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Editorial

Alfred Gerstl & Christian Wawrinec

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Mit der vorliegenden Ausgabe startet ASEAS eine neue Beitragsserie, in der österreichische Forschungseinrichtungen, an denen zu Südostasien gearbeitet wird, vorgestellt werden. Den Anfang bildet das Institut für Geografie und Regionalforschung der Universität Wien, wo seit den 1980er-Jahren intensiv Themen wie sozioökonomische und demografische Transformationen, Migration, Tourismus sowie regionale Auswirkungen von Globalisierung in Asien, vor allem Südostasien untersucht werden.

Natürlich bietet die aktuelle Ausgabe auch wieder exzellente Beiträge der aktuellen Südostasienforschung. Unserem „Call for Papers" zum Schwerpunkt Gender- und Frauenforschung folgend, geht Niklas Reese (Universität Passau/Universität Bonn) in seinem Beitrag der bedeutenden Rolle der Frauen in der philippinischen Zivilgesellschaft wie auch in der formalen

With this issue ASEAS starts a new series of articles aiming to introduce Austrian research institutes working on South-East Asian topics. We begin with the Department of Geography and Regional Research at the University of Vienna that has since the 1980s been examining topics such as socio-economic and demographic transformations, migration, tourism, and the regional effects of globalisation in Asia, mainly focusing on South-East Asia.

The current issue again offers outstanding contributions to current research on South-East Asia. In line with our Call for Papers on gender research and women's studies, Niklas Reese (University of Passau/University of Bonn) elaborates on the crucial role of women in civil society as well as in formal politics in the Philippines. He demonstrates the importance of gender equality in civil society dialogue

Politik nach. Er zeigt, dass Geschlechtergerechtigkeit im zivilgesellschaftlichen Diskurs eine hohe Bedeutung hat und viele Frauen in politischen Ämtern vertreten sind. Gleichzeitig stellt er jedoch fest, dass sich an der patriarchalischen Superstruktur wenig veränderte und der Selbstbestimmung der Frauen noch immer zahlreiche kulturelle und soziale Einstellungsmuster entgegenstehen. Alimatul Qibtiyah (Griffith University/UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta) behandelt in ihrer Analyse das Thema Feminismus und Frauenaktivismus an indonesischen Universitäten. Die Autorin geht dabei der Frage nach, warum nur knapp ein Fünftel der StudienteilnehmerInnen sich selbst als FeministIn bezeichnet. Dabei macht sie deutlich, dass die Befragten höchst unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über den Begriff und die Rolle von FeministInnen in der Gesellschaft hegen.

Außerhalb des geplanten Schwerpunkts, aber nicht weniger interessant, stehen Indonesiens Palmölindustrie und die Auswirkungen der Agrartreibstoffpolitik der Europäischen Union auf die Produktionsbedingungen im Land im Mittelpunkt von Melanie Pichlers (Universität Wien) Beitrag. Indonesien ist der weltweit größte Palmölexporteur, und wie

and the actual representation of women in politics. Yet he also shows that the patriarchal superstructure has changed only to a minor degree and that women still face the challenge of various cultural and social beliefs. Alimatul Qibtiyah (Griffith University/ UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta) examines the topic of feminism and gender activism at Indonesian universities. The author analyses why only a fifth of all her study respondents identify themselves as feminist. Thereby she demonstrates that the interviewed partners hold very different views about the term and the role of feminists within Indonesian society.

Outside the gender focus, but also highly important is Melanie Pichler's (University of Vienna) contribution on palm oil in Indonesia and the effects of the European Union's agrofuels policy on the respective industry and labour conditions in that country. Indonesia, the biggest exporter of palm oil, is, as Melanie Pichler shows, in need of a sustainable policy to stop forest degradation and the loss of biodiversity and to reduce poverty and social conflicts (primarily about land). Subsequently, Alexander Lautensach (University of Northern British Columbia) and Sabina Lautensach (Human Security Institute) discuss the extent to

Pichler zeigt, wäre eine nachhaltige Entwicklungspolitik notwendig, um die Abholzung von Regenwäldern und den Verlust von Biodiversität zu verhindern sowie Armut und soziale Konflikte (vor allem um Land) zu reduzieren. Alexander Lautensach (University of Northern British Columbia) und Sabina Lautensach (Human Security Institute) diskutieren anschließend, inwieweit bestimmte Elemente innerhalb des Konzepts von menschlicher Sicherheit priorisiert und für Südostasien angewendet werden können. Dabei arbeiten sie die Bedeutung der Ökologie heraus, die laut ihnen die wirtschaftliche und gesundheitspolitische Dimension von menschlicher Sicherheit wesentlich beeinflusst. Dass Menschenrechte, vor allem politische Rechte, im ASEAN-Diskurs zu menschlicher Sicherheit nur eine geringe Rolle spielen, demonstrieren Eduardo T. Gonzalez (University of the Philippines) und Magdalena L. Mendoza (Development Academy of the Philippines) in ihrem Beitrag zu den Philippinen. ASEAN rückt in erster Linie die entwicklungspolitische Dimension menschlicher Sicherheit in den Vordergrund. Aufgrund des wachsenden Einflusses der Zivilgesellschaft werden Machthaber jedoch zur Zulassung von mehr Partizipation in politischen

which certain dimensions of the human security concept could be prioritised and applied on South-East Asia. Thereby they emphasise the ecological pillar that, according to the authors, heavily influences the economic and health-related dimension of human security. Human rights, in particular the political rights, play only a minor role in ASEAN's discourse on human security, as Eduardo T. Gonzalez (University of the Philippines) and Magdalena L. Mendoza (Development Academy of the Philippines) argue in their contribution on the Philippines. ASEAN emphasises the developmental dimension of human security. However, due to the growing influence of civil society, the elites in the Philippines and other South-East Asian countries are under pressure to allow more participation in political decision-making processes.

In the section 'Forum', Poowin Bunyavejchewin (University of Hull) analyses the role and implications of 'Thainess' on the polarised politics in the kingdom. He regards this concept as a construct of the Thai elites, aimed at legitimising their hold on power ideologically and to exclude the opposition legally and morally from the political process by labeling it as non-patriotic. Marginalised are in Thailand

Entscheidungsprozessen gezwungen.

In der Rubrik „Forum" befasst sich Poowin Bunyavejchewin (University of Hull) mit der Rolle und den Implikationen des „Thaiseins" auf die polarisierte Politik im Königreich. Er sieht in diesem Konzept ein Konstrukt der thailändischen Eliten mit dem Ziel, deren Machterhalt ideologisch zu legitimieren und die als unpatriotisch abgestempelte Opposition legal wie moralisch auszugrenzen. Ausgegrenzt werden in Thailand auch Homosexuelle wie Santi Leksakun (Sem Pringpuangkeo Foundation) am Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Homosexuellen und diese ablehnende Aktivisten in der Stadt Chiang Mai zeigt.

„Im Dialog" mit Regina Gerlach (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) erläutert Yuniyanti Chuzaifah, Direktorin der Indonesischen Kommission zur Bekämpfung von Gewalt gegen Frauen, dass patriarchalisches Verhalten in Indonesien immer noch weit verbreitet ist. Einerseits überwacht ihre Organisation die Menschenrechtssituation in Indonesien, andererseits führt sie geschlechterspezifische Informationskampagnen für die breite Bevölkerung durch. In einem zweiten Interview spricht Pascal Honisch (SEAS) mit der von den Philippinen nach Wien emigrierten Arlene Castañeda über ihre

also homosexuals, as Santi Leksakun (Sem Pringpuangkeo Foundation) illustrates, using the conflict between homosexuals and activists opposing overt homosexuality in the city of Chiang Mai.

'In Dialogue' with Regina Gerlach (Goethe University Frankfurt), Yuniyanti Chuzaifah, Director of the Indonesian National Commission on Violence against Women, explains that patriarchal behaviour is still widespread in Indonesia. On the one hand her organisation monitors the human rights situation in Indonesia, on the other hand it conducts gender-sensitive information campaigns for the broader population. In the second interview Pascal Honisch (SEAS) speaks to Arlene Castañeda, who emigrated from the Philippines to Vienna, about her cultural and language transfer projects.

We are again pleased to present impressive pictures in our section 'South-East Asia Visually'. Philip Jablon (Chiang Mai) introduces his project (started in 2008) on South-East Asian movie theatres which are threatened by abandonment or demolition.

The current ASEAS issue will be completed by three book reviews. The first deals with co-operative security in the Asia-Pacific and in particular the ASEAN Regional Forum (Julio S.

Kultur- und Sprachvermittlungspro-jekte.

Auch dieses Mal haben wir wieder das Vergnügen, eindrucksvolle Fo-tos in der Rubik „Südostasien sehen" präsentieren zu können. Philip Jablon (Chiang Mai) stellt sein Projekt zu süd-ostasiatischen Kinos vor, bei dem er seit 2008 vom Verfall oder Abriss be-drohte Kinos dokumentiert.

Abgerundet wird die vorliegende Ausgabe von drei Buchrezensionen zu kooperativer Sicherheit in Asien-Pazi-fik und speziell dem ASEAN Regional Forum (Julio S. Amador III), Timor-Les-tes Weg zur Unabhängigkeit und den Auswirkungen auf Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft des kleinen Landes (Julia Scharinger) sowie Kooperati-on zwischen China und Vietnam am Beispiel des Mekong-Deltas (Ramses Amer).

Amador III), the second with Timor-Leste's path towards independence and its effects on the politics, econ-omy, and society of the small nation (Julia Scharinger), and the third with co-operation between China and Vi-etnam, for example on the Mekong River (Ramses Amer).

"Still Working on it": An Overview on the Current State of Public Activism of Women in the Philippines

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This paper gives an overview on to what extent public activism in the Philippines is still gendered and how far it, therefore, disadvantages women. The paper consists of three major topics: (1) observations on women and the public space, (2) an outline of women and formal politics, and (3) a glimpse into gender within civil society and social movements in the Philippines.

Keywords: *Civil Society, Gender Roles, Women's Movement, Public Space, Philippines*

Dieser Artikel behandelt die Frage, inwiefern Aktivismus von Frauen im öffentlichen Raum in den Philippinen noch immer geschlechtsspezifisch definiert ist und ob Frauen dadurch benachteiligt werden. Der Artikel ist in drei Abschnitte gegliedert: (1) Beobachtungen zu Frauen und öffentlichem Raum, (2) Überblick über die Rolle der Frauen in der formellen Politik und (3) eine Annäherung an geschlechtsspezifische Fragestellungen in Zivilgesellschaft und sozialen Bewegungen in den Philippinen.

Schlagworte: *Zivilgesellschaft, Geschlechterrollen, Frauenbewegung, Öffentlicher Raum, Philippinen*

Introduction

The *Filipin@s*[2] are known for their vivid civil society and their massive street protests (named 'EDSA-revolutions', after the main traversal in the capital Metro Manila), which have led to the downfall of now two presidents, Marcos in 1986 and Estrada in

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1 Niklas Reese is a lecturer in South-East Asian Studies at the University of Passau and a researcher at the University of Bonn, Germany. He has headed the *philippinenbuero*, a Germany-based information centre on the Philippines, from 2000 to 2004 and has been involved with educational and journalistic work on development issues since 1998. He has studied social sciences and spent his childhood in Hong Kong and Davao. He is also an alumnus of Our Lady of Fatima Academy, Davao City, the Philippines.

2 *Filipin@s* is a gender-sensitive term, which includes Filipinos as well as Filipinas. It is copied from a social movement practice in Latin America.

2001. Women have up to now taken a significant role in prominent social movements. Furthermore, according to a World Economic Forum survey ("RP among the best", 2009), the Philippines is rated number 9 in the world in terms of promoting equality among the sexes. Does this imply that the public sphere is no longer male territory as the traditional patriarchal setup considers it to be?

This paper has an exploratory character, seeking to identify to what extent reality and discourse on public activism and citizenship in the Philippines are (still) gendered and how far they disadvantage women.[3] Though there is some first-hand research included (Reese, 2009), the claim of this paper is modest: it attempts to provide a general overview on the state of gender and politics in the Philippines and to associate different arenas of gender politics – from the private to everyday resistance and outer-parliamentarian political activism to formal politics. Thereby, I suggest that all these different spheres are ruled by a similar paradigm.

The results presented here have been written to provide women's rights activists in the Philippines and elsewhere with a kind of 'state description' rather than contribute to an academic discourse (especially as the theoretical integration of the article had to be withdrawn due to space constraints). Therefore, it would be far too ambitious if this paper were to be understood as a conclusive state description of gender and politics in the Philippines. Because of this, the research focused on observing and participating in the public discourse and everyday life in the Philippines. Bases for the paper have been (1) a re-reading of academic and everyday literature on democratisation and gender in the Philippines, (2) participant observation and in-depth interviews during various field trips to the Philippines since 1998, and finally, (3) 14 interviews and group discussions with several women (and a few men) involved in social movements and political work in the Philippines, conducted in 2009 and 2010.

Private Women and Public Men? Gender Regime in the Philippines

The Philippines seems to be very progressive in regard to gender equality and female presence in politics. That is why there are claims made, especially by men, that

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3 The notion of citizenship I want to draw on expresses itself in (a) political agency and (b) a sense of entitlement to social and public services. So it is not necessarily linked to a sense of nationalism and a clear identification with one nation state, still common despite a growing literature on transnational and post-national citizenship.

patriarchy is only a kind of icing with women pulling the strings in the background. It happens that Filipino men portray themselves as *takusa* (short for *takot sa asawa*, meaning 'scared of the wife'). In this spirit, Castillo and Guerrero described in 1969 the Philippines to be "a male-dominated society (in the public eye) managed by females (in private)" (Castillo & Guerrero in Medina, 2001, p. 156). But this suggestion lacks empirical evidence. It seems to be much more appropriate to describe the Philippines as a society "that revolves around male privilege on one hand and female acquiescence on the other" (Tan, 2003; also cf. Reese, 2006).

The normative ideal that wives should stay home and care for the family is still very prevalent. Nevertheless, many women have joined the labour force.[4] The feminisation of migration may be the most visible way of seeing how women have crossed the border from private to public space, the latter being traditionally considered male territory, especially if one considers that migration not only leads to the overcoming of poverty but also is a way of "getting to know the world and linking with it" (Martínez, 2001, p. 41). The feminisation of migration has also resulted in more and more women being the main breadwinners of their families, which contradicts the still in-force patriarchal model of the "male as breadwinner" and forces men to "remake their masculinities" (Pingol, 2001).

Glass ceilings though are still prevalent in the Philippines. This is the same as in other countries where the higher the position, the fewer women can be found. And what speaks even more against the myth of gender equality in Philippine society is that there has only been little rupture of the gender-specific division of labour. While one can witness the entry of women into the public sphere, there is only little entry of men into the private sphere, as this is still widely considered to be a female domain. Working women receive only minimal acknowledgment and understanding, even though they may also prove themselves as good family guardians. Shattered family relations and 'problem kids' are solely blamed on mothers and wives (Parreñas, 2002). Women often call their employment 'helping out', sometimes even if they are the main breadwinners in monetary terms (cf. Paguntalan, 2002, p. 174). They consider this to be an "extension of her wife and mother role which demands that she contributes her share for the economic survival of the family" (Medina, 2001, p.

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4 Some occupations, though, are still nearly completely male-dominated. You would still hardly see any female drivers or construction workers in the Philippines.

201). Being a good mother, a good wife, and a good caretaker are still the primary responsibilities of a Filipina and, for most of them, their main identity as well: to be a 'whole women' to most of them means to be married and have children (Doyo, 1998). Because of the resulting double burden, lack of time is the most important everyday life restriction of working mothers.[5] The entry into the public space reflected in the higher ratio of female employment is not necessarily a sign of higher acceptance of women in the public (rights driven), but may rather be especially for lower class women out of economic necessity (needs driven).

Traditionally, patriarchy also manifested itself in the public space reserved for men. Women had no business being there if not for their specific female business: *bata*, *bahay*, *baboy*, and *bana* (children, house, 'pig' for supplementary income, and husband). They should not be seen in pubs or seen smoking and drinking in public in order not to be mistaken for a *mujer publica*, as prostitutes were called in Spanish times, and considered *walang hiya* (without decency).[6]

But then again, there have always interesting 'traces of women power' within patriarchy. Many Filipinas may behave *mahinhin* (decent) towards strangers and in public, but according to my observations they indeed display a high zest for action, entrepreneurship, assertiveness, and firmness in spaces perceived as 'private'. Managing the household and family affairs and caring for a responsible spending of the scarce resources (romanticised as 'power of the purse') alone expresses a high incidence of female agency.[7] At the same time, this is not yet proof of the incidence of female *political* agency.

Of course, times have changed: The Philippines has had two female presidents in only two decades and there are more women governors, congresswomen, mayors, and local councillors in the Philippines than elsewhere in Asia. The Philippines was in

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5 The women union leader I interviewed (Reese, 2009) was even president of a male-dominated union for more than ten years. Making her president was a strategic move by the union, as the factory owner hired goons but would not have deployed them against a women leader. She was considered brave, but another major reason was that she was single at that time. She had no double burden, could attend to a 'male timetable' and would not have left a family behind in case the goons killed her.

6 The dualism of either 'Madonna' or 'whore' is again simplified. There have been other roles, such as the healer (*babaylanes* or *mananambal*) or the lesbian, that women could take on allowing them to deviate from traditional notions of femaleness. But the dichotomy of Maria Clara (the prototype of a decent woman) or 'the other Mary' seem to be the dominant field of tension within which most women up to now have to develop their own womanhood (Ellwood-Clayton, 2006).

7 Considering that 'citizenship' is not only attributed to rights but to duties and responsibilities as well (communitarian and republican tradition), the high sense of responsibility of women for their "loved ones" (Tan, 2003) can been seen as another expression and base of women's citizenship and agency.

1995 one of the first countries worldwide to adopt a policy providing for gender and development (GAD) in its national budget through the Women in Development and Nation Building Act, which requires all government agencies to set aside five percent of their budgets for gender and development activities. Another much cited law is the 'Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act' of 2004. And several cities in the Philippines have followed Davao City in passing its 'Women Development Code of 1997'. Finally, media projects non-traditional women's roles and gender relations into nearly every household, which makes alternative self-concepts for women imaginable.

Given these circumstances, did an agency of women in public develop during the last decades? To find this out, I first had a look at the micro-politics of everyday gender relations, assuming this to be a significant indicator for the broadening of the political agency of women in general as without a change in the life-world setup, an empowerment of women in 'formal politics' will hardly be sustainable. (Herewith, I also followed the approach of Foucault and Gramsci, who consider social institutions such as the family and practices such as sexuality the places where subjects are 'educated' and 'governed' to do what is 'desirable'.) During my field research in 2009 and 2010, I encountered five areas of everyday gender relations that seem significant to give an answer to the question of female agency: (1) the distribution of household chores and child raising, (2) the presence of women in public, especially for leisure purposes, and the way they are expected to dress in public, (3) courtship rules, (4) decisions regarding contraception, birth control and sex frequency (women asserting the right to their own body), and, finally, (5) 'daring' to end an abusive or even a disenchanting relationship or marriage.

In all five areas, it can be said that changes have occurred, although they seem to be minuscule especially in regard to contraception decisions: Still 80 percent of Filipino men have never used a condom, and 58 percent have never used any other contraceptive (Health Management and Research Group Foundation [HMRG] Inc., 2009, p. 39).[8] Likewise, the redistribution of household chores and child raising only happens at a snail's pace, mainly where women become the main breadwinner, no

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8 Even a lot of women think that "condom use interferes with the future-orientated view of a sexual partner, with condoms signifying a lack of fidelity and intruding into intimate settings as decidedly unromantic" (Ellwood-Clayton, 2006, p. 15). She comes to the conclusion that "negotiating safe sex is culturally incongruous to Maria Clara norms of femininity [which] means that women defer to boyfriends, and later to husbands, in their sexual decision-making" (Ellwood-Clayton, 2006, p. 23).

other woman is at hand to take over, and husbands agree to take care of the children and, to a lesser extent, of the household. Again, women have come to terms with this reversal of roles (Pingol, 2001; surveys by the author in 2009).[9]

Courtship rules and the access of women to leisure space may have changed most (reflecting amongst other things the generational causation of changing gender relations), although this again is more strongly pronounced in an urban setting. Frowning upon women going out at night (often without a male companion but nearly always with female companions) has decreased, as long as 'she' is not yet married. (It seems that the expectation that women 'stay at home' as soon as they are married is still predominant.) Only young women, for example, can be seen wearing spaghetti straps. And (urban) women are no longer required to play *pakipot* (hard to get) once a male courts her. At times, she actually has to show assertiveness for courting to proceed. However, to make the first move when attracted by a man would only be dared by a very few women, even if they no longer submitted to the underlying gender ideology and perceived it as symbolic violence. "The Filipino men are not ready for that and most would consider you to be cheap girl and desperately seeking ... We cannot afford to be commented on like that; it would be shameful", as respondents said during a focus group discussion (Reese, 2009). The patriarchal gaze seems hard to escape or to resist, just like Foucault's *panopticon*. So most women can only act to the extent of being *pahiwatig*, hinting their interest in a man by nonverbal signs or verbal goofing around ('*joke lang*' as one often says in the Philippines). Even 'Manila girls', who are seen to be the most progressive in their behaviour, consider it to be inevitable to comply with the dominant sexual conservatism (dubbed 'family values' in the Philippines) and the passivity it ascribes to women in order not to lose their respectability.

Finally, more women than ever are putting an end to abusive and violent relationships and marriages instead of staying in them. And this is despite the fact that separated wives are often treated as second-class women (Ellwood-Clayton, 2006, p. 6). While women often think "good for you" and are even somewhat envious, men consider them fair game, as they "have been used already", so they are placing

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9 Several women are reluctant in handing over household chores to their partners, as they do not meet their standards in exercising them. Even more, they hesitate to entrust their children to their husbands, especially if they are still young. Activists jokingly call this behaviour 'obsessive-compulsive *disease*' (the 'D' in OCD actually stands for '*disorder*') and observe it amongst themselves as well (Reese, 2009).

themselves more at risk of experiencing unwelcome advances and harassment (personal communication, in Reese 2009).

Not only men but also women, above all the mothers-in-law (Pingol, 2001), react when women depart from traditional behaviour and enter the public space. "My [mother] in law is my number one critic", as one female trade unionist said (Reese, 2009).

Formal Politics and Gender in the Philippines

Traditionally, women have mainly appeared in the political sphere as supporters of their male kin – their sons, brothers, or fathers, but especially their husbands. Wives are usually "partners in politics" (Roces, 1998, p. 7), running the charity work, organising community projects, and sharing the political work of their politician husbands. Roces even assumes that "an active wife or a female kin was generally necessary for the success of the male politician" (Roces, 1998, p. 30). But even if wives function as the politicians' "number one advisor" (Gina de Venecia, the wife of ex-speaker Jose de Venecia, in Roces, 1998, p. 54), they are exercising these tasks informally and consider themselves in a role where they 'just help out'. This supportive role still seems to be the prevalent one that women occupy today, not only in the sphere of institutional politics but within civil society as well (see below).

However, somewhat in contradiction of this, one also finds more women directly involved in (formal) politics. The terms of two women presidents have normalised the political activity of women (for more on Arroyo and Aquino, see Veneracion, 2009).[10] Being formally politically active – although still the exception – has become a role for women which is tolerated by more and more men and seen as a positive role model by women. Yet, women have to be mindful not to create the impression that they are overpowering or upstaging men and putting them down or 'polluting the minds of women', an apprehension feminists of the first generation were considered to have triggered.[11] It seems that the model of women speaking up and acting in public

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10 Both women came to presidency in times of crises, times in which women are called to fix – just like Germany's Angela Merkel in 1998. "It seems that in crisis, there seems to be a natural course of action to take women to lead. There is a general sentiment that they can be trusted (*mapagkatiwalaan*)", as Jun Naraval observes (Reese, 2009). But usually when the crisis is over, women feel the pressure from men to hand power back to them.

11 This correlates with the experience of activists when conducting gender sensitivity training. These only lead to lasting changes within gender relations when such training is conducted for men as well. Otherwise, "even if trained

has become possible, although it still leads to irritation and even negative feedback. They are still reminded "You cannot shut up and listen" (personal communication, in Reese, 2009).

Furthermore, the public commitment of women is often only feasible because of the "*yaya* sisterhood", as Coronel (2005) calls the division of labour between "madam and maid" (Young, 1999). Where women lack the time to shoulder the double load of family and job, rarely men and husbands step into the breach (even if they are underemployed or unemployed). Better-off households employ women from the lower classes as domestic workers or nannies (*yaya*); in poor households, usually other female relatives fulfil this role. This is true for 'emancipated households' as well, although one can find a few cases of househusbands in this context.[12]

As mentioned before, many women are involved in politics, but have been mainly elected or appointed into these positions not because of (or even despite) their being women but because of kinship ties (next to being famous actresses or beauty queens). Most of them come from powerful families, and many of them took over a post from a male relative who can no longer run due to term restrictions. This is one expression of how families rule political affairs (a feudal trait of politics) not individuals. Wives and female kin get identified with the incumbent male (partly as they acted as supporters before), so that they appear to be their alter ego and natural successors in office. This also implies that they have to pursue the interests of their clan first and are less geared towards a pro-women agenda dissolving patriarchal structures, putting an end to the socio-economic and cultural discrimination of women, or bringing more women into the corridors of power.

Women who leave their role of a 'supporter' within the framework of informal politics 'behind the scenes' and enter the 'open transcript' (Scott, 1990) of the public arena then usually make use of female scripts. They act the role of mothers, be it as caretakers, as guardians of morality, or as martyrs for the greater good. While the 'hard issues' and influential committees are still taken care of by men, women

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and enlightened, women go home and they submit to the decisions of the male", a (male) gender trainer told me, as men insist on their role as the head of the family and the women attach more importance to peace in the family than to their own equality. "It is very difficult to empower women if you leave the men behind" (Reese, 2009; cf. HMRG, 2009, for more on gender sensitivity training for men).

12 Men who take over traditional female roles or work in all-women environments all report to have gone through a time of adjusting to these unfamiliar roles, and also to get used to self-confident, outspoken, and assertive women cracking lots of 'green' jokes (Reese, 2009; on househusbands, cf. Pingol, 2001).

politicians are given the responsibility for 'female issues' like welfare, health, children, housing, beautification, orderliness, and cleanliness (and as a 'logical extension of that', environmental issues [Roces, 1998, p. 55]), thereby extending their caretaker role to the 'national family', although after 1986, some women were also assigned to fields like diplomacy, economics, and law.

Even women activists believe that women can be a cure for 'dirty politics' (inhabited by *trapos*, traditional politicians a.k.a. 'dirty rugs'), 'cleaning' it through moral behaviour by being more human and nurturing and emphasising negotiations and dialogue (Reese, 2009), even if the 'dirtiness of politics' is an argument exploited to keep women out of politics because it could be considered to defile their purity.

Women activists and politicians often capitalise on feminine assets and make use of 'womanly wiles'. They strategically use a soft (but persistent) tone, do not openly antagonise, and charm to get the necessary resources for their projects, or display *lambing-lambing* (*lambing*, meaning 'to fondle'), act *cariñoso* (affectionate) to 'convince' their husband or a male colleague of their submissiveness. They are also assigned roles by male leadership where they are expected as women to be more successful than men (in the case of protest politics for instance, deceiving the authorities with female wiles). However, this is done in the expectation that these women can be 'managed' and act the way the male leaders advise.

This style of female politicking is often singled out, but it is not the only style that can be observed. The anthropologist Michael Tan (2009) has isolated different "*Pinay* [leadership] archetypes": next to the *tita* (aunt) style, which most resembles the moral mother type and has been embodied by former president Corazon Aquino, he discovered the *ate* (strict oldest sister) archetype in former president Macapagal-Arroyo's way of leadership. Arroyo's (self-declared) framework was that of a "strong republic" (*matatag na republika*), which makes Veneracion (2009, p. 112) call her an "Iron Lady", and activists consider her to be "only woman in physical but macho in action" (Reese, 2009). Arroyo has been under harsh attack for years, and this again has a gender aspect only because she acts 'macho', so she can be attacked and criticised like a man. Finally, Tan distinguishes the *madam* type, which he finds in Imelda Marcos, "for whom life is one big continuing performance, with the Imeldas as director, producer and leading actress" (Tan, 2009).

There might even be more than these three archetypes mentioned by Tan: The

manang (old spinster) or *amazon* type personified by senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, very vocal and critical and not only harsh but pitiless and insulting at times, a woman who can 'take on' men. Another is the *lola* type, a type which is very motherly but decisive and ruling at the same time and "whom you should not answer back" (one respondent in Reese, 2009). Still another is Grace Padaca, provincial governor of Isabela from 2004 to 2010. She may belong to a further group, the moral guardian, which is rather situated in the extra-institutional opposition and has been most significantly embodied in the nuns of the anti-Marcos dictatorship struggle (discussed in the next section).

The sense of this enumeration at this point is only to illustrate that the mother archetype is not the only one at hand for women entering formal politics. But most of the mentioned female politicians not (dominantly) performing the mother archetype perform their role within the logic on female politics as well or, like Macapagal-Arroyo at times, "reinvent" (Roces, 1998, p. 112) themselves and resort to female images to improve their chances.

Norms and Realities: Gender and the Progressive Forces
Origins of Feminism in the Philippines

Feminism as a social movement in the Philippines is a rather young and still a peripheral phenomenon. Within families, the church, the media, and the educational system, the traditional gender setup is still largely reproduced. According to my observations, 'liberated women' are usually understood as ones who are 'cheap' and 'easy to get'. "Patriarchal ideology is so strong that a counter-hegemonic movement can only hope to develop pockets of resistance, even within the progressive movement" (Raquiza, 1997, p. 181). Many women advocating feminist concerns therefore feel uneasy about being named 'feminists' and rather speak of themselves as 'woman rights activists' (cf. Roces, 2010, for parallels all over Asia).

The times of martial law altered the images of women in public and female power with two new images evolving: the militant nun and the woman warrior within the armed/national democratic (ND) anti-dictatorship struggle. While the first was formative for the public image, the latter stayed marginal (cf. Roces, 1998).

The radical nuns put their life at risk, protected men who were victimised by martial law, political prisoners, workers on strike, and indigenous people who were in danger of losing their ancestral domain (Roces, 1998, p. 123). This model became especially graphic during EDSA I, also known as the 'Rosary Revolution', when nuns 'armed' solely with rosaries confronted the military. The non-violent nuns were exercising moral power, suffering and sacrificing themselves for the greater good. But they did not claim formal power. (I know of no nun who turned politician, unlike former priests who populate the political ranks.) The parallels to the anti-dictatorship struggles in Latin America are stunning. As in the case there, one may understand the image of the militant nun as a 'politicisation of motherhood' (Kron, 2008).

Most militant nuns turn out to be very conservative in gender and reproductive matters, as I witnessed, but again, it has been nuns who acted as the ferment of feminism. A nun (Sister Mary John Mananzan) founded the first academic Woman's centre at St Scholastica College, facilitated the founding of the political Woman's networks PILIPINA and GABRIELA, and up to now has been one of the key figures of radical feminism in the Philippines. The militant nuns can be considered the cradle of feminism in the Philippines, being the first and, still to today, the most confident in labelling themselves 'feminists' (Roces, 1998, p.133). But at the same time, they refrained from claiming official/formal power.

Women in Civil Society

Feminist issues and organisations taking on a feminist agenda only acquired full priority in 1986 after the end of the anti-dictatorship struggle and its more seemingly pressing issues, as before "tensions between feminism and nationalism prevented any sophisticated theorising of feminism and its adaptation to the Philippine cultural matrix" (Roces, 1998, p. 148). Nowadays, the presence of women and women's groups in social movements, civil society, and people's organisations is manifold because of the global departure of feminism in the last decades, the growing pressure of women within progressive movements to extend the paradigm of liberation and empowerment to the sphere of gender relations, the grassroots women's quest for self-determination and, last but not least, the top-down influence of government and (international) funding agencies promoting gender issues. Can we observe that this

does not only lead to much 'gender talk' but to 'walking this talk' as well?

On the one hand, the (often dominant) participation of women in civil society goes beyond the membership in women's (rights) groups, especially extending to groups dealing with traditional women's issues like health, children or consumer issues. But men usually dominate organisations with mixed gender membership, even if most members are women. In mixed gender discussions, usually men dominate the talk, while women most of the time keep low key and only listen. They would only speak up and 'push the wall' when 'female issues' come up.[13]

In Philippine NGOs and people's organisations, above-average men are occupying symbolically prized positions such as president, while women execute the labour-intensive tasks. They are secretaries, treasurers, or bookkeepers, as well as in charge of cooking, catering, and the decoration committee. Men make decisions, while women put them into effect. Gender-sensitivity training for women – and nowadays even for men – has only been able to change this slowly.

And where women assert leadership positions in civil society organisations (CSOs), they mainly have a middle- and upper-class background, even within 'people-oriented' leftist movements, while the staff consists mainly of lower-income professionals with a middle-class and petty bourgeois background. The informal working class is largely excluded from active participation in CSOs, and if men and women from lower classes are to be found, then they act mainly as clerks, caretakers, and street workers, or simply as part of the 'warm bodies' (as the participants of mass rallies are called in the Philippines) and the grassroots of the CSOs. The number of persons with underclass origin that have made careers within civil society is very limited despite the pro-poor rhetoric that dominates civil society discourse. Women from the lower echelons of society feel treated in a disrespectful way by middle-class people, academics, and intellectuals. "Even if we do not hear them say these things [downgrading terms] we feel it … They are smiling, but they put the alcohol [cleaning their hands]" (Women Trade Unionists, personal communication, in Reese, 2009).

Gender issues are still often considered to be 'side contradictions' in progressive circles, with men withdrawing once these are raised in discussions – just like in the times of the anti-Marcos struggle, when the objectives of feminism were perceived to

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13 This is a reason why many women's rights activists do insist on 'all-women spaces', as they consider them to be an arena where women can develop assertiveness and leadership skills, which they finally can also use to 'voice out' in mixed gender settings even if this would mean entering into a conflict (Reese, 2009).

be in conflict with the aim of national liberation and social revolution, and the (male) leadership of the liberation movement gave the issues of social injustice and class struggle priority. Within the 'National Democrats', GABRIELA tried to strike a balance between socialist and feminist ends, but met widespread reservations, especially amongst the male cadre, as they were accused of being divisive. They supported the issue of violence against women, an issue that was prevalent within 'politically mobilised' households as well.

Conclusion

While there has been a massive entry of women into the public sphere (labour, politics, and leisure space), the gender superstructure has remained stable within the traditional patriarchal setup. Women in the public sphere therefore still have to be more open and forthright in their assertion to be there, even though it is still not really considered their place. Women activists experience that some officials would rather listen to men than to women when certain concerns are ventilated, and that officials at times are turned off if women just put facts on the table, not playing on the 'women's keyboard' and using the tools of informal politics.

