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FOCUS IMAGINING INDONESIA

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FOCUS IMAGINING INDONESIA

The present ASEAS issue features a focus on political utopias and homeland imaginaries held by Indonesians and, in one case, East Timorese at home and abroad. These include labor and marriage migrants, expatriates, overseas students, political exiles, and refugees living outside of their home country. Since being in exile does not always require an actual departure from the homeland, this special issue also takes into account the imaginaries of those who are physically within the boundaries of Indonesia, yet in one way or another voluntarily or involuntarily 'exiled' from the rest of society. 'Imagining Indonesia' aims to explore the multiple readings of longings for a better life that are projected both on Indonesia's past and future. The papers deal with the romanticization and transfiguration of the Indonesian homeland without ignoring the darker sides of internal and external exile, migration, and long-distance politics.

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INHALT ∼ CONTENTS

Imagining Indonesia From Afar: Exploratory Thoughts on Utopian, Nostalgic, and Embodied Longing for the Homeland

Antje Missbach & Henri Myrttinen

▸ Missbach, A., & Myrttinen, H. (2014). Imagining Indonesia from afar: Exploratory thoughts on utopian, nostalgic, and embodied longing for the homeland. *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7*(2), 141-146.

Unlike India and China, which have the largest diaspora worldwide and have been nurturing their connections with their multi-generational overseas population for a long time, Indonesia has only recently started to pay more attention to fellow Indonesians outside of the homeland. In August 2013, Wahid Supriyadi, the head of the Diaspora Desk at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, welcomed more than three thousand diasporans at a three-day conference in Jakarta. This event served to discuss issues, such as immigration and citizenship, business and investment, education, culture and youth affairs, and other matters of interest to the Indonesian diaspora (Soemartopo, 2012). Wahid Supriyadi, the main organizer of the event, expressed his hope stating that "the fundamental objective of engaging with the diaspora was to find ways for Indonesia to benefit". In other words, Indonesians overseas "could potentially be courted to invest in the country and contribute to its development" ("3,000 to Attend Sunday's", 2013). Economic aspirations aside, how do 'ordinary' Indonesian diasporans, outside of such business-minded organizations, perceive their 'homeland'? What non-economic imaginations of and "homeland anchorages" (Meel, 2011) for Indonesia do they have in their minds and hearts? In order to explore in more depth what Indonesians located overseas aspire to for their homeland beyond economic progress and how they imagine a 'better' Indonesia for the future, which includes their own participation and contributions while living outside the *tanah air* (homeland), this special issue has compiled the work of five authors who have critically examined this question within the realms of their specific disciplines.

Currently, between 1.8 and 6 million Indonesians are living and working overseas (Muhidin & Utomo, 2013), first and foremost in Malaysia and the Middle East. With most Indonesians just having recently established overseas communities, there are, however, also some rather established Indonesian diaspora communities (Martinez & Vickers, 2012; Meel, 2011). While away from 'home', the 'homeland' shapes the post-migratory life significantly and therefore remains a special point of reference for people's biographies. Many overseas Indonesians choose to uphold their connections with people and institutions in Indonesia due to modern communication technologies and more affordable transportation, both of which allow for more regular real-time contact (Trupp & Dolezal, 2013). Despite these opportunities for 'staying in touch' with current developments in Indonesia, homeland imaginaries are shaped to a large extent by

other, often rather emotive, factors. As Peter Meel (2011) reminds us, the "homeland anchorage" includes in particular language, religion, cuisine, etiquette, art, dance, literature, and music. Whether homeland is primarily understood as the country of origin or simply the country that ancestors hailed from, remains open for debate.

Like other diasporic or exilic populations, Indonesians overseas can choose from all the homeland information available to them and selectively decide on what to consume and what to ignore. In fact, they can easily opt for cherishing past memories (or traumas) over taking into account developments and changes and thereby generate distorted homeland views and 'time warps' (Missbach, 2011). Depending on whether the emigration or the departure from home was voluntary or not and whether the stay overseas was meant to be short-term, mid-term, long-term, or even permanent, people create and recreate their collective and individual homeland relations over time in multiple ways, for example, through overseas student organizations, diasporic business collectives, or cultural and folkloristic associations.

While away from Indonesia, people might delve in memories of their past, or they might dream of their return and brighter futures for Indonesia more generally. In fact, current research shows that Indonesia serves overseas Indonesians as a multi-faceted canvas for projections of longings for a better tomorrow and of a golden yesteryear (Chauvel, 2009; Dragojlovic, 2010, 2012; Hearman, 2010; Hill, 2010; Missbach, 2011; Steijlen, 2010; Van Amersfoort, 2004). While such visions for Indonesia's future and the diasporic interpretations of its past might not necessarily be shared by those living in the everyday reality in Indonesia, for the Indonesians overseas who project them onto their *tanah air*, they turn out to be powerful means for their political agitation, long-distance politics, transnational solidarity/activism, fund-raising, and even for shaping Indonesia's reputation in the host country. Homeland imaginaries are by no means homogeneous or static; instead they develop over time and often, when coming under closer scrutiny, they may turn out to be rather fragmented, ambivalent, or even outright 'unrealistic' as specific actors see the Indonesian homeland in a different light.

To an extent, the same can be said about the social and political and even religious imaginaries employed by those Indonesian actors who remain in the country but have 'exiled' themselves either voluntarily or involuntarily from mainstream society. They project their imaginings of a better society onto a societal canvas they see as being currently imperfect, be it due to religious considerations in the case of Salafis (Chaplin in this issue), political objections in the case of Papuan independence activists (Myrttinen, 2011, forthcoming), or, in a past era, socio-political concerns in the case of the Indonesian Communist Party (interview with Hearman, Missbach in this issue).

Utopias generally conceptualize social orders and political systems for times yet to come; in some cases, they also look back at glorified pasts. Thus, in both cases, they depict responses of current dissatisfaction with political regimes, state orders, and social frameworks. Utopias serve their inventors to excogitate alternatives deemed to improve the destinies of many. However, attempts to implement social or political utopias are often characterized by a tragedy of 'unrealizability' or unfeasibility (*Machbarkeit* as defined by Norbert Elias in Voßkamp, 2009), or in the worst case, they achieve the opposite of what was intended. Despite the fact that many utopias

might never enter the phase of implementation at all, it is still worthwhile to examine the political contents of these utopias as they also represent a critique of contemporary societal conditions.

When examining the state of the art on the politically active Indonesian diaspora – from Acehnese, Papuans, and Moluccans to overseas student associations – it appears that antagonism against the Indonesian state and its government is a decisive element of diaspora politics (Ali, 2013; Van Amersfoort, 2004, p. 161). Scholarship on political diasporas often ignores more subtle forms of socio-cultural politics and activism. By not limiting our gaze to more or less established diasporic groups with internet presence and regular media outlets, this special issue seeks to also include less formalized and temporary group activities of Indonesians overseas that complement the already existing assemblies of Indonesian homeland narratives and imaginaries.

The special issue aims to explore the multiple readings of longings for a better life that are projected both on Indonesia's past and/or future. The papers deal with the romanticization and transfiguration of the Indonesian homeland without ignoring the darker sides of internal and external exile, migration, and long-distance politics. In particular, the papers critically reflect on the construction and perceptions of 'homeland' and 'homing', the creating of transnational political links and activism, as well as the significance of diasporic groups and their influence in Indonesia. The contributions examine in detail political utopias and homeland imaginaries held by Indonesians and, in one case, East Timorese at home and abroad. These include labor migrants (Hertzman), expatriates, marriage migrants (Utomo), overseas students (Hasyim), political exiles, and refugees (Askland). Since being in exile does not always require an actual departure from the homeland, as people can retreat into an 'inner exile', this special issue also takes into account the imaginaries of those who are physically within the boundaries of Indonesia, yet in one way or another voluntarily or involuntarily 'exiled' from the rest of society, such as Salafi activists (Chaplin) or political prisoners (Hearman).

In her contribution, Emily Hertzman examines the multiple ways in which ethnic Hakka Chinese Indonesian migrants to Southeast and East Asia navigate their lives abroad while maintaining deep emotional ties to and (re-)imagining their area of origin, Singkawang, in West Kalimantan. Ariane Utomo similarly looks at Indonesians living abroad for extended periods of time and explores how Indonesian mothers in the Australian capital of Canberra use language schooling for their children as a way to maintain their own ties to Indonesia, but also build transnational relations for their children. On a more political note, Syafiq Hasyim investigates the history of Indonesian student activism in Berlin over the years and the struggle both for a more democratic and a more pious Indonesia. In terms of examining diaspora communities, Hedda Askland's contribution might seem to be an outlier at first sight since it examines changing perceptions of exile East Timorese in Australia of their native country. The link to Indonesia here, however, is a historical one, as most of the exiles had fled Indonesian occupation. The remaining contributions – a paper by Chris Chaplin and an interview with Vannessa Hearman – examine re-imaginings of Indonesia from *within* the country by Indonesians who are either voluntarily (in the case of Chaplin, Salafis) or involuntarily (in the case of Hearman's study of letters of the political prisoner Gatot Lestario) distanced from mainstream society.

The papers in this special issue thus pay attention to individual homeland conceptions among Indonesians and East Timorese overseas but more so, they are interested in collective narratives, imaginaries, and interpretations as well as the more practical expressions resulting therefrom. The contributions follow interdisciplinary approaches and are situated at the intersections of anthropology, political science, history, as well as migration and diaspora studies. They give fascinating insights into the dynamic meanings attached by different Indonesians and East Timorese to their homelands and how these imaginings, although they might in part be at odds with the imaginings of the majority of the population, act as parts and fragments which add up to the mosaic that is Indonesian society.

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Returning to the *Kampung Halaman*: Limitations of Cosmopolitan Transnational Aspirations Among Hakka Chinese Indonesians Overseas

Emily Hertzman

▸ Hertzman, E. (2014). Returning to the *kampung halaman*: Limitations of cosmopolitan transnational aspirations among Hakka Chinese Indonesians overseas. *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, *7*(2), 147-164.

Migrants originating from Singkawang, West Kalimantan, Indonesia, experience limitations in their ability to engage in host societies overseas despite their hopes and fantasies of becoming cosmopolitan transnational citizens. Marginality, stemming from the lower status associated with being a migrant, as well as forms of parochialism which hinder the ability to adopt a flexible attitude to cultural difference combine and lead to a significant reimagining of those original cosmopolitan fantasies. Essentializing characterizations of "us" versus "them" reveal some of the difficulties of being received in other societies and come to constitute a recuperative discourse in which migrants can preserve a sense of self – as Hakka Chinese Indonesians – when the value of that identity is called into question. In this context, migrants experience practical limitations in translating cosmopolitan fantasies into lived realities. As a response, a romantic nostalgia for the home is constructed, which in turn provides the imaginative resources used for planning a return to the *kampung halaman* (Indonesian: home/home town).

Keywords: Chinese Indonesians; Cosmopolitanism; Home; Marginality; Migration

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Trotz ihrer Hoffnungen und Wunschvorstellungen, transnationale WeltbürgerInnen zu werden, stoßen MigrantInnen aus Singkawang, West Kalimantan, Indonesien, an die Grenzen ihrer Fähigkeiten, beim Versuch an Aufnahmegesellschaften im Ausland teilzunehmen. Marginalität, die auf dem niedrigen Status beruht, der oft mit MigrantInnen assoziiert wird, wird mit Formen von Provinzialismus kombiniert, die das Einnehmen einer flexiblen Einstellung zu kulturellen Unterschieden verhindern und führt zu einer bedeutenden Neuorientierung der ursprünglichen Wunschvorstellungen. Essentialistische Darstellungen von „uns" gegenüber „den anderen" offenbaren manche der Schwierigkeiten, in anderen Gesellschaften aufgenommen zu werden, und bezeichnen einen Diskurs, in dem MigrantInnen das eigene „Ich" bewahren können – als IndonesierInnen Hakka-chinesischer Abstammung –, wenn der Wert dieser Identität in Frage gestellt wird. In diesem Kontext erfahren MigrantInnen praktische Grenzen der Möglichkeiten, ihre kosmopolitischen Wunschvorstellungen in eine gelebte Realität umzusetzen. Daraufhin konstruieren sie eine romantische Sehnsucht nach der Heimat, die wiederum das Vorstellungsvermögen für die Planung der Heimkehr zum *kampung halaman* (Indonesisch: Heimat/Heimatort) unterstützt.

Schlagworte: Heimat; IndonesierInnen chinesischer Herkunft; Kosmopolitismus; Marginalität; Migration

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INTRODUCTION

Hakka Chinese Indonesians from Singkawang, West Kalimantan, Indonesia, move abroad on a large scale for working, studying, and marrying. Many migrants travel with the ambition of eventually attaining a kind of cosmopolitan transnational citizenship exemplified by members of a different class of elite Chinese business people, who act as imaginative role models for young people. These ambitions, despite being vague and seldom supported by financial, educational, social, or logistical backing, nevertheless constitute a powerful motivation for migration. Evidence from long-term, multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork reveals that when these migrants go overseas (to Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, or South Korea, to name a few destinations), they are treated as various kinds of *Others*: as Hakka, as Indonesians, as Southeast Asians, as poor, as rural, or simply as migrants.[1] These labels carry lower status vis-à-vis other groups in the host societies and this negative evaluation occurs despite the fact that these migrants ostensibly share some aspects of the same ethnicity (Chinese) as sizeable parts of these overseas populations. Ambivalent reception abroad impacts migrants' senses of self and compounds other existing limitations they face engaging within the new societies. Initially surprised at feeling alienated, migrants' hopes of actualizing their aspirations of becoming adaptable transnational citizens become significantly undermined.

As a response to the less than favorable reception overseas, migrants begin to construct essentialized characterizations of host populations, which rely heavily on stereotypes (i.e. Singaporeans are arrogant, mainland Chinese are rude, Japanese are authoritarian). Such characterizations are inherently comparative, revealing how the migrants have come to imagine themselves in relation to others. Aspects of both migrants' ambivalent status overseas and their own essentialized portrayals of locals index, among other things, socio-economic differences and dialect group antagonism. In the end, migrants' social marginalization leads to a particular kind of self-portrayal emphasizing the uniqueness, goodness, and integrity of Hakka Chinese Indonesian culture from Singkawang. This paper considers the impact of these "us"-versus-"them" constructs on the self-perception of Singkawang Chinese, and how this self-perception contributes to the schism between hopes and fantasies for transnational engagement, on the one hand, and the vagaries and realities of living overseas, on the other.

1 This study is based on long-term, multi-sited, ethnographic fieldwork conducted primarily in Singkawang, Indonesia, with shorter research trips to Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Taiwan, between 2010 and 2013. The findings are based on in-depth interviews with 60 migrants, combined with a broader range of ethnographic data gathered through informal conversations with friends and family members of migrants as well as participant observation in the field.

SINGKAWANG

Singkawang is a small city in West Kalimantan, which is unique in Indonesia as the only city with a majority Chinese Indonesian[2] population.[3] Hakka, a Chinese dialect, is the main language of the market place and the former mayor, Hassan Karman, was the first ethnically Chinese mayor elected in Indonesia. The Chinese community traces its origins back to multiple groups of overseas Chinese migrants (coolie laborers and pioneers), who came to Borneo from the southeastern coastal provinces of China to mine for gold beginning in the 1740s (Heidhues, 2003; Yuan, 2000). The first generation of these laborers married local indigenous women who adopted their husbands' language, patrilineal and patrilocal family structure, and religious practices, which created subsequent generations that came to constitute the local Chinese community (Heidhues, 2003). Traders, merchants, and entrepreneurs arrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries further diversifying the community socially, economically, and linguistically (Heidhues, 2003). Until today, the Chinese population consists primarily of working class and lower middle class petty merchants, famers, and primary producers, a profile that contributes to both migration practices and cosmopolitan imaginings.

Located three hours by road from the busier provincial capital, Singkawang remains peripheral; lacking a functioning port, airport, or a university it has limited economic prospects. Many houses are not connected to water and electricity out-

2 My usage of the term 'Chinese Indonesians' requires clarification, as there are considerable variations not only in scholarly approaches to ethnicity, but also in the criteria by which people identify themselves and are identified as Chinese Indonesians by others in different areas of Indonesia. In Singkawang, those people whom I shall refer to as Chinese typically and regularly identify their ethnicity or 'tribal-national affiliation' (Indonesian: *etnis*, *suku-bangsa*) as Chinese (*Tionghoa*, *Cina*); they trace their lineage and genealogical descent (*keturunan*), whether by blood or by marriage, to immigrants originally from China; they observe customs and kinship patterns (*adat*) that they trace to these immigrants; and they predominantly speak Hakka (*bahasa Khek*) as their first language. The fact that Chinese Indonesians in Singkawang identify their ethnicity, customs, kinship patterns, and language as not simply "Indonesian" does not in itself differentiate them from other Indonesians as a majority of Indonesians speak a first language other than the national language and observe ethnic customs that are more specifically identified with a sub-ethnic group (e.g. Malay, Dayak, Madura, Sunda, Batak). In Indonesia and particularly in the academic literature about Chinese Indonesians, there has been a tendency to think and talk in terms of two groups, *peranakan* versus *tokok*, the former being more assimilated and hybridized with Indonesian regional languages and cultures and the latter maintaining Chinese language and cultural traditions to a greater extent. I have decided not to use these terms because they are inaccurate in the case of Singkawang where individuals display characteristics of both processes of long-term, multi-generational assimilation and acculturation into Indonesian society, as well as persistence and preservation of Chinese language and traditions. Degrees of assimilation, acculturation, hybridization, as well as cultural perpetuation and persistence are not accurately captured by these two identifiers; to use such terms reifies groups and suggests internal homogeneity, where in fact great individual variety exists. It is now increasingly possible, since *Reformasi*, for individuals as well as communities, to reorient themselves towards China, or Chinese cultural identifications, via processes that greatly complicate the idea and reality of *peranakan* and *tokok* communities. An important example is the recent trend for youth from *peranakan* families in Java to study Mandarin after decades of prohibition and despite the fact that perhaps multiple generations in their family had long since stopped using Mandarin and other Chinese dialects.

3 While the official census does not aggregate the population by ethnicity, estimates based on religious affiliation suggest that the Chinese population is approximately 42 percent of roughly 200,000. The former mayor, Hassan Karmen, in an interview with the author, claims the percentage is over 62 percent and media reports sometimes claim it is as high as 72 percent.

ages; water shortages are a common, almost daily occurrence. Singkawang is a city of shophouses where people from the surrounding rural areas can buy clothing, furniture, household goods, food, and building materials. However, with little production-based economy, and profits from agricultural and forest products benefiting only a small portion of the population (particularly those who have moved to Jakarta), many people are compelled to go overseas for employment and higher education. There is also a perception on the part of the Chinese community in Singkawang (which is often not shared by members of other ethnic groups) that the local economy is not "busy enough" (Indonesian: *tidak cukup ramai/kurang ramai*) to be able to quickly save money to start one's own business.

MIGRANTS FROM SINGKAWANG

Several different kinds of migrations collectively comprise the Chinese mobility complex of Singkawang. There are international students studying primarily in Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, China, Australia, England, and the United States. There are low-wage laborers in Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong, and there are cross-border brides in Hong Kong and Taiwan (and to a much lesser extent Malaysia). There is also considerable temporary and permanent migration to Jakarta and other parts of Java. These three groups of international migrants – students, workers, and brides – (which are not discrete, but frequently overlapping), form the basis of this research. However, there are other individuals involved in international trade, multinational temple networks, and tourism, whose perceptions of "us" and "them" both at home and away also influence the imaginaries of aspiring migrants.[4]

In Singkawang, there is widespread desire to be wealthy and successful through one's own business pursuits. To be able to chart a path through the multiple challenges that constitute Indonesia's struggling economic reality is a commendable achievement, and a frequently recurring subject of city dwellers' 'talk'. The dream of prosperity is by no means limited to Hakka Chinese from Singkawang. In a study of migrant workers in Batam, Johan Lindquist (2009) observes that achieving middle-class status, defined by material wealth and consumerism, has become a broad, nation-wide goal, transcending ethnic groups. However, for Singkawang Chinese, one of the ideal routes of attaining this middle-class goal is to become one's own boss, as opposed to applying for a government sector job, developing a professional career, or working as a wage earner for someone else.[5]

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4 This paper is a subset of a larger dissertation research project, which studied multiple dimensions of mobility within the Hakka Chinese Indonesian community of Singkawang, West Kalimantan, Indonesia. This paper will focus primarily on the experiences of temporary labor migrants and overseas students. While marriage migrants constitute a large subset of the research project, aspects of their experiences differ significantly from those of these other types of migrants and are best analyzed separately.

5 In Singkawang (as elsewhere in Indonesia), there are relatively few ethnically Chinese people working in the civil service. This fact reflects a long-standing discriminatory policy as well as sociological patterns that have been handed down over generations. Increasingly, Chinese are involved in local politics, but mainly as publically elected officials, rather than as civil servants. Throughout Indonesia, there are countless numbers of Chinese Indonesians working as professionals and as wage earners for others. However, in Singkawang, the goal of becoming one's own boss is particularly common as comparison with the working goals of members of other ethnic groups.

Periodically throughout Indonesia's history, the Chinese have been restricted and excluded from professional and government sector jobs, favored and limited to business, managerial and middlemen type roles, particularly under the Dutch colonial regime and then during the post-independence, nationalist governments, including Suharto's New Order (Fasseur, 1994; Reid & Alilunas-Rodgers, 2001; Suryadinata, 2004). Colonial, nationalist, and Suharto era politics and policies have left a powerful legacy (Fasseur, 1994), which continues to play out in the present through a long-standing tendency among ethnic Chinese to mistrust government institutions. This mistrust combines with ideas, passed down over generations, about the inherent values of business ownership, and being able to become one's own boss.

Business ownership, as an ideal, is evident in people's aspirations, in the ways they talk about famous Indonesian businessmen, particularly Liem Sioe Liong, and Phang Jun Phen.[6] These tycoons are people who have been able to translate their financial success into cosmopolitan lifestyles that have all the material and social forms of prestige entailed and required by such status, including multiple passports,[7] a transnational business network, and children studying overseas. At the local and national level, people who have become financially independent based on their own business pursuits are looked up to; they are considered heroes and morally upright community leaders (Indonesian: *tokoh*). They are appreciated for their success, materialized in the form of houses, cars, and businesses, and praised for their burgeoning symbols of cosmopolitanism, such as trips abroad, knowledge of foreign languages, and philanthropic activities.

People like to know these individuals, cultivate connections with them, and emulate their behavior, in the hopes of also becoming successful. The desire to become one's own boss is further reinforced in stories, songs, films, and reflected in widely known idiomatic expressions including "*se se sen li cang co kong*" (Hakka: "even the smallest business is better than working for somebody else"). This aspiration is perpetuated by the plans, hopes, behaviors, and choices of relatives, friends, and neighbors in Singkawang, to the extent that nearly all people pursue the same goal of business ownership. This is a socio-cultural pattern that is well documented (Carney & Dieleman, 2008; McVey, 1992; Weidenbaum, 1996) and it is also the result of businesses being owned and operated by families and passed down to children and grandchildren. Small trade shophouse-type businesses are a common inheritance, including the physical space, business partners, and networks, and the skills and experience needed to run a business.

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6 Liem Sioe Liong (Indonesian name: Sudono Salim) was a businessman and capitalist. Before his death this year, he was one of the richest Chinese Indonesians and one of the richest Southeast Asians in the world. He started life in a small town in Fujian province in China, the son of a farmer and later he immigrated to Indonesia and became involved in the clove trade. He eventually formed the Salim Group, one of the largest holding companies in Indonesia. Similarly, Phang Jun Phen (Indonesian name: Prajogo Pangestu) is a successful Chinese Indonesian businessman. He was a timber tycoon, who owned the Barito Pacific group, which sold timber from Kalimantan during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. He is a Hakka Chinese Indonesian from a poor family in Bengkayang, West Kalimantan.

7 Indonesia does not permit citizens to hold more than one passport, which limits people's possibilities of becoming transnational actors. However, attaining permanent residency overseas, while maintaining an Indonesian passport, is highly sought-after.

However, Singkawang's shophouse, trade-based economy is saturated and people find it increasingly difficult to actualize their aspirations to be successful local business people. The town faces economic involution, not involution indicative of economic growth, but rather suggesting stagnation of the economy. More and more similar types of businesses start, but without the same rate of consumer growth, fueling competition, which forces the bottom line down and diminishes profits. New shops often close shortly after opening due to economic unviability. Population growth in the 1970s and 1980s also put pressure on families, as family businesses could no longer support all members of the subsequent generations. The town's economic saturation and stagnation is widely and frequently discussed, to the extent that young people readily articulate their confusion (Indonesian: *pusing/bingung*; Hakka: *an fun/an hin*) about what sorts of businesses might be viable, even if they had start-up capital to invest. It is in this context that going overseas has emerged as a major alternative to staying in Singkawang and foreign countries are idealized as places of plenty, bountiful in terms of wages, opportunities, and connections.

Going overseas has several different motivations, mostly related to the ultimate goal of becoming one's own boss either locally, nationally, or transnationally, and each of these goals comes with its own set of imaginations of cosmopolitan transnational citizenship and involves taking a different route. First, people work overseas in order to save money so they can return and start a business (despite the prevailing confusion about what businesses might be viable.) Second, people study abroad (while also working part-time) hoping to enter into a different labor market, or be able to enter into a more professional work force overseas. Such individuals usually choose to study accounting, economics, finance, commerce, and business management, as well as English and Mandarin, which are courses of study that they imagine can be translated into careers in international centers of business and finance like Hong Kong, Singapore, and New York. Third, people go overseas to make connections, which they hope will lead to opportunities later. Thus, young people actively try to be taken under the guidance of an uncle, a wealthier or more successful friend, relative or established boss knowing that, in the short term, this will provide an income and work experience, and, more importantly, in the long term, could provide the capital and connections needed to become one's own boss in the same or an adjacent industry, or in a transnational part of an existing business.

It is primarily individuals from families of the property-owning class (who can afford to attend foreign universities) who explicitly entertain the idea of translating their (often newly acquired) prosperity into forms of cosmopolitan transnational citizenship. However, it would be wrong to assume that it is only members of that class who do so. Labor migrants also fantasize about how their work experiences overseas may lead to richer, more glamorous, worldly, and prosperous lives. This resembles what Appadurai theorizes as 'cosmopolitanism from below', or "the urge to expand one's current horizons of self and cultural identity and a wish to connect with a wider world … a variety of cosmopolitanism that begins close to home and builds on the practices of the local, the everyday and the familiar" (Appadurai, 2011).

COSMOPOLITAN DREAMS

Susanto lives with his sister in a two-story shophouse. By day, they work in the family bakery downstairs, and by night, they sleep together in a single bedroom upstairs. The bakery is small, but busy and well located in the center of the city and although Susanto's parents only received an elementary school education, they have managed to send both him and his sister to university in Malaysia.

The first time I met Susanto, he was 17 years old and about to graduate from high school. I asked him what he wanted to do after graduation and whether he would take over the family business. He replied quickly and confidently, "I plan to be an international businessman. I will not continue to run the bakery. I want my own business, with branches in many countries around the world. I want to live in a mansion and drive a Mercedes", he announced. "What will this business be", I asked him. "Do you have any ideas yet?" "No, not yet", he replied. "I have to go to business school first."

It is now two years later and Susanto is studying business management overseas. He speaks fluent English, Mandarin, Indonesian, and Hakka and aspires to learn even more languages. He is of a small minority of young people from families slightly wealthier than the average. However, his tuition and expenses abroad place a significant financial strain on the family, and Susanto's living arrangement in Malaysia is substantially less luxurious than he originally imagined. Whereas he thought that he would be able to rent a single detached two-story house in the city and live with a group of friends who would each drive their own car to school, the reality is significantly different. When I met him in Kuala Lumpur, he was sharing a small single room with only one bed with another male student from Indonesia in a shared apartment near the campus. He could not afford to eat in the modern food courts boasting Western foods, but instead was limited to 'economy rice' to keep to his daily budget.

The subject of Susanto's fantasy is an international businessman made in the image of an elite overseas Chinese transnational akin to the kind of subjects that Aihwa Ong and others have studied (Ley, 2010; Ong, 1999; Ong & Nonini, 1997). This is a wealthy, well-connected cosmopolitan, who is adorned with symbols that both constitute and communicate that identity: a transnational business network, multiple houses in multiple countries, multiple passports, luxury cars, Rolex watches, expensive brand-name clothing and jewelry, hobbies, and philanthropic pursuits. While it is not difficult to understand the allure of the socio-economic status of this kind of individual, particularly for poorer, or lower middle-class individuals, the fantasy does not consist merely of the material conditions of wealth alone; there are also several immaterial qualities involved in this fantasy, which have a role in people's imaginings and aspirations, things which guide, more than other factors, the trajectories of their lives and motivate new forms of mobility.

Material symbols of wealth and status are alluring and powerful because of the kinds of social and cultural capital that go along with them, and make them possible (Strassler, 2008); being able to travel, being accepted and taken seriously in contexts that are not one's home, being able to negotiate multiple levels and kinds of difference with ease, and being able to transcend that which is local. These are qualities that scholars such as Hannerz (1990) identify in theorizations of cosmopolitanism.

