FOCUS MOBILITIES

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Mobilities in South-East Asia

ALEXANDER TRUPP[1] & CLAUDIA DOLEZAL[2]

In the current age of time and space compression, one finds people (e.g. tourists, migrants, refugees, researchers) as well as material and immaterial objects or resources (e.g. capital, vehicles, information, ideas) to be increasingly on the move, leading to the idea that we are living in an "age of mobility [,which] has replaced the sedentary age" (Rolshoven, 2007, p. 17). For more than two decades, this shift has been noted in various academic disciplines (such as geography, anthropology, and sociology, to name a few), and most importantly in the field of migration and tourism studies – areas of study where a pronounced interest in issues of mobilities has emerged (Husa, Trupp, & Wohlschlägl, 2014).

For some decades now, South-East Asia has been characterized by rapid economic and socio-cultural transformations involving large movements of people and goods within and between countries as well as rural and urban areas (Rigg, 2003). In addition to classical spatial mobility patterns of rural-urban migration, international labor migration, and international tourism becoming increasingly dynamic, forms of multi-local household arrangements, skilled migration, transnational communities or long-term tourism and domestic tourism have emerged. In this context, one can observe a number of interdependent forms of mobility, including the *physical movement of people* for reasons of work, leisure, family, or lifestyle as well as the *physical movement of objects* from and to producers, consumers, retailers, and the different places where people live, work, or go on holidays (Larsen, Urry, & Axhausen, 2006).

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1 Alexander Trupp studied theoretical and applied geography in Vienna. He is currently assistant professor (*Universitätsassistent*) at the Department of Geography and Regional Research, University of Vienna, Austria, and member of the ASEAS editorial board. He specializes in tourism and migration in Asia. Contact: alexander.trupp@univie.ac.at

2 Claudia Dolezal is a doctoral researcher at the University of Brighton, UK. Her PhD project looks into community empowerment in community-based tourism in Bali. Claudia has a background in tourism and international development with a focus on South-East Asia and contributes to the work of the Society for South-East Asian Studies, i.a. as a member of the ASEAS editorial board. Contact: C.Dolezal@brighton.ac.uk

The prevailing "mobility turn" (Cresswell & Merriman, 2011) and the "mobilities paradigm" (Sheller & Urry, 2006) criticize the notion of sedentarism, which locates bounded places, regions, or nations as the fundamental basis of human identity and experience and thus, the main unit of social research analysis. In contrast, the mobilities paradigm "emphasises that all places are tied into at least thin networks of connections that stretch beyond each such place and mean that nowhere can be an 'island'" (Sheller & Urry, 2006, p. 209). Although different forms of mobility have always shaped human life, academia only recently (re)discovered the importance and value of including notions of mobility in research. This emerging emphasis brought with it not only the acknowledgement of an increasing movement of people and objects, but also broader "transformat[ions] of social science, generating an alternative theoretical and methodological landscape" (Büscher, Urry, & Witchger, 2011, p. 4).

In recent years, an increasing number of empirical and theoretical studies dealing with mobilities in Asia have focused on *international* forms of movements. Important research areas in this context are tourism (Hitchcock, King, & Parnwell, 2009) and transnational migration flows (Hewison & Young, 2005; Yeoh, Willis, & Fakhri, 2003). Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that a large number of people moves *within the borders* of their country of birth (Skeldon, 2006, p. 17). Therefore, the "dominance of 'transnational migration' as an object of study over and above other forms of mobility in the region [in Asia] is somewhat at odds with its numerical importance" (Elmhirst, 2012, p. 275). Based on this argument, Olwig and Sorensen (2002) seek to redirect "migration research away from the narrow focus on international population movements" and instead call for "a broader investigation of mobile livelihoods and the fluid fields of social, economic and political relations and cultural values that these livelihoods imply" (p. 2). Elmhirst (2012) suggests that the popularity of transnational (and international) migration on the international research agenda can be traced to political fears that this type of migration provokes in the context of global security as well as the possibilities that come with it, such as in the context of economic remittances. Moreover, we should not forget that despite a seemingly interconnected world without borders, constraints on people's mobilities continue to exist, mainly through the presence and impact of states aiming at controlling or preventing migration (Carling, 2002; Horstmann, 2011).

The present collection of articles addresses a variety of issues concerning mobilities in South-East Asia, including case studies that involve moving people and objects in or from Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

Erik Cohen, by focusing on the cultural meanings of objects of mobility, analyzes the origins and making of airbrush paintings on charter tour coaches in Thailand serving the domestic and international tourism market. Cohen thereby explores the complex interplay between *global* and *local* in terms of its presence in the buses' motifs and depicts these objects of mobility as containers of globalized, hybridized post-modern symbols. The study's data are based on the documentation of 145 buses; of which 18 pictures are published in this contribution to help illustrate the discussed motifs.

Shifting the discussion from the objects to the subjects of mobilities, Dinita Setyawati addresses the idea of framing migrant workers as state assets, based on the premise that these workers maximize national economic benefits. While sending countries benefit through remittances of their 'economic heroes', receiving countries gain in low-skilled labor supply. Setyawati's contribution offers an examination of the legal regulations concerning migrant workers' protection in Indonesia and the Philippines, two of the largest exporters of migrant labor in South-East Asia.

In the context of low-skilled labor movements, forms of skilled migration seem to be underrepresented, especially in South-East Asian contexts. Cirilia Limpangog conducted a study based on in-depth interviews with professional Filipina migrants in Melbourne und identified diverse motives which are not only related to economic household strategies but highlight alternative lifestyles, escape from political persecution, migration in order to live united with one's spouse, and escape from gender and cultural norms as driving forces of mobility.

However, potential obstacles to mobility remain, supporting the argument that our times are characterized not only by large flows of various forms of mobilities but also by *immobilities*. Immigration policies and harsh controls by local or national governments can restrict migration. Highland ethnic minorities in Northern Thailand, for example, have sometimes found their mobility restricted by state regulations, as they had not received official Thai IDs and citizenship rights. Therefore, the notion of a seemingly borderless world in constant motion needs to be questioned and supplemented with the perspective of an "age of involuntary immobility" (Carling, 2002), which aims at identifying and analyzing barriers and constraints. In a study

on mobility and immobility of asylum seekers passing through Indonesia, Antje Missbach further focuses on international migration flows to Indonesia by comparing Indochinese asylum seekers between the 1970s and mid-1990s and more recent asylum seekers coming from the Middle East. The author explores how claims for protecting asylum seekers are handled in Indonesia and in this course introduces the notion of *obstructed mobility* to this issue.

In addition, everyday mobilities, e.g. walking for work purposes of mobile street vendors (Trupp, 2014), can be restricted by urban or selling regulations imposed by local governments or private actors. In our section 'Research Workshop', Kirsten W. Endres offers an anthropologically oriented contribution to this topic, which looks into marketplaces and bazaars in socialist Vietnam, exploring the influence of neoliberal politics on the lives of small traders. The author shows that these traders experience difficulties surviving in the marketplace, which is now owned by private investment companies, therefore deteriorating the traders' livelihoods. At the same time, the development of markets is actively fostered in the West, where urban planners regard markets as a tool to improve community life and relations.

Endres furthermore introduces the relevance of tourism as one aspect of mobility, by observing two opposing developments: On the one hand, privately owned supermarkets replace Vietnamese bazaars, while on the other hand, the traditional aspects of marketplaces are fostered to satisfy tourists in their search of the 'authentic'. The notion of authenticity has been a point of discussion in tourism studies for many decades and, hence, forms a vital part of the broader mobility paradigm, given its identification as one of the major travel motifs of international tourists. MacCannell's (1976) sketch of the modern subject on the move in search of *authenticity* still finds usage in current academia. While MacCannell's (1992) initial idea, however, pictured host communities as the ones being exploited, playing 'ex-primitive' on the touristic stage, authenticity or self-commodification are increasingly realized as bearing potential of self-empowerment for local communities in the global South (Ruiz-Ballesteros & Hernández-Ramírez, 2010). Oftentimes, it is through community-based tourism (CBT) – if organized and managed carefully – that rural communities in South-East Asia can gain power and derive greater economic and social benefits from tourism activity and international mobility, also through the conscious usage of notions of authenticity (Dolezal, 2011). In the section 'In Dialogue', Claudia Dolezal

presents an interview with the chairman of the *Bali Community-Based Tourism Association*, which refers to the complex play with ideas of authenticity as an aspect of the controversial empowerment debate in a tourism-for-development context. The interview sheds light on the social as well as economic impacts of international tourism on local communities in Bali and discusses the meaning of the ambiguous term 'empowerment' as well as the possibilities CBT creates locally. Tourism therefore can be regarded as an engine for mobility, connecting the tourist and rural communities in a complex interplay between the global and the local (Burns & Novelli, 2008).

In our section 'South-East Asia Visually', Bianca Gantner and Philip Weninger offer a visual account of a Filipin@s migrant communities' festival in Vienna, underlining the importance of the event in terms of fostering social and economic ties of the biggest South-East Asian migrant group in Austria.

Outside the mobilities focus, this issue features a 'Current Research' contribution on the social dimensions of deforestation and forest protection in local communities in Northern Cambodia, which have implemented Community Forestry (CF) and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) programs. The study conducted by Maya Pasgaard and Lily Chea is based on qualitative interviews and reveals that vulnerable households are disproportionately affected by the *costs* of deforestation and that they only marginally *benefit* from forest protection due to social exclusion facilitated by prevailing power structures.

The issue further includes two book reviews. William J. Jones' review of *Conversations with Thaksin: From Exile to Deliverance: Thailand's Populist Tycoon Tells His Story* by Tom Plate presents a collection of interviews with Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, thereby focusing on Thaksin's self-exile and, at the same time, on the influence he still has on Thai politics from afar. A second book review by Dayana Parvanova of *Faith and the State: A History of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia* by Amelia Fauzia addresses Islamic philanthropic practices in Indonesia and provides insights into their influence on state-civil society relations as well as on socio-political and religious ideologies. The book discusses the practices of *zakat* (almsgiving), *sedekah* (donation, giving), and *waqf* (religious endowment) by covering a number of historic periods in the development of the Indonesian nation state.

Furthermore, ASEAS continues its introduction of Austrian research institutions featuring a focus on South-East Asia. In this context, Alfred Gerstl presents the newly

developed South-East Asian orientation at the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Vienna.

Finally, Paulo Castro Seixas provides some thoughts and reflections on the role of international scientific conferences and presents a short report on the coordination of the 7th EuroSEAS Conference, which took place in Lisbon in July 2013. The next EuroSEAS Conference is scheduled to take place in Vienna in August 2015.

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Bus Paintings in Thailand:
A Post-Modern Urban Art Form in Comparative Perspective

Erik Cohen[1]

Studies of paintings on motorized vehicles are rare. Existing studies indicate that such paintings play a role in national identity politics or serve as means of representation of an alternative national history. This article deals with the origins and execution of airbrush paintings on charter tour coaches in Thailand, and with the sources and styles of the motifs represented on them. The paintings are produced in a hybridized process, involving artwork and computerization; they are thus a post-modern art form, which is not strictly classifiable into modernist categories of art, craft, or decoration. The sources, styles, and motifs of the paintings reflect global influences: They are highly heterogeneous, deriving primarily from contemporary Western or Japanese popular cultures or from Thai or Chinese 'traditional' painting. The bus-owners' motivations for the choice of motifs are primarily aesthetic and social rather than religious or political. Thai bus paintings can thus be seen as a globalized, post-modern art form, with most of the motifs just being pleasing symbols, without external reference.

Keywords: *Airbrush Painting; Bus Paintings; Globalization; Post-Modern Art; Thai Popular Culture*

Studien über Malereien auf motorisierten Fahrzeugen sind selten. Vorhandene Studien zeigen, dass solche Malereien eine Rolle in nationaler Identitätspolitik spielen oder als Mittel zur Darstellung einer alternativen nationalen Geschichte dienen. Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit den Ursprüngen und der Realisierung von Airbrush-Malereien auf Charter-Bussen in Thailand und mit den Quellen und Stilen der Motive, die auf diesen dargestellt sind. Die Malereien werden in einem hybriden Prozess entwickelt, der Kunstwerk und Computerisierung vereint, und können deshalb als postmoderne Kunstform bezeichnet werden, die nicht klar modernen Kategorien wie Kunst, Handwerk oder Dekoration zuordenbar ist. Die Quellen, Stile und Motive der Malereien spiegeln globale Einflüsse wider: sie sind äußerst heterogen und beziehen sich vor allem auf zeitgenössische westliche oder japanische Populärkultur oder auf thailändische oder chinesische „traditionelle" Malerei. Die Beweggründe der Buseigentümer für die Wahl der Motive sind eher ästhetische und soziale als religiöse oder politische. Thailändische Bus-Malereien können deshalb als globalisierte, postmoderne Kunstform gesehen werden, in der die meisten Motive ansprechende Symbole ohne externe Bezüge darstellen.

Schlagworte: *Airbrush-Malerei; Bus-Malereien; Globalisierung; Postmoderne Kunst; Thailändische Populärkultur*

1 Erik Cohen is the George S. Wise Professor of Sociology (emeritus) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he taught between 1959 and 2000. He has conducted research in Israel, Peru, the Pacific Islands, and, since 1977, in Thailand. Contact: mserik@mscc.huji.ac.il

Introduction

Paintings on vehicles have been described as "moving art" ("Truck Art", 2013) as well as a "vital form of contemporary urban folklore" (Meñez, 1988, p. 38). The best-known examples of that art form are the colorful paintings covering Pakistani trucks ("Decorative Truck", 2011; Sökefeld, 2008) and Philippine jeepneys (Meñez, 1988). But such paintings can also be found on buses in Suriname (Laughlin, 2009), in Panama (Szok, 2008), in some cities in India (Chattopadhyay, 2009), and in Thailand. In the past, paintings have also been common on Argentina's *colectivos* and on Maltese buses, but the custom disappeared with the modernization of the bus fleets. In Western Europe and the United States, buses and trucks are also occasionally painted ("40 Creative Painted", 2009; Harris & Harris, 1988), but such paintings serve predominantly as advertisements for particular products[2], whereas in Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean they are not primarily meant as promotional devices.

Though an attraction for visitors, and amply illustrated on the Internet, paintings on vehicles have aroused little interest among social scientists and art historians, except for a few studies of Philippine jeepneys (Güss & Tuason, 2008; Meñez, 1988) and Pakistani trucks (Elias, 2003; Rich & Khan, 1980; Schmid, 2000; Sökefeld, 2008). The paintings on Thai buses, which have in recent years proliferated in a plethora of colorful shapes, have attracted the attention of journalists (Biggs, 2013; Le Febre, 2010), but have not yet been systematically examined. In this article, I will deal with their emergence, execution, and the variety of their sources, styles, and motifs as a unique globalized, post-modern phenomenon, significantly different from the stylistically more homogeneous decorations on Pakistani trucks and Philippine jeepneys, as well as from the contemporary commercialized folk crafts of Thailand (Cohen, 2000).

Lizardo and Skiles (2008) state that "a key feature of industrial and post-industrial societies consists of the formally organized production and market based dissemination of cultural goods that were previously produced and procured in more informal folk and community contexts" (p. 485). This led to a "rise of mass-produced 'media cultures' – at concurrently national and global scales – disseminated by new technologies of mass communication" (Lizardo & Skiles, 2008, p. 485). I show in this article that, ironically, these same mass media cultural products provided the styles and motifs on

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2   See e.g. the paintings on German trucks on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXgHKo7fwwI

most of the paintings that are deployed on Thai buses, in order to individualize those impersonal vehicles. The decorations serve to publicly display their individuality among the mass of unmarked vehicles on the road, and hence endow distinction on their owners. By having their buses decorated with figurative representations, the owners provided the incentive for the rise of a new, hybridized art form in Thailand.

Literature Review

Painted vehicles can be found in a number of countries. However, there are differences among them in the extent of variety of their painting styles, and in the nature and diversity of depicted motifs. One can hardly talk of a 'style' in the case of the vehicle paintings in Western countries because these are a relatively rare and sporadic phenomenon, serving predominantly as advertisements. The paintings on Philippine jeepneys, Pakistani trucks, and the *wilde bussen* (lit. wild buses) in Suriname's capital Paramaribo are produced in fairly uniform, locally developed styles, though within each style, motifs may vary widely. Thus, Pakistani trucks feature diverse figurative motifs, such as "screaming tigers, flower arrangements, mosques, roaring trains, barnyard roosters, jet aircraft, peacocks, *Buraq* (the mythical human-headed horse that carried the Prophet Mohammad on his journey to Jerusalem) figures, and panoramic views of Kashmir" (Rich & Khan, 1980, p. 257). A more recent study adds to this list "movie heroes, portraits of women and landscapes", and comments with regard to the latter that "with all these lakes, forests, mountains and small huts [they] resemble more an imaginary Switzerland than any Pakistani landscape" (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 176). Elias (2003) offers a classification of motifs on Pakistani trucks, ranging from romanticized village landscapes, beautiful women, and elements from modern life (such as political figures) to talismanic and religious objects. Pakistani trucks also exhibit Koranic inscriptions on their fronts or sides (Sökefeld, 2008, pp. 182, 185, 186). According to the website *TwistedSifter*, there is a difference in signification between the front and back of the truck: "Unlike the front of the truck, which largely features powerful religious material, the back is whimsical (often humorous) and predominantly has motifs from modern life" ("Decorative Truck", 2011).

Sökefeld (2008, p. 177) distinguished three styles of Pakistani truck paintings by focusing on the differences in the prominence and choice of figurative motifs. Referring to famous cities, they are named *Pindi* (short for *Rawalpindi*), *Havelian,* and *Peshawari* style. The sides of trucks in the long-established *Pindi* style "carry one row of figurative paintings" (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 177). In contrast, "the *Havelian* style never makes use of human portraits [while] *Peshawari* style is almost minimalist. Here, figurative paintings on the truck sides are reduced to small miniatures, framed by ornaments"; that style also "never makes use of images of humans" (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 190). According to Sökefeld, the "*Havelian* and especially *Peshawari* styles can be interpreted as a kind of Islamization of truck art" (p. 190). He concludes that

> truck art with the ornamental minimalism of the Peshawari style, on the one hand, and the increased lavishness of Pindi style, including the popularity of portraits of unveiled women . . . on the other, can be considered as a site of the struggle between a new Islamic orthodoxy and popular culture (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 190).

This argument puts the process of change in Pakistani truck art squarely into the field of Pakistani identity politics.

In the past, Philippine jeepneys also featured mainly "paintings of rural scenes – waterfalls, trees, flowers and birds" (Meñez, 1988, p. 38). More recently, a comparative study of decorated jeepneys in Manila and Davao found that "Manila jeepneys featured more decorations . . . concerned with religion, identity and Western commercialism, while Davao jeepneys featured more political and civic themes" (Güss & Tuason, 2008, p. 211). De Sousa Bastos (2008), commenting on that study, perceives the jeepney paintings as "a semiotic device which carries social suggestions and promotes personal actions and goals" (p. 237).

Paramaribo's *wilde bussen* feature "a mobile pantheon of very different culture-heroes" (Laughlin, 2010), ranging from pop culture icons, such as Bollywood stars and Hollywood starlets, to political figures, such as Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and even Saddam Hussein. Laughlin (2010) sees "an alternative nation-story [to the hegemonic one], [rendering] alternative insights into how contemporary Surinamese understand and imagine themselves" in the Paramaribo *wilde bussen* paintings.

As limited as they are, these studies raise some important comparative issues regarding the recent proliferation of bus paintings in Thailand: Has a distinct painting style (or distinguishable sub-styles) emerged in Thailand? Do the paintings have religious or

magical significance? Do they relate to Thai identity politics or express resistance to the hegemonic Thai nation-story? Or do the paintings only express the aesthetic preferences and individual aspirations of the owners of the buses? I relate to these questions in the conclusion. Before turning to an analysis of the body of paintings on the buses, it is, however, necessary to find out about the painters and the procedures of the painting process.

The Painting Process

In the non-Western world, the vehicles that get painted mostly belong to the older, relatively low stratum of the transport vehicle stock or to the informal sector of the transportation system. The Manila jeepneys were initially US Army jeeps, left over from World War II, which were adapted for public transportation. In Pakistan, in the past "the highways were almost exclusively plied by old Bedford trucks produced under license in Pakistan" (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 177; see also Rich & Khan, 1980). Though newer brands of trucks were added more recently, "the Bedfords will continue to dominate the roads for years to come" (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 177). The Paramaribo *wilde bussen* are privately owned minibuses (Laughlin, 2010). These vehicles are not considered 'modern' means of transport, which is also indicated by the fact that in Argentina and Malta, the painting of buses was discontinued with the modernization of their fleets.

In Thailand, three types of buses can be distinguished: buses of the national bus company plying formally regulated interurban lines, which are uniformly painted white and blue, without much additional decoration; buses plying the urban lines in Bangkok, many of which carry conspicuous, colorful advertisements (but no paintings); and charter tour coaches, run by often small, privately owned companies. There are an estimated 5,000 such coaches in Thailand (Chinmaneevong, 2013), serving primarily the domestic tourism market. Bigger charter tour companies have their coaches painted in uniform, mostly non-figurative designs. By the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, figurative paintings began to appear on buses owned by smaller charter tour operators. The novelty soon became a fashion: Presently there are hundreds of often richly decorated tour buses plying the country's roads.

Despite their 'modern' appearance, the majority of these buses are reassembled, renovated, and refitted old vehicles. Similar to Pakistan, where a "considerable craft

economy has evolved around the trucks . . . which to a great extend involves recycling" (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 176), in Thailand, the refitting of old buses takes place in tens of mostly small workshops, but two big bus manufacturers also engage in the refitting business. Most of the workshops are located in two geographical centers: in Nakhon Phathom province, about 60 kilometers west of Bangkok, and in Nakhon Ratchasima province, about 260 kilometers northeast of the capital. Many of the refitted buses are decorated by paintings, executed by specialist 'airbrush painters'.

I have visited several refitting enterprises in both areas and interviewed three managers as well as three airbrush artists regarding the emergence and development of bus paintings in Thailand, the sources and choice of motifs, and the manner of execution of the paintings. There was considerable agreement among the respondents on the basic traits of these processes. The following account is based on those interviews.

Unlike in Pakistan, where the team of workers assembling the trucks includes a "specialist who paints the images and other non-specialists who paint ornaments and other non-figurative parts of the decoration" (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 177), the airbrush painters in Thailand are predominantly freelancers, working for several workshops on demand; but some also possess their own, small refitting workshops. There are about 20 airbrush artists in Thailand. Some have an academic background in fine arts and all work with a team of three to five assistants.

The execution of a bus painting is a relatively expensive affair. At present, prices for the decoration of a bus range from THB 35,000 to THB 100,000 (approximately USD 1,200 to USD 3,450), according to the size and complexity of the design. The process starts with a meeting between the airbrush artist and the owner of the vehicle. In some instances, the owner supplies the artist with a picture or sketch of the desired bus painting. In others, the artist shows the owner his 'portfolio' of drawings and photos to choose the designs for his or her bus.

The owners' motives to invest considerable sums in decorating their buses are difficult to determine. They seem to be driven by a mix of aesthetic, social, and business motives, but the choice is sometimes quite arbitrary: In one instance, for example, the choice was made by the young son of the owner who insisted that two animated cars from the film *Cars*, released by Disney in 2006, be depicted on his father's refitted bus.

Informants report that the owners' principal motives in choosing paintings for their buses are aesthetic. They want their buses to look nice or beautiful (*suay*) and compete

with one another regarding their attractiveness. But the informants also pointed out that charter tours' clients prefer to rent a beautifully adorned bus; business considerations thus might accompany the purely aesthetic ones.

The painters distinguish two basic painting techniques: 'freehand' and 'stickers'. In the former, older technique, the painter would paint the design directly upon the bus ('freehand'). In the latter, more recent one, the chosen painting is put on a computer, enlarged to the desired size, and cut by a plotter onto an adhesive stencil ('sticker'). The painters either do this by themselves or employ a computer plotter operator to cut the stencils for them. The stencils are then applied to the surface of the bus and the painting is airbrushed onto the outline. The whole process takes about eight days. The use of stencils simplified and expedited the painting process but made for some repetition of motifs on several buses. However, the identically stenciled motifs may be colored differently, according to the taste of the airbrush artist. Some charter tour companies have their coaches decorated with the same or similar paintings, which endow them with a shared identity.

Between late 2010 and early 2013, I have photographed figurative representations on almost 150 buses, which I encountered primarily in seaside resorts popular with Thai tourists, at Buddhist temples, at tourist attractions, and at gas stations. I made more than 300 photographs of whole bus sides or of individual figurative paintings. I have excluded non-figuratively decorated buses and those painted only with orchids or other flowers from the study. The following discussion is based on those materials. Just as jeepneys or trucks have been used as the unit of analysis by other researchers, so buses (rather than individual paintings) were chosen as the unit of analysis in the present context.

Sources, Styles, and Motifs

In contrast to the painted vehicles in Pakistan or the Philippines, there is no stylistic uniformity in the Thai bus paintings. As a first step to deal with this heterogeneity, I made a distinction between comprehensively and discretely painted buses.

Like the Pakistani trucks or Philippine jeepneys, some older non-air conditioned buses were completely covered by paintings, often applied 'freehand' upon the sur-

face of the bus. The comprehensive coverage is achieved by a complex combination of figurative representations and non-figurative ornaments, seamlessly mixing styles and cultural motifs. One such bus features a stylized, pipe-smoking American Indian on the upper right corner, and a ghost-like ogre on the lower left corner of its side (Photo 1); on another, an American bald eagle is combined with a Chinese dragon (Photo 2). Comprehensive painting became an expensive affair over the years; at present, few buses are painted like this. Consequently, their number is relatively small with only six of the buses in my collection belonging to this category.

Newer, air-conditioned buses are generally discretely painted; mostly featuring identical, airbrushed paintings on both sides, while the rest of the vehicle is left blank. In the past, an additional painting was in some instances added on the back of the vehicle, but the authorities have prohibited this, since it might distract other drivers. Unlike the Pakistani trucks, the front of the buses is generally left unadorned. The motifs on such buses usually share a uniform style; however, on a few of them, the various figures are executed in divergent styles.

The name and phone number of the tour company is usually printed in large letters on the sides of the buses but does not constitute part of the decorative design. The painter sometimes inserts his 'tag' and phone number in small letters at the bottom of the painting.

While the painters enjoy great freedom in the choice of motifs, there are some limitations. The authorities have prohibited the depiction of female nudity, even on mythological figures, and the placing of a Buddha image on a bus side is considered inappropriate.

The bus paintings are based on a variety of sources in different styles, but adapted, rearranged, or ornamented according to the taste of the painter or his customers. To start the analysis of the paintings, it is therefore necessary to identify the sources from which the styles and specific motifs were drawn.

I have identified four major sources of the paintings on discretely painted buses: American popular culture, Japanese/Korean popular culture, Thai 'traditional' culture, and Chinese 'traditional' culture. Paintings based on these four sources are found on 107 (74 percent) of the 145 buses in my collection.[3]

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3 The remaining 26 percent of the buses include the six comprehensively painted buses and buses painted in different, predominantly naturalistic styles, from various, mostly hard to identify sources; I will discuss them below.

PHOTO 1: Smoking Indian and ghost-like monster on a comprehensively painted bus (2012)

PHOTO 2: American bald eagle and Chinese dragon on a comprehensively painted bus (2010)

PHOTO 3: Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (2012)

PHOTO 4: Rock musicians (2012)

PHOTO 5: The Scott Nipper Sacramento Rock Meeting Group (2012)

PHOTO 6: Skateboarding boys (2012)

PHOTO 7: "Red Indian" riding mustang (2012)

PHOTO 8: Female anime guitarists (2012)

PHOTO 9: Female anime character (2011)

PHOTO 10: God Rama on chariot (2011)

PHOTO 11: A pair of *nagas* shooting fire balls from Mekong river (2011)

PHOTO 12: The legendary battle between the Thai King and the Burmese Crown Prince at Don Chedi (2013)

PHOTO 13: Chinese dragon (2011)

PHOTO 14: Chinese cranes (2010)

PHOTO 15: Chinese opera characters (2012)

PHOTO 16: Pandas (2011)

American popular culture was the most frequent source of motifs, found on about 40 buses. Several distinct styles can be distinguished within this source. The most easily recognizable and most numerous is the distinct animated cartoons style, pioneered by Walt Disney. It is found on 15 buses in my collection. Anthropomorphic animal characters, such as Mickey Mouse, predominate, but more comprehensive representations, such as Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs from Disney's 1937 film (Photo 3), can also be found. Spider-Man, a popular American comic book (and film) character, was depicted on two buses.

On several buses, various American rock bands were depicted in cartoon style. One painting blends three such bands, Deadsy (a Californian synth rock band), the Distillers (a punk rock band), and Blink 182 (a rock band) (Photo 4). Another carries on its sides a cartoon-like depiction of the Scott Nipper Sacramento Rock Meeting Group (Photo 5) and on its back a realistic portrait of Scott Nipper himself.

A group of break dancers is featured on one bus, on another a pack of skateboarding boys (Photo 6). The caricatured figures on these buses make exaggerated animated movements and wear pugnacious facial expressions. A painting on one bus depicts the airbrushing process itself in a similar style.

A single bus features an American Western motif – Native Americans riding wildly on unsaddled mustangs (Photo 7) – a reflection of the considerable popularity that Native Americans and cowboys enjoy in contemporary Thailand (Cohen, 2008, pp. 181–223).

Japanese/Korean popular culture was the second most frequent source of motifs, found on 35 buses in my collection. The style of all these paintings is based on Japanese or Korean manga comics or *anime* (the Japanese abbreviation for "animation") television series and video games. While virtually all depicted figures manifest the distinctive bodily proportions and facial features of the anime characters, such as big, expressive eyes and small mouths (Photos 8 and 9), I could not identify individual members of the cast or particular episodes on which the various figures were based. One important difference between Japanese-style paintings and those derived from American popular culture stood out: Both are gendered, but in opposite directions. There is a marked predominance of female characters on the former, with 19 buses painted in the Japanese/Korean anime style presenting only females against three with males only (the rest included both, male and female characters). On the latter,

there is a marked predominance of males. On 19 of the buses painted in American popular styles only males appear, as opposed to a single bus with females only (the rest had either both or no human figures at all). Thus, American popular culture often seems to appeal to painters or bus owners for its celebration of male super heroes while Japanese/Korean popular culture seems to appeal for its expressions of feminine charm.

Thai 'traditional' painting was the third most frequent source of the motifs, found on 21 buses in my collection. Approximately three quarters of these were decorated with Thai mythical motifs, such as the god Rama driven on a chariot, a scene from the epic Ramakien (the Thai version of the Indian Ramayana) (Photo 10), two *nak* (*naga*) serpents shooting fireballs from the Mekong river at the end of the *pansa* retreat (Buddhist lent) (Cohen, 2007) (Photo 11), *thewada* (heavenly beings), *yak* (*yaksha*) gate guardians, and similar mythic characters. One bus was adorned by characters from the works of the Thai poet Sunthorn Phu (1786-1855), another with the famous scene of the legendary battle on elephants' backs between the Siamese King Naresuan and the Burmese Crown Prince, reenacted every year during the Memorial Fair at Don Chedi in Suphanburi province (Photo 12). There were a few paintings of Thai female dancers and of Thai children, but remarkably, purely Buddhist themes were absent, save for a depiction of the pair of *stupas* (pagodas) of the Phra Doi Tung Temple on top of *Doi* (mountain) Tung in northern Thailand and Wat Arun (see below). However, the owner of a small tour company showed me a small picture of the Buddhist temple in which she worships that she had depicted above the other paintings on one of her buses.

Chinese 'traditional' painting was the least frequent source of the paintings, appearing on only 11 buses. The most common motifs were the Chinese dragon (Photo 13) and the Chinese crane, a symbol of longevity (Photo 14). A few buses were decorated with stylized paintings of predominantly male Chinese children, while one featured several Chinese opera characters (Photo 15).

The sources of the motifs on the remaining discretely painted buses are hard to determine. About 20 of them feature more or less naturalistically painted animals, birds, and sea life, which might have been copied from photos, advertisements, and other printed sources. Several of the depicted animal species are of some significance in the context of Thai tourism. Polar bears and penguins, found on two buses, seem to signify the cold polar world, which many Thai people desire to experience

PHOTO 17: Powerboat racing (2013)

PHOTO 18: Astronaut (2013)

(see e.g. Cohen, 2010. p. 157). However, they could also be a metaphor of the pleasant air-conditioned cool within the bus, in contrast to the oppressive heat prevailing outside. The elephants, dolphins, and pandas (Photo 16) found on several buses, are leading animal tourist attractions in Thailand.[4] And lastly, the fairly numerous scenes of sea life, some of them imitating the batik paintings found on popular souvenirs, and of powerboats upon waves (Photo 17) obviously foreshadow the diverse delights of seaside vacationing.

