It was more than one year – it was eighteen months. During that time I got basic material on social organization, religion and language. Although I had a home village I also travelled into many other valleys. I was not particularly fit when I started, but I was very fit when I ended. Then I went back to Cambridge to write up the PhD thesis. It took me about a year to decide on Temiar religion as the topic. In the meantime I wrote some of the basic papers on the Temiars that were later published. After I had finished, within the same week of the oral exam of my PhD I was back in Singapore for a newly opened position at the old University of Singapore in the then brand-new Department of Sociology.

CW: Some of those essays you have published during the last decades will now be included in your two books?

GB: Yes, four of those early essays on aspects of Temiar social organization will be chapters in one of the new books. There will be some later material too. Since I have been going back to the field in the last two years after a very long gap, recent changes will be dealt with as well. And the changes have been quite massive. It is not really a tribal society anymore: some individuals are tribal, others are rural proletariat, and so on, but with a great deal of internal differentiation. Modern politics has entered, and I was able to look at the campaigning amongst the Temiars during the recent Malaysian general election. The religion has very much changed: now it is not a matter of Temiar religion in the singular, but of Temiar religions in the plural. There have been adoptions of world religions like Islam, Christianity or Bahai, and there have been revivalist cults from within their own tradition. I should nevertheless point out that, although my main ethnographic focus has been on the Temiars, I have worked in one way or another on all the Orang Asli groups. I have also worked on Malay culture and linguistics.

CW: In your curriculum vitae you also mention bio-sociology as one of your fields of interest and expertise – what exactly is meant by that?

GB: I guess it is what would otherwise be called biological or physical anthropology. It is a passive interest, not something I do active research in. I try to keep up with the literature and I do keep in active touch with at least some of the people who are doing research of that kind in Malaysia and Indonesia. I am also prepared to teach human evolution and human variation at a very elementary level. But in terms of active research – no, I do not do that. I have done some language classification work and I have done some work on the ethnohistory and prehistory of the Malay Peninsula in which the linguistic data have figured quite highly. Others have since tried to see if the things I have said made any genetic, biological or archaeological sense.

CW: Talking about interdisciplinary studies. Do you think "interdisciplinarity" is just a fashionable talk nowadays or is there more on that? What do you think can the various disciplines that you actively pursue contribute to interdisciplinary research?

GB: I have a quite definite view on this. For me disciplines are teaching devices, and not really research devices. They are very useful for getting students orientated to train their minds, but when it comes to real-world research I think disciplines should be put aside and people should focus on problems. Of course, they will bring their specialist training to their work but they must keep their mind open to all the other things that feed in. I have – apart from the period

when I was in the Prehistory and Anthropology department at ANU – always been in a sociology department. I have never felt it strange not being in a social anthropology department. Any research today inevitably involves aspects of culture, social organization, political science, history and geographical issues, and even linguistics. (Linguistics does require a bit more of specialist training, which unfortunately most anthropologists in the British tradition do not have. In the American tradition they do.) Interdisciplinary research brings in music too. There is a central core area of social science where we do not need to distinguish disciplines, and then there are ancillary areas where you can spread out into things like language and music, or – if you are interested – representational art, architecture and so on. In the real world these things are not separate from each other.

CW: Coming to the Austrian tradition of research in South-East Asia – you wrote an introduction to the reprint of Paul Schebesta's "Among the Forest Dwarfs of Malaya" (1973). Have you been influenced by this Austrian anthropologist?

GB: Yes, I wrote a short introduction to the reprint of his *Urwaldzwerge* book based on my own short ethnographic researches among various Semang groups, but I was not exactly influenced by that book, as it does not have a great deal of material in it on my primary concerns. It is his big three-volume work "Die Negrito Asiens" (1952–1957) which contains his most detailed material. (There is a Human Relations Area Files translation of this. Those files are difficult to get, but there is a set at the National University of Singapore library.) There are aspects of Schebesta's work from which one could learn quite a lot of things. He worked mainly on the Semang, whom I have also worked on. These groups, who neighbour the Temiars, were – traditionally at least – nomadic hunter-gatherers. One thing I liked about Schebesta's work was that he was a quite honest researcher. He was sent out to find amongst the Semang people evidence for *Urmonotheismus*, the idea of an original monotheism, and indeed his expedition [in 1924] was financed by the then Pope [Pius XI.]. But he later admitted in his writings that there was no such thing and that the Semang were thoroughgoing polytheists. He had to give up the idea of primitive monotheism, but in doing so he nevertheless gathered a lot of information, including some quite valuable linguistic material.

CW: Do you think that those old texts still contain important information for young scholars?