Hannerz (1990) portrays the cosmopolitan as a figure who is flexible, and adaptable, open to a plurality of cultures and demonstrates a willingness to engage in new and multiple cultural forms. Likewise, Appadurai explains that cosmopolitanism contains "a certain cultivated knowledge of the world beyond one's immediate horizons … the product of deliberate activities associated with literacy, the freedom to travel, and the luxury of expanding the boundaries of one's own self by expanding its experiences" (Appadurai, 2011). Salzar (2010) shows how people can use knowledge of the world beyond Indonesia to cultivate cosmopolitan selves without even traveling abroad, an observation which illustrates the role of the imagination (Appadurai, 1996) in accumulating symbolic capital.

Hakka from Singkawang, despite forms of marginality in Indonesia, are nonetheless powerfully influenced by images and ideas of cosmopolitanism circulating in the media. Overseas Chinese transnationalism, of the sort exemplified by studies of Hong Kong business elites (Ley, 2010; Ong, 1997) as well as the image of 'rising China' have implications for Chinese communities overseas, including Singkawang, where by "imagining oneself as part of a globally significant, transnational Chinese diasporic community" (Dawis, 2009, p. 35) one can find, or at least imagine, a kind of symbolic inclusion (Ang, 2001) and/or a form of cosmopolitanism that may be lacking at home. In these images and imaginings, people also find a model for the kinds of economic and professional success, as well as lifestyles that constitute the middle-class dream life (Lindquist, 2009). Individuals actively pay attention to and position themselves in relation to these images and ideas about rising China and overseas Chinese transnationalism as part of their identification practices (Dawis, 2009). However, when people from Singkawang try to transform these imaginings into realities, when they attempt to self-make themselves into the kind of successful transnational subjects of their fantasies, a disconnect appears between what is imaginatively possible and what is practically possible given their idiosyncratic social, cultural, economic, and geographical location. What emerges from this disconnect is a complicated set of behaviors, experiences, and adaptations that account for the realities of people's lives and not simply their imaginings.

Fantasies of becoming elite cosmopolitan transnational subjects are practically limited by an inability to develop the flexibility and willingness to engage with a plurality of cultures. Partially, this inflexibility is a response to conditions of marginality overseas and partially, it stems from inherent limitations and lack of experience. As I will show below, the lack of willingness to develop the flexibility needed to engage in new societies is best viewed as a coping strategy that helps to deal with cultural difference and allows individuals to preserve a sense of self and self-worth under conditions in which that worth is called into question by majority/minority politics. The practice of making judgments, both negative and positive, is also a way of performing one's discernibility.

FOOD

Once overseas, and upon returning, imaginings about the allure of foreign places have started to transform into complaints, dislikes, and ambivalences. One of the main ways this is expressed is through appraisals of food. Singkawang people com-

miserate together by talking about food and the difficulty of finding food to suit their tastes overseas. They miss food from home and talk incessantly about the unique flavors and ingredients from Singkawang. A desire for food from home is an axiomatic experience among migrants internationally and has resulted in networks of restaurants, shops, and super markets catering to the tastes of specific ethnic communities (Quayson & Daswani 2013). What is striking, in this case, is the fact that people describe the food overseas not only as not delicious, but that, in fact, it cannot be eaten (Hakka: *sit ng gan*). Talk about food reveals both implicit and explicit comparisons between "us" and "them". Whereas our food is delicious (and, therefore, superior), their food is difficult to eat (and, therefore, suspect). The difficulty to find suitable food both contributes to and can be seen as a manifestation of other kinds of barriers to engaging with and integrating in new societies.

Alang is a middle-aged mother of four children. She is energetic, independent, and loves to travel and she has been on tours to Europe, Asia, and America. She and her husband have prospered economically in Singkawang via several entrepreneurial pursuits, including a garage, land speculation, bird's nest cultivation, and stock investments. They live in the center of the city, own a large house and a car and have enough money to send their children overseas to Australia and Singapore to study. Alang prides herself on having exotic foreign things such as red wine bought in France and cheese bought in the Netherlands. However, despite owning these, she has not developed a taste for them nor does she want to. They are simply symbols of her burgeoning cosmopolitanism.

I had the opportunity to meet up with Alang in Taipei, while she was visiting a relative. We walked around for hours visiting tourist sites, shopping, and gossiping about Singkawang. When it was time to find dinner, I took her to a popular night market, where she and her relative began a lengthy process of inspecting all of the food options, sizing up each restaurant and food stall, peering into the dining rooms, scrutinizing what others were eating, and glancing at the Mandarin menu (which was mostly incomprehensible to them). In an attempt to broker the exchange, I suggested a busy medium-priced restaurant with indoor seating and a wide selection of standard Chinese fare. They agreed and judiciously ordered steamed dumplings, rice, soup, and vegetables. When the dumplings arrived, Alang's face lit up with a smile, but after she took her first bite, it looked as if she might spit it out. She chewed and swallowed but said nothing, then gobbled up her rice and picked at a few vegetables, mostly moving them around on the plate until others finished eating. Claiming not to be hungry, they got up and started to leave, with at least half the food still on the table.

Alang cut her trip in Taipei short because of the difficulty of finding food that she could eat. She struggled to communicate what she wanted to order in restaurants because of her broken Mandarin and she was visibly disturbed at how different the reality of the cuisine was compared to her expectations. Seeking recognition and verification from me, we talked constantly about how much better the food is in Singkawang than in Taiwan. Now, two years later, she is planning a trip to Canada and has asked me repeatedly whether or not she will be able to find rice once she arrives.

Lily is 42 years old, a high school graduate who worked in an insurance company before entering local politics. Now she makes fairly frequent overseas work trips to places like

Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Australia. She is a well-known, well-connected individual with significant political aspirations and she considers herself an adaptable person who can move between various circles of people.

I asked Lily to tell me about her overseas travel experiences. In response, she asked me whether I liked to eat bread dipped in olive oil. I said I did and she shook her head and grimaced in response. She told me about her recent trip to Italy and said that she absolutely cannot eat that bread dipped in olive oil and vinegar. She said it was very difficult to find food (read: rice). That was the only thing she told me about Italy as well as her other overseas travels.

Food may seem trivial, or obvious, but food preferences and attitudes communicate a lot about people's experiences overseas and are directly implicated in the processes of developing cosmopolitan sensibilities.[8] Food is intimately connected to the affective dimensions of belonging, memory, and nostalgia (Mannur, 2007; Mintz & Du Bois, 2002; Raman, 2011), despite the fact that anthropologists are still working to pin down the precise mechanisms through which food and belonging become so intricately bound. Jon Holtzman (2006) wants to know how "real or perceived resilience in foodways speak to understandings of the present and imaginings of the future", particularly in relation to concepts of the past (p. 363). For studies of migration, this important question must be extended across transnational space in order to shed light on how food mediates migrants' senses of belonging in multiple locations. Mannur (2007), for example, explores this theme by explaining how identity politics of Indian American immigrants gets expressed through nostalgia for imagined culinary pasts that are linked to national and ethnic identities. According to her, culinary concerns, which were initially of little importance, take on greater significance in new host societies as food and food memories allow individuals to imaginatively recreate connections to their former homes and pasts. According to Saunders (2007), "eating and talking about eating are both communicative acts … creating new understandings of the ways in which food shapes those who eat it" (p. 204). Narratives about food can be used to create a sense of community, both real and imagined, even across transnational space (Saunders, 2007). Communication and practices related to food and eating are also ways to mark distinctions between groups of people along lines of class, ethnicity, and other forms of identity. Talking about food (in the form of complaints about foods overseas and praises for foods from home) with other people from Singkawang is a form of communication that strengthens their group identity.

For Hakka from Singkawang overseas, the logistic of getting food that one likes is difficult for some migrants, because of language, cost, and taste barriers. People have a limited budget for food and face challenges when trying to order food in foreign languages (English, Mandarin, Cantonese, Korean, etc.). This generates, often repeated, disappointment, which leads to cooking at home, or only eating in the cafeterias of the factories where they work or the schools where they study, that is, generally not venturing far from these familiar locations. In this context, a discourse about the superiority of the food from home is developed and acts as something of a cipher for the

8 For an interesting analysis of the ways that Jewish American immigrants use eating Chinese food as both an ethnic identity marker and as a sign of cosmopolitanism, see Liu (2010).

experiences of the migrants abroad. This discourse is also common in Singkawang as people regularly perform their ability to make extremely subtle distinctions between foods, thereby demonstrating their discerning tastes.

Ubiquitous complaints about foods overseas also reveal people's inadaptable palate, and their inability to develop the flexibility needed to consume new things, a major part of becoming cosmopolitan and transnational. Images of elite businessmen talking on cellular phones, dining on gourmet food in executive airport lounges enroute from one country to another underline the following personal traits: Mobile, flexible, confident, they are at home anywhere in the world. Not liking new foods, and not being able or willing to cultivate a taste for new foods, constitutes one of the front lines where people must come to terms with the practical limits of their ability (and, subsequently, their desire) to actualize their transnational fantasies. Surprisingly, these issues surrounding food play a major role in influencing the decision to return to Singkawang, the *kampung halaman*, and the ability to find food that one likes, or to develop a taste for the food away from home becomes a marker of bourgeoning cosmopolitanism. For those who can cultivate flexible tastes, this ability becomes a hallmark of their success in living and integrating into the host society in multi-dimensional ways; these more adaptable migrants become important culture brokers for others who have just arrived. For those who stay overseas for long periods of time but remain limited in their ability to develop a palate for local food, there are now small companies, as well as networks of friends and relatively on-hand ready-to-mail food from Singkawang to other places in Indonesia and overseas.[9]

MARGINALITY OVERSEAS

Temporary overseas labor migration is currently the largest form of migration from Singkawang and has some unique characteristics. Most Hakka migrants do not join official government-administered TKI/TKW (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia/Tenaga Kerja Wanita – Indonesian workforce/female Indonesian workforce) programs, which send workers overseas via legally sanctioned schemes involving agents, fees, visas, training programs, wage deduction, and remittance plans. Instead, they travel independently of government involvement, using packaged tours sold by Hakka agents in Singkawang and Jakarta, which are specifically designed as routes for labor migrants to enter foreign countries with the intention of forfeiting the return ticket and staying on to work illegally (Indonesian: *gelap* (dark) or *tidak resmi* (not official); Hakka: *si theu si het* (expired visa)). These migrants work in low-level labor market jobs in the service sector, construction, and factory production. Unlike Indonesia's largely female official overseas workforce, Chinese from Singkawang almost never work as domestic cleaners and nannies. Instead they use networks of friends, rela-

9 In Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are special Indonesian food stores, some of which have buffet-style dining areas. Some of these stores are run by people from Singkawang, or West Kalimantan, and carry or make the Singkawang foods, which migrants overseas most crave, including wheat noodles with pork (Hakka: *jam mian*), fried rice noodles (Indonesian: *kwe tiau goreng*; Hakka: *chau pan*), as well as snacks such as durian candy (Indonesian: *durian dodol*). Fermented fish paste, fish sauce, different kinds of curries and sambals as well as pork meat and pork fat are more likely to be sent directly to individuals by relatives, or friends using special remittance parcel services that link Singkawang with popular destinations overseas.

tives, and fellow city folk already in those host countries to help them find jobs, low-cost living arrangements, food, recreation, and remittance agents. Many people leave Singkawang empty-handed[10] (Indonesian: *tangan kosong*; Hakka: *khung siu*) and are only 'brave enough' (Indonesian: *berani*) to return once they have become successful (Indonesian: *sudah sukses*), meaning once enough capital has been saved to invest in a small business in Singkawang or Jakarta.

Living overseas as illegal migrant workers means having a *pariah* status, which limits people's daily engagements and mobility. People are afraid of being discovered by the police, or being asked to show identity cards, or being at the mercy of employers who sometimes withhold their wages or passports, or being required to communicate in a foreign language. The experience of living under these conditions and migrants' economic marginality powerfully shape the daily activities that are considered possible and not possible. Their economic and social limitations (a subject which has been well investigated in the literature on migrants and migration),[11] however, are not the only source of disappointment. There is also the problem of not having one's ethnic and national identity recognized or recognized accurately[12] in the new society. This was a recurring theme among the migrants that participated in this study.

Ajung is the father of four children and has a computer servicing business in Singkawang. He lives in a small house on the outskirts of the city, with his wife, children, and his father-in-law. He is an avid gardener and likes to go fishing regularly. At the age of 18, he went to work illegally in Korea. This was directly after the anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, in May 1998. He travelled to Korea with a tour group from China and worked in different factories for two years, before moving to Taiwan and working illegally for another three years. He said it was easy to get a job and easy to make money there but Korea was very cold, language was always a barrier, and he never went out, even when he was invited. He only thought about saving money and he did not want to be caught by the police. Ajung's journey was directly linked to the economic and political situation in Indonesia at the time of Reformasi[13] and his desire to save money to return to Indonesia to start his own business. During our interview, he succinctly articulated a common frustration that Hakka migrants experience: "In Indonesia, there are problems from Islam and from Malays. They

10 Migrants often borrow money from family members in order to pay for their initial travel costs to go overseas. Once overseas, they must work full-time, sometimes more than one job, in order to save money, not only to remit home and bring home at the end of their sojourn, but also in order to pay for their travel home and the penalties they may incur if they are caught crossing the border as illegal workers. For those who find it difficult to find employment quickly, they often undergo long periods of poverty overseas, in which they rely on the charity of friends, relatives, city folk, or church groups to meet their basic daily needs.

11 See, for example, the recent compilation edited by Philip Kretsedemas, Jorge Capetillo-Ponce, and Glenn Jacobs, *Migrant Marginality: A Transnational Perspective* (2014). For a report on the effects of socio-economic factors on health among Samoans overseas, see McGarvey and Seidin (2010). For a discussion of the role of the state in producing migrants' social and economic insecurity, see Tseng and Wang's (2013) case study of guest workers in Taiwan.

12 For Hakka Chinese Indonesians from Singkawang, this inaccurate identification by others took the form of not always having their sub-ethnic identity recognized, and/or valued by individuals in the host societies.

13 *Reformasi* is the Indonesian term for the political transition and democratization process that began during the fall of President Suharto in 1998.

don't consider us (i.e. Chinese Indonesians) to be real Indonesians. But when we go overseas to Taiwan, and to Hong Kong, the Chinese there don't consider us to be 'real Chinese', they think we are Indonesians."

Andy has had a similar experience. He is 19 years old. He is currently studying accounting at a small university in the UK. On a trip home for the summer, he told me that there is a lot of discrimination in England. According to him, people there do not like the Chinese, so when he meets white people he tells them that he is from Indonesia and speaks Indonesian. He strategically downplays the ethnically Chinese part of his identity. However, when he meets Chinese people, including his Cantonese boss, he tells them he is Chinese Indonesian, and speaks Mandarin and Hakka, downplaying the Indonesian aspects of his identity, and emphasizing the ethnically Chinese aspects in order to find acceptance and a common ground. This relational shifting is a daily experience in his life. By day, he is one of only a handful of Asian students at the small local university and by night he works at a Chinese restaurant. With customers and fellow students he speaks English, but with his boss and the other staff he speaks Mandarin.

Andy is in an advantageous position because he can speak Mandarin, which is not the case for many older people who grew up during the Suharto era when schools that taught Mandarin were banned. This older generation is often called 'the lost generation' because they were denied the ability to study Mandarin, which is perceived as an important part of becoming a Chinese person, especially in overseas Chinese communities where Chinese dialects are often the dominant languages within the Chinese community. The politics of speaking or not speaking Mandarin have generated problems for people who want to work overseas in places that have a majority population of ethnic Chinese, and this limits people's cosmopolitan dreams. This gets expressed as anger at the Indonesian government, embarrassment, and a sense of personal failure, as well as frustration with not having one's Chineseness recognized and affirmed by other groups of ethnic Chinese. People frequently contrast their situation with that of Malaysian Chinese, many of whom are fluent in English, Mandarin, and Malay, as well as a Chinese dialect.

Afui is 40 years old. He lived in the United States for six years and then in Hong Kong for three years. He told me that when he goes overseas and he cannot speak Mandarin, he feels ashamed. He feels embarrassed and he feels like he is not a real Chinese person. He said, "I am so fucking angry. The Indonesian government is so stupid. They don't think far. They don't want us to develop. It is because of Indonesia that I cannot speak Chinese."

Amin only received an elementary school education, but taught himself Chinese by speaking with elderly people and watching satellite TV. While working in a factory in Malaysia, he joined a local mutual aid society. He said that he felt that Malaysian Chinese consider Chinese Indonesians to be stupid, uneducated, and unable to speak Mandarin. But he was able to impress a group of people by giving an impromptu public speech in Mandarin. This instantly increased his status and allowed him to make friendships, which, years later, he still maintains.

NEGATIVE JUDGMENTS OF *OTHERS*

In descriptions of their experiences overseas, migrants often make essentializing characterizations of host populations, which rely heavily on stereotypes (e.g. "Singaporeans are arrogant", "Taiwanese are aggressive", "Chinese are rude"). These are common shorthand expressions that distinguish "us" from "them" and these negative judgments are made in the context of the migrants' own marginality and their perception of also being negatively evaluated by the local populations. The experience of living as low-status non-citizen foreign 'others' who are limited in their engagements within the host society fuels these characterizations, which are inherently comparative, reflecting how migrants come to imagine themselves in relation to others. While judgments relate to ethnic or national group characteristics, they also index the difficulties of fitting in that stem from socio-economic, dialect, and sub-ethnic group differences and frustration at not having one's identity recognized and valued.

Not having aspects of the Chineseness of migrants' Chinese Indonesian identity recognized is a problem, but another problem arises when a sub-ethnic identity, while recognized, is negatively evaluated. Hakka identity (which is both a dialect and a sub-ethnic group designation) carries certain stereotypes, which vary depending on historical, geographical, and intergroup relations, but can be generalized as associated with working class socio-economic status, labor-intensive jobs, lack of education, sojourning, and rural lifestyles. These characterizations only make sense in relation to those of other groups, such as Cantonese, or Hokkien, who are often afforded a more favorable characterization, as refined, cultured, hard-working, educated, and enterprising. When people from Singkawang travel to countries with other groups of Chinese people, the politics of these sub-ethnic group stereotypes play out in terms of how they are perceived by locals and therefore whom they feel comfortable associating and communicating with.[14] As a way of refuting these negative stereotypes of Hakka sub-ethnic identity, people frequently cite the fact that some famous people including Sun Yat-Sen, Deng Xiaoping, and Lee Kuan Yew were/are Hakka.

In addition to being Chinese Indonesian and being Hakka, migrants overseas must also contend with the politics of being Southeast Asian, which carries the stigma of coming from a developing country and implies poverty, corruption, and lack of discipline. I do not want to suggest any truth in these claims. The reason for focusing on the negative characterizations of migrants, and the negative judgments that they, in turn, make about host populations, is merely to understand the context in which these characterizations are imagined and reproduced in talk, eventually becoming common shorthand understandings for groups of people. Young people go overseas with hopes, dreams, and fantasies of being able to adapt and be included in the new societies where they live, work, study, and marry. They imagine they will make friends and connections, start businesses and seek better lives (Indonesian: *cari kehidupan lebih bagus*). At one end of this spectrum of dreams is the image of cosmopolitan transnational citizenship. At the other end is the hope of living temporarily in a more affluent society, working, and saving money. However, Hakka from Sing-

14 These politics play out in the Indonesian context as well, as reflected in negative judgments and animosity between the Hokkien Chinese communities in North Sumatra, Jakarta Chinese, and the Hakka communities in West Kalimantan.

kawang face significant limitations in becoming transnational and they often lack the financial, educational, social, logistical as well as cultural credentials needed to create the kinds of cosmopolitan sensibilities of their fantasies.

Among such limitations is the tendency of Hakka from Singkawang, much like other Indonesians, not to spend a lot of time alone, both inside and outside the home. In Singkawang, people live with their extended families, sleep together in a room of many, and do not expect or imagine much in the way of personal or private space. When going out, people travel with a friend or a group of friends. Continuously, they seek social engagements that are busy or crowded (Indonesian: *ramai*; Hakka: *an nao*), generally considering them happy affairs. While overseas, Hakka from Singkawang also reproduce this sociality. They sleep in rooms with other people from Singkawang, they go out in groups of people from Indonesia, they chat and SMS and take funny photos in funny places as often as possible, as they would do at home. The majority, however, do not have any local friends,[15] nor have they ever been to the houses of locals, nor have they accessed social or medical services that would allow them to develop a more nuanced, insider view of the mechanics and nature of the host society. They feel unable to mix with local people (Indonesian: *susah bergaul*; Hakka: *an nan kak phan*), because of the fear that they would be negatively judged and therefore not received graciously as potential friends, acquaintances, or business partners. While cross-border brides from Singkawang make greater inroads in these new societies in terms of making local friends, they also tend to rely most heavily for social support on their networks of friends and family who are also, originally, from Singkawang.

RECUPERATIVE DISCOURSE

Migrants' social marginalization and their wish to subvert hegemonic structures and discourse leads to a particular self-portrayal that emphasizes the uniqueness, goodness, and integrity of their own culture. They self-identify with 'traditional' Chinese culture, strong kinship and family structures, unique religious practices, and they describe themselves as loyal and fraternal, engaging in group solidarity and mutual aid among friends. Such descriptions do reflect, to some extent, the realities of Singkawang's "traditional", small-scale Chinese society as defined by concrete social, cultural, and economic arrangements. However, this characterization also reflects ideals that have emerged from experiences overseas, and the assertion that some of these qualities have been lost in other societies.

In Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and the USA, for example, migrants witness states of development and modernity that are very different from home. They see, firsthand, the advanced industrial and post-industrial economies, the prevalence of famous international export brands, the international centers of business and finance, middle-class and upper middle-class professionals who appear well-dressed, disciplined, hard-working, and sophisticated. Migrants who fantasized about being able to enter into this world before going overseas instead find work in service sector jobs,

15 While this is not designed to be a quantitative study, it is significant to note that 98% of the 60 migrants interviewed said they did not have any local friends.

selling noodles or bubble tea to these wealthier office workers, who occupy social and economic space as the ideal citizen-subjects: productive, consuming, and self-disciplined. Within these daily interactions, people feel the practical limitations of converting their more humble origins into lives resembling their original cosmopolitan transnational fantasies as represented by these established elites.

As a function of these encounters, migrants sense the uniqueness of their own culture and sociality and begin to emphasize "us" versus "them" through a discourse about the preservation of culture at home and the loss of 'culture' overseas. Whereas they describe Japanese as technologically and economically advanced, they depict Singkawang as preserving filial piety, respect, honor, and care for the elderly. Whereas they call Singapore alienating and competitive, they see Singkawang as relaxed and friendly. Whereas they herald mainland China for its rapid economic growth, authoritarian leadership, and strict laws (which some migrants valorize as being better than Indonesia's weak political system), they praise Singkawang as a center of Chinese folk religion (something believed to be lost in China and preserved in Singkawang). This recuperative discourse highlights positive characteristics of 'home'. Culture, sociality, and behavior become valuable resources they can identify with, but which are lost or diluted in modern industrial places overseas. Home becomes something to be proud of in situations where the society challenges their parochial, small-town status – a status that limits their ability to fit in. Reorientations towards home are ironic given the ambiguous position of the Chinese ethnic minorities in Indonesia, and the historic and persistent challenge for Hakka from West Kalimantan to be considered anything other than "strangers at home" (Hui, 2011). Nonetheless, overseas migrants indulge in nostalgic daydreams of home, which include all these cultural characteristics as well as memories of delicious food, socializing with friends, and the familiarity of the town and the environment. Just as the fantasy of becoming a cosmopolitan transnational subject powerfully motivated migration, so too does the allure of returning to the newly reimagined *kampung halaman* motivate their return journeys.

CONCLUSION

Going abroad initiates a process by which migrants come to learn about their own idiosyncratic patterns of behavior, sociality, and cultural adaptations as Hakka Chinese Indonesians from an out-of-the-way small town. This happens through the dynamics of their encounters overseas where they experience, first-hand, a new society, new people, new living and working conditions. During these experiences, migrants must confront the practical limits of their ability (and, consequently, their desire) to build lives overseas. So what happens to the fantasy of being a cosmopolitan transnational subject when the very transnational encounters they imagined wanting to attain challenge their ability to be open, flexible, adventurous, accepting, and enjoying forms of difference? Rather than recognizing the role of class, education, and experience, they resort to essentializing stereotypes of "us" and "them", and a discourse of cultural difference emerges. They also readjust their plans to accommodate what might be described as parochialism. No longer imagining the life of wealth and success in Taipei, Hong Kong, or Seoul, people instead bring back small influences to Singkawang by opening bridal salons, photography studios, bubble tea cafes, by in-

troducing Korean fashion trends, or starting English language schools. People reorient themselves to local industries such as bird's nest cultivation, rubber and oil palm plantation, and decide to put more energy into cultivating wealth and social status at home where their specific culture logic is readily recognized and respected, not challenged or undermined. Based on this case study, we can reflect back on Appadurai's observation that imagination has become an axiomatic social practice in modern life (Appadurai, 1996), and one which is not limited to elites, but increasingly used by non-elites to formulate their own "cosmopolitanisms from below" (Appadurai, 2011). In this paper I have illuminated a schism that exists between the imaginings and the realities of people's cosmopolitan transnational fantasies. While Hakka from Singkawang endeavor to build their own cosmopolitanism from below, in practice, what occurs is a reimagining of home, a reorientation towards the social and cultural settings that are familiar, and actual, physical returns from overseas. Through this circuit of imagining, experiencing a disconnect, and then reimagining, people's transnational imaginaries ultimately fuel the continued construction and reconstruction of home, as an idea, as a physical place, and a social space.

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Mother Tongue, Mothering, and (Transnational) Identity: Indonesian Mothers in Canberra, Australia

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This article focuses on the cultural-linguistic maintenance rationales, efforts, and experiences of a group of Indonesian mothers residing in Canberra, Australia. The conceptual framework rests on the premise of a bidirectional relationship between migration and mothering, and how this dynamic shapes the identities of both migrant mothers and, potentially, their children. The article's auto-ethnographic approach centers on my involvement in a small community organization in Canberra that runs Indonesian language and dancing classes, primarily targeting young children of parents with Indonesian background. I argue that, while mothers' collective efforts in this institutional setting may not be effective enough in achieving a native level of language proficiency among second generation children, the club facilitates the production of shared transnational identities among migrant mothers and the mothers' collective aspirations for their children's transnational identities.

Keywords: Indonesian Diaspora; Migrant Mothers; Migration; Mothering; Transnational Families

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Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit kulturell-sprachlichen Erhaltungsprinzipien, -bemühungen und -erfahrungen einer Gruppe von indonesischen Müttern in Canberra, Australien. Der konzeptionelle Rahmen basiert auf der Annahme eines doppelt gerichteten Verhältnisses zwischen Migration und Bemutterung, sowie auf dem Einfluss dieser Dynamik sowohl auf die Identität der migrantischen Mütter, als auch deren Kinder. Der autoethnografische Ansatz fußt auf meiner Einbindung in eine kleine Organisation in Canberra, die indonesische Sprach- und Tanzkurse mit einem besonderen Fokus auf kleine Kinder von Eltern mit indonesischem Hintergrund anbietet. Es wird gezeigt, dass auch wenn die kollektiven Bemühungen der Mütter in diesem institutionellen Setting nicht effektiv genug sein mögen, um ein muttersprachliches Niveau unter Kindern der zweiten Generation zu erreichen, der Verein dennoch die Produktion von geteilten transnationalen Identitäten unter migrantischen Müttern und das kollektive Bestreben der Mütter für transnationale Identitäten ihrer Kinder erleichtert.

Schlagworte: Bemutterung; Indonesische Diaspora; migrantische Mütter; Migration; transnationale Familien

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INTRODUCTION

Within the literature on migration in the West, there is a consensus that "migrant families orient significant aspects of their lives around their country of origin" (Haller & Landolt, 2005, p. 1183). Along this line, segmented assimilation theorists treat the family as a social institution within which children of migrants receive an ethnic and linguistic socialization (Haller & Landolt, 2005; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Ruben G. Rumbaut, 1994; Zhou, 1997). Furthermore, according to recent scholarship on youth and transnationalism, the family plays a crucial part in the formation of transnational identities across different generations of migrants and their children (Goulbourne, Reynolds, & Zontini, 2009; Levitt & Schiller, 2004). This interest on intergenerational identities of migrants has expanded across a wide range of disciplines in the social sciences. Economists, for example, provide further quantitative modeling of the socialization of cultural traits in migrant groups, holding that parents have a set of "well-defined preferences over the cultural traits acquired and developed by their children" (Bisin & Verdier, 2000, pp. 956–967).

Central to the discussion on identity formation in migrant families is the practice of mothering. In her decadal review of scholarly work on mothering, Terry Arendell (2000) concludes that in the interdisciplinary space, the definitions of mothering share a common theme. Mothering is "the social practices of nurturing and caring for dependent children [and] is associated with women because universally, it is women who do the work of mothering" (2000, p. 1192). Through their practice of mothering, mothers shape the "transmission of culture", the "constitution of kinship", and the family and societal reproduction (Barlow & Chapin, 2010, p. 342; Gedalof, 2009).

There is a growing body of research on the effects of transnational migration on the family, kinship, and particularly on gender ideology and practices within the family as well as on the identity formation of migrants' children (Coe, 2011; Ho, 2006; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Levitt & Waters, 2006; Nora Chiang, 2008; Wu, 2009). At the same time, there are also studies that examine the effects of motherhood on cross-cultural adaptations of migrants (Guo, 2013; Moon, 2003; Sigad & Eisikovits, 2009; Tummala-Narra, 2004). While migration adds a layer of complexity to ideas of mothering, the scholarship on the topic of motherhood among overseas Indonesians is still limited (cf. Doxey, 2007; Tsai, Chen, & Huang, 2011; Winarnita, 2008).