A few paintings on the buses feature some well-known tourist landmarks of Thailand, such as the Khmer-style Wat Arun temple on the western bank of the Chao Phraya river in Bangkok or the so-called "Bridge on the River Kwai", in Kanchanaburi province in western Thailand, made famous by a film by the same name; while one bus features the twin Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Finally, paintings on a few buses conjure up the space age, depicting the sun and the planets, and, in one case, an astronaut (Photo 18).

Conclusion

The preceding detailed presentation was not intended to create a gallery of Thai airbrush art, but rather to enable us to draw some theoretical and comparative conclusions regarding the distinctive traits of the body of Thai bus paintings.

In contrast to paintings on vehicles in the other countries discussed above, the bus paintings in Thailand do not display a characteristic local style. Rather, as the preceding discussion amply demonstrates, they are marked by a considerable heterogeneity of styles and motifs, taken from many parts of the world, and primarily from the two globally leading popular cultures, the American and the Japanese. This indicates that, taken as a whole, Thai bus paintings are a globalized art form, expressing openness to the immensely diverse choice of styles and motifs, which became easily accessible on the Internet. In that respect, the Thai body of bus paintings differs radically from the paintings on Philippine, Pakistani, and Latin American vehicles, which are more uniform in style, even though some novel motifs were gradually added to the more traditional ones in Suriname and to some extent also in Pakistan.

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4   The panda is native to China but one pair is kept on loan in the Chiang Mai Zoo (Cohen, 2010).

Again in contrast to those other countries, the paintings on Thai buses do not carry a message, whether religious or political. Unlike, for example, the religious invocations on Pakistani trucks (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 176), there are no protective symbols included in the Thai paintings. Even mythical themes do not seem to play a magical protective role, as do Buddha images on the coach cabin's panel board or amulets and magic tattoos (Cummings, 2012) often worn by drivers or passengers. Buddha images as decorations on bus sides would probably be seen as sacrilegious rather than protective. Furthermore, unlike the paintings on the *wilde bussen* of Paramaribo, the paintings on Thai buses do not relate to Thai identity politics. While some Thai bus paintings refer to tourist attractions, such as sea life, iconic animals, and some popular landmarks, the great majority are endowed with a post-modern character, as enjoyable, surface decorations, devoid of symbolic meaning – signs without reference. In that respect, they reflect a wider trend in Thai popular culture, where alien symbols, such as the Christian cross or Muslim half moon, are often adopted as ornaments (especially on earrings), decoupled of their religious significations.

The production of the Thai bus paintings is a process consisting of clients' preferences, the skills of the airbrush artists, styles and motifs taken from the Internet, and computer technology used to cut the images on stencils. The process is thus a post-modern hybrid of different types of activities, which cannot be unequivocally classified into such modernist categories as 'art', 'craft' or 'decoration'. In contrast, the painting of vehicles is a relatively simple folk art in the other non-Western countries discussed above.

Most of the motifs on the Thai bus paintings are chosen from the impersonal, contemporary mass popular culture and applied to impersonal vehicles; however, by fiat of such choice, the combination of distinct motifs on particular buses bestows upon those vehicles, and by extension, on their owners, a mark of individual distinction, while up-lifting those popular cultural products to the level of 'artwork'. I suggest that it is the achievement of such distinction, in a context of invidious comparison between the paintings by both owners and clients that constitutes the driving force motivating the owners of tour companies to incur considerable expenses in painting their buses. However, in order to substantiate this suggestion, a systematic study of Thai tour companies, which is beyond the means at my disposal, needs to be conducted.

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Assets or Commodities? Comparing Regulations of Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers in Indonesia and the Philippines

Dinita Setyawati[1]

In labor-abundant countries, migrant workers are considered state assets and the government often calls them the 'economic heroes' of the nation. Yet by maximizing economic benefits, the protection of labor migrants is often neglected by both origin and host countries. The state's assumed presence in protecting its nationals is tied to its capacity to 'control' migration flows and protect its nationals abroad. Within this framework, the regulations concerning migrant workers' protection in Indonesia and the Philippines, which comprise the two largest exporters of migrant labor in South-East Asia, are assessed. This paper compares the two key laws in both countries: Indonesian Law No. 39/2004 and the Philippine Republic Act (RA) No. 10022. In this context, it also aims to answer the following question: Are Filipinos better protected than Indonesians? Looking specifically into the state and the economy, the history of workers' protection, and key aspects of the law, this paper recognizes several weaknesses of the Indonesian government's migrant workers protection scheme, especially in the aspects of educating workers and defining the responsibilities of government agencies. Thus, strong commitment from the government, along with close monitoring by civil society, is needed to ensure better protection for citizens.

Keywords: *Indonesia; Labor Law; Labor Migration; Migrant Workers; Philippines*

In Ländern mit vielen Arbeitskräften werden ArbeitsmigrantInnen als staatliches Vermögen angesehen und die Regierung bezeichnet sie oft als „wirtschaftliche Helden" der Nation. Um den ökonomischen Nutzen zu maximieren, wird der Schutz von ArbeitsmigrantInnen allerdings oft vernachlässigt, sowohl von Herkunfts- als auch von Zielländern. Die vorausgesetzte Präsenz des Staates im Schutz seiner BürgerInnen steht in Verbindung mit der Kapazität, Migrationsströme zu „kontrollieren" und seine BürgerInnen im Ausland zu schützen. In diesem Rahmen werden die gesetzlichen Bestimmungen bezüglich des Schutzes von ArbeitsmigrantInnen in Indonesien und den Philippinen, die die zwei größten Exporteure von ArbeitsmigrantInnen in Südostasien darstellen, analysiert. Dieser Artikel vergleicht die beiden wichtigsten Gesetze in beiden Ländern, das Indonesian Law No. 39/2004 und den Philippine Republic Act (RA) No. 10022. In diesem Kontext soll folgende Frage beantwortet werden: Sind PhilippinerInnen besser geschützt als IndonesierInnen? Durch einen genauen Blick auf den Staat und die Ökonomie, auf die Geschichte des ArbeiterInnenschutzes sowie auf Schlüsselaspekte des Rechts, weist dieser Artikel auf zahlreiche Schwächen des staatlichen Regelwerks zum Schutz von ArbeitsmigrantInnen in Indonesien, insbesondere in der Ausbildung von ArbeiterInnen und in der Definition von Verantwortlichkeiten der staatlichen Behörden, hin. Verbindlichkeiten von Seiten der Regierung, zusammen mit engem Monito-

1 Dinita Setyawati is a researcher and analyst, with research interests in South-East Asian politics, government, migration, and economic development. Graduated from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, she now resides in Indonesia and works as government relations officer in an international organization. Contact: s.dinita@gmail.com

ring von Seiten der Zivilgesellschaft, sind deshalb notwendig, um einen besseren Schutz der BürgerInnen zu gewährleisten.

Schlagworte: *ArbeitsmigrantInnen; Arbeitsmigration; Arbeitsrecht; Indonesien; Philippinen*

> *Our goal is to create jobs at home so that there will be no need to look for employment abroad. However, as we work towards that end, I am ordering the DFA, POEA, OWWA, and other relevant agencies to be even more responsive to the needs and welfare of our overseas Filipino workers. (Aquino III, 2010)*
>
> *My Government is intensifying cooperation with both domestic and foreign recruitment agencies, to ensure their safety of migration and also their protection in the host countries. (Yudhoyono, 2011)[2]*

Introduction

Working abroad has become a means of escaping poverty in Asia. A large number of migrants have seen better opportunities in other countries compared to those at home which were limited, stagnant, or declining. This perception is popular in Indonesia and the Philippines, the two largest exporters of migrant workers in South-East Asia. In Indonesia, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) documented that the registered remittances of Indonesian overseas workers accounted for more than USD 6 billion annually, contributing 1.4 percent to GDP in 2007 and 1.2 percent in 2009 (IOM, 2012). Equally, the Philippine workers recorded a rise in remittances of USD 10.7 billion in 2005 to USD 17.4 billion in 2009, contributing 10.8 percent to GDP in 2005 (Antique & Ahniar, 2010). These figures do not include money sent directly by workers via non-bank institutions or non-formal channels. According to the World Bank, however, only about 20 percent of the total remittances that arrive in Indonesia are registered (World Bank, 2008). Meanwhile, labor receiving countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia continue to rely on labor supply from Indonesia and the Philippines to work as low-skilled and semi-skilled workers in the sectors of service, construction, and domestic work. The International Labor Organization (ILO) recorded some 700,000 to 1,000,000 workers leaving Indonesia and the Philippines

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2 DFA – Department of Foreign Affairs, through its post abroad has the capacity to manage the protection of migrant workers; POEA – Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, has the capacity to monitor recruitment agencies and issue permits for the deployment of workers; OWWA – Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, has the capacity to ensure workers' welfare, including the organization of pre-departure briefings and trainings.

each year, while approximately twice as many remain undocumented (ILO, 2011). However, as ILO (2009) stated, "the contribution of labor migration to employment, economic growth, development and the alleviation of poverty should be recognized and maximized for the benefit of both origin and destination countries" (p. 5).

With regard to these facts, this paper attempts to compare and contrast the regulations for labor migration from Indonesia and the Philippines. To achieve its purposes, this paper uses qualitative research with the following primary methods: Discourse analysis of key labor laws from both countries and literature review of books, journals, independent publications, and online news articles. The discourse analysis approach is imperative to understand how the government protects and places their migrant workers. In addition, discourse analysis can identify the social context in which the text was written, while a literature review is useful to grasp the background knowledge of the topic discussed.

In order to situate the discussion, a brief overview of the economic indicators in Indonesia and the Philippines is given, followed by the history of policy development in the two countries. Subsequently, the key laws in both countries – Indonesian Law No. 39/2004[3] and the Philippine Republic Act (RA) No. 10022[4] or Amendment of 1995 Magna Carta – are compared. Following Ford's (2012) argument that the Indonesian government has poor consular assistance for its citizens working overseas compared to the government of the Philippines, which has established a number of structures to support overseas workers, this paper argues that the Philippines' Magna Carta has provided more state assistance and protection for migrant workers than the respective Indonesian law, which continues to be criticized by migrant activists for its weakness in protecting and promoting the workers' welfare.

The Corridors of Migration: Political and Socio-Economic Factors

Theories in migration studies rest upon the assumption that labor migration can in fact be influenced and controlled effectively and coherently through the use of legal

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3 Republic of Indonesia (2004). Indonesian Law No. 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers Overseas. 133 Statute Book of the Republic of Indonesia.

4 Republic of the Philippines (2010). Philippines Republic Act (RA) No. 10022, an Act Amending Republic Act No. 8042, Otherwise Known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. (2010). Retrieved from the LAWPHiL project website: http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2010/ra_10022_2010.html

instruments directed by the state (Guild & Mantu, 2011). The state's assumed presence is linked to its capacity to 'control' migration flows and protect its nationals abroad. As Day (2002) defines it, "the state regulates power and morality and organizes space, time, and identity in the face of resistance to its authority to do so" (p. 34). Bohning (1988) further emphasizes the argument that:

> *The state of which the migrant is a national owes him protection because of the membership which that person has acquired by virtue of birth or naturalisation. The constitutions of contemporary States proclaim, inter alia, the rights and freedom that nationals should enjoy; and some States' constitutions – such as Spain's – make it a special duty of the executive power to safeguard the rights and welfare of citizens abroad. (p. 133)*

The state's responsibilities have been recognized by Philippine and Indonesian leaders who are committed to protecting their nationals abroad, as reflected in their statements in the first section of this paper. However, in practice, the placement and protection of migrant workers remain complex. For example, four days after delivering his fundamental speech at the ILO conference, President Yudhoyono received the news that an Indonesian worker, Ruyati Binti Sapubi, was being beheaded by the Saudi government for allegedly murdering her (allegedly abusive) employer ("Migrant Workers," 2011). In addition, in 2012, the Indonesian NGO *Migrant Care* found that out of the 417 migrant workers abroad who were facing charges, 32 were on death row ("Workers Send," 2012). Criticism was directed towards the government's inaction. Meanwhile, the Philippines' NGO *Migrante International* (2012) reported that in a span of less than two years in office, four Filipinos were executed in China because the Aquino administration did not provide enough legal assistance and support.

A closer look at some economic indicators of Indonesia and the Philippines leads to assumptions regarding the conditions that created corridors of migration. As shown in Table 1, in the period of ten years, mainly due to the Asian crisis in 1997/1998, both countries have failed to increase their GDP per capita significantly. In fact, Indonesia and the Philippines have experienced a steady rise in unemployment rates from the mid-1990s to 2006. The crisis resulted in the decline of the domestic market and the closing of factories, forcing workers to seek employment elsewhere. Moreover, political and economic constraints and lack of employment opportunities at home are maintained in order to uphold a steady flow of migrant workers to receiving countries. Ruhs and Martin (2010) support this argument by claiming the existence of a trade-off (i.e. an inverse relationship) between the number of migrants and some of

the socio-economic rights of low-skilled migrant workers admitted to high-income countries. Garces-Mascarenas (2011) points out that "the more rights low skilled migrants have, the less advantageous (or desirable they are)" (p. 65).

Table 1: Economic Indicators				
		GDP PER CAPITA (CONSTANT 2000 US$)	POVERTY GAP AT $1.25 A DAY (PPP) (%)	UNEMPLOYMENT, TOTAL (% OF TOTAL LABOR FORCE)
INDONESIA	*1996*	848.2	11.4	4.4
	2006	953.9	6.5	10.3
PHILIPPINES	*1997*	1,045.4	5.2	7.9
	2006	1,225.0	5.4	8.0

Source: ESDS International, World Bank Data, 2011

Based on the argument above, overseas deployment is mainly in favor of the government rather than the workers. Gonzales (1998) provides the argument that overseas workers have not been sufficiently equipped to adapt to the conditions they are facing in pre-departure, during the placement period, or upon their return. As a result, most of these workers are at risk of illegal recruitment, criminal offenses, and family/marriage breakdown. Yet, working abroad remains popular as these workers are often framed as the 'economic heroes' of their nation by the government due to the high remittances and foreign currency reserves they send home. For example, Indonesian President Yudhoyono (2011) stated: "We in Indonesia call these migrant workers 'economic heroes' (*pahlawan devisa*), due to their hard work and selfless devotion to the welfare of their family back home."

Indonesian Overseas Workers: 'Economic Heroes' of the Nation

The Indonesian labor export policy began in the Suharto era from the late 1960s to the mid-1990s, with the intention of generating economic growth from workers' remittances. The implementation of this policy was given to the Department of Manpower, Transmigration and Cooperative Units (*Departemen Tenaga Kerja, Transmigrasi dan Koperasi*), which was established in 1970. This department issued Ministerial

Regulation No. 4/1970 which prohibits recruitment without a permit and imposes conditions upon recruitment (National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant *Workers* [BNP2TKI], 2011). The regulation explains general ways in managing domestic and international migration through the Intra-region Cooperation Program (AKAD) and the Intra-nation Cooperation Program (AKAN). It also paved the way for the involvement of the private sector in workers' recruitment and placement. As a ruling dictator, Suharto gave no room for civil society to criticize his handling of migrant workers. Consequently, the regulation of migrant workers was not monitored and mishandling of workers often occurred.

In the post-Suharto period starting from 1998, the government increased its efforts to protect Indonesian migrant workers through the introduction of several regulations and policies. The Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration passed the Ministerial Decree No. 104A/2002 which set the platform for the early recognition of 'vulnerable workers', which refers to those who work in the domestic sector without contracts (IOM, 2012, p. 13). In addition, the government established a national agency for workers, the BNP2TKI and enacted Law No. 39/2004 that regulates the placement and protection of migrant workers. Yudhoyono's administration further elevated the regulation framework by issuing a Presidential Instruction No. 6/2006 on Reforming the System and Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. This instruction sets up guidelines, i.e. for the advocacy of workers, service at embarkations under the 'one roof' system (a system where immigration at airports provides special counters for overseas workers, which includes many dangers for them, i.e. exposure to corrupt officials), the improvement of the quality and quantity of workers, and eradication of illegal recruiters, which are mainly responsible for recruitment that leads to physical and psychological damages. In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued Regulation No. 4/2008 which was designed to assist Indonesian nationals abroad through close cooperation between consulate offices in host countries and the BNP2TKI.

Although these policy decisions illustrate the increasing intention of the government to effectively manage and protect overseas labor, its implementations are weak and they fail to address the issues surrounding domestic workers (IOM, 2012, p. xi). Anies Hidayah, Migrant Care's Director, criticized the government for not taking a step towards reforming the placement and protection of migrant workers in accor-

dance with human rights standards. For instance, insurance problems are still left unsolved, and the forgery of identity documents is common ("Benahi Serius Nasib," 2011). National migrant NGOs such as Care for Workers *(LSM Peduli Buruh Migran)* and Association for Indonesian Migrant Workers (*Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia*) also expressed their frustration with the government's response in handling migrant workers' cases. They claim that most of the violent cases surrounding migrant workers are left unresolved (Ruslan, 2012). Domestic workers currently do not benefit from many of the legal protections granted to other workers under Indonesian law. In this sense, Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific Director, points out the 2003 Manpower Act (UU No. 13/2003, *Hukum Ketenagakerjaan*), which discriminates against domestic workers by not providing the same protection it gives to other workers, such as a reasonable limitation on working hours and provisions for rest and holidays (Amnesty International, 2011). The draft and passage of the Domestic Workers Protection Bill was included in the National Legislation Program 2012, however, progress has been slowed. It seems that the government's commitment is mainly rhetoric and bound to 'lip service'.

Philippine Labor Policies: Stepping up Workers' Protection

Sending workers abroad became popular in the Philippines during the first five decades after independence in 1946 as a political response to worsening economic problems: Setbacks in the growth of industry and low labor absorption. During the Marcos era from 1966 to 1986, the Philippine overseas labor migration program was regulated in the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442 of 1974). The Labor Code stipulated the establishment of the Overseas Employment Development Board and the National Seamen Board as well as operational guidelines for placement, dispute resolution, and documentation (Gonzales, 1998, p. 121). After the fall of Marcos, President Aquino vowed in 1987 to continue labor migration protection as part of her priorities. Indeed, under her presidency from 1986 until 1992, three Executive Orders (EOs) dealing directly with labor migration were issued. These were EO 126 which renamed the Welfare Fund as Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA); EO 247, which subsumed the deployment of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) under

one agency, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); and EO 450, which lifted the ban on the issuance of licenses to new recruiting agencies (Gonzales, 1998). There seems to be a shift from labor export to migration management and the privatization of migration during this period. At this phase, 'labor friendly' provisions were incorporated in the 1987 Constitution. For instance, Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution[5] stated that "the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all".

An important phase in the development of the Philippine labor policy started after the execution of Flor Contemplacion, a Philippine worker, in 1995. After her execution, protesters took to the streets of the city, demanding from the government to reorganize its state migratory apparatus (Tyner, 2000). In response, Ramos endorsed the completion of the Magna Carta of Overseas Filipino Workers (RA No. 8042) by the Congress in the same year. This law marked a significant policy shift from the previous laws since it de-emphasized the economic aspects of the diaspora and created a higher standard for the protection and welfare of overseas workers (Gonzales, 1998). In 2010, President Noynoy Aquino addressed some of the issues pending from his predecessor, including a commitment to not pursue overseas employment as a developmental strategy and a priority in the protection of workers ("OFWs Score," 2012). In line with these action plans, the President successfully pushed the Parliament to pass the Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010, an amended version of the Migrant Worker and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, which was signed during the term of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Furthermore, Congress also approved HB 5804 or the Magna Carta for Domestic Workers or Batas Kasambahay, which put in place a better legal protection for domestic workers or those who work within the employer's household.

In the course of these changes, NGOs in the Philippines played an important role in ensuring workers' protection. They not only provide support and services for workers but, most importantly, advocate for the protection of their families back in the Philippines. Although the government helps to protect migrants abroad through various agencies, migrants' families are often forgotten. The lack in protecting mi-

5   The 1987 Constitution of the Repulic of the Philippines. (1987, February 11). Retrieved from the government website: http://www.gov.ph/the-philippine-constitutions/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-article-xiii/

grant workers' families often becomes the source for criticism of existing govern-ment regulations. NGOs thus focus on strengthening supportive systems for family members and caregivers left behind through programs rooted in the private sector.[6]

Comparison of Indonesia and the Philippines

This section compares the placement and protection of migrant workers within the regulatory framework of Indonesia's Law No. 39/2004 and the Philippine RA. Indone-sian Law No. 39/2004 was passed by the Megawati administration in 2004 with little consultation with civil society members or organizations (IOM, 2012, p. 13). Since its adaptation, the law has attracted much criticism from migrant worker activists. Wahyu Susilo, a policy analyst from Migrant Care, expressed his concern that the law has a limited scope of protection and a tendency to accommodate the placement process of migrant labor rather than creating a protection mechanism for migrants (Susilo, 2010). In contrast, RA No. 10022 sought to improve the standard of state as-sistance and promotion of overseas workers' welfare. By amending the articles, the law improved the rescue and assistance mechanism, expanded the scope of illegal recruitment definitions, set heavier penalties for violators, and included penalties for overseas employment administration members who did not follow the law. In its analysis, this section will briefly cast a look into the ILO conventions ratified by both governments.

By comparison, the Philippines have ratified a total of 35 ILO conventions, while Indonesia has ratified 18 ILO conventions.[7] Both countries have ratified the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Despite both governments' commitment to protect their nationals abroad, there are several differences in the provisions of the law that result in Filipinos being better protected than Indonesians.

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6   For example, the Philippine NGO *Women's Feature Services* (WFS) has programs with the private sectors, including "Justice and Healing for Survivors of Gender-Based Violence" and "The Impact of Female Migration on the Filipino Families and Strengthening Support Systems in the Community", retrieved from WFS website: http://wfstest.weebly.com/justice-and-healing-for-survivors-of-gender-based-violence.html/ and http://wfstest.weebly.com/the-impact-of-female-migration-on-the-family.html. Apart from WFS, other NGOs in the Philippines that are active in migrant workers' protection are *Centre for Overseas Workers, Blas F. Ople Policy Centre*, and *Asia Pacific Missions for Migrants* (APMM).

7   These ratifications include technical conventions such as C017 – Workmen's Compensation (Accidents) Convention and C157 – Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention. For a full list, see ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11001:0::NO:::

Defining Overseas Migrant Workers

General provisions of both laws provide different definitions of migrant workers. Section 2 of the Philippine law states that an "overseas Filipino worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a citizen". On the other hand, the Indonesian Law Article 1 stipulates migrant workers as Indonesian citizens who meet the requirement to work overseas for remuneration for a certain period of time. While the Philippine law incorporates a broader definition of overseas workers, the Indonesian law covertly stipulates that irregular workers who used unofficial channels or migrated illegally will not receive protection under this law. This is a violation of the ILO Convention C111 on Discrimination, which Indonesia has ratified, in which Article 1 (a) states that:

> *Discrimination includes any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation.*

The differing views on protection of undocumented migrant workers make Indonesian workers more vulnerable towards physical torture and other poor treatment by their employers. Based on a report prepared by the Indonesian Migrant Worker Trade Union, most of the undocumented migrant workers are women who have obtained their employment without official documents, do not have standard salaries, and are not permitted to join a trade union ("Indonesia to Encourage," 2011). This negligence of rights stands in contrast with the commitment of ILO Convention C-087 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, especially Article 5:

> *Workers' and employers' organizations shall have the right to establish and join federations and confederations and any such organization, federation or confederation shall have the right to affiliate with international organizations of workers and employers.*

The Indonesian Embassy in Malaysia recorded that there were more than 800,000 illegal workers in Malaysia in 2009 ("TKI Bermasalah," 2009). Since they were perceived to be illegal, the Indonesian government would not be able to take any affirmative action in response to the treatment of the host country towards these workers.

Key Government Stakeholders and Responsibility

The Philippine Magna Carta provides more comprehensive details than the Indonesian law in terms of key government stakeholders involved in migrant workers' deployment and their responsibility. RA 10022 identifies the agencies involved, provides definitions of these agencies, and elaborates the responsibilities of these government units.[8] In addition, the law incorporates the establishment of a National Reintegration Center for Overseas Filipino Workers (NRCO) and Oversight Committee (Section 24) which comprises five senators and five representatives to be appointed by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, respectively. Comparable strategies are absent in the Indonesian law. Apart from the government agencies mentioned above, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is also involved in the protection of the interests and welfare of Filipinos abroad. Under the DFA, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) is tasked to monitor and organize pre-departure registration and orientation seminars for Filipinos leaving the country (Gonzales, 1998).

In comparison, Indonesian Law No. 39/2004 addresses the role of the regional government and the BNP2TKI in the process of labor migration. As stipulated in Article 5, the government is obliged to regulate, guide, implement, and monitor the placement of Indonesian labor migrants, with the optional involvement of the local government, following delegated authority by the central government. The law then specifies the two roles of the national government, which comprise both execution and supervision. However, this situation creates a bias in reporting, since supervision should be carried out by non-governmental agencies (IOM, 2012). BNP2TKI is directly responsible to the president and in charge for the placement process of overseas workers, including servicing, coordinating, and monitoring in the pre-departure phase, during workers' placement, and during their return. However, unlike the Philippine law, the Indonesian law does not stipulate which other agencies or government departments are to be involved in this process. As a result, the management of overseas workers has created a dispute between the agencies and high-ranking officials involved in this matter.

It is important to note that a national agency responsible for the reintegration of workers, like the Philippine NRCO, is absent in Indonesia. In the latter, the Ministry

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8   See Republic Act (RA) No. 10022 Section 14, Section 16 and Section 20, which regulate the role and responsibilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POA), Department of Health, and the establishment of a Shared Government Information System for Migration, http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2010/ra_10022_2010.html

of Manpower and the BNP2TKI implement the process simultaneously. Furthermore, BNP2TKI is often dependent on international or national NGOs to handle reintegration cases, like in the project migrant village in Central Java, which is conducted in cooperation with IOM (Prihadiyoko, 2012). Publications by the Indonesian government tend to promote the workers' success story, rather than encourage the formulation of new programs for productive living options in the home countries.

Educating Workers

A perennial challenge to the government's public policy is the creation of educational programs for overseas workers to ensure their rights are protected. Education and training of prospective labor migrants is vital to improve their knowledge of basic rights and reduce cases of mistreatment by their prospective employers. Both the Indonesian and the Philippine governments have introduced workers' education programs in their laws. However, the Indonesian government has 'assigned' the rights to educate workers to private agencies, while the Philippine government takes direct responsibility. Some of the private agencies in Indonesia have no valid permit, cram many workers into a dormitory designed for fewer people, and keep the workers waiting for months before being sent abroad (Haryanto, 2011). The Philippine law, however, states that the responsibility for the education of workers lies in the hands of the overseas employment administration (RA 10022, Section 14, para. 2).

In comparison, Indonesian Law No 39/2004, Article 86, Subarticle 2, states that in undertaking education and training for workers, the government can include recruitment agencies, other organizations, and/or the community. However, the government has failed to monitor whether the workers have received adequate education or training (Syaiful, 2009). According to the Transmigration and Labor Ministerial Regulation No. 17/MEN/VIII/2009, the listed pre-departure briefings should be delivered within a timeframe of at least 20 hours. However, a survey carried out by the *Institute for Ecosoc Rights* found that the pre-departure briefing is delivered in eight hours (or less) to an often over-crowded room (IOM, 2012). In other cases, a significant number of individuals did not receive any pre-departure training at all (IOM, 2012). Uneducated workers, upon their return, are more vulnerable towards the Indonesian 'one roof' system at the arrival gate at the airport. Indonesian labor migrants have to go through the repatria-

tion system at Terminal IV at the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport and are often harassed by corrupt officials and unofficial brokers (who often act as transport providers charging more for transport services to the workers' hometowns) (Safitri, 2012).

Rights of Migrant Workers and Family Members

In response to numerous cases involving workers abroad, the Indonesian and Philippine governments have regulated legal assistance systems in their laws. For Indonesia, the scheme is stated in Indonesian Law No. 39/2004 Chapter VII, Article 80 (1) and (2):

> (1) *In consideration with the situation and period where migrant workers are situated in destination countries abroad:*
>
>> a) *Legal assistance is given in accordance with the rule of law in effect in destination country and international custom*
>>
>> b) *Protection of the fulfillment of rights is in accordance with the contract and/or the rule of law where the migrant worker is located*
>
> (2) *Further guidelines regarding the protection of migrant workers during their placement abroad according to Article (1) are stipulated with Government Regulation. [Author's translation]*

However, this provision has proven to hold little weight since many labor migrants have experienced poor handling of their cases, indicating weakness in the legal aid services (Liu, 2012). The embassies in host countries serve as government representatives and point of contact for troubled workers. However, the legal response to overseas workers' cases seems to be practiced on an ad hoc basis. The Task Force (known as *Satgas TKI*) mandated with assisting and providing legal advocacy to Indonesian migrant workers facing legal problems, especially death sentences, was formed only recently under Presidential Decision No.8/2012 as a response to mounting criticism against the government, especially after the case of Ruyati (Liu, 2012). In contrast, the legal assistance system for international and domestic cases is regulated in several provisions of the Philippine RA 10022, with an emphasis on 'free' access and the inclusion of undocumented workers (Section 1 (e), Section 8, and Section 18).

Another important issue raised by migrant worker activists from Migrant Care is the ratification of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which was issued in 1990. While the Philippines ratified this convention in 1995, Indonesia signed it in 2004 and was slow in implementing it. In February 2012, President Yudhoyono issued a letter R-17/Pres/02/2012 that mandated the Ministry of Manpower to discuss the process, followed by the par-

liament's ratification in April 2012 (House of Representatives, 2012). The ratification obliges countries to ensure workers' basic human rights, including the right to return to their home countries, the right to be informed of working conditions before taking up employment, and the right to form trade unions. In contrast, the Philippine law is more advanced in terms of ensuring the rights of migrants and their families. For instance, RA 10022 Section 23 mandates that migrant workers are entitled to a compassionate visit by family members when hospitalized.

Bilateral, Regional, and International Cooperation

The Colombo process obliged the state to operationalize the mandate of protecting their migrant workers in domestic as well as international context (Wickramasekara, 2006). According to the process, both bilateral cooperation and the Memoranda of Understanding are important for managing migration as they (1) ensure continued access to the labor markets of receiving countries, (2) reduce domestic unemployment pressures, (3) ensure protection of migrant workers' rights and welfare, and (4) earn foreign exchange through workers' remittances (Wickramasekara, 2006). The Philippine law elaborates several conditions that host countries must observe, including laws protecting labor and social rights of migrant workers, a signatory of multilateral conventions relating to the protection of migrant workers, and concluded bilateral arrangement with the Philippine government (RA 10022, Section 3). The latter article is found in the Indonesian law, while other provisions were absent. Article 11 and 27 of Law No 39/2004 state that placement for overseas workers could only be applied in countries that have signed a written agreement with the Government of Indonesia.

Conclusion

The analysis of Indonesia's and the Philippines' regulatory framework to provide protection for overseas workers highlights the fact that, the Philippine regulatory framework is more advanced than the Indonesian. The Indonesian government clearly puts economic importance over the protection of workers. Although both governments recognize migrant workers as 'economic heroes' of the nation, the Philippines regulates migrant workers' protection in a more comprehensive way. For instance, in

opposition to the Philippine law, by defining 'migrant workers', the Indonesian law does not recognize irregular or illegal workers in their protection scheme. In addition, the Indonesian law does not define specific roles of the government agencies, which often creates confusion when handling migrant workers' cases. The role of private agencies in educating Indonesian migrant workers also becomes a source of problems since the monitoring of those agencies is still weak.

Thus, it is important for Indonesia to revise its law to maximize the protection of its migrant workers. For Indonesia, the government needs to consider several aspects of the law, especially the definition of the roles of various government agencies and the education of migrant workers. The clear division of tasks between the Philippine government agencies means that the government could work more effectively. In contrast, vague articles in the Indonesian law about the role of regional government resulted in misinterpretations and conflicts among the government agencies involved in the management of migrant workers. As for migrant workers' education, the article in the Indonesian Law No. 39/2004 that allows for unreliable private agencies to educate workers has made workers less prepared and aware of their rights and responsibilities (Haryanto, 2011). This situation has made Indonesian workers more desirable by employers as they tend to prefer workers who are less educated and know less about their rights. In response, the workers have more opportunities to find employment. The government enjoys more remittances, even though negligence of workers' education has created legal problems that affect the government's credibility. It also means that Indonesian workers are more vulnerable towards abuse and legal problems. To fix this situation, Indonesia needs to address its regulatory failure and impose fair protection for its workers – even if it is opposed by the host government.