GB: Well, there has been quite a lot of research in recent years and we have a bibliography on Orang Asli studies put together by Lye Tuck-Po (2001) which has many hundreds of items

in it. I would say almost every Orang Asli group by now has had at least some study done of them. Some of this has not been published unfortunately, even though some people worked there 30 years ago or so. But there is now a substantial body of workers. We get on very well with each other and have our own newsgroup to exchange information. An archive has been set up in Keene State College[2] where Rosemary Gianno works, and there is another archive in Malaysia run by Colin Nicholas at the Centre for Orang Asli Concerns[3]. There are also a few Orang Asli themselves who are scholars and contribute quite seriously.

CW: Was there any special reason why you did not go back to the UK to take a university position after finishing your PhD studies?

GB: I just seem to be happy in this part of the world (which includes Australia, where I was for six years). I have nothing against the UK, but I have been closer to my field area here. I sort of settled down here and I am perfectly happy in South-East Asia. It is not as opposed to anywhere else – it is just that, in its own terms, it suits me.

CW: As a final question – do you have any practical advice for young students just trying to figure out what subject to choose for themselves? What should they pay their attention to?

GB: That is a little bit difficult. I mean, let's face it – a lot of students come into university, especially in this part of the world, with some kind of vocational aim in mind. Some parents tend to push them into subjects they believe their children can easily get a job in. The actual situation is not like that, and I would say that most of our students spend at least some of their time stretching their minds. That means not coming up to the professors asking 'What is it that we need to know to pass the exam?', to which I always reply 'There is no limit: the more you can put into what you do, the higher grade you are going to get.' I find that students these days do not read as much as students were previously expected to read. This may be because there are other competing sources now, like the Internet and television. It is only about ten percent of students who really do read the large amount of material that students traditionally were asked to read. But even if they cannot manage that, I feel that from time to time they should deliberately tackle some quite difficult material from the original literature. They should not just read in the textbooks. They should read the sort of material that professional social scientists and researchers have written for other researchers to read. When they start on such a reading they think they will never understand it. Then, as

2 Orang Asli Archive, Keene State College, NH, USA. http://www.keene.edu/library/orangasli/
3 Centre for Orang Asli Concerns, Subang Jaya, Malaysia. http://www.coac.org.my/

they proceed they achieve a little personal victory and realize that after all they are getting their minds stretched. Of course, the majority of graduates do not become professional social scientists but go into quite different areas. That is fine: it will be all the better for them to have done something that does enlarge their outlook. The only other advice I can actively give students is: make sure to do something that interests you. In the final analysis, most employers do not want people who already think they know what is what. They want people with good classes of degrees who they can further train on the job. So if you want to get a good class of degree – do something that interests you.

References

Benjamin, Geoffrey (Forthcoming a). *Temiar society.* Singapore: NUS Press.

Benjamin, Geoffrey (Forthcoming b). *Temiar religion, 1964-2008.* Singapore: NUS Press.

Benjamin, Geoffrey and Cynthia Chou (Eds.) (2002). *Tribal Communities in the Malay World: historical, social and cultural perspectives.* Leiden: International Institute of Asian Studies (IIAS) and Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).

Lye Tuck-Po (Ed.) (2001). *Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia: A Comprehensive and Annotated Bibliography.* CSEAS Research Report Series no. 88. Kyoto: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University.

Schebesta, Paul (1952-1957). *Die Negrito Asiens.* (Vol. I: *Geschichte, Geographie und Anthropologie der Negrito,* 1952; Vol. II Part 1: *Wirtschaft und Soziologie,* 1954; Vol. II Part 2: *Religion und Mythologie,* 1957). Wien-Mödling: St. Gabriel-Verlag.

Schebesta, Paul (1973). *Among the Forest Dwarfs of Malaya.* Second impression. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Introduction by Geoffrey Benjamin. (Orig.: *Bei den Urwaldzwergen von Malaya.* Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1927.)

Netzwerk Südostasienforschung / Network South-East Asia Research

Anthropologie in die Öffentlichkeit - Kultur reflektiert
DIE MASKE – Zeitschrift für Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie

Anthropology Goes Public - Reflecting Culture
DIE MASKE - Journal for Cultural and Social Anthropology

DIE MASKE Redaktion / DIE MASKE Editorial Board

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

Die Maske ist ein Gegenstand, der auf jedem Kontinent vorkommt und Bezüge zu vielen Teilbereichen der Anthropologie erlaubt. Sie steht für die menschliche Vielfalt und betont dennoch die großen Gemeinsamkeiten. Masken erfüllen vielseitige Aufgaben in unterschiedlichen (kulturellen) Kontexten, sie bieten einen Rahmen, innerhalb dessen etwas erprobt werden kann. So verhält es sich auch mit der Zeitschrift DIE MASKE, die seit 2007 ehrenamtlich von StudentInnen und AbsolventInnen der Anthropologie in Wien herausgegeben wird.