In this article, I built upon literature in the field of population studies on gender and migration and upon interdisciplinary scholarly work on mothering to examine the mothering experience of Indonesian women residing in Canberra, Australia. With an estimated population of 382,863 people (ACT Government, 2013), Canberra provides a unique setting for the Indonesian diaspora in Australia, not least as it scores highest in the wellbeing index of the country (OECD, 2014). According to a recent study, Canberra hosts only 1.6 percent of the Indonesian diaspora in Australia (Muhidin, 2013). By crude social groupings, the Indonesian diaspora in Canberra is largely composed of Indonesian nationals working in the embassy, university students, marriage migrants, and a small but increasing number of professionals who came to Canberra via the various skilled/business migration schemes. The Indonesian community in Canberra is comparatively smaller and more close-knit than in

other major cities in Australia such as Sydney, Melbourne, or Perth. There is a range of community groups established largely for the benefit of the Indonesian diaspora, including student organizations, family associations, and prayer groups.

The conceptual framework of this article rests on the premise of a relationship between migration and mothering. Based on this assumption, the following arguments are based on the question of how dynamics in this relationship shape the practices and identities of migrant mothers and, potentially, their children. The article's auto-ethnographic approach (see Anderson, 2006) centers on my involvement in a small community organization in Canberra that runs Indonesian language and dancing classes, primarily targeting young children of parents with Indonesian background. The core volunteers in this organization are tertiary-educated mothers[1] from Indonesia with young children, all of whom are first-generation migrants with either an Australian Permanent Residency Visa or an Australian citizenship.[2]

Auto-ethnography is not a new analytical approach in migration research (Kusow, 2003; Marvasti, 2005; Turgo, 2012). Ellis, Adams, and Bochner (2010) define auto-ethnography "as an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyze personal experience in order to understand cultural experience" (p. 1). I use my own selective hindsight on migrant mothering and relate it to a broader research context on migrant mothering as well as to the experiences of other mothers engaged in this community organization. In doing so, I draw upon semi-structured interviews conducted in Bahasa Indonesia with four mothers between 35 and 42 years old who are active members of the club and whose children attend language and dancing classes. These mothers are tertiary-educated and have permanent migrant status in Australia. Two of the mothers were employed at the time of the interviews. Two of the mothers are married to Indonesians and the other two are married to Australians. Together, these mothers have five Australian-born children. Due to the small interview sample and the fact that these mothers – including me – are from roughly the same socio-economic background, I am aware of the limited potential for generalization of my study.[3]

As an aspect of mothering, the cultural-linguistic maintenance rationales, efforts, and experiences of Indonesian mothers residing in Canberra are my point of departure. My initial research question thus focused on mothering from the perspective of gender and migration research. Building on participant observation and a pre-

1 All mothers have tertiary education; some completed their university degrees in Indonesia, and some completed post-graduate degrees in Indonesia/Australia. A number of mothers hold Australian non-university tertiary level qualifications (e.g. graduate certificates or associate diplomas).

2 In general, current Indonesian law does not allow an Indonesian citizen to have another citizenship. However, dual citizenship is an exception for children of Indonesian nationals overseas or children from mixed marriages who were born on or after 1 August 2006 (Law No. 12/2006, retrieved from the website of the Consulate General of the Republic of Indonesia, Perth, Australia: http://kjri-perth.org.au/index.php/indonesian-citizen/dwi-kewarganegaraan/). The majority of mothers in the committee have Australian Permanent Residency Visas obtained through the dependent spouse visa scheme or through the general skilled migration scheme.

3 In effect, the social proximity that I share with the participants of my research had contributed to my decision to avoid the discussion of class altogether in this article. Future work on class and gender dimensions of migrant mothering would benefit not only from the budding scholarship on transnationalism, networks, and connectivity among overseas Indonesians, but also the under-theorized role of mothers in international migration studies (Gedalof, 2009).

liminary round of interviews with four active members of the language and culture club, I explore whether and how bilingualism and biculturalism play a role in the practice of migrant mothering, in shaping migrant mothers' identities, and in their perception of the development of their children's identities. I argue that, while the mothers' collective efforts in running a language club may not be effective enough to achieve a native level of language proficiency among their children, the club serves to produce shared transnational identities among migrant mothers, and to promote migrant mothers' collective aspirations for their children's transnational identities.

The article is organized as follows: I start by looking at pertinent scholarship and demographic data supporting my choice to approach the issue of transnationalism from a cultural-linguistic and a gender perspective. I then outline my auto-ethnographic account on the complex interplay of migration and mothering practices. Here, I present my relatively recent involvement in a community organization that aims at promoting native language (Bahasa Indonesia) use in early childhood among young second-generation children of Indonesian migrant mothers. In attempting to localize my rationale and experiences in involving myself and my children in this organization in a broader context, I outline interviews with other mothers participating in the same organization, which show the diversity and the commonalities in bilingual and/or bicultural mothering. Finally, I situate language retaining efforts in the context of the ongoing negotiation of mother-child relations and identities in transnational families.

MIGRATION, TRANSNATIONALISM, AND LANGUAGE RETENTION

Since the early 1990s, there have been several waves of transnational migration scholarship (see Levitt & Schiller, 2004 for a seminal review). Distinct to classical assimilation theorists (e.g. Gordon, 1964) who proposed that immigrants in the West[4] would ultimately lose their homeland ties and practices, the transnational perspective highlights the enduring connections that generations of migrants maintain to their place of origin at the same time as they are gradually incorporated into their host countries. In the bourgeoning literature on transnational migration, these enduring connections are discussed in terms of transnational identities and sense of belonging, transnational networks and kinship, and socio-economic, cultural, and religious practices across national borders and boundaries.

One issue that has emerged out of the complex layers and multiple dimensions of transnationalism in migration studies is the question of whether "transnational migration is an ephemeral first-generation phenomenon" (Levitt & Schiller, 2004, p. 1005). This question of whether migrants can pass on their transnational identities and practices onto their children and grandchildren is the subject of an increasing number of migration research. One measurable outcome of such processes is language retention, whereby speaking a native language other than English at home became a common indicator of transnational identities among first and later generation migrants in English speaking countries (Lazear, 1995; Rumbaut, Massey, & Bean, 2006).

4 Here, the West is comprised of popular OECD destination countries for international migrants, including, but not limited to the United States, Western Europe, and Australia.

There is a great variation in the extent to which a minority language can be successfully retained in migrant communities. For example, in Australia, second-generation Dutch migrants have the highest rate of progression of language shift, with about 96 percent speaking only English at home. In contrast, only about 11 percent of second-generation Vietnamese speak only English at home (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999). A longitudinal study of language retention among migrant communities in the US suggests that 'language death', rather than 'language retention' is the norm for migrant languages. Applying methods commonly used to derive life expectancies in mortality studies, Rumbaut et al. (2006) estimated linguistic life expectancies across generations of migrant groups in Southern California. On average, Mexicans have the highest generational span for linguistic life expectancy among all migrant groups in the study area. When defining linguistic life expectancy as the preference to speak in the mother tongue, a Mexican household is expected to retain such preference for less than two generations. However, when defining linguistic life expectancy as the ability of the migrant household members to speak the mother tongue well, it was found that no migrant language could survive further than the third generation (Rumbaut et al., 2006, p. 457).

Using a more qualitative approach and broadening the proxy of transnational identities outside of language retention, Tracey Reynolds (2006) points to the relatively limited attention given to the relationship between ethnicity and social capital. Her case study on the formation of transnational identities among second- and third-generation young people of Caribbean descent in the United Kingdom underlines the importance of "collective ethnic bonds", of "shared identities and values", and of the "networks of trust and reciprocity" that operate within minority ethnic communities. In particular, Reynolds (2006, p. 1098) highlights how Caribbean young people's participation in transnational networks and celebrations provided them with a sense of belonging and collective membership.

The above-mentioned discussions on the importance of collective ethnic bonds, migrant networks, and transnational childrearing practices in facilitating inter-generational transnational identities among migrant families serve as departing points of my analysis of the interrelation between migrant mothering practices and cultural-linguistic identities. Unlike Reynolds, who based her research on practices and identities among second- and third-generation migrants, my focus rests on the collective ethnic bonds, transnational identities, and language retaining efforts among a selected group of first-generation Indonesian migrant mothers in Canberra, Australia.

MOTHERING IN MOTHER TONGUE: THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

Since language retention is a quantifiable indicator of transnational identity among second-generation migrants, background statistics from the Australian Population Census relating to language retention in Australia can provide a first insight into the research field. Alongside this indicator, I examined the literature for the gender dimension of language retention practices in migrant families. Here, my focus rests on migrant mothers as the central figure of cultural-linguistic transmission across various marital settings in the West.

Data from the 2011 Australian Population Census on Indonesian migrants in Australia show that language retention varies by age and by degree of ancestry.[5] In 2011, fewer than 70 percent of children from 0 to 4 years with Indonesian as their first ancestry spoke their native language (Bahasa Indonesia) at home (Figure 1). Among young children with Indonesian nominated as their second ancestry, the percentage speaking Bahasa Indonesia at home was at only 30 percent (Figure 1). These figures suggest that the prospect of linguistic survival for Bahasa Indonesia in Australia is rather weak.



Figure 1. Population of Indonesian ancestry speaking Bahasa Indonesia at home.[6]

When using minority language retention as an indicator of the cultural-linguistic transmission of identities within the family context, the immediate question arises of who is primarily preoccupied with this transmission. In reviewing the literature on interconnections of gender, intermarriage, migration, and language retention, the following observations arose: To begin with, the literature acknowledges that there is a particular relationship between patterns of intermarriage and patterns of cultural-linguistic retention (Bisin & Verdier, 2000; Jan, 2013; Okita, 2002; Robinson, 1989; Winter & Pauwels, 2005). A study in the US found that ethnic language retention decreases with a rising rate of exogamy and increases with a rising rate of endogamy among East Asian men in the US (Jan, 2013). For women, ethnic language retention decreases with a rising rate of intermarriage for East Asian women (Jan, 2013). However, the exact direction of causality between intermarriage and language retention is less clear.

5 Data from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2013) suggest that by the end of June 2011, there were 73,940 Indonesian-born persons in Australia. There were slightly more Indonesian-born women than men (56 and 44 percent, respectively).

6 Adapted from "Australian Population Census 2011: Customized Tables in TableBuilder", Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013.



Figure 2. Overseas born men and women in couple families by birthplace: Percent married to Australian born partners, 2006.[7]

Because patterns of intermarriage between men and women differ, one may speculate on whether mothers or fathers of a particular ethnic background are more likely to promote their native languages (presumably a minority language) in exogamous marriages. In a study of intermarriage patterns in the US with a focus on gender, Jacobs and Labov (2002) found that among Asian Americans, "females are more likely to marry whites than are their male counterparts" (p. 621), while the reverse pattern could be observed among African Americans. Similar patterns can be observed among first-generation, overseas-born individuals in Australia. Using data from the

7 Adapted from "Table 7: Overseas-Born Men and Women in Couple Families, by Birthplace: Percent with Australian-Born Partner 2006", by G. Heard, S.-E. Khoo, & B. Birrell, 2009, *Intermarriage in Australia: Patterns by birthplace, ancestry, religion and indigenous status* (p.17). Monash, Australia: Monash University Press, Centre for Population and Urban Research.

earlier 2006 Australian Population Census, Figure 2 outlines the percentage of overseas-born men and women in couple families in Australia who were married to an Australian-born partner. Such statistics may not offer an accurate measure for the rate of intermarriage; nevertheless, they serve as useful proxies for the intermarriage differentials by ethnic origin and gender. For example, a significantly larger proportion of women born in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines were married to Australian-born partners, relative to their male counterparts of the same origin.

In the case of Indonesians in couple families in Australia, the following two points can be observed: First, significantly more Indonesians are married to another Indonesian than to an Australian-born partner. Second, the likelihood of marrying an Australian-born partner is higher for Indonesian women than it is for Indonesian men. Therefore, women are disproportionately represented as the bearers of minority mother tongue in Australian mixed marriages where one of the partners is Indonesian.

On the one hand, women's central role in socializing minority cultural-linguistic traits to their offspring in exogamous marriages is well expected. A study of French native language retention in mixed marriage families in Canada suggests that children are more likely to adhere to French when the mother, not the father, speaks French as a native language (Robinson, 1989). Okita's (2002) rich life stories of Japanese mother/British father families highlight the tensions experienced by migrant mothers in taking up the emotionally demanding and time-consuming tasks of cultural-linguistic socialization of their young children. On the other hand, studies on migrant families and cultural-linguistic retention point to the centrality of migrant mothers not only in exogamous but also in endogamous marriages. Winter and Pauwels' (2005) analysis of Australian studies shows that the transmission of the native language from migrant parents to later generations is seen as the responsibility of mothers, not of fathers.

This gendered aspect of minority language transmission supports the argument that the transmission of native language and cultural identities ultimately rests on the mothering practices of migrant mothers, irrespective of whether they are in an exogamous or endogamous marriage. The study of bilingual and/or bicultural mothering is thus a meaningful contribution to scholarship on transnationalism, kinship, and connectivity among overseas Indonesians. Taking up this endeavor, I continue with some auto-ethnographic reflections on bilingual and bicultural mothering as I recall my lived experience. I use the term bilingual and bicultural mothering to refer to a) my everyday language practice, using both Bahasa Indonesia and English in communicating with my children, and b) my conscious and unconscious efforts to socialize my children with what I perceive as moderated versions of my native cultural traits including religion, social values, and practices.

THE EARLY YEARS: 'ISOLATED AND PRIVATIZED' MIGRANT MOTHERING

I spent most of my formative years in Jakarta, Indonesia, and Canberra, Australia. I lived in Jakarta until the age of eight and moved to Australia in 1992 with my siblings and parents who had both received scholarships for their postgraduate studies. I had about 3.5 years of secondary education in Australia before completing

my undergraduate degree at an Australian university. In 2001, I received my Australian Permanent Residency Visa under what was then the newly introduced general skilled migration scheme. Upon receiving a PhD scholarship in 2003, I embarked on fieldwork in Jakarta and Makassar in 2004, working on my thesis on the interplay between gender roles, attitudes in marriage, and labor market expectations among university students.

I lived in Jakarta between December 2004 and mid-2006. These two years represented a demographically dense period in my life, in which I went through what demographers coined as two important markers of adulthood: marriage and childbearing (Lloyd, 2005). Both my husband and I are native speakers of Bahasa Indonesia. We grew up in different parts of Jakarta and spent the parts of our formative years living abroad. In August 2006, I had to return to Australia to complete my PhD thesis. Reflecting on this period, my return to Canberra with my five-month-old son marked the beginning of a long and demanding journey inside the complex realms of migration and motherhood. In the past seven years, since the birth of my eldest son, I have become increasingly aware of and at the same time curious about the intricate nexus between migration and mothering: How has migrating to Australia from Indonesia at the early age of 14 shaped my mothering practices and how do these practices affect the identity formation of my children today? In turn, how has mothering in Australia influenced my maternal and cultural identities?

My early experience of mothering in Australia was imbued with feelings of inadequacy, guilt, and ambivalence. However, treading the water of motherhood in a social and cultural context that was significantly different to how I had been mothered in Jakarta during the 1980s had placed another layer of intricacy on my emotional and mental state. My initial beliefs of what good mothering entails often conflicted with the generational, cultural, class- and family-specific differences of what back then I interpreted as the mainstream parenting practices in urban middle-class Indonesia and the West. To give a more vivid example, upon my arrival back in Canberra with my five-month-old son, a neighbor invited me to join her mothers' group. The idea that other mothers in the mothers' group, most of whom were of Anglo-Australian origin, had a seemingly effective baby's sleeping arrangement practice in place was unfamiliar to me. I slept together with my son as it is a 'common practice' among new mothers in Jakarta, and not so much because I am an avid believer of attachment parenting. I was initially baffled to see parents taking their young babies to sleep clinics and coming home with the *nurse-play-sleep* routine.[8] However, as I directly experienced sleep deprivation and the absence of a relief mother in the house (and in the neighborhood), I began to see the importance of sleeping routines and later on, to the early promotion of child independence for my own benefit.

To me, migrant mothering in the twenty-first century meant living what Sharon Hays (Hays, 1996) called the "cultural contradictions" of a child-centered, intensive-mothering ideology that has taken central stage in the US and much of the Western world (Lupton, 2000; Maher & Saugeres, 2007) with much less social capital than I

8 Currently, nurse(feed)-play-sleep is one of the recommended sleeping arrangements to help newborns and babies settle into their routine. Advocates recommend parents to feed or nurse their baby, play/interact with her or him, and then lay her or him in the cot to sleep. This is distinct to practices in which babies are fed on demand and in which mothers nursed their babies to sleep.

had grown accustomed to back in Jakarta.[9] In my son's early years, when the traditional support for childcare that I had enjoyed in the first five months of my motherhood were no longer available, I found myself facing a heavier domestic workload and progressing towards more of what Moon (2003) refers to as "isolated and privatized mothering" (p. 851) in her research on Korean migrant mothers in the US. There was no 'village' I could rely on and the responsibility to raise my child rested primarily on me. [10]

Undoubtedly, 'isolated and privatized mothering' moves increasingly towards the center of the social and cultural tensions experienced by first-time migrant mothers in the West. I was aware that 'back home', in Indonesia, the maternal role models in my immediate family and my contemporaries would tend to have their 'village' help them in looking after their children. My experience in living such contradictions has been well documented in recent studies on mothering among women of East Asian origin in the West (Ho, 2006; Moon, 2003; Nora Chiang, 2008; Wu, 2009).

In speaking about the isolation and privatization of migrant mothering, it is arguably easy not to speak of fathers' involvement. While acknowledging the contribution and support from my husband to date, I have had the larger share of parenting as he assumes the role of the primary breadwinner with long working hours.

Perhaps because I am married to another Indonesian with a transnational identity like myself, we assumed that our children would be 'like us'. Coming to live in Australia in our mid-teens, we both continue to have a good command of Bahasa Indonesia. We never experienced language loss and in my son's early years of childhood, we did not put much consideration into which language we used at home. Both my husband and I code-switched between English and Bahasa Indonesia in our daily conversations. We did not anticipate that our son would be a passive user of Bahasa Indonesia by the time he had finished preschool. On a number of occasions, when we returned to Jakarta and our young son began to speak English in public settings, we felt 'embarrassed' at our lack of success in teaching him to appropriately use his native language. In the first three years of parenthood, we essentially had no strategic plan to actively pass on Bahasa Indonesia to our children. My involvement in a collective effort to retain Bahasa Indonesia was largely incidental.

THE LANGUAGE AND DANCE CLUB: MIGRANT MOTHERING IN A COLLECTIVE SETTING

After completing my studies and the subsequent birth of my daughter in 2008, I somewhat veered into new and multiple circles of social networks of Indonesian mothers with young children in Canberra. Arguably, Facebook – being very popular

9 The literature on the social and cultural contradictions of mothering in the West draws on the premise on the renewed desire to live up to the ideals of 'the good mother' that co-reside with increased demands for women to participate in the public sphere and paid labor. In demography, the conflicting expectations arising from women's higher educational attainment and workforce participation, on the one hand, and persistent gendered practices in family institutions, on the other, are seen as a central driver of low fertility levels in developed economies (McDonald, 2000).

10 I partly enjoyed the help of my mother. Later on, I started using on-campus childcare facilities while working on my thesis.

among both urban and overseas Indonesians – not only facilitated my connection to other Indonesian mothers with young children in Canberra, but also provided a visual map of Indonesian migrant groups in the city and their heterogeneous nature. It was through these virtual social networks of Indonesian mothers that I became a member of a Bahasa Indonesia playgroup that was later incorporated into a community language and culture club with a focus on dancing. In this section, I briefly outline the nature of the language and culture club, its effectiveness in language retention, and its role in promoting collective identities.

The Language and Culture Club and the Indonesian Diaspora in Canberra

The Indonesian language and culture club had 30 registered pupils in 2013 aged between three and nine years and is currently registered as a community language school in Canberra. The club heavily relies on parents' volunteer activities for its organization and operation, including administration, fundraising, and teaching activities. It charges a small annual membership fee to families and receives some financial support from the Indonesian embassy and community grants from the local government. Parents, mostly mothers, also run fundraising campaigns through selling food at community and cultural events.[11]

In 2013, language and dance classes were held on Saturdays in a public library and once a week at a local school (usually in the afternoon after school activities during school semesters). In 2014, the venue for the Saturday class moved to a shared education and cultural facility provided by the Indonesian embassy. Saturday classes are generally attended by children of parents with Indonesian background, whereas the after-school language club is attended by students enrolled in that local school, regardless of their migration background. In contrast to the after-school language club with a steady student attendance, the attendance rate of the Saturday classes tends to vary and depends largely on the teachers' and/or volunteers' availability, as well as on the teaching content of these classes. Since 2011, I volunteer in both teaching and coordinating Indonesian dance classes. Every year, children are invited to perform at community and/or multicultural events. Despite the club's focus on language retention, dance classes seem to draw much more interest of both parents and students than language classes.

Language and Homeland

Difficulties in language retention were experienced by mothers in either type of marriage (mixed and endogamous marriage). Interviews as well as broader informal discussions with other members of the club suggest that while language retention was the central rationale for running the club, in reality, none of the children had a native speaker's command of Bahasa Indonesia, the majority being passive speakers of the language. Most member families I observed did not consciously practice bilingual parenting in a strict sense. In some cases, some families had cultivated a

11 In the past, funds were mostly needed to meet rental costs. Meanwhile, with classes being held at a school and maintaining a public library, most of the club's revenues go to teaching expenses and school materials.

consistent practice of one parent (mostly mothers) speaking only Bahasa Indonesia to their children prior to joining the club. In a few cases, joining the club had inspired mothers to establish a 'consistent language policy' at home. But in most cases, mothers continue to mix English and Bahasa Indonesia when communicating with their children.

> Until she was two years old, my daughter spoke Bahasa Indonesia 100 percent (of the time). But when I started working and she began attending childcare, she could not converse with others (in childcare). So I ended up speaking in English to her. Now, she has started showing interest (to speak Bahasa Indonesia) because Bahasa Indonesia is a subject at school. And she feels that, "oh, my mum is Indonesian, I have to be able to". So she started trying, (also) because my husband also speaks a little bit of Indonesian, so she wants to know (what we talk about).[12] (*Rosa, married to an Australian, with a daughter aged eight*)

In some cases, joining the language club encouraged mothers' willingness to use Bahasa Indonesia in their daily interaction with their children. Most interviewed mothers did not take the conscious decision to raise their children bilingually from the very beginning. These mothers acknowledged the early onset of language loss among second-generation young children of Indonesian background and also that it is difficult to overcome this loss unless at least one parent was very consistent in using Bahasa Indonesia from the very start, or unless the children had a relatively lengthy period of in-country experience. This last point was made by mothers who observed an increased fluency in Bahasa Indonesia in their children after a longer holiday in Indonesia.

> I don't oblige my children to be able to read books in Bahasa Indonesia. The most important thing is that they can communicate. Maybe, that is what drives me (Sundanese: *keukeh*) to speak Bahasa Indonesia at home. … Well, maybe if the father was an Australian, it is okay but in this case when both parents are Indonesians and their children cannot speak Bahasa Indonesia, it feels sad. (*Indira, married to an Indonesian, with daughters aged seven and four*)

In effect, without the consistent use of Bahasa Indonesia throughout early childhood, the attending of Saturday language classes itself is not effective enough in ensuring the children's mastery of their 'mother tongue'. However, the mothers interviewed were generally content with the club's success in *promoting*, as supposed to *retaining*, the use of Bahasa Indonesia. While they reported that having a child who can communicate in Bahasa Indonesia is important, a closer analysis of the conversations reveals also their desire for transnational identities in their children. Beside the Saturday classes, groups of mothers, children, and their families frequently gathered at play dates, birthday parties, and group holidays. For the mothers, the social capital maintained directly or indirectly through their engagement in club activities offers a sense of reassurance and belonging, asserting their transnational mothering practices and identities. In the context of these mothers' new collective identity, the idea of

12 Quotes of the interviews are translated from Bahasa Indonesia. Informants and their families are anonymized.

imparting transnational identities to their children through communal mothering is important. For example, one of the members who is married to an Anglo-Australian man said that she wanted her daughter to feel Australian, but at the same time Indonesian, and more specifically Manadonese, a sub-ethnic identity.

> I do not want my identity as an Indonesian, not only as an Indonesian but also as a Manadonese, to disappear. So that is what I wish for my daughter as well. I try so that she [would feel like she] is a Manadonese, not only Indonesian. She has been to Manado a couple of times and I sometimes use Manadonese or its accent when speaking to her. I don't think she will have the same experience like us, ya? I think for our children, it's not going to be like that: Javanese, Manadonese. I don't think they can make the connection because we live here [in Australia]. Except, maybe when the ethnic community group is strong, like the Batak kids maybe. How can we make them say that 'oh I am a Manadonese' when it is hard for them to say that they are Indonesian? … Well, my daughter has to know that she is an Indonesian. … Sure, she is Australian but my husband and I told her to say that she is both Indonesian and Australian. … And through language, of course [in shaping identity]. Hopefully though. There were phases when my daughter refused to speak Bahasa Indonesia: "I don't want to speak Bahasa Indonesia, I cannot." (*Linda, married to an Australian, daughter aged seven*)

One mother expressed that her husband and she liked the idea of their children carrying some of her home culture.[13] The practice of socializing children according to common parenting practices and values in Indonesia, to common parenting practices in their current surroundings, or to a moderated mixture of these is expressed by all of the women interviewed. An example would be for the mother to say the words 'I love you' to her daughter, which she cited as a common practice in Australia, and for her daughter to express filial piety, for example, through *salim*, which is cited as an Indonesian sign of respect by kissing or putting an elder's hand on one's forehead or nose. The negotiation of these often-contradictory practices, values, and customs is illustrated by the following examples:

> In Indonesia, no parents would say sorry for pinching (*nyubit*) or ear-pinching (*jewer*) their child. So here, we have to learn, no matter how upset and tired [we are] (*kesel*), smacking a child's hand (*ceples tangan*) means we have to say sorry. But compared to kids here, Bunga is like an Indonesian child, she will do what we ask her to do (*nurut*). … But when speaking about Javanese culture, it is hard to impart it to her. What I think is important is for her to have her manners (*sopan-santunnya masih ada*). But I don't want her to be like completely Indonesian, what do you call it, too many don't do this and that (*terlalu banyak nggak boleh ini itu*). I don't want her like that. I want her to explore [the world] herself but she should know her limits too. … Here, sometimes I get a bit worried that there is too much freedom. (*Rosa, married to an Australian, with a daughter aged eight*)

13 Home culture here refers to customs and practices which the respondents were accustomed to in their family in Indonesia. The respondents grew up in different parts of Indonesia and had different ethnic and religious identities.

> I do it [practice my family traditions]; in terms of religious perspective for instance, praying before eating. … She also cannot say words like crazy, stupid, ugly. That's how my father raised me. … I don't think Indonesians often say 'I love you', but I always say 'I love you'. Indonesian [parents] don't often express something that is personal. (*Linda, married to an Australian, with a daughter aged seven*)

> The people here have a lot of freedom (*bener-bener bebas*) whereas we can't do many things (*nggak boleh ini*, *nggak boleh itu*), [can't be] impolite. We still try to enforce Eastern traditions. I mean, the people here have good manners, but we still give our children, what do you call it, cuddles? For example, we still sleep in the same bed with them. White people really don't like that. (*Indira, married to an Indonesian husband, with two daughters aged seven and four*)

> Yes, I also don't have the heart to do that [to let her young son sleep in his own room]. Even though, now my [youngest] son is alright to sleep in the same room with his big brother, sometimes I just lifted him up and moved him back to my bed. (*Vonny, married to an Indonesian, two sons aged 15 and 4*)

The experience of the migrant mothers in the collective language and culture club setting highlights the club's function as a hub to expose their children to other young children with Indonesian heritage. In practice, the club's activities outside the language class allow children to identify with other children *like* themselves: Children who live in houses where shoes are taken off prior to entering and whose mothers cook similar food or speak loudly to each other in Bahasa Indonesia, while insisting that their children too should try to speak Bahasa Indonesia.

> I am looking for a place (*wadah*) for Indonesian children groups here. It is for my own sake. I need a group where my daughter could meet other Indonesian children. So she could stay in-tune with our culture. (*Linda, married to an Australian, with a daughter aged 7*)

Performing

At this point, I would like to draw upon my hindsight on the relative popularity of the dance class. In informal conversations, parents shared with me that the dance classes provided a fun alternative in relation to the classroom environment of language classes. One mother expressed that her daughter did not wish to sit in the language class but was very keen on participating in the dance classes. Its fortnightly frequency and more flexible attendance policy also meant that it was potentially less of a burden for families to meet the schedule of all their children's extracurricular activities. However, I also have the impression that dance classes offer a much gentler, less coercive way to introduce Indonesia and Indonesian identities to young children. Additionally, mothers often felt nostalgic about their children's public performances and were excited to see their children dressed-up in regional traditional Indonesian costumes. Between 2011 and 2013, the club staged three performances at the annual Indonesian Festival held at the grounds of the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra.

On these occasions, some mothers reminisced how they too had once performed at school and neighborhood events during their childhood 'back home'. Both mothers and their children were keen on ensuring the success of these performances, attending extra sessions outside the fortnightly slot if necessary. The shared experience of the mothers and their children before and during these public performances demonstrate the club's essential role in the maintenance and reproduction of shared transnational identities.