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Waiting on the Islands of 'Stuckedness'.
Managing Asylum Seekers in Island Detention Camps in Indonesia:
From the Late 1970s to the Early 2000s

ANTJE MISSBACH[1]

This article sheds light on the obstructed mobility of asylum seekers who were passing through Indonesia during their search for permanent and effective protection, and the politics of their detention. The flows of Indochinese asylum seekers who were 'stored' in Galang Island between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s, awaiting either their resettlement or repatriation, are compared with more recent arrivals of asylum seekers from the Middle East, many of whom were hosted in open detention facilities on Lombok Island during the mid-2000s. This comparison provides comprehensive background information on how the asylum seekers and their claims for international protection have been handled in Indonesia. Given that Indonesia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, Indonesia offers no formal rights to asylum seekers and refugees within its territory. Instead, Indonesia 'tolerates' their presence as long as they are under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Highlighting the differences regarding the management of these two distinctive groups of asylum seekers helps to grasp the full scope of 'stuckedness' (Hage, 2009) and also helps to understand the varied impacts of obstructed mobility on asylum seekers looking for permanent and effective protection.

Keywords: *Asylum Seekers; Detention Camps; Indochinese 'boatpeople'; Indonesia; Middle Eastern Refugees*

Dieser Artikel beleuchtet die eingeschränkte Mobilität von Asylsuchenden auf ihrem Weg durch Indonesien auf der Suche nach dauerhaftem und effektivem Schutz sowie die Politik ihrer Inhaftierung. In diesem Kontext werden Asylsuchende aus den Indochina-Staaten, die von den späten 1970er bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre auf der Insel Galang festgehalten waren und dort auf ihre Umsiedlung beziehungsweise Repatriierung warteten, mit den neueren Flüchtlingsankünften aus Nahost verglichen, von denen viele Mitte der 2000er Jahre auf der Insel Lombok in offenen Asylstätten festgehalten wurden. Dieser Vergleich dient in erster Linie dazu, den Umgang Indonesiens mit Asylsuchenden in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten aufzuzeigen. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Indonesien bisher die Flüchtlingskonvention der Vereinten Nationen (1951) sowie das dazugehörige Protokoll (1967) nicht unterschrieben hat, bietet Indonesien Asylsuchenden und Flüchtlingen keine formellen Rechte. Solange diese sich jedoch beim Flüchtlingshochkommissariat der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCR) oder auch bei der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) registrieren, toleriert Indonesien ihre Anwesenheit

1 Antje Missbach is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Melbourne, Australia.
Contact: antje.missbach@unimelb.edu.au

innerhalb seines Territoriums. Unterschiede im Umgang mit diesen beiden Flüchtlingsgruppen ver-deutlichen nicht nur das volle Ausmaß des „Festsitzens" (stuckedness) (Hage, 2009), sondern zeigen auch verschiedene Auswirkungen von eingeschränkter Mobilität auf, wenn es um den Zugang zu dauerhaftem und effektivem Schutz geht.

Schlagworte: Asylgefängnisse; Asylsuchende; Flüchtlinge aus dem Nahen Osten; Indochinesische Bootsflüchtlinge; Indonesien

Introduction

> *It's good to hope, it's the waiting that spoils it.*
> *(Yiddish proverb)*

This article compares the treatment of Indochinese and Middle Eastern asylum seekers in Indonesia between the late 1970s and the early 2000s by examining Galang and Lombok – two islands used for detaining asylum seekers in the past. In particular, this article seeks to illustrate the general conditions of obstructed mobility – or even stasis – experienced during protracted stays on these 'detention' islands. In order to better understand the general and specific features of human migratory flows in current South-East Asia, it is insufficient to focus solely on the causes, courses, and conditions of movement. The other side of the coin, obstructions to migrants' mobility as well as the total inability to move (on), requires at least the same degree of attention if a complete picture of human migratory flows is to be provided.

There has been a significant spread in the use of global detention regimes for asylum seekers and undocumented migrants to remote corners of the world, particularly to those situated at the 'margins' of the 'West'. Potential receiving states use these detention regimes as punitive and disciplinary deterrents to reduce further irregular movement and migration (Babacan & Briskman, 2008; Briskman & Dimasi, 2010; Mainwaring, 2012; Moran, Gill, & Conlon, 2013). Unlike immigration detention centers on the mainland, detention islands and detention facilities on islands are a special case (Mountz, 2011a; 2011b). In a fashion similar to legendary prison islands such as Alcatraz and Pianosa, island detention centers are surrounded by the sea and escaping from them often appears less feasible than from jails elsewhere.[2] It is the

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2 Lombok differs significantly in terms of its size and population from other, often rather small, detention islands. This, however, shall not distract from its function as a temporary detention island where asylum seekers could not leave.

very nature of isolated islands that makes them more attractive as 'natural' prisons given the lower security precautions required.

These days, island detention facilities have gained notoriety, as they are symbols of the suffering of asylum seekers deprived of many of their basic rights. Especially notorious are the facilities on Lampedusa (Italy), Guam (USA), and two Australian-financed facilities, Manus Island (Papua New-Guinea) and Nauru. The idea of 'storing away' asylum seekers and preventing their integration into a host community, whether temporary or permanent, is by no means novel, as this article sets out to illustrate. What is novel are the debates about island-based detention camps and the recently increased practice of states to host asylum seekers on (remote) islands as means of migration management or as a punitive deterrent for their 'irregular' movements. In particular, current debates focus on the jurisdiction and the management of detention islands as well as the impact on asylum seekers and their right to apply for protection (Broeders, 2010; Thomson, 2006).

In her pioneering study of maritime detention centers, Alison Mountz (2011a; 2011b) has demonstrated that island detention centers have become special sites of exclusion in a geographical landscape where migrants try to access asylum processes. Nation states and the international community have established special intra-governmental institutions and invested considerable resources to enforce the management, interruption, and redirection of global irregular migratory flows. While the cruelties of war and the hopelessness of persistent poverty are among the reasons why these people were displaced from their homelands, it is the strict asylum/migration regimes of the receiving countries of the 'West' that prevent them from reaching their desired destinations. 'Irregular' migrants, many of whom are registered asylum seekers or even recognized refugees under the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR), are held in open or closed detention in island facilities for extended periods, during which they are unable to return or move on. This leaves them "suspended in time and space" (Mountz, 2011a, p. 383).

As an archipelago with more than 17,000 islands, of which only a third are permanently inhabited, Indonesia appears to have an unlimited potential to 'lock away' asylum seekers for extended periods. Neighboring Australia, the most popular (potential) destination country for asylum seekers in the Asia-Pacific region, is well-aware of Indonesia's potential and increasingly seeks to exploit it. In the last few decades,

Indonesia has gained extensive experience with receiving and managing asylum seekers and refugees. Indonesia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, has no domestic mechanism for processing asylum claims, and does not offer permanent protection and integration to asylum seekers. Instead, Indonesia relinquishes the determination of refugee status to the UNHCR.

After the fall of Saigon in 1975, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, and later, Cambodian, asylum seekers fled by boat to Indonesia and its neighbors. Given the reluctance of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia to become permanent settlement destinations, the international community, under the auspices of the UNHCR, agreed to resettle large numbers of refugees. Despite initial plans to host them only temporarily on a secluded island in the Riau Archipelago, it was not until 1996 that the last Vietnamese left the camp on Galang Island.

Around the time when the last Vietnamese asylum seekers left Indonesia, the first wave of asylum seekers from the Middle East, mainly Iraqi, Afghan, and later, Iranian started to arrive in Indonesia. As their numbers were significantly smaller compared to the Indochinese refugees, no regional plan was set in place. However, neighboring countries such as Malaysia and Thailand received an increasing number of Middle Eastern asylum seekers, especially as a result of renewed violence in the countries of origin. Coinciding with the arrival of Middle Eastern asylum seekers in the second half of the 1990s, Indonesia was experiencing great political and economic turmoil and saw massive displacement of many of its own people due to ethnic-religious and separatist conflicts in a number of outer provinces (Hedman, 2008). Despite the large numbers of displaced people and refugees within Indonesia that could have triggered a more proactive stance on the part of the Indonesian government, the handling of the foreign asylum seekers remained the responsibility of the UNHCR and the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM). Although the numbers of Middle Eastern asylum seekers remained far below the Indochinese, they were by no means negligible. In fact, Indonesia's *laissez-faire* attitude towards their presence and onward migration to Australia evoked substantial tensions between Indonesia and Australia (Fortuna, 2002).

The Middle Eastern asylum seekers had no intention of staying in Indonesia for the long term. Rather, they tried to use a rapidly developing people smuggling industry to reach Australia as soon as possible (Barker, 2013; Missbach & Sinanu, 2011; Munro, 2011). When Australia's 'Pacific Solution' was launched in 2001, a number of boats with asy-

lum seekers onboard were forcibly returned to Indonesia. Unable to leave Indonesia, these returned asylum seekers were held as discretely as possible for several years on Lombok. Meanwhile, more asylum seekers kept arriving in Indonesia and were stranded there (see annual UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks). Asylum seekers' lives were shaped by indefinite periods of waiting for onward migration. They often experienced waiting as something unbearable due to many uncertainties they faced and the prohibition on working legally. 'Waiting it out' while being torn between hope for resettlement (in the best case) and fear of forced repatriation (in the worst) left lasting imprints on people, especially when endured over many years. The remoteness of their location, their collective isolation from the temporary host society, restricted mobility, and deprived liberty were a form of punishment that was intended to dissuade other potential asylum seekers from following their paths.

While the presence of Indochinese and Middle Eastern asylum seekers in Galang and Lombok was concealed from the general Indonesian public, news about the fate of those detained in the island detention camps reached a more interested audience outside Indonesia, such as activist groups and NGOs in Australia. Asylum seekers' access to cheaper and more easily accessible communication technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones made Indonesia's 'out-of-sight-out-of-mind-approach' work only in the short term.

Plans for future island detention camps keep lingering within political debates in Indonesia when it comes to finding solutions of how to handle asylum seekers, even though many decision-makers admit that the problems of both Galang and Lombok outweighed the gains. Indonesian proponents of island detention camps listed better cost efficiency of centralized management and better surveillance mechanisms for detention islands among their arguments (Alford & Nathalia, 2013). Based on this perspective, the option of stricter control movements is deemed more important than upholding asylum seekers' right to freedom of movement. If hosted far away from local communities, asylum seekers cannot exercise any negative influence on the Indonesian population, such as assumed threats to Indonesian health and security. Also, the possibilities of implementing orderly onward migration schemes for the asylum seekers (resettlement or repatriation) are greater, making self-organized crossings by boat to Australia less likely.

Opponents of detention islands in Indonesia do not show much resentment of the plans of setting up a main immigration detention island because they are concerned

with the well-being of the transiting asylum seekers. They are not necessarily in favor of accommodating asylum seekers in smaller detention camps spread out all over the archipelago or allowing them to live among local communities, as is currently widely practiced due to the shortage of space in the existing centers. Rather, they would prefer Indonesia not to interfere and obstruct transiting asylum seekers from reaching Australia. Not only do they consider the detention regime as waste of money, but more importantly, they also dislike the idea of Indonesia acting as a lackey (*kaki tangan*) for Australia's externalized asylum and migration policies.

Based on fieldwork, interviews, official reports, witness accounts, and other secondary sources, this article provides detailed background information on Indonesia's handling of Indochinese and Middle Eastern asylum seekers in Indonesia from the mid-1970s to the 2000s.[3] Besides retracing trends and numbers of these two specific asylum seeker cohorts, the article sets out to explain major differences in reception and processing of their claims in Indonesia. Next to depicting the everyday complexities and hardships of being held on a small island, the article seeks to elaborate on the intimacies of transit, 'stuckedness', or as Ghassan Hage (2009) described it, the "sense of existential immobility" (p. 7). By retracing previous experiences of transiting asylum seekers in Indonesia and examining the politics of detention as played out between the Indonesian state, the international community, the UNHCR, and the IOM, the article highlights in particular Indonesia's lack of proactiveness in finding viable solutions for asylum seekers. The article argues that, in the case of Indonesia, despite the dire circumstances on these 'islands of stuckedness', those detention islands only had very little impact as a tool of deterrence. The ebbs and flows of asylum seekers across the region were generally triggered by the wider geopolitical context rather than the dreadfulness of the detention islands.

Vietnamese 'Boat People' in Indonesia

Following the fall of Saigon in April 1975, tens of thousands of Vietnamese who had previously supported the US forces started to flee their home country in fear of Communist retaliation. Economic hardship and political discrimination also contributed

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3 As part of a larger research project on transit migrants in Indonesia conducted between 2010 and 2012, I also had the chance to interview a number of former UNHCR staff members who had worked in Galang.

towards the exodus. Besides the Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese from South Vietnam, thousands of Cambodians and Laotians also fled due to political unrest across the region. They either crossed to Thailand or tried to reach Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Indonesia by boat. Thousands perished in the pirate-infested South China Sea.

The first report about Vietnamese refugees arriving in Indonesia appeared on 19 May 1975, when 92 people passed through the town of Tarempa (Riau Islands) on their way to Singapore (Fandik, 2013). A week later, a Vietnamese boat landed on Pulau Laut (Riau Islands). From then on, Vietnamese refugees started arriving almost on a daily basis at different islands in the Riau Archipelago, such as Batam, Bintan, Natuna, Anambas, and Kuku. By 30 June 1979, the United Nations General Assembly (1979) reported that close to 43,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian 'boat people' were present all over Indonesia. Indonesian officials provided substantially different data:

Table 1: Numbers of Asylum Seekers from Indochina					
ARRIVALS IN	JANUARY 1979	FEBRUARY 1979	MARCH 1979	CUMULATIVE (1975- 31 MARCH 1979)	PERSONS AWAITING SOLUTION ON 31 MARCH 1979
HONG KONG	3,413	15	0	9,888	5,100
INDONESIA	1,831	406	3,101	9,193	7,187
MALAYSIA	4,202	3,166	6,033	83,495	52,273
PHILIPPINES	199	797	254	5,819	2,150
THAILAND	7,690	4,604	6,644	235,474	149,387

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 1979.

When the Indochinese exodus began in 1975, not a single country in South-East Asia had acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Additionally, none of the South-East Asian countries had instituted a domestic legal framework for the reception of asylum seekers. With no screening mechanisms for asylum seekers in place yet, the UNHCR granted all asylum seekers automatically *prima facie* refugee status and protection *en bloc*. Given the political circumstances of the Cold War, the exodus of the Vietnamese refugees, for the West, was an indication of the Vietnamese Communist regime's arbitrariness. Despite the resettlement of about 200,000 Indochinese refugees to third countries such as the US, Australia, France, and others between 1975 and March 1979, it was the countries in South-East Asia – and first and

foremost Thailand and Malaysia – that had to take care of more than 340,000 people in various camps. Due to the massive scale of the exodus, the South-East Asian countries appealed to the international community for burden sharing and assistance in managing the refugee flows.

After a series of meetings among the South-East Asian transit states and Western resettlement countries during the first half of 1979, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines each offered to allocate a sparsely populated island to establish regional processing centers for refugees who had already been accepted for resettlement. While the Philippines offered to host 7,000 refugees temporarily on Tara Island,[4] about 250 km south-west of Manila, the Indonesian government chose Galang Island in the Riau Archipelago as a temporary home for up to 10,000 refugees at a time.[5] Galang is not only strategically located and easily accessible by air and sea, but it was then inhabited by only about 200 people. This also made it easier for the local authorities to separate the refugees from the local population in order to avoid intermingling. Galang was never supposed to offer permanent integration for refugees. It was conceived as a temporary location where refugees could prepare for their resettlement by undertaking language and other courses. From the very beginning, the Indonesian government emphasized

> that it would not receive refugees in its territory, but for the sake of humanitarianism it was forced to accept them during transit while they were waiting to move on to a third country, as well as actively providing thoughts and concrete support to find a solution for this problem. (Department of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, 1980, p. 1)

The meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in May 1979 issued a statement on refugees, which stipulated that "countries providing the site or island for the processing center shall retain the sovereignty, administrative control and security responsibility over the island" (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 1979, p. 5). All costs of establishing and running these centers, including the provision of food, education, and health care, were to be covered by the UNHCR. Delegates of the international community at the time widely welcomed this plan, resulting in substantial financial support (totaling about USD 160 million in cash and kind) being provided to

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4 Tara Island was populated by only about 100 families, mostly fishermen and -women or farmers. The total estimated costs of establishing and running the camp for two years were USD 6,072,853 (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 1979).

5 After WWII, Galang Island served as a transit location for Japanese soldiers before they were returned to Japan in 1946 (Fandik, 2013).

the UNHCR to run these centers (United Nations General Assembly, 1979). The decision to establish temporary processing centers was based on the condition that the Vietnamese government would stop further 'illegal' departures and instead promote orderly departures, to which Vietnam agreed (Robinson, 2004).

On 2 July 1979, the Indonesian Ministry of Defense established the Team for the Prevention and Management of Vietnamese Refugees (*Tim Penanggulangan dan Pengelolaan Pengungsi Vietnam*, P3V). Presidential Decree No. 38 of 1979, dated 11 September, confirmed this team under the Ministry of Defense, but also ordered integrated and coordinated measures with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior Affairs for handling the "Indochinese refugee problem". It was envisioned that the refugees would stay there only for a "reasonable period", estimated at three to five years. As Indonesia was reluctant to spend any domestic resources on establishing and running the center in Galang, the UNHCR had to cover all costs, estimated at about USD 18,562,000 over a period of two years (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 1979).

Refugee Processing in Galang

The refugee processing center was established near Sijantung village on Galang, between June and August 1979. Inside the camp, people were housed in barracks, one containing up to 100 people (Fandik, 2013). Galang camp was equipped with water, sanitation, schools, a hospital, and even a small port. Compared to local standards, conditions in the camp were adequate but frugal. The UNHCR spent about IDR 400 (USD 0.64) per person per day in rations, not cash. The camp was supposed to assist refugees to improve health and fitness levels as well as participate in classes including languages (English and French) and cultural instruction, as was required by most receiving countries before resettlement.

The Indochinese refugees were well organized amongst themselves and promptly established various organizations for religious and cultural activities. Given that some refugees had cash and other valuables, they started commercial activities inside the camp. For example, some built small coffee shops while others sold cigarettes and convenience goods. Over time, churches, temples, markets, bakeries, gardens and

even gambling spots, cinemas, video parlors and discotheques sprang up (Cohen, 1993). There was also a jail in the camp to lock up drunkards or those involved in fights. Sexual violence and intimidation, both by fellow refugees and by guards, was widely reported (Yen, 1995). A cemetery was built to accommodate those who died while awaiting their resettlement.

In the beginning, the local population on Galang welcomed the establishment of the center, as it offered them temporary employment. However, incidents of theft swayed public opinion against the Vietnamese refugees and social resentment emerged. Sometimes camp inmates would leave the premises overnight to go to town. According to Indonesians who used to work in the camp, there were also substantial business activities between some refugees and the Chinese community on the neighboring Bintan Island (Imalia Komalo, personal communication, Pancawati, 10 February 2012).[6] Although the informal sector benefitted from the presence of refugees, it was, first and foremost, members of the military who profited from the establishment of the camp as it served them as a source of commerce and employment.

In the early years of joint action (1979-1980), the UNHCR tried to reach an average level of resettlement to third countries of about 25,000 people per month across all South-East Asian camps (United Nations General Assembly, 1979). Between July 1979 and July 1982, about 623,800 Indochinese refugees were resettled to a total of 20 resettlement countries, mainly the US, France, and Canada (UNHCR, 2000). Logistics for these resettlements were provided by the *Intergovernmental Committee for Migration* (ICEM), the predecessor of today's IOM. From 1980 to 1986, resettlements in Galang outpaced new arrivals (Robinson, 2004), but from 1987 onwards, when more people from North Vietnam joined the exodus, the number of refugees arriving in South-East Asia increased drastically (Balfour, 1993). Although the conditions in the processing camps were far from ideal, the possibility of resettlement to a country in the West itself had become a pull factor.

In order to deal with the rising numbers, a second camp for newly arrived refugees was established at Galang. In the mid-1980s, the Indonesian military launched operations and also engaged in joint maritime patrols with Malaysia and Singapore to prevent the arrival of additional refugees (Fandik, 2013). This cooperation was overshadowed by

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6   The Red Cross also helped with money transfers.

Malaysia's unilateral redirection policy, adopted in the late 1980s, which was responsible for pushing back boats into the sea (UNHCR, 2000; Yen, 1995).[7] Despite international protests, Malaysia prevented at least 5,600 refugees from landing at Bidong Island (Azam & Vatikiotis, 1990). With some deaths reported and many more that went unreported, the majority of these rejected refugees decided to go to Indonesia (Betts, 2006). While there were fewer than 2,000 people in Galang in 1989, the number of camp inmates increased to 16,500 in the following year, thereby overburdening the facilities (Yen, 1995).

Galang Under the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)

Between 1975 and 1995, almost 2 million people from Indochina had fled their home countries, about 800,000 of them on boats, looking for asylum and hoping for resettlement (Yen, 1995). During this period, between 122,000 and 145,000 asylum seekers transited through Indonesia (Cohen, 1993; Fields, 1992; McBeth, 1994; UNHCR, 2000).

Table 2: Vietnamese Arrivals in Indonesia (1975-1995)				
1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990-1995	CUMULATIVE (1975-1995)
51,156	36,208	19,070	15,274	121,708

Source: UNHCR, 2000, p. 98.

Despite ongoing resettlements, mainly in the USA, Canada, Australia, France, and a number of other European countries, there were still more than 200,000 Indochinese people stuck in refugee camps all over South-East Asia in 1989. Given the combination of rising numbers of arrivals, increasing waiting times for resettlement, and a compassion fatigue among Western resettlement countries, the transit countries decided to discourage the Indochinese from entering. Multilateral consultations had already begun in 1988 for what later came to be known as the *Comprehensive Plan of Action* (CPA) for Indochinese refugees.

The *International Conference on Indochinese Refugees*, which took place in Geneva in June 1989, saw the beginning of a new era in managing large refugee flows. For the

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7   There were also push-backs by Thai officials at Khlong Yai port, assisted by Thai fishermen (Helton 1990/1991, p. 114) and by Singaporean coastal guards (Fitzpatrick, 2009).

first time, as an outcome of the Conference, a refugee status determination scheme was introduced for the Indochinese refugees. Rather than a *prima facie* grant of refugee status and en masse resettlement, asylum seekers were now required to provide evidence to support their individual claims for protection in order to qualify as refugees. After a cut-off-date, which was determined in the CPA, every new arrival had to undergo a screening procedure to establish an individual case for protection. In order to prove a well-founded fear of persecution, it was no longer enough to cite former maltreatment or collective discrimination. Instead, claimants also had to show that their lives would still be endangered upon return. If unable to provide evidence of individual persecution, they would be considered economic migrants instead. Those who were not found to be in need of international protection and resettlement were to be returned to Vietnam. The main objective of the CPA was to discourage departures from Vietnam, as it was by then widely believed that it was not only political persecution and discrimination that drove people to flee their homeland, but that the option for resettlement in the West had become an even stronger pull factor.[8] This objective was not met straight away, and another 400,000 people left Indochina over the duration of the CPA (Robinson, 2004). However, after the first wave of repatriations to Vietnam, the annual Vietnamese exodus decreased drastically. In 1989, the number of newly-arrived refugees was still about 64,000 but it fell to about 32,000 in 1990 and about 23,000 in 1991 (Bari, 1992, p. 509).

In order to ensure fairness within the refugee status determination process, the CPA sought to introduce uniform screening mechanisms all over the region. Most transit countries relied on the UNHCR as advisor, observer, and sponsor. Also, national officials were trained to assess refugee claims. In Indonesia, the aforementioned Team for the Prevention and Management of Vietnamese Refugees, composed of army, navy, immigration, and police personnel, was in charge of conducting interviews and making decisions in the first instance (Bari, 1992). Everybody who arrived after 17 March 1989 had to undergo a screening. According to Arthur Helton (1990/1991, p. 121), one of the most vocal critics in the NGO community and the representative of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the screening procedures

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8   James Hathaway (1993) has criticized the inconsistent labeling of asylum seekers from Vietnam, stating that the "conceptual shift between the unbridled inclusion of Vietnamese asylum seekers under the 1979 Accord and the presumption of economic motivation in the 1989 Plan is not explained by a substantive shift in the nature of the protection claims advanced" (p. 689) because basic civil and political rights, such as denial of free speech, press, and assembly, were still missing.

in Indonesia "began disastrously" because authorities relied on resettlement criteria instead of refugee status criteria.

Before the actual screening interview with P3V, UNHCR representatives conducted weekly information sessions with the applicants. During these sessions, leaflets were distributed which explained the status determination process, but not the actual criteria for grant of asylum. During these sessions, the UNHCR also conducted eligibility assessments with applicants. These initial assessments, paired with a recommendation on whether the request for asylum should be granted or not, were then forwarded to the Indonesian authorities. The UNHCR representatives were not present during the actual P3V screening interviews, which in many cases were extremely short, sometimes lasting only twenty minutes. In the majority of cases, P3V accepted the recommendation of the UNHCR representatives (Helton, 1993).

There were, however, widespread complaints from the applicants about the arbitrariness of the refugee status determination process (Betts, 2006). The Indonesian fast-track version of the refugee status determination process that often consisted only of simple 'yes' or 'no' questions was seen as seriously compromising the fair-

Table 3: Refugee Status Determination in Galang		
Number interviewed	10,253 persons	7,423 cases
Positive decisions	3,657 persons	2,293 cases
Negative decisions	7,382 persons	5,263 cases
Positive review decisions	165 persons	112 cases
Negative review decisions	1,815 persons	1,409 cases

Source: UNHCR, 2000, p. 98.

ness of the interviews (Helton, 1993). Other obstacles to a fair screening included the choice of interpreters, who were often just recruited from the camp. Legal consultants for the asylum seekers were not provided with sufficient training and, more generally, the understanding of the situation in Vietnam was inadequate (Robinson, 2004). There were widespread allegations of corruption, bribery, and demands for sexual favors in order for refugee status to be granted (Betts, 2006; Robinson, 2004; Yen, 1995). By July 1992, three years after the introduction of the CPA, P3V had managed to screen about two-thirds of all the people in Galang.

Rejected asylum seekers received a written decision, but the reasons for the decision were often only cursory. They were allowed to appeal within 15 to 30 days to a special review committee in Jakarta, which, however, also consisted of P3V members as well as officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UNHCR did not provide the asylum seekers with any help for the preparation of appeals. On the contrary, rejected applicants had to undergo special counseling by the UNHCR about voluntary return before they were allowed to hand in their appeal. Unlike asylum seekers in Hong Kong, people in Galang were not allowed to use private lawyers or advocacy groups (Bari, 1992). Given the lack of legal advice, many faced substantial difficulties with the bureaucratic mechanisms of the screenings and the appeals, as they did not know how to present their cases.[9] All in all, under the CPA, a total of 18,131 people were screened in Indonesia between March 1989 and September 1993, including about 1,000 unaccompanied minors (Fields, 1992).

Most accepted refugees were resettled in the US, Canada, or Australia. Between 1975 and 1995, a total of 1,311,183 Indochinese refugees had been resettled to third countries (UNHCR, 2000, p. 99).[10] According to McBeth (1994), this included at least 132,000 refugees from Galang. Usually, the UNHCR matched the resettlement criteria of potential resettlement countries with the refugees in the camps, and the IOM provided logistical support for resettlement (Betts, 2006). Nonetheless, problems arose, as in the case with *de facto* couples. Legal marriage was not allowed in the camps and informal marriages did not qualify for resettlement as one unit (unless it involved children born to the couple), making family reunions difficult.

In June 1996, the UNHCR funding for Indochinese refugees under CPA stopped throughout the region (Robinson, 2004). Although Indonesia and Thailand extended their involvement with the CPA for another 90 days, both decided that all remaining camp inmates had to be returned eventually. Following Hong Kong's example, Indonesia (as well as Thailand and the Philippines) signed a tripartite agreement with the UNHCR and Vietnam in October 1992, establishing an orderly return program for rejected asylum seekers. Although Vietnam had promised to accept and reintegrate its

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9   Between 60 to 70% of the claimants across the South-East Asian camps failed to be recognized as refugees, which led to serious charges of procedural deficiencies for the screening mechanism. Unfortunately, it was only towards the end of the CPA when applicants were given guidelines on how to prepare a submission.

10   According to UNHCR statistics (2000), the four resettlement countries with the largest intake were the US with 822,977; Australia with 137,543; Canada with 137,145; and France with 95,671 Indochinese refugees received (p. 99).

people without punishment or persecution, voluntary return proceeded hesitantly. Despite incentives for return, such as reintegration grants (Betts, 2006), only 3,911 rejected asylum seekers in Galang had accepted repatriation by September 1993 (Yen, 1995).[11] Altogether, more than 109,000 Vietnamese were repatriated under the eight-year period of the CPA (UNHCR, 2000).

Being aware that it would not be possible to convince all rejected asylum seekers to return voluntarily, and that it would therefore be necessary to adopt involuntary return as well, neither the UNHCR nor the IOM wanted to be involved in organizing the repatriations (as that was considered a violation of their statutes). Thus, the primary responsibility for the returns was left to the transit countries (Betts, 2006). As the Indonesian government was dedicated to clear Galang as soon as possible to allow for its plans to redevelop Galang into a special industrial zone, the majority of the remaining 8,500 Vietnamese were eventually returned despite protests and acts of resistance (Cohen, 1993). Rejected asylum seekers in Galang did not accept their destiny without protest. In 1994, camp inmates organized hunger strikes and riots (Lander, 1996). To protest against their rejection and their imminent repatriation, a number of people committed suicide, either by hanging or by self-immolation (Fields, 1992; McBeth, 1994). Moreover, a few rejected asylum seekers tried to escape the camp and reach Australia on their own initiative (Gilley, 1996). If their plans were discovered, the Indonesian authorities punished such attempts severely. Nevertheless, in July 1994, a group of Vietnamese who had been screened out in Galang succeeded in arriving in Broome (Grewcock, 2009).[12]

Asylum Seekers From the Middle East

Not long after the last Vietnamese departed Galang, a new group of asylum seekers started coming to Indonesia. The first five Afghan and the first seven Iranian applications for protection under the UNHCR in Indonesia were recorded in 1996 (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2002). The push factors for leaving their homelands were the poor political and economic conditions, for Afghans it was in particular the rise of the Taliban

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11   Between 1993 and 1995, the UNHCR spent USD 34.4 million on economic and social reintegration projects for returnees in Vietnam. It also employed observers in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to oversee the wellbeing of the returnees. The European Union contributed about USD 135 million for the reintegration of returnees in Vietnam (Robinson, 2004). In the first year, returnees received between USD 240 and USD 360 as assistance (Balfour, 1993; Cohen, 1993; UNHCR, 2000).

12   Between 1976 and 1978, 2,087 Vietnamese asylum seekers arrived in Australia on 55 boats (Kneebone, 2010, p. 347).

in 1995, accompanied by massive discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities. Choosing to come to Indonesia instead of remaining in their homelands was mainly due to the policy shifts in countries of first asylum that consequently led to their so-called secondary movements. For example, in the late 1990s, Pakistan adopted harsher treatment towards Afghan asylum seekers residing in its territory, where many had stayed during the Soviet occupation, some for more than 20 years (HRW, 2002). Iran also stopped tolerating Iraqi and Kurdish asylum seekers, many of whom had fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and the first Gulf War (HRW, 2002). Applying for protection at UNHCR offices in Iran and Pakistan was often difficult, as local security forces prevented physical access to the UNHCR offices (HRW, 2002). The lack of legal status combined with severe restrictions on employment and freedom of movement, the lack of health care, education, and housing as well as ongoing risks of arrest, detention, and deportation made life for asylum seekers in these two countries of first asylum highly insecure.[13]

Although neighboring countries in the region, including Jordan and Syria, are parties to the Refugee Convention, they offered no effective protection, as both countries lack domestic laws to protect refugees. This absence of protection spurred local smuggling networks to create new routes for those asylum seekers who could afford to leave again and look for protection elsewhere. First Europe and then Australia became alternatives, because their asylum policies were deemed to be more favorable, offering high approval rates and, at times, enabling family reunion and offering extensive integration services (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). Nonetheless, the push factors in the countries of origin and the countries of first asylum were more relevant for asylum seekers' decision-making than the pull factors in the destination countries (Koser, 2010).