Women's rights activists and women's citizenship rights still have a long way to go. Reproductive rights are still contested by the Catholic hierarchy, even if the reproductive health bill finds large support amongst the populace (which in Western terms is still rather conservative), with 78 percent supporting it and only nine percent opposing it (Mangahas, 2009) – or are 'still working on it', as rural women activists once responded when I asked them how they struggle free from the powerful culture of traditional gender relations. Women's presence in the public sphere is more accepted nowadays but still contested.

So, a rollback is hardly to be expected, even if the society's economic dependency on women makes their working indispensable. Sooner or later, this tension between social reality and ideological expectations may fracture and thereby weaken the patriarchal superstructure.

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Self-identified Feminists Among Gender Activists and Scholars at Indonesian Universities

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Being a self-identified feminist is controversial among women's rights activists and scholars. This relates to different interpretations of and positive and negative associations with the term 'feminist' in society. The research presented here discusses the different 'feminist' identities and other labels among activists and scholars at Indonesian universities and explores what 'feminist' means for them. Respondents come from Pusat Studi Wanita *(Centres for Women's Studies) or* Pusat Studi Gender *(Centres for Gender Studies) at six universities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Many respondents acknowledge that Western feminists are able to raise awareness of gender issues, strengthen feminist identity, and build up faith in Islam. The paper, however, also addresses the question of why some reject the 'feminist' label.*

Keywords: *Indonesia, Islamic Feminism, Feminist Identity, Women Studies, Gender Studies*

Die Selbstidentifikation als FeministIn ist unter FrauenrechtsaktivistInnen und WissenschafterInnen ein kontroverses Thema. In erster Linie liegt dies wohl an unterschiedlichen Interpretationen und positiven wie auch negativen Assoziationen die geläufigerweise mit dem Begriff „FeministIn" verbunden sind. Die hier präsentierte Forschung untersucht wie sich AktivistInnen und WissenschafterInnen an indonesischen Universitäten innerhalb oder gegenüber dem Begriff Feminismus selbst verorten und analysiert die den jeweiligen Inhalt und die Bedeutung, welche der Begriffs „FeministIn" für die befragten Personen einnimt. Die Datenerhebung erfolgte an Pusat Studi Wanita *(Zentren für Frauenforschung) bzw.* Pusat Studi Gender *(Zentren für Genderforschung) sechs verschiedener indonesischer Universitäten in Yogyakarta. Viele Befragte unterstreichen die Bedeutung westlicher FeministInnen für die Bewusstseinschaffung für geschlechtsspezifische Probleme, für die Stärkung feministischer Identität sowie islamischen Glaubens. Diese Untersuchung behandelt jedoch auch gezielt die Frage, warum der Begriff „FeministIn" widerum von anderen abgelehnt wird.*

Schlagworte: *Indonesien, Islamischer Feminismus, Feministische Identität, Frauenforschung, Genderforschung*

Women and Gender Studies in Indonesia[2]

The women's movement in Indonesia has a long history, an early example being Raden Ayu Kartini.[3] More than 70 women's organisations, such as *Putri Merdeka, Isteri Sedar, 'Aisyiyah, Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia Putri, Muslimat, Keutamaan Istri, Pawijatan Wanito*, followed (Qibtiyah, 2009). However, the appearance of a movement of Indonesian Muslim women that acknowledges and adopts some Western ideas about feminism in a broader movement is a quite recent development. In Indonesia, the 1990s were an important decade for Muslim women because new forums, new organisations, and new Islamic books with more liberating ideas for women were launched in this period. Some books were concerned with the topic 'gender equality', for example *Women in Islam* by Fateema Mernissi and *Women in the Qur'an* by Amina Wadud, were published in Bahasa Indonesia in 1994 by Pustaka Bandung. In the same year, *Ulumul Qur'an* (Qur'an, 1994a; 1994b), a prestigious Islamic Journal in Indonesia, published a special edition on women's rights issues, feminism, Islamic feminism, and anti-feminism. Women activists had an opportunity to read and discuss directly with some prominent Islamic feminists from other parts of the Islamic world, such as Asghar Ali Engineer, Rifat Hasan, and Amina Wadud (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003). According to Arimbi (2006), the 1990s witnessed the shift from 'State *Ibuism*'[4] to a feminist discourse in Indonesia, including Islamic feminism, which challenges patriarchal culture, furthers equality and justice for women as an expression of her or his Islamic faith that is based on the Islamic texts (the Qur'an and Hadith), and promotes a happy and democratic family (*mawadah, warahmah*, and *maslahah*).

During the late 1980s, the government of Indonesia established *Pusat Studi Wanita* ('Centres for Women's Studies' or PSW) at prominent universities across the country as a way of supporting the government policy of women's empowerment and gender equality (Burhanudin & Fathurahman, 2004; Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan Republik Indonesia, 2004). One of PSW's functions is to help the process of developing

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2 I would like to thank all my supervisors, Dr Julia D. Howell, Dr Catherine Burn, and John Butcher, who have helped me through this arduous task. Their useful guidance and brilliant ideas as well as their spirit and support gave me confidence to write this paper. Many thanks as well to all respondents for their insightful ideas, without which this research would not have been successful.

3 Many sources mention RA Kartini as the first Indonesian feminist.

4 The New Order government of former President Suharto (1968-1998) started promoting 'State *Ibuism*': the roles of wife and mother (*ibu*) were mandated for women and government guidelines for those roles were implemented nationally.

methodologies and theoretical foundations for research with women (Committee on Women's Studies in Asia, 1995). According to Sadli (2010), the main objective of these centres is to provide research data on women's issues such as women's rights and women's needs relevant to specific provinces. She asserts that it is good to have PSW and *Pusat Studi Gender* ('Centres for Gender Studies' or PSG) for several reasons:

> *They constitute an awareness raising process for decision makers at ail [all] levels of which majority are men. In particular they help to raise their awareness that women's issues should be given adequate attention in program development, and that women should be part of the decision making process in developing these programs … adequate funds should be allocated in the provincial budget to do research on women and further on to develop relevant programs for women. These centres are therefore also good vehicles to stimulate university-government-community partnership (Sadli, 2010, p. 366).*

Looking at the historical development of the role of PSW, it seems that in the early decades they acted more as New Order government tools focusing on maintaining traditional gender roles.[5] From 2000, particularly after the launching of new forums, new organisations, and new Islamic books that redefined women and gender roles, some PSW in Islamic universities began to reformulate some programs that promoted women's interests, such as challenging patriarchal culture and providing new egalitarian interpretations on gender in Islam. These centres conducted research on 'misogynist' Islamic texts, by implementing historical and hermeneutics approaches[6] to get the relevant meaning of the texts and reformulate the egalitarian interpretations. They published these new egalitarian interpretations and used them as important references in their training for Islamic leaders and judges.

In 2000, the Indonesian government led by Abdurrahman Wahid made an important contribution to the gender equality movement by issuing a Presidential Instruction (*Inpres* No. 9/2000) on 'Gender Mainstreaming into National Development'.[7] This policy had a significant impact on the development of PSW in terms of subsequent female participation in education and other institutions. For instance, Kull (2009)

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5 Some programs were based on gender stereotype, such as giving sewing machines and cooking utilities to women, and holding cooking competitions for women.

6 The historical approach considers the influences of place and time on the revelation and recording of texts, understanding them as shaped by the social, cultural, and geographical conditions. It follows the principle of fallibility of human knowledge (Abdullah, 2002). The hermeneutic approach focuses on three aspects of the text: the context in which the text was written, the grammatical composition of the text, and the world-view of the text (Amina, 1999).

7 Gender mainstreaming is a major strategy to ensure that women and men gain equal access to, and participate equally in, the benefits of development. This instruction applies to all the ministries, the armed forces, the police force, the High Court, the heads of local governments and the heads of all other governmental agencies. It aims to mainstream gender in the planning, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all national development programmes (Surbakti, 2002).

found that the number of female students enrolling in higher Islamic education has continuously increased for several decades, and currently female enrolments often constitute up to 50 percent of the students at these institutions. The number of females as postgraduate students, researchers, and teachers across all educational levels has also increased.

Looking at the attitudes and identities of the members of PSW is one way to research how widespread feminist identification in Indonesia is now and what feminism means to the Indonesians. PSW members are considered important actors in the area of gender equality in Indonesian academia; for example, some of them act as cultural brokers, crucial opinion makers, and academic multipliers, and are at the forefront of introducing feminist writings from the West, the Middle East, and Asia. They are considered agents of change by spreading information, research findings, and new interpretations about women's rights in Islam throughout Indonesian Muslim society, both in academia and at the grassroots level (Jamhari & Ropi, 2003). Since 2002, PSW IAIN/UIN Yogyakarta has been considered one of Indonesia's most active Islamic research institutions on Islam and gender (Doorn-Harder, 2006).

One important issue for both gender activists and feminist scholars is identity. 'Feminist' as a term of identity has been more controversial than the term 'feminism'. Most authors of Islamic feminism literature adamantly rejected being labelled as 'Islamic feminists' (Badran, 2008). Being a self-identified feminist is controversial among women's activists both in the West and the East. This includes Indonesian feminists. In the Western context, some young generation 'third wave' women activists are reluctant to identify themselves as 'feminist', stating that "I am not a feminist but ..." (Caro & Fox, 2008; Gromisch, 2009). In the Indonesian context, the reluctance to identify as a 'feminist' stems from the stigma attached to the feminist label: 'feminists' are linked to either leftist (communist) or liberal tendencies (Suryakusuma, 2004; Wieringa, 2002) that allegedly promote individualism, selfishness, and 'immoral' behaviour such as premarital sex (Doorn-Harder, 2006). Identifying as a 'feminist' is also regarded as being anti-men, and sympathetic to lesbianism (Sadli, 2002). In addition, a feminist is often seen as someone who is against female natural attributes (*kodrat*[8]) and is anti-male, who destroys Islamic principle (*aqidah*), rebels

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8 *Kodrat* is a power; the ability or capacity to do a particular thing; aptitude; everything that men and women have that have been determined by God and that humankind cannot change or reject.

against domestic tasks, and even challenges Islamic law (*syariah*). Because of these negative associations, some Indonesian women's organisation members make the disclaimer that "even though we struggle for women's rights, we are not feminists" (Suryakusuma, 2004, p. 271).

The debate over feminist identity also comes from the notion of compatibility between feminism and Islam. The debate is based on the historical polemic between the Islamic world and the West, between Islam and so-called Christianity-colonialists, a frequent Muslim assumption that colonialists were usually from the West and Christian (Safi, 2003). There are two positions taken by people engaged in the debate.

1. The first group argues that Islam lies on the line of faith, while feminism is a secular term; therefore Islam and feminism are not compatible. Hammed Shahidin (as cited in Moghadam, 2002; Mojab, 2001) points out that 'Islamic feminism' is problematical and an oxymoron in the Islamic world. Furthermore, this group argues that Muslims do not need to import Western terms or values into Islamic society, since Muslims have their own religious texts that are more relevant and culturally appropriate than those of the West.

2. The second group asserts that Islam and feminism are harmonious. Contemporary scholars who are in favour of the term 'Islamic feminism', such as Laila Ahmed, Riffat Hassan, and Fatima Mernisi, argue that feminism fits into Islam. According to Moghadam (2002), Islam does not inherently contradict feminism because Islam values the promotion of equality between men and women, although in practice this principle has been misused in order to justify the subordination of women. Majid (1998) also asserts that Islam and feminism are not necessarily two opposing terms or contesting with each other. Majid criticises those who limit the term 'Islamic' to a pure religious belief.

From these debates are generated the self-identity among women activists in Indonesia. According to Doorn-Harder (2006), the younger Indonesian women are more comfortable being called feminists than the older generation. One of the older generation activists, Saparinah Sadli, says that "I am reluctant to use Indonesian feminism because I am not sure that we have developed an Indonesian theory of

feminism" (Sadli, 2002). However, she calls Musda Mulia an Indonesian Islamic feminist (Mulia, 2005).

Another impact of the debate is on self-identified feminists: whether they identify themselves as 'Islamic feminists' or 'Muslim feminists'. According to Cooke (2001), 'Islamic' is more relevant than Muslim, because 'Islamic' means there is an Islamic tradition of feminism whereas Muslim feminism just refers to feminists who embrace Islam but who do not necessarily practise the Islamic tradition. Furthermore, Cooke describes an Islamic as

a particular kind of self positioning that will then inform the speech, the action, the writing, or the way of life adopted by someone who is committed to questioning Islamic epistemology as an expansion of their faith position and not a rejection of it (Cooke, 2001, p. 61).

This paper shows the prevalence of controversial 'feminist' identity among Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities based on quantitative and qualitative data. It also reveals various understandings they have about Western feminists and feminism. The discussion on feminist identity presents the percentages of (1) people who claim to have or dispute having a feminist identity, (2) the different feminist identities among respondents at the public and Islamic universities, and (3) the different feminist identities among the male and female respondents. Furthermore, in the feminist identity section, I explore what 'feminist' means for both people who identify themselves as 'feminist' and for those who do not, and for the latter, why they reject that identity. I also seek out what are the most and the least popular preferred labels for those two groups. The second section explores the various understandings of Western feminists' ideas among Muslim gender activists and scholars in the Indonesian universities surveyed. I show which Western feminist ideas have been incorporated into Muslim gender activists' understanding, and show which ones have not been and why some members of PSW and PSG disagree with these ideas.

In this paper I argue that self-identifying as 'feminist' among Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities has been influenced by the ways of understanding the term 'feminist', which has both positive and negative connotations in Indonesian society. Furthermore, I will show that Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities have a range of understandings about Western

feminist ideas which can be adapted to the Indonesian context. Most hold that universal values such as gender equality, gender justice, and the recognition of women as equal human beings are grounded in the Islamic tradition (Quran and Hadith) and in local tradition. Those values are not imported from Western feminists. However, some respondents acknowledged that Western feminist concepts and strategies have influenced their views, their thoughts, and their strategies for dealing with gender issues in Indonesia.

The research was conducted through a case study involving PSW and PSG at six universities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Three of them are Islamic: UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesian Islamic University (UII), and Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta (UMY). Three of them are public universities: Gadjah Mada University (UGM), the State University of Yogyakarta (UNY), and the University of National Development (UPN). The total number of respondents is 165, including 70 males and 95 females. 105 are from Islamic universities and 60 are from public universities. All respondents have been involved in PSW or PSG and all self-identify as Muslims. In-depth interviews were conducted with 25 respondents across all categories. This paper uses pseudonyms to ensure the confidentiality of all respondents.

Research Findings on Feminist Identity

One of the important issues among Indonesian Muslim feminists is that of identity. Although all respondents of my study are gender activists or people who are concerned with women or gender issues, not all of them identify themselves as 'feminists'. Figure 1 illustrates that the overall percentage of respondents who are self-identified 'feminists' is lower than that of those self-identified 'non-feminists'. However, an analysis based on sex shows that the percentage of male respondents who are self-identified 'feminists' is slightly higher (22 percent) than those who are self-identified 'non-feminists' (21 percent). Conversely, the share of female respondents who are self-identified 'feminists' is significantly lower (22 percent) than the share of those self-identified 'non-feminists' (35 percent). This is an interesting finding because feminism mostly deals with women's issues. It was predicted that generally more women would identify themselves as 'feminists' than men, but in this research finding this is not the case.

Figure 1: Respondents by Sex and Identity

n=165

| | | Female | | |
| Self-Identified Feminist |
| 22% | 21% | 35% | 22% |
| | Male | | Self-Identified Non-Feminist |

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Source: Own Compilation

The reason why more women than men did not identify themselves as 'feminists' could be related to the connotation of the term 'feminist'. This term is usually attached to women rather than to men, and implies someone who is against women's *kodrat*, who is a man-hater, who wants to dominate men, and who accepts lesbianism. Therefore, if a woman labels herself as a 'feminist', she would be seen to possess those negative attributes held by certain members in the society. Conversely, those negative associations will not attach to men. In other words, self-identification as 'feminist' implies a higher risk for women than for men in Indonesian society.

Figure 1 also presents that males and females form the same proportion of the total of self-identified feminists (22 percent). These findings help us to understand how both male and female activists have become involved in gender and feminist activism in Indonesia (cf. Nuruzzaman, 2005). They also help us to understand the fact that male core members have been involved in all six selected PSW and PSG since their establishment.

Another argument is that the social structure in traditional Indonesian communities is bilateral and this local kinship may shape contemporary values. From my literature review, it is evident that the position of women has been relatively elevated, with a high status (Atkinson & Errington, 1990; Goody, 1976). Some of the women held leading positions in their societies. Javanese women have enjoyed more freedom to venture into public space than their sisters in Arab countries (Arimbi, 2006; White,

2006) and have had more rights than some African women (Goody, 1976). In some Arab countries women have not been allowed to go out and drive a car by themselves; most Indonesian women have been free to drive and go everywhere by themselves. In terms of inheritance, Indonesian women have been able to inherit land and other property; however, certain African women have been able to inherit only houses and other property but not land, since production from the fields is reserved for male offspring (Goody, 1976).

Using an 'Independent Samples T Test' analysis, my research shows that being affiliated with Islamic rather than public universities does not affect self-identification as 'feminist'. Table 1 below illustrates the significance (2-tailed) score as .072 and .069 (*p*>.000), which means that there is no significant difference between those who self-identified as 'feminist' in Islamic and public universities.

Table 1: Respondents' Affiliation With Islamic or Public University								
	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-Test for Equality of Means					
							95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
TYPE OF UNI — Equal Variances Assumed	12.734	.000	-1.814	163	.072	-.1362	.07511	-.28455	.01207
Equal Variances Not Assumed			-1.832	159.555	.069	-.1362	.07436	-.28310	.01062

Source: Own Compilation

Research shows that the type of university is not the determinant social factor for feminist identity. It can be perceived that in the Indonesian context, the public and Islamic university backgrounds do not necessarily influence someone's religiosity. Around 71 percent of female respondents from public universities also wear a *hijab* as a symbol of Islamic identity and most of the respondents have been engaged in Islamic women's organisations such as *'Aisyiyah*, *Nasyiatul 'Aisyiyah*, or *Muslimat*. Many male respondents from public universities also have been involved in *Muhammadiyah* or *Nahdatul Ulama*. Therefore, Islamic and public university staff are considerably similar in their religiosity.

The sex of the respondents does not differentiate self-identification as 'feminist' and 'non-feminist'. Table 2 clearly shows that the significance (2-tailed) scores are .112 and .114 (p>.000), meaning that there is no significant difference between feminist identification and sex.

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-Test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
SEX	Equal Variances Assumed	5.225	.024	-1.598	163	.112	-.1236	.07734	-.27630	.02913
	Equal Variances Not Assumed			-1.591	151.965	.114	-.1236	.07767	-.27703	.02986

Table 2: Respondents' Sex

Source: Own Compilation

The finding that the sex of respondents does not associate with self-identification as 'feminist' could be perceived as related to the heavily bilateral social structure of traditional Indonesian communities. This helps us to understand Jayawardena's observation that Third World countries, including Indonesia, "have had a history of active and militant feminism, as well as early movements for women's emancipation, supported by women and men reformers" (Jayawardena, 1982, p. v).

Respondents who identify themselves as 'feminist' are predominantly those who have considerable knowledge of feminism, have less prejudice toward the term 'feminism', and have a more progressive approach[9] to gender in Islam. This means that the influential aspect of gender awareness is not the level of education in general, but rather the knowledge of gender issues or feminism due to special interests, trainings, or workshops. In fact, although in society there are many people who have graduated from a higher education institution and hold the title of Master or Doctor, if they have never learnt about or studied gender and feminism, they will usually continue to have a gender-biased perspective.

9 Progressive Muslims have produced a growing body of literature that re-examines Islamic tradition and addresses pluralism and gender issues at both a theoretical and a practical level. They argue that a fresh interpretation of Islamic sources and a reformulation of Islam is urgently needed (Esposito, 1998).

Self-Understanding of Indonesian Gender Activists and Scholars

There are various understandings of the term 'feminist' among the respondents. The group of self-identified feminists obviously do not associate a negative understanding with the term 'feminist'. However, they define the term in a diverse way. Respondents who do not identify as 'feminists' explain that there are two meanings of the term 'feminist', one being negative, the other being positive.

For example, according to Dullah, a self-identified feminist, "a feminist is someone who has awareness that there is inequality experienced by women and who has notion that women are human beings" (Dullah, personal communication, 8 February 2010). Nova defines a feminist as "someone who has an intention to give rooms for marginalised groups, including for women by having either direct or indirect activities" (Nova, personal communication, 24 February 2010). Maman, a self-identified non-feminist, expresses his view that the different treatment between the sexes is part of the 'natural order', and therefore it is unproblematic:

> *I see that the position between men and women is natural, so for me that should be just like that … Treat men and women proportionally without making the ideas [gender relationship] an ideology. This is my understanding [about the gender relationship] that is grounded from my Islamic teaching … I fell that my family and neighbourhood do not find any problem about this issue (Maman, personal communication, 5 May 2010).*

Furthermore, according to some self-identified feminists, 'feminist' does not simply imply the awareness that women have capabilities, rights, and goals just as men do, it should also be followed by actions such as empowerment for themselves and others. Also a 'feminist' is not necessarily someone who participates in demonstrations or joins women's NGOs. Someone who is concerned about gender equality and women's issues through teaching or publishing his or her academic work is also a feminist. An example for this notion is presented by Gizela:

> *A feminist is someone who is aware of inequality and endeavours to empower her or himself and others … A feminist is not necessarily an activist or … goes down to the street. A philosopher who gives an egalitarian interpretation between men and women is also a feminist (Gizela, personal communication, 5 May 2010).*

In contrast, according to some self-identified non-feminists, a 'feminist' is someone

who struggles for gender equality, has a deep concern and knowledge of women's issues, and joins women's NGOs. As Dama and Hera said:

> *I don't want to call myself a 'feminist', because … in my understanding a 'feminist' is someone who really has a deep knowledge on those issues … So someone can be called a 'feminist' if she or he really gets involved not only just sympathetic … (Dama, personal communication, 12 June 2010)*

> *I only write something … that relates to feminist thought … I want to be a feminist but not yet … A feminist struggles in the NGO or doing real research … because I have ever conducted research [about women and economic] and I was disappointed about the result, so I was like a failed feminist (Hera, personal communication, 1 June 2010).*

In addition, according to Sita, 'feminist' depends on a person's mindset, neither being a man or woman. Therefore, a man can be a 'feminist'. Although there is an idea of a women's way of knowing,[10] meaning that only women have direct experience of what it means to be a woman, this does not mean that men cannot help to solve women's problems (Sita, personal communication, 3 June 3 2010). A similar idea is presented by Tria, a self-identified feminist:

> *A feminist for me can be a man or a woman who sees inequality relationship between men and women and there is an effort to deal with that inequality problem … For me, I believe that actually men also feel oppression … for example, the idea that to be a head of family, the husband has to have more income than the wife (Tria, personal communication, 20 May 2010).*

Interestingly, some people who reject a feminist identity define the term 'feminist' in a positive way. However, because there are many different beliefs in society about the term 'feminist', including the negative association mentioned previously, these people do not identify as 'feminist' as part of their strategic positioning. Abdullah and Zihan, self-identified non-feminists, reported:

> *The definition of 'feminist' in positive manner is that someone who struggles for the equal position between men and women, therefore there will be an ideal life and an equal gender relationship in the society and in the family (Abdullah, personal communication, 22 May 2010).*

> *Socially I don't have to call myself 'feminist' because there are many negative associations on that term in the society, but personally I don't have any problem with feminist identity as far as the meaning is someone who struggles for the equality between men and women (Zihan, personal communication, 19 May 2010).*

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10 Belenky, Clincgy, Goldberger & Tarule (1986) also present similar idea in the book *Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind* that women have a different experience from men, and only women themselves could experience and feel it.

Other reasons people reject feminist identification are that they define 'feminist' negatively and because some of them have misunderstood the term. Negative associations of the term 'feminist' respondents mentioned include: that a 'feminist' is too extreme and radical (Dama, personal communication, 12 June 2010); that 'feminism' is against women's *kodrat*, such as demanding that women want to become boxers or football players (Ana, personal communication, 5 February 2010); or that a 'feminist' wants to dominate men, wants men and women to be exactly the same, does not want to experience child birth, and accepts lesbianism.

Several misunderstandings about the term 'feminist' reported by some self-identified non-feminists are that 'feminist' is motherhood or womanhood and 'feminist' is something that relates to a woman's personality and femininity. One male respondent, Lida, states that "a feminist is someone who has women's attitude, characteristic, and personality" (Lida, personal communication, 24 February 2010). "Feminist for me is someone who has motherhood or womanhood characteristics, because of that I am not a feminist" (Joko, personal communication, 24 May 2010).

In summary, the range of definitions according to self-identified feminists includes that a feminist could be a man or a woman who is concerned with women's issues, who holds the notion that women are human beings and have the same capability as men do, and who is aware of gender inequality, but who does not necessarily participate in demonstrations or join women's NGOs. Although some self-identified non-feminists define 'feminist' in a positive manner they do not identify themselves as 'feminists' for four types of reasons:

1. To be a 'feminist', someone needs advanced knowledge, takes part in certain types of activities such as demonstrations or joining women-related NGOs, and also actively advocates and gets involved in issues dealing with women and gender publicly.

2. In society there are many understandings about the term 'feminist', including the negative associations such as being too extreme, too radical, a men-hater etc. Thus, some people reject identifying themselves socially as 'feminist', although they personally or internally may not have any problem with a 'feminist' identity. The rejection of self-identification as a 'feminist' is therefore a part of strategic positioning in society.

3. While some people do believe that the term 'feminist' is associated with negative connotations (see above), the different position and roles of the sexes are a common phenomenon and for them part of the natural order. Hence for them, different positions and roles do not need to be conceptualised as problematic.

4. There are misunderstandings about the term 'feminist': sometimes it is perceived as motherhood or womanhood and something that relates to a woman's personality and femininity.

The Most and the Least Popular Preferred Labels

In the survey, respondents who identified themselves as 'feminists' were then asked to reflect on more specific identity labels. Four choices were offered in order to identify the most and the least popular preferred labels among these respondents: 'Islamic Feminist', 'Muslim Feminist', 'Islamic Feminist and Muslim Feminist', and 'Others'. Likewise, four choices were offered to respondents who are self-identified 'non-feminist' to observe their ways of identifying themselves: 'Gender Activist', 'Women's Activist', 'Gender Activist and Women's Activist', and 'Others'

Figure 2 shows that 'Muslim Feminist' is the most popular self-label (18 percent) among the self-identified 'feminist' group, while the least popular label for this group is 'Islamic Feminist and Muslim Feminist' (only 7 percent). 10 percent of respondents identified themselves as 'Islamic Feminist'. In the self-identified 'non-feminist' group, the survey result shows that the 'Others' label is the most popular choice (27 percent). Only 1 percent of the respondents chose both 'Gender Activist and Women's Activist'. During their in-depth interview, some respondents differentiated between the labels 'Islamic Feminist' and 'Muslim Feminist'. Gizela, for example, described an Islamic feminist as someone who has the autonomy, power, and capability to reinterpret fundamental values about gender equality within Islam, whereas a Muslim feminist is anyone who embraces Islam (called a Muslim in Islam) and is not necessarily concerned with Islamic teaching on gender.

Gizela identifies herself as 'Islamic Feminist' and differentiates 'Islamic Feminist' from 'Muslim Feminist' as follows:

Figure 2: Identity Labels Among Feminists and Non-Feminists

Source: Own Compilation

A Muslim feminist … embraces Islam and printed in a personal identity formally and becomes Muslim without challenges, without having access to learn deeply and even she or he might not be practicing. For me … I would say that I am an 'Islamic Feminist' not a 'Muslim Feminist' because I teach tafsir *Qur'an [Qur'anic exegesis] and* Hadith, *so I have access to read the basic Islamic teaching to build Islamic values, so I have an access and capability to reconstruct Islamic teaching based on gender equality (Gizela, personal communication, 5 May 2010).*

Another respondent, Sita, labels herself as 'Muslim Feminist'. She defines a Muslim Feminist as a person but Islamic feminism as a discourse. Sita reported that:

If 'Islamic' is an attribute to the religion. I said that I am a 'Muslim Feminist' because I am a person who embraces Islam which in Islam we call a Muslim … I think the discourse is an 'Islamic Feminism' and the person is a 'Muslim Feminist' (Sita, personal communication, 3 June 2010).

However, Figure 3 now shows the variety of labels in the 'Others' option among 'non-feminists'. These data help us to understand that although the 'Others' label is the most popular option, it comprises respondents who held various understandings. This also implies that the 'Gender Activist' option, chosen by 18 percent of total

respondents among those self-identified as 'non-feminist' (Figure 2), is actually the most preferred label among people in this group.

Figure 3: Self-Identified Non-Feminist 'Others': Variety of Sub-Labels

10%	Caring About Gender Issues *(Peduli or Pemerhati Persoalan Gender)*
2%	Researcher on Women Studies *(Peneliti Tentang Perempuan)*
2%	Good Muslim *(Seorang Muslim Yang Baik)*
1%	Gender Equality Concept User *(Pengguna Konsep Keadilan Gender)*
7%	Other names
5%	Abstain
27%	IN TOTAL Identity Label '**Others**' of Self-Identified Non-Feminists Among Respondents

Source: Own Compilation

Indonesian Muslim Gender Activists' and Scholars' Understanding of Western Feminist Ideas

One of the research questions probed the various understandings about Western feminists' ideas among Muslim gender activists and scholars in Indonesian universities. The research has found that, for various reasons, not all Western feminist concepts are adopted by respondents at the selected PSW or PSG. There are many types of Western feminists such as radical, liberal, Marxist, psychoanalyst, standpoint, and postmodern feminist (Lorber, 2001). Although all of them have the same goal of improving women's lives, they have different concepts of how to identify the sources of women's problems. Having discovered different root causes, they have different strategies for responding to women's issues. Therefore, in this research, respondents were asked about Western feminist ideas in general rather than being asked which particular Western feminist ideas they identified with.

Respondents have different views on which Western feminist ideas can be applied in the Indonesian Muslim context. Mostly, they argue that universal values such as gender equality, gender justice, and the recognition of women as equal human

beings are derived from their own sources in the Islamic tradition (the Qur'an and Hadith) and are not imported from Western feminists. Some of them even mention that traditional Indonesian social structures have been egalitarian. However, some reported that Western feminist concepts and strategies have influenced and shaped their thoughts and strategies on dealing with women and gender issues in Indonesia.

For example, Gizela argues that 'feminists' have existed in Indonesia since the Queens of Aceh in the sixteenth century, and therefore Western feminism is only for strengthening feminist identity, particularly after experiencing 'competing identity' following the development of the Indonesian Islamist movement in the 1970s. Gizela explained as follows:

> *Actually since RA Kartini, … even since Ratu Sima … Queens in Aceh in the 16th century … there were many feminists around in Indonesia, because those women got involved in the war and social political activities … and then it seems that the appearance of feminism in Indonesia just happened in the 80s … in my opinion if we trace back in the 80s …* Ikhwanul Muslimin *has become stronger in Indonesia … particularly after Soeharto collapsed there were many Islamic symbols everywhere … also many friends, activists, in the 80s graduated from the West … and read feminist literature … So, non-Indonesian feminists [including from the West] Strengthening of the feminist identity … because there is competing identity [from Islamist group]. So we do have the values of equality since Ratu Sima … (Gizela, personal communication, 12 June 2010).*

In contrast, Rama and Darma, both self-indentified feminists, argued that Muslims do have gender equality values, but many Muslims still read Islamic texts on gender literally. As a result, its egalitarian values do not usually manifest themselves when reading these texts. In other words, Muslims need a different approach for rereading and reinterpreting the gender-related texts in a way relevant to the present. Therefore, the approaches Western feminists employ for understanding texts contextually is one they agree with. They explained:

> *Western feminists contribute to implement the Islamic values into real life easier, so it is like a tool to put the existing of Islamic values into ground. Honestly, I think we still recite the Qur'an and Hadith by memorising, sometime we don't understand the meaning … (Rama, personal communication, 11 June 2010).*

> *Western feminists influence two things the discourse … and raise our awareness … what I mean by influencing the smart discourse is not transferring their values into Indonesian, but the feminist discourse make aware that what they have done in the West is also stated in the Qur'an … and the most important thing is … that nowadays Western [succeed] because there is an effort to 'dismantle' [reinterpret] the religious texts based on what they need … that is the one that inspires Indonesian Muslim to do the same thing … so the discourse in the West … gets Muslim closer to their faith (*iman*) (Darma, personal communication, 9 May 2010).*

By implementing the historical and contextual approach that some Indonesian gender activists learned from Western feminists, some respondents reported that the contribution of Western feminists is strengthening their faith and belief. Indonesian gender activists have used the contextual approach as a tool to explore and understand how these values and beliefs become more tangible and more empirical. Also the approach encourages them to be more critical and to explore the impact of the Islamic doctrine on women.

Other ideas that most Indonesian gender activists and scholars in this research agree with Western feminist ideas are the issues that almost all women in the world experience similar discriminative and oppressive problems (Wira, personal communication, 8 May 2010) and the ideas of women's independence, persistence, and openness (Rama, personal communication, 11 June 2010). Furthermore, one respondent also mentioned that she has been inspired by the concept of gender or women's issues not only at the individual level but also at the collective level of Western feminist ideas (Aibar, personal communication, 3 June 2010). In addition, Western feminists have also encouraged the Indonesian discourse and understanding of feminism, such as the concept of patriarchal culture, equal work for equal pay, reproductive and sexual health and rights, women's rights, and other rights of marginal groups. Within this discourse, it is important to note that Western feminists introduced new terms such as gender, autonomy, feminism, and patriarchy to the Indonesian Islamic feminists.

There are also various views among Indonesian Muslim gender activists and scholars in academia regarding Western feminist ideas that are not incorporated into their understandings. The self-identified non-feminist group shows that most of them lack knowledge relating to feminist literature. They are not sure whether their statements represent Western feminist concepts. Some Western feminist concepts that they disagree with include the rejection of the family as an institution; the notion that men and women must have the same rights in all aspects of life; the idea of challenging and questioning the religious notion of women leadership in prayer and in the family; the acceptance of lesbianism; and the concept of men as an enemy. As noted here, many Western feminists also disagree with these ideas.