Als Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber wagen wir auf gut 92 A4-Seiten pro Heft den Brückenschlag zwischen wissenschaftlichem Erkenntnisgewinn und einer interessierten Öffentlichkeit. Artikel, Forschungsberichte, Reportagen, Interviews und Essays werden von ProfessorInnen, Studierenden und von JournalistInnen verfasst. Auch englischsprachige Beiträge von internationalen AutorInnen sowie transdisziplinäre Zugänge sind in jedem Heft vertreten. Das Experimentieren mit Schreibstilen ist dabei erwünscht. DIE MASKE basiert dabei auf der Arbeit eines enthusiastischen Teams und den hochwertigen Beiträgen, die kostenlos zur Verfügung gestellt werden.

Das Projekt begann im Herbst 2006 unter der Leitung von Norma Deseke, Mitbegründerin des Kulturvereins Pangea. Die erste Ausgabe erschien im Juni 2007 mit einer Auflage von

300 Stück und war schnell vergriffen. Sie wurde primär im universitären Rahmen rezipiert und erreichte hier ein ausgezeichnetes Echo. Mit der zweiten Ausgabe, die im Jänner 2008 mit einer Auflage von 700 Stück erschien, gelang es, auch außerhalb der Universität bekannt zu werden. Mit der dritten Ausgabe (Juni 2008) wurde eine weitere Auflagensteigerung auf 1000 Stück gewagt, neue Vertriebswege wurden erkundet, Werbemaßnahmen folgten und auch renommierte österreichische Medien wurden langsam auf das Projekt aufmerksam.

DIE MASKE wendet sich an eine LeserInnenschaft, die sich für die komplexe Vielfalt menschlicher Organisationsformen interessiert und darüber hinaus deren Gemeinsamkeiten kennen lernen möchte. Das Credo: Das Wissen, das die Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie erarbeitet, darf nicht im universitären Elfenbeinturm bleiben! Das Ziel der Redaktion ist ein Wissenschaftsjournalismus, der für eine breitere Öffentlichkeit verständlich ist und gleichzeitig auch für FachexpertInnen spannend bleibt. Das Spannungsfeld zwischen lokalem Lebensraum und globalen Wirkungszusammenhängen soll dargestellt, kulturelle Vielfalt diskutiert werden. DIE MASKE steht hier für Transparenz, Kontinuität, Benutzerfreundlichkeit und Tiefgang.

KulturwissenschaftlerInnen erarbeiten und eröffnen heute mehr Möglichkeiten denn je, sich den Herausforderungen der Globalisierung zu stellen, geerdet durch die lange Theoriengeschichte des Faches und sensibilisiert durch einen Eurozentrismus-kritischen Diskurs. DIE MASKE bietet einen Schauraum dieser Entwicklungen, einen ausgewählten und vielstimmigen Querschnitt, der sich nicht zu einem repräsentativen Aussagenbündel zusammenschließt, sondern das komplexe Themenspektrum zeitgenössischer sozial- und kulturanthropologischer Inhalte aufnimmt.

DIE MASKE unterteilt sich in folgende Rubriken:

- Der „Salon“ bietet Platz für theoretische Überlegungen zu einem von der Redaktion festgelegten Thema oder Phänomen.
- Die Rubrik „Fachgebiete“ stellt ein bestimmtes Arbeits- und Themenfeld der Disziplin vor. Interessant sind hier z.B. Artikel, die ein neues Forschungsfeld öffnen oder die ihre Themen in den aktuellen Forschungsstand einbetten. Auch Analysen empirischer Beispiele passen gut in diese Rubrik.
- Die dritte Rubrik „Region“ ist, neben dem von uns vorgegebenen geographischen Bezug, inhaltlich sehr frei gehalten und soll Raum für empirische Forschungen, Überlegungen und Erfahrungen ermöglichen.
- Des Weiteren gibt es noch die Rubriken „Wiener Institut“ und „Vernetzung“ – hier werden u.a. Diplomarbeiten, Projekte, Initiativen, sowie wissenschaftliche Literatur vorgestellt. Daneben werden wissenschaftliche Beiträge auch gerne mit journalistischen Kolumnen bzw. Essays abgerundet.

DIE MASKE erscheint derzeit zweimal pro Jahr, ein viermaliges Erscheinen und eine weitere Auflagensteigerung ist angedacht. Die vierte Ausgabe erscheint im Jänner 2009 und widmet sich den Schwerpunkten „Individuum“ (Salon), „Stadtforschung“ (Fachgebiete) und „Ostasien“ (Region). Die fünfte Ausgabe wird sich in Kooperation mit „Ethnocineca“ dem Schwerpunktthema „Anthropologischer Film“ (Fachgebiete) widmen und aller Voraussicht nach bereits im Mai 2009 erscheinen. Folgende Schwerpunktthemen für 2009 sind außerdem angedacht: Konsum (Salon), Afrika (Region).

Artikelvorschläge sind bereits willkommen, wir freuen uns zudem sehr über konstruktive Kritik, Ideen, Tipps, Zusammenarbeit und Vernetzung. Weitere Informationen findet sich auf der Plattform www.diemaske.at. Hier ist DIE MASKE auch online bestellbar.