Unlike the Indochinese who arrived in large numbers by boat, many Middle Eastern asylum seekers arrived in small groups by air and entered on short-term tourist visas. The new arrivals were comparatively few, in both absolute and relative numbers. Consequently, their treatment by the Indonesian authorities differed substantially from the treatment of the Indochinese.

Nevertheless, the arrival of asylum seekers from the Middle East triggered several problems for Indonesia in administering, accommodating, and resettling them. As

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13 Despite the deteriorating situation in the countries of first asylum in the Middle East, it should not be ignored that the largest numbers of Afghan asylum seekers continue to live in Pakistan (about 550,000), and Iran (about 1.1 million).

there was no legal framework for the processing of asylum seekers, nor any national legal guidelines or standard procedures for immigration officials on how to handle transit migrants, officers on the ground were inexperienced and had no understanding of international refugee procedures or the work of the UNHCR.[14] Given that the management of refugees and asylum seekers had previously been the task of the special committee P3V, local immigration authorities frequently did not differentiate between asylum seekers in need of international protection on the one hand and irregular migrants on the other, especially when claimants did not possess valid travel documents (Missbach & Sinanu, 2013). Also, after the refugee processing center in Galang had been closed, Indonesia was left with only limited detention facilities (*karantina imigrasi*), mostly unfit to host undocumented migrants for a longer period of time.

Overwhelmed by its many serious domestic problems in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and the end of the authoritarian Suharto regime, Indonesia had little capacity left for handling 'irregular foreigners', who were, after all, aiming to reach Australia. For this reason, it was hardly surprising that the Indonesian government did not welcome Australia's idea of opening an asylum seeker processing center in Indonesia (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Indonesia chose to ignore to the greatest possible extent the presence of these transiting asylum seekers, assuming that they would not stay for the long term. Instead of enacting new laws on the handling of refugees or installing a domestic mechanism for assessing asylum claims, Indonesia preferred to rely on the services of the UNHCR in Jakarta to process the applications of asylum seekers and organize their resettlement. The reason for the government's inactivity was the lack of political will and also the lack of funding. For example, the Immigration Department lacked the funds to deport irregular migrants or even try them for breaching the immigration law (Lindsey, 2002; United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001).

People in search for international protection therefore had to contact the UNHCR office in Jakarta in writing or in person. After an initial interview, they would be provided with a letter of attestation, written both in English and Indonesian, which explained their status as asylum seekers. Possession of such a letter was intended to minimize the risk of detention and forced deportation; however, there was no

14 The 1992 Immigration Law (UU 9/1992, Section 8 and 24) governed who was permitted to enter the country lawfully, but it did not specify asylum seekers and it contained no provisions relating to the grant of asylum or effective protection.

legal guarantee that would not occur. After an initial interview, UNHCR staff would interview applicants more thoroughly in order to determine whether they qualified as refugees or not. Due to the small number of staff and interpreters at the UNHCR in Jakarta, this could take months, if not years. Both the processing of refugee claims and the processing for resettlement proceeded very slowly. For example, between January 1999 and August 2001, the UNHCR in Jakarta recognized 476 refugees but resettled only 18 of them, due to shortage of offers from resettlement countries (HRW 2002; Lindsey 2002).[15] If asylum claims were rejected, the applicant had the right to appeal, however only once. Meanwhile, waiting asylum seekers had access to minimum health care through the Indonesian Red Cross. Caritas Indonesia, the local implementing partner of the UNHCR, offered its clients counseling and, in exceptional cases, even financial support. Generally, asylum seekers were expected to live self-sufficiently among the local community.

In hindsight, it was not surprising that many asylum seekers and refugees tried to leave Indonesia as soon as possible. The resulting demand for irregular onward migration to Australia created a new smuggling industry, especially in Indonesia's impoverished eastern province, Nusa Tenggara Timur (Balint, 2005). The peak of people smuggling from Indonesia to Australia was reached in 2001, with 43 boats and 5,516 asylum seekers on board (Phillips & Spinks, 2012). In the first three weeks of August 2001 alone, 1,212 people arrived at Australian outposts (Howard 2003, p. 37). Altogether, more than 6,000 asylum seekers reached Australia by boat between 2000 and 2002 from Indonesia (Kneebone, 2010, p. 354), causing the Australian government during John Howard's prime ministership to make substantial changes to its asylum and bordering policies.

Without describing the impact of the so-called 'Pacific Solution' in full detail (as this has already been done by a great number of scholars, including Grewcock, 2009; Howard, 2003; Kneebone, 2010), it is sufficient for the purposes of this article to concentrate on forcible returns of boats to Indonesia, as this explains why Middle Eastern asylum seekers became 'stuck' in Indonesia for several years. As part of the Pacific Solution, the Howard government initiated 'Operation Relex' to deter 'unauthorized' boats. Under this operation, the Australian defense forces were allowed to intercept any Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel' (SIEV) once within the vicinity of Austra-

15   Resettlement countries were extremely reluctant to accept refugees from Indonesia as they saw the caseload in Indonesia as an outcome of Australia's refugee policy (HRW, 2002). Those who were accepted went mostly to New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, and Canada, and to a lesser extent, Australia.

lia's contiguous zone. If the crew of an unauthorized boat ignored the warning given to them and continued into Australian waters, Australian forces would then board the vessel to remove it back to the high seas (Howard, 2003).

Under Operation Relex, at least five boats containing asylum seekers were towed back to Indonesia without prior formal agreement with the Indonesian government and without any guarantees of their protection there (Crock & Ghezelbash, 2010; HRW, 2002). Between October and December 2001, four boats with at least 500 people on board were forcibly returned (Howard, 2003). By doing so, Australia breached several of its obligations under human rights and international maritime law. The returned asylum seekers were to be kept in Indonesia for an undetermined period of time. Most of these asylum seekers, mainly Iraqis, Afghans (Pashtuns, Hazara, Balochs, Tajiks, and Uzbeks), and Iranian Mandaeans, became stranded in perpetual limbo as their claims for protection were rejected and they therefore could not be resettled in an orderly fashion elsewhere, while at the same time they also could not be deported to their home countries due to ongoing political instability.

In Limbo in Lombok

After the Australian forces initially 'dumped' the asylum seekers in Nusa Tenggara Timur, where overall conditions were harsh and where they could not be accessed by the UNHCR, Indonesian authorities transferred them to Lombok Island in January 2002 and housed them in several hotels around the provincial capital Mataram (HRW, 2002; Hunter, 2004; Taylor & Rafferty-Brown, 2010a). Since the Australian government, in cooperation with the Indonesian government, engaged the IOM to provide custodial care, it covered the costs of their accommodation and medical services (Mountz, 2011b).

In January 2002, the UNHCR also started processing some of the asylum seekers in Lombok. Their status determination process, however, received widespread criticism for its inadequacy. Not only was the number of interpreters insufficient, but applicants also complained about their partiality, as they allegedly favored some ethnic groups over others or were not trained in all the various dialects spoken by the asylum seekers (Ghulam, 2004). General complaints about the UNHCR status deter-

mination process concerned the brevity of the interviews and the lack of legal advice. Some claimants did not know how to address certain interview questions or how to provide evidence to back up claims (Nassery, 2004). The number of those who were accepted as refugees after the first assessment was relatively small, leading to the belief among rejected asylum seekers that the UNCHR status determination process was merely a "lottery" that could only be overcome by those who had relatives living overseas prepared to pay for lawyers to assist them with their applications (Nassery, 2004).

While waiting for the outcome of their assessments, asylum seekers were visited by representatives of the Afghan and Iraqi embassies, who tried to convince them to return voluntarily. Of 220 Afghan asylum seekers in Mataram about 142 accepted these offers (Nassery, 2004). Iraqis, however, were less inclined to return after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Because of the war, the UNHCR agreed to reassess the Iraqi asylum seekers once more, even though some had already been rejected twice (Hunter, 2004). In October 2003, almost two years after their return to Indonesia, there were still 146 people (including newborn babies) living in Mataram and waiting for the outcome of their asylum claims (Hunter, 2004).

Although asylum seekers on Lombok theoretically enjoyed freedom of movement, only those who received remittances from friends and families overseas could make use of that right (with the permission of the IOM). One Afghan applicant took the initiative to teach children and adults English and computer lessons. For a short interval, there was a mixed soccer team, including Iraqi and local *Sasak* players (local ethnic group on Lombok). A few men married or dated Indonesian women, sometimes causing tension with the local communities. Tensions also arose from social jealousy as many locals envied the asylum seekers for their perceived privileges, such as free accommodation and food (Hunter, 2004). Moreover, interethnic tensions built up between the Iraqis and the Iranians, most often about religious differences, such as the Sunni-Shia divide, which led to a redistribution of accommodation according to ethnic background. When the local population (Sunni) learned about the presence of Shiites, some locals threatened to burn down the hotels that hosted them, and police had to guard the premises for a number of weeks (Hunter, 2004).

In early January 2004, Iraqi asylum seekers in Mataram learned about a hunger strike that had taken place in December 2003 in Nauru, where the Australian government had detained hundreds of asylum seekers. In solidarity they organized one

themselves, to protest their situation in open detention and the repeated rejection of their asylum claims (Hunter, 2004; Kneebone, 2010). They were accompanied by the Afghans, of whom seven sewed together their lips (Ghulam, 2004). The hunger strike attracted considerable attention in Australia. Unlike two decades earlier in Galang, asylum seekers in Lombok were in regular contact through mobile phones and email with activists and advocates in Australia and, to a lesser extent, friends and family in their homelands and countries of destination. The protesters ended their strike after they met an UNHCR protection officer who promised to review their cases on the basis of the most up-to-date information about the situation in their home countries. By October 2005, there were still 92 Iraqis and Afghans left in Lombok. The rest had returned to their homelands and some had been resettled. In December 2007, after many attempts by the IOM to persuade the Afghans to accept voluntary return in exchange for free travel and an AUD 2,000 assistance payment, which the Afghans declined, nine men were separated from their wives and children and transferred to the detention center in Makassar (on Sulawesi island) (Mountz, 2011b). This separation was intended to increase pressure on the asylum seekers to return 'voluntarily' to Afghanistan, pressure which some people eventually gave in to, despite the unsafe conditions there.

Due to the tense situation in Lombok and manifold protests, all remaining asylum seekers were eventually resettled in Cisarua, a village in the mountainous area near Bogor about 60 km from Jakarta, where they continued to be under IOM care. Given the deteriorating political conditions in their countries of origin, the UNHCR in Jakarta decided to re-open a number of cases of the previously rejected asylum seekers. Some were accepted in 2009, after their fourth assessment (Taylor & Rafferty-Brown, 2010b). Resettlements on humanitarian visas to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand took place until 2011. Meanwhile, more asylum seekers arrived in Indonesia, not only from the Middle East but also from Burma, Sri Lanka, and even from a number of East African states. While Thailand and Malaysia (involuntarily) host greater numbers of asylum seekers, people of concern to the UNHCR in Indonesia have been steadily increasing. Since 2009, the number of asylum seekers who continued to Australia by boat has also increased, with official figures recording 278 boats carrying 17,202 asylum seekers in 2012. Due to Australian pressure and funding, Indonesia has enlarged its detention capacities. But rather than utilizing single remote islands for detaining asylum

seekers, there are now 13 detention centers operating across the archipelago. Nevertheless, ideas for creating one large centralized detention center on a single, secluded island persist (Alford & Nathalia, 2013). While the issue of asylum seekers has not been a high priority in Indonesia until recently (Hoffman, 2010) and prompt action on that idea appeared rather unlikely, it has to be taken into account that the political pressure on Indonesia from the new Australian government under Tony Abbott will increase. During Abbott's first visit to Jakarta in late September 2013, it became very clear that Australia's persistent efforts to coopt Indonesia into assisting Australia with its asylum seekers policies would continue (Maher, 2013).

Table 4: People of Concern to the UNHCR in Indonesia							
YEAR	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Refugees	89	301	315	369	798	811	1,006
Asylum seekers (pending cases)	58	265	211	353	1,769	2,071	3,233
Returned refugees	135	0	0	1	311	0	0
Various	246	0	0	3	0	0	0
Total population of concern	528	566	526	726	2,878	2,882	4,239

Source: UNHCR, 2006-2010.

Conclusion

This article has compared the handling of asylum seeker flows from Indochina and the Middle East to Indonesia over the last thirty plus years. In particular, the article has demonstrated how asylum seekers' mobility was obstructed once they had arrived in Indonesia. Not party to the Refugee Convention, Indonesia's approach was first characterized by open aversion to hosting asylum seekers for the long term. Despite officially unsympathetic rhetoric, Indonesia has nevertheless allowed asylum seekers and refugees to remain in its territory and established open detention facilities on remote islands. Against initial plans to accommodate transmitting asylum seekers only temporarily, most of them have spent several years in Indonesia, not least because the UNHCR and the IOM covered all related costs.

Nonetheless, when comparing the handling of Indochinese asylum seekers with the handling of those from the Middle East, the disparity could not have been greater. While the Indochinese were collectively granted *prima facie* refugee status, at least during the decade prior to the enactment of the CPA and its compulsory individual screening procedures, the Middle Easterners faced great difficulties in accessing basic protection mechanisms provided by the UNHCR. Being located on Galang Island and managed by the military, the processing of the Indochinese asylum seekers proceeded steadily, although the time of 'stuckedness' was also marked by human tragedy and exploitation. All in all, the Indochinese refugees enjoyed many sympathies from the West, possibly being perceived as living proof of the claimed depravity of the Communist regime in Vietnam. Unlike their Muslim Middle Eastern counterparts, they were resettled to final destination countries in great numbers. In contrast, resettlement countries accepted the Middle Eastern asylum seekers, although much smaller in number, only reluctantly. The absence of a comprehensive (regional) approach and the lack of shared responsibility across the region left Middle Eastern asylum seekers in Lombok stranded. Although there were a few reported escapes both from Galang and Lombok, the two detention islands turned out to be highly effective barriers to asylum seeker mobility, much to the detriment of those in need of effective protection.

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Migration as a Strategy for Maintaining a Middle-Class Identity: The Case of Professional Filipino Women in Melbourne

Cirila Limpangog[1]

This paper surveys the diverse motives of professional Filipino immigrant women in Melbourne, Australia. In-depth interviews of 20 women reveal that their mosaic of motives challenges the traditional notion of economic advancement framed within the household theory, or ideas of purely individualistic pursuits. Their movements were facilitated through the intersection of established families and social networks in Australia, and the possession of skills required by the immigration department, defying the mail order bride stereotype that was projected on almost all Filipino women in the 1980s. It is argued that migration provided a bridge to more liberating quality of life, enabling them either to recover their declining middle-class status in the Philippines or to explore an alternative lifestyle in the new context.

Keywords: *Australia; Gender; Lifestyle; Philippines; Skilled Migration*

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die unterschiedlichen Motive gut ausgebildeter philippinischer Migrantinnen in Melbourne, Australien. Die Ergebnisse, basierend auf 20 Tiefeninterviews, zeigen eine Vielfalt an Migrationsmotiven, die klassisch wirtschaftlichen Konzepten wie jenen der mikroökonomischen Haushaltsstrategie widersprechen. Die Migrationsbewegungen philippinischer Migrantinnen wurden durch das Zusammenspiel sozialer und familiärer Netzwerke in Australien sowie durch die Fachkompetenzen, die von der Einwanderungsbehörde vorausgesetzt werden, gelenkt. Dieses Migrantinnenprofil widerspricht dem Vorurteil der „Katalogbraut", das während der 1980er Jahre auf viele philippinische Migrantinnen projiziert wurde. Es wird argumentiert, dass Migration einen im Herkunftsland zu erwartenden sinkenden Status verhindert und persönliche Freiheiten, das Ausprobieren alternativer Lebensstile sowie individuelle Lebensqualität im Migrationszielland ermöglicht bzw. erhöht.

Schlagworte: *Australien; Gender; Lebensstil; Philippinen; qualifizierte Migrantinnen*

1   Cirila P. Limpangog holds a PhD from the University of Melbourne, Australia and is currently a lecturer at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. She is also Program Manager at the International Women's Development Agency. Contact: cirila.limpangog@rmit.edu.au

Introduction

Immigration takes place within the complex interaction of macro (structural, legislative), meso (familial, social network), and micro (individual) contexts. In this context, human agency is significant in determining people's migration trajectories. This is the force through which social and human capital are summed up, accessed, and utilized for the individual to succeed. This paper explores the informants' (micro) reasons and motives for migrating to Australia. I analyze how human agency is facilitated, fortified, or curtailed through its interaction with macro and meso forces.

Migration involves various and complex motives. The range of women's aims can include advancing themselves and their family economically, fleeing gender-based persecution, reuniting with their families, seeking asylum, seeking greater personal autonomy, and (re)marriage, to name a few (DeLaet, 1999; Kofman, 2004). I thus reject the one-dimensionality of household or family-centered economic theory (without negating the importance of family and kinship in people's movements), which asserts that the individual's decision to migrate is induced by household needs. Migration primarily appears as a strategy for household maintenance, with the migrant worker returning to the same household in between contracts or during work holidays (Semyonov & Gorodzeisky, 2005). So far, studies on Filipino migration have emphasized economic motives that are directed towards the 'left-behind' family remaining in the Philippines. Hereafter, migrant workers are studied as remitters of income (Basa et al., 2012; McDonald & Valenzuela, 2012; McKay, 2011; Quisumbing & McNiven, 2010; Semyonov & Gorodzeisky, 2008). I extend such analysis by exploring the ways that migrating women remain family-oriented in their economic interests, but in a situation where the family has also migrated. As Kofman (2004) remarks "women may seek to combine work, career and marriage but these rationalities are difficult to grasp using a classification of migratory moves based on a single reason, such as labour, family or asylum" (p. 647). My informants' migratory aspirations were variously framed. Alternative lifestyles and, to some extent, marriage and escape from political persecution and from oppressive gender and cultural norms were their motives. They left the Philippines as middle-class[2] professionals, and migration was principally a strategy for maintaining or extending their class position.

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2 In the Philippines, education is an important marker of class. Thus, *middle-class* is used here to refer to people possessing educational qualifications from reputable universities, and occupying well-paid jobs. They usually come from well-educated families.

Despite the extraordinary global reach of Filipino migration, there has been a lack of scholarship on Filipino skilled or professional migrant women, and this could be attributed to two reasons: First, the majority of Filipino women working overseas are low-waged laborers, mainly domestic workers (Constable, 1997; Liebelt, 2011; Parrenas, 2001); and second, they often leave the country as 'marriage migrants', or, as they are commonly known and thought of in Australia, 'mail order brides' (MOBs) (Angeles & Sunanta, 2007; Jackson, 1989; Robinson, 1996; Saroca, 2007; Woelz-Stirling, Kelaher, & Manderson, 1998). Studies reveal that despite their high education, low-waged workers experience meagre occupational mobility after migration. Even nurses – the only prominent, female-dominated Filipino migration stream of skilled workers – have experienced deskilling, downward occupational mobility, and structural as well as everyday discrimination in their transnational movement (Ball, 2004; Choi & Lyons, 2012; Hawthorne, 2001; Pratt, 1999; Salami & Nelson, 2013).

Roces (2003) notes that women who move as either a spouse or fiancé quickly become mothers, workers, and citizens in a new context, and yet, these new identity dimensions are rarely surveyed. Instead, migrant women are pigeonholed as brides, even after years of settlement in Australia and despite their high level of education and skills prior to migration. These narratives also obscure the movements of the other skilled Filipino migrant women. The category 'skilled migrant' is used here to refer to holders of university degrees who occupied white-collar jobs during the interviews, although some of them had experienced under-employment at one point or another. Their entry was facilitated by either a skilled visa, through family reunification, studies, marriage, or a combination of any of these.

The under-representation of skilled Filipino women in the migration discourse seems anomalous for two reasons: First, since 2004, Philippine entrants to Australia largely come through skilled migration visas; in the period between 2011 and 2012, 70 percent of these visas were issued through the skilled migration stream (Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2011). Second, Filipinos represent the seventh largest immigrant group in Australia, with a men-to-women ratio of 1 to 1.5 for the year 2010 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). This paper therefore challenges the invisibility of skilled Filipino migrant women in the migration discourse in Australia and beyond.

This paper is based on my research for my PhD thesis on skilled migrant Filipino women in Melbourne. From 2006 to 2007, I conducted in-depth interviews with 20 Filipino women who came to Australia over the past 25 years.[3] As I used a 'snowball' approach in the selection of informants, some of them were each other's friends, colleagues, neighbors, or relatives. Yet, they were diverse in their professional fields, and in the circumstances of entering Australia. As a minority scholar researching the lives of co-nationals, I occupied a unique position. My own embodied experience as a skilled Filipino woman researching the lives of skilled Filipino immigrants in Australia has enabled the deployment of indigenous knowledge valuable to this research project. I did not conduct the interviews as an 'outsider' but more as an 'outsider within' (Collins, 1986). While minority scholars have the privilege of accessing trust and comprehension of the cultural ways of the subjects, they are constantly faced with self-criticism to ensure authenticity of their own voice and those of the subjects (Andersen, 1993). I was aware that my own historical and cultural situatedness would always influence me as researcher (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007). The researcher's subjectivity is integral to the knowledge production process. Interpretation involves a 'fusion of horizons' – that of the historical specificity of the researcher and that of the object of inquiry: "The fusion at the center of understanding means that we must see knowledge production as a flexible, creative, historically influenced process" (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007, p. 23).

I used the intersectionality framework in analyzing the informants' accounts. Intersectionality, according to Davis (2008), is "the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power" (p. 68). I argue that middle-class maintenance, expressed in terms of alternative lifestyle, retrieval of a declining class position, and a host of other interlocking motives, many of which have familial undertones, frame the migrants' move to Australia. The following sections contextualize the migration of Filipino women and explore the diversity, nuances, and conflicts associated with their migrations.

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3   Pseudonyms were used to protect the informants' privacy.

An Overview of the Australian Immigration Restriction and the Passage of Filipino Women

Australian migration history is significantly different from that of other major destination countries of Filipino immigrants mainly because of its racial policy that prohibited the settlement of non-white people. In the 1850s, labor disputes both in the gold mining industry and in factories, due to Chinese diggers' productivity and cheap wages for the hardworking indentured laborers from the South Pacific, would all precipitate the White Australian Policy (1901-1973). Also known as the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, the policy deployed language tests to prevent 'undesirables' (prostitutes, criminals, paupers, contract laborers, non-Whites) from entering the newly federated Australia mainly for economic reasons.

It was also during this last half of the nineteenth century when the history of Filipino immigration to Australia was first recorded. The first wave of Philippines-born migrants consisted of sailors, artisans, laborers, and divers. They were recorded in the official registry as Manila men and Sulu men.[4] Many of them fled the pre-republican Philippines in search of peace, away from the tyrannies of the Spanish colonizers. They petitioned for their families to emigrate; some married local residents. Thus, the first wave of Filipino settlers clearly made use of their familial and social networks as an immigration strategy, consistent with the clannish orientation of Filipino culture. This trend would continue irrespective of the constraints in subsequent immigration regimes (Hennessy, 2004).

The White Australian Policy was officially terminated in the 1970s, as the Whitlam government affirmed anti-discrimination treaties. Yet, a strong anti-immigration sentiment would reverberate on a structural level (for instance, refugees without valid visas were subjected to mandatory detention[5]; or through ideological critiques on multiculturalism as 'Asianization of Australia'[6]).

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4 The Philippines was declared a republic in 1898, although its independence was immediately disrupted by the invading Americans. It was only in 1946 that it became an independent nation state. Before 1898, inhabitants of the archipelago were recognized in terms of their regional orientation. Those who came from Manila and the larger Luzon region were simply called 'Manila men', while those who came from the Mindanao Region were called 'Sulu men' (see Ileto, 1993).

5 Colloquially known as 'boat people', asylum seekers who arrived by boat – such as those aboard the historic Tampa in 2001 – were subjected to mandatory detention. Such political posture is a blunt contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which Australia is a signatory.

6 In 1996, politician Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party endorsed a populist and protectionist stand calling for the abolition of multiculturalism and the prevention of further Asian immigration to Australia.

Another reason that historically prevented Filipino women from entering Australia was gendered labor restrictions. Looking at the larger contours of Asian migration, Hugo (2003) emphasizes that male-led movements from Asian countries to Australia in the nineteenth century were facilitated by labor migration strategies that restricted the entry of women. This was however neutralized in the third part of the twentieth century with the onset of family and humanitarian visa schemes, which also propelled female-led migrations, and then later with the government's preference for skilled migrants. Despite these policy developments, feminist thinkers demonstrate that Australia's skilled migration strategy is gender-biased. Fincher (1995) sees these skill categories as oriented towards the male migrant, as men are more often trained in the professions required for overseas employment. Thereafter, male managers, administrators, professionals, paraprofessionals, and tradespersons embody the skills favored by Australian immigration policy(Fincher 1995, p. 212).

Through the nineteenth and twentieth century, policy guidelines have placed women as 'immigrant wives', 'breeders for Australia', and 'unskilled dependents' (see Hugo, 2003). Iredale (2005) observes that it was not until quite recently (namely 1989) that Australia's immigration policies have taken into consideration the professional qualifications of the spouse of the main applicant.

Despite the restrictive measures that led to the decline in their number in earlier eras, Filipinos have not stopped entering Australia. They came again in trickles, mainly as female nursing students through the Colombo Plan[7] in the 1950s. Most of them were enrolled in universities in Sydney and Melbourne, and opted to permanently settle after graduation. Simultaneously, changes in Australian immigration policies were introduced to fill shortages of skilled tradesmen in response to post-war needs. The repeal of the White Australia Policy in the 1970s coincided with the proclamation of the Martial Law in the Philippines. In the following decades, many Filipinos were demoralized because of the widespread corruption, growing insurgency, and suppression of democracy during the Marcos dictatorship.[8] The political instability and persistent economic predicaments on the one hand, and the state's aggressive move

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7   The Colombo Plan was a bilateral aid set up in the 1950s to enable economic, technical, and educational assistance by Western countries to developing countries in South and South-East Asia. Australia played a critical role in the Colombo Plan by sponsoring Asian students to its tertiary academic institutions.

8   President Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law on September 21, 1972. He ruled the Philippines until 1986, when his dictatorship was toppled by the famous People's Power movement. Subsequent leaderships attempted to restore democracy, install transparency in governance, and improve the country's economic life – but with little success.

to globalize its labor force on the other, resulted in an unprecedented out-migration and overseas work deployments, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. The migration of many middle-class Filipinos was also a means to maintain their standard of living that was endangered in their homeland (Tacoli, 1999, p. 668).

Mosaic of Motivations for Coming to Australia

In this section, I outline the informants' diverse motivations and strategies as well as the facilitating factors that enabled their migration to Australia.

Family reunification has been a favored strategy of Filipino immigration not only in the U.S. (Keely, 1973; Liu, Ong, & Rosenstein, 1991; Tyner, 1999) but also in Australia (Cariño, 1994). Although geographical studies focus more on receiving countries' changing immigration policies, it can be assumed that Filipinos take advantage of these opportunities to advance their family-centered agenda.

The family is described in many writings as the site of Filipinos' most cherished values (Asis, 1994; Medina, 1991; Miralao, 1997). Filipinos abroad are characterized to have maintained a strong 'shared identity' with family and friends in the homeland, inducing them to recreate such affiliation through family reunification (Pe-Pua, 2003). The family is the chief inspiration and benefactor of its members' goals, aspirations, and trajectories in life, including their migration to urbanized cities in the Philippines as well as abroad (Asis, 2002; Asis, Huang, & Yeoh, 2004; Lauby & Stark, 1988; Parrenas, 2006; Ronquillo, Boschma, Wong, & Quiney, 2011). Such attitudes extend beyond economic factors, for the ideological force of the family is stronger than the restrictive immigration policies and discriminatory cultures in the host country. However, as will be shown later, this compelling desire to move, although couched as family-induced, is actually tied to other individualistic agendas.

The family was a motivator and facilitator in the informants' migration. Yet, regardless of kin support, the informants' diverse motives to migrate were not necessarily consistent with the visas they obtained. To elucidate the complexity of both migrant women's motivations and experiences, in the following I will sum up informants' responses into three themes, according to dominant, recurrent motives: (1) alternative lifestyles, (2) escape from political persecution, and (3) consequential

migration. Yet, in reality, these are no neat categorizations, and motives and experiences tend to overlap in one or the other way.

Alternative Lifestyles

Due to the prevailing focus on family culture rather than on the individual, migration studies in the Philippines tend to focus on the role of the family as the primary lens in analyzing migrant movements. Similarly, Filipino migrants tend to couch their stories in line with familial responsibility. I do not dispute the importance of this aspect; yet, I suggest that the family is just one factor in their cross-border movements. Other desires, individualistic as these may sound, equally frame their migration and thus deserve attention.

One dominant and overlying reason for the informants' migration was to search for an alternative lifestyle. Lifestyle migration puts one's own self-centered desires as the focus, and uses one's agency and social capital to fulfill them. Giddens (1991) calls this 'reflexive biography' as the self takes on the responsibility traditionally expected from society or the state. Lifestyle migration also resonates to some extent with individualization, an approach that Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) appropriate for those who relocate to explore their self-centered motives. Focused on the power of the individual rather than of organized institutions, migration is an escape option in which people construct their 'do-it-yourself-biography'.

The informants' alternative lifestyle movements may be further understood as acquiring an improved quality of life, resisting financial insecurity, and accomplishing greater autonomy.

Improved Quality of Life

Coming to Australia held a promise of improved quality of life especially in terms of better political governance, employment opportunities, and protection from social unrest and economic vulnerabilities. Informants commonly appraised the Philippine economy as 'unstable', 'worsening', and 'plunging' due to the exponential foreign debt being serviced, and a corrupt bureaucracy. The series of coups d'état that deposed or destabilized national leaders, the long-standing communist rebellion, the Muslim separatist movements, and the atrocities committed by the militant Muslim fundamentalist Abu Sayyaf had all weakened the informants' trust in the govern-

ment. In contrast, Australia was seen as having an established, transparent, and efficient government. The informants perceived Australian society as egalitarian and affluent "*where there is dignity in labor*", as they often told me. They heard anecdotes of migrant Filipino tradesmen in the 1970s and 1980s who became financially successful in Australia, but who would have stayed poor had they remained in the Philippines.

Susan, a medical doctor, and her husband were motivated by this fantasy of an 'alternative lifestyle'. She explained that their migration was prompted by their shared dream for "*quality of life. In the Philippines, although you're earning well, it's always stressful.*" By this she meant that the cost of living was higher than a worker's average wages. Susan's husband supported her desire for a more comfortable life, as he was experiencing stagnation in his IT executive job. Although they were thriving in their respective professions and had no children to support, they could not afford to buy their dream house.

Coming to Australia was a step to a secure comfortable lifestyle for Carol, even if, at first, she vaguely knew this country. Her father suggested Australia, having read about its potentials for a good life: "*My dad said, it would be good if you could go to this country. It's a young country. You can be part of the growth of this country.*" Her father-in-law, who as a cargo ship captain had visited all corners of the world, agreed. Carol argued, "*if he would live his life all over again, or if he were in his 30s, he would live in Australia. So my husband and I thought there must be something wise about our fathers' words.*" Carol was born to a middle-class family, married to a man with a lucrative IT job, a graduate from a reputable university, and enjoyed a thriving career as a statistician. Yet, these were not enough for her to attain her desired quality of life.

> I guess we were young. . . . We thought life in the Philippines is hard, although from our parents' side we didn't face hardships. We knew we wanted more for our own children. . . . We had our eldest [child] in Manila. We trained him here . . . we wanted more, more . . . greener pasture. More chances of getting a good job, be able to afford a house, be able to afford a holiday.

Leah, then a PR executive, came with her family in 2002. Working abroad had been a desire she nurtured over the years. "*Like most migrants, [we were] looking for a better life . . . despite the fact that we're both professionals, we were not very happy economically. We felt that there were more opportunities for the kids and the family here in Australia,*" Leah said. Choosing Australia over Canada where her husband's side of the family had migrated proved to be strategic.