For example, Abdullah asserts that he does not agree with some radical notion about the rejection of family institution. "Few feminists do not need marriage institution

and then they are against that institution and create many things including [women] do not need men" (Abdullah, personal communication, 22 May 2010). Another example is presented by Joko:

> *In my understanding so far that Western feminists want [men and women] to be exactly the same...In everyday life we face a real life...sometime we cannot treat [men and women] exactly the same. So, for me we don't need to treat men and women exactly the same, as far as [the different treatment] is for the best interest for both men and women (Joko, personal communication, 24 May 2010).*

Both self-identified non-feminists and self-identified feminists have concerns about lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights and the anti-male attitude. In respect to LGBT rights, respondents assert that in the Indonesian context it is difficult to accept them legally. Marriage occurs between man and woman. Moreover, they do not agree that lesbianism should be promoted through a political or ideological movement. Thus, Tono observed:

> *Homosexuality and lesbianism, for radical feminist are fine but in Islam they do not have room yet in Islamic jurisprudence. However, as human beings they have rights to live that need to be supported, whatever their sexual orientation is. In addition, Islamic teachings value the behaviour not on the attitude, meaning that if it is only on orientation [unobservable] not in behaviour is fine. Furthermore, if lesbianism become a political and ideological movement it is inappropriate in Indonesian context (Tono, personal communication, 9 May 2010).*

Another issue that some of the self-identified feminists disagree with is the radical and confrontational approach applied by a small number of Western feminists. Darma argues that "Western women [feminists] tend to employ a conflict approach [*galak dan melawan*] to achieve their goals" (Darma, personal communication, May 9, 2010). Based on a literature analysis, in Indonesia there are some women's NGOs outside the universities, such as *Perempuan Mahardika*, who also would not use the soft approach. For example, *Perempuan Mahardika* condemned the banning of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) congress in Surabaya on 24 March 2010 (PMN Committee, 2010).

The idea of the family institution in Indonesia differs from that in the Western concept. According to Sita (personal communication, 3 June 2010), in the Western context, family is the representation of capitalism that supports or complements public life and productive activities. Indeed, the standard assumption in the political economy is that gender equality can only be achieved when women participate in

the formal labour market, as a consequence, the economic and social significance of household labour is ignored (Ross, 2008). Therefore, positions, roles, and activities in the public sphere are more important than the private or domestic sphere. Marxist feminists challenge their non-Marxist counterparts on the greatly different valuations of these two spheres (Lorber, 2001).

In addition, Sita argues that in Islam the core value is not within the public sphere but in the family. Therefore, public activities must support the existence of the family. The family is the microcosmos of the society. A solid family foundation is the basis of a strong society (*ummah*). As a result, management of reproductive activity within the family unit is the most important aspect in the Islamic concept for community development. The family has a strategic function to strengthen the community by having natural regeneration in the family. Strengthening and empowering the family institution by creating equal rights among family members is one of the main goals of Islamic feminists. The family is a core value and not a commodity as in the capitalist model. When Sita discusses how she negotiates between her feminism and her family, she said "they both fit, because my feminism is the foundation of my family, and my family is a foundation of my feminism" (Sita, personal communication, 3 June 2010). This kind of notion is similar to what Amina Wadud (2010) articulates in her article *The "F" word: Feminism in Islam*:

> *Islamic feminism is not just about equality in the public space but also in the family, where most gender roles are prescribed and gender inequality is fixed. Islamic feminism takes responsibility for our souls and our bodies, our minds and our contributions at every level. We take inspiration from our own relationships with the sacred and with the community to forge a way that enhances the quality of our lives and the lives of all others (Wadud, 2010, p. 1).*

Another issue concerns the concept of power. Power in the West according to Sita often relates to hierarchy and is played out mostly in the public domain (Sita, personal communication, 3 June 2010). Individualism shapes the idea of power, and therefore power relationships tend to be top-down. Sita asserts that the concept of power in Indonesia has been shaped by the idea of collectiveness, and therefore power sharing in Indonesia is quite common. However Sita's notion is a simplification, because in the West power can also be the medium by which collective interests may be realised, including class interests (Olderma & Davis, 1991). An equally important point relating to the concept of power is that commonly Indonesian women have more

power in terms of managing the financial aspect of the family than their husbands. Therefore, the concept of power in Indonesia resides not only in the public but also in the domestic domain. As a consequence, the rigid segregation between public and private sphere is not compatible with Indonesian culture. Many Indonesian women choose to be housewives; according to some respondents this does not matter because their choices are based on their individual conscious decision and free will, and because in domestic life some Indonesian women have their own power.

Similar ideas have also been asserted by Suzanne April Brenner (1998). She argues that the domestic sphere is, according to the Laweyan community (Surakarta, Central Java), the source of power and prestige, while traditionally Western discourses claim that the public sphere is the main source of political power. In terms of the relationship between men, women, money, and desire, Brenner points out that a wife should control the family money because the husband could not manage the money. Usually if the husband handles the money he will *jajan* (visit a prostitute) or go gambling. Therefore, the good husband should trust his wife to control his desire by giving her the authority to manage the money. However, in some cases there were many Laweyan women who had more freedom to express their sexuality in a negative way when they had more power in controlling money. Again, Brenner argues that women did that based on economic and family concerns, not to fulfil their *nafsu* (sexual desire) like men.

Conclusion

In Indonesia, identifying oneself as a 'feminist' remains a controversial issue for people who are concerned with women's and gender issues. This relates to the various understandings surrounding the term 'feminist'. It is associated with both positive and negative connotations within the society. Because of this, for strategic reasons, some gender activists do not publicly identify themselves as 'feminist', although personally or individually they do identify themselves as 'feminist'. The negative connotations mostly attached to women – that a feminist is against women's *kodrat*, she wants to dominate men, she accepts lesbianism – make self-identification as 'feminist' a higher risk for women than for men in Indonesian society.

In terms of what Western feminism has shaped and been thought relevant to the

Indonesian context, most respondents argue that the universal values such as gender equality, gender justice, and the recognition of women as human beings are based on their own sources in the Islamic tradition (the Qur'an and Hadith) and local tradition, not imported from Western feminism. However, some respondents reported that there are many Western feminist concepts and strategies that have influenced and shaped their thoughts and strategies in dealing with women and gender issues in Indonesia, such as challenging patriarchal culture, the contextual approach that encourages the Indonesian gender activists to be more critical and use gender and feminism as a tool of analysis for gender power relationship. Many respondents acknowledge that Western feminists are able to raise awareness of gender issues, strengthen feminist identity, and build up faith in Islam among Indonesian Muslim gender activists.

Some Indonesian Muslim gender activists disagree with some Western feminist ideas which they claim are not relevant to Indonesian context. These include the rejection of the institution of family, the notion that men and women must have the same rights in all aspects of life, the idea of challenging and questioning the religious notion of women's leadership in prayer and in the family, the notion of lesbianism, and the concept of men as an enemy. The biggest difference between Indonesian and Western feminists according to my research findings is that in Indonesia the concept of having a family is non-negotiable (and this is borne out in reality), whereas in Western countries, feminists are often single women who also do not necessarily have a family.

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Agrofuels in Indonesia:
Structures, Conflicts, Consequences, and the Role of the EU

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This paper deals with agrofuel policies within the European Union (EU) and the consequences of these policies in Indonesia. That South-East-Asian country is the world leader in the production and exportation of palm oil, which is one of the cheapest feedstocks for the production of biodiesel. Recently, production has expanded significantly due to the incentives of the international energy market. This paper analyses the interests and strategies of the key players in the palm oil and agrofuels business in Indonesia, looks at the model of development they (re-)produce, and analyses their reactions to the problem of sustainability in relation to deforestation, land conflicts, and biodiversity loss through the expansion of monocultures and industrial agriculture.

Keywords: Agrofuels, Palm oil, Land Conflicts, EU, Indonesia

Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit der Agrartreibstoffpolitik der Europäischen Union (EU) und den Auswirkungen dieser Politik auf Indonesien. Das südostasiatische Land ist weltweit führender Produzent und Exporteur von Palmöl, dem derzeit billigsten Rohstoff für die Produktion von Biodiesel, und dieser Sektor expandiert aufgrund der politischen und ökonomischen Anreize ungehindert weiter. Der Artikel analysiert die Interessen und Strategien der zentralen Stakeholder in der indonesischen Palmöl- und Agrartreibstoffindustrie, beleuchtet das dahinterstehende Entwicklungsmodell und analysiert die Reaktionen zur Nachhaltigkeitsproblematik in Bezug auf die Abholzung von Regenwald, Landkonflikte und Verlust von Biodiversität durch die Expansion von Monokulturen und industrieller Landwirtschaft.

Schlagworte: Agrartreibstoffe, Palmöl, Landkonflikte, EU, Indonesien

Agrofuels: A Solution or Part of the Problem?

As part of an "energy revolution" (International Energy Agency, 2008, p. 3) and the "global green new deal" (United Nations Environment Programme, 2009), agrofuels have been promoted as a solution to the multiple global crises of rising energy prices, climate change, and economic downturn. Internationally, economic powers such as the European Union (EU), the USA, Brazil, China, and India are determined to expand and develop the use of agrofuels. Mandatory blending of fossil fuels with biodiesel or ethanol fuel has created strong demand for agrofuels, resulting in the emergence of a global market.

The EU mandatory 10 percent target for agrofuels by 2020 plays a key role in the global promotion of agrofuel production. As this volume of agrofuel is so large that the full amount cannot be produced inside the European Union, the export of feedstock as well as of processed agrofuels was seen as a perfect chance for further economic development of countries in the 'Global South' (European Commission, 2005, p. 41).

Whereas Brazil is the leading exporter of ethanol fuel (mainly produced from sugarcane), Indonesia and Malaysia are important biodiesel producers (OECD, 2008, p. 16) and leading exporting countries of palm oil,[2] which is currently the cheapest feedstock for biodiesel production. Palm oil production has expanded significantly over the last few years due to incentives and high demand from the international market.

Whereas governments of South-East Asian countries see great opportunities for economic income from palm oil exports, the global boom has dramatic social and ecological consequences. Huge areas of tropical rainforests are cut or burned down and people are forced to leave their traditional lands.

The intention of this paper is to outline the expansion of palm oil production in Indonesia and the connection of these developments to the European regulations on agrofuels. The analysis examines the different actors and their interests and strategies in Indonesian palm oil production and deals with the discussion of sustainability and certification within the framework of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).

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2 Together, Malaysia and Indonesia account for 85 percent of global palm oil production (Wuppertal Institut, 2007, p. 5).

European Regulations on Agrofuels

The EU has promoted the idea of non-fossil energy sources systematically since 2003, when it signed the first biofuels directive. The directive included a target of 5.75 percent agrofuels on member states' markets by 2010 (European Union, 2003, art. 3). Although human rights and environmental organisations raised concerns over the directive, a follow-up directive with a mandatory target for the transport sector was issued in 2008. This compulsory document requires 10 percent of the energy used in transport sector to come from renewable energy sources (EU, 2009, art. 3). So-called second-generation biofuels, produced from waste, non-food cellulosic material, and ligno-cellulosic material count double towards the target (EU, 2009, art. 21). Nevertheless, these technologies are less competitive for now and the target will be mainly based on first generation agrofuels made from palm oil, rapeseed, soybean, sugarcane etc. (Eickhout et al., 2008). Furthermore, the EU included sustainability criteria in the directive. Greenhouse gas emission savings from the use of agrofuels shall be at least 35 percent (EU, 2009, art. 17([2]) and agrofuels shall not be planted on land with high biodiversity value, namely primary forests, nature conservation areas, highly biodiverse grasslands, wetlands etc. (EU, 2009, art. 17[3,4]). However, the directive lacks clear provisions on how to calculate these savings. Most importantly, so-called indirect land-use changes (ILUC) will not be included in the calculation of sustainability (European Federation for Transport and Environment [T&E], 2009, p. 13). Indirect land-use changes occur when agrofuel plantations displace agricultural production for food, feed, fibre etc. to other areas and thereby cause deforestation. These replacements can cause a major increase in greenhouse gas emissions and "outweigh any savings from using biofuels as an alternative transport fuel" (T&E, 2009, p. 13).

Sustainability implies both environmental (greenhouse gas emission savings, direct and indirect land-use changes etc.) and social criteria (human rights, food security, land rights, indigenous rights etc.). However, besides the abovementioned weak environmental criteria, no social standards for agrofuels are mentioned within the mandatory sustainability criteria. Instead, the Commission is asked to report every two years to the European Parliament and the Council on the impact of agrofuels on social sustainability in the EU and third countries, including the status of ratification

and implementation of selected ILO conventions without further binding social standards (EU, 2009, art. 17[7]).

For countries like Indonesia it is likely that weak and insufficient sustainability criteria in EU agrofuel policies cannot lead to a major change in Indonesian palm oil production, which is socially inequitable and often environmentally destructive.

Palm Oil and Agrofuel Production in Indonesia: An Export-oriented Model

Indonesia is the world's largest producer and exporter of palm oil. In 2008, the South-East Asian country produced 18 million tonnes of crude palm oil (CPO), of which 14 million tonnes were exported. The demand in the international market has boosted the expansion plans of the Indonesian government. By 2020 Indonesia intends to produce 30 million tonnes of CPO (Secretary-General of APROBI [Indonesian Biofuels Producer Association], personal communication, 5 January 2009). Production doubled between 2001 and 2007 from 8.4 million tonnes to 16.9 million tonnes (Indonesian Palm Oil Board [IPOB], 2008, p. 1), which may be an indicator of the connection between agrofuels promotion and palm oil expansion.

Figure 1: Indonesian Palm Oil Production 2001-2009

Source: Own Compilation (from IPOB, 2008, p.3; Indonesian State Official, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, personal communication, 7 January 2009)

The currently largest plantation areas are located on the islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan (IPOB, 2008, p. 8), while the expansion is concentrated on Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. Some of these new plantations are exclusively for the processing of agrofuels. In 2005, the government supported a plan to develop 1.8 million

hectares of oil palm plantations for agrofuels in Kalimantan on the border with Malaysia. [3] In the autonomous province of Papua, where most of Indonesia's ethnic minority groups live, the Indonesian state wants to convert 1.5 million hectares of tropical rain forest into a huge palm oil plantation (non-governmental organisation [NGO] representative, personal communication, 31 December 2008).

The biggest concentration of palm oil plantations can be seen in the province of Riau on the island of Sumatra, where officially 1.4 million hectares of agricultural land and former rain forest is planted with oil palms (IPOB, 2008). According to SPKS, a union of independent oil-palm-growing peasant farmers, the area used for palm oil production is actually 2 million hectares (Secretary-General of SPKS, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

Palm oil production in Indonesia is based on an export-oriented model (Kok & Hilderink, 2007): approximately 78 percent of the palm oil produced is exported (Secretary-General of APROBI, personal communication, 5 January 2009). The most important export partner is India, which buys nearly half of Indonesia's exported CPO. The European Union is the second biggest importer: the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy are

Figure 2: Importing Countries of Indonesian Palm Oil in 2007

Source: IPOB, 2008, p.33

3 The ambitious plan to develop 1.8 million hectares of oil palm plantations (1 million for the local agrofuel industry and the rest for export) along the border with Malaysia competed against a conservation project, covering big parts of East and West Kalimantan (Indonesia), Sabah and Sarawak (Malaysia), and Brunei. The 'Heart of Borneo' project, initiated by the WWF and other environmental NGOs, built a strong opposition against the palm oil project. Accordingly, in 2006 the Minister of Agriculture admitted that only 180,000 hectares of land were suitable for oil palm plantations in the border region (Potter, 2009). However, "the Minister added that the government would look for other available land outside the Heart of Borneo conservation area" (Potter, 2009, p. 101).

the major buyers. Important regional partners are Malaysia and Singapore (IPOB, 2008).

In line with the global trend, Indonesia has recently pushed through national laws on the mandatory blending of fossil fuels with agrofuels. Since January 2009 all petrol and diesel for transport purposes has had to contain at least one percent agrofuel. By 2025 this will be raised to 25 percent. Although Indonesia wants to diversify its potential sources for agrofuels, palm oil is currently the only feedstock for cost-efficient agrofuel production (Indonesian State Official, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, personal communication, 7 January 2009).

The Political Economy of the Indonesian Palm Oil Industry:
Different Actors, Different Interests

This paper focuses on an actor-oriented approach towards analysing the structure of the Indonesian palm oil industry and to emphasise "the role and interaction of actors in environmental conflict" (Bryant & Bailey, 1997, p. 25). Therefore, I will refer to the state, business, international financial institutions, NGOs, and grassroots actors as major stakeholders. In the following, I highlight some results of the empirical research in Indonesia in outlining the interests and strategies of the actors involved as well as conflicts, coalitions, and consequences in the field.

The State

The Indonesian state vigorously promotes the production of palm oil and agrofuels. Officially, poverty alleviation, the creation of jobs, sustainable economic activities, and the reduction of domestic fuel consumption are the main objectives (Indonesian Delegation, 2008). Experts and representatives from NGOs, however, doubt that the current development of an export-oriented model can help attain these goals. A member of WALHI, a network of the NGO Friends of the Earth Indonesia, confirmed that

> *the increasing production of CPO in Indonesia is for export purposes and to fulfil biofuel production goals in other countries. Indonesia uses less than 30 percent of the produced CPO, the additional amount is*

exported (NGO representative, personal communication, 30 December 2008).

Furthermore, the need for a reduction of fossil fuels in its transport system is a new phenomenon for Indonesia. The only South-East Asian member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quit the organisation in 2008, as it had become a net oil importer in recent years due to a considerable increase in population and low investment in the exploration for and extraction of oil ("Indonesia pulling out," 2008).

Nevertheless, not everybody in Indonesia supports the palm oil boom. Most notably, indigenous peoples and rural communities often oppose the development of monoculture plantations for the export business. The criminalisation of such communities and groups is a widespread strategy in dealing with resistance. A spokesman of the farmers union SPKS confirms that many communities are criminalised by the government and are accused of being anti-development (Secretary-General of SPKS, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

Business

Various companies are involved in the field of palm oil and agrofuel production. Producers, plantation owners and refinery companies aside, trading companies, banks and other financial institutions play an important role (employee of TA Future Sdn Bhd [Malaysian company dealing in palm oil and biofuel futures], personal communication, 22 January 2009). The Indonesian palm oil business is highly centralised and only a few corporations control the whole industry. The most important companies are Sinar Mas, Salim/Indofood, Bakrie Plantations, Raja Garuda Mas, Wilmar Group, Astra Agro Lestari, IOI Corporation as well as the state-owned palm oil company PTPN (Ekonid, 2007, p. 41; NGO representative, personal communication, 27 January 2009). European or US investment plays a marginal role in the production of palm oil, which is mainly financed with Indonesian, Malaysian, Singaporean, and Chinese investment (Ekonid, 2007, pp. 62-63; Pye, 2008, p. 433). The biggest investors in Indonesia are Malaysian companies, which own more than 40 percent of the plantations (Norman Jiwan, personal communication, 25 February 2009).

Different strategies strengthen the current structure of an oligopolistic market:

As the maximal plantation area for one company is limited by law to 100,000 hectares (Directorate General of Plantation, 2007, p. 12) many companies create sub-companies to bypass this regulation. Indonesia's largest palm oil company Sinar Mas is an example:

> *As Indonesian law does not allow any one company to hold in excess of 200,000 hectares in Papua[4], Sinar Mas has split large forest blocks into several concession areas. For example, it has created 14 separate companies in a bid to gain control over 1.8 million hectares in the forested southeast corner of Papua (Greenpeace, 2007, p. 40).*

This expansion through division is accompanied by horizontal integration. Many palm oil companies branch out to gain further access to related industries or beneficial services. Again, Sinar Mas is an example: As observable from its website (http://www.sinarmasgroup.com/app.html), the corporation is engaged in pulp and paper production, has set up banks and insurance companies, and invests in real estate.

Another important issue is the various strategies with which companies try to take over land from communities and village leaders. Representatives from the palm oil companies normally try to convince the key person in the village, mainly through donations and the prospect of great economic benefits for that individual and the people of the village (Indonesian social scientist Lian Gogali, personal communication, 23 December 2008). Plantation companies together with influential villagers often play an important role in the parcelling up and selling off of common lands. McCarthy describes this process in a village in Jambi, Sumatra:

> *Influential villagers had gone out into the common village lands (*hutan lepas*) and staked out parcels of land which were then sold at large fees to the oil palm companies … The plantation solicited the process, indicating to villager brokers the areas where … it wished to expand into and plant. The village head facilitated the process by issuing a letter, for a fee, recognising individual title over sections of communal land. This letter then became a basis for legitimate sale to an outside buyer – the plantation company (McCarthy, 2010, pp. 842-843).*

If donations fail, intimidation or even forced eviction is a common way of displacing people from their traditional land in order to plant oil palms. In many cases the military is directly involved in the displacements (Lian Gogali, personal communication, 23 December 2008; Marti, 2008, p. 108).

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4 In the autonomous province of Papua the maximal plantation area is extended to 200,000 hectares compared to 100,000 hectares on the other islands (Directorate General of Plantation, 2007, p. 12 & 34).

Moreover, a common strategy to convince the communities of the benefits of the monoculture production of oil palms within a plantation system is the prospect of good infrastructure for the production and sale of fresh fruit bunches (FFB, fruit of the oil palms). Many independent palm oil farmers have problems selling FFB in time due to poor transportation systems and refineries being far away. [5] In addition, they cannot afford their own vehicles for the transport of the FFB to the mills (Colchester & Jiwan, 2006, p. 2 & 9). Good infrastructure, especially in remote areas, is often a good argument for communities to sell their land and work for a plantation company.

Another problem in which companies as well as local authorities are highly involved is deforestation in respect of palm oil production. According to a study by Greenpeace, cited in Marti (2008), Indonesia has the highest annual rate of deforestation worldwide. Between 2000 and 2005, 1.8 million hectares of rainforest were destroyed each year, with palm oil expansion being a major contributor to this figure (Marti, 2008, pp. 19-21). A large amount of Indonesian rainforest is peat swamp forest that holds enormous amounts of carbon. However, in recent years the slash-and-burn practices to clear the land for plantations has released "hundreds of millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide, making Indonesia the third highest contributor of CO_2 emissions in the world" (Marti, 2008, p. 7).

Meanwhile, many surveys have confirmed the involvement of palm oil companies in illegal deforestation, logging, and clearance of peatlands. For example, a recent audit of Indonesian palm oil giant PT SMART Tbk, part of the Singapore-listed company Golden Agri-Resources (GAR) and certified member of the RSPO, affirms oil palm plantations on carbon-rich deep peatlands (Creagh & Wulandari, 2010, p. 2). Similarly, Sinar Mas is accused of destroying peatlands and rain forests for the plantation of oil palms (Greenpeace International, 2010). Another survey reveals the proven involvement of three oil palm plantation companies in illegal logging in West Kalimantan. The relevant companies are related to the Singapore-listed corporation Wilmar which is one of the biggest agribusiness players in Asia (Khaimur, Theile, & Zakaria, 2007). The research findings indicate that "illegal logging and removal of forest produce (timber, rattan) is taking place without the legally required Forest Product Removal Permits" (Khaimur et al., 2007, p. 54). Furthermore, the oil palm

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5 Good transportation systems and marketing channels are essential to an integration of smallholders in the palm oil production as FFB have to be processed within 24 to 48 hours after harvesting (McCarthy, 2010, p. 826).

plantation companies clear forests without having conducted High Conservation Value Forest (HCVF) assessments.

International Financial Institutions

Like big palm oil companies, international financial institutions play an important role in the palm oil business. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group are important actors in this context. The main interest of these financial institutions is the promotion of free trade and private investment: in short, market-based instruments for the economic development of Indonesia.

The IMF's influence increased during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. An important condition for the credits of the IMF was trade liberalisation (IMF, 1997). This policy can be seen today in the palm oil and agrofuels production, as the industry is focused mainly on the export and trade of products on the international markets. The current promotion of a free trade zone in the autonomous province of Papua exclusively for the production of agrofuels is another indicator of these developments (NGO representative, personal communication, 31 December 2008).

While the International Finance Corporation (IFC), as a member of the World Bank Group, is very active in the promotion of private investment in the palm oil and agrofuels sector, the World Bank as such acts mainly as a "global environmental manager" (Bryant & Bailey, 1997, p. 97). The director of APROBI, Paulus Tjakrawan (personal communication, 5 January 2009), confirmed that the World Bank is mainly involved in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and acts as a consultant for companies on carbon trading.

Non-Governmental Organisations

NGOs are important actors in palm oil and agrofuel production as they inform the population about the risks of a monoculture and export-oriented agricultural model, try to influence the legislative process, and monitor executive power (Norman Jiwan, personal communication, 25 February 2009).

The NGOs involved differ widely in size, structure, ideology, and legal status, and consist of big international NGOs such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, or WWF

as well as small local and regional networks. The main interest of NGOs in Indonesia is to put the socio-ecological problems and conflicts regarding palm oil production on the agenda of everyday politics through campaigning, lobbying, and raising awareness. The focus of engagement ranges from supporting minority cultures and demanding nature conservation to broader calls for climate justice "which links the double environmental crisis of climate change and biodiversity loss to the dominant development model of the North, and its repetition in the South" (Pye, 2009, p. 97).

The foundation of SPKS, a union for palm oil producing independent farmers, is one step towards addressing the problems of peasants in the centralised palm oil industry. An Indonesian NGO network with a focus on palm oil, Sawit Watch, established the smallholder union in 2006, after several years of informal efforts to inform and organise independent palm oil farmers in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Through seminars with the communities, SPKS wants to strengthen the position of smallholders during negotiations with companies over land or commodity prices. Furthermore, conflict management and resolution as well as providing information on the production of oil palms are major objectives. Members of SPKS consist mainly of independent palm oil farmers (*swadaya*) who are exclusively responsible for the whole production process. However, the union explicitly addresses contract farmers (*plasma*)[6] because they face the same problems as independent smallholders, especially in negotiations with companies and the enforcement of their rights (Secretary-General of SPKS, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

Grassroots Actors

Grassroots actors, a category which variously includes shifting cultivators, small-scale farmers, nomadic pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, poor urban dwellers or fishers ... have more often than not been at the losing end of environmental struggles with their lot in a politicised environment one largely characterised by marginality and vulnerability (Bryant & Bailey, 1997, p. 158).

In Indonesia, many of these grassroots actors are still very forest-dependent, which means that they gain a "substantial proportion of monetary and non-monetary

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6 Many of the palm oil plantations in Indonesia are organised in a nucleus/plasma structure, whereby state or private plantation companies convert local land into palm oil plantations (nucleus), with the provision of smallholder plots (plasma) (McCarty, 2010, p. 828-829). The company acts as the plantation "core", providing infrastructure and setting up the plantation. The smallholders are contractually bound to pay back the investments in the planting process with interest and within a given time period (Peters, 2000, p. 38).

income" (Marti, 2008, p. 55) from forest goods such as timber, firewood, traditional medicine etc. In many cases these resources are organised as "common pool resources" (Marti, 2008, pp. 56-58). No single person has individual rights to these common resources and access is regulated collectively. Likewise, land in general is often cultivated under customary rights, lacking state registered land certification (McCarthy, 2010, p. 829). The expansion of palm oil plantations highly endangers these collective strategies of agricultural cultivation. Many indigenous people and small-scale farmers lack formal land rights and are therefore easily displaced from their traditional lands. This problem with land rights and marginalisation is highlighted in a survey on palm oil expansion on the island of Sumatra: "The lack of secure and enforceable rights over both private and village common land weakened the landowners' bargaining position and left them vulnerable to elite manipulation during the process where 'informal' and 'fuzzy' rights were translated into formal legal entitlements" (McCarthy, 2010, p. 838). Especially, vulnerable landowners and marginalised grassroots actors are exposed to the risk of poverty and exclusion in the palm oil business. As du Toit (2007, p. 2) states, "poverty and disadvantage themselves can often flow not from exclusion, but from inclusion on disadvantageous terms, into a system that in itself is exploitative".

Furthermore, diversification of income is a common feature in rural areas of Indonesia and helps to spread risk in times of commodity price fluctuation and climate change. The current palm oil expansion is based on a monoculture and a large-scale mode of production, which endangers the possibility of traditional income diversification and sustainable livelihood creation (Marti, 2008, pp. 60-61).

Although these problems are documented, many communities are in favour of developing palm oil plantations on their territories. They expect higher income and new job opportunities as well as investments in public infrastructure (NGO representative, personal communication, 30 December 2008; Pye, 2009, p. 92). In fact the advantages and disadvantages respectively of palm oil expansion for grassroots actors and especially smallholders are variable, depending on a number of economic, social, and political relations as well as power constellations that vary over time and space (McCarthy, 2010, p. 824). Accordingly, state intervention and withdrawal on different scales have been crucial, further contributing to the marginalisation of vulnerable landowners in recent years. In the neoliberal transformation after the

fall of Suharto, the state has withdrawn from direct interventions and inputs into palm oil plantations, further excluding independent small-scale farmers (Indonesian Liaison Officer of RSPO, personal communication, 12 January 2009). In this context, the commodity-specific characteristics of palm oil are important as the plantation crop requires large investments in quality seedlings, fertiliser, and transportation infrastructure (Colchester & Jiwan, 2006; McCarthy, 2010).

> *The large capital investment required, combined with the physical nature of oil palm, such as its requirement for significant labour inputs only at intermittent stages in the planting, weeding and harvesting cycle, make it ideal for an absentee landlord-wage labour mode of production (McCarthy, 2010, p. 845).*

Conflicts and Coalitions

Having outlined interests and strategies of different actors in palm oil and agrofuel production, I briefly highlight conflicts and coalitions arising from this structure.

At the centre of coalitions in the Indonesian palm oil and agrofuel industry is "a collaboration between Indonesian government, military and investors" (Lian Gogali, personal communication, 23 December 2008). This coalition is most important in areas rich in natural resources. Local governments benefit financially from this coalition, which can be seen as a reason to invest in short-term economic profit rather than in long-term benefits for the population. The Indonesian state facilitates the centralisation and expansion of the palm oil business through pro-palm oil industry legislation (local NGO representative in Riau [Sumatra], personal communication, 27 January 2009). In short the state acts as kind of a marketing centre for the Indonesian palm oil industry (Pye, 2008, p. 438).

An ambivalent image can be seen in respect of the relations between companies and communities. Communities that have not previously been involved in monoculture cultivation or wage dependence are likely to agree with the terms and conditions of the companies for selling their land and starting work as employees. In contrast, communities that have already experienced the process of palm oil production often oppose further expansion plans. One reason for these developments is the inadequate information for farmers about the real impacts of the agreements.

Companies … frequently fail to explain to communities that the land they relinquish will not return to them at the end of the HGU [land use permit], but will instead return to the State … The community leaders are being duped into signing agreements which they think entail temporary transfers of use rights, when the government or company representatives know that they are actually agreeing to the extinguishment of their rights in land (Marti, 2008, pp. 33-34).

Furthermore, payments are often minimal in relation to the value of the land as communities lack information on adequate prices and do not have any experience in negotiation processes. "As a result, communities are often under the impression that the land is only being borrowed and that they are being compensated for not being able to carry out productive activities on this land during the plantation cycle" (Marti, 2008, p. 68). Only years later they realise that they have lost their lands forever and are dependent on crude palm oil and its highly volatile price on the world market.

Accordingly, in 2009 the Indonesian NGO network Sawit Watch (Palm Oil Watch) recorded 576 ongoing land conflicts all over Indonesia (Sawit Watch representative, personal communication, 25 February 2009). In many cases, land conflicts and the clearance of land for palm oil plantations go hand in hand with violence and the displacement of people from their traditional lands. A representative from WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) confirms that violence on the plantations and during negotiations as well as land conflicts are major issues they have to deal with (NGO representative, personal communication, 30 December 2008).

Another ambivalent relationship can be outlined between the NGOs on one side, and the companies as well as the state on the other. NGOs have to find a balance between their role as a spokesperson for civil society and the necessity of collaborating with companies and the state to reach compromises. The potential danger of an appropriation of NGOs for business interests is widespread, as can be seen for example with the role of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) within the RSPO. Many other NGOs accuse the WWF of legitimising the role of the RSPO as a plausible instrument to ensure sustainability whereas the real problems of the affected people in the 'Global South' continue (International Declaration, 2008). For a better understanding of this criticism, a brief outline of the structure and role of the RSPO follows.

The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil: Sustainability for Profit

The RSPO was created in 2002 following increased pressure on European food companies and supermarkets using palm oil in their products. Especially, big international conservation and environmental NGOs were successful with transnational consumer awareness campaigns. The main initiators of the RSPO were the European company Unilever and the environmental NGO WWF in co-operation with the Malaysian palm oil industry (Pye, 2008, pp. 447-450; RSPO, 2004). The most important objective of the organisation is the promotion of palm oil as a clean and sustainable solution for agrofuels, food, and cosmetics. Working groups have formulated principles and criteria for the production of palm oil, however, they function mainly as guidelines for companies as the RSPO is a voluntarily association and membership does not really force a company to act in a sustainable way (Indonesian Liaison Officer of RSPO, personal communication, 12 January 2009). The principles and criteria try to create a win-win situation for all the various stakeholders (producers, trading companies, banks, NGOs, supermarkets, the food industry, energy companies etc.), in line with its motto "People, Planet, and Profit" (Indonesian Liaison Officer of RSPO, personal communication, 12 January 2009).

Although RSPO is a big marketing centre for South-East Asian palm oil and may be essential for the future export of palm oil to Europe, the roundtable cannot solve the ecological and social problems of the monoculture palm oil industry. Addressing this issue, Torry Kusqardono from Friends of the Earth Indonesia states that "certifying palm oil as responsible or sustainable makes consumers feel good and encourages increased consumption, which is precisely the root cause of the problem" (WALHI, 2009). Accordingly, the irrational and excessive use of vegetable oil for food and agrofuels is the main problem causing plantation expansion and deforestation at its current high level. Voluntary market-based mechanisms without permanent monitoring and sanctions for violations of principles and criteria can never replace strict legislation and political will for a new system of palm oil production based on local demand and the needs of the local population (WALHI, 2009).

The voluntary nature and lack of implementation of RSPO principles and criteria as well as the uncritical position of the industry-led initiative towards the large-scale monoculture production of palm oil has recently undermined the legitimacy of the

RSPO (Greenpeace Netherlands, 2008; Pye, 2009, p. 94; WALHI, 2009). Many important NGOs and networks in Indonesia such as Greenpeace, WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia), La Via Campesina, and other local and regional civil society organisations doubt the credibility of the RSPO or reject its basic objectives and are engaging in new transnational campaigns that focus on the integrated framing of environmental, social, and human rights concerns related to palm oil expansion (Pye, 2009, pp. 94-96).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis of palm oil and agrofuel production in Indonesia shows that existing inequalities between different groups have been strengthened while marginalised and vulnerable groups such as indigenous people or rural communities have been further weakened.

The companies as well as the Indonesian state strongly promote the expansion of monoculture and large-scale palm oil production, whereas traditional forms of cultivation, subsistence agriculture, and independent small-scale farming are not supported. These developments have led to social tensions and are manifested in hundreds of land conflicts between communities on one hand and companies and the state on the other. Palm oil corporations are quite creative in their strategies to expand plantation holdings and gain access to local lands. Conflicts arise mainly over land, including conflicts over land tenure, as well as uneven bargaining power between palm oil companies, state authorities, and villagers.