CONCLUSION

Drawing upon the interviews and reflecting upon my own experience, I note the following preliminary observations: First, the language and culture club serves as a connecting hub for migrant mothers, their children, and an institutionalized migrant network that offers valuable social capital at the individual level. Second, the shared transnational identities generated through migrant mothers' networking overcome the 'isolated and privatized' aspect of (migrant) mothering, especially through the identification of a shared past, shared migrant mothering experiences as well as challenges of intermarriage across national borders. Third, the club and associated socializing groups have sustained not only collective identities of migrant mothers, but also what these mothers perceived and aspired to as collective identities of their children through the children's participation in a variety of social and cultural engagements outside the school context. As with other migrant community organizations, perceptions of a 'social clique' of mothers who run the club may have hindered the club's success to garner widespread support among other social groups of Indonesian migrant mothers in Canberra.

The Indonesian mothers I interviewed practiced what Gedalof (2009) refers to as the work of "reproducing heritage, culture and structures of belonging" (p. 81). While collective language retention efforts by migrant mothers may not be effective in preventing language loss among second- and later generation children of migrant parents, the social practices surrounding these efforts are crucial in creating and maintaining a shared transnational identity of migrant mothers and their children. Through promoting a sense of belonging both among mothers and their children, the language and culture club serves as both a connecting hub to a homeland as well as a piece of the homeland itself.

The emic perspective I offered in this article shall serve as a step towards a more detailed understanding of the centrality of mothers in the cultural reproduction of collective identities among overseas Indonesians. Collective language retention efforts among Indonesian mothers in Canberra mimic similar efforts run by other migrant groups on a volunteer basis, commonly by women. This particular example supports the idea that mothering is conducted not only on behalf of individual children, but also on behalf of the larger social group in which they are situated (Levitt & Schiller, 2004).

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Challenging a Home Country: A Preliminary Account of Indonesian Student Activism in Berlin, Germany

Syafiq Hasyim

▸ Hasyim, S. (2014). Challenging a home country: A preliminary account of Indonesian student activism in Berlin, Germany. *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7*(2), 183-198.

This article gives an overview on Indonesian student activism in Berlin, Germany. Based on documents (published and unpublished), interviews, and conversations with former and current student activists, the paper scrutinizes the trajectory of activism of Indonesian students in the capital of Germany since the 1960s and asks about the evolution of specific student organizations, the issues and topics they tackled, and their media and networking strategies. The article illustrates the activities of the PPI Berlin as a dominant example of Indonesian students' political activism abroad and the activities of Indonesian Muslim students as a prominent example of religious-based activism which has gained significance since the fall of Suharto. These examples indicate the diversity of Indonesian student activists in Berlin that are nevertheless united in their aspirations to challenge politics back home.

Keywords: Anti-Suharto Protests; Berlin; Indonesian Student Activism; Indonesian Student Associations; Religious-Based Activism

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Dieser Artikel gibt einen Überblick über den Aktivismus indonesischer StudentInnen in Berlin, Deutschland. Anhand von veröffentlichten und unveröffentlichten Dokumenten, Interviews und Gesprächen mit früheren und derzeitigen studentischen AktivistInnen wird die Entwicklung dieses Aktivismus seit den 1960er Jahren untersucht und nach der Entstehung von einzelnen StudentInnenorganisationen, den behandelten Themen sowie den Medien- und Netzwerkstrategien gefragt. Der Artikel zeigt die Aktivitäten der PPI Berlin als Beispiel für politischen Aktivismus von indonesischen StudentInnen im Ausland und die Aktivitäten von indonesischen muslimischen StudentInnen als Beispiel für religionsbasierten Aktivismus, der seit dem Fall von Suharto an Bedeutung gewonnen hat. Diese Beispiele zeigen die Vielfalt von indonesischen studentischen AktivistInnen, die dennoch in ihren Bestrebungen, auf politische Prozesse im Heimatland einzuwirken, vereint sind.

Schlagworte: Anti-Suharto Proteste; Berlin; indonesische StudentInnenvereinigungen; indonesischer studentischer Aktivismus; religionsbasierter Aktivismus

INTRODUCTION

The political position of students (*mahasiswa/i*) in Indonesia has been a determining factor at key junctures since the colonial era. This was most evident in the course of the downfall of Suharto in 1998 (Aspinall, 2005; Botz, 2001, p. 39; Eklof, 2004, p. 297), as Indonesian students not only played a critical role in their home country, but some of them living abroad also contributed remarkably to this change in leadership. Already during Dutch colonial rule, Indonesian student associations in the Netherlands were engaged in struggling for the independence of Indonesia. For instance, Mohammad Hatta through *Perhimpunan Indonesia* (PI, Indonesian Student's League), Syahrir, and many others who studied in the Netherlands were active in persuading the international community to lend their support to the independence of Indonesia (Mrázek, 1994; Rose, 2010).

This paper seeks to highlight the activism of Indonesian students in Berlin from the 1960s until today. In order to do so it poses the following question: How have Indonesian students abroad organized their political activism, built networks, and sustained consistency in order to express their critical stance towards events at home? In particular, the article focuses on Indonesian student activists in Berlin-based campaigns between the 1970s and today: What issues have been preferred, what media used, and what networks established? Finally, this paper also illustrates nuances between the activism of secular student movements and religion-based student activism. The current capital of Germany is the center of this article's analysis since most Indonesian students in Germany, estimated to number perhaps a thousand, currently reside in Berlin.[1]

This study is based on written documents (published and unpublished), interviews and conversations with former and current student activists, and on personal participatory observation with former and current students who lived and studied in Berlin from 2010 to 2013. This set of written material and oral histories allow for a closer insight in the activism of Indonesian students abroad.[2]

INDONESIAN STUDENT ACTIVISM IN GERMANY UNTIL THE FALL OF SUHARTO

Student activism refers to a series of collective actions outside learning and educational undertakings, which are oriented towards contributing to the change of unjust political, social, and cultural circumstances surrounding them. In many countries, the targets of their opposition are the entrenched, ruling regimes (Weiss, Aspinall, & Thompson, 2012, p. 1). The political and historical position of student activism in the process of social and political change of any country is of utmost importance. In the Republic of China, for example, students in the 1990s spearheaded protest move-

1 This number is estimated by an informant at the Indonesian Embassy in Berlin. Besides this estimation, the Indonesian Embassy cannot provide accurate figures.

2 For the literature review, I have benefited from the closer study of bulletins, booklets, and magazines of student organizations which remain preserved by Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja in a private collection. He is a former prominent activist of the Indonesian Student Association (PPI) and one of the founders of *Watch Indonesia!*.

ments against the authoritarian ruling regime, while in Indonesia, student demonstrations successfully forced Suharto to step down from presidency in 1998 (Aspinall, 2005; Eklof, 2004; Vatikiotis, 1994; Wright, 2001). Similar to the student movements in their home country, Indonesian student activists in Berlin remained focused on and critical of the politics in their home country. This section highlights the activism of Indonesian students in Berlin, Germany, between the 1970s and the fall of Suharto in 1998. Prior to this, especially in the post-colonial era of Indonesia, many student organizations were established abroad, but their activism did not have any discernible impact on the domestic politics of their home country.

The information regarding the first Indonesian students who arrived in Berlin is both scarce and not particularly clear; several names have been mentioned as the early generation of Indonesian students who came to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1960s. Regardless, there certainly was an Indonesian student presence in the GDR, most of whom were sympathetic to the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party), such as Soebronto K. Atmodjo (1929–1982) (Ardjo, 2012, p. 437; Baets, 2002, p. 280). In the Sukarno era, Atmodjo was sent to East Berlin by the government of Indonesia to study music. In 1965, he completed his studies at Hanns Eisler Advanced Music School, Department of Choral Music and Art Ensembles (Ardjo, 2012, p. 438). Xing Hu Kuo was reported as one of the first Chinese-Indonesian students who came to the GDR; yet he was anti-communist (Slobodian, 2013). Mas Prasetyo Soeharto, who was buried in the front yard of the Sehitlik Mosque in Berlin in 1957, can also be regarded as one of the first Indonesian students in Germany.

By the mid-1960s, there were some 70 Indonesian students in the GDR. During the Sukarno era (1945–1965), Indonesia had a closer alliance with the GDR than with the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany) (Slobodian, 2013, p. 38). Sending Indonesian students to the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, Cuba, and many other countries was part of his strategy to collaborate with socialist and communist countries and promote NASAKOM (*nasionalisme* [nationalism], *agama* [religion], *komunisme* [communism] at home (Hill, 2012; Lamoureux, 2003, p. 100; Westad, 2005). To underscore this, in 1965 Subandrio (the leftist foreign minister of Sukarno's cabinet) refused to issue permits for 13 Indonesian students to travel to the US (Murphy & Welsh, 2008, p. 15).

The *Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia* (PPI, Indonesian Student Association) was established in 1954 in West Germany. At that time, PPI was an association of Indonesian students in both East and West Germany tied with the sentiment of Indonesian nationalism. As an umbrella group for Indonesian student organizations in Germany, the Central PPI (*PPI Pusat*) functioned as a coordinator of the PPI branches established by Indonesian students throughout GDR and FRG. In addition to the PPI, *Organisasi Pelajar Indonesia* (OPI, Indonesian Student Organization) was established in East Germany in the 1970s. This organization was not established to replace or counter the PPI and it eventually existed only in East Germany, functioning as an umbrella organization for student activism parallel to the PPI. In its early days, PPI was not concerned with social and political criticism. Rather, it worked closely with the Representatives of the Indonesian Government in both FRG and GDR. Yet, in the 1970s it changed its legal status from being based upon Indonesian law to becoming an *eingetragener Verein* (e.V.) (registered association) under German law (informant,

personal communication, 1 July 2014). Although PPI was considered to be an entirely independent student organization, from that time on it began to take a more critical stance towards Indonesian politics. This happened at the same time as the first critical comments against Suharto began to be put forward by student activists at home. A turning point was the *Malari* incident of 15 January 1974 (*Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari*, Fifteenth of January Tragedy) – a big demonstration against Suharto's policy of providing more benefits to the economic interest of Japan than to Indonesia (Hidayat, 2008, p. 47; Widjojo & Noorsalim, 2004, p. 60). Three years later, in 1977, the PPI *Cabang Berlin Barat* (Cabe, West Berlin Chapter; in Indonesian language *cabe* means hot chili peppers), one of the local branches of Central PPI, started its critical activism. Although there is no direct link between the Malari incident and the beginning of Indonesian student activism in Berlin, both shared a critique of the ruling Suharto regime. One of the first signs of Indonesian student opposition in Berlin was their refusal to attend the Indonesian Consulate of West Berlin's commemoration of *Kesaktian Pancasila* (Day of Pancasila's Victory).[3] *Kesaktian Pancasila* is a public holiday set by Suharto to commemorate the defeat of the PKI in 1965. Suharto introduced the day as a symbol of devotion to the generals who became victims of the aborted coup on 1 October 1965, allegedly driven by the PKI (Cribb, 2005, p. 34). This rejection led the Consulate Office to speculate that the branch of PPI supported the ideological stance of Indonesian Communist and Sukarnoist groups in Berlin (Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja, personal communication, July 2014). Although the board members of PPI Pusat seemed to disagree with the position of its West Berlin branch, they did not have the right to interfere, since PPI Berlin profited from institutional autonomy. The Indonesian General Consulate was concerned with this matter since any indication of communism was considered a threat to the stability of Indonesian politics abroad. Meanwhile, Indonesian Communist and Sukarnoist groups (alumni of *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, PNI, or Indonesian National Party) did not confirm any shared activities with the PPI Berlin. The former were mostly cadres of PKI and Sukarnoists who came from communist-socialist countries in the Soviet Union and from China after obtaining political asylum from FRG. They assumed that the members of the PPI Berlin were not revolutionary enough for them to fight against the Suharto regime. The situation put the Indonesian Student Association of West Berlin in a difficult position. In short, its refusal to attend the *Kesaktian Pancasila* commemoration was a means of showing its opposition to the repressive politics of the Suharto regime, but not to Indonesia itself. It was a sign of an active concern of members of PPI with the daily politics of Indonesia, although they lived in Germany (Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja, personal communication, 20 May 2014).

From this incident onwards, the relationship between the Consulate Office of Indonesia and the Indonesian Student Association began to deteriorate. The Consulate had two opponents at the time: Indonesian Communist and Sukarnoist groups, on the one side, and the PPI Berlin, on the other. Although Indonesian Communist groups in Berlin never clearly declared their ideological stance in front of the Indonesian public, their tendency towards communism and socialism could be recognized

3 Pancasila represents the ideological foundation of independent Indonesia set out in the Constitution and consists of five pillars: (1) union of God, (2) humanity, (3) unity of Indonesia, (4) social justice, and (5) democracy (Darmaputera, 1988; Intan, 2006; Ramage, 2005).

from their favorable discussions of Marxism, Stalinism, Leninism, and Maoism and from the back-up of communist and socialist parties such as the *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* (DKP) and *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED) (Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja, personal communication, 19 July 2014).

In reaction to the critical stance of the PPI Berlin, the Consulate attempted to intimidate some core Indonesian student activists by pressuring them over their Indonesian citizenship. The Consulate did not revoke their citizenship since this would be a move against human rights laws, yet it delayed and even refused to issue passport extension (or renewal). Without a valid passport, Indonesian student activists were not eligible for extension of their student visas from West German authorities. Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja was one former Indonesian student activist targeted by this intimidation. This strategy, however, did not reduce the criticism of Indonesian students of the official representative of Indonesia in Germany.

Years later, a similar intimidation strategy was directed at Ivan Al-Hadar, a core activist of *Persatuan Pemuda Muslim di Eropah* (PPME, Association of Muslim Students in Europe) and a PhD student at Technische Universität (TU) Berlin. In 1992, the Suharto regime prevented him from going back to West Germany after a long fieldwork period from 1989 to 1992 in Indonesia. During his fieldwork, Al-Hadar was summoned by the *Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara* (BAKIN, State Intelligence Coordination Agency) for interrogation regarding his and his student friends' activities in Berlin. It seemed that BAKIN was afraid that Ivan Al-Hadar had used his PhD fieldwork to consolidate support for the Indonesian student movement in West Berlin, assuming that the issue of PPI Berlin's resistance against Suharto had been heard by pro-democracy activists in Indonesia.[4]

However, BAKIN's efforts to intimidate Kartawidjaja and Ivan Al-Hadar were not successful. Instead of acquiescing, PPI Berlin increased its resistance against the Suharto regime. In fact, they not only opposed the regime but also adopted a strategy of counter-intimidation by creating activities that irritated the personnel of the Indonesian Consulate Office in West Berlin. In the 1980s, for instance, PPI Berlin published and circulated its own internal magazine called *Gotong Royong* (mutual aid). This magazine was funded with their own money to indicate its independence from any intervention. In addition, Kartawidjaja regularly wrote a personal note that contained gossip and rumors happening among home and local staff of the Consulate. These notes were partly published in *Berita Tanpa Sensor* (News Without Censorship) in 1984.[5] Some of the staff were not happy to see how they were mentioned in Kartawidjaja's diary and staged a sort of a public tribunal against him. They forced him to burn the manuscript of the diary. Although the confrontation with the Indonesian Consulate and the Embassy of Indonesia were evocative of the story of "David

4 For example, Abdurrahman Wahid (General Chairman of *Nahdlatul Ulama* and Indonesian president from 1999 to 2001), Emha Ainun Nadjid (artist and poet), and Adnan Buyung Nasution (human rights defender and lawyer) often met and shared experiences either when they visited Berlin or when PPI Berlin activists were going home to Indonesia. Emha Ainun Nadjib lived in Berlin and Amsterdam for eight months in the 1980s. According to him, the activity of PPI Berlin grew popular among the pro-democracy activists of Indonesia.

5 This diary was not published in the form of a bound book, but printed on photocopiers. Some members of PPI Berlin participated in circulating the diary among the Indonesian public in Berlin. I got this information from Asep Ruhiyat and Rolf Susilo during my stay in Berlin from 2009 to 2014.

against Goliath", as Kartawidjaja puts it, the activists of the student association never despaired.

SCHOLARLY POLITICS

In anticipation of the criticism from Indonesian students throughout Europe, 'scholarly politics' (*politik ilmiah*) was introduced as a guiding principle in the cadres of PPI. As a student organization, PPI was supposed to be independent from the intervention of the ruling regime in Indonesia. However, many of the leadership's members were close to the state. Consequently, the imposition of state intrusion happened mostly through its leadership. Scholarly politics was introduced by Daud Joesoef who had studied in Paris, France, in the 1970s. The jargon was intended to motivate Indonesian students abroad to focus on their studies and to keep distance from political activism. Engagement in political activism, in Joesoef's words, led students into non-academic activities, which were against the original intention of their presence abroad. Besides, politics was deemed a "bad" engagement in disharmony, conflict, and immorality. Interestingly, during his period as Minister of National Education and Culture in Indonesia, from 1978 to 1983, Joesoef introduced scholarly politics at campuses at home through his policy called NKK/BKK (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan*, Normalization of Campus Life/Bodies for Student Coordination). Similar to the idea of scholarly politics for Indonesian students abroad, the spirit of the NKK/BKK aimed to depoliticize the role of Indonesian students at home (Aspinall, 2005, p. 120; Machmudi, 2008, p. 109).

In the context of the PPI in Germany, this idea of scholarly politics received various responses from Indonesian students. The PPI Pusat in West Germany generally agreed with the idea. They brought forward the argument that many Indonesian students failed their studies because they were too involved in political activism. This assumption, however, is not totally accurate since many of them dropped out of their studies due to job opportunities in a Western country and to earn money, sufficient not only for their own expenses, but also for their families at home. PPI Berlin, on the contrary, challenged the idea of scholarly politics, as it would lead to ignorance and antipathy towards politics at home or in general. The concept tended to be 'pro-status quo' and facilitated control by the regime.

Like PPI Berlin, the Catholic students who formed *Keluarga Mahasiswa Katholik Indonesia* (KMKI, Indonesian Community of Catholic Students) as well as Indonesian Muslim students in Germany opposed scholarly politics.

MEDIA AND NETWORKING

The success of PPI Berlin in its activism in the 1970s was mainly due to its awareness of the importance of media and networking. Since their inception, the media was regarded as an important tool and strategy to promote their ideas and their struggles. It published *Gotong Royong*, a regular bulletin that reported news, articles, and also featured translated articles from either German or English into Indonesian. The bulletin had quite a significant readership (a circulation of 200 to 300 exemplars of each edition) compared to an estimated 700 Indonesian students living in Berlin

back then (Sembering, former Indonesian student activist, personal communication, 9 July 2014). From the 1970s to the 1990s, reading Indonesian newspapers was a privilege, limited to the staff of the Indonesian Consulate that regularly received supplies from Garuda Indonesian Airways.

Besides a bulletin, the establishment of a network of local activists in Berlin and West Germany is worth mentioning here. As a result, in 1991, the former activists of PPI and local activists agreed to establish the NGO Watch Indonesia!. The tragedy of Santa Cruz, East Timor, that resulted in the death of 290 civilian East Timorese on 12 November 1991 (Gunn, 1997, pp. 126–127; Lawson, 1996, pp. 782–783) was a major reason for the establishment of the NGO.[6] Furthermore, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 inspired the spirit of liberation for the Indonesian community in Berlin. Watch Indonesia! became a bridge between PPI Berlin and German activists. The establishment of Watch Indonesia! can therefore be regarded as evidence of the failure of the "politics of isolation" (*politik isolasi*) conducted by the Indonesian Consulate. The politics of isolation intended to create a public discourse or image that political activism was 'bad' for Indonesian students abroad. The involvement of senior activists of PPI Berlin in the formation of Watch Indonesia! presented a response to the politics of isolation as it indicated the ability to extend their activism to German citizens. According to Kartawidjaja, the politics of isolation led the PPI Berlin to interact even more intensively with local NGOs.

PROTESTING AGAINST SUHARTO IN GERMANY

In 1995, Indonesia was a Hannover Industrial Fair partner country and Suharto used this opportunity to visit Dresden. This was not Suharto's first visit to Germany. Already in 1991, the President was greeted by demonstrations organized by those who would found Watch Indonesia! and other Indonesian student activists in Berlin who protested against his government's policies, particularly towards East Timor.

Although the demonstration against the 1995 visit of President Suharto was not big in scale (attended only by 150 to 200 protestors, mostly Germans and a few Indonesians), it had an impact on the political position of the authoritarian leader at home and the eventual degradation of his image as a strong and charismatic leader in both domestic and foreign politics. This was evident in the way the domestic politics of Indonesia responded to this event, and in how East Timor's independence movement, and also labor activists, used this degradation to strengthen their activism (Elson, 2001, p. 277).

Many speculated that PPI Berlin was an important actor behind the protest. Yet, there is no direct evidence for its involvement but the spirit of opposition against the Suharto regime. One assumed link between the Dresden incident and PPI Berlin was the arrival of Sri-Bintang Pamungkas to Berlin, which coincided with Suharto's visit to Hannover. Sri-Bintang Pamungkas was a public intellectual and an opposition figure to the Suharto regime. He was elected Member of Parliament (DPR) for

6 Prior to the establishment of Watch Indonesia!, Indonesian and German students together with other interested citizens formed the *Deutsch-Indonesische Gesellschaft* (DIG); yet, this institution was focused on culture and art rather than on political issues.

the Muslim-based *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, United Development Party).[7] Sri-Bintang Pamungkas spoke out critically with regard to the authoritarian regime. In particular, he criticized the concept of "development economy" (*ekonomi pembangunan*). Until then, this concept was seen as a trademark of the New Order regime and praised by national and international institutions (like the World Bank) alike. The idea was to counter *ekonomi pembangunan* – celebrated by Suharto's crony companies and then Minister for Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie – with a critical point of view.

Sri-Bintang Pamungkas came to Germany on invitation by a coalition of international human rights institutions based in West Germany, including Watch Indonesia!. Human rights and democracy activists, such as Yeni Rosa Damayanti,[8] were also invited. After finishing his program in Bonn, Sri-Bintang Pamungkas returned to Berlin to give a lecture on the progress of Indonesian politics at the TU Berlin on 9 April 1995. The lecture was a regular activity organized by PPI Berlin that had hosted other Indonesian speakers such as Adnan Buyung Nasution (lawyer and human rights advocate), W. S. Rendra (poet), and many other Indonesian 'national figures' before.

In the context of Sri-Bintang's visit and the demonstration mentioned above, PPI Berlin had no intention to connect the two events, since the protests took place before the lecture of Sri-Bintang. The Dresden protest was set up by *Timor und Kein Trupp*, an NGO of former East German activists that fought against any kind of authoritarian regimes in the world and had also been participating in toppling the dictatorial regime in East Germany.

The incident curbed the pro-democracy protest movements of Indonesian activists, which had largely stagnated during the New Order. Suharto tried to criminalize all those who were directly or indirectly involved in the protests. On his way home from Germany, he spoke to journalists claiming that all those involved in the demonstration against him were a group of insane people (*orang sinting*). Sri-Bintang Pamungkas was a possible target of prosecution, although there was no evidence at all connecting his lecture at PPI Berlin's forum to the incident (Elson, 2001, p. 277; Prasetyo & Hasibuan, 1996, p. 33). Nevertheless, the Jakarta Central Court found him guilty of inciting hate speech in his lecture. The court charged Sri-Bintang Pamungkas under a regulation that forbids insulting the President of Indonesia. The government accused him and Indonesian student activists of masterminding the Dresden demonstration against Suharto. Furthermore, Suharto called for a dismissal of Pamungkas' mandate in parliament. While it was believed that PPP had no right to recall an elected MP, the leadership felt that it had no other choice. As a result, the PPI Berlin received wide coverage in Indonesian media. In short, although there was no direct connection between PPI Berlin and the Dresden incident, this event formed

7 PPP was the result of a forced unification of several smaller political parties oriented towards Islam and one of three legal political parties under Suharto's dictatorship (Ziegenhain, 2008, p. 52). The role of PPP and *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party) was comparable to "rubber stamp parties" (*Blockflöten-Parteien*) in the GDR: Their function was to legitimize the policy of Suharto and the ruling party Golkar (*Partai Golongan Karya*, Party of the Functional Groups).

8 Damayanti was an activist of PIJAR (The Center for Information and Reform Action Network), one of the prominent Indonesian NGOs critical of the Suharto leadership. She went to study at the Institute of Social Sciences in the Netherlands and continued her criticism against the undemocratic regime in Indonesia from abroad.

an apparent link in the minds of many, and in turn influenced protest movements at home (Pamungkas, 2008).

THE EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM STUDENT ACTIVISM

As mentioned above, not all Indonesian students in Berlin were affiliated with PPI Berlin. In 1973, Indonesian Muslim students established the PPME (Muslim Youth Association in Europe) in Germany.[9] The organization was a reincarnation of KII (Indonesian Islamic Family Association), which was established as a response to the establishment of KMKI. In addition, the founding of this Muslim youth association was stimulated by emerging identity politics of the Indonesian community in Berlin at the time. Internationally speaking, it also merged with the spirit of global Islamic revivalism, for instance in Egypt and Iran. From Egypt, it took the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood and from Iran, it took the spirit of the Iranian revolution (Ivan Al-Hadar, personal communication, 23 September 2014, Jakarta).

Although it referred to Islam as an ideological foundation, the youth organization also involved some members of other student associations. Ivan Al-Hadar, for instance, was both an active member of PPME and a core activist of PPI Berlin (1973–1989). Not surprisingly then, the relationship between the two organizations was relatively harmonious at the time, with different roles at the beginning. Whereas the PPI was active in mobilizing political and critical activism, the PPME Berlin focused on providing services to Indonesian Muslim students such as finding a place for Friday prayers, celebrating Islamic festivities, and many other religious activities. Differences between them arose when PPME showed its radical Islamic outlook in public, for instance, regarding the position of women. In 1985, this disagreement became evident when PPI Berlin commemorated the Indonesian women's day with a focus on the Indonesian female 'hero' Kartini. The PPME opposed the celebration with reference to Islam, as the female students at the event were dressed without covering their '*awra/aurat*' (Arabic term for the part of the female body that must be covered in Islam, excluding the face and hands). This opposition showed PPME's stance, which was primarily based on the conventional opinion of Muslim jurists among the four schools of Islamic law (Hanafī, Mālik, Shāfi'ī, and Ibn Hanbal). Its conservative religious tendencies, however, did not stop there, but continued in the daily activities of their members such as in Islamic study groups (*pengajian*) in which women were segregated from men. Abdurrahman Wahid (General Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1984–1999), for instance, had a disturbing experience with PPME that invited him to give an Islamic sermon at a conference on Islam in Berlin in 1987. Wahid came to the forum and witnessed that the audience was separated in a male and female group through a partition. Wahid opposed this segregation and suggested them to

9 PPME was first established in the Netherlands in 1971. The use of the word Europe was envisioned to dissociate the organization from Indonesia and therefore avoid trouble with the Indonesian Consulate. The founders of PPME were Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Tengku Razali, Muhammad Chaeron, A. Hanbali Maksum, Abdul Muis Kaderi, Rais Mustafa, and Moh. Sayuti Suaib. Conservative tendencies of the PPME appeared when it started to collaborate with the World Assembly Muslim Youth (WAMY), the Muslim World League (*Rabita al-'Ālām al-Isāmī*), and the Council of Indonesian Islamic Propagation (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, established by Mohammad Natsir, leader of *Masyumi Party*) (Chabibi, 2011).

dismantle it. When they refused his demand, Wahid left the forum (Pipit Rochijat Kartawijaja, personal communication, 19 July 2014).

The conflict intensified when the PPME accused student activists of PPI Berlin of being secularists and communist sympathizers. At this point, PPME was closer to the anti-communist viewpoint of the Indonesian Consulate. With regard to religious orientation, the PPME was dominated by Muslim student activists inclined towards Salafism (the idea of going back to the practice of the first Muslim generations, see also Chaplin, this issue). PPME often hosted Indonesian Salafi or Muslim Brotherhood preachers (Arabic: *muballigh*) commissioned from Saudi Arabia or Egypt for proselytization (*da'wa*) in Berlin.

Although the PPME claimed it was an Islamic student association, its commitment to Islamic solidarity at home was questioned by other Indonesian students in Berlin at the time. This skepticism was related to PPME's reaction to the Tanjung Priok tragedy, which took place in Jakarta. In 1984, the struggle of Muslim groups for the use of Islam as the sole ideology of Indonesia (*asas tunggal*) led the Indonesian military to commit mass murder in the area of Tanjung Priok, in the north of Jakarta (Muluk, 2009, p. 106). It was not clear why the association did not issue a solidarity statement as the PPI Berlin did.

POST-SUHARTO STUDENT POLITICS IN BERLIN

After the resignation of Suharto, the activism of both PPI Berlin and the Central PPI dramatically declined. They assumed that the resignation of Suharto in 1998 would improve politics in Indonesia, especially in terms of democracy and social justice. They also believed that elected leaders – executive and parliament – in the post-Suharto era would assist in this. In fact, the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President of Indonesia for the period from 2000 to 2001 gave rise to a slight sense of optimism among the students. Wahid announced to amend the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* (MPRS, Transitional Indonesian People Assembly) XXV/1966 Decree, which had been a main source of political injustice and discrimination of Indonesian citizens, especially for those who adhered to non-mainstream ideologies such as communism. The amendment of the law became an important starting point to promote reconciliation across the political spectrum in Indonesia. For Indonesians abroad, the amendment was especially important as those who were sent to study abroad by Sukarno regained their citizenship. Although Wahid's plan received criticism from political parties such as Golkar and some Islamic parties in Indonesia, the international community and Indonesian diaspora responded very positively to it. Of course, from the perspective of PPI Berlin, this plan was in line with one of their key struggles. After a controversy, Wahid had to resign from his presidency in 2001, and the agenda of amending the decree was not an urgent issue for his successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri (Susanto, 2007, p. 70).