> *First, comparing Canada and Australia in terms of financial requirements such as 'show money' as bond, the latter required less. . . . And second, my mom who had already settled in Australia helped us in having our skills assessed. She lent us money, and hired an agent to start the processing of our papers.*

Familial networks can thus have diverse purposes. Supplying information and financial resources influenced my informants' decision about the destination. In Bashi's (2007) 'hub-and-spoke' network model, the old immigrants' accrued resources in terms of housing, social connections within and outside the ethnic network, entrenchment in the labor market, and monetary power all collude to provide the new recruits an opportunity to risk, survive, and eventually succeed. These resources largely catalyze my informants' decision to move to Australia.

Lorna, a civil engineer, also came with her husband for career furtherance. Like Carol, Leah, and Susan, she was looking for a more secure life especially in the light of economic and political crises in the Philippines.

> *In 1985, my husband Randy won a scholarship from an organization [anonymized by author] in America. He proceeded in taking his masters and PhD there. I went along with him. There, our two boys were born. We were on an exchange visitor visa, under which as a spouse I was permitted to work. After the scholarship, Randy was expected to serve in our home country at least for two years. But the political condition in the Philippines was worsening, so we thought of migrating abroad instead. Randy tried applying for jobs in New Zealand and Australia. We eventually chose Australia because of the better employment benefits offered. We didn't know much about Australia back then. All we knew then was it is a huge mass of land in the South Pacific!*

Amy, who came with her family in 2004, echoed similar sentiments. Her two young children were enrolled in an exclusive school where Amy taught, enabling them a 50 percent discount in tuition fees. Yet, her salary combined with her husband's, who was in the IT marketing field, was just enough to cover their needs, leaving them little to improve their lifestyle. She yearned to own a house and live a slower-paced life. After an eight-hour job back in Manila, Amy would sell insurance before negotiating the polluted and often choked-up thoroughfares to get home. As soon as she arrived home, her household duties would always conflict with her teaching work, as she had to mark papers and make lesson plans. This routine always left her exhausted. Migrating to Australia offered a chance to reconstitute paid work into one that was more harmonious with family life. Before they left Manila Amy had begged her husband to take on the breadwinner role alone at least for a year or two upon arriving in Melbourne. She longed for a break after 15 years of continuous teaching. She had also envisaged that migrating to Australia would reduce the strains in her paid work

and family life. She wanted to re-channel her energies into looking after her children.

Coming to Australia was somewhat of an escape strategy, as the informants' reasoning would dwell on the romanticized image of the new country. Although it had some legitimate basis, its depiction was partly flawed. Egalitarianism and multiculturalism in Australia is increasingly advocated. However, in practice, its exclusionary white culture, although indirect and less blatant than before, remains well entrenched (Dunn & Nelson, 2011; Mapedzahama, Rudge, West, & Perron, 2012; Poynting & Noble, 2004). The informants did not have false pretenses about the many forms of discrimination and challenges they would encounter. But as far as they were concerned, Australia symbolized 'hope' where they could stake a new life through the use of hard work, qualifications, and ambitions.

Resisting Financial Insecurity

The need for financial security was more pronounced for those who had older children. Bing and her family were perennially vulnerable to the economic crisis despite their combined earning capacity. She and her husband, at some point in their lives, served as full-time ministers in a Christian church. Understandably, they depended on members' tithing. Echoing her husband's apprehension, Bing recalled, "*the children are getting older. There is no future here*." They believed that migrating to Australia was their only hope. It was a strategy to reverse their declining class status.

All of their five children went to private schools and reputable universities in the Philippines. Before coming to Australia, the couple had worked in the U.S. on a tourist visa, at least to alleviate their immediate financial woes. They did not stay long in the U.S. because their children in the Philippines were having problems. The youngest of their five children was only four years old, and their eldest daughter, who was barely 18, looked after them with the maids' assistance. Upon returning to the Philippines, her husband fell from favor in his Church because he had sought other employment while in the U.S., and his ministry was terminated. Moving to Australia was considered an escape from their chronic economic hardship. In consultation with her four Melbourne-based siblings, Bing and her husband worked strategically to obtain enough points for the skilled visa assessment. Bing returned to teaching and enrolled for an education graduate certificate. Drawing on his engineering qualifications, her

husband opened a home appliance repair shop. Being a teacher in a well-established private college did not guarantee an adequate living, as Bing struggled to make ends meet with jewelry retailing and after-hours tutorials. In 1999, the couple's combined monthly income was 25,000 pesos.[9] However, they needed at least 1,000 pesos a day for food, petrol, and the children's matriculation and allowances. Family migration sponsorship and a reasonably settled clan to lean upon presented a way out of their financial distress for Bing's family. Coming to Australia enabled a reassertion of their middle-class status, which was greatly imperiled in the Philippines.

The husbands of Susan, Carol, Leah, Amy, and Bing shared their desires to migrate. Gender equality was not an issue for these women in terms of strategizing their family migration. Both wife and husband equitably helped each other to garner enough points for the immigration assessment, and both also took advantage of their kinship networks in Australia. Typically, the husband was the principal applicant, but both parties were actively involved in the tedious visa application process.

The case of Amy is different because her movement to Australia marked a conscious desire for downward job mobility and a radical career shift for the sake of 're-duced stress'. We might also infer that her desire to be 'available' for her children was an implicit strategy that authenticated her ideas of maternal responsibility, placing obligations derived from ideologies of the gendered nature of social reproduction. She proudly told me of her involvement in her daughters' school assignments and attendance in their co-curricular activities.

Seeking Greater Autonomy and 'a Taste of Good Life'

Those who came as single migrants were motivated more by the chance to experience the adventures and leisure brought about by traveling and living in a foreign country. Such were the cases of Kris, Gemma, and Ligaya.

Kris reunited with seven of her eight siblings, their respective families, and her widowed mother in Melbourne. In Manila, Kris lectured at a prestigious university when she was offered a scholarship to Australia, but she declined. She preferred to come instead via family visa in 1991. Migration, to her, promised an *"opportunity to travel for pleasure and a taste of good life"*. She recalled:

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9   PhP 25,000 was equivalent to USD 584 or AUD 609 on June 13, 2013.

> *When I came, I thought . . . this would be nice. I can have a gallivanting life. In Manila, I had to work really hard. When I arrived here, life was really gratifying. The means of transportation, food and environment . . . it's clean everywhere. Then you have all the time. So there was time for gallivanting even amidst my studies and part-time work . . . Practically my first two years was largely gallivanting.*

Apart from having siblings already settled in Australia, Gemma (the sister of Kris) decided to come for better economic prospects. She said that her father who went to the U.S. for a postgraduate degree had always advised his children to study hard and obtain a college diploma.

> *It seemed that he was always discouraging us from taking a blue-collar job. But here in Australia, it is very useful. . . . Back home, when you're a driver or mechanic how much do you get? But here, they get a much better pay, right?*

Gemma readily gave up her teaching job in Manila. Like her sister Kris, Gemma benefited from an elder brother's family visa petition and offer of free accommodation while she was job hunting.

"All my friends are here. [I want] challenges, adventures," was the reason for Ligaya's lifestyle change-induced migration in 1990. She was single without any boyfriend or relatives in Australia. But after a one-year residence in Bangkok as a government-sponsored scholar her perspective about life abroad broadened. She learned about Australia's skilled migration opportunity, but reluctantly resumed work at the government's agrarian reform bureau in Manila to compensate for her one year of full-time study abroad. The desire to be with her friends who had all obtained their visas to Australia prompted her to follow suit. Besides, the wide-scale corruption in Ligaya's bureau demoralized her. Quitting her job and migrating to Australia was a much better option.

Ligaya did not convince any of her siblings to come to Australia. *"That's why I left [the Philippines]. If they were here, I'd rather go home [laugh]. That's because I'm independent. It seems to me that your family has a lot of expectations sometimes."* It was clear to her that migration would allow for a do-it-yourself biography; after all, she was young, unattached, and without any dependent. Her stance was in striking contrast to the family-oriented patterns and practices of Filipino migrations. Nonetheless, she supported the visa application of a skilled nephew and his wife, who were based in Adelaide during the interview. Apart from them, Ligaya had no other relatives in Australia, although she had friends whom she considered a 'second family'. They and

their respective families constitute her local support system. They would teasingly match her with prospective husbands, but she was not interested. Later she established a de facto partnership, which she feared would not be acceptable to her family back in the Philippines.

It appears that Ligaya's 'escape strategy' was stimulated by dissatisfaction in her previous job, but it was also her way to explore a less culturally restrictive lifestyle, especially in terms of intimate relationships. This was a lifestyle choice that she did not feel comfortable taking while in the Philippines. Benson and O'reilly (2009) explain that this form of "[m]igration is presented as a way of overcoming the trauma of these events, of taking control of their lives, or as releasing them from ties and enabling them to live lives more 'true' to themselves" (p. 610). Ligaya's friends provided the security of a social network, with which she shared home and gallivanting activities especially during her first year of settlement.

These women's envisaged 'alternative lifestyle' intersects with a desire to improve the standard of living they had while in their homeland. In the Philippines, young and single adults normally live with their parents and abide by their household rules. The only exception is when the children would study or work elsewhere. Thus, migration allows the informants to experience freedom, autonomy, and adventure. Even the siblings Kris and Gemma, who came through the behest of their elder brother and therefore were tacitly obliged to turn to him for household authority, saw their move as an opportunity '*to gallivant*'. Gemma's desire to improve her economic status would even intensify when she saw that trade skills in Australia were valued more than in the Philippines. Migration is perceived as "a rite of passage from dissipated youth to responsible adulthood" (Tacoli, 1999, p. 670). Without any dependents to send money to and with family or friends to rely upon, the 'alternative lifestyle' lets them indulge in what their new life has to offer at their own pace. In the case of Ligaya, leaving the bounds of her nuclear family and the cultural constraints it imposed was an additional attraction. She was the only informant who lived with a partner without marriage or children, and therefore circumvented the mother-wife identity that most informants assumed. The alternative lifestyle she chose was one that transgressed the traditional gender roles in the household.

My observations resonate with the findings of Tacoli (1996) on Filipino women in Italy. For those coming from relatively affluent backgrounds, economic advancement

is subsidiary to their "desire for change, seeing the world and living a different experience" (p. 17). The informants' desire for change and election of an alternative lifestyle was based on career dissatisfaction and financial insecurity, although they were not typically out of jobs nor endangered in the labor market. I interpret this as wanting to retain their notions of middle-class privileges, which had been threatened by the worsening socio-political climate in the Philippines. Their seemingly advantaged position, such as having relatives in Australia, possession of above-average educational credentials, and, in one case, prior residence in Australia had enabled them to initiate that change.

Escape from Political Persecution

Political grievances against the Marcos dictatorship, and the failed reforms promised by the People Power administration that toppled Marcos, influenced informants' migration decisions. Two were blacklisted during the Martial Law era. Vilma recounted:

> *The declaration of Martial Law in 1972 prompted me to migrate. Scholars then were in hotspot. From 1973 to 1975, there were scores of disappearances amongst scholars. I finished pre-nursing in Baguio [northern part of the Philippines]. I was the very first in my family to migrate to Australia as a student, and then later stayed on as a skilled worker. I'd never set foot in Manila until it was time for me to collect my visa and go to the airport.*

Vilma did not look back. After graduation, she met and married another medical practitioner of Anglo-Australian background. They have two children.

Maggie, a broadcasting journalist, also left the Philippines to escape political persecution. She was a co-founder of an underground radical feminist movement of student activists organized during the First Quarter Storm (FQS). Filipino feminist academic and former student activist Judy Taguiwalo (2005) described the First Quarter Storm that occurred in January to March, 1970, as

> *mark[ing] the series of widespread protests in Metro Manila against the then administration of Ferdinand Marcos and signif[ying] the resurgence of nationalist struggle in the country which has been dormant since the 50s. The ferment of the FQS would lead to a frenzy of organizing among the students, community youth, workers, and farmers.*

To quell the FQS outrage and the unrest that followed, Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972. A fellow youth activist, Maggie's husband, disappeared without any trace. He was assumed murdered along with other comrades during the militarized regime. In the course of community organizing work, Maggie met Rudy, an Anglo-Australian

who was stopping-over in Manila en route to India. They fell in love and married shortly after. Maggie was at first hesitant to move to Melbourne: *"No, it wasn't our plan, but that era was turbulent. That's because I am an activist, and I was advocating for human rights."*

Maggie came on a tourist visa, believing that she would still return to the Philippines. But she eventually stayed, found a job, and re-established her family. She became pregnant and gave birth to another child, and later, petitioned for the migration of her first child from the previous marriage.

Marriage to an Australian national was an unplanned life-changing event that facilitated these women's flights to safety. The cases of both Vilma and Maggie demonstrated that Australia offered the peace, stability, and security they longed for. Yet, they continue to spearhead social reforms and political activism in Australia on issues that affect Filipinos there and in their homeland. Vilma was a mentor to an association of Filipinas in rural Victoria, and was actively involved in assisting those who sustained psychological trauma due to domestic violence. Maggie, on the other hand, was engaged in human rights advocacy. Immigration therefore allowed them to freely retain their political identities that would have otherwise risked their lives, had they returned to the Philippines.

Consequential Migration

Studies show that the nexus of family and work-related migration often leads to one spouse sacrificing career and social networks, to follow the other's (usually the male's) work-induced movement (Ho, 2006; Jervis, 2011; Meares, 2010; Van der Klis & Mulder, 2008; Yeoh & Willis, 2005). Such were the cases of Rosanna, Luningning, and Sharon, who all came as fiancées to their Philippines-born partners.

Rosanna and her husband Eric got engaged in Manila in 1990. Two years later, Eric obtained a skilled visa with family sponsorship and joined his parents and sister in Melbourne. On spousal grounds, Rosanna followed in 1994. They married in Melbourne and raised two children. Rosanna said that she would not have relocated to Australia without the stimulus of marriage. She was satisfied with her life in Manila as a dentist and part-time lecturer, jobs that were not easily recaptured in Australia. There were numerous challenges for her qualifications to be accredited. She had to

undergo professional review seminars and pass qualifying tests, as well as work as a dental nurse during the process of obtaining her professional license. Pregnancy and maternal responsibilities slowed her career reconstitution even more.

Luningning moved to Australia in 1989 on a fiancée visa. Unlike Rosanna, she was discontented with her life in the Philippines, and was looking for a way out.

> *I had no intention of coming to Australia. When I returned from the States after completing my masters I tried to work in Manila. I wasn't contented or happy working in that kind of environment. I couldn't apply what I have learned in the States. PR work in the Philippines was still publicity-oriented.*

Luningning had an active yet stressful career in the Philippines. Although her partner's prior movement paved her migration, Luningning implied that a job prospect overseas would improve her career. Like most informants, she was not acquainted with Australia, and would have probably gone elsewhere if it were not for her fiancé. Yet, she chose not to enter the PR industry in Australia. Therefore, even as Luningning initially believed her relocation to Australia would advance her career, marriage and new status as a wife-mother circumscribed her options. Her changed circumstances meant she had to take a different career path and when she had children, her choices were further limited.

For many, their migration motives were straightforward. To be with one's family and loved ones might seem a clear-cut reason to migrate, and this is intertwined with their economic motives, but not to some who had other equally attractive options. Sharon is a case in point. She came in 2003 to marry Richard despite her ambivalent feelings about moving to Australia. The couple met online the previous year. She was then employed as an administrative officer in a Japanese construction company in Manila. Richard, a Filipino-Australian, was holidaying and exploring a computer-related business in Manila. Their whirlwind romance produced a son, who was born after Richard had returned to Melbourne. Richard then petitioned for their migration. But Sharon, who enjoyed a prestigious job, the trust and recognition from her expatriate bosses, and a comfortable life in Manila with full-time maids, was initially reluctant to come.

In a different scenario, Sharon might have opted for a green card in the U.S. She would have gone there for two months with her grandfather and aunt, both naturalized U.S. citizens who came to Manila for Christmas in 2002. Sharon would have tried living in the U.S. on a tourist visa before finalizing her migration plans. "*But I was two-months pregnant, so that plan was shelved aside.*" Giving up her life in Manila, and waiving her chance to reunite with her relatives in the U.S. was not without fur-

ther complications. It also meant declining her former fiancé who courted her back despite carrying a baby by another man. According to Sharon, he was an affluent and mature 42 years old American. Being financially unstable, Richard paled in comparison to him. Thus, Sharon's family favored her American boyfriend over Richard. But she turned her back on the American life option, and chose to marry the latter. Her move to Melbourne was mired by financial insecurity. Richard was then just establishing himself as a freelance programmer. Sharon and their son migrated amidst the fears of her mother that Sharon was marrying someone who was financially unstable. Migrating to Australia in this instance signified a loss of prestige for the family as well as a subversion of gender expectations.

During the interview, Sharon was working as a training coordinator in a professional association, which she found stimulating, although less prominent than her posts in Manila. A job in line with her original career path was not her priority at that time.

The cases of Rosanna, Luningning, and Sharon suggest that consequential migration is accompanied by varying degrees of reluctance. Severe reluctance in the case of Sharon was linked to her vulnerability to class demotion. In Rosanna's case, the 'slight' reluctance may be viewed as fear of temporary career instability, which is presumably common to well qualified migrants. All three women faced difficulties in recapturing their careers, prompting Luningning and Sharon to shift course.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper showed the informants' complex, contradictory, and overlapping reasons for migrating. It concurs with feminist writings that women's and men's migrations cannot be explained alone by monolithic household- or individual-based theories. The migration of these professional Filipinos had varied and complicated starting points, which were not solely economically motivated. In sum, their movements were facilitated through the intersection of established kinship networks in Australia, and the possession of education and skills required by the immigration department. Yet, what appeared to have overlaid their decision to move were the maintenance of middle-class status as well as the exploration of an alternative lifestyle. In this paper, I have shown the connectivity of these two main migration motives.

For those whose aim was mainly economic, migrating to Australia was a way of retrieving their declining class position, or at best protecting it against the economic and political turbulence that beset the Philippines at that time. Most of the informants' move is argued to be used as a strategy to middle-class maintenance. My argument coincides with Tacoli (1999), whose study of Filipino women in Rome shows migration as a means to protecting their middle-class standard of living against the perennial domestic economic crisis. Subsequently, I would add to this argument by emphasizing that their motives are essentially fluid and do change during the course of migration. Unfolding opportunities and desires, such as meeting a partner or establishing a family, affect their trajectories. Migration as a solution to economic problems seems over-determined in the Philippines. Given their qualifications, these women could have succeeded in their career aspirations in the homeland, yet they did not rely on it. Hope and ambition were projected into migration – and were reinforced by the encouragement of relatives who had already migrated.

Most informants had either a spouse or direct family members as companions during the process of migration. Those who came as students met their partners and subsequently settled down. More than half of the informants had established clans in Australia, either sponsoring their nuclear family, or petitioned by a kin who arrived before them. I see the ways and capacities through which they negotiate their new identities as migrants as markedly privileged given their social capital in both the homeland and Australia.

Another dominant stimulus of the informants' migration is the opportunity to explore other facets of their lives. Focused on the power of the individual rather than that of organized institutions, many exercised their self-centered motives to *enjoy, gallivant, be with friends rather than family, and meet new challenges*. The quest for lifestyle change appears to be a subplot for most, which, though not exclusively, relates to middle-class status maintenance. The informants' ability to elect and eventually pursue their desire for a lifestyle change by coming to Australia was also facilitated by their middle-class status in their homeland. It enabled them to reconfigure gendered expectations inscribed in Filipino culture, especially when living with one's own family while single, and obeying its implicit decorum.

The informants' entries were mediated by stringent immigration measures and steep visa costs which are not accessible or affordable to the average Filipino. Despite

their middle-class status in the Philippines, some had to sell off their properties, get loans, and solicit financial help from relatives in Australia to subsidize their immigration. Once in Australia, it became necessary for them to aim for well-paid work corresponding to their qualifications in order to recover the costs of their migration.

Yet, in some cases, prior class privileges, high skills, and education would not translate into economic success. Sharon's story suggests that marriage with someone in a Western country did not guarantee an improved quality of life. Coming to Australia meant downward social and occupational mobility, and a letdown to an implicit gendered expectation to marry up.

The mosaic of motives outlined in this paper challenges the traditional notion of economic advancement framed within the household theory, or of purely individualistic pursuits to self-development and gratification, although some informants, like Kris and Ligaya, had prominently cited these at the outset of their migration. Surprisingly, advancing one's career as a main motive to migrate was not mentioned except by three informants, Luningning, Lorna and Ligaya, whose move were triggered by the lack of satisfaction in their previous jobs. Quite the opposite, Amy envisaged her migration as a step to downscale her once stressful professional life in Manila.

Overall, the informants' accounts show that migration provided a way towards a better quality of life, regardless of their original intentions. Yet, the migration process also compromised some informants' social status and caused frustration.

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Double Inequity? The Social Dimensions of Deforestation and Forest Protection in Local Communities in Northern Cambodia

Maya Pasgaard[1] & Lily Chea[2,3]

In Cambodia, numerous powerful drivers of land-use change threaten the remaining natural forest and the livelihoods of local communities living on the forest periphery. In an attempt to protect remaining forests, Community Forestry (CF) and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) were implemented in the north-western province of Oddar Meanchey. This case study examines the distribution of costs and benefits within local communities participating in the CF/REDD+ project. Qualitative interviews conducted in the communities indicate how the costs of deforestation disproportionately affect the poorest households, which are more reliant on forest products due to less land and more insecure tenure. Meanwhile, the benefits from CF/REDD+ hardly reach these vulnerable households since their access to forest resources is constrained by physical barriers and a lack of resources or information. Their ability to enjoy benefits from forest protection is likewise limited by social exclusion facilitated by prevailing power structures. Instead, benefits are biased towards the better-off households who engage in forest protection activities and decision-making. In the context of weak governance, contested tenure arrangements, high agricultural dependency, and power discrepancies, this paper analyzes and critically discusses this 'double inequity' of deforestation and forest protection in Cambodia, and recommendations on how to ensure more equitable distribution of costs and benefits are put forward.

Keywords: Cambodia; Community Forestry; Deforestation; Equity; Social Assessment

Zahlreiche Triebkräfte von Landnutzungsveränderungen gefährden in Kambodscha sowohl die verbleibenden Regenwälder als auch die Lebensgrundlagen von lokalen Gemeinschaften, die am Rand der Waldgebiete leben. Um die verbleibenden Wälder zu schützen, wurden in der nordwestlichen Provinz Oddar Meanchey Community Forestry (CF) und Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) implementiert. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Verteilung von Kosten und Nutzen innerhalb von lokalen Gemeinschaften, die am CF/REDD+ Projekt beteiligt sind. Qualitative Interviews, die in den Dörfern durchgeführt wurden, zeigen, wie die Kosten der Abholzung die ärmsten Haushalte, die aufgrund von weniger Land und unsichereren Besitzverhältnissen

abhängiger von Forstprodukten sind, unverhältnismäßig stark treffen. Indes bewegt sich der Nutzen von CF/REDD+ weg von diesen benachteiligten Haushalten, weil ihr Zugang zu Waldressourcen durch physische Barrieren und einen Mangel an Ressourcen oder Informationen eingeschränkt ist. Ihre Möglichkeiten, mehr Vorteile aus dem Waldschutz zu ziehen, werden zudem durch soziale Exklusion, die durch vorherrschende Machtstrukturen bedingt wird, begrenzt. Stattdessen profitieren bessergestellte Haushalte stärker, indem sie sich an Maßnahmen zum Schutz des Waldes und an der Entscheidungsfindung beteiligen. Im Kontext von schwacher Governance, umkämpften Besitzverhältnissen, hoher Abhängigkeit von der Landwirtschaft und Machtdiskrepanzen analysiert und diskutiert dieser Artikel die „doppelte Ungerechtigkeit" von Abholzung und Waldschutz in Kambodscha und bringt Vorschläge für eine gerechtere Verteilung von Kosten und Nutzen vor.

Schlagworte: Abholzung; Community Forestry; Fairness; Kambodscha; soziale Bewertungskriterien

Introduction

In many South-East Asian countries, rapid and extensive deforestation and other massive land-use change have not only impacted both nature and ecological services, but also local livelihoods. Cambodia is perhaps the most extreme case due to the compression of many sources of change in a short period of time and a relatively small space (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011). These trends have concerned researchers (e.g. Le Billon, 2002; Poffenberger, 2009) as well as development agencies and donors in the past decades (e.g. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Danida] & Department for International Development [DFID], 2006; Thul, 2011). At the local, regional, and national scale, various drivers such as agricultural expansion by local communities and Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) by private companies led to deforestation in Cambodia (Poffenberger, 2009) – particularly in the north-western province of Oddar Meanchey (Bradley, 2009). In an attempt to protect remaining forests, the Cambodian government and international donors initiated a national Community Forestry (CF) program, with projects emerging from this program in the early 2000s (The Center for People and Forests [RECOFTC], 2011), following the trend of many other South-East Asian countries and regions across the world. More recently, projects under the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD and REDD+) program have also emerged, with Cambodia's first project established in Oddar Meanchey (United Nations REDD programme [UN-REDD], 2010).

Despite the growing number of critical studies on REDD+ (e.g. Hansen, Lund, & Treue, 2009; Thompson, Baruah, & Carr, 2011), international organizations plan and

implement these projects together with government agencies at a fast pace and extensive scale across continents (Cerbu, Swallow, & Thompson, 2011). Social co-benefits and local livelihoods are high on the agenda; yet, social assessments of the feasibility and implications in the participant communities are lagging behind (Jagger, Sills, Lawlor, & Sunderlin, 2010). The proposed social assessment approaches rely heavily on quantitative measures, while aiming at capturing the complexities of REDD+, such as intangible issues of participation and diverging interests of various stakeholders (e.g. Thompson, Baruah, & Carr, 2011). Thus, there seems to be a gap or mismatch between the realities of REDD+ and the proposed social assessments relying on indicators, which preferably are tangible, measurable, and observable (Pasgaard, 2013). For instance, while equity is one of the main challenges in REDD+ (e.g. Springate-Baginski & Wollenberg, 2010), few indicators describe intra-community political impacts, which could help to assess equitability in the distribution of costs and benefits. Indeed, intra-community indicators describing existing or changing power relations among groups or individuals in a community are needed to assess people's rights to access and use resources, e.g. to reveal if restrictions of use disproportionately affect poorer people (Schreckenberg et al., 2010). Drawing on empirical data from Oddar Meanchey, this paper aims to address this specific gap in social assessments by investigating how the costs and benefits from forest protection under CF/REDD+ are distributed within communities. First, the paper provides the background for the study followed by a presentation of the REDD+ initiative. Second, the theoretical foundation is presented, followed by the methodology of the case study. Subsequently, the paper presents and discusses the results of the case study from a distributional equity perspective and concludes by suggesting specific recommendations to ensure increased equity in REDD+.

Background

The Case Study Site

Throughout South-East Asia, REDD+ initiatives are emerging in a context of high deforestation rates and rapid land-use change. In an attempt to protect the remaining forests in Cambodia, the government, working together with donors, began to es-

tablish a national CF program, which was officially recognized as a national policy in 2003 (RECOFTC, 2011). In the north-western province of Oddar Meanchey (see Figure 1), which has suffered from a deforestation rate of more than 2 percent decline in forest cover per year (Bradley, 2009), 13 CFs have been established and are managed by local communities. These CFs provide the platform for the country's first REDD+ demonstration project initiated in 2008, followed by the approval of the National UN-REDD Program a few years later (UN-REDD, 2010). The REDD+ project in Oddar Meanchey CFs is expected to provide financing and development to the communities through carbon credits generated from the forest protection and regeneration (Terra Global, 2012). The 13 CFs in Oddar Meanchey participating in the REDD+ demonstration project consist of 58 villages and cover an area of approximately 68,000 hectares of forestland (see Table 1). An international NGO (Pact) and two local NGOs

Figure 1: The Oddar Meanchey Province bordering Thailand which includes REDD+ project sites.

Source: Kmusser (2010)

(Children's Development Association and Monks' Community Forestry) facilitate the preparation and implementation of the CF/REDD+ project in partnership with the government (the Forestry Administration). In the CFs, the Management Committees have the main responsibilities and decision-making power, including recruitment and fund management, and these committees are elected by CF members on five-year terms (Royal Government of Cambodia [RGC], 2003). In order to reach the targeted emission reductions, the REDD+ project aims to mitigate the local drivers of deforestation, including the conversion of forestland to agriculture by the increasing number of residents who rely on cropland (Blackburn, 2011). Specific project activities that aim to reduce deforestation in the project area include the reinforcement of forest land-tenure and formulation of land-use plans as well as a range of site-based activities, such as community-based forest protection, introduction of fuel-efficient stoves, agricultural intensification, and development of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (Terra Global, 2012). According to the Forest Administration, a minimum of 50 percent of net income from the sale of carbon credits, after project costs are covered, is expected to flow directly to local communities (Bradley, 2009). Both monetary and non-monetary benefits from the protection of the forest (e.g. in terms of NTFPs) are to be shared among the community members. One of the main policy docu-

COMMUNITY FORESTS	VILLAGES	POPULATION	CF MEMBERS (%)	CF SIZE (HA)
Angdong Bor	4	3,267	99	6,114
Chhouk Meas*	1	641	42	383
Dung Beng	4	1,611	100	1,843
Ou Yeay Kaov	1	577	74	960
Phaav	4	1,383	100	2,025
Prey Srorng*	5	3,058	71	6,344
Prey Srors	2	1,371	97	1,604
Ratanak Ruka	16	16,214	79	12,872
Rolus Thom	4	4,123	46	2,666
Romdoul Veasna	4	4,252	100	6,016
Samaky*	4	2,669	44	1,079
Sangkrous Preychheu*	3	2,179	62	4,151
Sorng Rokavorn*	6	3,551	100	18,261
Total	58	44,896	81	64,318

Table 1: The 13 Community Forestry groups in Oddar Meanchey, the number of villages and people involved, membership rates and size of the CF. (* sites included in the study)

Source: Pact 2012

ments calls for a pro-poor approach to benefit sharing to specifically ensure that the poorest households receive substantial benefits from the project (Terra Global, 2012). Drawing on empirical findings from Oddar Meanchey, the question of how costs and benefits from CF/REDD+ are shared within communities on the ground is addressed in this paper. First, some background on deforestation and migration in the province is provided, as the direct drivers of and the patterns inscribed in pressures on land and forest resources play an important role in the analysis of distributional equity within communities.

Deforestation and Migration Pressures in Oddar Meanchey

Complex factors at the local, national, and regional level drive deforestation in Cambodia – and in the Oddar Meanchey province in particular (Table 2). At the local level, agricultural expansion, forestland encroachment, and illegal logging as well as land speculation and firewood consumption lead to deforestation (Bradley, 2009; Strange, Theilade, Thea, Sloth, & Helles, 2007). At the national and regional level, large-scale Economic Land Con-

Table 2: Drivers and Agents of Deforestation in Oddar Meanchey.						
DEFORESTATION DRIVER	MIGRANTS	PRIVATE COMPANIES	LOCAL COMMUNITIES	HUNTERS	SOLDIERS	OTHER NON-LOCAL
Forest clearing for land sales	X		X			
Conversion to cropland	X	X	X			
Conversion to settlements	X		X			
Fuel wood gathering	X		X			
Forest fires induced to clear forest understory			X			
Forest fires induced by hunters				X		
Illegal logging for commercial on-sale		X			X	X
Timber harvesting for domestic use	X		X		X	
Large economic land concessions		X				
Timber concessions		X				

Source: Adapted from Terra Global (2012).

cessions (ELCs) as well as influential elites and the military drive deforestation through the encroachment on forests and crop land (Poffenberger, 2009). These actors are often reported to be involved in illegal logging of valuable timber (e.g. Sidon, 2011).

Behind these direct drivers are underlying causes contributing to deforestation such as poverty and population growth, pushing migrants to clear land and settle in the forest-rich remote provinces like Oddar Meanchey (UN-REDD, 2010). Weak forest sector governance, external commercial interests, ELCs granted by the government, and displacement of rural populations aggravate the problem (UN-REDD, 2010) with high levels of corruption and violence in the forestry sector also playing a role (Global Witness, 2007). Furthermore, the influx of poor, landless people to Oddar Meanchey and other forest-rich resource frontiers plays an important role in the competition for land and resources (United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2004). Indeed, communities in the area are relatively young. A household survey conducted in the province shows that on average, people migrated to their present villages in 1999 with a steady rise of migration until the mid-2000s, when the migration rate leveled off (Blackburn, 2011). In a migration study, McMahon (2008) notes how community leaders in Oddar Meanchey around the turn of the century freely allowed newcomers to join and clear necessary land with available labor as the only apparent limitation. Recent years of violent upsurge and unrest at the Thai-Cambodian border has brought military families to the province, adding a further dimension to the migration pressure. For instance, more than 740 migrant families have moved into one of the CF areas over the past two years, claiming land for settlement and cultivation in local communities, while forestry officials have been unable to control their widespread clearance of forest (Bradley, 2012).