The regulations on agrofuels within the EU may have a connection to the expansion of palm oil production in Indonesia as production has been boosted to an enormous extent since the beginning of this century. The Indonesian industry is highly geared towards the export of CPO as a feedstock for foods, cosmetics, and agrofuels but is not able to develop an integrated feedstock production and processing industry model. Due to this situation, the country is highly dependent on volatile vegetable oil prices on the international market and is likely to fall short of its goals on poverty alleviation and sustainable development. Although sustainability criteria may be an opportunity to absorb some of the environmental and social problems in feedstock-

producing countries in the 'Global South', the current sustainability criteria within the EU directive are insufficient and cannot solve the pressing problems in Indonesia, especially those concerning land conflicts, human rights violations, deforestation, and land-use change. Likewise, the RSPO as a multi-stakeholder organisation, initiated mainly by European NGOs and companies, has lost legitimacy, giving rise to other transnational campaigns against monoculture palm oil production and agrofuel expansion in Indonesia.

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Prioritising the Variables Affecting Human Security in South-East Asia

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Human security is usually framed as a multidimensional concept that depends on socio-political, economic, health-related, and ecological 'pillars'. An assessment of human security requires an analysis of the nested relationships between those variables. Focusing on South-East Asian countries we illustrate how those relationships can be used to prioritise determinants of human security. Such priorities are important because policies directed at promoting human security require definite starting points and targets. What emerges is a collage of nested systems in which global and regional environmental patterns exert the dominant influence. We assess the long-term human security prospects of South-East Asian countries by comparing their ecological footprints. South-East Asia's major ecosystems have not yet been overly incapacitated by the impact of its human populations. Human security policies could be much improved by addressing the growing inequities in ecological footprints and by public education campaigns on the significance of ecosystem health.

Keywords: *Human Security, Environmental Security, Ecological Footprint, Sustainability, Overshoot*

Menschliche Sicherheit wird für gewöhnlich als multidimensionales Konzept charakterisiert, das auf sozio-politischen, ökonomischen, gesundheitsbezogenen und ökologischen „Säulen" basiert. Eine Untersuchung menschlicher Sicherheit erfordert demnach die Berücksichtigung der Wechselwirkungen zwischen diesen Variablen. Anhand der südostasiatischen Länder illustrieren wir, wie diese Wechselwirkungen genutzt werden können, um die Determinanten menschlicher Sicherheit zu priorisieren. Derartige Prioritäten sind notwendig, da eine Politik zur Stärkung von menschlicher Sicherheit klar definierte Ausgangs- und Zielpunkte benötigt. Es entsteht eine Art Collage von ineinander greifenden Systemen, in denen globale und regionale ökologische Muster einen bestimmenden Einfluss ausüben. Wir untersuchen die langfristigen Perspektiven von menschlicher Sicherheit in den südostasiatischen Staaten durch einen Vergleich ihrer ökologischen Fußabdrücke. Südostasiens wichtigste Ökosysteme sind bisher relativ wenig durch menschliche Aktivitäten in Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Menschliche Sicherheit in Südostasien könnte also stark verbessert werden, wenn den zunehmenden Unterschieden der ökologischen Fußabdrücke entgegen gewirkt wird und öffentli-

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che Kampagnen zur Bewusstseinsbildung für die Bedeutung der Ökosysteme betrieben werden.

Schlagworte: Menschliche Sicherheit, Umweltsicherheit, Ökologischer Fußabdruck, Nachhaltigkeit, Raubbau

Conceptualising Human Security

Human security as a concept first surfaced in the early 1990s when it became increasingly clear that the end of the Cold War would not be accompanied by an end to armed conflict but that instead the nature of violent conflict was changing, away from traditional interstate war towards intrastate conflicts fuelled by ethnic, religious, or ideological divisions. The discourse about security became enriched with the new insight that states are not the only entities whose security ought to concern us. Regions, communities, families, and individuals can only feel secure if they have reason to believe that their continued functioning is not going to be threatened at every turn. Furthermore, the security of the state largely depends on the security of regions, communities, families, and individuals. And occasionally states fail to fulfil their obligations as security guarantors, even to the point of threatening the security of their own citizens. It was realised that a primary requirement for human security was not merely the absence of war but the absence of structural and personal violence (Galtung, 1969). These realisations informed a shift in perspective from the state as the subject and object of security policy to the human individual as the centre of security considerations – from state security to human security (Griffin, 1995). And since human beings, unlike states, are capable of sensations and emotions, human security was recognised as partly contingent on those particular states of mind that we tend to associate with human well-being.

It follows that human security depends on variables that extend beyond what has traditionally been regarded as the political arena. The absence of violent conflict is only one of many determinants of human security, including a relative safety from acute infectious disease, minimum complements of safe fresh water and adequate nutrition, and a formal guarantee of basic human rights and dignity. Concern for security also became extended further into the future. It became acceptable to

express concern about the future well-being of one's children, and, from middle age onward, with the well-being of their children, and so on. This long-term humanitarian concern has gradually come to inform the agenda of human security, as indicated by some common definitions of sustainability (WCED, 1987; UN Millennium Project, 2005).

With those concerns in mind, how, then, should we define human security? Development agencies operating under national, super-national, or non-governmental umbrellas have adopted these extensions of the security concept into environmental and ethical dimensions. This re-conceptualisation is evident in several key policy documents of the United Nations. In the Secretary General's Millennium Report the UN's security agenda is defined as 'freedom from fear' and its development agenda as 'freedom from want' (United Nations, 2000). Thus, the UN's guiding principles on security are paraphrased in negative terms as freedom from a condition that is evidently undesirable. Similarly, Alkire (2002, p. 2) defined the objective of human security as 'to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, and to do so without impeding long-term human flourishing'. Elsewhere (Lautensach, 2006) we suggested that those definitions are unhelpful, an argument which we can only summarise here. First, negative definitions are always fraught with logical difficulties. Second, 'freedom', 'fear', and 'want' are highly subjective and emotive concepts: the extent to which individuals will experience those sensations depends on differential metabolic states, emotional states, situational and associative contexts, as well as cultural backgrounds. An absence of wants or needs can also be caused by an absence of self-confidence, a negative self-image, or a defeatist self-concept. It is also not possible to reduce those wants and needs to minimum requirements for survival.

Another objection to those popular definitions states that the focus on 'freedoms' blinds the observer to the problem of limits or of scale. In any given quasi-closed system (such as an island, a desert oasis, or a planet) the extent to which the human inhabitants' needs and wants can be satisfied depends on the population size. Other variables, such as individual affluence and technological sophistication also apply, but only temporarily. For example, the same freedom from water shortage for a region in sub-Saharan Africa can be achieved without much effort for a population of a few thousand while remaining utterly unachievable if that population measures

in the millions.

In order to arrive at a definition of human security that might realistically allow us to promote it in specific contexts, it is helpful to first examine what sources of insecurity might threaten the global citizen. Because of the subjective nature of human security, such an examination must involve consultation with the people in question. Multinational opinion surveys[3] point towards criminal violence, armed conflicts (civil or international), terrorism, infectious disease, and 'natural disasters' as the events that people are most concerned about. The latter include extreme weather events, climatic aberrations, pest invasions, famines, floods, landslides, earthquakes and volcanism, and meteorite impacts. Other sources of insecurity include economic collapse, personal bankruptcy, personal accidents with traumatic health effects, and chronic health problems. Of course all of those factors potentially give rise to acute wants and needs in the individual. But by focusing on those sources of insecurity we eliminate some of the ambiguity and heterogeneity associated with the abovementioned 'freedoms' while gaining the advantage of focusing on more clearly defined targets. This would better facilitate proactive and preventive policy planning and enable us to enlist a host of descriptive-analytical sciences for our planning efforts. Returning to the example of water security, by focusing on possible causes of water shortage and on the systemic requirements for water security, the observer would be forced to take into account the limits of the local system, an essential requirement for the design of long-term effective and sustainable policies.

To summarise so far, the most useful definitions of human security tend to focus on sources of insecurity because they allow us to eliminate unreasonable, unjust, and counterproductive demands from our scope of targets – demands that are often formulated by security providers rather than by the victims of insecurity. While these definitions may not give us a more objective notion of what human security means, they enable us to more clearly identify the most deserving targets for countermeasures. Given the added strength of source analysis with regard to problems of scale we feel justified in advocating it as the superior conceptual

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3 For example, one survey conducted in the UK identified crime and ill health as the greatest concerns (cf. http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/8084). Of course such surveys are biased by the influence of media, the entertainment industry, and momentary scaremongering. But taking them into account decreases the extent of paternalism in security policies, where people are often told what their security needs are by a small number of individuals holding relatively secure positions in society. The same consideration applies at the international scale in the context of 'development aid'.

approach. Focusing squarely on the sources of insecurity obliges us to pay attention to areas that lie beyond the scope of peace research in Galtung's (1969) sense, namely the absence of personal violence and the presence of social justice. The reason is that some of those sources are situated outside of the social realm and are shaped by the ecological interactions between our species and its biotic and abiotic environment, beyond ethics and justice. Thus, human security in its expanded meaning includes more than peace.

A survey of the sources of insecurity suggests that a comprehensive definition of human security needs to include four broad areas which we refer to as the 'four pillars' of human security (Lautensach, 2006). They include the traditional area of military/ strategic security of the state; economic security, particularly the contribution made by heterodox models of sustainable economies; health-related security, informed by epidemiology and the complex determinants of community health and health care priorities; and environmental security that models the complex interactions between human populations and their ecological support structures, the source and sink functions of their host ecosystems. Environmental security is defined as security from 'critical adverse effects caused directly or indirectly by environmental change' (Barnett, 2007, p. 5). Elsewhere (Lautensach, 2006) we elaborated on how each pillar can contribute to our understanding of the sources of human insecurity and enables us to mitigate their effects. We shall now show that environmental security plays a special role among them.

The Significance of Environmental Security

Since the inception of the Four Pillar model and other similarly multidisciplinary models (such as the United Nations Development Program's [UNDP] seven dimensions [UNDP, 1994, pp. 24-33] which cover the same areas as the four pillars), it has become increasingly clear that the most intriguing and challenging questions in human security deal with the interrelationships between the four pillars. Numerous case studies suggest that sources of insecurity have roots in more than one area. Those different roots tend to affect each other, sometimes reciprocally in a positive feedback pattern. A well-known example is the causation of violent conflict that is often situated in social injustice, economic destitution, and environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon,

1999). Any increase in one of those variables tends to stimulate the others, which leads to a general worsening of the situation unless drastic interventions lead to simultaneous improvements in more than one of them. Any sustainable solution to the crisis requires improvements in all three areas of causation. The current situation in Sudan exemplifies this problematic.

The example also illustrates the significance of sustainability in addressing human security issues, a requirement that appears as self evident as the frequency with which it gets ignored by policymakers and theorists alike. Sustainability is defined by the balance between efforts to support the quality of life for a human population and the continued functioning of its environmental support structures, namely ecosystems.[4] Ecosystems consist of local communities of species and their physical environment. They serve as sources of food, raw materials, and energy, and they recycle the population's wastes. Complex ecosystems that are rich in species (occurring especially in the tropics) tend to be more resilient to disturbances, whereas ecosystems that consist only of a few species tend to be more fragile.

Human populations, like all other animal populations, obtain their sustenance from ecosystems which provide food, raw materials, and energy, and which recycle organic wastes back into biomass. Human populations are special in that they employ technology to maximise the benefits of those ecosystem processes. But regardless of this technological windfall, the capacities of local ecosystems remain limited. Generally, the environmental impact I of a human population on local ecosystems is described by the $I=PAT$ formula, where P means population size, A stands for the affluence or economic means per capita, and T represents the technological impact per capita (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971; York, Rosa, & Dietz, 2003). The maximum sustainable impact, also referred to as carrying capacity (Curry, 2006, p. 126) is thus described as the product of the three variables: it can be reached by small populations with a high-impact lifestyle or by larger populations where each individual demands less in terms of support services. When a population exceeds the maximum sustainable

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4 We use the term only in its original environmental meaning and do not refer to other, secondary interpretations such as cultural or social sustainability. Lemons (1996, p. 198) defined sustainability as "the continued satisfaction of basic human physical needs, such as food, water, shelter, and of higher-level social and cultural needs, such as security, freedom, education, employment, and recreation", along with the "continued productivity and functioning of ecosystems". We regard the popular 'Brundtland' definition of sustainability (WCED, 1987) to be quite useless because of its lack of conciseness, inattention to meta-ethical considerations, and its neglect of fundamental ecological limitations. A more useful definition, attributed to Steve Goldfinger (Chambers, Simmons, & Wackernagel, 2000, p. 2), states that a sustainable community is one that converts resources into waste no faster than ecological support structures can convert the waste back into resources.

impact it enters into overshoot, whereby the services of the local ecosystem are being overtaxed and, depending on their fragility, may undergo irreversible structural changes (Catton, 1980; McMichael, 2001; Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2004; Wackernagel et al., 2002). Inevitably the consequence for the population is such that various biological regulatory mechanisms lead to a decrease in population size, below the system's carrying capacity. Numerous precedents from animal populations have allowed ecologists to characterise and predict those dynamics with impressive accuracy.

The environmental impact can also be expressed in terms of the area of productive land required to support a population's lifestyle. This is referred to as that population's ecological footprint (Wackernagel & Rees, 1996). A population whose footprint exceeds the amount of accessible land is clearly in overshoot. This may not always have immediate negative consequences for their security as they may obtain the shortfall from other regions that are either underpopulated, defenceless, or otherwise disempowered. It is, however, often unjust and supports unsustainable patterns of consumption.

To summarise this sequence of causation, unsustainable practices sooner or later lead a population into overshoot, which in turn erodes environmental support structures and decreases their capacity to deliver resources and to accept wastes. This means that the environmental security of the population is threatened, which can manifest itself in shortages of food, energy, or other commodities, or in elevated levels of pollution. Such changes invariably compromise population health and lead to economic decline, civil disorder, and vulnerability to external enemies. Evidence is provided by the historical precedents of cultures that disappeared as a result of this sequence of effects (Diamond, 2005). The upshot is that whatever safeguards may be in place to protect the economic security of a population, its public health, its national security, and the rule of law – they seem of little help in the long term unless sustainability and environmental security are guaranteed. This resonates with Barnett's (2007) finding of a mutual dependence between environmental security and peace, and it reaffirms Norman Myers' (1993; Myers & Kent, 2004) original thesis that all security ultimately depends on environmental security. It also brings the 'four pillar' metaphor into question – more appropriate would be one in which environmental security forms the basis from which the three pillars of economic,

socio-political, and health security support human security as a whole. This does not imply that the ultimate causes for all security threats are necessarily environmental; it does mean that mitigation efforts directed at the pillars will be ineffective if the ultimate cause lies in the base, and that mitigation directed at the base may well end up solving certain problems in the pillars.

This revised model informs a different approach towards assessing the human security of countries and regions, at least in the long term. If human security in the long term depends first and foremost on environmental security, then it can be assessed by examining the extent to which sustainability is evident. The easiest way to verify whether a community or country is living sustainably is by examining the population's ecological footprint, although other approaches are being developed by experts in the new field of pherology (Ponton, 2001), the science of human carrying capacity. We will now illustrate this approach on the example of South-East Asia.

Assessing Human Security Through Sustainability in South-East Asia

We have seen that the four determinants of human security interact and reinforce each other and that environmental security forms an essential baseline because sustainability represents a *sine qua non* condition for the other aspects of human security, at least in the long term. Focusing now on the region of South-East Asia we shall apply this conclusion in order to assess its prospects for long term human security.

As explained above, the ecological footprint of a population or country is equivalent to the total bio-productive land area required to sustain its consumption of resources (food, energy, raw materials) and the processing of its wastes. It is calculated by complex algorithms that are still being refined to take into account further pherological details (Wackernagel et al., 1997). Table 1 shows the footprints of the twelve South-East Asian countries as well as their respective land areas. Normally, in order to assess whether a country is in overshoot, its footprint is compared with its available bio-productive land area in the manner of an economic comparison of demand and supply (Wackernagel et al., 1997; Ronsin, Newman & Dubois, 1999). However, in this case data on bio-productive land were either not available or based on unclear definitions.

Table 1: Demographic and Biogeographical Comparisons of South-East Asian Countries: Sustainable Countries, At Risk Countries and Comparison Countries						
Country	Population [Thousands] (Year)	Area [ha]	Individual Footprint [ha/Person] (2009 data)	Collective Footprint [ha][5] = Claimed Footprint	Sustainability Quotient[6]	Annual GNI per Capita [USD][7]
Sustainable Countries						
Burma / Myanmar	50,020 (2009)	67,657,800	1.07		0.79	‹ 975 (est.)
				53,521,400		
Cambodia	14,805 (2009)	18,103,500	0.83		0.68	640
				12,288,150		
Laos	6,320 (2009)	23,680,000	0.91		0.24	760
				5,751,200		
Papua New Guinea	6,732 (2009)	46,284,000	1.40		0.20	1,040
				9,424,800		
At Risk Countries						
Indonesia	240,272 (2009)	190,456,700	1.48		1.87	1,880
				355,602,560		
Malaysia	28,318 (2009)	32,984,700	3.68		3.16	7,250
				104,210,240		
Phillippines	91,983 (2009)	29,976,400	1.42		4.36	1,890
				130,615,860		
Singapore	4,998 (2009)	73,232	4.2		286	34,760
				20,991,600		
Thailand	67,764 (2009)	51,312,000	2.70		3.57	3,670
				182,962,800		
Vietnam	88,069 (2009)	33,121,000	0.95		2.53	890
				83,665,550		
Comparison Countries						
South-East Asia[8]	599,281 (2009)	493,649,332	1.60 (0.83 – 4.2)		1.94	2,644[9]
				959,034,160		
EU (27)	495,000 (2010)	420,000,000	4.99 – 9.88 Av. 5.1 (2005)		6.01	38,839
				2,524,500,000		
Canada	33,931 (2010)	998,467,000	7.66		0.26	43,640
				259,911,460		
USA	309,186 (2010)	982,663,000	12.22		3.84	47,930
				3,778,252,920		
World	6,818,500 (May 2010)	14,894,000,000[10]	2.1 (2005)		0.96	8,654
				14,318,850,000		

Sources: NationMaster, World Wildlife Fund, CIA World Factbook, Living Planet Report, Global Footprint Network (GFN), Redefining Progress

We therefore resorted to a simple comparison of national footprint to national territory, giving a sustainability quotient (SQ). We consider this simplification acceptable for two reasons. First, South-East Asia does not include extensive regions of non-productive land such as deserts or alpine mountains, making it likely that a country's area of bio-productive land approaches its total territory minus urban areas which are not extensive, relative to other regions. Second, this simplified comparison produces an optimistic estimate of sustainability, in the form of the SQ as the ratio between the two areas. An optimistic estimate might preclude some of the criticism that such comparisons invariably attract. We will address some possible objections below.

The ratio between collective footprint and available productive land area, i.e. the sustainability quotient, provides a measure of the effort required of each country to reach the goal of sustainability. The most extreme situation is obviously that of Singapore, with a footprint 286 times its territory (which is largely not bio-productive). However, as a city-state it carries a separate status, one of obligatory ecological dependence on surrounding lands, a circumstance which evidently has not impeded its growth so far. For Singapore, sustainability can only ever be reached with significant help from its neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. This example also illustrates the limits of an analysis based solely on national statistics; many aspects of environmental security are more clearly described by data across bio-geographical regions. The significance of national SQ values is that they directly relate to national polities.

The other eleven countries form a continuum ranging from clearly sustainable (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea [PNG]) to clearly unsustainable situations (with the Philippines and Thailand being the worst off), as listed in Table 1. Not unexpectedly the SQ values seem to correlate inversely with per capita GDP, which suggests an interesting relationship, namely that poverty might somehow facilitate

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5 The collective ecological footprint is calculated as the footprint per person multiplied by the population size.

6 The sustainability quotient (SQ) is calculated as the collective national footprint divided by the area.

7 Annual gross national income per person was reported in the OECD Atlas, October 2009.

8 South-East Asian totals and means were calculated without Timor-Leste and Brunei.

9 This figure is reported for East Asia and the Pacific. For South Asia it is only USD 963.

10 The number represents the total planetary land area. A more appropriate number for footprint analysis is 13.4 billion ha of biologically productive land and water area (GFN, 2005), although that, too, probably represents an overestimate. Most of the more detailed analyses suggest that the critical SQ of 1.0 was already exceeded during the mid-1980s and has steadily increased ever since (MAB, 2005).

sustainability. We do not mean to imply causality but a correlation seems to be evident. However, several clarifications are in order. Average per capita statistics are quite an unreliable measure of poverty as they say nothing about the differences between urban and rural communities, nor do they say much about the poorest section of the population – and even if they did, such a number would only measure spending power which often does not reflect at all how those people perceive their own 'poverty' in terms of the quality of their lives. Also, Table 1 shows high values of GDP correlating with low degrees of sustainability. We hold this to be a direct result of the growth ideology, the belief that greater affluence represents a worthwhile goal in itself and must be pursued by all possible means through 'economic growth'. Following that ideology, most development agencies regard low-GDP countries as natural targets for remedial action. Sadly, most development aid programs and associated agencies have taken this ideology on board quite uncritically, resulting in 'development' towards increased consumption and away from the goal of sustainability (Myers & Kent, 2004).

We also derive some encouragement from those numbers insofar as they show the potential of South-East Asia to get it right in time. The comparison of the regional mean with the data for North America and the EU shows the extent to which those 'developed' countries are still entrenched in their colonialist tradition of extracting their livelihood from other parts of the world. Clearly they are very far from being able to satisfy their demands from the resources of their own territories. Thus they are the main contributors to humanity's global overshoot, estimated at about 40 percent (SQ = 1.4) (Wackernagel et al., 2002); by the late 1990s humanity appropriated 40 percent of the biosphere's net primary photosynthetic productivity (Vitousek, Mooney, Lubchenko, & Melillo, 1997). South-East Asia, on the other hand, although sharing some culpability, does not face the same daunting obstacles on its path towards sustainability. We wish to emphasise that nature inevitably makes populations reach sustainability one way or another: their co-operation merely renders the transition less painful. Thus, the major good news emanating from this analysis it that South-East Asia's transition, although traumatic in terms of reversing economic trends that have by now assumed the status of a crypto-religion, is unlikely to bring as much hardship as other regions will face.

In our analysis of numerical data we have not commented on several possible objections to the pherological approach, which we wish to rectify in closing. One frequent objection rests on the claim that human populations are incommensurable with other animal populations because of their use of technology. We know of no evidence suggesting that the advent of agriculture and other technology has changed the principle of our basic dependency on ecosystems; however, it did result in maximum sustainable impacts being more closely approached or even increased, and it served to obscure the fact of our dependency. Agriculture has led to profound modifications of supplier ecosystems, which increased their yield and decreased their complexity (Rees, 2004). Adaptive technology has allowed for a much wider range of habitats to be colonised by humans at a global scale, and it has helped us establish trade links to transport resources and wastes between distant locations. What it has not done and cannot do is to change our status as a consumer species, as opposed to producers and decomposers. Certainly the exceptionalist ideals of the pervasive anthropocentric ethics do not make it so.

Another objection states that the consumption patterns of a modern community or country, its global trade and migrations, are too complex to be expressed merely as a land area. Most developed countries, especially urban centres, are deeply dependent on daily infusions of food, fuel, fresh water, and other supplies and services from its trade partners. This is illustrated in Table 1 by the extreme SQ value for Singapore, and it reflects an extreme economic and ecological dependence that resulted from profound ecological modifications. What portions of local ecosystems in such 'highly developed' places that have not been paved over have long been changed into intensive agricultural production systems, which many endemic species could not accept as their habitat, resulting in their extinction. While it is true that all local populations and ecosystems are connected with neighbouring regions and with the biosphere through complex biogeochemical cycles and migrations, the human situation represents merely a quantitative extension, not a qualitatively different situation. Furthermore, footprint analysis is equipped to take such exchanges of goods and services into account.

Lastly, we wish to engage with the argument that this kind of analysis merely points to an area of inadequacy without offering much help towards mitigating the situation. A detailed analysis of the components that contribute to a country's footprint, based

on data that are not shown in this paper but that were instrumental in the footprint calculations published by others, itemises and quantifies the areas of consumption. It readily allows for specific measures directed at reducing specific demands. It does not, however, address the problem of unrealistic costing as evident, for example, in the ubiquitous practice of not including environmental costs in transport and fuel use. Should those fuels ever become scarce as the 'peak oil' scenario suggests, or should their use become restricted as part of mitigation measures to address climate change, the impact of the resulting reality check can be mitigated through timely and directed restrictions to the most expendable areas of consumption. Also, at the international scale, comparisons of national footprints can identify the transition needs for rich and poor countries and guide appropriate transition initiatives promoting distributive justice. Voltaire's dictum that "the rich require an abundant supply of the poor" certainly holds true at the global scale as well; in this situation, however, the poor will be able to advise the rich on how to cut their consumption with minimal trauma.

Our moderately optimistic conclusion that South-East Asian countries are relatively secure from threats emanating from unsustainable practices also requires a few qualifications. First, our comparison of national footprints against national territory inevitably leads to an underestimate of risk. This is clearly seen in the SQ of Canada, where the bio-productive area is obviously far smaller than the total area. Secondly, although footprint analysis addresses an important aspect of human security – we believe that it is the most important one in the long term – it does not reveal sources of human insecurity relating to the other three 'pillars' of the model, nor can it identify environmental problems that are not dependent on the population's impact, such as climate change. The recent unrest in Bangkok and the underlying problems with corruption and autocracy shows that some threats to human security are only very tenuously and indirectly linked to environmental security. Moreover, national footprints are based on average levels of consumption: in countries with extreme stratification such as the US and many developing countries, such numbers only touch the surface of the underlying internal problems of inequity. A national average also does not reflect territorial inequity, as in the case of continental and insular Malaysia. In the long term, however, the findings provide valuable insights for the designers of development policies. In some countries, especially Laos, Burma, Cambodia, and PNG, neither population growth nor current economic 'growth' poses a threat to long

term human security as of yet; excessive economic dependency is not in evidence which makes the transitions to sustainability easier. In other countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, the two trends need to be tackled together with great urgency, but differentially in urban and rural areas.

We believe that educational reform offers huge potential in mobilising the coming generations to take an active part in the required transition to sustainability (Lautensach & Lautensach, 2010). The United Nations recognised this to some extent in 2002 by naming 2005-2015 the 'UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development'. Every child and teenager needs to understand what ecological footprints can tell them about their future, and how important ecosystem health and a stable population are for the future security of their families and communities.

Besides education, direct intervention and re-direction of economic policies will be necessary in the countries with the highest SQ values in order to ease them into sustainable modes of zero growth (Daly & Cobb, 1994; Myers & Kent, 2004). This would include the Philippines, Thailand, mainland Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, taking into account data on economic stratification would allow policymakers to determine those communities where a large footprint is caused only by the excessive consumption of elite minorities, which should be politically easier to tackle; economic growth would merely need to be slowed, not reversed. The overarching political emphasis of those interventions should be on the protection, strengthening, and expansion of ecological support systems on the one hand, and the stabilisation of population growth and consumption on the other. With their environmental security thus secured, the citizens of South-East Asian countries will have the opportunity to ensure that economic security, public health, and socio-political stability will ensue.

Overall, the comparison of South-East Asian SQ values with North America and Europe indicates that the region has a little more time to deal with those problems, compared to other parts of the world where the number of options seems much diminished. Considering the massive ideological obstacles on the path to sustainability[11]

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11 As we elaborated on elsewhere (Lautensach & Lautensach, 2010), those obstacles consist mainly of beliefs, attitudes, ideals, and values that are dominated by the ideology of progress. They rely on our propensity to create myths and to rely on those myths for conceptual explanations and for normative justification and evaluation (Rees, 2004). Specifically, those myths include the intrinsic value of economic growth and the belief in its indefinite continuation (also referred to as cornucopianism) (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971), an ill-informed optimistic outlook on historical developments, scientism, moral nihilism and materialism, consumerism, and the ideal of dominion over nature informed by Cartesian dualism and anthropocentrism (Lautensach & Lautensach, 2010). It is the guiding influence of myths that Chet Bowers (Bowers, 1993, p. 99) referred to when he asserted that "humans are essentially cultural beings (in thought, communication and behaviour), and it is as cultural beings that they interact with the

a little extra time to influence the course of events may make all the difference.

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larger biotic community". In addition, certain peculiarities in the human psyche dispose people towards denying the signs of the crisis (Lautensach, 2009). Those peculiar characteristics include the inability to perceive one's environment in a holistic way; the inability to extrapolate to global dimensions; the inability to extrapolate to the long term; difficulty in detecting gradual change (Odum, 1982); and difficulties with sifting significant information from nonsense (Gordon & Suzuki, 1990). A second group of characteristics is perhaps best described as moral ineptitudes. It consists of the negation of moral responsibility and a lack of moral scruples. A third group of reasons for denial, sometimes referred to as 'mental habits', are wishful thinking, self-deception, groundless optimism, and *akrasia* (weakness of will) (Gordon & Suzuki, 1990).

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Mainstreaming Human Security in the Philippines: Options and Prospects for Non-State Actors in Light of the 'ASEAN Way'

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Progress in human security in the Philippines is influenced by the 'ASEAN Way', which underscores consensual approach to decision-making, informal structures and processes, and the principle of non-interference in member-countries' internal affairs. Along these lines, ASEAN broadened the agenda of security to encompass problems like poverty, epidemics, food security, human rights, and climate change, but failed to deepen security from a focus on the state to a focus on human individuals and communities. Yet the 'ASEAN Way' offers enough tolerance for 'operationalising' possibilities for normative non-state securitisation. Philippine NGOs have intervened in the decision-making process, shaped and disseminated politically relevant values and norms, and have taken the initiative to set rules themselves. For the Philippine government labouring under 'soft state' conditions, the most appropriate role based on a human security agenda would be to strengthen existing institutional structures, expand the democratic space for non-state actors, and join inter-state regimes and quasi-diplomatic arrangements, thereby reducing transaction costs and facilitating reciprocity within ASEAN.

Keywords: *Human Security, Non-State Actors, ASEAN, Securitisation, Diplomatic Tracks*

Der „ASEAN Way", der konsensuelle Entscheidungsprozesse, informelle Strukturen und Prozesse sowie das Prinzip der Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der Mitgliedstaaten betont, hat direkte Auswirkungen auf die Weiterentwicklung menschlicher Sicherheit auf den Philippinen. Innerhalb dieses Rahmens erweiterte ASEAN die sicherheitspolitische Agenda um Probleme wie Armut, Epidemien, Nahrungsmittelsicherheit, Menschenrechte und Klimawandel. Es erfolgte jedoch keine Vertiefung des Sicherheitsbegriffs durch einen Fokuswechsel vom Staat hin zu Individuen und Gruppen – und das obwohl der „ASEAN Way" ausreichend Operationalisierungsspielraum für normative nicht-staatliche Sekuritisierung böte. Philippinische NGOs beteiligen sich an politischen Entscheidungsprozessen, beeinflussen und vermitteln eigene politisch relevante Werte und Normen, und stellen sogar eigene Regeln auf. Für die im Kontext eines „weichen" staatlichen Rahmens agierende

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philippinische Regierung wären daher die am meisten angemessenen Aufgaben bei der Verwirklichung der Agenda menschlicher Sicherheit die Stärkung der vorhandenen internationalen Strukturen, die Erweiterung des demokratischen Spielraums für nicht-staatliche Akteure sowie der Beitritt zu zwischenstaatlichen Regime und quasi-diplomatischen Arrangements. Damit könnten Transaktionskosten gesenkt und die Reziprozität innerhalb ASEANs gefördert werden.

Schlagworte: Menschliche Sicherheit, Nichtstaatliche Akteure, ASEAN, Sekuritisierung, Diplomatische Ebenen

Introduction

The central purpose of this paper is to show how non-state actors (NSA) in the Philippines translate the concept of human security from discourse to action, and consequently, how the state can correspondingly calibrate its own human security outlook. Human security is approached using the 'ASEAN Way' as context because the Philippines is bound and influenced by the policy-making and diplomatic style favoured by the *Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (ASEAN). This paper argues that as a state with a relatively open democratic space but with weak political institutions, the Philippines – when seen through the lens of the broader ASEAN practice of human security – implies constrained human security outcomes but shows well-articulated policies by non-state actors. Along the lines of Arts (2003), the role of non-state organisations and players as 'securitisers' is analysed in the context of their newly-found decisional, discursive, regulatory powers in order to demonstrate the shift in focus of human security from a state-centric to a people-centred perspective.

The South-East Asian Policy Environment

ASEAN's Consensual Approach

The 'ASEAN Way' underscores a consensual approach to decision-making, informal structures and processes, and the principle of non-interference in member-countries' internal affairs (that is, respect for absolute sovereignty) (Camilleri, 2000; von Feigenblatt, 2009). This line of approach emphasises quiet diplomacy as

opposed to institutionalised rules[3] and direct censure of individual member states. As such, discussions within official ASEAN forums are often low-key, muted by the "comfort level" of the individual regimes (Campbell, 2006). Issues arising from any serious breach of the objectives and principles adopted in the ASEAN Charter such as "respect for and protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms", "rejection of acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, the use of rape as an instrument of war, and the discrimination based on gender, race, religion or ethnicity", and "enhancing the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them with equitable access to opportunities for human development, social welfare and justice" are to be handled nationally (Severino, 2008, pp. 106-109). ASEAN's loose structure and non-binding nature has proven to be an appealing formula for a region wary of super-power interference with a vivid memory of colonialism (von Feigenblatt, 2009).[4]

Nonetheless, ASEAN's diplomatic style may still mean progress in human security at many levels precisely because it is less threatening than might otherwise be the case (Camilleri, 2000). Voluntary co-operation and mutual non-interference suggests a longer-term horizon in arriving at comprehensive security. It may hinder short- and mid-term decisive answers, but it also avoids precipitate and impulsive action. And the fact that ASEAN has been willing to somewhat relax its cherished non-interference principle in specific cases (such as the recent Cambodia-Thailand border rift) may be an indication of a shifting attitude in order to make headway on the issue of human security in the region. The key, according to Acharya (2007), in making the idea of human security the basis for regional co-operation is to 'localise' the idea within the current security concepts and approaches of ASEAN.

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3   The 'ASEAN Way', compared to US and European Union human security perspectives, seems to be least unambiguous. According to Jensen (2006), the US policy is premised on the "non-negotiable demand of human dignity" and the centrality of democratisation and liberalisation of markets in the fulfilment of human security goals. US policy can threaten to meet democratic deficits with direct sanction and the latent threat of regime change. The EU policy mirrors a narrower interpretation of human security, emphasising multilateral forums and comprehensive agreements with a wide range of regional powers. Compared to US 'instantaneity,' EU policy allows more autonomy, time and resources to its regional partners. Thus the EU avoids imposing a solution and indicates a more relativist approach. To the extent that it succeeds in imposing its solution, the US is imposing a particular normative interpretation of the region according to a specific universalist code. The 'ASEAN Way' is closer to the EU perspective, but agreements are non-binding.