Rezension / Review

Sidel, John T. (2006): Riots, Pogroms, Jihad. Religious Violence in Indonesia.

Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
ISBN: 0-8014-7327-6. xvii + 279 Seiten

Martin Slama

Forschungsstelle Sozialanthropologie, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften / Social Anthropology Research Unit, Austrian Academy of Sciences

ASEAS - Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften / Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 1 (2), 2008

SEAS - Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften - www.SEAS.at

John T. Sidel, Professor für internationale und vergleichende Politikwissenschaft an der London School of Economics, legt mit Riots, Pogroms, Jihad ein Buch vor, das die Konflikte und Gewaltausbrüche, die in Indonesien im Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2005 auftraten, in einen Analyserahmen stellt. Dieser Ansatz unterscheidet Riots, Pogroms, Jihad von den zahlreichen in den letzten Jahren erschienen Arbeiten, die sich auf einzelne Phänomene wie „ethnische Konflikte“ oder „islamischer Terrorismus“ in Indonesien konzentrieren – Gewaltphänomene in jener kritischen Phase, in der das Land eine Transformation vom autoritären Suharto-Regime in eine demokratischere Ordnung vollzog.

Für Sidel sind die Gewaltausbrüche nicht von Religion zu trennen, die er nicht als Glaubenserfahrung oder als „kulturelles System“ untersucht, wie dies etwa der Kulturanthropologe Clifford Geertz tut, sondern als ein Feld im Sinne Pierre Bourdieus, das durch Institutionen, Machtbeziehungen, materielle Produktion und Akkumulation, Dispositionen (Habitus) und durch die Distribution von symbolischem Kapital bestimmt ist. Des Weiteren geht Sidel historisch vor, indem er bis in die Kolonialzeit und das frühe unabhängige Indonesien zurückgeht, als sich das religiöse Feld in Indonesien konstituierte, um die Diskontinuitäten und Verschiebungen in der Positionierung von Religion in Indonesiens Öffentlichkeit festzustellen.

Das religiöse Feld und seine Überschneidungen mit den beiden anderen zentralen Feldern der Macht, nämlich der Politik und Wirtschaft, stellt für Sidel den strukturellen Rahmen der religiösen Gewalt dar, die er als kollektive physische Attacken definiert, die gegen Personen oder deren Eigentum gerichtet sind und die religiöse Dogmen, Grenzen, Institutionen, Traditionen, oder Werte lautstark verteidigen oder preisen und bei denen religiöse Symbole und Slogans eingesetzt werden.

Das erste Kapitel zeigt bereits, dass die ab den 1990ern aufgetretene Gewalt in Indonesien – von den sogenannten anti-chinesischen Unruhen über die Konflikte zwischen Muslimen und Christen in Ostindonesien bis zu den islamistischen Terroranschlägen – immer religiöse Konnotationen aufwies. Seinem theoretischen Ansatz gemäß hält Sidel jedoch nicht viel von Erklärungsansätzen, die in der Religion an sich das Problem sehen. Er sieht im Gegenteil Religion bzw. in konkreten Fall den Islam eingebettet in Klassenbeziehungen, in Beziehungen zum Staat und generell zu säkularen Institutionen, die die Grenzen und den Grad der Autonomie des religiösen Feldes mitbestimmen. Die verschiedenen Formen religiöser Gewalt reflektieren laut Sidel vielmehr die sozialen und politischen Veränderungen in Indonesien und somit die Rahmenbedingungen dafür, die Religion der Mehrheit, nämlich den Islam zu artikulieren, zu repräsentieren, sich für ihn einzusetzen bzw. durch ihn zu mobilisieren.

In Kapitel 2 untersucht Sidel die spezielle Klassenstruktur, die im kolonialen Indonesien ihre Form annahm und Kapital in den Händen der chinesischen Minderheit konzentrierte, die sich – bis auf wenige Ausnahmen – nicht zum Islam bekennt. Dieser Kapital besitzenden Klasse stand die Mehrheit der einfachen, meist muslimischen Bevölkerung sowie die einheimische politische Elite gegenüber, die sich zunächst hauptsächlich aus der lokalen Aristokratie speiste und für deren Reproduktion moderne Bildungsinstitutionen immer wichtiger wurden. Sidel zeigt hier Parallelen auf zwischen dem holländischen System der Organisation der Gesellschaft in „Säulen“ (*verzuiling*), d.h. in eine protestantische und eine katholische Säule, die über ihre Institutionen, vor allem im Bereich der Bildung, in den Niederlanden staatstragende Netzwerke formten, und dem in Indonesien als *aliran* (Strömung) bekannten Phänomen, das die Aufgliederung der Gesellschaft in islamisch traditionelle, islamisch modernistische und säkular/christliche (sowie bis in die Sukarno-Zeit kommunistische) Solidaritätsnetzwerke beschreibt.