Underlying these deforestation and migration pressures are insecure and contested land tenure arrangements in Cambodia (So, 2010). Land tenure security and rights to carbon are central themes in REDD+ and essential to the discussion of benefit distribution (e.g. Sikor et al., 2010; Springate-Baginski & Wollenberg, 2010). Yeang (2012) analyzes tenure and REDD+ in Oddar Meanchey, arguing that in addition to securing tenure rights over land and forest resources of local communities in the project, tenure arrangements need to be continuously enforced in order to avoid overlapping claims. It is important to distinguish between *forest* tenure, which is strengthened under CF and REDD+ (Yeang, 2012), and *agricultural* tenure arrangements in the participating communities (Biddulph, 2011). While the rights to the forest, trees, and car-

bon are directly related to the implementation and success of REDD+, land rights and patterns for settlement and farming affect deforestation and benefit sharing in a less direct way. Based on research in Oddar Meanchey, Biddulph (2011) for instance argues that people with insecure access to agricultural land present a greater threat to the forests than people with secure access, as the latter have less incentive to clear patches of forest for land use. From this perspective, agricultural tenure is strongly linked to deforestation and in turn the success of CF/REDD+. The role of agricultural tenure for the distribution of costs and benefits within communities participating in CF/REDD+ in Oddar Meanchey are further discussed in this paper.

Equity in REDD+

McDermott and colleagues (2013) provide a comprehensive conceptual framework that identifies and brings together three dimensions of equity in REDD+, namely distributional, procedural, and contextual equity. Distributional equity is a major concern and widely discussed in the REDD+ literature, e.g. in terms of *which* actors should have the right to benefit from the program (Angelsen, Brockhaus, Sunderlin, & Verchot, 2012; van Noordwijk, Purnomo, Peskett, & Setion, 2008). Procedural equity relates to representation, participation, inclusion, and recognition in decision-making processes, while contextual equity concerns the underlying political processes and the social context; the latter issues are often overlooked and underplayed in the design of interventions such as REDD+ (Hansen, Lund, & Treue 2009; McDermott, Mahanty, & Schreckenberg, 2013).

At the center of investigation, distributional equity provides the main theoretical anchoring in this paper for the assessment of how costs and benefits are shared within communities. In this context, the intra-community level represents the specific target and social scale of the study (McDermott et al., 2013), namely the individual and household level. The three dimensions of equity are not separate elements but highly interrelated and interdependent, and issues concerning procedural injustice and contextual dimensions are continuously present and affect distributional equity. In particular, social exclusion, constrains to access, and existing power structures are recurrent issues in REDD+ that can compromise distributional equity. Additional

insights in these matters are therefore provided in the following.

Threats to an Equitable Distribution of Benefits

The risk of social exclusion from forest benefits has been studied and documented in various forest conservation projects, indicating problems with elite capture and exclusion of certain groups (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003; Dahal, Larson, & Pacheco, 2010). Studies on community forestry groups in Nepal, which are at a more advanced stage than in Cambodia, point to the exclusion of certain disadvantaged user groups as a serious equity concern. Studies describe how poorer households benefit significantly less than wealthier households, as the poorer face more restricted access and are often excluded from the forest management decision-making body (Adhikari, Di Falco, & Lovett, 2004). Decision-making bodies are often dominated by wealthier groups who have greater levels of awareness, while poorer groups have limited information and greater time constraints (Malla, Neupane, & Branney, 2003). For instance, decisions by resource-rich groups also concern the principles applied for the distribution of benefits, e.g. whether benefits should be allocated in proportion to contribution (merit-based), in accordance with needs, or based on other criteria (McDermott et al., 2013). Such principles are central to distributional equity, in particular in contexts of procedural inequity, where disadvantaged groups are excluded from participation or decision-making or are less able to contribute to forest protection activities (Agarwal, 2001).

Paying special attention to the social context and structures within communities is likewise essential in order to understand how costs and benefits are shared. Patron-client systems are informal social structures, which can affect distributional equity. These structures are highly relevant in a Cambodian socio-political context and can play an important role in community-based forest protection programs such as CF/REDD+. Scott (1972) defines a patron-client relationship as a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his or her influence and resources to provide protection or benefits for a person of lower status (client) who reciprocates by offering general support and assistance to the patron. Cambodian socio-political life is replete with such patronage networks involving exchange of resources and benefits between individuals (Hinton, 2005). Complex, interrelated networks of clients and powerful patrons are clearly prevalent

in the forestry sector (Global Witness, 2007; Le Billon, 2000, 2002). Since strong formal institutions are often absent or incomplete in this context, such informal institutions can emerge with socially shared rules that converge or diverge from formal rules (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Historically, patron-client structures have flourished in both colonial and post-colonial times, with brutal consequences in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime in the late 1970s (Hinton, 2005). New external resources for patronage such as development programs have also been created, in which jobs, cash, and favors can flow down the network, and votes and support can flow upward (Ledgerwood, 1998; Scott, 1972). Such changes in the external environment may change the distribution of power and resources within a community, strengthening actors who benefit from a particular informal setup while weakening others (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). In other words, patronage practices seem to co-evolve with the development of the country (e.g. Hughes, 2001; Ledgerwood, 1998, 2012). CF and REDD+ projects fall into this category of developments introducing decentralized control of physical and virtual forest benefits. With an electoral system, the leaders and committees are appointed by the members (RGC, 2003), providing the potential clients (CF members) with a new resource, namely the power to re-elect and support the appointed patron (CF leader). In return, the leader can use his or her discretionary power to control the access to forest resources, for instance, by distributing benefits suc has employment (appointing selected patrol teams) and permits (to extract resources) (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries [MAFF], 2006).

Methodology

The findings presented in this paper are mainly based on a case study conducted in Oddar Meanchey in 2011. Data primarily consist of semi-structured interviews with local villagers in five CF sites (eight villages in total, see Table 3).
The main interview questions revolved around respondents' crop land and land titles, their use of the forest and engagement in CF and REDD+ activities as well as their views on deforestation and their future plans for agricultural expansion. In total, 114 qualitative interviews were conducted (see Table 4 summarizing the main results). Interviews were conducted in Khmer (native language of one of the authors) and

Table 3: Description of the CFs and Villages Included in the Study		
COMMUNITY FOREST	VILLAGES INCLUDED IN STUDY	BRIEF DESCRIPTION
Chhouk Meas	Chouk Meas	Established in August 2004 as a response to increasing levels of deforestation. The CF covers 166 families.
Prey Srorng	Korki Kandal Sralau Srorng	Established in 2004 and covers 666 families. The forest is rich in timber resources and abundant wildlife, but was logged by a Thai company and influential elites between 1999 and 2003, and locals have cleared the forest land for farming.
Samaky	Ou Sramor Ou Anrae	Established in 2004 and covers 686 families. Historically, this CF was rich in high quality timber and abundant wildlife, but has been logged by locals and influential elites, and cleared to provide agricultural land.
Sangkrous Preychheu	Day Thmey	Initiated in 2001 and covers 633 families. The forest holds important mammal and bird species and a Resin Enterprise Group was initiated in early 2010.
Sorng Rokavorn	Tom Nub Thmey Poum Thmey	Initiated in 2001 by the local monk, venerable Bun Saluth, who took the lead in setting up a "Monk's forest", which evolved into community forestry. Covers 982 families. One of the largest CFs, with many bird species and mammals, including endangered species.
		* CF area based on CF Agreement

Source: Pact (2011) Community Forestry profiles

ranged from 15 minutes to over 60 minutes. The selection of respondents was random and covered about 10 percent of the village residents. Being an explorative study and one of the first of its kind to qualitatively assess local impacts from CF/REDD+ in the province, a relatively open and flexible interview approach was chosen. This allowed for many follow-up questions based on the respondents' answers, which often led the interview in unpredictable directions revealing useful information related to the three dimensions of equity. Relevant site-specific field observations were also an essential part of the data collection and subsequent analysis. For instance, wealth status was assessed and assigned for each respondent using a combination of infor-

mation gained from the individual interviews (e.g. amount of land, type of land title, and income sources) and field observations (e.g. type and location of settlement, clothes, and jewellery). Besides wealth, respondents were categorized according to their settlement location and entitlement to farm land, and their position and engagement in the CF. In-depth interviews and meetings with other stakeholders (government authorities, NGOs, and donors) were also conducted, and various secondary data sources were exploited.

Deforestation, Forest Protection, and Equity

As outlined above, the extensive and rapid land-use changes and deforestation in the Oddar Meanchey province and throughout Cambodia show significant implications at the local community level. Similarly, forest protection initiatives such as CF/REDD+ lead to changes in the participating communities. Empirical findings from the case study in Oddar Meanchey suggest that both deforestation and forest protection affect equity in its various dimensions. Two aspects here are of particular relevance: First, to what extent deforestation and migration patterns coupled with contested

Table 4: The main socioeconomic data from case study conducted in CF/REDD+ communities in Oddar Meanchey province 2011.							
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	GENDER	AVERAGE AGE	WEALTH ASSESSMENT	CF MEMBERS	FARM LAND (AVERAGE)	DESIRE MORE LAND	EXPERIENCED EVICTIONS
114 (across 5 CFs and 8 villages)	50% f 50% m	44.3	Poor 29% Medium 45% Rich 27%	54% (13% involved in forest patrols)	3.6 ha (29% with land title*)	68%	25%
*land title recognized by village chief, district authorities and/or the commune council							

Source: UNHCR, 2000, p. 98.

tenure arrangements affect the poorest in the local communities; and second, to what extent are forest benefits from CF/REDD+ biased away from the poorest households, facilitated by a complicated web of constraints and social structures.

Figure 2: Local perceptions on deforestation represented as percentage of respondents who mentioned specific drivers (grey) and agents (black) of deforestation in their area of residence. While many mentioned agriculture and timber collection as drivers, specific deforestation agents were pointed out in terms of military, high ranking people and "company" (referring acquisition of land by external business companies for plantations or mining). These local perceptions highlight not only the diverse and powerful pressures on the land and forests, but also indicate clear knowledge in the communities about the agents of deforestation, including their own critical role in forest clearings for agricultural purposes.

Source: Data collected by the authors

The Costs of Deforestation and Migration Among the Poorest

In Oddar Meanchey, findings show how the local perceptions on deforestation presented in Figure 2 confirm the drivers outlined in Table 1.

According to many respondents in the case study, village chiefs, local and district authorities as well as 'people with guns' are involved in capturing the benefits of natural resources. In one of the villages visited during the case study, several respondents reported how the village chief threatened them to sell their land to him at a low price, after which he would sell it to a company with substantial economic surplus. Such

examples of land grabbing[4] and evictions, some involving threats, violence, and under-compensation, seem to be common in the province (Mengleng, 2011). Among the respondents, fewer than one in three had a land title[5] formally recognized by authorities while one in four of the respondents was somehow affected by land grabbing. Typically, their previous agricultural land or settlement had been taken over by outsiders such as plantation companies or the military, forcing them to migrate; or some or all of their present land was demarcated for take-over. In Oddar Meanchey, the real or perceived threat of land grabbing led villagers in some of the visited sites to clear the forest land for agriculture in order to 'claim' it, thereby intensifying deforestation (Nathan & Boon, 2012). However, even if local or district authorities recognize a land title and communities have crops on the field, concession companies frequently take over the land, maybe with a small compensation or with the promise to hire workers from the villages.

From an intra-community equity perspective, the findings from the case study indicate that land grabbing and companies' demarcation of villagers' land disproportionately affect the poorest households. Poorer households are more vulnerable and less resilient in a variety of ways. First, the empirical data and interviews suggest that better-off groups of respondents have more diverse and stable livelihood options in terms of larger land and more secure tenure as well as other sources of income. In contrast, the poorer respondents have no or less land, often without formal titles, and they rely more on forest resources such as non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and wood for charcoal production – resources which are in decline due to the rapid deforestation and land-use changes. Even with the extensive and on-going land grabbing in the area, the interviews revealed that the vast majority of respondents planned to expand their current agricultural land; however, these plans or desires were often constrained by lack of resources or available land. The opportunities to fulfill this desire diminish with the expansion of ELCs and the increased protection of forestland, which comes at a greater prize to the poor and landless that are short of other means to sustain their livelihoods.

Secondly, the migration and settlement dynamics in the communities also disadvantage the poor. As noted earlier, villages and communities visited during the case

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4   In this paper, land grabbing refers to large-scale land acquisitions on villagers' crop land, either legally granted by the government or through illegal, forced encroachment (for further discussions on land grabbing, see Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, & Taylor, 2012, p. 11, or De Schutter, 2011, who refers to land grabbing as the "acquisition or long-term lease of large areas of land by investors" (p.249)).

5   A formal land title is signed by the village chief and with stamps from the district authorities and/or the commune council, the latter considered more 'secure' than the signature only.

study were relatively young. On average, the respondents had moved to their respective villages about 10 years ago. The influx of people has historically been driven by relocations related to the actions, downfall, and aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979, followed by unrest and civil war until the 1990s). More recently, the perceived opportunities for getting agricultural land in Oddar Meanchey have attracted the poor and landless from both adjacent provinces and the lower Mekong area. According to some of the older settlers interviewed, the first people who migrated to the villages could clear the forest for agriculture "based on their abilities" (personal communication, July 6, 2011). Today, the case study findings suggest that new migrants have to buy land from other villagers because there is no more free land available. Interviews and observations in Oddar Meanchey indicate that early migrants settled by (or formed) the main road, while recent migrants settle off the main road at smaller

Figure 3. Typical village structure. Sketch map of a fictive village in a community participating in the CF/REDD project in Oddar Meanchey. Larger settlements with houses with a concrete base and red metallic roofs are often situated along the main road with their crop fields extending outward from the back of the house. These houses dominantly belong to the early migrants. The more recent migrants often settle at a distance to the main road in smaller wooden houses along the small dust roads with little or less land for agriculture.

CROP FIELDS

CROP FIELDS

‹ NEAREST FOREST

NEAREST DISTRICT TOWN ›

CROP FIELDS

Source: Authors

dirt roads (Figure 3). What is crucial to this settlement pattern is that land concessions are often planned and realized at a certain distance away from the main road. Consequently, the settlements and agricultural land of the poor located at a distance to the main road face a higher risk of land grabbing than the land near the main road belonging to the wealthier group.

With the presence of companies and the threat of losing land, poor villagers are then pushed to seek other means of survival. Without alternative sources of subsistence there appears to be no local safety net to alleviate the negative social consequences for the poorest groups. Several respondents stated in the interviews that they were depressed and left with no options but to work for hire or (illegally) migrate to neighboring countries to work at plantations under harsh conditions (Barney, 2009). In sum, the costs of deforestation and migration disproportionately affect the poorest groups. How benefits from the forest protection are allocated within communities is detailed below.

Benefits From Forest Protection: Constraints and Deliberate Exclusion

In the CF/REDD+ villages studied in Oddar Meanchey, the most vulnerable groups appear to be excluded from the benefits of CF (Bradley, 2012). Several constraints can hinder villagers from participating and enjoying the benefits of forest protection and thereby lead to distributional inequity. By analyzing recurring themes in the interviews, four types of constraints became apparent: *disabilities* such as physical health (e.g. amputee or old age), *resources* such as money to buy petrol for patrolling or time to engage in CF activities, *distance* to the forest such as when limited resources (e.g. mushrooms) are captured by the villagers residing closer to the resource, and *information* such as being present during recruitment and having access to knowledge about activities. For instance, a village deputy stated that his CF now covers more than 100 families, but about 10 families were not members because they lived too far from the forest or were sick. Four male respondents, all amputees (missing a leg or a foot), did not engage in the CF because of their disabilities. One of them explained this was because of a requirement to join activities like patrolling. Others said they got no information about enrolment, including an elderly woman who claimed she was not informed because she was old and incapable of contributing to any CF activities. Several respondents said they did

not participate in activities because they were too busy working or due to a lack of financial support for petrol to travel to the forest.

All four constraints can, to different degrees or acting in synergy, limit the ability of a person to join the CF and/or participate actively, in particular in patrolling activities, during which many forest products (e.g. mushroom, fish, fuel wood) can be extracted. In turn, such constraints can exclude a person or household from enjoying the forest benefits because of their lack of contribution to the CF. The background for applying distributive principles based on contribution can be found in the CF regulations. While the Sub-decree on CF management states that Cambodian citizens living within the participating communities can be members, it also lists the roles and duties of community forestry members, including participation in forest resources management, in monitoring the use of community forest resources, and in conserving, protecting, and planting the forest (RGC, 2003). All these duties require a certain level of good health and available resources not likely to be present in all strata of a community. Whether these legal requirements are even feasible and how and to what extent they are followed across the CFs is likely to vary.

According to the Sub-decree, the specific benefit sharing principles are part of the CF regulations passed by the individual CF Management Committees (RGC, 2003, Article 5.8) who engage in decision-making and contribute to forest protection. Empirical findings from five CFs show that in many instances, only the better-off households can afford to engage and participate actively in the management of the CF, consequently dominating decision-making bodies and enjoying the benefits of forest protection. The case study also indicates that the requirements of active participation are explicitly interpreted at the local level when it comes to extracting forest benefits. This is true both for non-members or non-active members, who willingly or less willingly disengage with the CF, and for the CF committee and other active members, who expect to get a larger share of the forest resources, including expected benefits from carbon funding. As told by a former CF patroller (personal communication, Samaky CF, July 6, 2011):

> Subcommittee told me I could collect timber during patrols, but [I] never got the benefits from the sale, which were shared among other patrollers and [CF] committee.

From the perspective of the CF committee, the biased distribution of benefits is considered fair, as reflected in interviews with two CF leaders:

> *[We/I] don't want to distribute in cash to all members . . . The [carbon] funds will contribute to village develop-*
> *ment, and cash will provide to the members who are active in patrol activities, to fire breaker building and so*
> *on. For those who are not active, they will not get any cash. (personal communication, Samaky CF, July 2, 2011)*

> *The committees and members who are active will get benefits from the [carbon] project, such as the*
> *patrol team for example. (personal communication, Prey Srorng CF, July 13, 2011)*

Moreover, the empirical findings indicated a risk of inequitable distribution of benefits when some CF members were deliberately kept out of the information flow and thereby not able to participate. This in turn ensures a larger share of the benefits for the other members. It can happen when the CF leader calls in (or refrains from calling) individual members to participate in patrols or delegates this task to selected patrol team leaders. A few respondents directly accused high level CF members, who control the information flows and delegates tasks, of (de-)selecting certain members when benefits were ready to be extracted. Several indications of such deliberate exclusion and unequal benefit sharing were found, for instance as put forward in an interview with a former CF patroller:

> *[I] used to be active [in CF], but stopped being called to patrols and other activities five months ago . . .*
> *Other CF members share the benefits among them. [I] didn't get any benefits – other members do – [there*
> *is] favoritism of a closed group of related patrollers who keep the information and benefits to themselves.*
> *(personal communication, Samaky CF, July 5, 2011)*

Following up on statements as the ones presented above, a further investigation of the CF structures was conducted in order to explore the internal relations among some of the active CF members. This study revealed that many members of the management committees and forest patrol teams were often relatives, neighbors, or otherwise closely acquainted, e.g. with a shared history of settlement, as reflected in Figure 4. Finally, some respondents also directly accused their CF committee of illegal activities depleting the forest for personal gain, as exemplified by a male interviewee:

> *Some members collect valuable, endangered timber for sale. [There are] no big trees left. Subcommittee*
> *and leader [are] involved. Now, a few people work with patrolling and do timber business" (personal com-*
> *munication, Samaky CF, July 6, 2011).*

These accusations and their relation to the social structures in the CFs are discussed below from an equity perspective together with the other findings from the case study.

Figure 4: Diagram of relations in CF. A fraction of relationship mapping of the structure in one of the Oddar Meanchey CFs. Full arrow indicates blood relatives. Dashed arrow indicates a historical link or a settlement relation (* the CF leader urged other families from her former province Ta Keo to settle in Oddar Meanchey).

Village Chief (m)
House on main road
Came from Ta Keo

CF Leader (f)
House on main road
Came from Ta Keo*
Former Khmer Rouge

**CF Patrol Team
Leader (m)**
House on main road

Neighbors

Son

Timer Trader (m)
No CF activities

*Relative/
Neighbor*

Village Deputy (f)
CF member
House on main road
Came from Ta Keo

Sibling

CF Member (m)
House on main road
Came from Ta Keo

Son

Son

CF Cashier (f)

CF Patrol Team Leader (m)

Cousin

**CF Patrol Team
Leader (m)**

Source: Data collected by the authors

Discussion and Conclusion

Put together, the findings from the case study in Oddar Meanchey indicate the following: The poorest households are often more recent migrants with less secure tenure and risky settlement locations. As a result, this group is disproportionately affected by land-use changes in terms of deforestation and land grabbing. Meanwhile, the sharing of the benefits from protecting the remaining patches of forest seem to be biased away from the poorest households, facilitated by various constrains and social exclusion. In turn, the risk of inequity is two-fold, as both costs and benefits are shared unevenly within communities, creating a 'double inequity'. The case study specifically indicates that the poor are more reliant on forest products due to less agricultural land and more insecure tenure. In turn, as the poorest respondents are excluded or constrained from enjoying the benefits of the remaining forest protected under CF/REDD+, this minimizes the role of the forest in providing livelihood alternatives or supplements. This poses

a serious concern for reaching the equity objectives and social co-benefits in REDD+ (UN-REDD, 2009). Although framed as constraints to participation and deliberate exclusion, these types of social exclusion can also be viewed from a broader "access" perspective (Ribot & Peluso, 2003) as "the ability to derive benefit from things" (p. 153). In this perspective, access includes a wider range of social relationships that constrain or enable benefits from resource use. Shaping how benefits are gained, controlled, and maintained, the mechanisms of access also include technology, capital, markets, labor, knowledge, authority, and identities. Several of the issues covered in this analysis clearly relate to these mechanisms, such as knowledge (e.g. information about CF enrolment and patrols), authority (legal or customary rights to manage resources), labor (e.g. forest patrol), and social relations and identity (e.g. distribution of and exclusion from benefits). In particular, identity and social relations were shown to profoundly affect access and distributional equity, based on CF membership positions and forest patrol groupings facilitated by prevailing power structures. Empirical findings specifically raise concerns about the presence of patron-client relations in the CF management with their interdependencies and mutual exchange of benefits. The social structures seem to pose a risk, not only to the equitable distribution of benefits but also in terms of facilitation of illegal forest activities, such as logging of valuable timber, within the core clientele. Combined with the exclusion of peripheral members, such activities can potentially flourish and be effectively covered-up to the benefit of the patron and the selected core clients. The forest offenders could thereby be the same people who are supposed to monitor illegal activities, and they could easily blame outsiders or the lack of funding for protection activities to cover their own illegal extraction. However, such potential illegal activities are frequency-dependent, as too much illegal harvesting will harm project outcomes and in turn reduce carbon funds, while some illegal harvesting might go unnoticed. It also depends on whether the long-term perspective of forest protection outcompete the short-term gains in the offenders' view. Arguably, even with some slip, the illegal activities are fewer than with no protection at all. The management committees and in particular the CF leader, who are selected to represent the community, are granted an important domain of power to shape resource access and rights on the ground (Larson, Marfo, Cronkleton, & Pulhin, 2010). This is of concern in relation to procedural equity and benefit sharing – at least on the daily basis, where the elected committee acts at the local level without interference from forestry au-

thorities and CF/REDD+ implementing agencies, who visit the sites and meet with the leaders only when time and resources allow.

The findings presented in this paper question the common development discourse arguing that democratic institutions play a largely positive role in catalyzing pro-poor policies (see Hickey, 2009). Instead, the formal democracy in CF structure and procedures tend to reinforce social and economic inequities in the community (Young, 2000) as benefits are captured and distributed in already present informal institutions. Thus, while such community-based programs seem ideal, there is a strong likelihood that the newly created structures will come to mirror prevailing patron-client structures that dominate the region, and it is unreasonable to assume that forming new committees through elections will automatically create a nonbiased and representative body (Ledgerwood, 1998). The practical outcome of the forest tenure arrangements in CF/REDD+ in Oddar Meanchey then falls between a statutory system with legally defined and enforced rules and rights, such as CF regulations, and a customary system with rules that are socially defined, where some community members participate in decision-making while simultaneously taking on exclusion and monitoring responsibilities (Doherty & Schroeder, 2009). The case study findings suggest that simply formalizing customary tenure will not automatically yield positive outcomes to all members of communities. Thus, even when laws are seemingly fair, they can be unevenly implemented or selectively enforced, and are thereby not sufficient to overcome existing inequities (Larson & Ribot, 2007). From a more practical perspective, policies promoting participation and assisting poor and marginalized groups across rural Cambodia and beyond require the engagement of such private power structures at the village level, even at the risk of legitimizing and becoming reliant upon these networks for the implementation of projects (Hughes, 2001). This in turn presents a dilemma and a challenge for policy makers and practitioners on how to integrate development goals with culturally embedded power relations in the implementation of policies such as REDD+. In the case presented here, the biased distribution of both costs and benefits creates a double inequity for the most vulnerable groups in the participating local communities; quite contrary to the ambitious social objectives of the forest protection programs. From a policy perspective, such adverse impacts on local actors could even compromise the overall effectiveness of REDD+ (Doherty & Schroeder, 2011), which highlights the relevance of assessing the local equity dimensions.

Tackling the social implications of deforestation and forest protection in order to ensure more equity is not an easy task. However, based on the findings and analyses in this paper, five recommendations (to researchers, donors, and practitioners) on how to address the sharing of benefits from remaining protected forests are presented (see also suggestions by Mahanty, Burslem, & Lee, 2007).

Besides strengthening formal institutions as a catalyst of informal institution change over time (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), one of the greatest challenges here and now lies in how to ensure that forest management committees and leaders are more representative and accountable to the community. Specific measures suggested to ensure this could be:

1. Granting special consideration to non-members and to members who are not active in CF. Project implementers who are responsible for reaching social objectives should strive to ensure that benefit sharing principles are agreed on and implemented accordingly, such as a need-based or pro-poor approach outlined in the Project Design document (Terra Global, 2012, see the fourth point below);

2. Using a rotational system for patrol teams and committee members (the five-year duration could potentially be reduced and re-election prohibited) to increase participation and representation. However, the time limit could potentially *enhance* illegal activities as offenders would seek to optimize benefits during their time of authority. This could potentially be counteracted by:

3. Involving a so-called external insider in each CF management group as a respected figure who can mediate conflicts and improve internal unity (Dahal & Adhikari, 2008). Specifically for Cambodia, greater involvement of Buddhist monks beyond Sorng Rokavorn CF which is mainly managed by monks (e.g. Brady & Rukavorn, 2011) might mitigate risks of exclusion and illegal harvesting. Besides these three specific measures, more comprehensive interventions are needed:

4. Pro-poor initiatives and policies[6] should be considered, such as special income-generating projects and land allocation (Dahal et al., 2010) and pro-poor benefit sharing mechanisms to balance the equity in the communities and create incentives towards forest protection. Finally, to alleviate detrimental social impacts

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6   For the Oddar Meanchey REDD+ project, specific social objectives and activities have been outlined based on the findings from this and other studies, including improved inclusion and representation of the poorest in management committees and CF activities, frequent visits to vulnerable households, and continued research and surveys to capture changes in livelihoods (Terra Global, 2012, p. 164).

from both land grabbing and inequity in CF/REDD+,

5. Strengthening the conflict management capacity is needed for building trust and common understandings, for example, with the establishment of legal recourse mechanisms to ensure people's rights. In order to asses and address these social dimensions at the intra-community level, specific mechanisms and minimum standards for benefit sharing are needed (Mahanty et al., 2007), supported by comprehensive social assessments including more qualitative indicators such as indicators reflecting people's ability to participate in decision making and to access resources (Pasgaard, 2013). Importantly, in-depth qualitative research is valuable to supplement quantitative household surveys at individual sites.

The scenario described in this paper is probably not unique to Oddar Meanchey. Rather, it is likely that other communities in Cambodia and throughout South-East Asia, where forest protection is high on the agenda, exhibit similar social imbalances and risk of enhanced inequity. The findings indicate an urgent need to better address distributional equity in community-based forest protection like CF/REDD+. Such programs cannot afford to further increase the already skewed social imbalance in many local communities, as it threatens the global objectives of reducing deforestation whilst encouraging environmental and social co-benefits.

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Traders, Markets, and the State in Vietnam: Anthropological Perspectives

Kirsten W. Endres[1]

In the past two decades, marketplaces as sites of multifarious economic, social, and cultural exchanges have attracted renewed interest of economic anthropologists. The collapse of communism, for example, unleashed a tidal wave of small-scale cross-border shuttle traders and contributed to the mushrooming of so-called post-socialist bazaars that have since been subjected to various forms of state regulation. In some parts of the world, traditional marketplaces are being promoted (and even recreated) to satisfy Western tourists' desire for an authentic oriental bazaar experience. Elsewhere, or in different contexts, they are seen as indicators of a backward economy that need to be replaced by modern supermarkets and shopping malls. On the contrary, planners in the West now foster the development of community markets in order to enhance public life and improve community relations. In short, marketplaces, bazaars, and other sites of small-scale trading – sites of the so-called informal economy – hold plenty in store for anthropologists to explore and investigate.

Established in 2011, the Max Planck Institute (MPI) research group *Traders, Markets, and the State in Vietnam* investigates local markets and other sites of small retail trade in the seemingly paradoxical context of Vietnam's continuing socialist orientation, on the one hand, and contemporary neoliberal economic and social transformations, on the other. The group currently consists of Kirsten W. Endres as head of the group, two PhD students (Lisa Barthelmes and Esther Horat), and, since April 2013, Caroline Grillot as postdoctoral researcher (replacing Christine Bonnin who took up

new assignments in January 2013). Besides holding regular informal meetings, the group organizes and participates in workshops and conference panels in order to place its findings in broader comparative contexts *and to con*tribute to theoretical conceptualizations of the relationship between *neoliberal reforms, economic restructuring, and changing state-society dynamics.*

Market Development Policies in Vietnam Today

Ferdinand Braudel's (1982/2002) monumental study on European civilization and capitalism in the fifteenth to eighteenth century is a poignant reminder that public markets have, in different historic times and places, commonly been sites of intense policing and regulation. Along with the growth of markets, complex contestations emerged over important issues such as the institutionalization and control of marketplaces, the levying of taxes, the use of public space, as well as, more generally, over changes in production and exchange relations.

Vietnam is no exception in this regard. The 'appropriate' development of traditional marketplaces has been on the Vietnamese government's agenda since the early 2000s. New policies were issued in the areas of distribution network planning, general public market regulations and management issues, and the privatization of market construction, renovation, and upgrading. In the capital of Hanoi, in particular, a number of long-standing public retail markets have been demolished and rebuilt as multi-story trade centers by private sector contractors (Barthelmes, 2013). As a result, many small-scale market vendors, after years of struggling for economic survival in temporary markets awaiting relocation, now suffer the consequences of higher monthly fees, inadequate spatial conditions, and the loss of customers. In addition, since the mid-1990s, other 'disorderly' forms of commercial activity, such as street vending and hawking, have repeatedly been banned in government efforts to bring order to city streets and discipline citizens into becoming 'modern' urban subjects. Yet the state's modernizing mission represents only one side of the coin. Equally important in explaining the elimination of traditional public markets is the current climate of wealth accumulation in Vietnam that takes place at the higher levels of an 'unholy' confluence between clientelistic mechanisms of political power

and capitalist opportunities to profit – opportunities that serve the interests of a powerful politico-economic elite by absorbing its over-accumulated capital (Harvey, 2003). Consequently, the government's attempts at civilizing the marketplace has brought about significant changes in the distribution of social and economic entitlements that call for closer examination from an anthropological perspective.