4   A more interventionist 'flexible engagement' policy, proposed by Thailand towards Burma's human rights crisis, gained support only from the Philippines. A compromise solution within ASEAN was to adopt 'enhanced interaction' whereby individual member states could disapprove of other members' domestic affairs but ASEAN as a whole should not (Campbell, 2006).

Broadening the Agenda of Security

Along these lines, ASEAN was one of the first regional alliances to think of comprehensive security, an important step toward fulfilling the first important trait of human security – the *broadening of* the agenda of security from the focus on direct violence to problems like poverty, epidemics, food security, human rights, and the looming effects of climate change. Scheftel (2009) calls this the horizontal integration of human security.

In Asia, the recent rise of many non-military issues, such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), Indonesian forest fires, the Bali terrorist bombings, floods in China, and the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), has highlighted the shortfalls of the entrenched paradigm of traditional security in the region (Othman, 2004). ASEAN has moved toward the idea of security as symbolising safety from 'threats without enemies': disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, environmental hazards, piracy, drug trafficking, undocumented immigration, separatism, and other border-crossing pathologies. Such diverse phenomena, all falling under the rubric of human security, cannot necessarily be dealt with successfully by individual member-states.

ASEAN has succeeded in significantly extending the security debate, without automatically deserting the conventional approach of state sovereignty and state-centricity. Human security hazards have a power to harm communities and constituencies which outstrips the state's power to protect. These hazards have exposed the vulnerability of ASEAN member states and clearly restricted their defensive capabilities. Because of this ASEAN has recently become more receptive to a post-Cold War reassessment of what Lam (2006) calls 'regime security' and the utility of military power in inter-state conflict. The need to protect people from major disruptions in their daily lives has become a legitimate alliance concern.

A more balanced view of human tragedies seems to be emerging, as opposed to the tendency to regard security only in the context of military challenges and terrorism. After all, more people died from the AIDS epidemic (which can be prevented, cured, or effectively managed) than from 9/11 (Sen, undated). Likewise, the tsunami in December 2004 claimed more than 126,000 lives in Indonesia alone. The Bali bombings in October 2002 killed 200 innocent people. The sense of fear and

uncertainty sparked by the SARS epidemic in 2003 was of a far greater magnitude than any other transnational challenge, including terrorism (Acharya, 2005). The imperative to confront and defeat terrorism remains, as Sen (undated) argues, but the enormous toll of human neglect is also being recognised.

Yet another trigger for the shifting attitude, according to Sen (2000), is the region's economic vulnerability. While its economic progress had been very swift for many decades, and while poverty levels in the region have decreased considerably, the danger of a downturn affecting the lives of hundreds of millions also remains ever present – even if the area weathered the Asian economic crisis of 1997 (which wreaked havoc on the daily lives of people who had previously felt secure and protected).

At the bargaining table, ASEAN has matched intentions with accords. Principally through the Bali Concord II, ASEAN seeks to establish the ASEAN Security Community, along with the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, by 2020 (later accelerated to 2015). While economic co-operation is the main driving force, ASEAN leaders have recognised that economic integration, the main engine of alliance building, will be incomplete without the 'security' features (political development, human rights, rule of law, and democracy). Along more specific lines, the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (1999) has identified the threats to human security like illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, arms smuggling, terrorism, and various forms of economic crime. The blueprint is being implemented at the ministerial level.

In the wake of the devastation caused by the tsunami in December 2004, ASEAN concluded an Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response in July 2005. In the field of public health, the Regional Framework for Control and Eradication of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza has been put in place. ASEAN has likewise launched the ASEAN Plus Three Emerging Infectious Diseases Programme (along with China, Japan, and South Korea) in a run-up to the work of the ASEAN Disease Surveillance Network. To mitigate the effects of haze pollution resulting from forest fires (which disrupt social and economic life, and also adversely affect the health and well-being of millions of people in the region), the regional alliance came up with the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution of 2002 (Yong and Sané, 2007). The ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers was issued in 2007. Early on, ASEAN signed the Declaration

on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region in 1994. Lately, ASEAN has established the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AIHCR).

But as Severino (2008) cautions, such commitments are far from binding, and there is no evidence that progress in carrying out set interventions is being monitored or followed through. The process, tempo, and execution of these accords are still in doubt. Nevertheless, the agreements can be invoked in case of egregious violations, which suggests a slow, step-by-step progress in advancing human security. They likewise open the door for non-state actors to initiate human security activities in limited contexts. Where ASEAN is firmly united is in its opposition to the use of labour rights in international trade agreements for disguised protectionist purposes. ASEAN insists that the subject of labour rights be dealt with in the International Labour Organization (ILO) rather than in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Against Deepening of Security

The 'ASEAN Way' identifies the referent, or enforcer, of security as the sovereign nation-state – a residue of the Cold War's centripetal tendency of political regimes towards the consolidation of state power. Current thinking transcends security for states and their sovereignty and focuses on the security of human individuals and communities. Scheftel (2009) labels this process the *deepening* of security through the vertical integration of human security. Such deepening is part of the radical conceptual shift from national security, with its narrow focus on military defence, to human security, with its emphasis on individual welfare (Thakur, 2000). It is people who must be protected against dangers that threaten life and well-being – regardless of whether these threats can be traced back to societal activities or natural events, whether they exist inside or outside the framework of the state, whether they are direct or structural (Burgess & Owen, 2004).

Generally, what confronts the survival of the state also threatens the survival of its people. Yet the converse is not always true: menaces which affect people might not necessarily threaten the continued existence of states. Human security may thus be quite distinct from the security of the state. As Acharya (2005) illustrates, events like the AFC and SARS threatened neither the physical boundaries nor the territorial

integrity of states in the region, which is the core of the national security paradigm. Even if the AFC triggered a chain of events that led to the collapse of one of Asia's most entrenched authoritarian regimes – Indonesia's Suharto –and the separation of East Timor as an independent nation state, what was really at stake was the safety of the Indonesian people, their livelihoods, their health, and their sense of well-being. Acharya also observed that the massacre of the Indonesian Chinese that followed the fall of Suharto again did not endanger the state itself.

As Dahl-Eriksen (2007) contends, there are situations for which governments cannot be held responsible. On the other hand, state power itself, exercised repressively, could be a threat towards individuals (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007), as when a state's policies and laws discriminate against certain minority groups (Othman, 2004). Or, the threat could take the form of the incapacity of the state – whether through incompetence or lack of needed resources and infrastructure – to make available safety, health, justice, basic human rights, and education to develop the skills that lead to economic and social well-being (Othman, 2004).

An adequate concept of human security, Sen (undated) points out, includes at least the following distinct elements: (1) a distinct focus on *human lives*; (2) an appreciation of *the role of society and of social arrangements* in making human lives more secure in a constructive way (avoiding a socially detached view of individual human predicaments); and (3) a fuller understanding of the coverage of *human rights*, which have to include not just political freedom and personal liberties (important as they are), but also societal concern with food, medical attention, basic education, and other elementary needs of human lives.

ASEAN's historical preoccupation with regime security and the institutionalised retention of the political elite (Campbell, 2006) does not augur well for a normative shift toward a people-centric security perspective. If ASEAN has acted on matters that directly affect people's lives (such as SARS, the tsunami, or haze pollution), it has done so because it was forced to by circumstances (Severino, 2008). ASEAN has been challenged to reassess its priorities and its ability to manage human disasters in the wake of regional and domestic menaces that impair human lives.

Protective Versus Developmental Security

A closer look suggests that ASEAN may be averse only to *protective* human security, which stresses 'freedom from fear' and individual rights against political repression. The international 'responsibility to protect' and its implicit challenge to sovereignty, arguably falls within the parameters of 'protective human security.' ASEAN elites may be more comfortable with *developmental* human security, which stresses 'freedom from want' and the importance of economic issues in advancing human security, and avoids (for the time being) dealing with civil and political rights (von Feigenblatt, 2009).

'Freedom from fear' is understood as freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives only (Floyd, 2007; Caballero-Anthony, 2004) and emphasises civil-political human rights in particular (Richardson, 2007). It is the foundation of *protective* human security. The Canadian government favours this approach, which emphasises the protection of the dignity of the individual and the prevention of cruelty to people caught in zones of conflict (Acharya, 2005). It stresses the international community's 'responsibility to protect', which suggests that it does not rule out the collective use of force and/or sanctions and regime change if and when necessary (Caballero-Anthony, 2004) in order to protect individuals in other countries from genocide, ethnic cleansing or other physical threats beyond the capability of their home governments, with or without the government's approval.[5] It thus favours short- and mid-term decisive action. Protective human security has an unpalatable implication for ASEAN: it aims to break the barrier of absolute sovereignty in order to enforce the protection of human rights (von Feigenblatt, 2009).

'Freedom from want' is understood as safety from threats such as poverty, disease, and environmental disasters (Floyd, 2007). It draws on economic, social and cultural rights, includes development issues, and emphasises the creation and maintenance of a stable social and economic environment (Richardson, 2007; Acharya, 2005). It is the basis for *developmental* human security. It has been mainly promoted by

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5 According to Acharya (2005), in the post-9/11 political environment, freedom from fear has acquired a new meaning: fear of freedoms. The framing of terrorism as a national security concern has undermined the key bases of human security, such as multilateral peacekeeping in the region as well as confidence and trust-building. This is reflected in the narrowing of military-political perspective and approach between Western and some ASEAN governments (expressed in legislation that allows ever more intrusive surveillance). The region's elites could perhaps even take pride that their own security laws (say, Malaysia's Internal Security Act, or the Philippines' Human Security Act) closely resemble the US' Patriot Act, which essentially adopts a freedom from fear perspective.

the Japanese government through supporting a number of developmental projects overseas (Caballero-Anthony, 2004). It favours a long-term vision of development and goals for transformation. It does not deny the monopoly on the use of coercive power by the nation-state and thus serves as a cover for the strengthening of governing elites. Clearly it is the most compatible and favoured version of human security by regional elites and matches perfectly with the 'ASEAN Way' (von Feigenblatt, 2009).

Specifying the 'Vital Core'

In 2001, the Commission on Human Security, established through a Japanese initiative, argued for protecting the 'vital core' of human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfilment (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007).

This vital core is specified in terms of capabilities and resources needed to escape from absolute poverty. Its articulation is the capability approach which re-orients the objective of economic activity from an instrumental end (economic growth) to a people-centred end (expanding people's freedom). In plain terms, capabilities consist of the capability to enjoy a set of valuable 'beings and doings', such as being nourished, being confident, being able to walk about without terror, being able to wear what you like, and having a say in group decisions. The approach also focuses on the *opportunity* to attain positive economic, social, or cultural freedoms, and likewise includes both civil and political liberties. It also may include *agency*, which is the freedom to bring about achievements according to one's values. It is consistent with the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) *human development approach*, which describes the capability approach as "expanding people's choices" (Alkire, 2003).

The repercussions of specifying capabilities, as what Alkire (2003) calls a coherent space in which to identify the elements and threshold of the 'vital core', are central to ASEAN's need to 'resolve' its own predilections. First, as noted by Alkire, the capability approach solidifies human security's central focus on human beings. More importantly, as economist Amartya Sen suggests, the capability approach links human beings to economic opportunities, social facilities, the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, the encouragement and cultivation of entrepreneurship, and political liberties (Sen, undated). To the extent that the capability approach mirrors

the developmental human security perspective, in a context where economic, social, and cultural rights are prominent, ASEAN governments would have no trouble accepting it. ASEAN will continue being challenged on its insistence to regard political rights as a relativist (more akin to 'Asian values') rather than a universalist (global) prescription, but it will adopt developmental security for as long as an emphasis sits on building socio-economic capabilities and on a sequence of implementation from capabilities to rights.

Despite shortcomings in its interpretation of human security, the 'ASEAN Way' possesses certain positive attributes. These include: the increasing possibility for contextualised policies by both state and non-state actors due to an aversion to solutions imposed from without, a consensual approach that may help build a 'sheltering' social capital among peoples and communities within and across nations, and a vital core that provides the platform to allow individuals and communities to pursue human security projects. These factors 'operationalise' possibilities for normative non-state securitisation. They enable individuals and groups to (at least to some small degree) initiate securitisations (deal with existential threats), *on behalf of those who are otherwise not in a position to speak for themselves or exercise decision-making power in terms of security policy-making* (including disadvantaged groups and academics). Securitising actors can influence select securitisation processes in a deliberate and thought-out fashion, to a desired effect. Examples of such 'enabling' securitisations on the world stage are the high profile ban on land mines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Floyd, 2007), where a network of diverse actors effectively worked together, even if they had disparate perspectives on human security (Amouyel, 2006). More modestly, in the ASEAN region, non-state actors have successfully pushed for labour rights as a non-trade-negotiable issue. The literature indeed credits non-governmental sectors with 'reframing' and advancing a more human-centric agenda within ASEAN. A shift from purely state-focused security policies to more people-focused ones will increase the effectiveness of such policies by creating ones that better meet people's needs and empowering people through their participation in development (Stanley Foundation, 2003).

This paper adopts the 'vital core' perspective and argues for mainstreaming human security in the Philippines. It acknowledges arguments that the "multidimensional approach to security sacrifices precision for inclusiveness" (Thakur, 2000) and that

making individuals the ultimate referent object can be costly in terms of the loss of analytical purchase on collective actors both as the main agents of security provision and as possessors of a claim to survival in their own right (Buzan, 2004). Nonetheless it contends that the human security approach, though inadequate with regard to analytical utility, has much to offer in terms of normative utility, which is in part operationalised through individual and community securitisations (Amouyel, 2006).

ASEAN Contextualisation in the Philippines

How the ASEAN States Fare in Human Security

How would some of the ASEAN states fare regarding human security concerns, given their adherence to the 'ASEAN Way'? The possible combinations of these conditions and outcomes are summarised in the matrix below (the concepts, in modified form, are borrowed from Jensen, 2006). Even if the region is defined by the 'ASEAN Way', when it comes to defining specific policy approaches, there is a need to revert to *treating states separately.* The state's authenticity can refer to the legitimacy a state draws from its willingness to protect its population under ASEAN rules of non-

Table 1: Matrix of Human Security Outcomes in South-East Asia		
	Strong Normative Initiative	**Weak Normative Initiative**
State With Relatively Open Securitisation Practices	Best human security results; most contextualised policies *Thailand*	Limited human security results; possibility for contextualised policies by non-state actors *Philippines, Indonesia*
State With Autocratic Practices	Human security contextualised but on terms enforced by the regime *Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam*	Imposed results if any; least contextualised outcomes *Cambodia, Laos*
State With Doubtful Mandate	Refusal to compromise; human security considered interventionist tool	Poor prospects for human security; dangerous outcomes possible *Myanmar*

Framework adopted from Jensen (2006, p. 44); Country classifications by authors; no sufficient data exist to classify *Brunei* and *Timor-Leste.*

interference and gradualism. Resistance, on the other hand, draws from the tendency to regard the policy instruments on human security as a Trojan horse for Western intervention in the internal affairs of states. As Acharya (2007) points out, any link between human security and the 'ASEAN Way' is contingent on the nature of each member-state's government.

When the broader ASEAN practice of human security is filtered by contextualisation of domestic actors and their initiatives within member-states, it would seem that if the political will is strong, nations with relatively open securitisation practices (e.g. Thailand) would yield the best human security results and most contextualised policies, while states with autocratic practices would see human security contextualised but on terms enforced by the regime (e.g., Singapore, Malaysia).

Ensuring regime consolidation, where democratic legitimacy is inadequate and violent repression is logistically infeasible, also requires some measure of domestic consent to authoritarian rule. At the same time, where issues of national security, development and cultural continuity are stressed, and simultaneously, "regime" and "state" are conflated, ASEAN autocrats resort to claims that "strong leadership" is needed to protect the common good (Campbell, 2006).

If political will is weak, states with relatively open practices would show constrained human security results but well-articulated, contextualised policies by securitising non-state actors (e.g., the Philippines). Following Jensen's (2006) argument, when the state is subject to the kind of "autonomy capture" which removes human security from its list of priorities (Myanmar is the example), it remains a riddle as to how the grey area of the state's legitimacy should be considered when the ASEAN threshold of non-interference has not yet been crossed but the state is also not fulfilling its obligations towards its population. Here, regime maintenance is regarded as more important than the condition of the citizens of the regime.

The overall picture is best summarised by Campbell (2006) and Acharya (2007): Democratic transitions (if not consolidation) in several regional polities, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, have created greater democratic space for human security concepts and approaches. Such openness has been the outcome of the state-sponsored economic growth of these ASEAN countries. With the rise of a more self-confident population (particularly the middle-class), political elites within some ASEAN states have had to attend to popular demands for reform associated

with human security issues. These pressures have also served to encourage the independence of civil society that creates greater awareness of the need for people's initiatives and the dangers of excessive concentration on national security. Some of the governments of these states have also championed the human security concept more openly as a way of distancing themselves from their authoritarian predecessors, enhancing their legitimacy and attracting development assistance. While democratisation within ASEAN member states remains locked up in the tensions between domestic citizens and established political elites, the above trends suggest the possibility of further openness in South-East Asia and, in turn, improved regional promotion of human security. The emancipatory project of creating open structures is alive within some states in South-East Asia.

The strongest inference is that the political will to achieve human security goals is probably necessary on both sides (state and non-state) to achieve substantive results (Jensen, 2006). But with varying political will and normative initiative by the state, non-state actors become crucial. In the Philippines, that leaves open the field of action to non-state participants, who in some ways 'substitute' for the weak authority of the state.

The Power of Non-state Actors [6]

Despite their asymmetrical relationship with the state, non-state actors have turned the tide in human security – through social networking, informal diplomacy, and by putting pressure on nation-states. As Wehrenfennig (2008) argues, while the state itself, using traditional diplomacy, is struggling to respond to new global and domestic initiatives, NSAs are making better use of various forms (tracks) of non-state diplomacy and their own skills and resources to form alliances, internally as well as across state borders in order to extract reasonable outcomes. NSAs are challenging ASEAN's regime-centred policies and rhetoric more directly and substantially than extra-regional appeals for human security.

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6   For purposes of this paper, non-state actors are defined as those operating within a state. These include international NGOs with substantial presence in the state, civil society organisations, people's organisations (PO), and epistemic communities which have substantial constituencies and which have access (no matter how limited) to political arenas. Inter-governmental organisations are excluded.

The instrumental role played by NGOs, or Track III[7] in ASEAN parlance, importantly explains the change in ASEAN's attitudes towards human-centric norms. Again, the threats and crises helped these transnational activists and their domestic counterparts to 'reframe' the human security agenda. This job could not have possibly been undertaken by Track I and Track II working in an ASEAN multilateral diplomacy framework, given their historical preoccupation with state-centric norms. The key for Track III was to engage Track II in numerous conferences in order to convince the latter to adopt unconventional security issues in the workshop. Track II participants do not have to bear the responsibility of representing their respective countries, hence it is easier for them to embrace new norms. But if state action is required, Track III's hopes lie in Track II being able to influence Track I when Track II officials interact with Track I workers (Cheeppensook, 2007). Some Track III groups that Cheeppensook counts as quite active are the People's Forum, which has been organising conferences in order to convey the message that the growth-oriented development model is not the only path towards well-being, the Asian Exchange for New Alternatives (ARENA), which is a contact point for intellectuals to search for a more humane ASEAN order, and the Asian Task Force on NGOs (ATF), which organises training workshops and dialogues.

High-profile non-state actors raise the bar for effective multi-level inter-NGO networking strategies, and turn a multidimensional topic into a high priority issue in national human security discourse. They build coalitions within states among like-minded groups and convert others to embrace the cause. Following Kötter (2007), co-operation with local/homegrown NGOs provides the type of proximity that human security requires.

The principle of *subsidiarity* – that maximal responsibility should not be assigned to a higher level (e.g. national or regional) if the most local or specialised organisations *are capable of undertaking it* – ensures that the freedom and self-direction of local NGOs are preserved, while large international NGOs siphon off needs which cannot be addressed by smaller or weaker groups, or where there are significant economies of scale (Alkire, 2003). Such an approach responds to the actual needs of citizens, preserving their right to decide on resource allocation and distribution (Tadjbakhsh

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7 The three ASEAN diplomatic channels are: Track I – state (formal intergovernmental processes), Track II – state (informal, non-binding intergovernmental discussions, with civil society participation), and Track III – non-state (civil society networks).

& Tomescu-Hatto, 2007). It has the very constructive result of encouraging local 'ownership' of projects vis-à-vis the high-level formal dialogues initiated under ASEAN auspices.

To be effective securitisers, non-state organisations, and players must be equipped with the following three facets of power, as articulated by Arts (2003):

1. *Decisional* power, which is related to policy-making and political influence. In order to be consequential, NSAs need to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the decision-making process they want to influence. They can do so in several ways: lobbying, advocacy, monitoring, protest, and participation.

2. *Discursive* power, which is related to the framing of discourse. Conceivably, NSAs – by shaping and disseminating politically relevant values, norms, theories and stories – co-determine the behaviour of states and other participants.

3. *Regulatory* power, which is related to rule-making and institution-building. Rather than wait for governments and intergovernmental organisations to establish public rules, NGAs can set rules *themselves*. Rule-making in this context is to be considered standard-setting, whereby a standard is defined as an expertise-based voluntary rule on organisational regulations, structures and/or procedures.

In concert, they constitute the power of non-state agents, i.e. the capacity "to achieve outcomes" in social interactions, embedded in institutional and local contexts.

Mainstreaming Under Weak State Constraints

Following the non-violent uprisings that unseated the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 (People Power Revolution I) and the short-lived Estrada administration that was tainted by corruption (People Power Revolution II), the Philippines is a re-established, if frail, democracy. Its GDP per capita of USD 1,639 means that it sits squarely in the middle of ASEAN in terms of national wealth, below Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and only slightly lower than Indonesia, but above Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. As an archipelago, the Philippines has suffered from similar problems as Indonesia in terms of violent secessionism or problems compounded by the

emergence of Islamist terrorist organisations such as *Abu Sayyaf* (APCR2P, 2009). It likewise continues to face one of the most enduring Communist insurgencies in the region. Geographically, the country is within both the typhoon belt and the 'ring of fire' in the Pacific, making it vulnerable to natural disasters.

For years the Philippines has struggled to respond to human security fundamentals. The Philippine state's somewhat weaker normative initiative derives from its 'soft state' characteristics – lacking a disciplined and capable bureaucratic culture, a cogent societal fabric, and a strong political will to overcome such weakness (Myrdal, 1970) – and its (formal, non-substantive) democratic procedures, which often lead to gridlock.

Post-Martial Law Structural Power of Philippine NGOs

The Aquino Administration is credited with the burgeoning of NSAs in the Philippines, principally the NGOs. When President Aquino appointed the delegates to a convention charged with drafting a new constitution in 1987, over 20 percent of them were popularly associated with the NGO/PO community (Clarke, 1998). The new constitution, which is currently still in place, provided for NGO participation in national life to an extent that was unique in the developing world. Article II, Section 23 states: "The state shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organisations that promote the welfare of the nation." Article XIII, Section 15 states: "The State shall respect the role of independent people's organisations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means." Article XIII, Section 16 states: "The right of the people and their organisations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." Article X, Section 14 provides for NGO participation in local government structures. A devolution law, the Local Government Code, legislated in 1991, is perhaps the most sweeping measure to recognise the governance role of civil society groups in the Philippines.

Estimates of the number of civil society groups in the Philippines range up to 500,000, although only a fraction of this figure are registered as non-stock, non-

government institutions (NGOs, POs). The number of 'development-oriented' NGOs is put at somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000. In any case, there is consensus that the civil society sector is large and vibrant by developing country standards, even though most of the large number of organisations are small, struggle financially, and have weak capacity (ADB, 2007). These NSAs act as lobbyists, watchdogs, advocates, alternative delivery systems, and discussion forums for a plethora of social, economic, political, environment and other issues (Gonzalez, 2001) in location-specific, complex, and constantly changing contexts. Although these mechanisms have been held back every now and then by government meddling, they offer on paper the most effective means of promoting human security at the community and national levels. By operating beneath state obstruction, they have proved their worth through networking and coalition building, campaigning for policy reform, adopting good practice standards, and advancing "sustainable development" as a uniting vision for all organisations (ADB, 2007). Following Jensen (2006), such local initiatives have operationalised universalist human security fundamentals in a relativised context.

Decisional, Discursive, and Regulatory Powers

As 'securitisers', non-state organisations and players have exercised, following Arts (2003), decisional, discursive, and regulatory powers in order to advance human security concerns. A few examples are illustrated below.

DECISIONAL POWER. The Philippine environmental NGOs' successful lobbying, advocacy, and monitoring that led to the passage of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) is the most-talked about example of NGO decisional influence in the country. Various non-state policy actors were involved in the passage of the IPRA, basically an ancestral domain law, beginning from the agenda-setting phase to policy formulation and policy adoption. The Coalition for Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Ancestral Domains (CIPRAD), a network of 15 indigenous peoples' organisations and five NGOs, collaborated with Filipino legislators and the legislative staff members to smooth the process of the bill's approval by the Philippine Congress. After arriving at a consensus and bargaining with one another, the civil society groups' effort bore fruit when the bill was passed during the Ramos Administration in 1997 (Luserio Rico, 2005), a full decade ahead of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

Peoples. Tacit Track II support came in the form of the ILO-Inter-Regional Programme to Support Self-Reliance of Indigenous and Tribal Communities through Cooperatives and Self-Help Organizations (INDISCO) (ADB, 2002). This pioneering effort did not catch fire in ASEAN, however, except in Cambodia which had passed a similar law (SEACA, 2007). In part the reason is that ASEAN nations signed the UN Declaration only after 2007. In part, indigenous rights are ensconced within the term 'ancestral domain' (which suggests retention of 'aboriginal title' to lands claimed by indigenous groups, significant management rights, and respect for their traditions and identity) which is not a common international reference and needed to be parsed into territory, economic resources, and governance (Tuminez, 2005). As Tuminez further indicates, there are two hurdles to negotiating ancestral domain: public support through consensus, and accommodation of cultural and social differences. There are likewise divergences among ASEAN states in framing the issue of control over resources. In Aceh, Indonesia, for instance, the right of the Acehnese to secure political control over their territory did not take a communitarian form, but the form of a secure access to an economic base along the lines of conventional property rights. Moreover, whereas the Philippine state's support came at the end in the case of IPRA, the Indonesian government was very much involved in exercising its political power at the beginning of the Aceh negotiations, as Sevilla observes (2008). Today, Track I initiatives (review of legal frameworks) in ASEAN are being encouraged by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples' Rights, while Track III measures are sporadically underway, such as those being initiated in ASEAN countries by the International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests (IAITPTF) (SEACA, 2007).

Interestingly, Tracks I, II, and III function as a team in certain cases, as in the effort to contain Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. ASEAN governments (Track I) readily shared information and best practices in preventing the transmission of SARS within the member states, in contact tracing, and in aspects involving epidemiology, clinical features, public health measures, and infection control (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). Track II engagements in the Philippines included the formation of a local network of health agency professionals and health-based NGOs to formulate clinical guidelines for Philippine SARS preparedness (Lopez, 2003). For Track III, the Philippine SARS Response Network was organised by civil society groups (e.g., Friendly Care

Clinics, Medical Action Group), academia (e.g. the University of the Philippines College of Medicine and College of Public Health), and other multi-sectoral groups (e.g. Philippine Foundation for Sustainable Society) (Datol, 2003). The high level of co-operation could only be made possible, according to Caballero-Anthony (2002), in cases when (1) epidemics can reach crisis proportions beyond the capabilities of states to manage, and (2) grave threats leave little room for ideological contestation or policy preferences. The immediacy of the threats, in the context of a human security framework, easily generates regional and national consensus. Indeed, a huge ideological or cultural divide can thwart collaboration. In the case of support for counter-terrorism, the Philippines readily consented to the US 'war on terror', while Malaysia and Indonesia moved rather cautiously because of the complexity and sensitivity of having a large Muslim population (Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004). Conversely, in the case of the promotion of reproductive health, most ASEAN states and health NGOs have readily adopted WHO standards, while the health stakeholders of predominantly Catholic Philippines are locked in a battle with the country's church hierarchy, which is opposed to contraceptive methods (Fabros, 2010).

DISCURSIVE POWER. Human rights NGOs in the Philippines reframed the discourse on human rights after the Marcos dictatorship was toppled and contributed to elaborating the present human rights regime. Notable among the rights-based NGOs are the Task Force Detainees (for political prisoners), the Free Legal Assistance Group (lawyers assisting human rights victims, *Karapatan* (alliance of human rights associations), National Union of Journalists, and Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance. Many of their leaders advise the government-run Commission on Human Rights. They have held the state accountable for human rights infractions, an activity that has reduced the incidence of violations, thereby ameliorating related human security issues. The favourable rights environment that developed also made possible the adoption by the Philippine judiciary in 2007 of the *writ of amparo*, a legal remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation. It was conceived to address the issue of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances after 1999 (Puno, 2007). Deep linkages with Track III international human rights organisations (e.g. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and lately, the Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances) have made possible the marshalling of global action against the

perceived human rights abuses of the Arroyo administration. However, as the war on terror expands in South-East Asia, the cost to civil liberties may likewise be rising. Track III leaders remain concerned that anti-terrorism initiatives can be used to serve other political agendas. Human rights organisations, in particular, from *Imparsial* in Indonesia to SUARAM in Malaysia, are apprehensive that counter-terrorism measures would restrict hard-won rights (Jones, 2002). In the Philippines, the Human Security Act of 2007 has been heavily criticised for inadequately guaranteeing possible human rights violations committed by state agents in pursuing groups suspected of terrorist activities (FIDH, 2008). These developments necessitate vigilance on the part of Track III participants in order to foil Track I excesses.

In another noteworthy display of discursive power, peace-seeking groups have created, and have reached out to, local constituencies about specific issues that are based on perceived common values. One prominent example of this is the peace process that led to the peace pact between the government and the main Muslim rebel group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), in 1998. Many non-state actors created a multi-level dialogue process and formed a peace network. This connected local, regional, national, and global actors (including the Organisation of the Islamic Conference) into a powerful peace constituency that put pressure on the official peace process. A key Track I participant, Indonesia, hosted the peace talks that led to the peace agreement. A national consensus was reached through the joint effort of government and peace and development NGOs. Between Track I and Track III lines, the government has also started an interfaith and intercultural dialogue on preventing conflicts and healing social wounds in conflict-stricken communities in the southern Philippines. Interfaith dialogue has been found to be essential in translating shared values of peace and respect into practical action at the grassroots level (APCR2P, 2009). Such exchange of ideas has become more urgent as periods of violence seem to have no clear beginnings or endings. The situation in the southern Philippines, for instance, was supposed to be 'post-conflict' after the Jakarta accords between the Philippine government and MNLF in 1998, but has clearly reverted to being in the midst of conflict.

REGULATORY POWER. Local health and education boards, with substantial NGO participation, have set rules on health care and basic education at the local government level. Procurement committees in government agencies have NGO members setting

regulations on government purchases. Local environmental groups, such as *Haribon* and *Kalikasan*, have designed and institutionalised environmental management systems, covering rules on stewardship, accountability, continuous improvement, a community-right-to-know policy, and codes of practice (community awareness and emergency response). Microfinance NGOs (such as the Microfinance Council of the Philippines), have devised alternative options for non-collateralised loans (like group accountability) and savings instruments for the poor, following the Grameen principles. These are cases of non-state actors filling the institutional gap occasioned by state structures that are weak or lack authority. Such substitutive mechanisms thrive precisely in environments where formal rules are not routinely enforced or fail to achieve their goals (Helmke & Levtisky, 2004). Track II groups, such as Greenpeace South-East Asia and Climate Action Network South-East Asia, are providing logistical and technical assistance to local environmental NGOs, co-ordinate information exchange, and lobby ASEAN governments on sustainable development issues as well.

New Roles for the State

Human security does not bypass the Philippine state, weak though it is. The state remains an indispensable aspect of human security, even if it is not the ultimate answer for protecting its citizens. A weak state with few resources and with a policy apparatus that works in fits and turns may still be better than none at all. Domestic organisations cannot operate independently of the state. Inasmuch as security is built from below, a "downside-up" perspective (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007) demands the ability to deal with two parallel institutions: active non-state actors on the one hand, and an ineffective state, on the other. To be sure, in this setup, NGOs and other civil society groups have the initial advantage in negotiating normative frameworks, extracting concessions from government, and lobbying for a people-centric human security program.

The most appropriate role for the Philippine government based on a human security agenda would be to *facilitate productive change by its own agencies*. Corruption, inefficiencies, and a generalised system of patronage and clientelism have hobbled the Philippine government for decades. Rebuilding existing structures to improve their capacity and effectiveness as opposed to imposing a new order of

affairs will be a wise step in the direction of instituting good governance practices in the bureaucracy. Certainly, an effective human security approach will require the following good governance requirements, as summarised in ESCAP (2010):

- Fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially; impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary as well as an impartial and incorruptible police force

- Information that is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by government decisions and their enforcement

- Processes that serve the public within a reasonable timeframe

- Socially-inclusive policies and regulations

- Participatory mechanisms at various levels of governance

- Results-oriented monitoring and evaluation instruments

- Decision-making that is accountable to the public and to all stakeholders

The government has likewise to develop an institutional framework where human security concerns *direct* developmental resources. On this score, Sen (2000) proposes getting government commitment not just for "growth with equity" but for "downturn with security", inasmuch as economic slumps are common in emerging economies. But human security policies that yield numerous positive externalities, for instance, health and education (Amouyel, 2006), or that only require a minimum level of development (community-based health insurance) (Fordelone & Schütte, 2007), or that are free of ideological baggage (Caballero-Anthony, 2002) may be administratively easier to deal with. This would actually be a way to prioritise certain elements of human security over others. Analyzing one threat, grievance, or problem can resolve several issues at once, so it may not be sensible to categorically separate threats, rights, and underdevelopment issues (Amouyel, 2006). If one issue is addressed successfully, it should have positive consequences for other human security issues. For example, successfully reducing illegal logging resolves a number of other key problems: loss of forest cover (affects watersheds), drugs (truck drivers resort to stimulants to keep themselves awake on long-haul trips), malaria and other communicable diseases (spread during logging and deforestation), industrial pollution, organised crime (associated with logging syndicates), and corruption (bribes for forest guards and highway police).

To offset its own weaknesses, the state can, to appropriate the words of Tadjbakhsh

and Chenoy (2006), organise public space in such a way that it opens possibilities for NGOs, civil society, international and local organisations, individuals, and communities to create networks and mobilise social resources. This may jump-start a diffusion of human security from the bottom to the top. The Local Government Code of 1991 already enables the government to assist NGOs through:

- a process of accreditation of NGOs and POs at the local level;
- a local governance infrastructure composed of five special bodies, e.g. the local development council must be formed at the local level;
- a stipulation that at least one quarter of the local development council's membership must come from civil society or the private sector, which civil society representatives must come from locally-accredited organisations;
- the right of the people to amend, revoke, and enact ordinances through referenda;
- provisions for the establishment of other local committees, such as co-operatives.