In der Folge (Kapitel 3) beschäftigt sich Sidel damit, was aus dieser Klassenstruktur und den *aliran* in Suhartos sogenannter Neuen Ordnung (1966–98) wurde. Er unterscheidet hier zwei Phasen: die erste dauerte vom Beginn der Neuen Ordnung bis in die späten 1980er Jahre, die zweite umfasste die 1990er Jahre bis zur Abdankung Suhartos. Die erste Phase charakterisiert Sidel als „capitalism with a Chinese face“, in der Suharto eine kleine Gruppe chinesischer Unternehmer protegierte, die dadurch zu großem Reichtum gelangten, und als

„authoritarianism with a Christian sword“, da er sich im politischen Feld und vor allem im Militär auf christliche und säkulare Netzwerke stützte. Diese „Ordnung“ der Neuen Ordnung ließ sich jedoch in den 1990ern, in denen der Islam als Identitätsmarker für Indonesiens wachsender Mittelklasse immer bedeutender wurde (nicht zuletzt auch aufgrund dessen, dass die Neue Ordnung in anti-kommunistischer Absicht die Religionen allgemein förderte), nicht mehr aufrecht erhalten. Suharto machte so einen Schwenk von den christlichen Netzwerken zu den islamisch modernistischen, während das islamisch traditionelle Lager unter der Führung des späteren Präsidenten Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001) von sich aus eine größere Distanz zu dem nach wie vor autoritären Regime einnahm. Aufgrund dieses nicht zu übersehenden Schwenks Suhartos gewann der Islam eine stärkere Position in Indonesiens Öffentlichkeit, und prominente Vertreter der islamisch modernistischen Strömung konnten in die politische Elite des Landes vorstoßen. In dieser Zeit der Neustrukturierung des politischen Feldes Mitte der 1990er Jahre ereigneten sich auch die ersten Gewaltausbrüche, die dieses Buch unter der Kategorie „riots“ analysiert.

In Kapitel 4 geht Sidel konkret auf die Unruhen in den Jahren 1995 bis 1997 ein, die sich hauptsächlich gegen chinesische Geschäfte und Kirchen richteten und denen meist Dispute zwischen Muslimen und Chinesen bzw. Gerüchte über respektloses Verhalten von Chinesen dem Islam gegenüber vorausgingen. In dieser Zeit wurden die Klassenunterschiede unter den MuslimInnen Indonesiens immer sichtbarer. Die neue islamische Mittelklasse nahm einen ähnlichen Lebensstil an wie ihre chinesischen und christlichen Pendants, die nun gemeinsam die Einkaufszentren der Städte bevölkerten, mit ihren scheibengetönten Autos die Straßen verstopften und in bewachten Wohnsiedlungen lebten. Diese Entwicklungen erzeugten Ambiguitäten und Spannungen, was die Position des Islam in Indonesien betrifft, der bisher von vielen seiner Anführer als (alternative) Identität für die einfache Bevölkerung präsentiert wurde. Vor diesem Hintergrund des Entstehens neuer (widersprüchlicher) islamischer Identitäten und Klassenlagen sowie der nach wie vor starken chinesischen ökonomischen Elite sieht Sidel die zahlreichen Unruhen dieser Jahre.

Dem Höhepunkt dieser anti-chinesischen Gewalt geht Sidel in Kapitel 5 nach. Im Zuge der Abdankung Suhartos nahm diese einen Charakter an, der der islamischen Elite, die mit B.J. Habibie als Suhartos Nachfolger und Vorsitzender der islamischen Intellektuellenorganisation Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) plötzlich im Zentrum der Macht angelangt und zuvor mit anti-chinesischer und anti-christlicher Rhetorik aufgefallen war, zu weit ging. Diesmal wurden nicht nur chinesische Geschäfte und Wohnhäuser angezündet, sondern auch chinesische Frauen vergewaltigt. Diese Gewalt konnte nun nicht mehr als „islamisch“ interpretiert werden, als der Volkszorn einfacher Muslime, der sich gegen nicht-muslimische Kapitalisten richtet, und verstärkte die Zweifel und Ambiguitäten bezüglich der Position des

Islam in Indonesien, die auch die Post-Suharto-Ära bestimmen sollten, in der neue Formen religiöser Gewalt zum Vorschein kamen.