Rule by Uncertainty and Avenues of Negotiation

Many of the rules and standards imposed by recent political economy changes run counter to the moral norms that govern the social, spatial, and temporal organization of 'traditional' economic activity and therefore meet with various forms of resentment and resistance by those affected. In addition, rather than providing a consistent legal basis for their economic activity, the maze of rules and regulations relevant to Vietnamese small-scale traders does little in the way of reducing uncertainty. On the contrary, regulatory uncertainty (as well as coercion) has evolved as an efficient means by which the Vietnamese state exercises power over its citizens (Gainsborough, 2010). In her ongoing PhD research on street vendors in Hanoi, Lisa Barthelmes found that the possibility of a police raid, which usually results in the confiscation of goods and imposition of a fine, is the most agonizing part of their daily routine. The lack of predictability as to when and where a mobile law-enforcement team will chase after them and what kind of treatment and penalty they are to expect if caught further enhances the precarious economic situation of mobile vendors, whose semi-legal status as rural-to-urban migrant workers already sets significant limits to their livelihood options. Unlike in India or the Philippines, restrictions on the formation of associations persist and effectively block possible avenues for Vietnamese citizens to pursue and safeguard their interests. Vietnamese small-scale traders therefore engage in subtle everyday strategies of avoidance and compliance in order to subvert, contest, and negotiate the enforcement of top-down planning policies and legal provisions directed against their ubiquitous presence in the streets.

One way of negotiating the imposition of legal restrictions is through petty bribery. Whereas, generally speaking, Vietnamese citizens feel exasperated by the degree to which corruption in its manifold forms and manifestations has come to perme-

ate their daily lives, small-scale traders commonly justify their own resort to such practices by declaring them an essential means of economic survival. The tropes, analogies, and metaphors of corruption employed by Vietnamese small-scale traders not only frame and shape their (self-)perception and experience, but also transmit social commentary and political criticism. As Endres' research reveals, small-scale (ethnic majority) traders at the northwestern border between Vietnam and China rhetorically cast their petty bribe arrangements with officials as benevolent acts of providing access to economic opportunity for which they offer a token of appreciation – the bribe – in return (Endres, 2012a). The metaphorical justification of the bribe as a means of economic survival on the one hand and as an act of the state official's compassionate complicity on the other reflects small-scale traders' moral claims upon the state to their right of making a substantial living and transforms this type of corruption into a legitimate, and even moral, practice.

Informality, Moral economy, and Household-based Trade

According to a recent ILO study (Cling, Razafindrakoto, & Roubaud 2011), more than forty percent of non-agricultural household businesses in Vietnam engage in trade-related economic activities. With formal business registration as the main criterion of distinction between the formal and informal sectors of the economy, three-fourths of these households are categorized as belonging to the informal sector. Whereas this classification certainly applies to mobile street traders and to vendors in temporary, unlicensed markets, the boundary between the formal and the informal already starts to blur when it comes to formally registered vendors in public markets managed by local authorities. Many licensed traders engage in 'informal' vending activities, for example by merchandising goods obtained through informal/illegal channels (i.e. smuggled or imported 'duty-free' across the border, or purchased from unregistered traders or producers), by employing 'informal' stall helpers, or by 'informally' subletting their vending space to other users. In Vietnam's largely local, relationship-based economy, informality in fact constitutes a particular mode of social interaction and economic exchange and should, therefore, be treated analytically as an aspect of the moral economy rather than as a separate sector from the formal.

Advanced by E.P. Thompson (1971) in the context of the English working class and later applied to Asian peasant societies by James Scott (1976), the concept of moral economy stresses social institutions and moral beliefs as important components of economic behavior– or what Karl Polyani (1944/2001) described as the embeddedness of the economy in society.

In Vietnam, economic organization remains deeply entrenched in prevailing social norms and values regarding filial obligations and family cohesion. The importance of the household as an economic unit becomes particularly apparent in Esther Horat's ongoing research on the village of Ninh Hiep in the Red River Delta. Since the early 2000s Ninh Hiep has emerged as a dynamic regional trading community that channels Chinese textiles from the Vietnam-China border to various locations throughout Vietnam. Almost four thousand households are engaged in these trade-related activities. Family enterprises are the most common type of economic organization in this village, with each household specializing in a specific phase in the production and supply chain, i.e. importing fabric or ready-to-wear clothing from China, cutting and sewing garments, and selling textile products at the local market. While traditional gender roles continue to perpetuate male dominance and female subordination, it is the women who are perceived as both the main breadwinners and managers of the family economy (Horat, 2013). The prevailing preference for village endogamy and a low level of out-migration account for a steady growth in the number of household-based trading enterprises, as young couples usually set up their own business after marriage. Unlike in Hanoi, where the replacement of old-style markets by shopping malls has diminished spaces for traditional forms of vending, the recent construction of two new market buildings by private investors provides Ninh Hiep cloth traders with additional vending space that suits their economic needs and enhances the economic strength and reputation of the village as a major textile hub in Vietnam.

In contrast to Ninh Hiep, most villages in the densely populated Red River Delta still depend, for better or worse, on agricultural production for the bulk of their income. Migration (temporary/seasonal) to urban areas has therefore become a common household strategy for economic advancement. Whereas, for example, female street vendors are often looked down upon as second-class citizens in the capital of Hanoi, their remittances back to their home villages contribute significantly to enhancing their household's economic situation at the village level. Although they

retain strong links with their rural-based families, many street vendors who spend the bulk of their time in the city also find it difficult to adapt to the tight social environment and set role expectations associated with Vietnamese village life upon their (temporary) return. The interrelation between the street vendors' experience of migration and their sense of belonging and personal identity is one of the issues that shall be explored in greater depth during the subsequent phases of the project.

Cross-border Trade, Mutual Perceptions, and Notions of Entrepreneurial Success

Vietnam's love/hate relationship with China has been a persistent theme throughout Vietnamese history and forms a significant part of the background against which Kirsten Endres (2012b) and Caroline Grillot (2012a, 2012b) explore current small-scale trade relationships across the Vietnam-China border. After the brief but violent border war in 1979, official border crossings were shut down and trade came to a halt until the normalization of bilateral relations in the late 1980s. Since then, the border gradually transformed from a line of demarcation between two hostile neighbors into a vital economic resource and thriving nexus of social and cultural interaction. On either side of the frontier, internal migrants hailed (back) to the border area in order to seize the economic opportunities at hand. Along with the forging of new cross-border trading relationships, mutual images and perceptions evolved from the interstices of wider societal/political discourses and the localized, everyday experience of, and interaction with, the neighborly Other. Despite the fact that bilateral trade relations between China and Vietnam are clearly dominated by Chinese imports, cross-border economic ties are characterized by a high degree of mutual dependency, and small-scale traders on both sides are acutely aware of the fact that it is the very existence of the border that enables them to make a relatively decent living in this region. Yet whether Chinese or Vietnamese, the rules of the game are to a great extent determined by on what side of the border the economic exchange takes place, and the degree to which traders conform to business practices that differ from their own plays an incisive role in determining Vietnamese and Chinese traders' attitudes towards each other. Their mutual perceptions are thus informed as much by cultural

prejudice and political tensions that shape public sentiment as they are conditioned by economic opportunity, individual self-interest, and face-to-face commercial transactions with suppliers, intermediaries, and customers from across the border.

Vietnamese small-traders would certainly not deny the need to work hard in order to be successful in the market. The ways in which they conceptually frame their economic success, however, reveal that discipline, rational calculation, and personal skills are very much downplayed in personal accounts. Instead, a person's propensity for trade and the wealth generated by it are narratively constructed as part of a person's fate decreed by heaven. Accordingly, a trader's success in business is referred to as *loc* – a key concept that relates to good luck, fate-fortune, prosperity, and divine benevolence. *Loc* may be secured by moral virtue, enhanced by ritual practice, reciprocated in ritual exchange, distributed among kin, and transferred to future generations. It is thus in constant circulation: from 'heaven' to humans, from humans to deities and ancestors, and from deities and ancestors back to humans (Endres 2013). Further research into the complex web of interlinkages between the economic sphere and the metaphysical assumptions that govern and guide Vietnamese perceptions of the self and the world is expected to contribute valuable insights to our understanding of local economic practices, the moral implications of wealth, and ideas about human agency.

Ethnic Minority Traders in the Northern Uplands

The mountainous northern borderlands of Vietnam are home to a significant number of officially designated ethnic minority groups for whom local periodic markets have featured for centuries as integral to their social and material lives. Moreover, border residents have long sustained their livelihoods through cross-border goods exchanges and nurtured strong ties with kin in China. While market trade has gained central importance in the livelihood strategies of uplanders, minorities such as ethnic Hmong continue to be labeled as autarkic societies lacking in entrepreneurial know-how. Thus, the Vietnam state's agenda to develop the 'economically inefficient' northern upland region involves the 'modernization', upgrading, and regulation of local marketplaces (Turner & Bonnin 2012). Christine Bonnin's research has

enriched the group's agenda by looking at the effects of state-imposed standardized models of how markets should look and how traders should behave that prescribe fixed, licensed trading from a permanent market structure. On the other hand, 'ethnically colorful' upland markets are being assessed for their economic potential, as the state and private stakeholders alike seek to promote cultural tourism and 'cultural commodities' for external consumption (Bonnin, 2012).

Conclusions and Outlook

In his seminal book *The Great Transformation*, first published in 1944, Karl Polanyi has cautioned against the idea of the free market (i.e. free enterprise and private ownership) as the essence of human freedom, as this may ultimately come to mean "the fullness of freedom for those whose income, leisure, and security need no enhancing, and a mere pittance of liberty for the people, who may in vain attempt to make use of their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power of owners of property" (Polanyi, 1944/2001, p. 265). Such have been the effects of neo-liberal restructuring in many parts of the world, including Europe, and we can see evidence of its first seeds taking root in Vietnam today. The transformation of urban public markets into trade centers and shopping malls is one salient case in point: Large plots of state-owned real estate in the inner city are handed over to private investment companies for development, in the process of which thousands of small traders are 'dispossessed' of their means of economic survival in the marketplace. Ironically, this also happened during the period of socialist transformation, when small traders were 'encouraged' to engage in more productive work (Abrami, 2002).

In spite of these larger processes that have so far become most evident in urban settings, large sections of Vietnam's population continue to rely on small-scale trade and market vending activities in order to sustain their livelihoods. The expected results generated by this research group will contribute to a fuller understanding of complex market-society-state dynamics that inform, and are formed by, the social contexts in which the everyday economic practices of Vietnamese small-scale traders and market vendors are embedded. We anticipate that our findings will set the stage for further investigations that take up a broader historical and conceptual ap-

proach in order to situate the *particularities of the* Vietnamese experience within the wider trajectories of resilience and (post-socialist) transformation in Eurasia.

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Community-Based Tourism in Bali: On the Road Towards Empowerment? An Interview with Djinaldi Gosana

Claudia Dolezal[1,2]

Djinaldi Gosana, the chairman of the Bali Community-Based Tourism Association (CoBTA) and the Executive Director of Bali Hotels Association, seeks to empower communities in Bali's rural areas through community-based tourism (CBT). Bali CoBTA is an NGO that engages with CBT in Bali's least developed regions and strives to build stronger communities by assisting them in using, above all, their cultural assets to engage in a type of tourism that is financially beneficial for the community and at the same time helps preserve local culture. This interview was conducted on 2 June 2013 during the author's PhD fieldwork on the topic of CBT and empowerment in Bali. Community empowerment is a highly contested concept that seems to be easily achieved in theory but difficult to implement in practice. Empowerment, along with the challenges that Bali CoBTA is facing, forms the focus of this interview.

Djinaldi Gosana, Präsident der Bali Community-Based Tourism Association (CoBTA) und geschäfts-führender Direktor der Bali Hotels Association, bemüht sich darum, Gemeinschaften in Balis ländli-chen Gebieten durch gemeinschaftsbasierten Tourismus (community-based tourism) zu stärken (to empower). Bali CoBTA ist eine NGO, die sich im Bereich des gemeinschaftsbasierten Tourismus in Ba-lis sozio-ökonomisch am stärksten benachteiligten Regionen engagiert. Dies basiert auf der Verwen-dung ihrer kulturellen Ressourcen und dem Ziel, einen Tourismus zu fördern, der der Gemeinschaft finanziell zu Gute kommt, aber auch deren kulturelles Erbe bewahrt. Dieses Interview wurde am 2. Juni 2013 im Rahmen der Doktorats-Feldforschung der Autorin zum Thema gemeinschaftsbasierter Tourismus und Ermächtigung (empowerment) in Bali durchgeführt. ‚Community empowerment' ist ein sehr umstrittenes Konzept, welches in der Theorie einfach zu erreichen scheint, in der Praxis jedoch schwer zu verwirklichen ist. Fokus dieses Interviews sind das Konzept ‚empowerment' sowie die Herausforderungen, welchen Bali CoBTA gegenübersteht.

CLAUDIA DOLEZAL: What was the reason or what motivated you to create Bali CoBTA?

DJINALDI GOSANA: The reason why I am now building this community-based tourism is be-cause, firstly, here in Bali, there is nobody else who can do the same thing that I am doing and, secondly, it is my promise that when I come back to Indonesia, after my hospitality

1 Claudia Dolezal is a doctoral researcher at the University of Brighton, UK. Her PhD thesis looks into community empowerment in CBT in Bali. Claudia has a background in tourism and international development with a focus on South-East Asia and contributes to the work of the Society for South-East Asian studies, i.a. as a member of the ASEAS editorial board. Contact: C.Dolezal@brighton.ac.uk.

2 The interview was conducted in English and the phrasing was retained as authentically as possible during the transcription with only minor changes in order to improve readability.

studies in Germany, I should do something, for poverty alleviation, to make the people more wealthy. You know, I am working for Bali Hotel Association and I have a lot of experience in opening hotels. And, I said – why not, you just move the management system in a hotel and bring it into the village, into the rural area. A hotel has a lobby, an information center; there is a restaurant, and also accommodation.

DOLEZAL: So how do you go about initiating CBT and communicating with the villages?

GOSANA: Perhaps I am the first who tries to apply the system of the hotel in the village. For example, imagine the hotel; if you bring it to the village, the system is the same, but the situation is different. Now, as I said, because of my experience, I know the expectations of the guests; they are looking for something authentic, not mass tourism. And what is good for Indonesia, or for Bali, is creative tourism. Creative tourism means that guests engage, involve, and work together – something they can remember. How can we make this happen, though? I go to the village and I would like to get a confirmation from the head of the community, "Is it true that your community wishes or expects to become visited by tourists?" And then he asks me, "Teach me the strategy, how can we do it?" I would answer, "Firstly, you and the community have to be able to develop the 'seven charms' – they are security, order, cleanliness, beauty, green surrounding, friendliness, and building a nice memory; number two, once we have the basics you have to have a committee. So think and choose within the village who can become the leader to develop tourism." I need a minimum of three persons; ideally, it would be five in the committee: one for accommodation, one for food and beverages, one for marketing, one for accounting, and one for the activities or attractions. People will come to the village because of the attractions.

DOLEZAL: So how would you define CBT compared to other types of tourism?

GOSANA: What's happening here in Bali is that people have some money and they say, "Ok, I will build something artificial in rural areas, like in Ubud[3]." They make a stage, they build a hotel, because this person has some money, and then they call the community, "Come here, I have a guest!" You see? I feel that this one is not community-based tourism. Rather, community-based tourism means that the community has the share; that means that everyone, the 10 or 20 people are involved – that is the difference. If, say, Djinaldi has the money, I go to the village, I rent out 5 or 10 rooms there and if I am gone … it is finished. That is the difference when you speak about community-based tourism: If I am gone, hopefully the people or the children can continue it. And then, let's say, when there is an investment, not only one person is responsible, but the community. The investor, the bank that gives the money, is not giving the money to one person, but gives the support to the community. This is the difference!

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3   Ubud is a town in Gianyar regency, which is famous for tourism.

DOLEZAL: I understand. Concerning empowerment, Bali CoBTA states on its website that its mission is to build strong communities and empower them. So, in your eyes, what does empowerment mean and how do you define empowerment?

GOSANA: There are three or five people in the committee. I give them the idea, I train them, I have the money, I trust them to use the money for the activities. But if I am not empowering them, as I said, when I am gone, it is finished. It will not continue. That is why we have to empower them, until they say, "Ok, I give up trying to engage in tourism, because I am a farmer, I am a worker, because I am a government official, I have no hospitality experience like you." And until that time, I will keep empowering them. It is not easy, as I said to you, it is a process. Then your empowerment will be successful.

DOLEZAL: So how would an empowered community look like or how does empowerment show itself in practice? When, would you say, is a community empowered?

GOSANA: When they … when they can implement what I teach them, without me being there.

DOLEZAL: So you mean being independent?

GOSANA: Yes, when they are independent. But the people and their background … it makes every village different from the other. One village can be fast, while in the other they might be fighting each other. It depends on who would like to become the 'king'. But as I said, I should not be too much involved there. Ideally, they make use of the same recipe, the 'seven charms', and if they need money, they can contact me, I will introduce them to the bank, etc. But they have to decide on the roles in the village and on who runs the show. If it fails, don't blame me.
So far, I haven't seen anything that endangers the community. However, it does not always go according to our expectations. Sometimes they promise something and then we come back and it wasn't put into practice. I do the empowerment, however, I have to monitor where the limit is. I realize that with those people in the community it is a process, you cannot expect anything within one or two years. I cannot expect that the community can serve as good as I can, because they are not hoteliers. They are not learning that. They learn to be a farmer, they learn to be a worker, maybe a woodcarver. However, I am sure, perhaps in another five, six years, when they are able to train themselves, this will be different.

DOLEZAL: But do you try to monitor what's going on and if it is in line with CBT, or if it is going in the wrong direction?

GOSANA: Of course! Wrong direction, I don't think so, as long as the activities belong to the community. I have an example where I empowered the people and it went in the wrong direction. If I say that it is a wrong direction, it is no longer managed by the community; they get money and let the community from another village work. And that is what I think is

wrong. That is not bringing benefits to that community, but to another community. There-fore, I've always said, you have to exploit what you have, what is authentic and original. Once you already take something from the outside, like, let's say, catering service from Denpasar, and then you outsource the dancers, you outsource the Gamelan[4] orchestra, you outsource everything – your place becomes a venue. Then it goes in the wrong direction.

DOLEZAL: You said earlier that you want to fight poverty with CBT. Who do you think benefits from CBT or, to put it differently, do you think that the poor people in the village can also benefit?

GOSANA: Yes, I can give you an example when I was criticizing the community because they do not understand the concept. One day, I saw the community show a Gamelan orchestra. Imagine this, suddenly you see a master there playing the instrument. You think, "Wow, that looks professional!" And then I asked the community leader, "Who is that person?" – "Oh, that is our master, our best man! He already went all over the world, he is very famous!" – "So why do you let this person play in front of the community?" – "Because if it is not this person, we are ashamed, not proud." – "So that's a rich man, he went around the world!" – "So we made a mistake?" – "Yes, you should give the opportunity to the farmer who works in the morning as a farmer and has spare time and has a skill, who has a talent and can show it to the tourist, that is something original! Not the person who has already studied and learned and is professional for that." And then they realize. Therefore, CBT ideally would be to create the opportunity to let these people work who are not professionals.

DOLEZAL: But don't the people need training first?

GOSANA: No, because they are in the village, because of the authenticity, they can already do it, because they are talented! But sometimes they are not given the opportunity, because of the leader, the political leader. They are afraid, "If I let this farmer play, you know, the outcome will be bad." And that is what I criticize. And this has to be understood by the com-munity.

DOLEZAL: And you tell them?

GOSANA: Yes, a second example: What's difficult for me and dangerous is when the commu-nity leader cannot explain or socialize the program properly. I give you an example: Imagine that a group of guests goes for a walk in the village. I think the committee in the village should be smart enough to know when the group will pass through the rice field, for ex-ample. So, on the way, the Balinese farmer women should already stand there and know – when from far away she sees the tourists coming – that she has to go there. Beforehand, she already prepares a big bag of rice or whatever. So when the tourists come, the woman

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4 *Gamelan* is the Javanese word that is used amongst others in Bali to refer to a traditional musical orchestra, which usually consists of a group of people playing a number of different instruments similar to xylophones.

will take the bag and put it up on her head and then the tourists will say: "Oh, Balinese women are very strong!" And then they take a picture. This is something you will not see in your country. After they've left, you put it back and go back to work. Not that suddenly the tourists come and they say: "Oh, in the program it says that we will see the farmers work, but where are they?" This is why you have to be creative in using the program without disturbing the regular job of the farmer. The farmer can work over there, but if the guests come from the road without passing by the farmer, it is not efficient, right? The timing has to be right. Therefore you have to make a show. That is reality.

DOLEZAL: So you think it is still authentic if it is a show?

GOSANA: Yes, because daily life means you do it like that. They are just doing it at the same time when the tourists come – to show them. That's the reason why I said at the end of the month, the woman must get money, because this woman is also dancing, only on a different stage. Tourists can sit and see the dancer in a nice costume in the evening. If they give money to the dancer, why couldn't we pay money to the farmer? It is the same stage, only a different kind, you understand? Therefore, a good management of CBT is a package. As if you visited Walt Disney Land. You pay once, and then you don't need to pay again when you are entering the different attractions. That's it! The money has to be distributed. Some money goes to the farmer, some to the kids who were showing things to the guests on their way – who didn't realize that they were professional … Everybody gets something.

DOLEZAL: But how can you make sure that the blacksmith gets money, that the farmer gets money? How can you make sure it doesn't go to the leader?

GOSANA: I empower the community, that's the difference. Lucky me, that I am a little bit close with the community, they tell me, "Djinaldi, what's happening in the community, we experience this and that."

DOLEZAL: I am sure there is a lot happening … can you see any disparities in the villages because of tourism?

GOSANA: As I said to you from the beginning, it is dangerous when the community leader is not socializing properly with the community. That is one big mistake. There is an opportunity. If you only tell four or five people, who have the money and invest – that is wrong! You must sit together and hold a meeting, and you tell for example: "There is a guest looking for a bicycle. Everybody who would like to lend a bicycle, please report to me and I will organize it." If a person didn't know about that in the end and the conglomerate of the village gets the business, of course, this person will be angry. So then there is no more security and safety, and they will fight each other. And in the end no tourists will come to visit.

DOLEZAL: What do you think about the caste system in Bali, do you think that the caste system could be an obstacle to this, as it may be difficult to delegate power to the lower caste?

GOSANA: Yes, I know. But you know, it depends on the higher caste and how they behave. What I am trying to do now, since I have experience in Bedulu village – I am doing *Wisata Puri*, tourism related to the royal family. We have to use the opportunity; we have to utilize this caste system to implement what I explained before. I don't have the intention to awaken feudalism, but: Forty or fifty years ago, the royal family had a lot of land and the community worked on that land. The money they earned they gave to the king. So what happened after the land reform: The money comes, and who should maintain the temple, the *puri*, or the house where the cultural and economic activities happen? Only the royal family who has a sense of entrepreneurship can survive, just like the Ubud royal family, because they use the *puri* as an icon, and tourists come. The king invites the tourist to the village, to the royal family house, to the palace, for dinner, dancing, and so on. It is more attractive for the tourists, right? And if people in the community want to do tourist activities, yes, we can schedule for the guests who will stay in the royal family house to visit the community. So with these activities, the community will respect the king again.

DOLEZAL: So how do the others benefit then, besides the royal family?

GOSANA: It is the same, the *desa wisata[5]*, only that the *desa[6]* doesn't have the royal family and its attraction. The royal family brings the attraction, it is more beneficial. For the royal family it is not the money – it is the prestige. They could not maintain the relationship with the community, they could not make the palace look always nice and fresh, they could not maintain the *para*, the market, and so on. So, by having *Wisata Puri*, it is the same like 40 years ago. But the difference is that the community is now utilizing the tourists to make money.

DOLEZAL: So if the tourists stay in the *puri*, will there be other homestays, too?

GOSANA: Yes, as not all *puri* will welcome tourists. Some think it is a sacral place and that only the royal family may stay there. Other *puri* don't mind. So therefore, there are two options. We utilize the royal family house for cultural activities, like dinner together with the prince, where people can learn dancing, cooking, painting, the history of the area, but they stay in the homestays in the village. If the royal family has a piece of land, I can build a replica of the royal family houses there. If you would like to stay and feel like a part of the royal family, then, behind the wall of the royal family house, there are some villas with nice swimming pool and so on.

DOLEZAL: For you, what are some indicators that a CBT project has been successful – if the tourist is happy or if the community is happy?

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5 I.e. tourism village or what Bali CoBTA names 'community-based tourism'.
6 I.e. 'village' in Indonesian.

GOSANA: Yeah, if I see that the community is happy, because before they are poor and now they have a better life because of the activities. For example, in Blimbingsari: I started that place in 2004; and now people already have a different career.

DOLEZAL: So for you, a successful project means that the community improves their standard of living?

GOSANA: Yes, it means that the people who are involved in the activities get a better life. That is what it means for me.

DOLEZAL: What do you think are the challenges for Bali CoBTA? What is difficult when you work in CBT?

GOSANA: There are a lot of challenges. The biggest challenge for me is when a community is not professional – particularly the tourism committees that organize tourism in the villages. Bali CoBTA empowers and delegates, yes. But the problem is the human resources: The professionalism to handle the things on the ground is not there. It is still a challenge. But I believe that in another three years it will be different.

DOLEZAL: So you think it takes some time?

GOSANA: Yes, sometimes the challenge is the community itself; if they are not sure they want to do it or not. And that is where the community leader has to convince. If the community leader is not professional, that's difficult. Second, they don't understand that tourism is only a trigger. The trading through tourism and investment generates more revenue for the community. I give you an example: CBT should consist of three activities: tourism, trading and investment. Guests come to a village, they see a piece of land, and think, "Hey, that's good for tourists, I would like to invest and build some villas here." And then the community says, "Yes, we help you!" They build, they invest. It means more money comes in and it can be managed by the community or by the tourist himself. And then people come and say, "Oh, the coffee tastes delicious! Where does it come from?" – "Oh yes, I can arrange something for you, how many kilos do you need in a year?" You see, you just say, "I can supply." If this opportunity is not used, not taken by the community, then you will wait ages until you are rich. And these things need some time. So if they use only tourism, it takes ages – but if you can create trading or investment and there is still a piece of land that you can build on ... That is my challenge!

DOLEZAL: So this is what you tell the villages?

GOSANA: This is what I teach them.

DOLEZAL: Do you think that if land is sold and more tourists come to the village, that agriculture could be replaced?

GOSANA: I never tell them to sell. Collaborate, yes! It is good for the investor; it is also good for the community. That is why I said to you, if we can synergize tourism and trading and whatever can be invested, we can make the poor get rich faster. And yes, there is still a lot to be done, that's why we have to go back again, empower them, make a CBT center in the village, or a CBT college. If we have some people who would like to stay there and teach them how to speak English – fantastic! What I am doing is just idealism, and I am happy if I can make other people more productive and free them from poverty. That is what it is all about. For me, you feel rich when you can give to someone else. And again, the challenge is that sometimes we try to be good and teach people, but the result is not as fast as we expect. But again, communities do not belong to us. We just have the heart to help and it is up to the community to make use of the help or not.

DOLEZAL: Thank you very much for your time to do this interview!

Filipin@ Communities in Austria: Barrio Fiesta sa Vienna 2013

Bianca Gantner[1] & Philip Weninger[2,3]

On July 22, 2013, the Austrian-based Filipin@[4] communities got together on ATV Liesing Sportplatz in order to celebrate the annual Barrio Fiesta in Vienna. In the Philippines, the term *barrio* describes all rural sub-units of municipalities that lie outside the *poblacion* (municipal center) as well as any sub-units of some smaller cities (Romani, 1956). As Ramon Reyes, a Philippine native, described during the event, *barrio fiesta* could be translated as 'neighborhood party':

> *In the Philippines, people love to gather together to enjoy these festivals that celebrate anything from weddings to holidays. No matter who you are or where you come from, everyone is welcome as a guest and active participant. (Ramon Reyes quoted in "Barrio Fiesta in Vienna", 2011)*

As mentioned in this quote, there are various occasions for such get-togethers. In the case of the Viennese Barrio Fiesta, it is to commemorate the Philippine Independence from Spain in 1898. According to the Council of Filipino Associations in Austria, which organizes the event in cooperation with the Philippine Embassy, the Fiesta in the Austrian capital is supposed to be the biggest one outside the Philippines. With approximately 100 participating organizations and almost 6,000 participants from all over Austria, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Germany, and Italy, this seems likely.

The Filipin@'s account for 12,025 registered persons in Austria, representing the biggest group of South-East Asian migrants. Official data of *Statistik Austria* (2011a) shows that in 2011, 7,522 persons who held an Austrian citizenship but were born

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1   Bianca Gantner finished her PhD at the Department of Geography and Regional Research, University of Vienna in 2012, focusing on South-East Asia and tourism. Her dissertation dealt with the role of the informal sector in the Thai tourism industry. Contact: bianca.gantner@gmx.at

2   Philip Weninger earned his Master at the Department of Geography and Regional Research, University of Vienna in 2010. His thesis focused on Philippine migration and remittances. Contact: philip.weninger@gmail.com. Both authors are members of the „Zentrum für österreichische und philippinische Kultur und Sprache" (Sentro ng Kultura at Wika ng Austria at Pilipinas).

3   Picture 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10 in the series of fotos at the end of the article were taken by Christian Namiss, who is a core team member and the webmaster of the „Zentrum für österreichische und philippinische Kultur und Sprache" (http://www.zentrum-oep.at/). All other picures were taken by the authors.

4   The term Filipin@ refers to male and female persons of Philippine origin.

in the Philippines (2,160 male and 5,326 female) and 4,506 (1,895 male and 2,611 female) Philippine citizens were registered in Austria (second-generation not included). The strong presence of female migrants is related to the international migration of (mainly female) Philippine nursing staff to Austria since the 1960s. Later on, family reunification as well as marriage-related migration had an impact. With 8,517 persons, the majority of the 12,025 so-called *Pinoys*[5] are living in Vienna (Statistik Austria, 2011b). For most of the Philippine migrants, social ties and networks play a vital role in their occupational and private life, which is also reflected in the high number of Philippine associations and organizations. The strong organization in associations is a quite specific criterion of Filipin@ migrants compared with other South-East Asian communities in Austria. While some of the organizations stand for regions of origin of their members (e.g. Igorot-Cordillera Austria) or target areas (e.g. Philippine Association in Niederösterreich [Lower Austria]), others represent interest groups (e.g. Filipino Basketball in Wien [Vienna]; Philippine Nurses Association-Austria) or religious organizations (e.g. Vienna Christian Center – Filipino Fellowship). According to an information website for Filipino Overseas Workers (OFW), there are

> *more than fifty (50) organizations, clubs and associations of Filipinos or Filipino-Austrians — organized along either regional, ethnic, professional or religious lines, many of which maintain excellent cooperative and consultative ties with the Embassy and are actively supporting the Embassy in projecting a positive image of the Philippines through regular activities and projects. (Pinoy OFW, 2011)*

Hector Pascua (2012) summarizes the essential function of these various groups and the Barrio Fiesta in particular as follows:

> *These wonderful occasions bring us together. We need to set aside our differences and think as one people, one nation! This sense of unity, of having common heritage should continue to keep Filipinos in Austria together. It is this sense of community that will allow us to face the tremendous challenges confronting our lives as Filipinos living in a foreign land.*

Considering the importance of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, it is hardly surprising that the event started with a field mess celebrated by a Philippine priest and accompanied by a church choir. Subsequently, a big parade took place where every participating organization presented itself as eye-catching as possible, since the best parade performance was awarded. Moreover, there were competitions honoring the best booths, the best regional ethnic costume, and the best dance performance. One

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5 *Pinoy* is a commonly used word in Philippine language for Filipin@s outside and inside the Philippines. It is a term with a normally positive connotation.

of the fiesta's attractions was the food bazar where Philippine specialties such as pork barbecue, *halo-halo* (desert consisting of shaped-ice, evaporated milk, and sweet fruit and beans), or *balut* (duck embryo boiled in an eggshell) were served.

The large number of stalls with commercial interest, who expected to reach their target at the event, was especially astonishing. There were companies represented that directly support migrants' networks to their places of origin and families left-behind as money remittance services, tour and travel agencies as well as cargo-forwarding businesses. Filipin@ migrants play a vital role for the Philippine economy. Their money transfers from abroad – remittances – accounted for approximately 10 percent of the country's GDP in 2011 (World Bank, 2013). In 2009, the Austrian branch of the Philippine Metrobank had 7,000 registered clients, of which at least 90 percent were ethnic Filipin@s. Through this bank branch alone[6], EUR 14.5 million were sent to the Philippines in 2008 in the course of 32,000 transactions.[7] Furthermore, real investment firms and organizations that support development projects in the Philippines approached the migrants in their role as investors at the Barrio Fiesta. The Barrio Fiesta featuring such various attractions as traditional, contemporary, and – in Austria – rarely known Filipino cultural performances, information stands about 'transnational' commercial opportunities, and diverse palettes of food has become a highlight in the event calendar of the Filipin@ communities in Vienna and beyond. In addition to its original goals, which focused on showcasing Philippine culture and lifestyle, nowadays economic aspects play an important role as well. Stalls operated by mobile communication providers, travel and airline companies, money transaction services, or real estate companies are prominent features of Barrio Fiesta. Due to the joint efforts of the Council of Filipino Associations in Austria, the Embassy, and the involvement of many Filipin@ organizations, the festival has become a regular event, growing bigger year by year.