What is essential is that these provisions are carried out fully and uniformly across local government units.

Inter-State Co-operation

Human security is *amplified* through inter-state regimes which reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, and facilitate reciprocity among nations (Kim and Hyun, 2000). For the Philippines, these are the benefits to inter-state co-ordination. It can lean on three pillars, on which collective security is to be based, following Felício (2007):

1. Collective vulnerability. Since today's threats recognise no national boundaries, the Philippines can share its own threat suppression experience involving both state and non-state actors, limited though it may be.
2. National limitations. No state can unilaterally dispel that vulnerability. The Philippines will have to rely on its stronger neighbours' threat containment instruments and strategies. The question arises, however, of how a neighbouring actor can promote a human security agenda without imposing an exterior and foreign solution that does not mesh with the local context.

3. National fallibility. Each state will not always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own people, and to not harm its neighbours. Being a weaker state in the alliance, the Philippines may have to invoke mutual protection clauses of regional agreements. If it is the one being harmed, it will have to seek help from extra-regional authorities to pre-empt the threat. Curiously, however, in an important instance, the Philippines has shown disinterest when it was not the source or 'hot spot' of a particular threat. When the regional Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution entered into force in November 2003, the Philippines did not ratify it and to date has not done so. Haze pollution often originates from Indonesia (another non-ratifier), which is obliged under the agreement to contain the haze to its national jurisdiction (Severino, 2008). It is true that no forest fire haze had reached the country in the past to threaten the health of Filipinos, but non-ratification might haunt the Philippines later, when it is its turn to request reciprocal treatment from its neighbours.

Treaty-based agreements depend on joint implementation by ASEAN member states. Yet because most regional pacts are essentially non-binding, they may occasion difficulties for the Philippines. The Philippines may have to initiate what Acharya (2007) proposes as a collective rethinking of non-interference, in favour of more mutual help, sharing of information, and resources. Acharya notes that the 2004 tsunami dramatically, if tragically, showed why mutual assistance is necessary, while the floods that devastated Myanmar recently showed the limitations of the principle of non-interference.

This is not to say that there have not been collective breakthroughs even under current constraints. In relation to the SARS epidemic, the establishment of an ASEAN+3 'hotline' network among designated contact points, the quick sharing of information, pre-departure screening, the management of suspected cases in flight, disinfection of aircraft, co-ordinated procedures at international departure and arrival points, and other measures recommended by the World Health Organization for travel from and to countries affected by SARS, stopped the epidemic in its tracks. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response has not yet formally entered into force, but a number of its provisions are in place: disaster-related specialised training, information sharing through a dedicated website and

communications system, a stand-by relief fund, and early warning systems for haze pollution, typhoons, etc. (Severino, 2008). Joint delivery by the member-states does help the Philippines cope up with transnational threats and dangers.

It is in Track II where academics or the so-called epistemic communities deal with newly emerging human security issues. With the organisational development skills of its NSAs, the Philippines can be instrumental in forming a regional working group consisting of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds that can debate on options available to manage climate change, involuntary migration, and pandemics. Epistemic communities can build up a reservoir of cutting-edge know-how on the nature of interlinkages between issues and the chain of events that might happen when a particular action or policy is carried out (Kim, 2000). Through these working groups, various human security propositions are interrogated with particular regard for the diverse historical and cultural contexts of the region. They are a crucial link to creating a constituent base in Track I (Morada, 2006).

Summary

Progress in human security in the Philippines is influenced by the policy-making style favoured by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The 'ASEAN Way' underscores a consensual approach to decision-making, informal structures and processes, and the principle of non-interference in member-countries' internal affairs. Along these lines, ASEAN was one of the first alliances to think of comprehensive security, an important step toward fulfilling the first important trait of human security – the *broadening* of the agenda of security from the focus on direct violence to problems like poverty, epidemics, food security, human rights, and climate change. However, the 'ASEAN Way' identifies the referent of security as the sovereign nation-state, which goes against the second important characteristic of human security – *deepening* of security from a focus on the state to a focus on human individuals and communities.

A closer look suggested that ASEAN may be averse only to *protective* human security, which stresses 'freedom from fear' but challenges the state's absolute sovereignty in order to intervene (with direct sanctions if necessary). ASEAN elites may be more comfortable with *developmental* human security, which stresses 'freedom from want'

and the importance of economic issues in advancing human security and sustains the use of coercive power by the nation-state.

When the broader ASEAN practice of human security is filtered by contextualisation of member-states' political systems, it would seem that if political will is weak, states with relatively open democratic practices would show constrained human security results but well-articulated, contextualised policies by non-state actors. That is the case of the Philippines. Human security issues are location-specific, multifaceted, constantly changing – they are best dealt with by civil society organisations that operate at levels beneath state obstruction (or weakness).

As 'securitisers', non-state organisations and players have adopted three facets of power – decisional, discursive, regulatory – in order to develop a robust yet flexible coping capability. Along these lines, Philippine NGOs have intervened, directly or indirectly, in the decision-making process, have shaped and disseminated politically relevant values and norms, and have taken the initiative to set rules *themselves*.

Human security does not bypass the Philippine state, weak though it is. The most appropriate role for the Philippine government based on a human security agenda would be to facilitate productive change by its own agencies and to rebuild existing structures to improve their capacity and effectiveness. From a weaker vantage point, the Philippines can join inter-state regimes and quasi-diplomatic second-track arrangements, which reduce transaction costs and facilitate reciprocity among nations.

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Constructing the 'Red' Otherness:
The Role and Implications of Thainess on Polarised Politics

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Introduction

> *I think the Red Shirts are not Thai people because they destroyed things, they destroyed Bangkok, they destroyed Thailand. ("Bangkok Races to Erase Traces of Protest," 2010)*

The above statement was made by a dress-shop owner whose shop was located near the site of the destruction caused by the riot in May 2010. His statement is interesting in that he identified the Red Shirts, members of a political alliance opposing the current government, as not being Thai. While the *Red Shirts* and their supporters were accused of not being Thai due to violent behaviour, what about the *Yellow Shirts*, a group likewise formed in opposition to the former governments, who seized the international airport in 2008? Are they Thai? The question is: What constitutes being Thai or a Thai nationhood? Has Thainess really existed for a long time? If not, who constructed it for what purpose, and for whom was it constructed?

In this article, I will give some background information on current politics in Thailand and review theoretical concepts of nation and nationhood as well as conceptualising Thai nationhood or Thainess. In addition, the role of Thainess that has been used by Prime Minister Abhisit and his patrons – the current power holders – will be explained, and I will demonstrate the implications of the application of

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Thainess for Thai politics. This article argues that social scientists, when examining socio-political phenomena in Thailand, cannot neglect Thainess as both a norm of exclusion and a political weapon used by the power holders.

Brief Background of Polarised Politics

Democracies come in many forms, but their minimal basis is holding free and fair elections. Without such an electoral process, it cannot be claimed that there is democracy. In Thai political discourse, democracy is often negatively equated with the political dominance of the majority, i.e. people deemed unqualified to make the right decisions. Moreover, as the parliament is not recognised as the main mechanism for achieving political resolutions, power holders rather resort to the application of undemocratic means such as military interventions. For this reason, the political regime in Thailand is bureaucratic-authoritarian since it has experienced *coups d'état* both by military force and political means in recent years.

Bureaucratic authoritarianism is an approach used to explain political phenomena and regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the late 1960s (Wiarda, 2000, pp. 87-89). In my opinion, in the case of Thailand, it would be easier to understand bureaucratic authoritarianism if we call it 'the military in politics' to indicate that the military carries out a *coup d'état* and has a significant leadership role in politics. However, the military cannot mount a successful *coup d'état* without support from civilians. The military and its allies, the civilian elite, always base the legitimacy of their intervention in politics on the corruption of politicians. However, co-operation of the civilian elite alone was not enough to overthrow a democratic government in the context of contemporary Thailand. A signal from the palace was also a necessary element. The Thai bureaucratic-authoritarian regime requires the control of the lower classes in order to maintain its power.

The political order of Thailand has returned to a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime since the coup of 19 September 2006, which was led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. The coup was also strongly supported by the Bangkok-based middle class, royalists,

and the network monarchy[2], with General Prem Tinsulanonda, the head of the Privy Council, being its principle symbol. Despite the fact that two democratic governments had been established through elections, neither could bring the military under control. On the contrary, the military had more influence than the governments. The 19 September 2006 coup was a de jure *coup d'état*; however, a de facto *coup d'état* came about after that time.

The main reason that Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted from office in 2006 was neither corruption nor capital cronyism, but the need to break the de facto rule of Thainess of which Royal Nationalism, the mainstream political ideology in Thailand, is the core element. His behaviour and policies challenged the traditional manner of Thai politicians; for example, Thaksin's populist policies were suspect because it was thought that that they might replace projects in rural areas that had been under royal patronage.

Subsequently, two democratically elected governments, i.e. those led by Samak Sundaravej and by Somchai Wongsawat, could again not govern the country, since they were also perceived as Thaksin's nominees. As their governments were also treated as threats to Thainess, both had to leave office.

The de facto *coup d'état* occurred late in 2008 after the dissolution of the People's Power Party. This coup was led by General Anupong Paochinda, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. General Anupong invited politicians to have a meeting with him about the political situation, leading to a change in political factions in the House of Representatives, and opened the stage for Abhisit Vejjajiva to become the prime minister of Thailand. There is no doubt that the government led by Abhisit is backed by the military, royalists, and network monarchy. However, it has stirred up animosity and sparked a massive protest by the partly pro-Thaksin camp, which consists of rural residents and anti-coup protesters. This camp has been called the Red Shirts; however, the official name is 'National United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship' (UDD).

Apart from the Red Shirts, there are the Yellow Shirts or the 'People's Alliance for Democracy' (PAD). This group consists of the Bangkok-based middle class, royalists, and network monarchists who supported the coup by the military in order to protect

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2 For further details on the term 'network monarchy', see (among others) McCargo (2005).

the mainstream ideology and the palace. The Yellow Shirts held massive protests from 2005 through 2008. In addition, besides the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, there is a group called the Multi-Coloured Shirts, who are in general not different from the Yellow Shirts since its campaign can ultimately be seen as an effort to institutionalise the sacred concepts of 'Nation, Religion [Buddhism], and Monarchy'.

The massive protests have been out of control since 2009. The Red Shirts started them in Bangkok and have resorted to escalating violence. Because of casualties from this political violence, especially caused by the military forces, some academics have stated that they consider the situation, especially in April and May 2010, not just a riot but a civil war.

After heavy subjugation by the government, the Red Shirts officially ceased their protests. However, the leaders could not control the protesters, and the aftermath was not only the destruction of many buildings and department stores in Bangkok but also the burning of city halls in many provinces, especially in the country's North-East. Moreover, there were several unusual cases of arson there and in the North.

Although the government has attempted to call for unity, especially in television broadcasts, its efforts do not appear to be working because its repression of the protesters was enforced through terror. Therefore, it was pointless to cry out for unity without investigating what was really causing the deaths.

The government presented the 'third hand theory', claiming that there were terrorists camouflaged as protesters. However, many photos and clips of video footage by both news agencies and the protesters themselves make it difficult to accept such claims. Many protesters and other people are still questioning the government's responsibility for the deaths, although the government has made many efforts to show its sincerity. For instance, the government has appointed commissions to investigate the incidents and find the truth, but these were accused of prejudice.

It is clear that the government cannot regain its legitimacy as long as it is trying to eradicate its opposition. While the government has been calling for unity, it has used a powerful tool to polarise Thai society into those who conform and those who do not. That powerful tool is 'Thai nationhood', also known as Thainess or *Kwampenthai*.

What is Thainess?

Most people take the concept of a nation for granted and suppose that it has existed for a long time. However, according to Anderson (2006), a nation is an imagined political community. The concept of nationhood is similar to that of a nation in that it is not a natural entity, but a social construct. Thus it is problematic because it is not static or monolithic. As soon as a nation is constructed, some will be excluded despite living within the state's boundaries. Nationhood divides people into 'us' and 'them' or 'ourselves' and 'others'. The 'Other' is in danger because nationhood has been made to be sacred, and therefore the 'Other' is seen as an iconoclast. In this sense, nationhood is very similar to a religion that aims to make people believers or conformists without doubt and question.

Thai nationhood or Thainess is highly problematic. Thongchai Winichakul, a prominent Thai historian, noted that Thainess has never clearly been defined. However, what is not Thai or un-Thai is often identified. From this point of view, Thainess is obviously apparent when otherness or un-Thainess can be identified. Therefore, the latter is essential to the former. Thongchai called this process "negative identification" (Thongchai, 2004, pp. 5-6).

Apart from negative identification, there is 'positive identification', which refers to the selection of some elements or norms, such as political ideology, by power holders in order to define Thainess. For example, King Vajiravudh declared that the monarchy was the most important element of Thai nationhood (Thongchai, 2004, p. 4); thus, Vajiravudh's version of Thainess gave precedence to *Kwamjongrakpakdi* or loyalty to the royalty. Even though the power holders prescribed what Thainess was, negative identification is still important to enhance the obvious appearance of Thainess.

Thainess is an efficient political tool of the power holders for maintaining and expanding their power and interests, which is the real function of Thainess (Pavin, 2005, pp. 4-6). For instance, King Chulalongkorn attempted to popularise his version of Thai nationhood in order to enhance the legitimacy of his throne and his fixed status among rulers and subordinates (Pavin, 2005, p. 5). Thus, the function of Thainess is not only preserving and increasing the power and interests of the power holders. Instead, it is also used as a powerful weapon for eradicating political opposition without any doubts or arguments. Like any former power holders, Abhisit and his

patrons, the elites and network monarchy, have used their own version of Thainess to legitimise their regime and power as well as to eliminate the Red Shirts, their political opposition.

Thainess and its Role in the Abhisit Regime

> *Right now, [a lack of] unity in the Northeast is a major problem that obstructs the efforts to develop the region and the country as a whole. If we restore national reconciliation, this will bring immense benefits to the Isan people [population of Thailand's North-Eastern region]. (General Prem Tinsulanonda quoted in "Gen Prem Urges People of Northeast to Restore Unity," 2009)*

Unity or *kwamsamakki* is very important to Thai power holders because in their view it leads to stability by demanding conformity of thought, belief in Royal Nationalism, and interest in top-down control. By trying to remove all differences in thinking, it maintains the current structure of political relations. It is important to note that unity differs from harmony or *kwamprongdong* in that harmony respects differences and accommodates interests while unity does not. However, there is a close similarity in the use of these two words in the Thai language.

The concept of 'unity' has often been used by Thai power holders, especially when they were confronted with a political crisis. Abhisit is no exception to his predecessors, although he has been eulogised exaggeratedly by many Thai elites, for example, General Prem and the Thai middle class. Abhisit and his patrons have constantly called on the Thai people for unity since the Red Shirts started their movement. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a Singapore-based Thai political scientist, has also demonstrated that there is an attempt to merge the unity discourse with the concept of Thainess (Pavin, 2010, p. 333). From this perspective, therefore, the Abhisit version of Thainess has created disunity as being un-Thai or the 'Other'. Abhisit's Thainess functions as a 'weapon' against the threat of the Red Shirts, who have been polarised from ordinary Thais and labelled as 'disunity makers' and 'supporters of the plot to overthrow the monarchy'. In other words, they are being used to exemplify Otherness.

As the 'Other', they are in danger or are in a 'state of exception' in the terminology of Agamben (2005). The state of exception is "the legal form of what cannot have legal form. On the other hand, if the law employs the exception that is the suspension of law itself" (Agamben, 2005, p. 1). The Emergency Decree on Public Administration

in Emergency Situations (Emergency Act), which was declared by Abhisit on 7 April 2010, is the declaration of the state of exception that binds and abandons the Red Shirts and their supporters as being against the law. Their lives are no longer under the protection of normal law. Agamben (2005) calls this kind of living a "bared life".

In addition to being excluded from normal protection, their deaths are ungrievable. According to Butler (2004), a post-structuralist philosopher, lives are made ungrievable through the function of norms. Because those lives do not conform to the norms, they are negated from the outset. For this reason, their deaths cannot be mourned because their lives were negated to begin with. Thus, in the Thai context, the Red Shirts' lives are ungrievable because they fall outside the norms of Thainess, and many victims who opposed the Abhisit regime or Thainess have not received mercy or mourning.

Furthermore, the Red Shirts live under social sanctions. For example, Kantoop, a female teenager who joined the Red Shirt protests and disagreed with adherence to the monarchy, was deprived of her right to study in Silpakorn University. Silpakorn's representative claimed that she was not paying respect to the monarchy, therefore her belief and behaviour disqualified her according to the university's rules. Apart from this moral crime legally determined by university regulations, she is vastly stigmatised in cyberspace through forwarded e-mails and Facebook posts. Thus, her life has become a 'bared life'.

Thai nationhood or Thainess has become a weapon to legally and morally eradicate the political enemies of Abhisit and his patrons. As elaborated above, it is a very simple method: simply construct one's opponents as being the 'Other'. After that, they can be easily killed in a lawful and ethical manner in defence of the sacred Thainess.

Conclusion

This article elaborated on the role of Thainess as a political tool for Thai power holders and particularly for the Abhisit regime. Although the focus was on the use of Thainess by Abhisit and his patrons to eradicate their political enemies, it should not be concluded that others, including the exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin, have not acted in the same way. However, Abhisit has obviously used Thainess to maintain

power by destroying the opposition. I believe that Thainess will continue to be used as a weapon by Thailand's power holders in the future. Thai nationhood or Thainess is a construct of the elite to serve their own power and interests as well as to sustain the power structure.

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Chiang Mai: The Gay and the City

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Chiang Mai has been one of Thailand's top vacation destinations for both international and domestic tourists. Many tourists from around the world visit this magnificent city located in the midst of mountainous landscapes, with a natural environment, kind people, and a rich culture. Yet, it is not only traditional culture that attracts tourists. As mentioned in the popular gay guide book 'Spartacus' [2], Chiang Mai is also a well-known place for gay culture and therefore a popular destination for gay tourists: "Thailand is a gay and a tourist paradise … Thais do not use the artificial western way of putting us all into classifications like 'gay' or 'straight'. The most heterosexual young man may readily make love with you if he likes you" (Stamford, 1980).

During the last decade, the gay population in Chiang Mai has increasingly revealed itself. Gays nowadays openly identify themselves as such at schools, universities, and workplaces. Gay, 'ladyboy', transgender, and lesbian people can be found everywhere in the city, even in the religious institutions. It is claimed that homosexuality seems to be accepted by the local people, but it must be carefully reconsidered whether this really holds true for the city of Chiang Mai.

This article aims to take a closer look at the local experiences relating to the relationship between the city (of Chiang Mai) and the marginal group of gay people. It does so by describing the attitudes of advocates of 'traditional culture' towards

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2 Stamford, J. (1980). *Spartacus 1980 International Gay Guide for Gay Men*. Amsterdam: Spartacus.

gays, and the prejudices, constraints, and struggles the gay community is confronted with.

Anti-gay: Self-identified 'Gay Activists' and 'Gay Politicians'

During the last two years, Chiang Mai, the capital of the former Lanna Kingdom, has seen the appearance of many movements against gays, ironically led by activists who are gay and call themselves 'gay politicians' or 'gay activists'.

One striking example was the Gay Pride Parade in downtown Chiang Mai in 2009. During the parade, local politicians (including 'gay politicians') argued that 'those people' [gays] were ravaging the decent cultural heritage of the city. Also, Red Shirt demonstrators opposed the event, and finally the parade organisers decided to cancel it as they feared riots and violence. After the Gay Pride Parade, the same group of 'gay activists' came up with similar accusations against the owner of the biggest gay hotel in Chiang Mai, since they found out that his hotel was being promoted as a place where gay tourists would be able to meet handsome and charming local young men. Such an advertisement, they argued, is not suitable for the 'decent cultural heritage' of Chiang Mai.

Being a tourist city, Chiang Mai offers a wide variety of recreational and entertainment facilities. The city offers entertainment places for gays as well as for straight people, and there are several gay clubs, bars, and saunas. Previously most of these facilities kept a low profile or were even kept secret. Only people informed of their whereabouts – mostly gays of course – would recognise and find these places. Once these facilities stepped into the public sphere, they received unexpected and even invidious reactions towards their customers and owners. The cruelest comments were put forward by 'gay activists'.

Their argument was that Chiang Mai's cultural focus should rest with the old Lanna traditions and nature. That way, Chiang Mai would promote the natural and historical beauty of its region as well as the suavity, hospitality, and generosity of its people. Being gay, however does not seem to fit into this image. In the perspective of conservative local politicians, the local Chiang Mai tourism industry would not only easily go without gay-oriented tourism, however, the latter distracts or obstructs the concept of a cultural and tourism capital as they define it. Promoting Chiang Mai

or Lanna with the uniqueness or the sexiness of Lanna boys to – as they would say – 'sexually deviant' tourists, would damage Chiang Mai's tourism reputation.

However, for the attentive Thailand traveller and tourist, it will not stay unrecognised that in the whole country more and more gay people nowadays openly display their identity and meet acceptance. Even though there is no reference to gay people or a specific protection clause in the Thai constitution, there is a widespread acceptance and respect for members of the gay community.

Rationale Behind the So-called 'Gay Activists'

So what is the rationale behind this group of so-called 'gay activists', who ironically campaign against people who share their own sexual orientation in Chiang Mai? Apparently one reason is for them to publicly distance themselves from their own sexual orientation, and furthermore their criticism of other gays seems to be grounded in a general fear of oppression based on sexual orientation stemming from mainstream society. Even though there seems to be a widespread acceptance of gay culture in Thailand, sometimes gays are still demonised and scapegoated, have become victims of police brutality and housing isolation, and suffer from informal exclusion from and access to certain jobs.

Another problem seems to be one of a linguistic nature. Gays in Thailand openly use the description of 'gay' for themselves; what they however fear, is being called *kathoey*, a Thai word describing a hermaphroditic person as well as an effeminate, transvestite man. In Thai *kathoey* is a word that carries negative connotations and that means 'transvestite' or 'transsexual'. In contrast, the English word 'gay' positively embraces the idea of being a masculine-identified homosexual. For most Thais this sounds much more positive and not too effeminate like *kathoey*. However, the Thai language did not borrow the English notion of straight or masculine-identified to connote the concept of *kathoey*. Especially gays of a higher socio-economic or educational status are afraid of being called *kathoey* since they feel this term would stigmatise them in Thai society and complicate their lives. In the Thai media and television shows, *kathoeys* are portrayed as queer clowns who are noisy, rude, and inferior to 'ordinary people'. So besides sexual deviance there is also an element of low social status linked to the term *kathoey*.

Especially since Chiang Mai defines the origins of its own richness as based on a diversity of ethnicity and culture, it has to deeply re-examine whether it fulfils the character it likes to display – and whether it provides openness and tolerance towards all its inhabitants and guests, regardless of them being 'different' to mainstream culture or sexual preference categories.

Recently at the Loy Krathong festival[3] 2010, one of the most important cultural events in Chiang Mai, ladyboys and gays were banned from taking part in the Krathong street parade. The organisers argued that since the obvious aims of the parade would be the beauty of the parade participants and decorations, only ladies and gentlemen would fit as participants. If there was any controversy about parade applicants, they would not be permitted to join the parade. Only after filing a complaint to the administrative court was an injunction given that led to a temporary allowance for gays and *kathoey* to join the Chiang Mai Loy Krathong festival.

These are just some highlights of how gays and *kathoeys* are still facing difficulties in expressing themselves and openly participating in cultural life in Chiang Mai. Even though one could speak of a general mood of tolerance towards gays and people of alternative sexual identities in Thailand, there apparently still are some specific shortcomings if one turns an eye to Chiang Mai and especially its formal concept of cultural identity. Apparently it is the latter which leads to a situation that tries to exclude gays and *kathoeys* from social and cultural life and stimulates others to depict them as disgusting and abnormal.

The Old Chiang Mai Tradition and the Way Forward: A Personal Outlook

In my personal view, the difficulty in expressing sexual preference and tolerance of this is the consequence of the lack of education and knowledge about how gender or sexuality is produced. It appears as a lack of respect for the diversity of Chiang Mai's various inhabitants and visitors who however are all entitled to equal rights.

Chiang Mai is a growing city with many development plans that aim to enhance the quality of life. Those plans, however, seem to give priority to mainstream tourist businesses rather than to the people living in the city. Chiang Mai heavily promotes

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3   The Loy Krathong festival is a time to accumulate/generate merit, and some of Thailand's most elaborate celebrations can be seen in Chiang Mai. The festival is believed to originate from an ancient practice of paying respect to the spirit of the waters.

a staged culture of old Lanna traditions for tourists. It thereby overlooks the point that the development of the cultural sphere must be seen as part of a long term inclusionary process mixing old and new, incorporating traditional aspects as well as leaving space for development and creativity which rely to the social reality on the ground. Culture in that sense does not only consist of cultural artefacts such as temples, ruins, and old Lanna traditions, but also of changing and diversified lifestyles, attitudes, and behaviour. Those people who often refer to the 'the old Chiang Mai tradition', 'the uniqueness of Lanna', 'the decent and proud culture' do not realise that the 'true cultural city' should be a city that is open to different cultures, different people, different ethnicities, and definitely different gender and sexual preferences. Aside from educating its people to quit using plastic bags, the city should as well start promoting and respecting gender diversity, especially in such a way that gender is not limited to being only masculine and feminine, gay or lesbian, but also includes other, alternative sexual orientations which are even greater in their complexity.

Today one can see that there is some space in Thailand for gays to articulate and express themselves. When they are however suspected of bringing any kind of "disgrace to the social rules", a lot of people will be tempted to quickly revert to the notion of "gays" and "normal people" as an instrument to distance themselves, or as a means of exclusion. As things now stand it appears there is still a long way to go to reach a situation where persons of diverse sexual preferences are able to self-confidently claim and express their own identities. Chiang Mai's people, however, can already grow and live together more peacefully by calling for greater analytical attention, by respecting and tolerating cultural and personal rights of identity and expression, and by allowing some space for alternative ways of life.

Gender Politics in Indonesia - Recent Developments: An Interview with Yuniyanti Chuzaifah

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*Yuniyanti Chuzaifah is one of the founders of 'Voice of Concerned Mothers' (*Suara Ibu Peduli *or SIP[2]) and later joined the 'Coalition of Indonesian Women' (*Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia *or KPI[3]). She studied at the Universities of Leiden and Amsterdam in the Netherlands, and later returned to Indonesia. Since March 2010 she has been the Director of the 'Indonesian National Commission on Violence against Women' (*Komnas Perempuan[4]*). This interview was conducted on 15 March 2010 at the organisation's premises in Jakarta.*

Ricarda Gerlach: How did the work of *Komnas Perempuan* start and how did the organisation develop?

Yuniyanti Chuzaifah: In the *Orde Baru*[5] there were two different mainstream women's organisations: *wanita* organisations [established by the state][6] and *perempuan* organisations, which were founded by women close to the opposition. The definition of the concept *wanita* is that of the *Orde Baru*'s: a woman's status is based on that of her husband. The woman is a housewife who cares for the family and ideally engages in voluntary work. A woman's rank in the state-founded organisation *Dharma Wanita*

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2 *Suara Ibu Peduli* was founded in 1997 in order to protest Suharto's politics and the economic crisis. The organisation distributed food (especially milk for babies and children) to mothers, as those commodities were hardly available to poorer Indonesians at that time. Its members also joined demonstrations against the regime.

3 *Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia* is one of the biggest and most influential women's organisations in Indonesia.

4 *Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan Indonesia.*

5 New Order (*Orde Baru*) – the Suharto Era in Indonesia (1965 until 1998).

6 Additions in square brackets were later added by the author.

is according to her husband's position in the administration.[7]

The *perempuan* organisation's basis is the progressive Muslim and it defined itself in opposition to the mainstream of the New Order and the *wanita* organisations. By that time we had learnt the lesson that we needed to develop a big organisation, not only a small foundation. We really had to think big to make any progress and to achieve change. I was one of the founders of *Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia* (KPI) and *Suara Ibu Peduli* (SIP) during the reformasi era. Our dream was to create a big, influential organisation. We referred to 'human rights' also in that period, but sometimes we had to be careful when talking about these with certain communities. For example when we worked in Aceh, we avoided using the terms 'human rights' or 'gender' and still do so. These concepts are considered political terms, so we had to be sensitive. It is a bit contradictory; on the one hand we feel it is a universal value and basic human rights principle, but on the other hand there is Islam or religion in general and cultural interpretations. If we avoid these terms we preserve the allergic culture concerning this vocabulary in some areas. If we have more time to discuss the issues in the communities we finally use the terms 'gender' or 'human rights' to further the understanding of these concepts. But if we do not, we avoid using these words.

GERLACH: What is your conception of 'gender'?

CHUZAIFAH: Gender is like a microscope – the strategy is always based on our experience. What happens about the violence or the discrimination in our daily lives? To explain the concept of gender in the communities we say: "Look it [injustice or violence] happens to your mother, your daughter, your sister." We do not use the word human rights or *ham*[8], but talk about the concepts. After a while we introduce the words and tell them this is also called 'human rights' or 'gender'. But if you do not like these words or are not familiar with them, you do not have to use them. And gradually we can go further about the principles. You really have to be smart to use these words, especially in Aceh. But among the people who are more secular-oriented, it is quite common to use these terms nowadays.

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7 *Dharma Wanita* was the state organisation for the wives of administrative staff during Suharto's New Order regime.

8 *Hak asasi manusia (ham)* is Indonesian for 'human rights'.

I became director of *Komnas Perempuan* recently. We focus on certain complicated issues which are not dealt with by other organisations, like political and strategic issues. For example we do not handle cases of domestic violence case by case, one by one. Here we refer these cases to other organisations. We use our own strategy of documenting cases of violence in Indonesia for government institutions and offering shelter. And we collect and provide reports on KDRT [*kekerasan di rumah tangga*; 'domestic violence']. We handle cases which meet certain criteria. When the state is involved in violence, e.g. police officers, then we focus on that. Our task is to defend human rights: when they are violated, we want to guarantee prevalence in the public debate.

GERLACH: Can you give an example, please?

CHUZAIFAH: Of course. Recently, we had a case in the academic sphere: a professor at the University of Indonesia had abused students and we wanted to have the perspective of the victims. This abuse happened many times with different students. We chose this case to amplify and improve our mechanism, so it can be more systematic in the future. We sent a letter to the director of the university and built an alliance with the fact-finding team. We urged the university leaders to establish a system to protect the students and to implement precautions for the future. And furthermore, we gave advice on how to establish an example of good practice – how to deal with such cases in general – so that, as a result, the victims' rights are respected. We work on improving the police's management of such cases, so that stigmatisation of the victim does not occur, and we enforce documentation and ensure that the curriculum is based on our suggestions.

GERLACH: What do you think about the progress? Does the mechanism work? Was it difficult to establish it or was there any resistance?

CHUZAIFAH: Previously we have had a lot of cases related to one police officer. We developed a conceptual strategy and out of this case we tried to develop a national

strategy. We co-operate with *Lemhannas*[9], the Department to educate the bureaucrats and high-level administrators. Through this we want to ensure that the curriculum of *Lemhannas* includes our expertise and uses it and spreads it.

Gerlach: How is your co-operation with the Ministry of Women's Empowerment [MOWE]? Do they accept your recommendations and implement them?

Chuzaifah: I think there is some progress. *Komnas Perempuan* is a national state body, but at the same time the staff here has a strong background as political activists. That creates a different dynamic. We had a *perpres* [*peraturan presiden*: 'presidential decree'] based on the fact that we still have enough flexibility to create our own organisation. We still have the possibility to hire staff from NGOs; we don't have to take the civil servants like *Komnas Ham* for instance. This is based on the law, so they have to employ civil servants – this circumstance influences the atmosphere there. Here, in *Komnas Perempuan* we employ around seventy former political activists. The co-operation with MOWE and the government is very changeable. The thinking of the New Order is still prevalent in some people's minds in MOWE. Sometimes our co-operation is a bit sensitive: We need to work with them, but at the same time we have to criticise them – it is sometimes an uneasy position. We have to be independent on human rights – this is our obligation. On the one hand our task concerning the government is to control it and to observe human rights violations. On the other hand we depend financially on the government and for our status as well. This dependency is still there and concerns the extension of our staff's contracts, so this is sometimes a bit critical. Our mandate is to ensure the government's policy about a debate and discourse on human rights and to publish human rights violations. This is only possible if we are independent. We have to give input to the policy-making process, so we need to criticise *and* co-operate. We really have to be smart in the way we operate. We do a lot of documentation, which is based on data and on evidence. Usually we use the diplomatic and polite way and we try to establish a mutual respect with the government, so that they appreciate our input. But sometimes we also use the critical approach, for example via the press. If there are hundreds of cases and

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9 *Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia).

there is a national debate about it, yes, we do interviews with the press to express our point of view. We express explicitly, that we are disappointed and name the points which are not being fulfilled or which are violated.

GERLACH: Can you please specify that?

CHUZAIFAH: Our strategy at *Komnas Perempuan* is to act as a bridge between society and the government. We provide data from society to the government: for instance migrant workers' cases and human and women's rights violations. Our main demand is that the government provides shelter and defines what an appropriate shelter is. Furthermore the government should improve its relationships with embassy staff and government members of the receiving countries who have a good gender perspective. The embassy's staff should help the migrant workers to handle administrative issues and support them. SBY [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] did not react to this demand, but we also have documentation about discriminatory by-laws, and we have demanded that SBY revise these.

GERLACH: That sounds interesting. Do you also refer to the CEDAW[10] in your argumentation concerning the discriminatory by-laws?

CHUZAIFAH: Yes, of course, and to pluralism and to Shari'a, too. In fact SBY reacted only in relation to the administrative approaches. We criticised that publicly. Not all our demands became his priority. But at the same time in his yearly speech he quoted our data – it became national data then. Take the case of PKI [*Partai Komunis Indonesia*; 'Indonesian Communist Party'] for example. The president accepted the demand that there should be compensation for the victims. Historically we have to revise the stigmatisation. Sometimes he reacts positively, but he wants these issues to be dealt with by his departments.

GERLACH: For which policies does Linda Gumelar, the recent minister for women's affairs, stand for?

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10 CEDAW is the 'Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women', which Indonesia ratified in 1984.

CHUZAIFAH: Compared to others she is very skilled in Public Relations. She is less bureaucratic. When we want to meet her it is easy – that is good for our co-operation. I think at certain important moments, she came and delivered her speech, recognised some criticisms, and benefited from the expertise of NGOs. We co-operate and have some similar policies. But we have also different approaches. When they want to implement gender mainstreaming they discuss the implementation of the CEDAW report, for example, and then they invite us as well for discussion. We are independent and both make our own report but refer to the data of the other as well.

GERLACH: How do you assess the gender mainstreaming process? Are there any obstacles?

CHUZAIFAH: The government wanted to draft a bill about implementing gender mainstreaming in different departments. It is very tiring, because if there is a change, e.g. a different officer or director, then they have to start again from the beginning. Many people in the administration are not very gender-sensitive or aware of gender mainstreaming processes.