Kapitel 6 behandelt diese Formen von Gewalt der Jahre 1999 bis 2001, die Sidel „interreligious pogroms“ nennt. In dieser Periode verlor auch die islamisch modernistische Elite einen beträchtlichen Teil ihres politischen Einflusses, denn Habibie, ihr Patron, wurde Ende 1999 als Präsident nicht wieder gewählt, sondern Abdurrahman Wahid von der islamisch traditionellen Strömung, der 2001 wiederum von der säkularen Megawati Sukarnoputri, der Tochter des Staatsgründers Sukarno, abgelöst wurde. Diese politischen Turbulenzen und die damit verbundene Unsicherheit waren vor allem in jenen östlichen Provinzen Indonesiens zu spüren, in denen sich die christliche und muslimische Bevölkerung ungefähr die Waage hält und religiöse Netzwerke für die lokalen Machtaufteilung eine große Rolle spielen. Im Bezirk Poso in Zentralsulawesi und in den Provinzen der Molukken und Nord-Molukken, die diesem Bild entsprechen, brachen die interreligiösen Pogrome schließlich aus.

Im letzten Kapitel stellt Sidel das dritte Muster religiöser Gewalt in Indonesien vor, das sich beträchtlich von den anderen beiden (Unruhen und Pogrome) unterscheidet. Beim Jihad handelt es sich nicht um die relativ spontane Gewaltausübung ganzer Bevölkerungsgruppen, sondern dieser wird von wenigen, genau planenden Spezialisten getragen. Sidel versteht unter dieser Kategorie islamische Milizen, die von Java in die Krisenherde in Ostindonesien geschickt wurden, sowie Terrorgruppen, die von 2000 bis 2004 Indonesien mit Bombenattentaten in Atem hielten. Der verheerendste Anschlag wurde am 12. Oktober 2002 auf einen Nachtclub in Bali verübt, bei dem über 200 Menschen den Tod fanden. Diese Anschläge auf vermeintlich westliche Ziele wie Nachtclubs, Hotels und Botschaften reflektiert laut Sidel die Veränderungen in der Konstellation zwischen religiösem und politischem Feld (S. 214): „This new constellation was one in which the space for the promotion of Islam in the national parliamentary arena had dramatically shrunk, and in which the channels of quiet collaboration between jihadi activists and sympathetic elements in the state and the political class were rapidly being closed down.“ Weit davon entfernt, den Islam der Mehrheit der MuslimInnen Indonesiens zu repräsentieren, wurden die Anschläge der Jihadisten als sektiererische Gewalt wahrgenommen, die auch eine Delegitimation der nicht-gewalttätigen Islamisten zur Folge hatte (was z.B. auch im Wahlergebnis von 2004 reflektiert ist; Parteien mit einem prononciert islamistischen Programm konnten bei diesen Wahlen nicht reüssieren). Die Terroranschläge 2000 bis 2004, folgert Sidel, sind die traurigen Ausläufer eines gescheiterten islamistischen Projekts, das sich nach dem Fall Suhartos Chancen auf die Macht in Indonesien, dem Land mit der weltweit größten islamischen Gemeinschaft, ausgerechnet hatte.

Aus der Perspektive von 2006, als dieses Buch erschien, und auch aus heutiger Sicht gehört die von Sidel beschriebene religiöse Gewalt – und zwar alle drei Formen – der Vergangenheit an,

obwohl religiöse Spannungen in manchen Teilen Indonesiens nach wie vor zum Alltag gehören. Nichtsdestotrotz ist der „triumph for mulitfaith tolerance or secularism“ (S. 223), den Sidel am Ende seines Buches verkündet, nicht als ein solcher zu werten. Denn in den letzten Jahren versuchten islamistische Kräfte in Indonesien nicht durch Gewalt, sondern auf Provinz- und Distriktsebene in den Lokalparlamenten, die nach Suharto aufgewertet wurden, oder auch durch die staatlich anerkannte Organisation der Islamgelehrten (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) ihre Agenda durchzusetzen. Das im Moment relativ gewaltfreie Tauziehen zwischen islamistischen und säkularen bzw. christlichen Kräften hat noch lange nicht mit einem Sieg von Letzteren ihr Ende erreicht. Sidel ist jedoch zuzustimmen, wenn er die religiöse Gewalt von 1995 bis 2005 als einen Prozess beschreibt, aus dem die Islamisten geschwächt hervorgegangen sind. Hier kommt die Stärke von Sidels Ansatz zum Tragen, die nicht nach unmittelbaren Gründen für die Gewaltakte sucht, sondern mit der Analyse der Verschränkungen der religiösen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Felder ein umfassendes Bild der gesellschaftlichen Strukturen und sozio-politischen Konstellationen Indonesiens zeichnet. Diese Strukturen und Konstellationen, in denen die Gewalt verankert ist, frei zu legen, ist das große Verdienst von Sidels Buch.