At the same time, the activism of Indonesian Muslim student groups abroad began to evolve and increase. In Berlin, their activism was mostly concentrated at the al-Falah Mosque. The mosque was founded by the Indonesian Muslim community in Berlin and Brandenburg as a cultural center (IWKZ, *Indonesisches Weisheits- und Kulturzentrum*); however, the PPME played a pioneering role. Before the establishment

of the al-Falah Mosque, Islamic activities were concentrated around the Indonesian Embassy. The IWKZ itself was a center for cultural activity that was not officially intended to be used as a mosque. Because of difficulties in acquiring a building space for an independent mosque in Germany in terms of regulation, location, and financial resources, the Indonesian Muslim community in Berlin agreed with the Embassy to repurpose the IWKZ to a mosque.

The existence of al-Falah in Berlin created a flexible space for Indonesian Muslim students to organize and plan their activities such as weekly Qur'an lessons or *Majelis Taklim* for adult Muslims. The community of al-Falah can be roughly divided into two groups. The first comprises activist members who take part in the routine activities of the mosque whereas the second encompasses ordinary visitors of the mosque. The majority of the first group has a religious mindset close to the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and/or Salafism. Politically, most of them are affiliated with or at least sympathetic to *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party).[10] PKS regularly sends an Islamic preacher from Indonesia to deliver sermons to the Indonesian Muslim community in Germany. These visits are hosted by the al-Falah Mosque in Berlin. The second group comprises those who attend the mosque mainly for Friday prayers. They do not have strong ties with the agenda of the mosque but go there because it is the only mosque administered by the Indonesian community in Berlin. While the first group is smaller than the second one, it is able to dominate the activities because of the intense role in the management of the mosque. Informants assured me that the board of al-Falah is significantly dominated by activists from PKS.

The first group's tendency to support the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood is demonstrated by its adoption of an Islamic learning system for their activists and members. They employ a cell system (Arabic: *usra*, or family), within which the members are divided into several smaller groups ranging from senior to junior strata. Each group is maintained by a senior mentor (Arabic: *murabbî*). The different groups are separated from each other, i.e. juniors sit with juniors and seniors with other seniors. There is a strong sense of solidarity among members, what Mandaville (2007, p. 271) would call a micro-mobilization movement. Although this system is covertly organized, many people know about its activities. In addition, some of those who drop out from the circle have publicly criticized the system, especially through social media like Facebook and Twitter. Indonesian students in Berlin occasionally hear about these activities ,but understand them as standard Islamic learning activities, not related to the cultivation of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology.

In addition, Indonesian Muslim students have also organized an Islamic learning forum called *Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Muslim Indonesia Se-Jerman* (FORKOM, Communication Forum of the Indonesian Muslim Community in Germany). Although this organization is not intended exclusively as a forum for Muslim students, the majority of its members are students. Ideologically speaking, the members of FORKOM also tend to be close to the religious model of the Muslim Brotherhood and/or Salafism and most of its members are indeed members of the PKS. The forum

10 The PKS is an Indonesian Islamist political party that has a similar vision with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Based on its activities and programs, the party seeks to establish Sharia Law in Indonesia and has a very prominent presence among Indonesian Muslim students in Berlin. In the 2014 general election, the PKS won 35 percent of the vote in Berlin (Aziz, 2014).

has a very strong presence in Berlin, Hannover, Frankfurt, and other big cities in Germany. It sponsors not only religious learning activities but also sports festivals, similar to PPI. Importantly, FORKOM organizes almsgiving for Indonesian Muslims living in Germany. The sports festival is held every year and all the participants are required to wear clothing in accordance with Sharia norms.

Further evidence that suggests FORKOM and al-Falah's support for PKS can be seen in their promotion of the party's program through social media such as Facebook and Twitter. During the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012, they campaigned actively for the PKS-backed candidate pairing of Hidayat Nur Wahid and Didik J. Rahbini. Hidayat Nur Wahid is a senior politician of PKS and former spokesperson of the Indonesian People Assembly (MPR) and Rahbini is a senior politician of *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN, National Mandate Party). When both candidates failed to advance to the second round of the election, they shifted their support to Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi and launched a negative campaign via social media against the eventual winners, Joko Widodo (the current, newly elected President of Indonesia) and Basuki Cahya Purnama.

Religious activism among Indonesian Muslim students became more vibrant in Berlin when in April 2010, a number of Nahdlatul Ulama students coming from Indonesia to Germany established *Pengurus Cabang Istimewa Nahdlatul Ulama* (PCINU, Special Branch of Nahdlatul Ulama, Germany). PCINU focuses on organizing religious meetings and providing online and offline religious learning and public discussions for Indonesian Muslim students. Interestingly, both Muslim and non-Muslim students participate in PCINU activities. The presence of the special chapter of Indonesia's largest Islamic organization in Germany provides an alternative space for those Indonesian Muslim students who have a different point of view from the conservative Islamic groups.

In addition, after a lengthy slumber, the activism of the PPI was re-energized by a collaborative demonstration involving PPI Berlin, PCINU, and Watch Indonesia! during the visit of Indonesian parliamentarians to Germany on 26 April 2012. The demonstration received serious attention from prominent political figures in both the Indonesian Consulate in Berlin and back home. The protest was triggered by a rumor that a group from the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR, legislators of Indonesia) would visit Germany and hold a special session organized with the Embassy of Indonesia and the Indonesian community in Berlin. This meeting was 'dressed up' by the Embassy as part of the commemoration of Kartini Day. In response, some Indonesian student activists decided to attend the commemoration and conduct a protest, citing the legislators' visit as a misuse of public funds. As the Embassy of Indonesia was not aware of the plan, members of the abovementioned organizations found it easy to attend the commemoration. Once there, they brought up three important issues: First, to remind the legislators of their function as one of the democratic pillars of the country; second, to remind them of the need for a sense of urgency in their work; and third, calling on them to reduce overseas visits as they consume large amounts of funding but have little benefit at home. The activity gained wide media coverage in Indonesia because it was the first of its kind performed inside an Indonesian Embassy. Every major national media outlet – print and electronic – covered the incident as a means to stimulate public debate on the function of the DPR and the importance

of monitoring the use of public funds. As a result of this pressure, the DPR finally decided to reduce the frequency of members conducting trips abroad ("DPR pelesir", 2012).

CONCLUSION

This paper pointed out that Indonesian student activism in Germany comprises a diverse, dynamic, but also controversial interplay of voices. While PPI remains active, it is no longer the sole and central actor among Indonesian students in the country. PPI Berlin and Central PPI continue to focus their activism on issues of human rights and politics, but newer groups such as FORKOM have introduced more puritanical religious activism. Muslim students who associate with the PKS have a different way of performing their activism than students with the PPI Berlin. Relations between current student activists and alumni of both PPI and Muslim students are maintained and sustained, ensuring a basic thread of continuity across time. This is provided by a number of former student activists deciding to stay in Berlin beyond their studies. Furthermore, although there are differences among activist elements, there is a shared desire to critically discuss the situation back home and express and share different views. The PPI hopes its home country will evolve as an open and pluralist country whereas Indonesian Islamic students grouped under FORKOM and the PKS want Indonesia to become a more Islamized country. Since the resignation of Suharto, both groups appear freely in the German public sphere. Indonesian student activists understand dynamic engagement with (political) activism as part of their way in paving the way to the future. Therefore, although they know that their activism may produce unpleasant consequences for themselves, they continue their informed and active engagement and concern.

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East Timorese in Australia: Affective Relations, Identity, and Belonging in a Time of Political Crisis

Hedda Haugen Askland

▸ Askland, H. H. (2014). East Timorese in Australia: Affective relations, identity, and belonging in a time of political crisis. *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7*(2), 199-216.

This article considers the relationship between the East Timorese diaspora and its homeland. More specifically, it explores how a group of East Timorese exiles living in Melbourne, Australia, who left East Timor or were born in exile from the time of the 1975 civil war up to the end of the Indonesian occupation of the territory in 1999, was affected by the 2006–2007 political conflict in East Timor. The article considers how past diasporic practice established the East Timorese community in Melbourne as a largely homeland-focused community and how the subsequent centrality of the discourse of home exposed the exiles to the political events of 2006–2007. Through an analysis of Pierre Bourdieu's (1977) notions of habitus and practice, the article explores how the crisis affected the exiles' sense of self, community, and nation, and how it led to a process of negotiation whereby the notions of the homeland and exilic longing were muted through a gradual movement away from the translocal sphere. The article represents a contribution to the discussion of diaspora as process, condition, and consciousness; that is, diaspora as a dynamic, culturally and politically reflexive group that mediates between and negotiates competing pressures of multiple homes, cultures, and social domains. It sheds light on issues related to political mobilization, peace, and conflict, and the role of reciprocity, trust, and emotions.

Keywords: East Timorese Diaspora; Emotions; Habitus; Political Unrest; Translocal Practice

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Dieser Artikel betrachtet die Beziehung zwischen der osttimorischen Diaspora und ihrer Heimat. Er untersucht, wie eine Gruppe von osttimorischen ExilantInnen in Melbourne, Australien, die in der Zeit zwischen dem Bürgerkrieg von 1975 und dem Ende der Besetzung durch Indonesien 1999 Osttimor verlassen hatten oder im Exil geboren waren, von dem politischen Konflikt 2006–2007 betroffen wurden. Aufbauend auf Pierre Bourdieus (1977) Vorstellung von Habitus und Praxis analysiert der Artikel, wie die Krise die Wahrnehmung des Selbst, der Gemeinschaft und der Nation durch die ExilantInnen beeinflusste und wie sie zu einem Prozess der Verhandlung führte, durch welchen die Vorstellungen von „Heimat" und Sehnsucht sich durch eine graduelle Entfernung von der translokalen Sphäre veränderten. Der Artikel stellt einen Beitrag zur Diskussion über Diaspora als Prozess, Bedingung und Bewusstsein dar; das heißt Diaspora als eine dynamische, kulturell und politisch reflexive Gruppe, die den Druck multipler Heimatorte, kultureller und sozialer Sphären aushandelt. Er wirft Licht auf Themen in Zusammenhang mit politischer Mobilisierung, Frieden und Konflikt sowie die Rolle von Reziprozität, Vertrauen und Emotionen.

Schlagworte: Emotionen; Habitus; osttimorische Diaspora; politische Unruhen; translokale Praktiken

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INTRODUCTION

> [W]hen you look at it [the violence] from the outside – it's so sad, so sad. It's far too sad … And all these kids, the burning stuff, what are they doing? What is the government doing? Where is the law? Where is the respect? Why are these kids burning stuff? Why, why is this happening?

In late April 2006, politically and ethnically motivated violence erupted in the East Timorese capital, Dili. Following the 2002 independence, the lack of significant progress on key socio-economic variables such as health, income, and employment had led to increased frustration and disgruntlement, particularly among the country's youth. While high youth unemployment, increasing poverty in rural areas, and falling per capita incomes were undoubtedly part of the mounting tensions of 2006, the proximate cause of the violence can be traced to the dismissal of 594 soldiers of the national army, *Falintil-Forças de Defensa de Timor-Leste* (F-FDTL). In January 2006, the dismissed soldiers, known as 'the petitioners', had complained about unfair treatment of soldiers from the western part of the country, citing grievances such as limited opportunities for promotion, poor service conditions, and abusive discrimination by officers from the eastern part of the country. Their complaints were dismissed and, when their problems remained unresolved, they deserted. Refusing to accept their subsequent dismissal, the petitioners' protests became increasingly vocal. As the crisis escalated, they were joined by other East Timorese who sought to use the situation to convey discontent with the government and the impoverished situation of the country, as well as youth gangs who expressed rivalries and hostility across the east-west axis. With the security forces in conflict and with battles among several street gangs spreading across the capital, the East Timorese government called on the international community to restore order. At the same time, the Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, was under increasing pressure from all sides of the political spectrum – including members of his own party (*Fretilin*). Alkatiri resigned on 16 June 2006 and, after Parliament's appointment of the independent candidate José Ramos Horta as the country's interim prime minister and the establishment of a new UN mission, a process of reconciliation and rebuilding began. The crisis resulted in the death of at least 37 people, the internal displacement of approximately 150,000 people, and the destruction of more than 14,000 homes and buildings in the capital (UN, 2006; UNDP, 2011; Vieira, 2012). It exposed unresolved ideological and strategic differences of the independence movement, as well as ethnic and regional divisions and limitations of institutional, political, and economic sectors. Economically, the crisis set the country back dramatically, leading to more unemployment and restrictions in the delivery of social and welfare services (UNDP, 2011).

Physically removed from the unfolding conflict, East Timorese living in exile watched the breakdown of national consensus with a sense of bewilderment and shock. As is suggested by the epigraph, the exiles struggled to comprehend the turn of events. How could the peace they had all fought for disintegrate so easily? Where was the unity? Where were their leaders? What were the motives of those fighting? The questions were manifold and the crisis caused a sense of ambiguity, which triggered yet another set of questions related to association, belonging, and the sense of

self. While none of the exiles had anticipated that independence would be without challenges, the 2006–2007 political crisis and the subsequent breakdown of national consensus were beyond their expectations. The thought of East Timorese fighting East Timorese, of East Timorese people themselves causing suffering and pain to the nation's young and old, had been a distant fear, for many too surreal to consider a possibility. In contrast to the Timorese in East Timor, many of whom were aware of the tensions that led to the conflict (Silva, 2010), the exiles' engagement with local social dynamics in East Timor were in general restricted to the level of the family and they received relatively little information about the complex dynamics that underpinned simmering social conflicts, political tensions, and symbolic battles at the local level. Explanations of the crisis, which included native theories such as social envy and corruption, arrogance of political leaders, and lack of recognition of past suffering (Silva, 2010, pp. 109–110), as well as consideration of socio-political, socio-cultural, and socio-economic factors were thus employed in hindsight.

This article does neither analyze the causes of the crisis, nor the exiles' explanations or rationalizations of the events. Rather, it focuses on how the exiles experienced the crisis, the affective response triggered by the conflict, and the subsequent questioning of identity and belonging. The article, which forms part of the project 'East Timorese in Melbourne: Community and Identity in a Time of Political Unrest in Timor-Leste' (Askland, 2009), is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted within the East Timorese community in Melbourne during the time of crisis.[1] Based on an understanding of diasporic communities as dynamic, culturally and politically reflexive groups that mediate between competing pressures of multiple homes, cultures, and social domains, I explore how the exiles' experiences of the crisis form part of an ongoing process of negotiation, where cultural codes, values, meanings, and expectations shape the dynamics of their post-independence identities in intricate ways. I take as my starting point the observation that concern for family and friends at home is a continuous issue facing refugees and exiles (Varvin, 2003, p. 16), and that news about violence and unrest can be associated with intricate and complicated feelings of anxiety, fear, guilt, remorse, disappointment, and loss. There is no uniform or simple answer to how conflict, violence, and unrest in the homeland affect exile and refugee communities; rather, the particularities of the refugees' flight, the nature of their exile, the specific character of the conflict, and variation in cultural and moral discourses may provoke diverse reactions and manifest in individuals' lives and exile communities in different ways.

Placed within the discipline of social anthropology, this article is indebted to phenomenology, particularly the phenomenological tradition that focuses on worldly

1 The paper is based on eight months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted with the East Timorese community in Melbourne in 2006–2007, as well as two months fieldwork in Dili in the period between March and May 2006. The fieldwork incorporated research strategies such as participant observation, including neighborhood studies, engagement with various organizations, and participation in community events; semi-structured interviews; and discussions with non-Timorese individuals in key roles associated with the community, such as community workers, youth workers, and members of various solidarity organizations. For the Melbourne part of the fieldwork, a total of 56 East Timorese were formally interviewed; the number of individuals who informed the study is, however, much higher due to the nature of the fieldwork, which incorporated informal conversations with community members in their homes and at community events.

existence (over transcendental essence) and embodied practice (over pure form). In line with phenomenological thinking, I try to grasp social processes through the phenomenology of individual experience, and the social world – local and translocal – of the exiles is conceived of as constituted through a dialogue between the self and their environment(s). With Pierre Bourdieu's *Theory of Practice* (1977) as a theoretical point of departure, I explore the conjuncture of the individual subjective experience and the more objective frames within which this unfolds.[2]

The article is divided into four main parts. First, I present a brief outline of the East Timorese community in Melbourne and explore how a notion of reciprocity formed part of the establishment of the community as a homeland-focused diaspora. Understanding the exiles' reactions to the crisis and its implications on diasporic practice requires recognition of their past histories and imagined future; the exiles' experience of and reactions to the political conflict are closely connected to their hopes and expectations of independence and the community's history as a highly transnational homeland-focused diaspora. This is followed by an exploration of how the exiles were exposed to and how they experienced the crisis. I thereafter consider the exiles' affective responses to the conflict before, in the final section, presenting the theoretical analysis of the affective responses and the associated process of negotiation of identity and belonging.

EAST TIMORESE IN AUSTRALIA

There is some uncertainty about the size of the East Timorese community in Australia, though estimates suggest that the number of individuals born in East Timor – estimated at 9,320 – and their descendants total between 15,500 and 20,000 (ABS, 2006; Askland, 2009, pp. 25–26). The majority of the East Timorese in Australia arrived in the period between 1975 and 1999 as political refugees in a diaspora born of catastrophe – a brief civil war between the political parties *União Democrática Timorense* (UDT) and *Frente Revolutionaria de Timor-Leste Independente* (Fretilin), followed by the Indonesian invasion and occupation of the territory. Most of the departures were traumatic and coerced, and the suffering of the occupied homeland exerted a powerful influence on the community. Subsequently, the diaspora grew as a "community of co-responsibility" (Werbner, 1998, p. 12), which, through political mobilization and material gestures, maintained and remained part of East Timorese long-distance nationalism (Wise, 2006).

The majority of refugees, together with many second-generation youth, participated in a protracted political campaign aimed at national liberation and, throughout the occupation era, the diaspora played a central role in the campaign for self-determination. The political struggle drove, directly or indirectly, social and cultural activities and lay at the heart of the exiles' collective imagination. Through efforts to educate the international community about the tragic plight of East Timor, for

2 While much could be said about the relationship between Bourdieu's theory and phenomenology, this is beyond the scope of the article. For the purpose of the discussion presented here, it is sufficient to note that Bourdieu's 'theory of practice', despite its inherent criticism, is highly dependent on phenomenology. For in-depth analyses of Bourdieu's critique and the alignment between his theory of practice and phenomenology, see, for example, Endress (2005), Throop & Murphy (2002), and Lau (2004).

example political campaigns, humanitarian fundraising, and aesthetic performances of cultural identity, the East Timorese refugees tied themselves to the suffering of their family and friends in East Timor and experienced it themselves as participants of the liberation struggle. The actions of the people living in exile maintained a level of diplomatic pressure on international power brokers and ensured that the East Timorese people's cause was not forgotten. At the same time, the political campaign and the sense of imagined community on which it rested provided a means by which the refugees could participate in and maintain important social relationships and alleviate feelings of loss and guilt associated with their flight.

Because of the political campaign, the East Timorese exile community developed as a highly homeland-focused community, and the community emerged largely unified and coherent. The community was, however, never a homogeneous group and, behind the unified front of resistance, ethno-linguistic, generational, political, and socio-economic differences existed. Within the overarching community, there are smaller 'sub-communities', including the 'twin communities' (Thatcher, 1992) of the Timorese Chinese and the *mestiço*[3]/indigenous Timorese, the political groupings UDT and Fretilin, and the group of young 'modern Timorese' who are committed to the preservation and regeneration of East Timorese culture and cultural identity. In conjunction, the diaspora is today marked by the divergent experiences of those who were politically active throughout the Indonesian occupation of East Timor and those who refrained from participating in the campaign. Whereas those who were intimately involved in the resistance movement had vested interests, motivations, and hopes for independence, those who did not engage in the independence campaign demonstrated greater openness to change and were not affected by the intense emotional proximity between East Timor's independence and the image of self. In this article, I focus on the narratives of a group of first- and second-generation East Timorese who were actively involved in the resistance struggle and who, throughout the occupation years, imagined exile as temporary displacement. These groups, which cross the ethnic and political sub-groupings of the community, are united by the similarity of their exile identities and the political campaign. Throughout the occupation years, they intertwined their exile identities with the symbols of home and return (Wise, 2004, 2006), and – at a higher level of abstraction – a moral order of reciprocity. Before continuing the discussion, a brief note on the logic of reciprocity is required, as it forms part of the East Timorese cultural framework.

The Logic of Reciprocity

The logic of reciprocity is central to East Timorese sociality (Askland, 2009, pp. 127–129; Fox, 1993; McWilliam, 2005), and notions of exchange and a dualistic organization of the world are prominent across the East Timorese landscape. A fundamental epistemological orientation exists which provides, as Andrew McWilliam (2005) observes, "a focus for the articulation and celebration of connections that bind individuals and households within an historical and symbolic unity" (p. 32) and connect people to a 'historico-mythic' past. Moreover, as he argues in a separate article

3 The term *mestiço* refers to people of mixed Portuguese and Timorese ancestry.

about the Fataluku community of East Timor, "[a]ncestry, the mythic origins of settlement and the memorialised spatio-temporary trajectory of the clan provides an enduring basis for contemporary social practice and claims to resources" (McWilliam, 2007, p. 363). This notion of origins and conceptions of precedence is characteristic of most Austronesian societies and is frequently paralleled with an idiom of exchange (Fox, 1996a, 1996b). In eastern Indonesia, such conceptions often feature with dyadic categorizations or a dual organization of social and cosmological elements (Fox, 1989; Traube, 1980, 1986; van Wouden, 1968). Cultural and social icons are ordered according to a system of complementary categories; that is, they are classified into pairs of opposites such as male/female, elder/younger, above/below, outside/inside, heaven/earth (Fox, 1996b, p. 132; Soares, 2003, p. 34; Traube, 1986, p. 4). The symbolic dyadic scheme represents various realms of experience and forms part of social institutions, ritual practice, and myths.

East Timorese anthropologist Dionísio da Costa Babo Soares (2003) argues that "traditional thinking regarding dual categories might have some influence on the way the political forms of expression and explanation of life processes among the East Timorese are formulated" (p. 35). According to Soares, the dual category of the past and the present/future has become particularly pervasive in post-independence East Timor and in the East Timorese people's portrayal of struggle. Through this dualism, the East Timorese engage the past as a source to explain, classify, or predict contemporary events and possible future events (Soares, 2003, pp. 38–39). It implies an idiom of reciprocity and exchange, through which the social order (as well as the balance between the cosmos and the living world) is sustained.

The cultural code of reciprocity and the associated notion of morality run through the East Timorese society and form part of the East Timorese people's perceptions, explanations, and rationalizations of post-independence realities. Elizabeth Traube (2007) and Kelly C. Silva (2010) have shown how the notion of reciprocity and a sense of a failure on the part of the nation to fulfill expectations of reciprocity underpinned the political crisis of 2006–2007. I have argued elsewhere (Askland, 2009, 2014) that the logic of reciprocity is also relevant in understanding the East Timorese exiles' post-independence practice and their rationalization of contemporary events. Despite their detachment from traditional belief systems, cosmology, and social life, the East Timorese living in exile have retained the notions of morality and the dualistic complex of East Timorese society. This is demonstrated by their responses to the political crisis and their (subsequent) negotiation of boundaries, belonging, and, ultimately, identity.

EXPERIENCING THE CONFLICT

At the time of my fieldwork, the exiles remained bewildered and emotionally confused as to why and how the peace could have been broken so easily. They asked questions like the following: How could their leaders and their people allow things to go this far? How could they let go of the peace that they – the people – had sacrificed their lives for? Why was there no interference to ensure that suffering and trauma did not again become the reality of the Timorese people? As these questions remained unanswered, the exiles were left with a sense of hopelessness and emptiness. These

emotions were expressed in both formal conversations between the study participants and myself and in more informal interactions at family and community events. They illustrated an intense emotional connection between the exiles' selves and the homeland, and manifested an emotive void in which their past and imagined future were confronted by the new reality introduced by the crisis.

The distress experienced by the exiles has to be seen not only in relation to their past ventures and imagined futures, but also to their present situations, which – in most circumstances – were shaped by their position in the translocal sphere.[4] Whereas only a minority of the exiles repatriated after independence, the majority continued to engage in translocal activities. This typically included receiving and sharing information from and with friends and family in East Timor, remittances to family members at home, and a continued engagement with and concern about East Timorese politics and culture. Some of the exiles also reclaimed property left behind at the time of flight; others bought land in East Timor considering the possibility of a future return 'home'. With property and family in East Timor, many of these individuals experienced the crisis in a direct manner: Some received threats to their family and property in East Timor and others' houses were attacked and burned to the ground. Many have family and friends who were forced to leave their homes and seek refuge in camps around Dili or with relatives in other districts. Although these camps would protect their loved ones from any immediate threat of violence, the exiles remained concerned about their situation due to the poor living conditions in the camps and the disruption that the violence caused to their families' lives. Limited and often contradictory information fueled people's concerns for family and friends, and they were often left in a state of panic as they received news about violence but were unable to contact their loved ones; either because they had fled to areas without phone coverage or because Dili's phone network had broken down.

The direct exposure that many of the exiles had to the crisis is exemplified in Chen's story.[5] Chen is a fifty-year-old Timorese Chinese man who has visited East Timor numerous times after he left the country in 1976. Following independence, Chen started to consider moving back to East Timor in order to start a small business. Reflecting upon the logic of reciprocity, he explained that "I wanted to contribute to East Timor, and I thought that I could do so by creating my own business". He continued, that "it would create employment and help stimulate the economy. Of course, I hoped to get a small profit, but this was only secondary, it was because I am East Timorese that I wanted to do this. I wanted to give something back." Chen had planned to return to East Timor for six years, sacrificing his prospective earnings in Australia and leaving his wife and children in Melbourne; but after the crisis he reconsidered his plans. As he explained, "I was willing to sacrifice a lot, but my own safety, my own life – I don't think so".

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4 I adopt Greiner and Sakdapolark's (2013) definition of 'translocal' and 'translocality' as a description of "socio-spatial dynamics and processes of simultaneity and identity formation that transcend boundaries – including, but also extending beyond, those of nation states" (p. 373). As a term, translocal(ity) refers to phenomena that involve mobility, migration, circulation, and spatial interconnectedness that may exist within and beyond national boundaries; it refers to "simultaneous situatedness across different locales" (Brickell & Datta, 2011, p. 4).

5 Pseudonyms are used throughout this article.

Chen's perception of the risk involved in moving to East Timor was largely influenced by his experience of the crisis, as mediated through his family in Dili. Speaking about the crisis, Chen appeared quite distressed and upset. With an empty look in his eyes, he told me how one of his brothers was forced to flee and seek asylum in Australia on humanitarian grounds.[6] His brother, half Chinese and half 'Easterner', had been threatened by local gangs, as well as by a senior commander of the police:

> [W]hen the police chief knows [that my brother had travelled to the East] and he ring him and threaten him, saying 'you involve with Lorosae [Easterners], you be careful'. So that's why my brother was scared and wanted to come to Australia. With the local, he say that with the local, not, not, you know, [this] happens all the time, but with the police chief he started to worry and also there were a few people, Timorese young people who said, they threatened him and said 'I'm going to rape your, I'm going to rape your daughter'. So when all this happened, my brother said that, how can we stay here? You know, that's why he came … they have a small clothes shop in there, so people came and they asked for money and they threaten him and also they throw rocks all the time in the night.

Chen explained how the crisis brought back terrible memories about the invasion and occupation. The distress, fear, and worry that he felt were further exacerbated by the uncertainties connected to the crisis: What was really happening? Who was behind the violence? What would happen next? These concerns echoed in the narratives of other participants who emphasized the hardship of not knowing what was happening at any given moment and the inability to help. They expressed feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, restlessness and numbness, often coupled with a sense of guilt due to what they perceived as their privileged position as members of a second national community, earned by their flight from East Timor.

During the Indonesian occupation, emotions such as these underpinned a sense of migration guilt, which added force to the exiles' translocal practice during the occupation years. Australian anthropologist Amanda Wise (2004), who did research with the East Timorese diaspora in the period between 1998 and 2002, argues that many of the protest events of the resistance struggle "appeared to represent spaces in which East Timorese refugees were able to participate in strategies of intensification" (p. 27). Drawing on Ghassan Hage's (2002) concept of migration guilt – that is, guilt resulting from the inability of exiles to participate in, and share, the faith of the family, community, or communal group that "provided them with [the] gift of commonality" (p. 203) – she explains how the sense of guilt experienced in the face of the suffering of those who remained in East Timor "translated into a desire to participate in the political struggle" (Wise, 2004, p. 27). The sense of migration guilt underpinning the political mobilization of the diaspora reflects the logic of reciprocity discussed previously. Considering the continued relevance of the logic of reciprocity to the exiles'

6 There is no official information available about the number of East Timorese who have sought asylum in Australia as a consequence of the political crisis of 2006–2007. I was told by community workers who were intimately involved in the cases of East Timorese refugees that ten people sought asylum on humanitarian grounds. According to Chen, his brother's application for protection was approved by the Refugee Tribunal in 2007.

translocal activity, it could be expected that the feelings that emerged in the shadow of the political crisis of 2006–2007 would lead to the reappearance or enhancement of migration guilt and its associated practices. However, while an initial intensification of feelings of guilt materialized, this did not translate into translocal practices. Rather, there appeared to be a decrease in translocal activism in the aftermath of the crisis. At the time of my fieldwork, the exiles were, as is suggested in the following quotes, increasingly moving away from the translocal sphere: Plans of future return were discarded; people were cautious about participating in fundraising activities, withdrawing both material and symbolic support of community activities; and East Timor was left out of many of the exiles' plans for the future.