I have a background in the women's movement. After *reformasi* I was working on women's empowerment and that means I was focusing on the secular approach which is not sufficient. We have a guarantee in our national bill that women and men have the same rights to be leader or head of the country. But in fact the most important influence is via the mosque or in the church: when the preacher says it is not allowed by religion, and then many people will believe it. And all the secular approaches automatically land in the bin. At the same time, we notice that we have to start at the basis of Islam; we start to embrace Islamic NGOs but not only women's NGOs. We start from really apolitical issues, for example reproductive rights. Then we invite important *ulama* [preachers] to talk about these issues. It sounds apolitical, but it means we start from the body politics, gradually talking about other issues like democracy, politics, everything about women and politics. We work with Islamic women's organisations concerning various issues as well. So it becomes more important for us in general to study women's issues and religious interpretations. And then there is a debate on women's politics and Islam.

GERLACH: How do you assess the situation in Indonesia? Would you say that the Islamic influence has increased? Do more people follow religious rules now?

CHUZAIFAH: Yes, I think so. Actually during the New Order, according to Islamist groups, they tried to get back their supremacy. During the Suharto era they discriminated against Islamic hardliners so there were a lot of victims and political prisoners out of these groups and furthermore there was no supremacy of the *ulama*. Their strategy in the beginning was, because the political oppression was very strong, to start the publication of books from Iran and the Middle East. If you go to a bookshop now you will see that these books are there, much more in numbers than the progressive books. So we decided to write a book about women and Islam to compete with these books. The book should be spread from Aceh to Papua and easy access should be given to all people: it should be simple and cheap and it should be possible to be acquired everywhere. We train a lot of people on topics like the foregoing, but we need more money. The radical Islamist groups do not need a lot of money: For example when they hold an Islamic gathering, an *ulama* is speaking, and it is very effective and cheap. Everybody will follow. Their strategy is completely different. Theirs is effective, easy, and massive, and we have only a couple of people, we need money. So we have to review our strategy.

GERLACH: Why do people follow the *ulama* so easily?

CHUZAIFAH: In Islamic culture, we have the saying that the *ulama* are the continuation of the prophet. Because the prophet has already died, it means that these people who continue his legacy are very powerful, very much respected, and authorised to interpret the Qur'an and the Hadith. So the *ulama*'s heuristics combined with feudalism – and in Indonesian culture feudalism is very prevalent – sometimes leads to interpretations which do not conform to our understanding of human rights.

GERLACH: So you think people want to follow a strong leader?

CHUZAIFAH: Yes, that is why we have to work and communicate with Islamic and Islamist groups. Prior, I was the gender advisor of the Islamic University in Jakarta

(UIN)[11]; we tried to be creative, we trained the preachers, we discussed with them, and we also tried to revise the curriculum in the university and in the *pesantren* [Islamic boarding school] based on human rights, gender, and environmental issues.

GERLACH: What was the response?

CHUZAIFAH: It was quite positive. Just a few of the *pesantren* are led by hardliners. In the media, its [Islamic radicalism's] presence is massive and overrated. People who have never been to Indonesia think it is a huge movement, but in fact it is not. I graduated from a *pesantren* boarding school. The director of that *pesantren* was very progressive. He preached pluralism, he was good friends with priests from other religions – like Christian preachers, Hindu and Buddhist priests – and we invited them and discussed religion and pluralism. Most of the *pesantren* are like that. Unfortunately the media prefers to cover the sensational, dramatic things. In fact, there are a lot of progressive *pesantren* out there.

GERLACH: So probably, at the centre of the issue, is the discussion about a pluralist or autocratic conception of Islam?

CHUZAIFAH: *Nahdlatul Ulama*[12] (NU) was liberal and now some of them have become radical traditionalists. *Muhammadiyah* in the beginning was progressive, and although modernist on women's issues, lately has become more progressive on women's issues than NU.

GERLACH: Is it possible to state that women's rights can be promoted within a religious/Islamic frame? Does it just depend on the interpretation? What is *Komnas Perempuan*'s strategy on dealing with religion?

CHUZAIFAH: Yes, of course. In Islam you have a thousand colours. You can find a range of very liberal, progressive people, and you can find fundamentalists. They have different policies, totally different perspectives about Islam and its interpretation.

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11 Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN).

12 *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), a traditionalist Muslim Organisation promoting the existence of a 'Javanese' Islam.

You can have hardliners in theology who do not care about politics, and there are religious hardliners who strictly oppose violence.

There are also different meanings about the interpretation of the word *jihad*. It is a misleading term. My father – he was an *ulama* – interpreted *jihad* as struggle. According to him *jihad* is the struggle to make the society better. Just lately it started to hold the connotation of violence. There are a lot of interpretations of *jihad*. My father was a very devout *ulama*, but once he said, "I did not want to go on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, Mecca, on the *hajj*, before my daughter and my son graduated from university." He meant to say that welfare of the family is more important than religious duties.

So, I have an Islamic background but I am working with a secular women's organisation. Sometimes this is an advantage. I can talk even with the hardliner community – using their symbols and language, like Arabic terms, makes them feel comfortable. For example, when I translate gender into Arabic, it means *musawah*. That can be translated as equality. When I use that word they feel comfortable. If you use Arabic words, they are associated with having an Islamic perspective and even an Islamic experience. So this is important for communicating and to not be excluded by them immediately. I try to talk with them even about human rights as universal phenomena, a universal principle.

But if you talk with real hardliners, do not talk about the differences, just talk about the common ground. The most extreme situation I experienced was after the riot of May 1998. It was a discussion about the rape of Chinese women. I was talking with some Muslim hardliners and they said that the women's movement ruins Islamic values. And I replied, "I am Muslim and proud of it." At the time I wore a scarf for that meeting and I was part of the women's movement. We talked about our concerns, and about the victims. I said: "Whoever they are, Chinese, Japanese, Muslim, even you, from the hardliners, if you are one of the victims of that human rights violation by the state or whoever, we need to protect you. Do not see the background – victims have to be protected." I confronted them with that. After a while they agreed. At the beginning they said they wanted to catch certain women activists who publicly said that the rapists should be prosecuted and punish them. But in the discussion it turned out that the problem with secular activists is that they are sometimes busy with the term itself and not strategic enough. Of course, people can be trained to

discuss with hardliners. The contradiction should not get stronger because of the way of communicating and the advocacy of certain values.

GERLACH: So it is probably important to speak the language of the group you are addressing?

CHUZAIFAH: It is very important and also the sign language. The real benefit I get from the secular and Islamic women's organisation is that there are different kinds of people in the communities with whom you have to speak in different ways. We have to be very careful about which words we use. We use local language and if you talk to the government it is again very different. We really have to know who we are talking to.

Lately we were invited to a juridical review at the Constitutional Court about the issue of not discriminating on the basis of religion. I suggested case studies about the *Ahmadiyah* based on our data and from our experience and the experience of other victims of the discriminated beliefs. And some members of the Islamist groups were attending, sitting on the balconies and shouting: "You are PKI! You are PKI!" [13] But I did not mind. Later I said to the leader of the group: "Okay, we can have another strategy and different views on this matter. But we can communicate and we should. We can talk in a polite way with each other." Some of our friends were very afraid to face this group, but I said it is okay. Usually there is the reflex that you want to avoid discussions or meetings with them and they treat women sometimes quite disrespectfully, like they use certain names of parts of the female body in a very rude way to silence women speakers. But I think they are afraid. We really have to be ready to face this problem. In *Komnas Perempuan* usually human rights are always an issue which is discussed as well in Europe, the US, and Asia-Pacific. But in the Middle East, there is a different perspective and it is not discussed over there. I think we should discuss with the activists from the Middle East at least about the migrant workers – because there are many Indonesian women who work there. We should talk about human rights with them. I consider Indonesia to have a strategic position. We consider ourselves as a bridge: We are not hardliners like in the Middle East,

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13 They meant to say: "You are a Communist!"

but we have a network with Western societies as well. We have a lot of experience in human rights and we are the biggest Muslim country in the world. So we can legitimately talk about Islam. We should develop this. We have the knowledge, so why do we not talk together? Even if we have a lot of problems in Indonesia, we can talk about general and global issues. If you talk about the global terrorists there are two different worlds: Islam and the West. Indonesia is in between. We constitute transnational meetings with other human rights organisations in other countries like Pakistan, Switzerland, India, Bangladesh, and Iran. But Saudi Arabia is limited; it is very difficult to enter into the scene there.

GERLACH: That is very interesting. What do you think then – which reforms are due in Indonesia?

CHUZAIFAH: The general gender role model is that the wife should obey and follow the husband and serve him. The culture is still very patriarchal and many people are very critical of the concept of gender equality. For them gender is linked to feminism. They say it is a product of Western countries, which does not belong to the Indonesian culture. It is considered as *haram* [forbidden] by religious Muslims. Also the recent enactment of the Anti-Pornography Law is a setback for women's rights as the law is designed to target women rather than men and criminalises the female body. The problem is that the terms are not defined sufficiently and that people are allowed to act arbitrarily to punish possible violators. Yet, a 'real' law should be implemented because on the streets and on the internet porn is available easily. Also children can consume it.

There need to be reforms concerning the marital rape for example. A new draft was recently rejected in Parliament. But a successful reform was the implementation of the Marriage Law 2003-2004. Domestic violence was considered as a violation of the law.

A general lack in Indonesia is that there are rights and laws, but they are not upheld in public and by the police. Then you do not need any laws, if no one is following them. This is a challenge for the future.

GERLACH: Thank you very much for your time!

Soziale Netzwerke philippinischer MigrantInnen in Österreich: Ein Interview mit Arlene Castañeda

Pascal Honisch[1]

Universität Wien, Österreich

*Arlene Castañeda emigrierte nach ihrem Pädagogik- und Englischstudium vor 20 Jahren von den Philippinen nach Österreich, wo sie Translationswissenschaft an der Universität Wien studierte. Neben ihrer hauptberuflichen Tätigkeit beim OPEC Fonds für internationale Entwicklung (*OPEC Fund for International Development *oder* OFID*) unterrichtet sie seit 1995 an der Volkshochschule Brigittenau in Wien. Sie ist Hauptorganisatorin der Österreichisch-Philippinischen Kultur- und Sprachwoche, die erstmals vom 2. bis 6. August 2010 stattfand. Als Mutter dreier Kinder engagiert sich Castañeda vor allem für die Erhaltung philippinischer Kultur und Sprache unter Jugendlichen in der österreichischen Diaspora und interessiert sich für den österreichisch-philippinischen soziokulturellen Austausch.*

Pascal Honisch: Frau Castañeda, Sie organisierten im Sommer 2010 eine philippinische Kultur- und Sprachwoche in Wien, mit der Sie gleichermaßen deutsch- wie philippinischsprachige InteressentInnen aller Altersgruppen ansprechen wollten. Wie wurde diese aufgenommen?

Arlene Castañeda: Sehr positiv. Die Teilnehmer und Teilnehmerinnen haben uns nach der Abschlussfeier gefragt, was wir in der folgenden Woche machen würden, und die Eltern wollten wissen, wann die zweite Kultur- und Sprachwoche stattfinden wird. Das ist ein sehr schönes Kompliment. Das Hauptziel des Zentrums für

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1 Pascal Honisch studiert Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie an der Universität Wien und ist von Oktober 2010 bis Februar 2011 Praktikant bei SEAS. Das Interview wurde am 2. November 2010 im SAS Palais Hotel, 1010 Wien, geführt.

österreichische und philippinische Kultur und Sprache (*Sentro ng Kultura at Wika ng Pilipinas at Austria*) ist, den Kindern und Jugendlichen die Muttersprache und Kultur der Eltern näherzubringen und die Wichtigkeit der beiden Kulturen zu betonen. Unsere Kinder wachsen philippinisch und österreichisch bzw. europäisch auf. Es ist uns ein großes Anliegen, beide Kulturen und Sprachen zu präsentieren und auf einer gleichberechtigten Ebene zu vermitteln. Durch die Kultur- und Sprachwoche ist uns das gut gelungen. Fünfzig Prozent der Kinder und Jugendlichen, die an dieser Veranstaltung teilgenommen haben, entstammen interethnischen Beziehungen und Ehen, bei denen die Mutter Filipina und der Vater Österreicher ist. Es waren zehn Mädchen und 8 Buben im Alter von 6 bis 17 Jahren in jener Woche anwesend. Die Kinder und Jugendlichen wurden gemeinsam von zehn österreichischen und philippinischen Trainern betreut. Eine Kultur- und Sprachwoche bietet nicht nur Kulturelles an. Die Teilnehmer lernen neue Leute kennen und machen gemeinsam in einer schulischen, aber dennoch lockeren Umgebung eine „Reise" in das Heimatland der Mutter bzw. der Eltern, bei der sie den Tagesablauf mitgestalten dürfen. Der Inhalt des Lehrplans wird durch Spiele und Musik belebt. Alle Trainer und Trainerinnen beherrschen mehrere Sprachen und gehen liebevoll mit den Kindern um. Während der Kultur- und Sprachwoche wurde das Thema Integration durch einfache Beispiele für Kinder verständlich aufbereitet. Respekt für einander wurde groß geschrieben. Die Kleinen lernten das Wort *Ate* (Anrede für ältere Schwester). Die Großen übernahmen während des Mittagessens die Verantwortung für die Kleinen, und diese halfen wiederum gerne beim Aufräumen. Ich denke, Selbstständigkeit und Zugehörigkeit verstärken die Persönlichkeit jedes Kindes – und das Gute war, dass die TrainerInnen jedem Kind viel Zeit widmen konnten.

HONISCH: Welche Themenbereiche umfasst eine solche Kultur- und Sprachwoche?

CASTAÑEDA: In der Kultur- und Sprachwoche wurde auf die Bedeutung der Muttersprache der Teilnehmer eingegangen. Das Themenspektrum wurde umfangreich gestaltet: von Geschichte, Geographie, Malen, Selbstverteidigungstechniken, Singen und Spielen bis hin zu Tanzen – sehr viel Philippinisches, aber auch Österreichisches. Die Kinder malten die österreichische und philippinische Flagge und lernten dabei die philippinischen Namen der Farben. Sie studierten den philippinischen Volkstanz

Kalapati ein, übten einfache Tricks der philippinischen Kampfkunst *Eskrima*, kochten philippinische Nachspeisen und spielten *Sungka,* ein beliebtes Gemeinschaftsspiel. Dabei zeigten sie viele Emotionen, als wir über das Thema „Ich bin ein Austro-Filipino" diskutierten. Dieses Modul wurde in den ersten zwei Stunden von zwei österreichischen und einer philippinischen Jugendlichen mittels Selbsterfahrung und Beobachtung geleitet. Jedem wurde die Frage gestellt: Was macht eine oder einen Österreicher bzw. Österreicherin oder einen Filipino bzw. Filipina aus? Was unterscheidet Österreicher von Filipinos? Also, welche Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede haben die österreichische und philippinische Kultur? Dieses Thema wurde dann von einer österreichischen Trainerin und einem philippinischen Trainer weiter vertieft. Am letzten Tag der Kultur- und Sprachwoche präsentierten die Kinder bei der Abschlussfeier die gelernten Volkslieder und -tänze sowie die Gedichte und Zeichnungen vor ihren Eltern und Verwandten. Anschließend wurden sie mit Zertifikaten, die von der Botschafterin Maria Lourdes O. Yparraguirre überreicht wurden, ausgezeichnet. Die gemalten Bilder der Kinder bestätigen viele Gemeinsamkeiten und zeigten doch zahlreiche Unterschiede der beiden Kulturen.

HONISCH: Was genau waren diese Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede?

CASTAÑEDA: Gemeinsamkeiten wie die Wichtigkeit der Familie, Freundlichkeit, Gastfreundschaft, Hilfsbereitschaft, Zugehörigkeit und Fleiß. Bilder von schneebedeckten Alpen bis zum weißen Strand von Boracay. Das farbenfrohe *Barrio Fiesta* beispielsweise, das wichtigste Fest für jeden Filipino im Inland und Ausland, ist österreichischen Dorffesten sehr ähnlich. Hier hört man schon einmal einen jungen Filipino seinen selbstkomponierten deutschen Rap vortragen. Allen Kindern schmeckt Reis mit Schnitzel. Sie tunken Äpfel in Salz ein, so wie es die Einheimischen auf den Philippinen machen. Die Philippinen sind ja auch nach dem habsburgischen König Philipp II. von Spanien benannt. Ferdinand Blumentritt, Ethnograph und Philippinen-Experte zu Lebzeiten, ist der berühmteste Österreicher auf den Philippinen, und jedes Schulkind kennt ihn. Er war mit dem philippinischen Nationalhelden Dr. Jose P. Rizal befreundet. All das und viel mehr verbindet Österreich und die Philippinen.

HONISCH: Sind für die Zukunft ähnliche Veranstaltungen in Bezug auf Kultur- und Spracherhalt in der Diaspora in Wien geplant?

CASTAÑEDA: Ja. Wir haben schon die zweite Kultur- und Sprachwoche in Planung, die voraussichtlich im August 2011 stattfinden wird. Unser Ziel dabei ist, die Zahl der Teilnehmer und unterstützenden Vereine zu verdoppeln. Die erste wurde Anfang 2010 auf Eigeninitiative organisiert, und 80 Prozent der gesamten Ausgaben waren selbstfinanziert. Leider konnte ich keine finanzielle Unterstützung von Seiten der Stadt Wien beantragen. Das Projekt wurde von *Mabuhay Accounting Services, Pinoy Relax, T-Mobile, Asian Bakehouse, Pinas First, Philippine National Bank Austria GmbH, Sipsundo Filipino Martial Arts, Rizal-Blumentritt Society* und der Botschaft der Philippinen unterstützt. Zudem war die Zusammenarbeit und Hilfsbereitschaft aller Eltern sehr groß. Wir planen auch einen Vortrag im Frühjahr, bei dem wir Philippinen-Experten aus Deutschland, Österreich und den Philippinen zum Thema „*The Global Filipino Youth: What is his personal identity?*" einladen.

HONISCH: Existieren noch weitere ähnliche Veranstaltungen mit Philippinen-Bezug in Österreich? Wenn ja, wer organisiert sie?

CASTAÑEDA: Es gibt circa 60 philippinische Vereine und Organisationen hier in Österreich, die meisten davon in Wien, von denen jeder eine bestimmte Herkunfts-region repräsentiert. Sie organisieren karitative Veranstaltungen und sammeln kleine Spenden für die Ärmsten oder Opfer von Taifunen auf den Philippinen. Keiner kann genau sagen, welchem Verein wie viele angehören, da jeder in verschiedenen Vereinen gleichzeitig Mitglied sein kann. Derzeit leben laut Angaben der Botschaft der Philippinen circa 30.000 Filipinos in Österreich. Die Hälfte davon sind Kinder und Jugendliche. Die genaue Zahl, wie viele Mitglieder dieser Gemeinschaft in Wien leben, ist mir leider auch nicht bekannt.

HONISCH: Was sind die Ziele und Aufgabenbereiche solcher Vereine?

CASTAÑEDA: Das Zusammensein. Jeder Verein bietet so etwas wie einen Familienersatz für seine Mitglieder. Alle Filipinas und Filipinos, die hier leben, aber deren Verwandt-

schaft und Freundeskreis auf den Philippinen ist, geht zu einem solchen Verein, um sich geborgen zu fühlen. Außerdem kann man so Lands- und Provinzleute kennenlernen. Die philippinischen Vereine sind geographisch gegliedert. Jeder Verein repräsentiert bestimmte Regionen. Das allgemeine Ziel ist es, ein Netzwerk, Zusammenkunft oder einfach das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu schaffen. Die „Philippinische Gottesdienst Gemeinde" sammelt Spenden für die Bildung der armen Kinder und organisiert Projekte mit Themen wie Orientierung oder Selbstfindung für austro-filipinische Jugendliche. Die Botschaft der Philippinen bietet im Sommer Wochenendmodule zu Themen wie Geschichte, Volkslieder, Tänze, Spiele und Sprache des Landes an. Dieses Projekt wird größten Teils von der *Philippine Community* ehrenamtlich unterstützt.

HONISCH: Bleiben wir gleich beim Thema „Leben in der Diaspora". Welche Bedeutung hat die Muttersprache der Eltern für die Kinder hier?

CASTAÑEDA: Sie ist sehr wichtig. Es ist weder für die Eltern noch für ihre Kinder einfach, Kultur und Sprache zweier Länder in einen paritätischen Lernprozess unterzubringen. Es ist unheimlich tragisch, dass die Wenigsten ihre Kinder mit ihrer ursprünglichen Sprache vertraut machen. Die Kinder und Jugendlichen sprechen, wie die meisten MigrantInnenkinder, untereinander Deutsch. Das finde ich in Ordnung und ganz natürlich. Dennoch denke ich, es ist unsere Aufgabe als Eltern, den Kindern zu zeigen, wie wichtig die Muttersprache ist, beispielsweise indem wir mit ihnen diese Sprache bewusst leben und auch ohne Zwang sprechen. Natürlich kann ein Kind auch mehr als eine Muttersprache haben. Es ist wissenschaftlich erwiesen, dass je besser ein Kind seine Muttersprache bzw. -sprachen beherrscht, es umso einfacher ist, eine Zweit- oder weitere Fremdsprachen zu erlernen. Das geschieht am besten zu Hause mit der Familie und den Verwandten oder Freunden. Achtzig Prozent der TeilnehmerInnen meiner Kurse in der Volkshochschule sind zurzeit Jugendliche aus Mischehen. Vor fünf Jahren waren es nur 20 Prozent. Die meisten damals waren österreichische Väter. Das ist eine Bestätigung, dass Kinder an der Muttersprache und Kultur der Eltern sehr interessiert sind. Ich finde, es ist sehr hilfreich, in der Muttersprache Tagalog, Bisaya oder Ilokano zu sprechen. Kinder fragen viel über Grammatik, Syntax, Vokabeln, und es ist natürlich nicht immer einfach, diesen Wissensdurst zu stillen, vor allem wenn man berufstätig ist. Ich würde am Anfang nicht allzu viel davon

erklären – das würde ihr Interesse dämpfen. Ich versuche beispielsweise mit meinen Kindern jedes Wochenende eine philippinische Geschichte oder ein Märchen auf Filipino zu lesen. Wir hören sehr oft tagalische Musik und sehen Filme in Tagalog an. Auf diese Weise lernen sie nicht nur die Sprache kennen, sondern auch ein bisschen Kultur und Literatur und bekommen ein Bild vom philippinischen Alltag. Meine Muttersprache ist Ibanag, und diese wird in den Provinzen Isabela und Cagayan auf Nordluzon gesprochen. Allerdings spreche ich mit meinen Kindern Tagalog, die Basis der Nationalsprache Filipino, damit sie sich im Idealfall überall auf den Philippinen, wo es circa 171 Sprachen gibt, verständigen können. Meine Kinder sind 16, 11 und 10 Jahre alt. Ich habe zwei Töchter und einen Sohn. Meine älteste Tochter hat bis zum dritten Lebensjahr Tagalog gesprochen. Dann begann sie plötzlich Deutsch mit mir zu reden. Die Geschwister sprechen untereinander natürlich auch Deutsch, aber wenn wir auf den Philippinen sind, sprechen sie flüssig mit den Großeltern und Verwandten Tagalog.

HONISCH: Können Probleme auftreten, wenn man mehrsprachig aufwächst?

CASTAÑEDA: Natürlich gibt es diverse Schwierigkeiten, vor allem wenn die Eltern nicht konsequent bleiben und ihre Sprachen mischen. Meiner Meinung nach entsteht dadurch eine Unordnung im Kopf des Kindes, und es kennt sich nicht mehr aus. Man muss zumindest seine Sätze einsprachig halten. Dann können sich Kinder mit der Zeit optimal an die verschiedenen Sprachsituationen anpassen. Jetzt spricht das Kind Englisch, dann Österreichisch und Philippinisch – *Code Switching* fällt ihnen also dann sehr einfach.

HONISCH: Wie würden Sie die Tagalog-Kenntnisse der zweiten Generation bzw. der aus interethnischen Beziehungen entstammenden Kinder einstufen?

CASTAÑEDA: Die zweite Generation kann gut Tagalog sprechen. Untereinander unterhalten sie sich in Deutsch und Tagalog. Viele rappen und singen oder schreiben ihren Verwandten und Freunden auf den Philippinen in Tagalog und Englisch. Kinder aus Mischehen können allerdings kaum die Sprache ihrer Mutter, da zu Hause fast nur Deutsch oder Englisch gesprochen wird. Manche haben die Sprache verlernt oder verlernen diese, sobald sie in den Kindergarten gehen – und hier beginnt das Dilemma

für Kind und Mutter, wenn tagalische und deutsche Wörter in einem Satz verwendet werden.

HONISCH: In gewisser Weise thematisieren Sie damit ja auch den Mangel an Philippinischem in den soziokulturellen Institutionen dieses Landes. Wie funktioniert denn überhaupt die Vernetzung der philippinischen Gemeinschaft innerhalb Österreichs und mit dem Heimatland?

CASTAÑEDA: Oft gibt es gemeinschaftliche Veranstaltungen von und für Filipinos und Filipinas, beispielsweise Geburtstage, Hochzeiten etc., in deren Rahmen man sich austauschen kann. Kinder von – zumindest teilweise – philippinischen Ehepaaren kommen mit und bringen ihre Freunde. So lassen sich Kontakte herstellen. Jeder Verein lädt den anderen ein. Eine der besten Gelegenheiten, um Kontakte zu anderen Filipinos zu knüpfen, wäre wohl in der Kirchenmesse. Die größte Zusammenkunft ist das *Barrio Fiesta* – sowohl im Inland als auch im Ausland. Das ist eine jährliche Feier anlässlich der Unabhängigkeit der Philippinen von Spanien. Dieses Fest bringt die Filipinas und Filipinos vom Norden bis zum Süden des Landes zusammen. Durch moderne Medien sind sie heutzutage natürlich auch weltweit verbunden und erreichbar. Durch Chat-Communities wie Facebook, Skype usw. werden alte High-School-Freunde wieder vereint. Per SMS oder Telefon sind die Filipinos im Ausland immer auf dem neuesten Stand der politischen Lage des Heimatlandes. Per Videotelefon sehen die Großeltern auf den Philippinen sofort ihr neugeborenes Enkelkind in Wien.

HONISCH: Das „Enkelkind in Wien" ist ein gutes Stichwort. Welche Faktoren, meinen Sie, sprechen für Filipinas und Filipinos, nach Österreich zu ziehen, um sich hier ein neues Leben aufzubauen?

CASTAÑEDA: Ökonomische, familiäre oder studienrelevante. Wenn die Möglichkeit zur Emigration gegeben ist, wird sie zumeist auch ergriffen. Der Export von Arbeitskräften garantiert Geldüberweisungen und somit eine wichtige Devisenquelle für das Land. Natürlich hat diese Entwicklung nicht nur Vorteile. Ein Problem, das so entsteht, wäre beispielsweise das des Braindrain. Die gebildeten Leute und Akademiker kehren dem Land den Rücken, um im Ausland eine bessere Zukunft zu finden. Dieser Prozess findet

schon seit 40 Jahren statt. Eigentlich ist das nichts Schlechtes. Das Beunruhigende dabei ist aber die darauffolgende oft unterqualifizierte Beschäftigung vieler dieser Migranten im Zielland. Circa 80 Prozent haben einen Universitäts-, Kolleg- oder High-School-Abschluss, müssen hier aber in teilweise äußerst anspruchslosen Berufsfeldern ihr Geld verdienen. Die ersten Arbeitskräfte kamen Anfang der 1970er-Jahre von den Philippinen nach Österreich. Mittlerweile haben die Ersten von ihnen auch schon österreichische Enkel. Viele der MigrantInnen werden heutzutage in Arbeitsfelder gedrängt, die von ihnen nicht gewollt sind. Sie nehmen eben einfach, was da ist. Ein philippinischer praktischer Arzt, der in seinem Heimatland eine eigene Ordination hatte, darf hier nicht einmal als Assistenzarzt arbeiten, sondern allerhöchstens die Krankenpflege übernehmen. Ein philippinisches Medizinstudium wird hier nicht anerkannt.

HONISCH: Kann man an diesen Umständen etwas ändern?

CASTAÑEDA: Auf der einen Seite gibt es leider viele Filipinos, die nicht gut Deutsch sprechen, selbst wenn sie bereits seit mehreren Jahren in Österreich leben. Auf der anderen Seite arbeiten viele in österreichischen Firmen sowie im Krankenpflegebereich oder Tourismus, wo sehr gute Deutschkenntnisse eine Voraussetzung sind. In der Kultur- und Sprachwoche wurde *Deutsch para sa mga Migrante* [Deutsch für philippinische MigrantInnen] angeboten – leider wurde die gewünschte Anzahl an Teilnehmern nicht erreicht. Es hängt alles sowohl vom Willen wie auch von der Möglichkeit zur Integration ab. Über 300 Filipinas und Filipinos arbeiten in internationalen Organisationen wie UNO, IAEA, CTBTO, UNOV, OPEC und diversen Botschaften und Missionen. Die meisten haben sich sehr gut in ihrem Adoptivland integriert. Die Krankenschwestern und -pfleger sind sehr beliebt und geschätzt.

HONISCH: Umgekehrt hört man auch immer wieder von Österreicherinnen und Österreichern, die auf die Philippinen ziehen. Auch als Urlaubsregion sind sie sehr gefragt. Planen Sie Ihren Lebensmittelpunkt irgendwann wieder dorthin zurück zu verlegen oder haben Sie in Österreich nun Ihr Zuhause gefunden?

CASTAÑEDA: Wenn ich in Pension gehe, würde ich im Winter auf den Philippinen bleiben und im Sommer hier in Österreich. Es gibt jetzt viele günstige Angebote

für *Balikbayan* [*Expatriates*] und Österreicher, in den Bau von Immobilien auf den Philippinen zu investieren. Es ist wohl eher der touristische Wert des Landes und die eigene finanzielle Situation, die den Ausschlag geben, im hohen Alter dorthin zu ziehen. Man kann sich dort dann auch leicht eine eigene Krankenschwester oder einen Krankenpfleger leisten, weil die Arbeitskraft im Vergleich zu Österreich wesentlich günstiger ist. Auf dem Lande ist Hektik ein Fremdwort. Die Sonne scheint jeden Tag, und trotz eines vorbeiziehenden Sturmes lächeln die Menschen. Ich hatte das Glück, nach Österreich zu kommen, und das Privileg, hier bleiben zu dürfen. Aus meinen Erfahrungen und Erlebnissen in beiden Ländern ist ein neues Selbstbewusstsein und eine neue Identität in mir entstanden, geprägt von Stärken und Schwächen beider Kulturen – eine sehr gute Mischung. Meine Kinder sind stolz darauf, Austro-Filipinos zu sein. Meine Heimat war und werden die Philippinen bleiben, aber im Moment ist hier mein Zuhause. Ich könnte mir zurzeit nicht vorstellen, woanders zu leben. Wir fühlen uns sehr wohl in Österreich.

Honisch: Vielen Dank für das Gespräch.

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Asia has witnessed dynamic economic, demographic, and social transformations during the last few decades. Especially India and several countries in East and South-East Asia have already become important global players, while only a few decades ago most of them were considered to be backward and dominated by agriculture. Increasingly complex economic interrelationships between the more developed countries and the so-called Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs), as well as the soaring attractiveness of developing (mass) tourism destinations, have led to a growing demand for regional experts, for example as consultants on economic matters, politics, international development co-operation, tourism, or mass media. For these reasons, at the Department of Geography and Regional Research, University of Vienna[3], we offer the possibility of specialising in 'development studies/development co-operation' within the 'Master of Geography/Regional Research' curriculum. We provide a regional focus on Asia, especially South-East Asia.

Geographical research on Asia at the University of Vienna started about one hundred years ago. Until the 1970s, however, geographical studies mainly focused on the Middle and the Near East. Starting at the beginning of the 1980s, the Department

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shifted its research and teaching focus towards East and South-East Asia. At that time, Asia's economic boom aroused worldwide attention. So did its economic bust in the late 1990s. In this context, issues of spatial and social inequalities came into focus. Moreover, the region has been experiencing rapid changes in the context of demographic development, urbanisation, internal and international migration, tourism development, and economic-agrarian development.

The Department's curriculum is designed to strengthen knowledge and understanding of this dynamic region using social science approaches and qualitative and quantitative research methods. Biannually, the Department organises, in co-operation with our partner universities in South-East Asia, a field excursion where students apply a combination of theoretical and empirical approaches on location.

Current Research Interests and Teaching Activities

Within the scope of the research clusters 'Demographic and Socioeconomic Transformations' and 'Megacities, Globalisation, and Migration', dynamic processes of demographic, economic, social, cultural, and political transformations in South-East Asia are discussed and analysed.

The study of structures and movements of populations has been a core element of human geographical research. When the department launched its regional focus on South-East Asia in the 1970s, governments and international organisations alike considered the 'baby boom', with its high fertility rates causing rapid population growth, to be the main dilemma of population development. Today we can demonstrate that birth rates have dropped and dramatic changes in population age structure are putting great pressure on the countries of South-East Asia. Another phenomenon that influences population structures is the ongoing development of internal and international migration, whose causes, processes, and dynamics are still insufficiently documented. In this context, the department principally focuses its research on transnational labour migration, rural-urban interactions, ethnic entrepreneurship, and 'Third World' megacities. A leisure-orientated form of mobility is tourism. Despite a series of shocks (e.g. political crises, tsunamis), South-East Asia has experienced impressive growth in both international and domestic tourism. A complex travel industry offering various forms of tourism – ranging from SSS

('sun, sea, sex'), cultural, ethnic, and nature tourism to urban, health, and retiree tourism – has emerged. Current research projects of the department analyse host perspectives and power relations at various travel destinations, and study the causes and impacts of 'amenity migration' and second home development. Modernisation and globalisation have brought benefits to parts of society; simultaneously, however, regional disparities and social inequalities between mainstream society and minority groups are increasing.

Demographic and socioeconomic transformation processes

- Spatial disparities and social inequality
- Fertility decline, demographic ageing, and their consequences
- 'Searching for Paradise': European 'amenity migration' and second home development in South-East Asia
- Ethnic tourism: Uncovering intercultural encounters in destination communities
- Dynamics and impact of mass tourism; new forms of sustainable travel

Megacities, Globalisation, and Migration

- International migration in South-East and East Asia: Dynamics, structure, and changing patterns
- Rethinking rural-urban migration: Changing impacts on city and countryside?
- 'Third World' megacities: Development, globalisation, and migration
- The role of NGOs and CBOs (community-based organisations) in new forms of urban governance in megacities
- Low-cost housing in Asian megacities: Participatory approaches and their effectiveness.

Selected Publications of the Department Staff

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Husa, K., & Wohlschlägl, H. (2002). Southeast Asia: A New Global Player in the System of International Labour Migration. *Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde (Englische Sondernummer 2002: International Migration – Problems, Prospects, Policies)*, 16-28.