Call for Papers

4th Viennese Conference on South-East Asia / 4. Wiener Südostasienkonferenz

National and Transnational Crises and Conflicts in South-East Asia / Nationale und transnationale Krisen und Konflikte in Südostasien

June 2009 / Juni 2009

Seit der Unabhängigkeit kämpfen die südostasiatischen Nationen mit zahlreichen internen Problemen, welche die sozioökonomische Entwicklung und das 'nation building' gefährden. Soziale Ungleichheiten, Urbanisierung, Landflucht oder ethnische Konflikte sind nur einige dieser Schwierigkeiten. Hinzu kommen regionale Herausforderungen, seien es Klimawandel, Nahrungssicherheit, die gegenwärtige globale Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise oder Chinas wirtschaftlicher und machtpolitischer Aufstieg. Diese Konflikte sind per definitonem transnational, weshalb zu fragen ist, ob sie das traditionelle politische Primat von Souveränität und Nicht-Einmischung in innere Angelegenheiten in Richtung verstärkte Kooperation und geteilte Souveränität verändern können.

Since their independence South-East Asian nations have grappled with numerous internal problems which have threatened both socio-economic development and nation-building. Social inequalities, urbanisation, rural exodus or ethnic conflicts are only some of these issues. In addition, there are regional challenges, such as climate change, food security, the current global financial crisis or China's economic and political rise to power. These conflicts are transnational in nature, which is why the question arises whether they are capable of changing the traditional political primacy of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of others in favour of increased cooperation and shared sovereignty.

Diese Konferenz gliedert sich in zwei große Panels:

(1) Nationale Krisen und Konflikte

Grundsätzlich stellen sich vier Fragen bezüglich dieses Themas: Erstens, wie werden Krisen wahrgenommen (z.B. Thailand - als eine politische, wirtschaftliche und/oder touristische?); zweitens, was wird als Krise wahrgenommen; drittens, welche Krisen werden „vergessen" (z.B. die Situation der burmesischen Flüchtlinge an der thailändischen Grenze oder diverse ethnische Konflikte in der Region); viertens, wie wird mit Krisen langfristig umgegangen (z.B. wurde Burma/Myanmar nach der Protestwelle im Jahr 2007 und dem Taifun Nargis 2008 rasch wieder aus dem Bewusstsein der Öffentlichkeit verdrängt); fünftens, was könnten zukünftige Krisen sein.

Sind Krisen demnach allgemein als solche anerkannt und, wenn ja, wie erfolgt ihre Bewältigung, und welche Prinzipien herrschen hier vor? Warum werden einige Krisen beispielsweise friedlich durch multilaterale Kooperation zu lösen versucht, andere jedoch durch traditionelle einzelstaatliche und mitunter repressive Maßnahmen?

This conference consists of two major panels:

(1) National Crises and Conflicts

Generally speaking five questions arise regarding this issue: firstly, how are crises perceived (e.g. Thailand - as a political, economic and / or a tourist crisis?); secondly, what is perceived as a crisis; thirdly, what kind of crises are 'forgotten' (e.g. the situation of Burmese refugees along the border to Thailand or the various ethnic conflicts in the region); fourthly, how are crises dealt with on a long-term basis (e.g. Burma/Myanmar, following protests in 2007 and Taifun Nagis in 2008, has vanished again from the public conscience); fifthly, what could future crises look like.

Are crises recognised as such and, if so, how are they dealt with and which principles prevail? Why, for example, are some crises dealt with peacefully through multilateral cooperation and others through traditional unilateral and often repressive measures?

(2) Transnational-regionale Krisen und Konflikte

Das zweite Panel zielt darauf ab, die nationalen Krisen und Konflikte analytisch in den transnational-regionalen Kontext zu stellen. Dabei interessieren vor allem spezifisch südostasiatische Dimensionen und Unterschiede zu unserer westlichen Wahrnehmung und Methoden zur Konfliktlösung und -verhütung, speziell im Hinblick auf humanitäre Probleme.

Hier stellen sich ähnlich wie beim ersten Panel sechs grundsätzliche Fragen: Erstens, welche Attribute müssen auf eine nationale Krise zutreffen, damit sie als eine transnationale Bedrohung wahrgenommen wird; zweitens, existieren in Südostasien regionalspezifische Governance-Mechanismen und -Institutionen; drittens, signalisiert die neue ASEAN-Charter eine Abkehr vom bislang sakrosankten Prinzip der Nichteinmischung in interne Angelegenheiten; viertens, wer sind die Akteure der Krisen (staatlich, nicht-staatlich, supra-staatlich) und kommen neue hinzu; fünftens, welche Rolle spielen andere regionale (z.B. EU, SCO) und internationale Organisationen (z.B. UN, IMF) beim Krisenmanagement - wenn sie das überhaupt dürfen und wollen; sechstens, findet etwa ein neues Zeitalter des Isolationismus statt?

(2) Transnational-regional Crises and Conflicts

The second panel aims at analytically positioning the national crises and conflicts into a transnational-regional context. Specific South-East Asian dimensions and differences to our Western perceptions and methods regarding conflict solution and prevention, especially with regard to humanitarian problems, are of particular interest.