> And then the problem start, everybody just feel numb. They feel numb. And when I see, and sometimes I end up with some people in the street or in the shopping center and they say 'my hope is gone. I have no more hope. I stay here it doesn't matter. I hoped to go to East Timor, but I stay here' … For me, [the crisis] affect me a lot because I always think that my kids would go back to East Timor … Now they all think no more security to go. Better we stay here. It affects me a lot … I think more than the invasion.

> We used to do fundraising, but at the moment people are a bit disappointed. The community, I don't know what happened with the other groups, but the one that I am representing now are really badly disappointed. Because they said, 'We're helping'. For what? To be destroyed again? That's why they, they think now, we're sort of like in intermission. They are watching … They want to help. But then we said, and people, suddenly everything happen, with all the things that has been happening, maybe we send it there and then the container will stay at the port for two-three years, and then they rampage everything to go in and after that … it's just better we wait and see until things settle to help in different ways.

The crisis instigated a limited response from and within the community. With the exception of a few public forums, none of which were organized by East Timorese community organizations, there was no communal response to the crisis. The forums, which reflected a discourse removed from the affective domain of the exiles, were dominated by Australian people concerned about the development in East Timor and representatives of civil society organizations, and only a small number of East Timorese attended. The sense of disengagement propounded by the lack of participation in communal events and the reduction in material and symbolic support suggest a gradual diminution of indebtedness and guilt. Understanding the disengagement and limitations of material and physical responses require further exploration of the exiles' affective reactions to the events and how these relate to the logic of reciprocity. This will be explored next.

AFFECTIVE RESPONSES

Community members were deeply saddened and disappointed by the turn of events. Reflecting on the years of occupation – the suffering of the East Timorese people, their own suffering, the sacrifices, and the hard work for freedom and peace – they felt a loss and found it difficult to comprehend the situation. They articulated a range of feelings including anger, frustration, sadness, and concern. They felt angry because of the senselessness of the violence; frustrated because of the lack of responsibility shown by the political elites;[7] sad because of the continued suffering that the violence brought on their people; and concerned about how the violence might affect their family, friends, and the future of East Timor.

The political elite's perceived lack of willingness to reconcile and the subsequent spiral of violence led to feelings of embarrassment and shame. Discussion within the Australian media and among Australian politicians, academics, and everyday Australians on the question of whether or not East Timor was presenting as a failed state (Askland, 2009, pp. 152–155, 175) fuelled these sentiments, which compounded concern about the reactions of the international community and the worry that the fight for independence would be seen as a fraud. How could they defend their right to independence when people were fighting among themselves? How could they claim a right to democratic self-governance when the political elites engaged in infighting, corruption, and nepotism and when a state of anarchy reigned? How could they defend the nation that they fought for when the unity on which it rested was threatened by regional feuds and divisions?

> We had a once-in-a-life-time opportunity and if we didn't take advantage of this thing – you know last year [2006], April and May, that was the most painful to look at. I feel embarrassed. I feel worse. People say, 'hey, you are Timorese, you are killing each other!'. I feel embarrassed. They say that, sort of in joking sense, but I feel it very heartfelt, this is really much, much more than a joke or a comment. I feel a lot deeper than that … Before it was easier. When you go against somebody else it was easier. You have someone to yell at. We are fighting a harder battle right now. In a sense it is a battle where you don't have directions … who are we going to scream at? No enemy. Different directions. You can't blame one leadership, you can't blame the government. You can't blame the politicians. It's harder than before right now.

7 The crisis triggered much criticism of the East Timorese political elite, several of whom spent the occupation years in exile. It is worth noting that the exiles focus their critique of the political leadership on the role of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, President Xanana Gusmão, and former guerrilla leaders such as Francisco Guterres (Lu'Olo) and Taur Matan Ruak, none of which were former members of the Melbourne diaspora. Their criticism follows party lines, with Fretilin supporters questioning the role of Gusmão in the lead up to and during the crisis and UDT supporters focusing on the role of the Fretilin leadership, in particular Alkatiri and Guterres. In contrast, politicians who had spent the occupation years in Australia, such as Estanislau da Silva and Emilia Pires, were seen by many of the exiles (particularly UDT supporters) to be the key for East Timor's future and it was suggested that they would play a role in changing the political culture of the country.

The feelings of shame and humiliation furthered a process of othering (Said, 2003, p. 332), which had been initiated after independence. The declining levels of translocal activism and the increased emotional distance resonating in the exiles' narratives are expressions of the exiles' movement away from the translocal sphere. Paradoxically, these actions and the attempts to restrict or reduce the emotional intensity of their relationship with East Timor are in themselves depictions of the strength of their affective relations with the nation; they are responses to intensely felt emotions rising from the symbolic proximity of the former refugees' image of self and their lives in exile to the discourse of home, nationhood, and ancestry.

The feelings of anger, sadness, frustration, and embarrassment indicate the continued relevance of the logic of reciprocity and the exiles' ongoing engagement in a collectivist discourse that underpins East Timorese communal life. The emotions signal the presence of a social bond; the events matter to the exiles because of their enduring social, cultural, and historical association with the community. According to Scheff (1990), the "primary social emotions" that convey such social bonds are pride and shame. He argues that "pride is the sign of an intact bond; shame a severed or threatened bond" (p. 95). The feeling of pride arises from conformity to exterior norms and the subsequent reward of others' respect, admiration, and esteem. Shame, on the other hand, is a result of the non-conformity to exterior norms and the subsequent loss of deference (Scheff, 1990; Velayutham & Wise, 2005, p. 37). The political crisis represented a breach of the norms to which the East Timorese nation and its people were expected to adhere and, through the Australian media's portrayal of the events and the public discourse about the crisis, the exiles experienced decreasing support and esteem for the young nation. The crisis represented the nation's failure to comply with its obligations towards the community set by the moral code of reciprocity and the social discourse of communalism (Askland, 2009, pp. 75–76, 127–129; Silva, 2010; Traube, 2007). This moral discourse posed expectations that – due to the suffering and sacrifices of the East Timorese people in the name of independence – the nation would compensate those who fought for its existence by ensuring peace and prosperity (Traube, 2007). It is in the shadow of the nation's failure to comply with the idiom of exchange and reciprocity that the social bond between the exiles and the East Timorese nation is renegotiated and transformed (Askland, 2009). In the following section, I will explore this process of negotiation and the paradox of the exiles' ongoing engagement with the discourses from which they attempt to distance themselves.

AFFECT, IDENTITY, AND NEGOTIATION OF BOUNDARIES

Reflecting on the ambiguous and dynamic nature of exile, Wise (2006) states that "individuals, communities, homelands, and countries of refuge are always situated within and in relation to a changing grid of circumstances and power relationships" (p. 7). Intensely felt experiences of changing circumstances, which engage the individual through its involving and affecting effect, can lead to a renegotiation of boundaries, identity, and belonging. According to this, we can expect the 2006–2007 crisis, due to its affective implications, to inform the continuous process of negotiation and transformation of boundaries of belonging. As illustrated above, the exiles showed,

at the time of my fieldwork, a physical distancing from the translocal sphere and an effort to emotionally detach themselves from the discourse of the homeland. These are practices underlying the East Timorese exiles identity and belonging. How, then, does the crisis affect identity and belonging?

An exploration of Bourdieu's (1977) theory of practice and his argument about the reproduction of habitus can help illuminate some of the processes at stake. In contrast to identity, which can be defined as "a reflexive construct or experiential modality through which one knows oneself and claims recognition" (Leve, 2011, p. 513), habitus refers to the principles of generating and structuring practices and representations that produce and reproduce identity "through particular dispositions and structures of perceptions which are associated with a sensory environment" (Askland, 2007, p. 240). It is acquired through primary socialization in childhood and adolescence, but is continuously reproduced and transformed, building on, or responding to its past conditions (Bourdieu, 1977). It embodies the individual's personal history, including her or his social location (class, ethnicity, gender, etc.), and is constructed through the individual's practice within specific cultural, social, and historical contexts. As such, it reflects the collective history of the group (or variety of groups) to which the individual belongs as well as the individual's biography.

According to Bourdieu (1990), the reification of habitus will protect it from "crises and critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as possible" (p. 61). It makes "systematic 'choices' … among the places, events and people that might be frequented" (p. 61), ensuring its reproduction and the creation of meaning and practice through familiar fields and a known milieu. However, to presume that individuals can refrain from potential discordance between the subjective dispositions and the objective structures that form their habitus is problematic. People may be exposed to situations in which they have no such 'choice'; they may be forced to move from their known milieu – as is the case with refugees and asylum seekers – or political or social circumstances may change to such an extent that the social world loses its familiarity. Bourdieu (1977) makes reference to such 'crises' when he argues that,

> [t]he critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation, has as the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in breaking the immediate fit between the subjective structures and the objective structures, destroys self-evidence practically. It is when the social world loses its character as a natural phenomenon that the question of the natural or conventional character (phusei or nomo) of social facts can be raised. (pp. 168–169)

Such crises bring the embodied assumptions underlying identity and practice into the sphere of consciousness. Faced with the reality of the political crisis, the East Timorese in Melbourne experienced a personal and communal crisis in which they were forced to question the character of their social world. While the crisis had only limited, if any, impact on the exiles' everyday practice, it manifested itself in the translocal sphere in which the exiles' social worlds of home and exile meet, and in the affective dimensions that are integral to their conception and experience of self. This was particularly evident in their emotive response to the crisis, which indicated

a heightened awareness of the subconscious classifications that guide their practice and a heightened reflexivity about their situation and position within the translocal sphere.

Although the development of habitus forms a significant part of Bourdieu's theory, his framework remains vague on the question of how this process takes place, let alone the role of emotions in the generation of habitus. In general, Bourdieu (1977) argues that habitus is "laid down in each agent by his earliest upbringing" (p. 81), and he emphasizes the notion of field, capital, and practice, particularly as it relates to significant others. It can be argued that this emphasis on the role of primary socialization incorporates a notion of emotions, as emotions and affect are central to the primary world into which a child is born. Indeed, as Rew and Campbell (1999) argue, "the domain of family and kinship … contributes centrally to the emotional salience of identity" and the family "provides the context, the models and the means by which key understandings regarding personhood, selfhood and individuality are learned and internalised by children" (p. 17). Through gradual accumulation of experience, children develop a sense of identity, personhood, and selfhood; that is, they develop an internal mental representation of self as well as a cultural or collective representation that reflects their positioning within social realities (Rew & Campbell, 1999). Emotive behavior and affective expressions manifest in the interactive pattern between a child and her or his significant others and mobilize a defined sense of association and belonging. Accordingly, the process of primary socialization not only equips the individual with cognitive abilities, skills and competence, capital, knowledge, and meaning; it also bestows an experiential dimension onto the habitus in which emotional expressions engender beliefs, attitudes, and desires that motivate and guide social participation and practice. As part of the habitus, emotions guide practice and subsequently form part of its development. Inherent in this argument is the possibility of affective experiences leading to change, negotiation, or transformation of the habitus.

The intensely felt (negative) emotions evoked by the political crisis in East Timor caused a disruption between the participants' subjective dispositions, their experience of self, and the social world to which they relate. Whereas emotions form an intimate part of individuals' daily lives, not all affective experiences will cause experiences of disruption or change; the *intensity* of the emotions resulting from the crisis is what put the conventional character of the exiles' social worlds at odds with each other. Bourdieu (1984) acknowledges that people may be affected in various ways and to different degrees by similar events depending on their position within physical space and variance in social distance. Drawing on this point, Hage (2002) contends that,

> [a]n intensely experienced reality is not the same as a 'hard hitting' reality. Intensity has more to do with the extent to which the reality is involving and affecting … An intense reality is primarily an intense *relation* where the person's engagement in reality contribute [*sic*] to construct its intensity. (pp. 193–194)

I have argued that East Timorese discourses, particularly those of reciprocity, national unity, and freedom, form a central part of the exiles' perception of self, commu-

nity, and nation. The engagement with East Timorese discourses and their influence on the exiles' habitus (specifically the habitus of those who were active in the political struggle for independence) denotes the intense nature of this relation. Rather than resulting from physical closeness, the intensity of the relation results from the affective and symbolic proximity of East Timorese discourses and their intimate, often subconscious, presence in the exiles' being-in-the-world. The involving and affecting character of these discourses is evident in the emotional responses outlined above. The emotions – anxiety, worry, concern, anger, sadness, disappointment, embarrassment, guilt, and shame – are signs of the exiles' interest and involvement in East Timor and the presence of East Timorese discourses in their lives.

In relation to shame, Elsbeth Probyn (2004b) proposes that "[s]hame is our bodies' way of telling us that we are interested … [it] is intimately involved in the passions of interest" (p. 225). Reactions to shame, she contends in accordance with Nietzsche, will reflect a type of self-transformation,

> [s]hame compels a rethinking of how we conceptualize the everyday as it is lived. Shame … dramatically questions taken-for-granted distinctions between affect, emotion, biography, and the places in which we live our daily lives … Shame rips the everyday out of its habitual stasis: its sentencing within the present. (Probyn, 2004a, p. 328)

However, is the disruptive consequence of shame restricted to this particular emotion? Probyn (2004b) herself observes that it is hard to delineate "where one emotion ends and another starts. Anger and rage can be closely tied to shame, attempting to displace the more painful feeling of shame. Shame can also bleed into sorrow" (p. 225). Considering the indefinite boundaries of particular emotions, their interconnections and relatedness, I suggest that the potential for self-transformation is not restricted to the emotion of shame, but translates to other intensely felt emotions such as embarrassment, sorrow, anger, and guilt. In the case of the East Timorese exiles, these emotions emanated as a result of the public exposure of what the exiles perceived to be a shortcoming or failure of the East Timorese nation. It was not an affective reaction resulting from the exiles' personal impropriety or their violation of a moral code or personal standards (which, as June Price Tangney and colleagues (2008) explain, are often seen as incentives of shame and guilt), but rather a response resulting from their association with a community that they saw as failing to meet the expected standards and conventions bestowed upon it by independence. They felt exposed by the events in East Timor and were concerned with what others would think of their country and of them as East Timorese. It directly affected the core of their self-imagination, and the social threat embedded in the crisis forced them to react.

A primary source of the negative emotions exhibited by the participants was a desire for social inclusion, resulting from a central need to belong (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 2008). These emotions will normally produce a "somatic temporality, where the future of being again interested is felt in the present pain of rejection" (Probyn, 2004b, p. 239). Probyn's words suggest that, despite the pain experienced in the moment of emotional disruption, there is an underlying interest in a continued

relationship through which shame (and other intensely felt emotions) will make interest matter again. But, in the wake of the 2006–2007 crisis, the East Timorese exiles' narratives and translocal practice suggested otherwise. The temporary rejection of East Timorese discourses was evident within their practice, and they were moving away from the translocal sphere. This does neither mean that they will not return to a greater level of translocal activity in the future, nor that the East Timorese sphere will not regain its affective intensity. The muting of their East Timorese connections signifies a continued presence of East Timorese discourses; their rejection or muting is in itself an action that results from the presence of these discourses.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that many of the East Timorese living in Melbourne were strongly affected by the 2006–2007 crisis – despite their physical distance to East Timor. Those who had family and friends in East Timor, or who owned property in Dili, were affected in a very direct way; many experienced their families being subjected to violence or being forced to flee their homes, and some had their properties looted and burned. It was, however, in the affective, translocal realm that the crisis manifested most strongly and, while the crisis had limited (if any) impact on the exiles' social fields of everyday practice, it forced them to question the character of their social world. This, I have argued, has to be understood in relation to the exiles' positioning within two parallel social worlds that exist independently of one another and in light of the integral role of the translocal sphere and affective dimension to the exiles' perception, conception, and experience of self.

The crisis precipitated a radical ambiguity in the exiles' pre-existing refugee identities. It challenged perceptions of the past and the very foundation on which the exiles had imagined themselves and their community of belonging. Shocked and embarrassed by the events, many expressed bewilderment and confusion as to how the unity of their people could dissipate so easily. Complicated emotions of hopelessness and helplessness, concern, sadness, disappointment, anger, and frustration intermingled, and many articulated a sense of loss of trust in the nation and its leaders. These intensely felt negative emotions caused a disruption in the exiles' subjective dispositions, their experience of self, and in their social worlds. People felt exposed by the events and – with their identities so intimately woven into the narratives of resistance, heroism, and reciprocity – it affected the core of their self-imagination. Consequently, many adopted a conscious strategy of increasing the emotional distance between themselves and the East Timorese sphere. Through a process of othering, the exiles increasingly defined themselves beyond – even in opposition to – the East Timorese nation. These processes were visible in people's withdrawal from the translocal sphere and an apparent disinterest in East Timorese affairs. The boundaries of belonging were shifting, yet, through the act of rejection and withdrawal, the notion of East Timoreseness remained part of the exiles' identity and sense of self; the rejection or muting of their East Timorese connections was an action that resulted from the affective and involving character of the East Timorese discourses upon their exile identities.

The process of othering and the exiles' movement away from the translocal sphere illustrate how migrants and diasporas renegotiate a sense of identity in relation to the cultural precedents and socio-political realities of home and exile. Migrant and diasporic identities are fluid and notions of home and away, here and there, before and after, us and them, change over time. Thus, while the most recent crisis in East Timor resulted in a temporary muting of the exiles' East Timorese connection, this does not mean that they will not return to greater levels of translocal activity in the future. Through their habitus, East Timorese cultural precedents continue to underpin the exiles' practice and, with vested interests in East Timorese discourses, East Timor remains part of the ongoing process by which they conceptualize and negotiate their experience of multiple belongings.

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Imagining the Land of the Two Holy Mosques: The Social and Doctrinal Importance of Saudi Arabia in Indonesian Salafi Discourse

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The emergence of Salafi Islam within Indonesia has shifted the imaginary boundaries of Islamic identity. Although relatively small in numbers, Salafis propagate a religious discourse linked to scholars in Saudi Arabia. While it cannot be regarded as merely a type of 'Saudization', the kingdom is frequently exemplified as a model for a pious society as well as pragmatic solutions on how to deal with contemporary issues ranging from justice to terrorism. Indeed, Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal part in the Salafi imaginary, balancing a historical Islamic past with a modernist religious present and future. Based on fieldwork conducted from 2011 to 2012 in Yogyakarta, this paper builds upon this premise, offering both a description and an analysis of the importance of the kingdom as a source of educational sponsorship but also, more interestingly, as a source of religious authority and social ideals, articulated within contemporary religious literature and the movement's study sessions (*kajian*). More pointedly, I argue that actors use Saudi Arabia to construct an imaginary ideal through which social and religious issues are contemplated and compared to apparent Indonesian 'social corruption'.

Keywords: Indonesia; Religious Renewal; Salafism; Saudi Arabia; Social Imaginaries

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Mit dem Auftreten des Salafismus in Indonesien wurden die imaginären Grenzen islamischer Identität verschoben. Obwohl sie nicht zahlreich sind, propagieren SalafistInnen einen Diskurs, der sich auf Gelehrte in Saudi-Arabien bezieht. Während der Salafismus nicht bloß als eine Art von „Saudisierung" angesehen werden kann, wird das Königreich oft als Modell für eine fromme Gesellschaft sowie für pragmatische Lösungen betreffend Fragen von Gerechtigkeit bis Terrorismus dargestellt. In der Tat spielt Saudi-Arabien eine zentrale Rolle in der salafistischen Vorstellung, indem es eine historische islamische Vergangenheit mit einer modernen Gegenwart und Zukunft ausgleicht. Basierend auf Feldforschung in Yogyakarta von 2011 bis 2012 baut dieser Artikel auf den oben genannten Annahmen auf und analysiert die Bedeutung des Königreichs als Quelle für Bildungsförderung und, noch interessanter, als Quelle religiöser Autorität und sozialer Ideale, dargeboten in zeitgenössischer religiöser Literatur und in studentischen Versammlungen der Bewegung (*kajian*). Es wird gezeigt, dass Saudi-Arabien für die Konstruktion eines imaginären Ideals verwendet wird, durch das soziale und religiöse Themen betrachtet werden und "soziale Korruption" in Indonesien verdeutlicht wird.

Schlagworte: Indonesien; Religiöse Erneuerung; Salafismus; Saudi-Arabien; Soziale Vorstellungen

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Salafi Islam within Indonesia has, for its adherents, shifted the imaginary and ethical boundaries of Islamic identity. Although relatively small in numbers, Salafis propagate a religious discourse linked to scholars and educational institutions in Saudi Arabia that they believe emulate the *Salaf al-Salih* (which they interpret as the first three generations of Muslims). While it cannot be regarded as merely a type of 'Saudization', the Land of the Two Holy Mosques plays a pivotal part in the Salafi imaginary, balancing a historical Islamic past with an ideal religious future. Frequently exemplified, Saudi Arabia is not only the caretaker of Islam's most holy sites, but provides a model for an imagined pious society (compared to the perceived immorality of Indonesia) as well as pragmatic solutions on how to deal with contemporary issues from justice to terrorism.

Based on fieldwork conducted from 2011 to 2012 in Yogyakarta, this paper explores the importance of the Saudi kingdom among Salafis as a source of educational and financial sponsorship, but also, more interestingly, as a place of religious authority and ideals. I approach the subject through a focus on religious literature and study sessions (*kajian*) prevalent in Yogyakarta. My line of enquiry does not relate to a singular foundation or group, but rather looks more widely at a variety of agents active under the label 'Salafi' within the religious landscape. In doing so, I maintain that Salafism is a broad, translocal, multi-layered, and multi-stranded social movement that encapsulates a variety of different actors, institutions, and foundations. It is sustained not through any singular organizational structure, but through the lived experiences, divergences, and multiple ways in which it is 'enacted' within a given locale. In Yogyakarta, its proponents include (but are not exclusive to) *Wahdah Islamiyah*, the *Yayasan Majelis At-Turots al-Islamy* (At-Turots al-Islamy Foundation, At-Turots), and *Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary* (YPIA, al-Atsary Islamic Education Foundation). These actors often differ and disagree in the modes and methods through which they promote Salafi teachings, not shying away from contention in relation to religious practice. Yet, they nevertheless share similar global linkages and utilize Saudi Arabia in remarkably similar ways. Indeed, the use of Saudi sources and imaginaries in order to promote specific religious practices is perhaps a crucial overarching characteristic that conjoins a variety of 'Salafi' strands throughout Indonesia.

Through a description of the ways Salafi doctrine 'travels' (Said, 1983) and is 'framed' (Benford & Snow, 1986), I argue that the image of Saudi Arabia is used by actors to construct an imaginary ideal through which social and religious issues are reflected. For Salafis, any religious decision must find its legitimacy in Saudi sources. Further, Saudi society itself is utilized as a model of piety that adherents should strive towards. Yet, while this imaginary is built on real links and experiences, it fails to move beyond a normative set of values and look at the complexities and nuances of Saudi society itself. Moreover, as Salafism is not based on any unifying organizational and hierarchical 'center', its spread depends as much on global linkages as it does on the ability of local agents to adapt religious resources to a given context. Consequently, the need to recompose global sources at the local level inevitably requires a level of adaptation that creates a degree of distance from any idealized image of Saudi

Arabia. This does not render the image ineffectual, but rather, for Salafis, it becomes part of an 'emancipatory desire' constantly insisted upon, even if impossible to enact.

FRAMING SALAFISM AND RELIGIOUS LEGITIMACY

Prior to analyzing the modes through which particular socio-historical images of an Islamic society and Saudi Arabia penetrate Indonesian Salafi discourse, a descriptive account as to what I mean by the term Salafism (and Salafism in Indonesia, more specifically) is needed. The phrase derives from the phrase *as-salaf*, referring to 'those who came before us'. It is commonly utilized in Islamic thought to denote the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and, generally, those who believe they follow the examples of these early generations (Hassim, 2010). Indeed, despite its recent popularity as a 'catch-all' phrase to label a variety of conservative Islamic groups with significant theological differences (for example, see Fradkin, 2008), the importance of the term Salafi can be traced to earlier periods of Islamic history. Hassim, for example, states that it was commonly used in the Abbasid era to distinguish 'guided' Muslims from those that deviated from the orthodox creed, although he also stresses that it was used before this period (Hassim, 2010). Steeped in Islamic historical significance, 'Salafi' thus resonates among Islamic advocates and has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been applied to a variety of factions claiming to uphold Islamic traditions. In Indonesia, for instance, the organizations *Muhammadiyah* and *Persatuan Islam* (PERSIS, Islamic Unity) have often been referred to as having 'Salafi' elements due to their use of the turn-of-the-nineteenth-century reformist ideas of the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh and his colleagues – also popularly denoted as the *Salafiyya* (Hassim, 2010).[1]

As important as this is, I do not wish to delve too deeply into the nuances concerning the variety of theologians and movements who lay claim to the phrase. Rather, returning to the topic at hand, this brief description underlines not only the significance of the term, but also the importance in qualifying to whom one refers when applying it (and indeed what they themselves mean when engaging with the term). My description thus utilizes 'Salafi' fairly narrowly in reference to a broad social movement that entered Indonesia during the 1980s and has links to several scholars who studied at Islamic universities in the Saudi kingdom. Referring to itself as a particular *manhaj* (methodology), the movement aims to 'literally' apply Islamic principles in order to emulate the *Salaf al-Salih* (by which they specifically refer to the first three generations of Muslims – the *Sahabah*, *Tabi'un,* and *Tabi' al-Tabi'in*) in every aspect of one's life. Following a rigid adherence to *tawhid* (monotheism) as well as to the *athari aqida* (creed) (while most Indonesian Muslims traditionally followed the *ash'ari aqida*), Salafis condemn any 'contextualization' of Islamic practice as well as any custom that may taint one's absolute commitment to God – such as celebrating the prophet Muhammad's birthday or visiting the graves of Islamic saints. In its place, they believe in a need for rigid adherence to the Qur'an and Sunnah, although it is notable that the way they study hadith is unique given the importance of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–1999), who questioned the authenticity of approximately 990 ha-

1 The use of the term *Salafiyya* represented Abduh's ideal of re-engaging with Islamic texts by going back to the main 'sources' of the Qur'an and Sunnah in order to find an Islamic synthesis with concepts of modernity.

dith considered authentic by most scholars (Kamaruddin, 2004). It is, moreover, what Mahmood (2005, p. 81)describes as a "post-*madhaab*" form of Islamic religiosity that believes one cannot solely follow a particular 'tradition' or school of jurisprudence but, rather, must engage personally with Islamic principles and practice.

Socio-historically, Salafism emerged from the University of Madinah during the 1960s, particularly among the followers of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, who taught at the university's Faculty of Hadith Studies. Although sharing similarities and quickly building bridges with several other global movements – such as the *Ahl-e Hadith* in South Asia – the Saudi roots of contemporary Salafism have led several observers to link it to the 'Wahhabism' of the kingdom's religious elite (Al-Rasheed, 2007; Roy, 2004). While correct in pointing out a similar set of historical references and socio-conservative values between the two, we must remember that conflating Salafism and Wahhabism ignores the level of contention within the Saudi religious 'field', often between the institutionalized 'Wahhabism' of the *aimat al-Da'wa al-najdiyya* (religious notables of Najd) and those who propagate a variety of other religious positions – including Salafism (Lacroix, 2011). Indeed, the rise of Salafism occurred much to the ire of the Wahhabi elite at the time; they even successfully conspired to deny al-Albani an extension of his visa in 1963 after he criticized Muhammad Bin Abd' al-Wahhab's (the āl-Shaykh) reading of hadith. Al-Albani's followers, referred to as the *Ahl al-Hadith* movement, who later grew into the *Jama'ah Salafiyyah Muhtasiba* (loosely translated as the Salafi *jama'ah* (group) that practice *hisba*, or the commanding of right and forbidding of wrong) thus began to promote a set of beliefs that challenged several tenants of Wahhabi thought, including, but not limited to, their approach to hadith as well as adherence to the Hanbali *madhaab*.

In this light, Salafism is perhaps best thought of as a reconstituted Wahhabism (Hasan, 2010), sharing several socio-conservative and theological similarities in relation to *aqida*, but also decoupled from the historical-scholastic lineage of the *aimat al-Da'wa al-najdiyya* and traditional *fiqih* (jurisprudence). They have fallen in and out of favor with the religious and political elite of the kingdom, most notably during the 1970s when the Jama'ah Salafiyyah Muhtasiba was subject to state repression, especially after some of its former members laid siege to the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. Yet, Salafism was also fortunate enough to benefit from influential support, especially due to the intimacy between its followers and the influential Bin Baz, who was a senior member of the *Majlis Hay'a Kibar al-Ulama* (Council of the Committee of Senior Ulama) and became grand mufti from 1993 to 1999. Bin Baz, the first grand mufti not to originate from the family of Muhammad al-Wahhab, was well respected among Wahhabi scholars, never fully aligning with any religious 'camp' but rather mediating between religious factions within the kingdom. It was often at his behest and intervention that activists formerly involved in the Ahl al-Hadith and Jama'ah Salafiyyah Muhtasiba received light treatment from Saudi authorities during several periods of political repression (Lacroix, 2011).