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The 'Southeast Asia Movie Theater Project'

PHILIP JABLON[1]

The 'Southeast Asia Movie Theater Project' is a one-person initiative to document the stand-alone movie theatres of the Mekong region. I began the project in 2008 in response to the demolition of the last two operating stand-alone theatres in Chiang Mai, Thailand – my home from 2006 to 2010. This event seemed to signify a sea change in the city's social life, inspiring me to deepen my understanding of the civic role that these venues played. Through photography I have tried to build a visual archive of the architecture, spatial typology, and cultural life that the stand-alone movie theatres embody. They constitute physical representations of distinct eras in the region's social and cultural past, while increasing the value of urban landscapes.

In addition to photography, I compile oral histories from area residents, former and current owners, employees, and patrons of the theatres I document, as a means of creating a multimedia ethnographic narrative specific to each theatre. Moreover, the regional scope of the project serves as a platform to compare and contrast the historical experiences unique to these venues in both cross-border and centre-periphery contexts. With an emphasis on breadth of research, I have conducted fieldwork in more than half of Thailand's provincial capitals, most of Laos, and half a dozen cities in Myanmar.

The images exhibited here are just a sample of the many hundreds of theatres already archived by the 'Southeast Asia Movie Theater Project'. Their varied states, from derelict and abandoned, to converted and still operating, speak to the wide political-cultural differences found throughout the Mekong countries. In Thailand there were once more than 700 stand-alone movie theatres nationwide. Today there

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Waziya Cinema. YANGON, MYANMAR: The *Waziya* was built while Burma was still a British colony. Its ornate beaux-arts architecture signifies the country's economic clout of Burma in the roaring 1920s.

Toan Thang Cinema. HO CHI MINH CITY, VIETNAM: This is one of the last pre-communist theatres still in operation in Ho Chi Minh City. During my visit, however, I was informed it would soon be closing.

Thahan Bok (Army) Theater. LOPBURI, THAILAND: The *Thahan Bok* was a gift of the fascist government of Field Marshall Phibunsonkram in 1941. Bauhaus-inspired architecture had made its way over to Thailand during the Second World War and many public works projects employed the style as a symbol of modernity.

Movie in the open. CHAIYAPHUM, THAILAND: The projectionist at an open-air movie screening gives the peace sign. Photo was taken during a town fair in Chaiyaphum in 2010.

Soe San Cinema football den. THAZI, MYANMAR: Football dens like this one have become widespread in Myanmar. They serve as places where local crowds can meet to watch football broadcasts from overseas. The *Soe San* employs this smaller side room as one.

are fewer than 30 still in operation, mostly found in district capitals in the Eastern and North-Eastern provinces.

Across the Eastern border in Laos, with its fewer urban areas, there is only one currently operating stand-alone theatre, used mostly for government functions. As of May 2010, the bulk of movie theatres in Myanmar cities between Yangon and Mandalay have been found to be in working order, though frequently with low customer turnout. For the next phase of the project, I will cover the delta cities and ethnic states of Myanmar, before turning my attention over to Vietnam.

As many of Southeast Asia's cities are in the midst of or approaching sweeping changes in their social and physical structures, the time to document is immediately. In the rush to keep pace with change, policy makers frequently demolish a city's out-moded buildings, overlooking the permanence of such decisions and the fact that the buildings can represent a city's competitive advantage. In carrying out this project, I hope to cultivate an appreciation for stand-alone movie theatres in the Mekong region, before perceived redevelopment imperatives lead to their destruction.

Shwe Hintha Cinema. Bago, Myanmar: Interior of the *Shwe Hintha*, an art deco gem dating to 1928, still in operation. Movies are projected using an LCD projector.

Scala Theatre. Bangkok, Thailand: The concessions seller scoops a bag of popcorn at the *Scala*. Dating to 1969, the *Scala* is the last of Thailand's world-class movie palaces still in operation.

Waziya Cinema. YANGON, MYANMAR: Ticket taker at the *Waziya*.

Chinatown Rama. BANGKOK, THAILAND: The lobby of the Bangkok's *Chinatown Rama*. Once a staple of Chinese entertainment, starting out as a live venue for Peking Opera in the 1930s. In later years it developed into a 'cruising ground' for gay men, though current films are still screened daily.

Saengcharoen Theatre. MAHASARAKHAM, THAILAND: Since closing its doors as a movie theatre in the early 2000s, the S*aengcharoen* has become the *Church of Hope Mahasarakham.*

Las Vegas Theatre. KORAT, THAILAND: Since ceasing to operate as a movie theatre, the *Las Vegas* has been converted into a retail shopping centre. Numerous vending stalls can be seen occupying the floor of the once vast *Las Vegas.*

Meuang Thong Rama. Singburi, Thailand: Detritus lays strewn across the lobby of the retired theatre. The trademark pyramid of Apex, along with the word 'scala' still hangs over the lower lobby.

Lao Jaleun Theater. Savanaket, Lao: Remnants of a prolific movie past. Discarded film litters the floor of the abandoned and rapidly decaying theatre.

Chiang Kong Rama. Chiang Khong, Thailand: The owner of the defunct *Chiang Kong Rama* displays a poster honoring the death of Mitr Chaibancha, Thailand's most beloved actor of the 1960s. Mitr fell from a helicopter while performing a stunt for the film *Insee Daeng*. The poster used to hang inside the *Chiang Kong Rama*, now it is a keepsake in the family home.

Taphan Hin Rama. Taphan Hin, Thailand: Mr Chalerm Praditsuwan, owner of the defunct *Taphan Hin Rama,* holds an old photo depicting a well-dressed audience at his theatre while explaining the social importance that his theatre held for the Taphan Hin community, before it was economically undermined by the dubious business practices of a larger film exhibition company.

Haacke, Jürgen & Morada, Noel M. *(Eds.) (2010).*
Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum.
Oxon, UK and New York: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-46052-1. 280 pages.

Regional security architecture is one of the Asia-Pacific region's pressing issues at this moment. The need to manage, if not resolve, the multifarious issues besetting the region has been pushed by advocates of regional arrangements as the reason for re-evaluating where the region is and the future directions that it should take. This book is an excellent contribution to that debate. Edited by Jürgen Haacke of the London School of Economics and Noel M Morada of the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, *Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum* brings together in one volume the most authoritative analysis to date of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) by a set of scholars and analysts who have been contributing to the analysis of Asia-Pacific regional institutions and issues.

The book has twelve chapters, a bibliography, an index, and, mercifully, a list of abbreviations necessary for readers to navigate the alphabet soup that ASEAN and related processes constantly generate. The various chapters are divided into overviews, security- or issue-related discussion, and country studies of participant-states' relations with the ARF. The first chapter by Haacke and Morada provides a summary of the other contributions to this volume and also sets forth the aims of the book. Haacke and Morada discuss the concept of co-operative security, which has been closely associated with the ARF and its role in forging regional order. They also seek to frame the discussion within the context of the security environment in which the ARF finds itself.

The second chapter, by Morada, is an overview of the origins and evolution of the ARF. He places the beginnings of the ARF in the context of a post-Cold War world and its influence over the ASEAN member states to create a multilateral security framework encompassing the Asia-Pacific region. He also investigates the reason why ASEAN has the leading role in the ARF, its security agenda, the impacts of 9/11 and the Bali bombings on the ARF's institutional and security concerns, and the expansion of

its activities after 2001. Morada's main thesis is that the ARF has not progressed into a true regional institution and towards preventive diplomacy because of the conflict between the activist participating states, who seek the implementation of security co-operation agreements, and those states which are fearful of losing a portion of their sovereignty if they engage in such activities. This has affected and will continue to affect the future directions of the ARF. Brad Glosserman, Executive Director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, authors the third chapter on the United States' engagement with the ARF, which he describes as a delicate balancing act. Glosserman traces the US's engagement with the region since the Cold War up to the Second Bush Administration. He emphasises that the US remains suspicious of multilateral institutions that may seem to constrain it (p. 46) and that it will continue to strengthen its bilateral alliances where it has the advantage. However, the US has also been keen in promoting Track II engagements and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Its US Committee (or USCSCAP), is active in ensuring the flow of information between it and the US Government.

The fourth chapter, by Christopher Hughes (LSE), focuses on China and its participation in the ARF. His main argument is that China's participation in the ARF is more complex than the common assumption that it was ASEAN's way of socialising China into its 'way'. Rather, when China perceives that its national security is being compromised, the ARF becomes of little value to it. The Forum's main use for China is that it is able to use the principles on which the ARF is built to articulate and advance its national interests. In the fifth chapter, Takeshi Yuzawa (JIIA) tackles Japan's relationship with the ARF. According to Yuzawa, Japan was enthusiastic in participating in the ARF at its inception because it was a means for lessening suspicion of its potentially active role in Asia-Pacific security. Also, Japan believed that after the Cold War the time was ripe for the region to expand political and security co-operation. However, it eventually lost its enthusiasm for the ARF because of the lack of progress in addressing what Japan sees as security concerns in the region.

Kuniko Ashizawa (Oxford Brookes University) then discusses the Australian-Japan-US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) and its potential impact on the ARF. She argues that these states' growing disenchantment with the ARF has led them to experiment with a new type of relationship called 'minilateralism'. While new political leaders in these states have led to the eventual watering-down of active dialogues among

the three, defence and military officials have found the TSD a useful avenue for consultation and dialogue on their particular remits. In the seventh chapter, Rizal Sukma of the Jakarta-based CSIS takes a critical stand towards ASEAN's role as the driver of the ARF, labelling it as only accidental. For Sukma, ASEAN's claim to centrality is tenuous and resented by other participants. Sukma sees that there will be no significant change in the ARF's future because of ASEAN's own inability to consolidate its internal political and security co-operation.

The eighth chapter by Haacke on the ASEAN Regional Forum and its response to transnational challenges focuses on the challenge of securitising certain transnational issues and the problems of their adoption at the national level. Haacke provides a discussion of securitisation theory and applies this to a whole range of issues being discussed in the ARF. Participating states have only moved towards full securitisation of international terrorism but have remained wary of securitising other issues such as migration, maritime security, and disaster management. The ninth chapter, by Morada, on the ARF and counter-terrorism examines the ARF's response to international terrorism after 9/11 in the US and the Bali bombings in Indonesia. For Morada, ASEAN's perception of terrorism found re-articulation in the ARF statements (p. 151). While there was initial convergence between the US and ASEAN on co-operation in combating terrorism using the ARF as platform, they eventually diverged because of the unilateral invasion of Iraq by the former. ASEAN and like-minded participating states found themselves opposing the US through the ARF. Nevertheless, the ARF continued with the dialogues and initiatives in countering terrorism.

In the next chapter, JN Mak, an independent analyst, discusses maritime security in the context of the ARF. His main issue with the ARF is its focus on dialogue rather than action. For a forum with many participants which are maritime or at least coastal states, the ARF should have been at the forefront of maritime security, however the ARF has had a limited maritime agenda. There are differing conceptions of maritime security within the ARF as maritime states tend to be at odds with coastal states over the critical uses of the ocean. For Mak, maritime security is an area where national interests produce deep conflicts among participant states in the ARF. Since the ARF uses ASEAN norms, especially consensus decision-making, inevitably progress in maritime co-operation is lost at the ARF level. In the eleventh

chapter, David A Boyd and Jörn Dosch of the University of Leeds examine the potential impacts of securitisation practices at the national level on the management of security challenges at the wider regional level: in ASEAN and the ARF. Choosing Indonesia and the Philippines as case studies, they try to determine whether security practices in the two states' national affairs have affected ASEAN and the ARF's regional responses to security challenges, finding that the two states' proactive position on transnational challenges do have an impact on ASEAN's security co-operation agenda. However, the links between national security discourse and securitisation in the ARF are not established because securitisation moves are reflective of government perceptions of structural challenges and possible impact on national interests.

Haacke and Morada provide a concluding chapter in which they ask if there is only more of the same with regard to ARF and co-operative security. There are many contradictory positions and stances on security issues in the ARF. Major powers themselves are divided on the future directions of the ARF. ASEAN still has to effectively provide leadership in the ARF, otherwise it will be eventually relegated only to the role of confidence builder. The ARF has engaged in practical co-operation on some transnational challenges such as terrorism and disaster management. Haacke and Morada contend that preventive diplomacy is not necessarily a barrier to further security co-operation but the question is how to promote it under the ARF (p.224). In the evolving regional security architecture, the ARF is limited in its role as major powers have their own agenda in developing alliances and bilateral co-operation. In conclusion, they posit the question: What if the ARF did not exist? Perhaps the region would not be the same.

Clearly, this book is a heavy read. It is full of empirical detail and sophisticated analysis of the complex security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. The book's main strength is its readability: jargon expressions are explained well and the authors make the effort to ensure that their main points are understood. The ordering of the chapters also allows people without a background on the ARF to understand the context around which the discussions in the more complex chapters revolve. The book also covers the essentials of the ARF: the complex relationship among participating states, the security challenges in the region, and the role of regional organisations and the major powers. The book could have been improved with a separate chapter on securitisation theory and a discussion of regional security

concepts and theories. These would have been helpful in providing a common point of departure among the chapter contributors. Overall, the book is an outstanding addition to the literature on the ARF and security co-operation. Policymakers can use the lessons in the book to understand the reason why there are tensions surrounding the ARF's future directions. Students and scholars of the Asia-Pacific, South-East Asia, and ASEAN security and international relations would do well to have this book in their collection as it might end up as a classic due to the breadth of its coverage and the depth of its analysis.

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Kingsbury, Damien (2009).
East Timor: The Price of Liberty.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN: 978-0-230-60641-8. 246 Seiten.

Seit 2002 unabhängig, ist Timor-Leste einer der jüngsten Nationalstaaten der Welt. Der Weg zur Unabhängigkeit verlief, wie auch in vielen anderen Fällen, alles andere als friedlich. Mit welchen vielschichtigen Problemen und Herausforderungen Timor-Leste auf dem Weg in die Unabhängigkeit konfrontiert war und ist, steht im Mittelpunkt der Arbeit mehrerer Wissenschafter und Forscher. Einer von ihnen ist der Politologe und Koordinator der australischen Beobachtungsmissionen von 1999 und 2007 Damien Kingsbury mit seinem jüngsten Werk *East Timor: The Price of Liberty*.

In acht Kapiteln setzt sich der Autor mit der Geschichte Timor-Lestes, den präkolonialen Strukturen, portugiesischer und indonesischer Fremdherrschaft sowie der anschließenden UN-Verwaltung und der Zeit der Unabhängigkeit auseinander. Kingsbury befasst sich dabei mit lokalen Widerstandsbewegungen und dem regionalpolitischen Kontext der postkolonialen Phase um schlussendlich, vor allem Bezug nehmend auf die Unruhen von 2006 und den Machtwechsel bei den Wahlen 2007, die Frage zu stellen, ob Timor-Leste als *Failed State* zu bewerten sei oder Gefahr laufe, einer zu werden.

Nach einer Einführung in politikwissenschaftliche Konzepte wie „staatliche

Legitimität" oder *Nationhood* widmet sich Kingsbury im darauffolgenden Kapitel präkolonialen und kolonialen politischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Strukturen Timor-Lestes, um diese dann klar und detailliert mit jüngsten Ereignissen, wie etwa den Unruhen von 2006, in Beziehung zu setzen. Die portugiesische Kolonialisierung als Ausgangslage nehmend, bespricht Kingsbury die indonesische Invasion, die Ausrichtung der Ökonomie nach den Bedürfnissen der Kolonialmächte, die Unterdrückung und den Widerstand der Timoresen sowie Reaktionen und strategische Interessen der internationalen Gemeinschaft – besonders der UN, USA, Australiens und später Portugals.

Im Rahmen der indonesischen Okkupation (Kapitel 3) zeichnet Kingsbury den Weg nach, den sich Timor-Leste in Richtung Unabhängigkeit bahnte. So setzt er sich eingehend mit jenen politischen Parteien, Ideologien und zentralen Personen innerhalb der Widerstandsbewegung auseinander, welche entscheidend zur Unabhängigkeit des Landes beitrugen und in der Folge wesentlichen Einfluss auf das politische System sowie auf die Entwicklung des Landes ausüben sollten (z.B. Falintil, CRRN, Xananas Gusmão oder José Ramos-Horta). Zudem beschäftigt er sich mit der Relevanz von Marxismus, Guerilla-Taktik und internationaler Mediation. Dem gegenüber stellt er die indonesischen Motive für die Besetzung, Indonesiens Selbstwahrnehmung als rechtmäßigen politischen Akteur in Timor-Leste und die Maßnahmen zur Unterdrückung des timoresischen Widerstands. Im Santa-Cruz-Massaker im November 1991 sieht Kingsbury einen Wendepunkt der indonesischen Okkupation, da der internationalen Gemeinschaft aufgrund der Anwesenheit internationaler Medien die Illegitimität und Brutalität der indonesischen Besetzer vor Augen geführt und von medialer sowie zivilgesellschaftlicher Seite ein Eingreifen gefordert wurde (S. 63). Die Asienkrise 1997/98, deren ökonomische Auswirkungen und die dadurch bedingten innenpolitischen Machtkämpfe in Indonesien ermöglichten in der Folge ein Referendum über den zukünftigen Status Timor-Lestes.

Im Rahmen dieses Referendums stimmte die Bevölkerung der indonesischen Provinz Osttimor klar für die Unabhängigkeit. Die Abstimmung stellte gleichzeitig die Ausgangslage für die Ereignisse des darauf folgenden *Black September* – den Ausschreitungen und Massakern der indonesischen Besetzer und pro-indonesischen Timoresen an der lokalen Bevölkerung und der Zerstörung der Infrastruktur – dar. Diesen Punkt behandelt Kingsbury leider nur in geringem Ausmaß. Ausführlicher

widmet er sich im Zusammenhang mit dem *Black September* und den nachfolgenden Entwicklungen der Rolle der UN. Wie einige andere Wissenschafter kritisiert auch Kingsbury, vorwiegend in Kapitel 4, deren Rolle in Timor-Leste und geht sogar so weit, hierbei von einer dritten Phase der Kolonialisierung zu sprechen (S. 77-79). Hierbei den Begriff „Kolonialisierung" zu wählen, schmälert die Argumentationskraft Kingsburys beträchtlich. Eine entsprechend vorgebrachte Kritik ist zwar vor allem bei postkolonialistischen Autoren durchaus häufig zu lesen, tritt jedoch meist als generelle Systemkritik in Erscheinung und zielt weniger auf speziell von der UN gesetzte Aktionen im Bereich von humanitärer Intervention und des *State Building* ab. Kingsbury kritisiert hier in einem Zug die Kompetenzanmaßung der UN, weist ihr jedoch gleichzeitig aufgrund fehlender lokaler Infrastruktur und Kompetenzen die primäre Verantwortung für den Wiederaufbau Timor-Lestes zu:

> *Having assumed responsibility for East Timor's referendum on independence and promising that it would not leave in the postindependence period, it was clear to all, in the UN and the rest of the international community, that following the destruction of East Timor and the mass deportation of its people, the UN had primary responsibility for the situation that East Timor now found itself in (S. 78).*

Geht es in seinen Beispielen um die unmittelbare Arbeit der UN-Mitarbeiter in Timor-Leste, wirkt Kingsburys Kritik, z.B. hinsichtlich fehlender beruflicher Kompetenzen, mangelndem Respekt gegenüber timoresischen Kollegen und unzureichenden oder nicht vorhandenen Sprachkenntnissen, wiederum durchaus angebracht. Besonders treffend erscheint seine Feststellung, dass langfristige Anforderungen des *State Building* nicht verstanden wurden und man vor allem bestrebt war, die Dauer der Mission so kurz wie möglich zu halten. So konzentrierte sich die UN eher auf die Wiederherstellung und Gewährleistung der öffentlichen Sicherheit durch UN-Mitarbeiter, anstatt den Fokus auf die Partizipation timoresischen Personals zu legen (S. 79-88). Lokale Demokratisierungstendenzen, Eigeninitiative und das ökonomische Potential timoresischer Kapazitäten und Ressourcen wurden dadurch außer Acht gelassen, was zur weiteren Verarmung und Exklusion der Timoresen vom *State Building*-Prozess und dadurch auch zu fehlender Nachhaltigkeit führte.

In Kapitel 5, *Transition to Independence*, konzentriert sich Kingsbury dann auf die timoresische Bevölkerung. Er skizziert die Herausbildung und Entwicklung der ersten (unabhängigen) Regierung, ihre marxistische ideologische Ausrichtung, die Auswirkungen der Zeit im Exil in Mozambique und natürlich besonders die Probleme

sowie Herausforderungen, mit denen sie vor und nach der Unabhängigkeit zu kämpfen hatte und hat. Darunter fallen Unstimmigkeiten über die zukünftige ökonomische und politische Ausrichtung Timor-Lestes innerhalb des Regierungskabinetts, Grenzstreitigkeiten mit Australien und Indonesien, Korruption, Patronage, Schmuggel und das fehlende staatliche Gewaltenmonopol.

Im Kapitel 6, *Capacity and Conflict*, arbeitet sich Kingsbury langsam an die Unruhen von 2006 heran. Kingsbury verdeutlicht hier, dass diese nicht nur auf die ethnische Trennlinie zwischen *Firaku*, Bewohnern des östlichen Teils, und *Kaladi*, Bewohnern des westlichen Teils, welche die Unruhen 2006 vermeintlich enorm verschärfte, oder die Konkurrenz von Polizei und Militär zurückzuführen seien, sondern sich vielmehr aus einem komplexen Zusammenspiel verschiedenster politischer, ökonomischer und sozialer Faktoren entwickelten (S. 131-141). So beschäftigt er sich mit Armut, Unterentwicklung und Frustration innerhalb der Bevölkerung, aber auch mit Themen wie Schmuggel, Grenzstreitigkeiten und Erdölvorkommen in timoresischen Gewässern sowie mit Konflikten, Korruption und Klientelismus innerhalb des Regierungskabinetts. Aus Kingsburys Analyse wird hier deutlich, wie vielschichtig und teilweise schwer fassbar jene Umstände sind, welche aus einem anfänglichen Streik der timoresischen Sicherheitskräfte zu besagten weit verbreiteten und lange andauernden Unruhen führten.

Mitunter etwas verwirrend und schwer nachvollziehbar beschreibt er schlussendlich jene Herausforderungen, mit denen postkoloniale und sogenannte *Post-Conflict-*Gesellschaften in ihren Transformations- und Demokratisierungsprozessen zu kämpfen haben. Er arbeitet in diesem Zusammenhang heraus, dass die eintreffenden internationalen Stabilisierungskräfte (ISF) zwar die direkte Gewalt eindämmen konnten, es jedoch die Timoresen – sowohl Regierung als auch Zivilbevölkerung – brauchte, um die Unruhen zu beenden und die Demokratisierung voranzutreiben. In diesem Sinne weist Kingsbury in Kapitel 7 auch auf die Bedeutung der Präsidentschafts- und Parlamentswahlen 2007 hin, mit denen sich nicht nur ein Machtwechsel einstellte, sondern auch ein großer Schritt hin zur weiteren Demokratisierung des Landes gesetzt wurde. Als entscheidenden Meilenstein dieser Entwicklung betrachtet Kingsbury in Kapitel 8 den Tod des desertierten Majors Reinado, der Timor-Leste von 2006 bis 2008 mit seiner Rebellengruppe durch Anschläge, Feuergefechte mit den ISF und der Androhung eines Bürgerkriegs in Atem hielt. Letztendlich wurde Reinado

bei einem versuchten Anschlag auf Präsident Ramos-Horta und Premierminister Gusmão getötet. Nach Kingsbury ermöglichte dies neue Wege aus der politischen Sackgasse, weil dadurch mit der Auflösung der von den Unruhen stammenden Camps für *Internally Displaced Persons* (IDPs) begonnen werden konnte. Außerdem wurde mit den Petitionären verhandelt und politische Legitimität sowie Handlungsfähigkeit zurück gewonnen (S. 191 und S. 207-208).

Die derzeitige AMP-Regierung („Allianz der Parlamentarischen Mehrheit", 2007-2012) stehe nun vor den großen Herausforderungen, ihre staatliche Autorität und Legitimität zu restaurieren, Unterentwicklung und Arbeitslosigkeit zu minimieren, Korruption und Klientelismus Einhalt zu gebieten und das Justizsystem zu stärken – besonders in Hinblick auf die Strafverfolgung der Verbrechen der Unruhen von 2006 und 2007 (S. 194-196). Ausgehend von der Frage nach effektiv funktionierenden Institutionen bewertet Kingsbury Timor-Leste als keinen *Failed State*, da 2006 zwar Teile der staatlichen Institutionen versagten, ihre Legitimität und Funktionalität jedoch nach und nach zurückerlangten und mittlerweile die Gefahr eines Bürgerkriegs oder des Zusammenbruchs jeglicher Staatlichkeit gebannt zu sein scheint (S. 190-191).

Wie Kingsbury in seiner Einleitung anmerkt, sei die Intention des Buches, politische Themen und Ereignisse herauszuarbeiten, welche besonders nach der Unabhängigkeit 2002 für die weitere Entwicklung des Staates relevant waren. Damit wolle er aktuelle Ereignisse in den historischen Kontext Timor-Lestes einbetten und somit den Transformations- und Demokratisierungsprozess der jungen Nation nachvollziehbar und bewertbar machen. Tatsächlich zeigt sein Werk eine immense Fülle an Informationen und besonders auch die persönliche Anteilnahme des Autors. Es gelingt ihm, komplexe politikwissenschaftliche Themenfelder – z.B. *State Building*, *Failed States*, die Bedeutung von Wahlen im timoresischen Kontext oder der Einfluss zentraler Einzelakteure auf politische Prozesse – mit aktuellen Entwicklungen in Verbindung zu setzen und zu veranschaulichen. Diese detailreichen Schilderungen führen Kingsbury allerdings auch immer wieder in Versuchung, Anekdoten einzuwerfen und vom Kern der Sache abzuschweifen, was das Buch teilweise sehr unstrukturiert und schwer nachvollziehbar erscheinen lässt.

Im Gegensatz zur überaus detaillierten Ausführung mancher Argumentationslinien werden andere Gedanken und Themen nur sehr oberflächlich behandelt. Kingsburys eher einseitige Beschäftigung mit der UN oder Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen

hinterlassen exemplarisch einen bitteren Beigeschmack. In der nur dürftigen Auseinandersetzung mit *Transitional-Justice*-Prozessen suggeriert der Autor beispielsweise, es gäbe keine weiteren Bemühungen hinsichtlich Strafverfolgung, Vergangenheitsbewältigung oder Versöhnung seitens Timor-Lestes. Damit lässt Kingsbury einen wesentlichen Aspekt des Demokratisierungsprozesses in Timor-Leste außer Acht, was umso bedauerlicher ist, da genau dieser Prozess ja das primäre Thema des Werkes wäre.

East Timor: The Price of Liberty besticht vor allem durch seinen breiten Theorie-rahmen, der praxisgerecht ausgeführt wird, durch aufschlussreiche Hintergrundinformationen sowie wertvolle, weiterführende Themen- und Fragestellungen in Bezug auf die politische Zukunft Timor-Lestes. Als Einstieg in die Thematik scheint es jedoch wenig geeignet, da komplexe historische, politische und soziale Zusammenhänge oft unklar formuliert werden und sich somit nur Lesern erschließen, die mit der Thematik vertraut sind. Für Letztere wiederum fehlt dem Werk eine umfassende und tiefgehende Analyse der Entwicklungen in Timor-Leste, da entscheidende Faktoren ausgelassen oder nur unzureichend behandelt werden. Dem Kenner öffnen sich somit leider nur wenige bisher unentdeckte Pfade auf der Suche nach neuen Zugängen zur Thematik.

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Hensengerth, Oliver (2010).
Regionalism in China-Vietnam Relations:
Institution-building in the Greater Mekong Subregion.
(Routledge Contemporary Asia Series 19).
London & New York: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-55143-4. 212 + xi pages.

This book by Oliver Hensengerth addresses two interlinked research topics, namely relations between China and Vietnam and collaboration within the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). The author aims for a comprehensive approach to the two topics and studies the importance of the GMS collaboration in the China-Vietnam relationship as well as the policies of China and Vietnam, respectively, with reference to the GMS.

Hensengerth also examines regionalism – and, more specifically, new regionalism – with special reference to "subregional" co-operation in the context of the theoretical discussion in the book. This comprehensive ambition deserves recognition.

The structure of the book is as follows: Chapter 1 is an introduction to the book (pp. 1-5). Chapter 2 is devoted to explaining "subregional" co-operation in the context of the Mekong basin (pp. 6-29). Chapter 3 is devoted to formulating an analytical framework for the GMS within the context of water co-operation, security, and international regimes (pp. 30-46). Chapter 4 is devoted to the history of Mekong co-operation and its linkage to the China-Vietnam dichotomy (pp. 47-74). Chapter 5 deals with current developments and institutional arrangements in Mekong basin co-operation (pp. 75-97). Chapter 6 looks at the GMS and foreign policy through border co-operation between China and Vietnam (pp. 98-141). Chapter 7 is a concluding chapter devoted to China's and Vietnam's foreign policies and "subregionalism" in the GMS (pp. 142-151). The Appendix encompasses several tables, including 'Table A1 Institutionalization Processes in the GMS 1991-2005' and 'Table A2 High-level meetings between Vietnam and China, 1989-2008' (pp. 152-177).

The strength of the book is undoubtedly the parts dealing with collaborative attempts relating to the Mekong River and the GMS. The various collaborative arrangements are addressed through their origins, developments, and current characteristics. The differences in membership, mandate, and also modes of operation between the various collaborative initiatives are outlined. The parts of the book dealing with such initiatives are comprehensive, with 'Table A1 Institutionalization Processes in the GMS 1991-2005' being particularly helpful.

The sections of the book dealing with the broader theoretical literature are solid and comprehensive. The author displays a good understanding of this literature and his presentation of the main features of the literature is sound. The problem is that the theoretical approach is not tied to the analysis of the empirical developments in a satisfactory way. To be more explicit, the theoretical approach is not operationalised into hypotheses that are tested against the empirical evidence. Thus the explanatory value of the theoretical approach is not assessed. This implies that the author has a solid theoretical presentation and discussion and then an empirical study with an analysis that is not explicitly linked to his theoretical approach. This is a common problem which seems to be linked to prevalent preferences in methodological

approaches in the social sciences.

The way in which the pattern of developments of the China-Vietnam relationship is addressed is uneven, with some periods and issues being addressed comprehensively while others are not addressed in a satisfactory way. The section dealing with co-operation along the China-Vietnam land border is the one that provides the best overview of any aspect of the China-Vietnam relationship. It is most coherent and inclusive in addressing the subject matter (pp. 127-139).

The most serious shortcoming relating to key dimensions in the bilateral relationship is the lack of attention paid to the territorial issues in the period since the normalisation of relations between China and Vietnam in late 1991. This can partly be attributed to the fact that the author has disregarded the existing literature specifically devoted to this issue. While Hensengerth acknowledges that the issues exist, they are addressed neither in a comprehensive nor in a coherent way in the book. Hence, the reader cannot grasp the nature of the problem, the degree to which it has affected the bilateral relations, the progress made in addressing territorial issues, and the remaining challenges. Given the fact that territorial issues have been the major cause of tension in bilateral relations since full normalisation in late 1991, they ought to have featured prominently and more coherently – but they are not.

Even more alarming is the fact that the author presents incorrect facts concerning agreements reached between the two countries relating to the Gulf of Tonkin. In 'Table A2 High-level meetings between Vietnam and China, 1989-2008' it is noted that on 25 December 2000 the two countries reached "accords on the demarcation and fisheries cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin" (p. 169). Then, in reference to Jiang Zemin's visit to Hanoi from 27 February to 1 March 2002, it is stated: "No resolve of the issue of Gulf of Tonkin (boundaries, fisheries agreement)" (p. 170). Subsequently, it is noted that on 15 June 2004 "Vietnam's National Assembly ratifies the Gulf of Tonkin agreements" (p. 171). Finally, it is indicated that on 30 June 2004: "Both deputy foreign ministers sign the demarcation agreement on the Gulf of Tonkin, regarding territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf, plus fisheries for the gulf. Both agreements were originally concluded on 25 December 2000, but come into effect only now with the signature of 30 June 2004" (p. 172). This is contradictory. If agreements have been signed then there is a settlement of the disputes. Also, how can Vietnam ratify agreements on 15 June 2004 when the author claims that the two

countries did not sign a "demarcation agreement" until 30 June 2004?

Hensengerth appears not to have understood the process and hence misinterprets the information in the primary sources he has consulted. The correct course of events is as follows: On 25 December 2000, China and Vietnam signed the 'Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin' settling their maritime boundary disputes in the Gulf. On the same day the two countries signed an agreement on fishery co-operation in the Gulf of Tonkin. The maritime boundary agreement relating to the Gulf of Tonkin entered into force on 30 June 2004, when the two countries exchanged documents relating to the ratification of the agreement in Hanoi. The ratification process and the entry into force of the agreement were made possible by the completion of the talks on an additional protocol to the agreement on fishery co-operation. The additional protocol and the regulations on preservation and management of the living resources in the Common Fishery Zone in the Gulf of Tonkin were signed on 29 April 2004. This agreement also entered into force on 30 June 2004.[1] The author would have avoided the factual mistakes relating to the Gulf of Tonkin if he had thoroughly consulted the leading journal *Ocean Development and International Law.*[2]

Despite the stated goal of studying the linkages between collaboration in the GMS and the China-Vietnam relationship, the author does not offer an explanation as to why the Mekong River is not an issue on the official agenda for high-level talks between the two countries. He appears not to have systematically examined the Joint Statements and Joint Communiqués issued in connection with such high-level meetings. Given the ambition of the book, this aspect ought to have been addressed in both the empirical overview and in the analysis.

To summarise, 'Regionalism in China-Vietnam Relations' is an interesting contribution with its focus on the collaboration in the GMS linked to the China-Vietnam relationship. The strength of the book is the parts dealing with collaborative attempts relating to the Mekong River and the GMS. The way in which the author

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1 See Nguyen H. T. & Amer, R. (2007). The Management of Vietnam's Maritime Boundary Disputes. *Ocean Development and International Law, 38*(3), 309-310 and 312-313; and Amer, R. & Nguyen H. T. (2005). The Management of Vietnam's Border Disputes: What Impact on Its Sovereignty and Regional Integration? *Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27*(3), 431 and 434.

2 This journal published two articles specifically dealing with the Gulf of Tonkin in early 2005: Zou K. (2005). The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. *Ocean Development and International Law, 36*(1), 13-24; and Nguyen H. T. (2005). Maritime Delimitation and Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf. *Ocean Development and International Law, 36*(1), 25-45.

addresses the broader China-Vietnam relationship is not as innovative. Furthermore, the way in which this relationship is presented is uneven in quality. Thus, readers are advised to consult further existing literature on China-Vietnam relations, both the sources used by the author and those that have been overlooked in his bibliography.

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