Similar to the first panel, six core questions arise: first, which attributes must a national crisis meet in order for it to be considered a transnational threat; secondly, do governance mechanisms and institutions specific to the South-east Asian region exist; thirdly, does the new ASEAN Charter signal a departure from the, til now, sacrosanct principle of non-interference in internal affairs of others; fourthly, who are the actors involved in the crisis (governmental, non-governmental, supra-governmental) and can additional actors be expected; fifthly, what role do other regional (e.g. EU, SCO) and international organisations (e.g. UN, IMF) play regarding crisis management – if they are allowed and wish to do so at all; sixthly, are we witnessing a new era of isolationism?

Einreichungen

Vorschläge für Konferenzbeiträge (maximal zwei A4-Seiten) und ein aktueller Kurzlebenslauf müssen bis spätestens 1. April 2009 per E-Mail (publics@seas.at) eingereicht werden. Präsentationen dürfen die Dauer von 20 Minuten nicht überschreiten. Weitere 10 Minuten sind für Diskussionen im Plenum eingeplant. Die Vorträge können in Deutsch oder in Englisch gehalten werden. Entscheidungen über die Annahme oder Ablehnung vorgeschlagener Vorträge werden bis spätestens Ende April 2009 getroffen und ausgesandt. Wir bitten jene AutorInnen, deren Beiträge angenommen wurden, die Konferenzartikel (5.000 - 12.000 Zeichen) bis spätestens 31. Mai 2009 an uns zu senden. Vortragende haben weiters - nach Absprache mit der ASEAS-Redaktion - die Möglichkeit, ihre Präsentationen in der Österreichischen Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften (Jahrgang 2 - Ausgabe 2, 2009) zu veröffentlichen.

Mehr Details und aktuelle Information zur Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften (SEAS) sowie zur Österreichischen Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften (ASEAS) finden Sie auf unserer Website: http://www.seas.at

Bei weiteren Fragen zur Konferenz kontaktieren Sie uns bitte per E-Mail: publics@seas.at

Submissions

Paper proposals (maximum two A4 pages) and a focused up-to-date CV should be submitted by e-mail (publics@seas.at) until April 1, 2009 at the latest. Please be aware that the presentation should not exceed 20 minutes and leave another 10 minutes for discussions in the plenum. Presentations can be held in German or in English. Decisions about the acceptance or rejection of proposed papers will be announced by the end of April 2009 at the latest. In case a proposal is accepted, we kindly ask the authors to submit their conference paper (5,000 - 12,000 characters) until May 31, 2009 so that it can be included in the conference reader. Additionally, papers presented at the conference may - after consultation with the ASEAS editorial board - also be published in the Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies (Volume 2 - Issue 2, 2009).

For further details and the latest updates on the Society of South-East Asian Studies (SEAS) and the Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies (ASEAS) please consult our website: http://www.seas.at

If you have any questions concerning the conference, please contact us by e-mail: publics@seas.at

Publizieren in

ASEAS

Submissions

Die Österreichische Zeitschrift für Südostasienwissenschaften (ASEAS) ist ein Schwerpunktprojekt der Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften (SEAS) in Wien. Die Redaktion lädt etablierte wie auch angehende WissenschafterInnen dazu ein, Forschungsergebnisse und theoretische Abhandlungen zu präsentieren, Fachliteratur zu rezensieren sowie Konferenzberichte und Interviews mit SüdostasienexpertInnen zu veröffentlichen. Als interdisziplinäre Zeitschrift beinhalten die Beiträge historische und/oder aktuelle Analysen kultureller, sozialer, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Fragestellungen.

Veröffentlichte Artikel müssen einen Bezug zu Südostasien aufweisen, sollen aber nicht geographisch auf die Region beschränkt bleiben, sondern können, wie es beispielsweise in der Linguistik, bei Diaspora-Gruppen oder Formen des soziokulturellen Transfers der Fall ist, die räumlichen und politischen Grenzen Südostasiens überschreiten.

Falls Sie einen Beitrag in ASEAS publizieren möchten, besuchen Sie bitte unsere Homepage, wo Sie nähere Informationen zu Einreichungen sowie unsere E-Mail-Kontaktadresse finden: http://www.seas.at/aseas

Deadline ASEAS 2(1) 15.März 2009.

The Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies (ASEAS) is a core project of the Society for South-East Asian Studies (SEAS) in Vienna. The journal editors invite both established as well as young scientists to present research results and theoretical papers, to review literature or to publish conference reports as well as interviews with experts on South-East Asia. As an interdisciplinary journal, ASEAS covers cultural, social, economic and political aspects of South-East Asia from a historical and/or a contemporary perspective.

Topics should be related to South-East Asia, but they do not need to be restricted to the geographical region, as in the case of - for example - linguistics, diaspora groups or forms of socio-cultural transfers where spatial and political borders of South-East Asia are crossed.

If you are interested in publishing a paper with ASEAS, please visit our website and find further information about submissions as well as our e-mail address there: http://www.seas.at/aseas

Deadline ASEAS 2(1) March 15, 2009.

ASEAS