By the 1980s, Bin Baz's influence led many Salafi ulama to engage with – and sit on – a variety of Saudi-sanctioned Islamic institutions including the Council of the Committee of Senior Ulama. Not only did this provide space for Salafi religious scholars, but it also endowed them with funding through which to facilitate religious programs, sermons, and social initiatives, often with little state oversight (Lacroix,

2011). It also coincided with a marked increase in funding for international religious programs. Shaken by the challenge of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in the same year, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi authorities augmented their drive to dress themselves in religious colors abroad (Al-Rasheed, 2008). Although Salafi scholars initially suffered from repression given the involvement of some of their former followers in the seizure of the Grand Mosque, their collusion with and loyalty to Saudi Arabia in relation to the war in Afghanistan brought them back into the fold (Lacroix, 2011).

This inevitably allowed activists to build bridges, provide scholarships, and construct mosques throughout the world – a process well documented in the work of Meijer (2009), but also within analyses pertaining to Salafism in Germany (Wurger, 2013), Ethiopia (Ostebo, 2011), and Yemen (Bonnefoy, 2011). Underlining the aesthetical and referential similarities amongst Salafis – all of whom reference similar religious scholars and sport either *jalabiyaa* (robes), beards, or the *niqab* (full veil) if they are women while avoiding *isbal* (trousers beyond the ankle) – such studies emphasized the commonalities and shared imaginative power of a 'global umma' utilized by a variety of actors throughout the world. Yet, they also highlight how the spread of Salafism is not the result of an organized state-based campaign, but has often circumvented direct state institutions and embedded itself in a variety of landscapes by transforming and recomposing itself in relation to the necessities of a given locale. Indeed, its increased global appeal had as much to do with Saudi Arabia's greater financial power as it did with wider global social transformations – mass urban migration, increased education, the 'failure' of Cold War ideologies, and the advent of mass communication tools, all of which led to a qualitative shift in religiosity both globally (Mandaville, 2007; Roy, 2004) and in Indonesia (Effendy, 2003; Feely & White, 2008; Hasan, 2006; Sidel, 2006).

The resurgence of Islamic identity from the 1980s onwards was, as studies have shown, not linked to any established form of Islamic authority, but came to rely on an individual's ability to reflexively think of oneself as primarily Muslim and to consider what this meant vis-à-vis the state, one's peers, the wider community, and market forces. Consequently, this presents a challenge to delineating a coherent Salafism. For example, from a social movement perspective, 'resource or political mobilization' (for example, see McAdam & McCarthy, 1996) is, given Salafism's frequent lack of explicit political mobilization, inadequate. The movement, rather than having a specific framework for engaging state and society, is based on what Hassim (2010) labels a particular 'paradigm of thought' that leads to a set of discursive practices drawing on a similar theological and socio-historical disposition. It remains a social movement, however, one that does not have clear-cut boundaries or objectives, preferring to be enriched through multi-layered and multi-directional characteristics, representing an enmeshment of people and lived experiences. In adopting such a definition, I borrow from the work of Lehmann and Siebzehner (2006) who, through their study of the *Shas* (Sephardic 'orthodox' religious political party in Israel), highlight how a multi-directional religious movement can reshape the intricacies and the very boundaries of a religio-ethnic community. Social movements often do not have specific objectives or even a defined set of ideas, but rather exist as the object of allegiance by individuals, whose own actions, built upon what Bayat (2005, pp. 891–908)

terms "imagined solidarities", endow the movement with new debates, programs, and strands.

This approach allows us to encapsulate a variety of Salafi 'strands' in our analysis that, while varying in their scope and nuances, can be tied together through similar linkages, both real and referential. Moreover, if we were to 'epidemiologically' trace their history in Indonesia, we could see several similar roots such as the founding of the *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* (LIPIA, Institute for Arabic and Islamic Knowledge, a branch of the Riyadh-based Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University) in Jakarta in 1980, an increase in scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia through the *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), an influx of Saudi-trained scholars, and a crisis in Islamic authority linked to political repression by Suharto's New Order. Indeed, for many young Muslims who, through rapid urbanization and access to educational facilities, neither identified with the belief system (Islamic or otherwise) of their parents' generation nor the official Pancasila ideology of the state, Islam provided an ideational reference point through which one could embody a modern identity. This process not only led to a form of religiosity that Fealy (2008, p. 15) believed penetrated further into social, cultural, and political life than ever before, but also an influx of scholastic works linked to 'global' movements including – but not exclusive to – Salafism.

Prior to continuing, it is important to point out that the emphasis on the Hejaz and Middle East more broadly – a key part of Salafi discourse – is not new to Indonesian Islam.[2] Indeed, the requirement of every able Muslim to undergo the Hajj points to the importance of the region for the religion as a whole. For Muslims in Southeast Asia, moreover, the Hejaz has constituted a marked source of scholarly work and religious legitimacy, with people, resources, and ideas continuously flowing from one to the other (see, for example, the collection edited by Tagiliacozzo, 2009). Ahmad Dahlan and KH Hasyim Asy'ari, the founders of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*, respectively, both studied in Mecca. It was also in Mecca that the Sumatran scholar Ahmad Khatib became the Great Imam of the Shafi'i *madhaab* at the Haram mosque in 1876 and taught many would-be reformist Southeast Asian Muslims – who would later become pivotal actors within the anti-colonial religious movement in the Dutch East Indies (Djamal, 1998). In this light, the Hejaz was not only a source of spiritual and intellectual inspiration, but was also entwined with a variety of religious reform movements within the Southeast Asian archipelago.

Yet, for many Indonesian religious organizations, the twentieth century also witnessed a shift in importance away from the region and towards the archipelago itself. The creation of new religious organizations – most notably Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama – alongside the emergence of an Indonesian nationalist project, shifted the political and religious focus to one concerned primarily with defining the position of 'Islam' within the new nation state (for example, see Effendy, 2003). Notably, this also occurred at a time when the Saudi kingdom was consolidating its rule and promoting the religious principles of the *aimat al-Da'wa al-najdiyya*, whose social conservative and puritanical pretenses were at odds with the theology and/

2 The Hejaz contains the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the former of which is where all able-bodied Muslims are obliged to undergo pilgrimage. The cities have not only been sacred to Muslim history, but also provided a crucial location for scholarship and study.

or social concerns of Indonesia's religious organizations. Indeed, although Abdulaziz ibn Saud held a pan-Islamic conference in Mecca in 1926 in order to confer some 'global' legitimacy to his rule of the Hejaz, this was of little significance to Islamic mobilization during 1920s Indonesia – despite the fact that Nahdlatul Ulama had to an extent been created to provide representation to 'traditional' Islamic scholars at this very conference.

The emergence of Salafi thought in 1980s Indonesia, which re-engaged with the imaginary potential of the Hejaz and a 'global umma', correlated with a crisis of legitimacy within established religious organizations whose need to align with New Order policy and Indonesia-centric focus appealed little to a generation looking for a 'pure and universal' Islam. Wahdah Islamiyah – whose Yogyakarta branch forms part of this case study – provides a case in point as it emerged from university students in Makassar who were traditionally aligned to Muhammadiyah. Breaking away from Muhammadiyah in 1984 after the organization was forced to adopt Pancasila as its founding principle, these students established their own foundation (Jurdi, 2007, 2012; Nisa, 2012). Benefiting from LIPIA scholarships and funding links to Saudi institutions and donors (facilitated through old Muhammadiyah and DDII contacts), these students were able to study abroad as well as set up a propagation program that disseminated Salafi texts amongst university and high school students before finally establishing the Wahdah Islamiyah community organization (*organisasi masyarakat/ormas*) in 2002. It is more politically nuanced than most Salafi foundations (as it has an agreement with the Indonesian Department of Social Affairs to provide social welfare to remote areas in parts of Indonesia) and also, unlike the majority of Salafi bodies, has a national structure with an extensive caderization system and approximately 70 branches across Indonesia.

In Yogyakarta – the primary geographical focus of my fieldwork – it was the activities of Abu Nida (full name Chamsaha Sofwan) that provided a foundational foothold for Salafi thought. Born in East Java and educated at the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh, he arrived in the city in 1985 and, through the assistance of the DDII, began to lecture to students at Gadjah Madah University (UGM). Becoming popular among students, these lectures quickly expanded to the campuses of the School of Middle Technology and Yogyakarta State University. Yet, during the 1990s, when Suharto's administration enacted a policy of rapprochement to non-political forms of Islamic organization that Salafis embedded themselves permanently within the locality. In 1992, Abu Nida invited several scholars including Jafar Umar Thalib, Muhammad As-Sewed, and Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas to join him and together they established a mosque in Degolan, Sleman (northern Yogyakarta, Central Java). This was to become a Euclidean point for religious learning, although no sooner had Salafism imbibed itself within Yogyakarta than a rift among its adherents emerged. Jafar Umar Thalib, a charismatic preacher who had spent time in Yemen, became highly critical of several of his cohorts including Abu Nida, believing their cooperation with non-Salafi student groups and donors (such as DDII) was contrary to the 'purity' of the movement. In the course of the 1990s, these strains became increasingly intractable, dividing the movement to this day (Hasan, 2006; International Crisis Group [ICG], 2004). Jafar's brand of Salafism, and its rise to national prominence after the fall of Suharto, has received much attention by regional and international

social scientists (Hasan, 2006; ICG, 2004; Wahid, 2006). Indeed, Hasan (2006) has expertly documented the way Jafar Umar Thalib mobilized his followers into the *Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah* and *Laskar Jihad*, who then partook in sectarian violence in Maluku. Yet, a topic that has been less frequently visited is the expansion of the opposing strand of Salafism represented by Abu Nida and his Majelis At-Turots al-Islamy as well as that of Wahdah Islamiyah (notable exceptions are ICG, 2004; Jurdi, 2004, 2007; Nisa, 2012a, 2012b). Indeed, similar to Jafar, Abu Nida's At-Turots underwent efflorescence during the 1990s, opening several educational institutes, such as the *Ma'had Jamilurrahman As-Salafi* and building a 'Salafi' village in Wirokerten, Yogyakarta (of which the Ma'had Jamilurrahman As-Salafi is the centerpiece). Unlike Jafar, however, the At-Turots maintained strong financial links to the Arabian Peninsula and, after the fall of Suharto, was able to utilize these not to mobilize politically but to focus on propagation. The group has grown dramatically, establishing the *pesantren* Islamic Centre Bin Baz (ICBB), a hospital, medical training facility, several housing complexes, a radio station as well as an expansive propagation program that its adherents claim stretches all the way to Sorong, West Papua (anonymous informant, personal communication, Jakarta, 6 July 2011 & Yogyakarta, 13 November 2011).[3]

The ICBB – which consists of a kindergarten, primary and high school and includes students from Malaysia, Timor-Leste, and Australia – has become a nodal point not only for At-Turots, but also for a wider network of Salafi actors within the city. Activists linked to the ICBB have played a pivotal part in establishing and assisting in the creation of other Salafi foundations, including the Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary (YPIA). Although it became an official foundation in 2007, YPIA's roots lie in *kajian* organized by and for students at UGM in 2000. Notably, this was an era of increased Islamic mobilization and anxiety (Sidel, 2006), marked by the rise not only of new Islamic political parties, but also increasing 'sectarian' conflicts in Maluku, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (especially Poso). For many of the initial participants of these sessions, a 'pure' or 'non-political' Islam not privy to the mass Islamic political mobilization, formation of religious political parties, and sectarian conflicts was an important part of the appeal of this strand of Salafism. Consequently, YPIA grew into a more organized body that offers structured Islamic classes, provides boarding and accommodation, runs a radio station and several websites, and produces several weekly bulletins it disperses throughout the city. By 2006, Wahdah Islamiyah also made inroads into Yogyakarta after participating in a Salafi conference concerning the evils of Shi'ism. Quickly gaining a following among the city's students, it was not long before an official branch office was opened and Wahdah Islamiyah initiated an Arabic language course, an after hours educational program for adults, a student hall, and a coordinated lecture program. It also aligned itself with several Salafi preachers linked to the *Pesantren Al-Madinah Nusantara* (established in 2001). The school, founded by Ridwan Hamidi, trains *Da'i* (preachers) who then preach throughout rural Java and has become a pivotal part in the Wahdah Islamiyah rubric.

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3 Given the political sensitivities revolving around the concept of Salafism, I have kept all interviewees anonymous to reduce any intended risk towards them as well as, from a methodological standpoint, to remain true to a 'do no harm' research framework.

EDUCATIONAL AND FINANCIAL NETWORKS

The Salafi groups briefly described above are independent from each other despite scholars frequently moving between different foundations and occasionally working together. They exemplify the loose and multiple ways through which Salafism has entered the religious landscape and the multivariate ways through which it can be 'enacted' in Indonesian society. Yet, these activists share a commonality in the way they utilize Saudi Arabia within their discourse and propagation. It is also important to note that despite the 'imaginary' power the kingdom has in Salafi discourse, such networks share real funding and scholastic linkages. Indeed, while Salafis linked to Jafar Umar Thalib (who believe themselves to be 'purists') refuse 'organized' funding streams, the donor bodies of *Jam'iyah Ihya' At-Turats Al-Islami* (Kuwait) and *Jam'iyah Darul Birr* have provided support for Abu Nida's At-Turots as well as Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar (Mujahid, 2012). Several of these Indonesian foundations have become adept at soliciting donations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to build religious facilities. For example, Wahdah Islamiyah recently opened a new office and mosque complex in Yogyakarta through the financial assistance of a private donor in Kuwait while At-Turots received a donation towards its ICBB from the Saudi embassy in early 2013 after the ambassador visited the foundation.

These linkages extend to a variety of educational institutions including the LIPIA in Jakarta as well as facilities in Yemen or Saudi Arabia. The most predominant of these is the Islamic University of Madinah, Wahdah Islamiyah claims almost 60 of its members have studied there (anonymous informant, Wahdah Islamiyah, personal communication, 17 December 2011) while several *ustadz* (preacher) working with At-Turots and YPIA have also attended the university. The Islamic University of Madinah also plays a more intimate role; it offers accreditation for religious schools that meet a certain standard of religious learning. In Yogyakarta and Central Java these include ICBB, but also the *Pesantren Iman Bukhari* in Solo and *Pesantren Islam Al-Irsyad* in Salatiga. Accreditation is not merely a 'rubber stamp' legitimizing the Salafi credentials of a school, but consists of a thorough examination of the curriculum and facilities in order to ensure a certain degree of competency (many Salafi schools have not reached this level). Receiving accreditation is an issue of pride that holds resonance not only amongst Salafis, but also very often within wider educational circles.

Quantitatively, however, the number of persons able to study in Saudi Arabia remains small and so for those wishing to continue their religious studies but unable to go abroad, the online Al-Madinah International University (MEDIU) provides a 'virtual' alternative. Originally founded in Madinah in 2004, the university has been relocated to Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia and received official accreditation from the Malaysian government in 2007. At present, MEDIU provides a variety of degrees up to doctoral level in both Arabic and English through online classes and test centers located across the globe. Accreditation by the Malaysian government may create the impression that MEDIU is part of some wider 'global' phenomenon, but this is far from the case. Saudi shareholders and academics remain both in financial and managerial control as all seven shareholders and five of the seven board members originate from the kingdom. Nevertheless, for Salafis throughout Yogyakarta, the institution provides an important 'virtual' place of study.

The facilitation of links with Saudi Arabia is further assisted through Indonesians physically located in Saudi Arabia. It is not uncommon for Indonesian religious students to organize Islamic talks for their fellow co-patriots in the kingdom. One informant provides an interesting example here. Fluent in English, he used to work in the tourism industry, living in Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia as well as working at the Hyatt hotel in Jeddah. While in Jeddah, he was invited to Islamic lectures held by Indonesians (as he spoke little Arabic). It was here that he slowly began to reassess his life and 'chose' Salafism. Moreover, through the Indonesian Salafi magazine *As-Sunnah* – which is available in Saudi Arabia – he was able to find an advertisement for a religious training program in Solo (anonymous informant, personal communication, Solo, 4 April 2012). He provides an interesting example of reversion outside of – but linked to – Indonesia, something catalyzed by Indonesian religious students based in Saudi Arabia who can provide such classes for their compatriots.[4]

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE RELIGIOUS IDEAL

The abovementioned linkages between Saudi Arabian religious institutions and religious actors in Indonesia, maintained through personal, professional, and even virtual ties, are thus integral in augmenting the importance of the Arabian Peninsula among Indonesian Muslims interested in the movement. Not only do they increase the resonance of Salafi claims to represent an Islam in line with the practices of Islam's most holy places but also, logistically, they increase access to funding and private donations from abroad. Yet, such connections are reified through the dissemination of Salafi scholastic works. Publishing houses frequently translate and distribute the works of Muhammad Bin Abd' al-Wahhab, Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Abd al' Aziz Bin Baz, Muhammad al-Uthayim, 'Abd Allah bin Jibrin, and Salih al-Fawzan. Initially, these translations were circulated by the LIPIA, although it has now spread to an insurmountable number of publishers scattered across the archipelago. The International Crisis Group has listed 24 prominent publishers, although the number is a lot higher when one takes smaller operations into account (ICG, 2004). For example, At-Turots, YPIA, and Wahdah Islamiyah all publish major works by Saudi scholars despite the sometimes small scope of their operations. These works, distributed through a network of religious bookstores and fairs as well as outside of mosque complexes, are an important part of any course or syllabus. YPIA, for example, runs several structured courses for students that include the work of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Abd al' Aziz Bin Baz, and Muhammad al-Uthayim (Lembaga Bimbingan Islam al-Atsary, 2006).

The distribution of the works of Arabian-based ulama also provides insight into the modes through which Salafi Islamic authority is constructed in Indonesia. With few notable exceptions (like Wahdah Islamiyah), Indonesian Salafi scholars do not

4 I refer to one becoming Salafi as 'reversion' rather than 'conversion' on two accounts. Firstly, it refers to the fact that, while perhaps lax in the observance of religious principles, this informant acknowledged he was born a Muslim. Secondly, Salafi propagation differentiates between bringing lax Muslims back to the fold and getting non-Muslims to convert (*mualaf*). They emphasize different points in their *da'wa* depending on one's religious affiliation. More so, those who are already considered Muslims do not undergo any official 'conversion' ceremony or the need to officially declare Islam their religion, unlike those who *mualaf*.

issue *fatwa* (religious judgments) of their own, but rather refer to the works, rulings, and *fatwa* of their Arabian-based cohorts. Consequently, Indonesian scholars often spend much time learning not only the Qur'an and hadith, but also cross-referencing *fatwa* by the abovementioned ulama in order to find adequate answers to the concerns of their constituents. For example, in the magazine *As-Sunnah* No. 7 XV November 2011, a woman writes to the editor to ask whether it was permissible to get dental braces in order to correct her teeth. The unnamed *ustadz*, who replied on behalf of the magazine stated that, according to a similar question asked to al-Fawzan (and recorded in a collection of his *fatwa al-Muntaqa min Fatawa Syaikh Shalih al-Fauzan*), this is permissible as long as one's teeth are abnormal and such dental surgery is not done to 'beautify' oneself ('Hukum Merapikan', 2011). A reader who asked whether one is allowed to eat crocodile meat provides a further example. In this case, the *ustadz* replied that, according to a *fatwa* given by the Saudi Permanent Committee for Research and Fatwa (*Fatwa* No. 5394) and signed by Bin Baz, eating crocodile meat is permitted ('Hukum Makan', 2012). Indeed, out of the 10 issues of *As-Sunnah* published between October 2011 and September 2012, there were 44 questions printed, 29 of which were answered by direct reference to Saudi Arabian shaykhs, most predominantly Bin Baz, Al-Abani, al-Uthayim, and al-Fawzan.

The use of Middle Eastern scholars is not extraordinary for Indonesian Muslims in itself. Yet, contemporary Salafism differs from the majority of Indonesian scholars as it also refers to specific twentieth century shaykhs who lived within the era of the modern Saudi state. Moreover, the heavy reliance on the rulings of Arabian ulama has led to a division of roles between these Salafi scholars and their Indonesian contemporaries, whose primary task seems to be transplanting and framing such teachings within the archipelago. By relinquishing a responsibility to directly issue *fatwa* or deal directly with the issues of constituents without foreign references, Indonesian scholars are not 'shirking their duties' but rather reifying a discursive position at the heart of the movement. Indeed, one of the notable appeals of Salafism is a unique clarity as to where one can find and access religious works dealing with all sorts of issues (as the question concerning the consumption of crocodile meat above attests to). Indonesian scholars play a primary part in transplanting religious concepts into Indonesian contexts and social environments, both by socializing the rulings of ulama (often in very intricate ways) and underlining their relevance (and meaning) to Indonesians as Muslims.

Importantly, this moves beyond the purely religious and taps into wider issues of what a modern and progressive society should look like. Saudi Arabia, not limited to a center of religious learning, also becomes part of a 'deeper' religious imaginary, providing pertinent examples of correct social practice Indonesia could learn from. Contrasting Indonesia with Saudi Arabia, Salafi preachers frequently lament the 'backwardness' and 'social corruption' of the former in comparison to the piety, social advancement, and modernism (all linked together) of the latter. While not explicitly referencing any civilizational dialectic (for example, the 'West' vs. 'Islam'), the use of Saudi Arabia builds an alternative idea of Islamic modernity that contains the advances of 'Western' sciences without any of their apparent social or moral decay. Indeed, Saudi Arabia, with its alleged religious observance and apparent economic wealth, represents a social model they believe Indonesian society can emulate in or-

der to enact a 'progressive' future still in line with the principles of an Islamic past.

One pivotal example in this regard is offered when examining the issue of Islamic terrorism, something Salafis show a particular sensitivity to given accusations that they are synonymous with terrorism (for example, see Idahram, 2011). Tackling the issue head-on, one article written by *Ustadz* Anas Burhanuddin describes the severity of rebelling against the state and the chaos it has caused in Indonesia. While the state has done much to curb it, terrorism is a political issue that, he argues, can only be addressed in a serious yet 'Islamic' manner. He thus elaborates that Saudi Arabia provides a useful insight that could be implemented within Indonesia to combat *Jama'ah Islamiyah* and religious violence more generally. Going into minute detail, he outlines how the kingdom combated threats of terrorism in 2003–2004 through a media campaign, which included Friday sermons and religious lectures as well as providing religious knowledge to those involved in anti-terror actions so they did not circumvent Islamic ideals. When extremists were captured, Islamic scholars were dispatched to run de-radicalization classes and bring them back to the 'true' way of Islam, a technique Burhanuddin writes was successful given the rapid fall in terrorism. He thus concludes that this example is not only useful for Muslim states like Indonesia, but those of *kafir* (non-Muslim) nations too. As he states, "what has already brought results in practice for Saudi Arabia will, Insya Allah, also produce results for Indonesia" (Burhanuddin, 2011, p. 41).

A further example is evident in an article written by *ustadz* Erwandi Tarmizi concerning corruption in Indonesia and how to deal with such cases according to Islamic law. Corruption is an extremely pertinent issue within the Indonesian public sphere. Tarmizi approaches the topic from a religious disposition analyzing where corruption would stand in relation to Saudi Arabia's *fatwa* committee. He refers to rulings by the *fatwa* committee in order to assess whether corruption could be classified as theft and so subject to the *hudud* that allows ones hand to be cut off. After careful consideration, however, he concludes that corruption and theft differ and so, under Islamic law, there would be no grounds to implement *hudud* against corrupt persons. His reasoning follows the line that, as Indonesia has a functioning and legitimate government, one must respect the laws in place. Tarmizi's article provides an interesting example of how an Indonesian contemporary issue is viewed by referencing Saudi Arabian shaykhs. While he concludes that cutting of one's hand or caning is not allowed in this case, he does not rule them out as legitimate punishments (Tarmizi, 2012). Furthermore, his final argument that one must respect the decision of the Indonesian government is somewhat representative of the political quietist approach taken by Salafis not aligned with Jafar Umar Thalib immediately after the fall of Suharto. This position is remarkably similar to the political line espoused by contemporary Salafis in relation to Saudi authority.

The two examples underline how Saudi Arabia is more than a base for learned scholars and networks; the country itself provides an evident example as how to best implement Islamic law in relation to topical concerns. The imaginary potential goes much deeper, however, as it also provides an example of modern society that Salafis refer to in order to build a bridge between the 'evils' of contemporary Indonesian society and the idealized Islamic society of the *Salaf al-Salih*. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the public *kajian* given by *ustadz* within Yogyakarta. These

scholars, many of whom have studied in the Arabian Peninsula, frequently refer to the region in order to emphasize what Indonesians should aspire to. In a process that perhaps 'thickens' how an Islamic ideal would be actualized, such preachers have become adept at utilizing Saudi Arabia as a resource to emphasize their message.

Ridwan Hamidi, a Wahdah Islamiyah preacher, offers a case in point. Holding weekly *kajian* at UGM's campus mosque, Ridwan lectures on Qur'anic and hadith studies over the course of 1 and a half hours. Attended by roughly 100 participants, these sessions offer intense lectures of Islamic knowledge and its application/use in everyday life. Ridwan, who completed his Bachelor's degree at the Islamic University of Madinah's *Dakwah* and *Ushul ad Din* faculty (1998) before receiving his Masters in *Fiqih* and *Ushul Fiqih* at the *Muhammadiyah University Surakarta*, is currently completing a further Master's in *Fiqih Sunnah* at the Medina International University (MEDIU) while teaching at the technical-electrical department at UGM. His experience in Saudi Arabia has given him a unique resource that he utilizes within *kajian* at the campus mosque in order to emphasize the seriousness of Qur'anic studies and what they could mean in socio-political terms. For example, he once lamented that many Indonesian ulama did not have sufficient Islamic knowledge nor set a good example, comparing them to people who had a good motorbike but could not ride it properly. He contrasted this to Bin Baz who, despite his prestige, was always humble and replied to every individual who wrote to him. In fact, he continued, his experience in Saudi Arabia was exemplary in highlighting ideal religious morals. Mosque attendance was '*luar biasa*' (out of the ordinary) as they were always full. He compared this to Indonesia, where many people avoided attending the mosque and there was a lack of morality among Indonesian women. His style, while talking of this experience and concern, was one of lament and reflection, urging his audience to learn from Saudi Arabia and, if possible, to visit it for study.

Ridwan was not unique in this instance but utilized a common tool through which preachers actualized an idealized world by referencing Saudi Arabia. Abu Muslim, who gives a weekly *kajian* at UGM's medical studies faculty, provides a further example. Having studied in Yemen and visited Saudi Arabia several times over the course of four years, Abu Muslim currently teaches at the ICBB while also conducting campus *kajian* in conjunction with YPIA. His lectures at the medical faculty are, compared to Ridwan's classes, aimed at a smaller audience (approximately 12 males and an unknown number of females) and cover more basic and foundational issues of Islamic learning. The main string of argumentation throughout these lectures consisted of the need for Islamic learning and introspection in order to save oneself from eternal damnation and the immorality prevalent in (Indonesian) society. Indeed, when the wider student community was involved in demonstrations against a planned government fuel hike, he argued that such worldly concerns only help cause friction among the umma.

He further elaborated (on several occasions) that the Indonesian campus, while an integral place of learning, was also one of corruption that through the mixing of the sexes caused *zinah* (illegitimate relationships) and desires that distract men (and women, presumably) from not only their studies but from religious duty. This in turn allegedly contributed to a wider breakdown of society. In Saudi Arabia, however, people took time to respect religion and, as such, society lived by a higher standard

of morals. On one account, he recollected a personal experience where after Friday prayers he was invited back to the homes of strangers to eat together. This, he lamented, could never happen in Indonesia, not only because society was riddled with selfishness but also because Friday, a day that should be reserved for Muslim prayer, was a workday. He continued that, with the exception of several schools in Indonesia such as ICBB, people abided by a work calendar linked to Christian worship, an issue made all the worse as people were ignorant of this fact. What was needed, in Abu Muslim's opinion, was greater emphasis on religious learning and social codes, and Saudi Arabia and Yemen provided not only a feasible model to follow but also emphasized the positive social results this would create.

TRANSPLANTING THE LAND OF THE TWO HOLY MOSQUES

The use of Saudi Arabia in such instances offers an insightful example into the methods of recomposing, transplanting, and, more specifically, 'frame bridging' exemplified in social movement theories. The concept of framing offers a cognitive tool for interpreting experience and how a certain ideological position can receive meaning. Actors produce, arrange, and disseminate a particular ideological bearing in order to achieve a certain amount of resonance among constituents (Benford, Rochford, Snow, & Worden, 1986). At its most basic level, it represents the art of communicating in specific ways, selecting issues and symbols that are of concern to those one wishes to reach. For example, Wiktorowicz (2004), in his study of intra-movement framing contests between Salafi *jihadist* and non-*jihadist* groups, highlights how different factions within a movement can compete for legitimacy through specific techniques, as well as how popular intellectuals contextualize such framing for followers. By emphasizing the perceived knowledge, character, and logic of its message, a movement attempts to assert its authority and resonate its message among potential constituents.