6   There are two more Philippine banks operating in Vienna: PBC International Money Transfer (a subsidiary company of Philippine National Bank) and iRemit.

7   Data was obtained in an interview with the head of the Metrobank branch in the course of a field study (dealing with remittances of Filipin@ migrants in Vienna) by Bianca Gantner and Philip Weninger in May 2009.

The opening Catholic Mass of Barrio Fiesta celebrated by Fr. Mars Sahulga and a Filipino church choir is well attended although it starts at 11 a.m

Association of Novo Ecijanos (ANEA; inhabitants of Nueva Ecija Province on the Island of Luzon) and many other associations are joining the parade.

Association of Novo Ecijanos (ANEA; inhabitants of Nueva Ecija Province on the island of Luzon) and many other associations are joining the parade.

Thanks to the fine weather a huge crowd is enjoying Barrio Fiesta 2013.

Igorot Cordillera Austria: Winner of the best booth 2013. The Igorot are an indigenous community who have their origin in the mountainous regions on the islands of Luzon. The Igorot Cordillera Austria's aim is to practice and promote their cultural heritage, to serve as a forum for the Igorot community in Austria, to establish bonds to other Filipin@ organizations as well as to support Igorots in their home region (www.igorot.at).

Filipinos are organized in associations representing their new home region (e.g. Philippine Austrian Association in Linz) or in associations consisting of people from their region of origin (Igorot Austria).

Filipinos are organized in associations representing their new home region (e.g. Philippine Austrian Association in Linz) or in associations consisting of people from their region of origin (Igorot Austria).

The food stalls offered Filipino specialities like pork barbecue as well as Austrian-Filipino 'fusion food' like Apfelstrudel-Malagkit (sticky rice apple pie).

The pupils of the "Paaralan sa Pasuguan - Schule in der Botschaft 2013" organized by the Philippine Embassy and the "Sentro ng Kultura at Wika ng Austria at Pilipinas - Zentrum für österreichische und philippinische Kultur und Sprache" are presenting a traditional folk dance.

Less traditional - more commercial are the aims of stalls as shown above.
Migrants should invest for their future return to the Philippines.

There are cheap flights to the Philippines or travel agency vouchers offered.

Donated by BABAYLAN Austria 2004
one classroom in Batad,
San Remigio, CEBU-Philippines.

Batad Elementary School

BABAYLAN AUSTRIA,
in collaboration w/ HOTEL AUSTRIA
supported with a total amount of P50,000.00
to the local government of Tambongon,
San Remigio, CEBU in their project of
building an urgently needed additional
classroom in Tambongon, San Remigio.
CEBU-Philippines
Tambongon Elem. School

BABAYLAN AUSTRIA
RECENT PROJECT
DONATION
TO

PANTAO ELEMENTA
SCHOOL
DELA PAZ BATANGA
PHILIPPINES

Some organizations are fund raising for the less privileged on the Philippines. They are organizing projects in their home provinces. Babaylan Austria has donated a classroom in Batad Elementary School for example.

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Netzwerk Südostasien / Network South-East Asia

Science on the Move: The 7th EuroSEAS Conference in Lisbon in 2013

Paulo Castro Seixas[1]

What is the role of *International Scientific Conferences* (ISCs) in the scientific system? This is the question I address based on a brief report on the coordination of the 7th EuroSEAS Conference in Lisbon in 2013.

In some circles of the scientific community, ISCs have been underestimated as 'merely' places where research is tested or science consumed rather than produced. I will argue that on the contrary, just like in the economic system in general, the place of consumption is also where new designs and ideas are produced, not only where production is assessed and decided. Besides, considering that the services on the one hand and science, technology, and entertainment on the other are the engines of the economy, ISCs represent an obvious asset in a global economy. Although research on international conferences has increased lately (e.g. Cutting, 1995; Green, 2008; Drife, 2008; Ngamsom & Beck, 2000; Olsen, 2004), analyses focused on motivations and constraints of attending an ISC and the economics of the event itself rather than a thick analysis of the role of ISCs in the global cultural dimensions and the scientific system in this context. Drife (2008) states that "in the 1980s the internet was expected to replace meetings; in the 1990s electronic conferences were promoted; and last year [2007] a 'Facebook for science' appeared. None of these can replace genuine communication" (p. 1466). I would argue that more than just for communication, an ISC is the place for cosmopolitan production of the self and, as a consequence, the proper realm for scientific production. As Cutting (1995) puts it concisely: "In essence, you should travel, see places, meet people, make friends, and identify one or two ideas that you can apply in your own work or research" (p. 249).

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1 Paulo Castro Seixas is an associate professor of sociology at the School of Social and Political Sciences (ISCSP) of the University of Lisbon, Portugal, and a researcher at the Centre for Administration and Public Policies (CAPP). He researches and works on development (on consultancy) in East Timor as well as on urban studies in a transnational context. Contact: pseixas@iscsp.ulisboa.pt

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doi 10.4232/10.ASEAS-6.2-10

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In 2007, I presented a paper at the EuroSEAS (European Association for South East Asian Studies) Conference in Naples and subsequently became the representative of the Iberian Peninsula on the Board until 2010. The intention was to boost South-East Asian Studies in Portugal and Spain. In September 2010, I coordinated a panel on East Timor at the EuroSEAS Conference in Gothenburg and – as secretary of the Board – accepted to organize the 2013 EuroSEAS Conference in Lisbon, Portugal. At the time, the political and economic situation in Europe and Portugal in particular was already difficult due to the 2008 financial crisis in the US, the Greek default and bailout program (May 2010), and the Irish and Portuguese default crisis and bailout programs (in November 2010 and May 2011). This context created considerable constraints and affected organizational decisions in the following years.

EuroSEAS conferences are events of international relevance and EuroSEAS itself is an institution with members and representatives from all continents. Though this is very interesting, it also creates several problems. In 2010, as the new secretary, I became aware that EuroSEAS was a formal organization from the Netherlands with a president from Germany, a secretary from Portugal, and a board to be managed from several countries. Besides, the webpage was hosted and managed by Italy and the logistics of the latter ISC were with the Swedish team in Gothenburg. Last but not least (moreover in a crisis context), the management of a EuroSEAS conference was expected to be a task of the university/faculty which hosts the secretariat. With this in mind, three years was the right amount of time to prepare an ISC: The first year may be spent trying to acknowledge the situation, the second preparing, and the third being alarmed . . .

The new board of EuroSEAS had four meetings being held in Germany and in Portugal. The members of the organizing committee of the Conference (myself with the new representatives for the Iberian Peninsula, Rui Feijó from CES-University of Coimbra and Lúcio Sousa from Aberta University) divided among themselves the organization and management of the meetings within a tight schedule of lecturing and research. Although inevitable problems arose to set up those meetings, the good moments created in a complex mix of intense shared international decision-making and tourism overcame the time spending and concerns with logistics and costs. In an international period of economic contraction, the board had difficulties supporting their own travels and conference sponsors were hard to find.

The turning point was the Porto meeting in June 2012 during the summer solstice that is commemorated with the Saint John's street party in Porto. The harsh conditions presented by the Portuguese public administration made it difficult to manage an ISC through a public institution. Thus, besides this option, I presented to the Board two others: a) choosing a company to manage the conference or b) to create an association for that purpose, assuming the managing of the ISC ourselves. Bearing in mind three briefings with companies that organize ISCs, the experience as participant in an ISC organized by companies and my own experience as an NGO manager, my option was quite obvious from the beginning: A company was a good choice if I preferred to save myself some work, but an association would fit the responsibilities of boosting South-East Asian Studies as it was originally intended to. So, in late 2012, AIA-SEAS was formalized resulting from a network of Portuguese and Brazilian colleagues, since it was hard to find Spanish colleagues. The idea of a conference organized for colleagues by colleagues also influenced our decision. This is a choice that confronts both the expropriation of the production of ISCs when outsourced and the impersonal conference setting that is often created by external entities.

In the beginning of 2013, we were already in the alarm level period. The Call for Panels ran between September 2012 and January 2013 and the Call for Papers and registration had to begin. Decisions had to be made: An accountant was needed, the webpage should be improved to have a proper registration office, an institutional account was a pressing need, and payment by credit card was a goal. All those bits and pieces were done but not without problems. Despite all the constraints, the Call for Panels and the Call for Papers were a success with around 100 and 650 proposals, respectively. Nevertheless, some problems emerged with the registration office and with the credit card payment; confirming that economic globalization implies always cultural differences, the conference reached its momentum. The momentum includes the two months prior to the conference: The frantic period in which everything must be ready (complete online program, the abstract booklet to be published, the keynote speakers and their logistics arranged, the accommodation of the grantees, the conference lunches and coffee breaks, the conference dinner, the social program, the publishers and their needs, the local secretariat of students and their role, the attention to the proper contacts with institutions: faculty, embassies, research centers, and so forth).

Finally, after more than 3,000 emails, the 7th EuroSEAS Conference took place at the School of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Lisbon from 2 to 5 July 2013. We had 77 panels with around 450 participants from Europe, the US, Asia, and Australia. Regarding publishers, NIAS, GIGA, Cambridge University Press, Routledge, ISEAS, and BRILL were present. The conference was a success as many mentioned, and several colleagues fell in love with Lisbon. For me, it was a fantastic challenge and the conference momentum was a non-stop week of work from 1 July (when the local secretariat prepared the conference bags) to 6 July (the social program to Sintra and Cascais).

Besides logistics, it is relevant to highlight some ideas and trends of the conference. The role of the conference organizer does not lend itself to an in-depth analysis, but I may leave some hints. On one side, area studies have been at stake already for some time, but the old empires are trying to keep their symbolic territories in hand; on the other, the traditional strong theoretical positions seem to confront both a lighter/diplomatic way of doing science or/and the challenge of a wider comparison in a perspective of global interdisciplinary studies. Thus, the critical perspective will always be a must. The late nineteenth century anthropological idea of cultural circles constituted a scientific asset both to support comparison and to establish its limitation within a certain area. This idea supported the colonial gaze, was reified in museum representation cultures and is still part of today's geopolitics. Meanwhile, a mix of cultures (hybridism) basically through the imbalanced transnational commoditization of culture is also a way to describe contemporary situation. As a consequence, area studies conferences are still the confrontation of two generations. Besides, science plays an undeniable part in the process of cultural commoditization. Thus, to say the least, sometimes it seems that we are facing blurred boundaries between critical ironies in a scientific analytical context and selling cultural gadgets for scientific entertainment.

I have no doubt that an ISC is a place to present research, many times even hosting the first public presentation of preliminary work, which is being prepared for publication. But an ISC is much more than that. An ISC is a place to play and display the role of a researcher among peers, even before the senior ones whom we had only had been in contact with through reading their books. Besides, these contacts are expected as possibilities to pave the way for new publications either in journals or

books. These gatherings in informal international settings are also the proper places to reinforce old teams/reputations and to create new ones as well as to initiate new international projects. Finally, publishers want to be present and even sponsor big conferences because they want to be 'just in time' spotters and co-producers of all these dynamics.

To conclude these notes on a conference, I would say that an ISC is in fact science on the move and in the making involving (1) universities/cities/countries, (2) research teams and theoretical perspectives, and (3) scientific and personal reputations. The conscience of the economic relevance of international conferences creates two paradoxical trends: a) the continuous scattering creation of new ISCs as a way to promote science production poles and b) continuous attempts to captivate, even to institutionalize in a certain locale, the ISC which already represents a brand. Thus, ISCs are indeed producing realms of science and new indicators for the continuous negotiation between geopolitical and economic center and periphery in science production.

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Research on South-East Asia in Austria: The Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Vienna

Alfred Gerstl[1]

The Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Vienna was established on January 1, 2000 by merging the Institutes of Sinology and Japanese Studies. Initially comprising the pillars Sinology, Japanese, and Korean Studies, the fourth pillar, the Chair of East Asian Economy and Society (EcoS), was established in 2007. The first Head of Department was Erich Pilz (2000–2001), followed by Sepp Linhart (2001–2012), both leading researchers on Japanese history, society, and culture. The current head is Rüdiger Frank (since 2012), specialized in East Asian politics and economics, in general and North Korea, in particular. In addition to six professors, the Department of East Asian Studies currently has a staff of about 50 permanent and temporary researchers and lecturers (Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften der Universität Wien, 2001–2013).

In addition to language courses, the disciplines Sinology, Japanology, and Koreanology offer strong social and cultural science studies. EcoS focuses on current political, security, and economic relations in East Asia and the respective national political and economic systems. The Department of East Asian Studies applies a broad area definition of East Asia by incorporating North-East and South-East Asia. In this context, South-East Asia, in particular the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in promoting East Asian regionalism, has always figured prominently in the respective EcoS courses. Yet, in order to demonstrate the growing international relevance of this region, it has been a strategic aim of Rüdiger Frank to institutionalize South-East Asian Studies at the EcoS Department to complement its range. In October 2013, the position of a university assistant at the postdoc level was created. Two

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1 Alfred Gerstl is a political scientist and currently postdoc researcher at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Vienna. He was ASEAS editor-in-chief from 2008 to 2010 and focuses on international relations and the political and economic systems in South-East Asia. Contact: alfred.gerstl@univie.ac.at

university assistants (praedoc) and one study assistant, concentrating on North-East Asia, complete the EcoS team. Overall, the teaching and research program at EcoS reflect the interconnectedness of North-East and South-East Asia. For instance, two key areas of research are state socialist systems (notably China, North Korea, and Vietnam) and climate change, the environment, and energy.

Since October 2008, EcoS offers a four-semester Master of Arts (MA) as well as a PhD course on East Asian Economy and Society. Since an adaption of the curriculum in 2011, the MA is offered exclusively in English, and South-East Asia features explicitly as an area of research in addition to the North-East Asian countries China, Japan, and the two Koreas. The Master course promotes the inter- and transdisciplinary comparative analysis of international relations and of domestic politics and economics in the region in the twentieth and twenty-first century. In their Master thesis, students have to compare specific topics in at least two countries, either in North- or South-East Asia. The program provides students with a broad range of possibilities to specialize in topics of their choice. In addition, students have to acquire basic language skills in an East Asian language, particularly in Chinese, Japanese, or Korean. An admission requirement is a Bachelor or an equivalent college or university degree; eligible majors are, for instance, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese Studies, (International) Business Studies, or Political Science. The five core modules are Contemporary East Asian Language, East Asian Economy, East Asian Politics, East Asian Society and Research, and Master's Colloquium.

Due to the popularity of the program in other European but also East Asian countries, student numbers have far exceeded the initial planning for 25 students per study year (217 Master students in the summer term 2013). Due to the shortage in staff, room, and teaching resources, the rectorate decided to introduce admission requirements, starting with winter term 2013/2014. Since then, students have to apply for admission to EcoS; inter alia, they have to submit a demanding letter of motivation, detailing their research interests and goals after graduation. Each study year, 25 students from all over the world are admitted to the Masters program, guaranteeing an optimum staff-student ratio.

The Department's South-East Asia Focus

Research on South-East Asia at the chair of East Asian Economy and Society concentrates on three main areas. The aim is to implement these research fields on multiple levels, notably promoting Master and PhD theses and research projects. The first field is ASEAN's centrality in shaping East Asian regionalism through trans-regional institutions such as ASEAN plus three, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit, applying neorealist, neoliberal as well as constructivist approaches. Both the Association's internal integration process, notably the ASEAN Community (to be established in 2015), and ASEAN's relations with the neighboring North-East Asian countries are analyzed. Thereby, the role of institutions as well as of formal and informal norms and values are examined with regard to their potential to promote collaboration in the region.

A second area of research are the territorial disputes in the South China Sea which is, due to its vast oil and gas resources and global importance as a shipping lane, a regional flashpoint. Directly involved in this highly complex judicial, political, and economic conflict are China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, indirectly the United States, Japan, Russia, and India. In addition to the arguments and concrete policies of the claimant states, a special interest rests on the reasons for ASEAN's low profile in this conflict.

The third focus is the gradually changing notion of security in South-East Asia from a traditional state-centric towards a human security perspective. Previous research was conducted by EcoS staff on the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and climate change and counter-terrorism policies. It has shown that despite a human security rhetoric with reference to the endangered security of individual citizens – and a more prominent role of national and transnational human rights NGOs – the South-East Asian governments still prioritize state and regime security (Gerstl, 2010; Gerstl, 2012; Gerstl & Helmke, 2012).

Out of the 20 Master theses submitted in 2011/2012, five explicitly dealt with South-East Asian topics in a comparative or transnational perspective: democracy in South-East Asia; social and welfare states in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan; foreign corporate entrepreneurship in China and Vietnam; tourism management strategies in China and Thailand; Vietnam, the Philippines, and China in the

South China Sea conflict. As North- and South-East Asia's economic importance for Europe is steadily growing, graduates who have obtained strong analytical and methodological skills during the program find jobs in private business or banks, others pursue an academic career.

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Tom Plate *(2011).*
Conversations with Thaksin – From Exile to Deliverance:
Thailand's Populist Tycoon Tells His Story.
Singapore: Marshall Cavendish. ISBN 978-981-4328685. 249 pages.

Nearly seven years after the coup that ousted Thailand's Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a reincarnation of the Thai Rak Thai party, the Phuea Thai party, came to power once again. The astounding landslide victory in the 2011 general election saw the country's first female Prime Minister, Thaksin's younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra. With campaign posters saturating the landscape and displaying slogans such as "Thaksin thinks, Phuea Thai acts", as well as periodic reports of Skype cabinet meetings with Thaksin orchestrating party politics as mediation in policy, there is no doubt that the ex-Prime Minister is very much involved in Thai politics, albeit from afar. Exile, it seems, has not curbed the passions and political relevance that are critical to the former Prime Minister's survival, return, and possible political rehabilitation. As Thaksin is currently in self-exile in protest against a politically influenced and biased judicial system and has multiple criminal cases pending, the exigencies surrounding his sister and vanguard political party have become central to dealing with the allegedly compromised judiciary.

Tom Plate's book is based on interviews garnered over a week's time, which allowed the academic and ex-journalist unprecedented access to the *man* (Thaksin) in Dubai. A recurring dichotomy becomes evident in this book: Is Thaksin the unrepentant democrat or chastened autocrat? The ex-Prime Minister often reveals himself to be an unfairly judged and accosted supporter of the poor or "the people" in general. Simultaneously, he acknowledges serious mishandling of critical domestic issues such as the Southern Muslim insurgency and, most importantly, his gross misjudgment of antagonisms with the palace, which may have led to his current exile. Nonetheless, this book is interesting in terms of how the author approaches the rise of Thaksin in functional order, his exile, and alleged indirect comeback via

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doi 10.4232/10.ASEAS-6.2-12

his younger sister. The author attempts to draw Thaksin into the critical realm of his deposition and investigates who was really behind his ouster by referring to the royal institution and his confrontations with privy councilor Prem Tinsulanonda, who is considered one of the most influential and instrumental figures in the palace political complex (p. 145). Confrontation with the royal institution is perhaps the most crucial aspect that the author addresses, albeit in a conservative manner. The reasons for the ambiguity in addressing the royal institution are of course Thailand's current polarized political climate and legal redress to Article 112 of the criminal code, better known as the lèse-majesté law. This highlights the still simmering undertones of Thai political economy where the extremely popular ex-Prime Minister stands, due to his electoral success, in direct confrontation with Thailand's most revered figure and its institutional machinery.

The author also provides the lay reader with a basic understanding of Thaksin, the man and politician, using a historical/journalistic approach to lend substance to the content. The author's elaboration on personal notes of what it is like to be in exile, traveling as a luxurious vagabond, and the very personal politics of the region are of interest regarding the conception of Thai politics since Thaksin's exile. Personal politics are demonstrated in Thaksin's close relationship with Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, and the very real friction and conflict this caused, not to mention the domestic criminal proceedings, which determine his continued absence. Plate's book depicts Thaksin as a political chameleon, but nonetheless focuses on his democratic credentials and support for Thailand's forgotten millions whom he gave a voice through policy.

However, the volume lacks depth in terms of critical issues such as the role of the monarchy, which is self-evident in light of Wikileaks revelations concerning the palace's role in the 2006 coup as well as Thaksin's alleged abuse of power and nepotism. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the author simply could not get further information out of Thaksin or if he just took his words at face value throughout the text. This point continues throughout the book, as Thaksin's story is told one-sidedly, with a mere depiction, not a discussion, of alternative views. The volume does, however, provide readers with a glimpse into the political mind of what Newsweek magazine considered the potential future leader of Asia in 2004. The vindictive nature of contemporary Thai politics and the lack of legitimacy of court decisions and

diplomatic initiatives against Thaksin are brought forth very assertively. In hindsight, it becomes apparent that ultimate vindication may very well await Thaksin in the future if events continue to unfold.

Using a clear journalistic style, this book is easily accessible to readers, and thereby avails itself to people with an interest in South-East Asian politics and former strong-men of the region such as Lee Kwan Yuu and Mahathir Mohammad. What remains to be seen in the final chapter is whether Thaksin's sister Yingluck can capitalize on her brother's legacy and continue it, eventually bringing him home and extending the nascent democracy in Thailand without antagonizing conservative forces.

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WILLIAM J. JONES

Mahidol University International College, Thailand

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Amelia Fauzia (2013).
Faith and the State: A History of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia.
Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. ISBN: 9789004233973. i-xxxi + 346 pages.

Amelia Fauzia's thorough analysis of Islamic philanthropic practices in Indonesia from the early decades of Islam in the archipelago to today is more than a timely review of a tradition that both perpetuates and influences state-civil society relations. Given their historical continuity, cultural tenacity, and social, political, and economic relevance, these practices – also referred to as *zakat* (almsgiving), *sedekah* (donation, giving), and *waqf* (religious endowment) – play a vital role in Indonesian society today.

As a lecturer of Islamic History and Civilization at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta and holding a PhD in Indonesian history and Islamic studies from the University of Melbourne, Amelia has been working on the topic of Islamic philanthropy since 2002, when she engaged with a global research project on "Philanthropy for Social Justice in Muslim Societies". This project brought together researchers from six different countries under her leadership, supported by a team of experts at the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) in Jakarta (including Chaider S. Bamualim and Irfan Abubakar, with whom she co-edited *Filantropi Islam dan Keadilan Sosial* [Islamic philanthropy and social justice] in 2006). Following several publications on the above-mentioned topics as well as on Islamization, Islamic identity, and civil society, *Faith and the State* is the subsequent publication of her PhD thesis – an extensive review and detailed analysis of the practices of zakat, sedekah, and waqf in Indonesia and their role in shaping the relationship between the state and Muslim civil society. Her central argument is that Islamic philanthropic activities, including the establishment of educational institutions, the provision of community services, or the financial support of community development projects, represent an element of a strong civil society and grow in the face of a weak state (p. 7). Amelia maintains this idea throughout her book without ignoring the complexity of the specific historical, socio-political, and cultural contexts.

Faith and the State deals exclusively with Islamic philanthropic practices in Indonesia and their development from the early centuries of Islamization to the more recent events of the post-New Order regime. It looks at the social and cultural consolidation of different forms of giving against the background of Islam and at various processes of reformation, (re)organization, and legislation of these practices. Islamic philanthropy is presented as a dynamic and a highly contested space between the private and the public realm, between faith and the state (p. 6). Both a part of civil society (following Kathleen D. McCarthy, author of the *American Creed: Philanthropy and the Rise of Civil Society*) and "an indicator of the state-civil society relationship" (p. 9), philanthropy renders a neat separation between the *private* and *public* as well as between the *state* and *society* hard to achieve. Avoiding structural and conceptual dichotomizations, Amelia indicates how, regardless of the role played by Muslim elites, religious authorities, or the state, Islamic philanthropy will never be fully formalized or regulated, mainly because of its authentic origin in the "altruistic and reciprocal nature of people" (p. xvii) and in the collective awareness and "concern for the welfare of others" (p. 1). And, although Islamic philanthropic activities are every so often used as a tool to communicate advanced ideas of social justice and to promote social change, the majority of philanthropic practices remain mostly traditional and self-contained, performed by Muslims motivated mainly by their faith.

The book is chronologically structured around three major periods in the history of Indonesia. Starting with early Islamization and a pre-modern period of "Muslim monarchs and Islamic kingdoms" (p. 6) from the thirteenth until the nineteenth century (Part One) – a period in which the "state" is present in the set of various political institutions other than today's idea of a modern nation-state – Amelia continues her analysis of philanthropic practices in the subsequent colonial period under the rule of a non-Muslim government that rarely interfered in religious matters (Part Two). Her analysis eventually covers the post-independence, Old and New Order, *Reformasi,* and post-Reformasi periods, all of which reflect a time of political and economic turbulence in the efforts of a Muslim government to establish a secular or, in the sense of *Pancasila*, a "religiously neutral" (p. 12) state (Part Three). Methodologically, the book blends a historical approach with a sociological analysis, drawing upon a variety of sources, such as Islamic authoritative texts (i.e. the Qur'an and the Prophetic tradition), legal texts, and reports as well as oral history and public surveys.

Throughout her book, Amelia illustrates the practices of zakat, sedekah, and waqf as "living traditions that have been dynamically developed by ruler, *'ulama* and society through a 'reading' of . . . fundamental Islamic texts" (p. 31), thus focusing on concrete practices and comprehensive case studies rather than on legal and theological aspects of these institutions. With a strong emphasis on the historical, socio-political, cultural, and religious contexts, the author shows how certain tendencies and aspirations of both the government and religious elites have shaped and continue to shape state-civil society relations and, along these, the form and extent of Muslim philanthropic practices. Despite the lack of data and the gaps in available resources, it is safe to assume that Islamic philanthropic practices entered the Indonesian archipelago along the introduction of Islam and other religious practices, and soon became a sign of generosity and religious piety, particularly among the royal circles (pp. 31-74). A central element in the politics of Islamization, the practice of zakat was soon encouraged and regulated by the ruler as a tax on crops and trade commodities – an instance of "top-down Islamisation" (p. 77) evident during the reign of the Acehnese Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607–1636); the practice of zakat supported both the sultan's legitimacy and the steady influx of Muslim traders to the province of Aceh (pp. 76-94).

A similar orientation towards the state and the formalization and legal regulation of zakat, emerging from a different historical background and in a different socio-political constellation, is the more recent trend towards an Islamic philanthropy reform. This reform strives to bring the state back to the center of zakat collection and thus aims at reviving an Islamic tradition, in which zakat is viewed as "a total economic and social solution" (p. 63). This trend, as well as divergent tendencies to adopt ideas of social justice, religious non-discrimination, and gender equality, based on an interpretative reading of and a contextualized approach towards Islamic authoritative sources, are analyzed in the sixth chapter of the book.

An instance of a stronger orientation towards the Muslim community and civil society is presented in the second part of the book, which focuses on the state-civil society relationship during the colonial period. Under the Dutch colonial government, which rarely interfered in religious and philanthropic matters, both traditional Islamic philanthropic practices in rural areas and modern philanthropic institutions among urban Islamic organizations increased in number, significantly contributing to the development of a strong Islamic identity, which was important during the

later period of independence struggle. A strong concern for the social welfare and the "needs of the poor" (p. 141) combined with a firm stance against state corruption and the lack of transparency drove zakat management away from the state and into the hands of local voluntary committees. The strong commitment on the part of civil society exposed existing conflicts among various religious groups and organizations, presented in the argument between the two largest Muslim mass organizations in present day Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (p. 157-167). The fact that the basis of their conflict consisted not only in their theoretical orientation and interpretation of the Islamic authoritative sources, but in their contradicting position with regard to the state's support and interference, is yet less observable.

The close study of Islamic philanthropic practices in Indonesia, analyzed in their particular historical, socio-political, and religious contexts, clearly reveals the fundamental tension in the relationship between the state (and its various forms) and civil society (and its various manifestations). Islamic philanthropy is thus not simply an aspect of a strong Muslim civil society, neither an expression of religious piety or social concern, but rather an indicator of the state's presence and role in prevailing socio-political constellations as well as religious ideologies and orientations. *Faith and the State* presents an exceptional historical review and a detailed analysis of Islamic philanthropic practices in Indonesia and thus an excellent starting point for anyone with an interest in the topic of philanthropy in Muslim societies, and particularly in the specific relationship between Islamic philanthropic practices, faith, and the state in South-East Asia. The focus on the institutionalization and legal regulation of the simple *act of giving* provides valuable insights in both state-civil society relations and socio-political and religious ideologies at stake.

Dayana Parvanova
University of Vienna, Austria

Call for Papers

ASEAS

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Imagining Indonesia

Exilic, Diasporic, and Migratory Homeland Utopias and the Power of Longing

This upcoming issue 7(2) of the Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies (ASEAS) will feature a focus on political utopias and homeland imaginaries held by Indonesians at home and abroad. The latter include labor and marriage migrants, overseas students, political exiles, and refugees living outside of their home country. However, being in exile does not always require ultimate departure from the homeland. As people can retreat into an "inner exile", this special issue also takes into account the imaginaries of those who are physically within the boundaries of Indonesia yet in one way or another voluntarily or involuntarily 'exiled' from the rest of society, such as political and religious activists or prisoners. While away from 'home', the 'homeland' shapes the post-migratory life significantly and therefore remains a special point of reference for people's biographies.

Despite modern communication technologies and more affordable transportation options that both allow for regular real-time contact and 'staying in touch' with current developments in Indonesia, homeland imaginaries are shaped to large extends by other, often rather emotive, factors. Indonesian diasporic or exilic populations, like others in the same situation, often opt for cherishing past memories (or traumas) over taking into account current developments, thereby generating 'distorted' homeland views. This said, homeland imaginaries are by no means homogeneous or static; quite to the contrary, they develop over time and they may turn out to be rather fragmented, ambivalent, or outright 'unrealistic' as the 'outside' Indonesians see their homeland in different lights.

Internal and external exiles may delve into memories of their past and might dream of their return and of

brighter futures for Indonesia more generally. Hence, their imaginaries become a multi-facetted canvas for projections of longings for a better tomorrow and of a golden yesteryear. Yet, Indonesians who face the everyday realities in the homeland might not necessarily share these interpretations of the past or the visions for Indonesia's future.

For the special issue, we specifically encourage papers that highlight:

- Gender and class dynamics of utopias
- Transnational dimensions of separatist conflicts and political utopias
- Labor migration and remittances
- Overseas student activism and religious networking
- Marriage migration and gender dynamics
- Cultural representations and folkloristic production of Indonesian artists abroad
- Material expression of homeland longing

Guest Editors: ANTJE MISSBACH & HENRI MYRTTINEN

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SEAS *Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften*
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Einreichungen

Die *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Süd-ostasienwissenschaften (ASEAS)* ist ein Schwerpunktprojekt der *Gesellschaft für Südostasienwissenschaften (SEAS)* in Wien. Die Redaktion lädt etablierte wie auch angehende WissenschafterInnen dazu ein, Forschungsergebnisse und theoretische Abhandlungen zu präsentieren, Fachliteratur zu rezensieren sowie Konferenzberichte und Interviews mit SüdostasienexpertInnen zu veröffentlichen. Als interdisziplinäre Zeitschrift beinhalten die Beiträge historische und/oder aktuelle Analysen kultureller, sozialer, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Fragestellungen.

Veröffentlichte Artikel müssen einen Bezug zu Südostasien aufweisen, sollen aber nicht geographisch auf die Region beschränkt bleiben, sondern können, wie es beispielsweise in der Linguistik, bei Diaspora-Gruppen oder Formen des soziokulturellen Transfers der Fall ist, die räumlichen und politischen Grenzen Südostasiens überschreiten.

Falls Sie einen Beitrag in *ASEAS* publizieren möchten, besuchen Sie bitte unsere Homepage, wo Sie aktuelle CfPs sowie nähere Informationen zu Einreichungen finden.

Submissions

The *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies (ASEAS)* is a core project of the *Society for South-East Asian Studies (SEAS)* in Vienna. The journal's editors invite both established as well as young scholars to present research results and theoretical papers, to review literature or to publish conference reports as well as interviews with experts on South-East Asia. As an interdisciplinary journal, ASEAS covers cultural, social, economic and political aspects of South-East Asia from a historical and/or a contemporary perspective.

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