In our case, the frame shifts between the global and the local 'scale', in a way where globally available resources take on local meaning. Framing in such an instance is complex as the movement both consumes existing cultural materials but also produces new ones influenced by global resources and networks. To offer a global frame, these movements need to internalize global symbols for domestic use and diffuse modes of contention from the global to the local and back (Tarrow, 2005). Yet, this is far from straight forward, but must contain a degree of adaptation, institutionalization, and representation dependent on the given locale. Ideas and concepts must travel and undergo a process of transplantation, adapting to new contexts and facing challenges different from an idea's point of origin (Bonnefoy, 2011; Said, 1983). In relation to our enquiry, Ridwan and Abu Muslim act as mediums bridging Indonesian social issues and a religious ideal through the credibility of their own experiences in Saudi Arabia. This moves beyond religious references, but also includes many 'contemporary' allusions of a modern and pious (Saudi) society. In doing so, they aim to move beyond religion as a scholastic and scriptural pursuit to one that becomes a living dialogical discourse concerned with all matters of life and society.

In this regard, a focus on contemporary concerns or on the suggestions to follow Saudi models against terrorism or corruption can play an important part in form-

ing the religious ideal Salafis strive for. I would go even further to say that through such references we can see the modes by which Salafis attempt to recreate an ideal society based on the first generations of Muslims. It is pivotal to the Salafi imaginary in terms of balancing an idealized and selective account of an Islamic past with a modern present and future. For several constituents, it provides solutions to social concerns, highlighting how following Islamic scripture can enact an apparently just and fair society. Thus, it is not uncommon for Salafis – even those who have not been to Saudi Arabia – to praise the kingdom as an ideal society. For example, one interviewee who had never been to Saudi Arabia stated that the kingdom was an example all Muslims should follow as well as a bastion of stability within a region that had become unstable due to events in Syria and wider 'Shi'a' subversion. When asked how this compared to Indonesia, the interviewee replied that Indonesia certainly was not a pious society but nevertheless it had potential, as Muslims were free to practice as they wished (anonymous informant, personal communication, Yogyakarta, 28 February 2012). In such instances, the Land of Two Holy Mosques is used as an implicit socio-political example of how governmental decisions should be made and relate to religion. Salafis highlight their political quietist position, stating the need to respect and follow a legitimately based government and so criticize Hizbut Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood over their concerns with political power (Arif Fathul Ulum bin Ahmad Saifullah, 2011). Yet, despite remaining explicitly apolitical, the utilization of Saudi Arabia or Saudi-based scholars in order to assess Indonesian policy does imply a political stance, where all decisions must be filtered through the works of religious scholars in order to judge their legitimacy.

However, concepts and imaginaries remain just that. They may offer examples and suggestions, but do little in the way of stating exactly how such programs could be implemented or enacted within Indonesia (besides through an increase in piety). The use of Saudi Arabia, consequently, fails to move beyond complementing the normative set of values they set out to enact in the first instance. Moreover, their imaginary element not only lies in their suggestive nature of how Indonesian society should act, but also in the fact that they rarely move beyond an idealization of Saudi society and entwine with the socio-political realities and religious complexities of the kingdom. For example, little mention is made of the plight of Indonesian and foreign workers in the kingdom, nor of a series of diplomatic spats throughout 2011 and 2012 concerning the beheading of an Indonesian woman that led to protests outside the Saudi embassy in July 2011 and a government embargo on sending maids to Saudi Arabia. Underlining their detachment from these issues, Salafis remained quiet, even actively ignoring such issues when brought up. The same interviewee mentioned above, when asked about his opinion concerning this controversy (as it was in the news), became dismissive, stressing how hotheaded Indonesians could be and then quickly ended the conversation (anonymous informant, personal communication, Yogyakarta, 28 February 2012).

The ability of such imaginaries to move beyond the normative is further inhibited by the fact that actors do not exist in a religious vacuum, but have to contend with a variety of religious agents, both old and new. Salafism, far from being either a decontextualized movement or form of 'Saudization' is, borrowing Hepp's (2009) use of the term, translocal. As Hepp argues – and I have attempted to emphasize through the

idea of framing and transplantation – the local remains important, as it is the place where the availability of global resources is reflected in the form of locally appropriated cultural codes and meaning. Localities do not dissolve but provide a reference point for ongoing globalization processes, highlighting the increasing connectivity between different spaces all over the world (Hepp, 2004 in Hecker, 2010, pp. 325–339). What Salafism thus represents is the recomposition of religious resources that disembed themselves from any singular territory before recombining within the localities of Indonesia through the work of grounded actors. The imaginary element of Saudi Arabia is thus part of the global resource utilized by activists in order to frame a contemporary problem and social issues and a 'perfect' Islamic society of the past.

While I believe this implies that actors gear many of their activities towards the local, this does not render the 'imaginary of Saudi society' as irrelevant or merely contradictory. I believe the use of such examples attests to a method of embedding a set of values based on transcendental salvation within the temporal and geographic landscape in which agents work. References to Islam's geographical heartland, and the institutions of study and religion within them, provide Salafism with a degree of legitimacy in their claim to represent 'correct tradition'. It is part of a meshing of Salafi networks, actors, texts, and other non-Salafi forces that sustain the ideals of 'piety' in a variety of different contextual settings. In Indonesia, its agents thus put forward the idea of a modern religious society at odds with the 'moral decay' and 'backwardness' of Indonesia. Yet, this ideal itself is (and has to be) continually disrupted given that it is refracted through the local – responding to concerns of potential followers, opponents, with wider forces of public opinion and governance – to a point where the imaginary ideal can never be fully actualized. Saudi Arabia, or the idealized image of it, rather plays the part of a utopic goal, an aspiration (if only everyone followed religion properly) that is never realistically attainable. This perhaps mirrors Derrida's (2006) affirmation of a group's need for an "unpredictable future to come" where, despite knowing what an idealized future may hold or what the blue print for it should be, exactly when and where it can be established in the "here and now" remains an uncertain aspiration. Indeed, as Derrida states, "not only must one not renounce the emancipatory desire" but "it is necessary to insist on it more than ever" (p. 94).

The examples of a 'perfect society' built upon personal piety and social values – imagined through reference to Saudi Arabia in opposition to Indonesian social ills – forms part of this "emancipatory desire", an image constantly insisted upon but never fully reachable. However, obtaining the goal is not the point. Rather, the utilization of Saudi Arabia as a worldly utopia provides an earthly face that pious individuals can strive towards. One should therefore not view the fact that there is no 'decontextualized' or perfect Salafism (based on an idealized Saudi example) as testament to its failure. The examples highlighted in this paper point to the useful reference and role Saudi Arabia plays in providing an imagined but 'real' solution to how piety should be enacted. Consequently, this gives Salafis a unique point upon which to build claims of legitimacy and underscore the temporal rewards for religious exactitude.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The relationship between Salafi religious discourse and the imagined ideal of the Arabian Peninsula provides an interesting case study of both socio-political imaginaries and contemporary religious movement. Representing a broad multi-layered social movement enriched through the lived experiences and debates of its agents, it is difficult to talk of one singular unifying Salafism. It has spread throughout the world, defined by its adherents as a search for religious 'purity'. Yet, despite the multivariate ways it has been enacted and embodied, there is a high level of coherency in terms of drawing from similar scholars and institutions within the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, as is the case in Yogyakarta, the kingdom is more than an institutional heartland; it becomes an imagined ideal through which socio-political solutions and a picture of a perfect religious community are described. Juxtaposed against the 'social ills' of Indonesian society, such as corruption and terrorism, it forms a pivotal resource through which preachers stress the importance and benefits of correct religious behavior. However, while Saudi Arabia may give such Salafi imaginary values a nuance of physical resonance, these same imaginaries often ignore the complexities of the Saudi religious field or political developments within the kingdom. Yet, providing an accurate account of Saudi Arabia is not the point. Rather, it remains an image utilized as a resource not only to 'thicken' descriptions as to what an embodied piety would mean socially, but also to provide Salafi discourse with a greater degree of proximity to Islam's holy sites. It thus becomes a desire, constantly insisted upon if impossible to enact.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Chris Chaplin is currently writing his PhD thesis concerning the social dynamics of the Salafist movement in post-Suharto Indonesia at the Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, UK. His research interests include a broad curiosity concerning global religious movements and their impact on social/national identity as well as a regional interest in Indonesian political/social reform, human rights, local identity, and West Papua.

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Seeing Indonesia From Behind Bars: An Interview With Vannessa Hearman

Antje Missbach

▸ Missbach, A. (2014). Seeing Indonesia from behind bars: An interview with Vannessa Hearman. *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7*(2), 237-242.

In the aftermath of the 1965 military coup that brought right-wing General Suharto to power in Indonesia, (para)military death squads killed between half and one million alleged communists (especially union members, landless farmers, and intellectuals). Vannessa Hearman completed her doctoral thesis at the University of Melbourne on the 1965–1968 anti-communist killings and violence in East Java, and the New Order regime's struggle to win acceptance following the killings. She is currently a lecturer at the Department of Indonesian Studies, University of Sydney. In one of her current research projects, she is researching transnational activist and friendship networks born out of letters written by and to political prisoners incarcerated between 1965 and 1985 as part of the anti-communist persecution in Indonesia. In this interview, conducted in Perth, Australia, in July 2014, Vannessa Hearman speaks about political prisoners in Indonesia under the Suharto regime, their exchange of letters with pen friends around the globe, and what can be learned from these letters until today.

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Nach dem Militärputsch 1965, der dem rechtsstehenden General Suharto in Indonesien an die Macht verhalf, töteten (para)militärische Todesschwadronen zwischen einer halben und einer Million vermeintlicher KommunistInnen (vor allem Gewerkschaftsmitglieder, landlose Bauern und Bäuerinnen und Intellektuelle). Vannessa Hearman schrieb ihre Doktorarbeit an der Universität Melbourne über den antikommunistischen Genozid und die Gewalt zwischen 1965 und 1968 in Ost-Java und die Bemühung des „New Order"-Regimes, Akzeptanz im Anschluss an die Gewaltakte zu gewinnen. Derzeit unterrichtet sie am Department of Indonesian Studies der Universität Sydney. In einem ihrer derzeitigen Forschungsprojekte untersucht sie transnationale AktivistInnen- und Freundschaftsnetzwerke, die aus Briefen von und für politische Gefangene entstanden, die zwischen 1965 und 1985 als Teil der antikommunistischen Verfolgung inhaftiert waren. In diesem Interview, das im Juli 2014 in Perth, Australien, geführt wurde, spricht Vannessa Hearman über politische Gefangene in Indonesien während des Suharto-Regimes, ihren Austausch mit BrieffreundInnen rund um den Globus und was wir aus diesen Briefen bis heute lernen können.

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Antje Missbach: Having just listened to your presentation, one of the political prisoners whom you are currently researching is Gatot Lestario. Can you tell us a bit more about this man and why you are so interested in his destiny?

Vannessa Hearman: Gatot Lestario was imprisoned under Suharto's New Order regime in 1969, accused of attempting to resurrect the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, *Partai Komunis Indonesia*). He was executed by a firing squad in Pamekasan, East Java, in 1985. Prior to his imprisonment, Lestario was a teacher and a member of the PKI's Regional Committee in East Java. While imprisoned, Lestario engaged in a substantial amount of letter writing to pen friends around the globe. Studying these letters reveals the personal thoughts of a former activist and teacher when facing death and provides an insight into his political ideas and how he imagined a better future for his country. Although not exiled in the strictest meaning of the word, Lestario was cut off from his former networks. Removed from his family and his professional career, in these letters, Lestario, as a representative of the Indonesian Left, discussed his ideas with his pen friends and in return received compassion and support. After his execution, his pen friends initiated a political prisoner fund to support former prisoners and their families, and in 1986, published *The Last Years of Gatot Lestario*, a book with his letters.

Missbach: As a historian, in your previous research projects you have relied extensively on oral history and personal testimonies that you have collected from survivors, both witnesses and victims. How did you come across the letters from Lestario?

Hearman: In 2010, I received a grant from the Australian Netherlands Research Collaboration scheme, which brought Australian researchers to the Netherlands and vice versa. I was looking for any material related to the PKI at the International Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam. One of these files I consulted was a set of personal papers. In it, I found letters not only from one of my informants in East Java, but also a collection of letters from Gatot Lestario and his wife Pudjiaswati to various correspondents. I have to admit that it is strange to work with the written word, having worked intensely with the spoken word during my doctoral research. The inability to refer back to your source, your interviewee, was also somewhat novel for me. The letters are the legacies he has left behind. Lestario may also have written for communist publications in East Java, but I haven't been able to trace these so far.

Missbach: Why was Lestario able to write letters while imprisoned?

Hearman: Prisoners could receive letters and cards and there was a Christmas card sending scheme that the Society of Friends – the Quakers – organized. Lestario received one of these cards from a British couple and his correspondence with them began that way. There were also supporters of Amnesty International who wrote to him. His letters were subjected to censorship. Not all letters were sent through official prison channels, but there were helpful guards and visitors instead who helped with conveying letters and parcels.

Missbach: Assuming that life in prison was anything but bearable – how did everyday life behind bars impact on Lestario's letter writing?

Hearman: His daily activities were often the same, which is perhaps why his letters often discussed things outside of the prison, such as his life before prison, political events in the world, and responding to the activities of his pen friends. There were, however, festive events such as Christmas, the anniversary of Indonesian independence, and visits from outside which broke the monotony for prisoners and about which he often wrote. So this is to say, that conditions in the prisons as reflected in political prisoners' own words are also valuable to document.

Missbach: How does this context matter when it comes to contextualizing his writings? There might have been a number of things Lestario might have wanted to comment on in his letters, but had to refrain from doing so for the sake of his own safety.

Hearman: The extent to which he was able to express himself would have depended on the particular letter being censored or not, if it had gone through the official channels or not. Of course being in prison was a highly restricted setting for letter writing.

Missbach: What (methodological) limitations did you encounter in analyzing these letters?

Hearman: To obtain more of his letters and contact more of his pen friends to gauge their responses to their correspondence with Gatot Lestario would be highly beneficial. Amnesty International in France was very kind in helping me track down one letter writer in the northeast of France. I have managed to trace another pen friend in Arizona to whom Lestario wrote. It was her letters that are stored in the IISH. There are also ethical issues. The letters in Amsterdam led me to Peter and Doreen Brown – the couple of pen friends in London who had compiled Lestario's letters into a book. When they heard that an Australian researcher was coming from Amsterdam to ask some questions about Gatot Lestario, they cut short their summer holiday and returned to London – that is how much they cared for this distant pen friend they once had. During the course of the day I spent with them, they could not decide among themselves whether I should have access to his letters that formed the basis of the book. They were custodians of a large bundle of letters from Lestario's other pen friends as well. In the end, they copied and sent them to me in Australia, but as these letters were not addressed directly to them I would now have to seek the permission from the letters' recipients if I were to use the letters in a publication. I would have to track down the letter writers to do this. So, it's about dealing with ethical issues in terms of personal letters.

Missbach: Why do you think it is important to shed light on these letters and what can be revealed through them more generally about the Indonesian Left?

Hearman: Other than the letters of Pramoedya Ananta Toer, some of which were published in *The Mute's Soliloquy: A Memoir*, Indonesians do not have access to these

letters. Letters prisoners wrote to their families are not publicly available, as many family members probably still feel concerned about disclosing that they had relatives in prison. The Indonesian Left, which was sizeable prior to 1965, was largely silenced through the imprisonment, killing, and exile of its leading figures from then onwards. This silencing of experiences was particularly true in the 1970s and 1980s, when many other prisoners were released from prison and the New Order regime consolidated its rule. The fact that prisoners were active in writing to overseas pen friends, encouraging them to campaign for and support them from abroad, is therefore of interest for the history of the Indonesian Left.

Missbach: Did you have a chance to meet or interview people from Lestario's political network or from his family?

Hearman: I met one of his political comrades in Indonesia. Unfortunately, before I had a chance to interview her exclusively about him, she is now largely unable to speak about him because of her advanced age. His wife Pudjiaswati died of cancer in the early 1990s, shortly after her own release from prison. So far, I have not been able to trace their two children in Indonesia.

Missbach: While imprisoned, how closely was Lestario able to follow ongoing events outside of the prison walls? Did he comment on them in his letters?

Hearman: His letters always discussed events outside of Indonesia, such as the nuclear arms race, Pakistan, Palestine, and so on. Indonesians of his generation, particularly those from the Left, tended to be knowledgeable about world politics, much more than Indonesians today tend to be. Also, he might have had access to newspapers and probably to television while in prison. His pen friends also supplied him with information through magazines, books, and their letters. His defense speech, copies of which were made available and circulated also outside of Indonesia, contextualized the Suharto regime within world politics and the Cold War.

Missbach: His pen friends overseas – what kind of people were they and how had they gotten in contact with Lestario (in a world without mobile phones and internet)?

Hearman: They came from all walks of life, but they shared a concern for human rights, which they expressed concretely through writing to death row prisoners. They obtained his name through the Society of Friends (the Quakers) and Amnesty International Networks. If he wrote back to one person, for example, that person might have also asked his or her friends to write to him. Sometimes other prisoners received letters but were uninterested in letter writing, and so Lestario (and others, too) might have taken over replying and adopting the writers as their pen friends instead. The pen friends were interested in Gatot's background, his family, for example, and what it was like to be in prison. Gatot told them a bit about his past, his education, his previous work as a teacher, his case, and his punishment, and also what the communists were trying to do in Indonesia, viewed through a 1980s human rights trope. He was very critical of the New Order regime. He wrote about the prison administration,

about growing a garden, reading and writing, and the celebrations that occurred in prison on special festive days such as Indonesian Independence Day on 17 August or Christmas.

Missbach: Having come across such a treasure, do you plan to extend this research in the future?

Hearman: I have another bundle of letters written by an Amnesty International member in France and a political prisoner in the same prison as Gatot Lestario, which I plan to analyze alongside the Lestario letters. I also plan to write to more of Lestario's pen friends in order to explore their motivations in writing to him. Incidentally, Brenda Capon, a British woman who wrote to prisoners in the same prison in the 1980s, has written a book (*A Sweet Scent of Jasmine*, 2006, self-published) about the friendship she developed with these men through letters. I assume there are many such letters that many men and women all over the world are storing or have thrown away. The possibilities are endless! Perhaps there are copies of letters held at the Amnesty International secretariat or the Society of Friends house in London, but I have not explored these places as possible repositories yet. One of my major research areas is on transnational activism by Indonesians during the Sukarno period, which I am working on with Dr. Katharine McGregor from the University of Melbourne. This letter writing research has some connections to that project although it obviously deals with the post-Sukarno period and the Indonesian activist in this case is highly immobile and is unable to travel and campaign directly. But the methods of building connections, adapting a global message to a local context, and interpreting one's world for others in order to motivate their action and so induce change are all common themes that this research has in common with research on transnational activism.

Missbach: Good luck with your upcoming research endeavors and thank you for the interview!

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Antje Missbach is research fellow at Monash University in Melbourne. She has written widely about the long-distance politics of the Acehnese diaspora. Currently, she is finalizing a book entitled *Troubled Transit: Asylum Seekers Stuck in Indonesia*.

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Tirolesia: A Trans-Medial Art Project Bridging Two Regions

Helena Manhartsberger

▸ Manhartsberger, H. (2014). Tirolesia: A trans-medial art project bridging two regions. ASEAS – *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7*(2), 243-260.

INTRODUCTION

As a student at the Department of Development Studies, University of Vienna, and a journalist and artist interested in global social issues, my early passion for *pencak silat*[1] grew into an intensive involvement with Indonesia – its people, social and cultural diversity, dynamic history, and current socio-political developments. In the course of traveling throughout the Indonesian archipelago, my passion for this country grew stronger and I decided in 2012 to channel my aspirations into a project, bridging my homeland Tirol and Indonesia.

'Tirolesia' is a trans-medial art project aimed at enhancing the intercultural dialogue and artistic exchange between Tirol[2] (Austria) and Indonesia (Java, Bali, Lombok). By using different means of expression (film, photography, and stencils) and presentation (exhibitions in both countries and virtual space), this dialogue transcends geographic borders. The participatory approach towards visual media encourages a profound communication between people from two regions that appear to be separated both geographically and culturally. The visual narratives show how people identify, perceive, create, and present their immediate surroundings. Based on photographs, people are encouraged to invent stories about this 'other' place and the conscious reception of these 'foreign' stories at home gives the opportunity to inquire into stereotypes, clichés, and prejudices regarding an often 'unknown' or remote reality. Interactive exhibitions in Yogyakarta, Jakarta, Innsbruck, and Vienna as well as virtual presentations offer an opportunity for the wide public to join the dialogue and continue the stories.

Each place, image, or setting of a photograph – taken either in Tirol or Indonesia – is intimately connected with a story; and behind this story lies the narrative of a person. With a backpack of images taken in my homeland, Tirol, I made my way on a motorbike through the Indonesian archipelago in search of these stories and their narrators. I showed these pictures to people I met along the way and asked them to pick one that they associated a strong memory or an intensive experience with. Consequently, they told me stories that were as diverse as the people I met. At the end of this journey, I had gathered portraits – stories and captions – for a much larger composition which cast a light on Tirol from the eyes of Indonesians. I presented these stories and images at the art festival "urban spricht kunst" in Innsbruck, Austria, in September 2013.

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1 *Pencak Silat* is an umbrella term for martial arts and fighting styles in Indonesia.

2 Tirol (in English, Tyrol) is the Austrian name of a mountainous region in the west of the country which is also part of the Alps.

In order to continue this dialogue, I took the chance to invite the Indonesian street artist and musician, Digie Sigit, to change the perspectives. Digie Sigit was traveling on a motorbike through Tirol and inquired into the narratives and memories of Tirolean people as they looked at images taken in his homeland Indonesia. This photo essay illustrates the people, images, and stories that contributed to this project both in Tirol and Indonesia.

In a next step, the entire project (TIROLESIA #1 and #2) will be presented at exhibitions and workshops in Austria as well as in Indonesia. The large variety of stories, thoughts, and perspectives will be made visible and accessible to a broad public in both regions. The exhibitions will take place throughout 2015 and will continue on the project's website (www.tirolesia.at).

~

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Helena Manhartsberger studies development studies at the University of Vienna and works as a freelance journalist. She is currently engaged with *ipsum* – an association that works in the fields of dialogue, education, culture, and development on a global level. In her projects she strives to combine arts (particularly photography) with journalism and theoretical discourse.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to thank all the people involved in the project, especially Digie Sigit, for all his personal contributions and ideas, *Euphoria Audiovisual*, who realized the montage and design of the first movie TIROLESIA#1, *NonPlus* Filmproduction, who are currently working on the second movie TIROLESIA#2, and *ipsum*, for their methodological guidance prior to the project.



"Through landscape, we experience and create the culture in which we position ourselves. In it, we combine all those impressions, phenomena, and ideas that influence our own identity. As such, landscape is a communicative act, which is based on cultural and individual memories as well as meanings and experiences, which are bound to places. In the space we invent the landscape that offers us guidance." (Marcus Cordes, translation from German by the author) This quote inspired me to implement the project 'Tirolesia'.

While searching for an adequate method in order to implement the project, I considered the method of generative picture processing. This method is based on photography as a non-verbal impulse capable of evoking the beholders' associations of personal memories, stories, and experiences.





















As I came to select the pictures, I thought of a phenomenon that highly intrigued me – the fact that many people get their first impression of a country by searching the Internet. This is why I browsed the Internet to see what kind of images I could find of my home region.

I took these pictures on a journey that led me from Yogyakarta through East Java and Bali to Lombok. On my way, I showed them to random people I met and asked them to share the impressions these pictures evoked. I recorded the interviews on video and took photographic portraits of my interview partners.



I asked my interview partners to write or draw a caption to go with their portrait or story. These captions reflected how they wanted to be seen in the exhibition. The results varied as did their stories: While some noted name, age, address, profession, and marital status, others documented the story they had just been telling word by word and again others just started drawing what came to their minds. The captions where scribbled on whatever paper was around at the time of the interview, thus representing an authentic part of their place of origin.

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Since the project is based on the premise of a mutual exchange of thoughts, memories, and perspectives between two places, the project had to continue in Austria. I invited the Indonesian graphic artist, musician, and street artist, Digie Sigit – one of my interview partners in Yogyakarta who had experienced the project and who was willing to contribute to this project with workshops and presentations throughout Indonesia.

The second part of the project focused on Tirol by involving random people from the region in a similar process of reflection upon the memories they associated with pictures taken in Indonesia and presented to them.



















Sigit and I decided to use pictures taken by ourselves that represented our memories and experiences of Indonesia.

On a three-week journey across Tirol, I accompanied Digie Sigit as he confronted people we met on the way with photographs of his home. He invited them to share their personal experiences and stories that they associated with the images.


EVA SCHIESTL
BERGISL, IN

John Craik, New Arzl,
Innsbruck;
If I could find the right
words at the right time
I would write a book!

yours
sincerely,
John

Rainer Maria
König – Alm, 1850 m
9971 Matrei / Osttirol

Ich lebe auf der Alm im
Sommer u. bewirtschafte mit
meiner Familie eine Jausen-
Station. Wünsche daß alle
Menschen in so einer schönen

Gegend leben könnten
und vorallem in einer
friedlichen Welt sich ihr
Leben gestalten könnten!
Wünsche allen alles
Gute und vorallem
viel Glück u.
Gesundheit
Thre Maria!

Both parts of the project 'Tirolesia' created space for the mutual exchange of thoughts and perspectives related to images of two geographically and culturally distant regions. In a dialogue, people shared their aspirations with regard to their perceptions of 'home' and 'identity'. At subsequent workshops, presentations, and exhibitions both in Austria and Indonesia, this dialogue between the 'authors' and the 'observers' shall continue.


Aus dem Fremden über das Eigene lernen
Ungewöhnliche Tierfreundschaften

Book Review: Ear, S. (2013). Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy.

New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ISBN: 978-0-231-16112-1. 208 pages.

▸ Nasrat, S. (2014). Book review: Ear, S. (2013). Aid dependence in Cambodia: How foreign assistance undermines democracy. *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7*(2), 261-264.

Based on the premise of the importance of national ownership for development, this book examines the relationship between Cambodia's aid dependence and its poor governance. Sophal Ear, assistant professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School, chooses Cambodia as a case study as it is one of the most aid-drenched countries in Southeast Asia. To achieve the aforementioned objective, the book is divided into four chapters, using field interviews, case studies, and document analyses as a source of information.

Chapter 1 concisely highlights the connection between aid dependence and quality of governance. This chapter claims that the quality of governance depends upon the governance system followed in the country. It argues that foreign aid has had negative incentives for good governance, weakened tax collections, and undermined accountability since donors failed to improve the rule of law.

Chapter 2 describes the recent economic growth in Cambodia and shows the ineffectiveness of foreign aid and government policies in three main economic sectors (garment, rice, and livestock). Ear points out that effective and sustainable economic growth depends upon good governance in as much as the government ensures the rule of law, democracy, and anti-corruption.

Chapter 3 assesses the effectiveness of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the effects of aid dependence based on the example of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). The chapter shows that the efforts and policy responses to prevent the disease were weak mainly because of the lack of good governance, fund management, and the weak coordination at the state level.

Last but not least, Chapter 4 looks into indigenous human rights activism between 2005 and 2006 that drew on international media and international diplomatic ties to curtail the excesses of the state and the ruling Cambodian People's Party. Funding by the international community was particularly oriented towards local, national, and international NGOs working to liberalize Cambodian democracy. As a result of international pressure, some political prisoners were released; yet, the pressure was too weak to spur government reforms in the country.

The central argument of *Aid Dependence in Cambodia* is that neither democracy introduced by the United Nation Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) nor foreign aid flows led to economic development and a stabilization of the country. Therefore, the author suggests that Cambodia should cut foreign aid as soon as possible and instead strengthen domestic tax collection and en-

www.seas.at doi 10.14764/10.ASEAS-2014.2-9

hance ownership for national development. Ear argues that Cambodia's main problems (e.g. poverty, corruption, and inequality) are global problems that can – particularly in postconflict societies – only be dealt with through international aid. However, Cambodia has received ODA for more than two decades with little impact on the socio-economic conditions of its people. The main reason for this ineffectiveness is high corruption and mismanagement of funding. The long-term aid dependence has made Cambodia a "laboratory for donors' trial and error experiments" (p. 10). Having this in mind, the author demands political will to change the culture of corruption.

With regard to specific economic sectors, Ear finds that donors in Cambodia failed to invest in the energy sector and fight against informal payments in order to develop the rice, garment, and livestock sectors in the country. The garment industry as an important employment and income generation sector was successful mainly due to favorable external market conditions, the imposition of good labor practices by trading partners, and unified trade association. Lack of collaboration between rice-milling associations, poor access to credit, and high cost of energy and transportation limited the rice production in the country. Similarly, lack of trade association, poor quality of certification, and high informal payments for exports were the main hindrances for the livestock sector development in Cambodia.

Ear claims that aid dependence is the main obstacle for Cambodia's ownership of development and links foreign aid flows with the government's political reluctance to tax; and without taxation, the link between the government and electorate is broken. Thus, in a recent interview with the broadcaster Voice of America (VoA Khemer), the author stated that when people do not pay taxes, they do not own their part of the democratic process (Sothearith, 2013).

An important argument further claims that directing aid to economic development means removing many of the gatekeepers who stand between a country's national economy and the international system. Therefore, aid can only trigger economic development if it fosters: (1) information to the general public of both donors and recipients; (2) transparency; and (3) consultation and participation in order to increase the demand for good governance.

In addition to these arguments, there are some points that have not been clearly discussed and potentially limit the strength of the book. First, clear and detailed information for most of the arguments is missing. For instance, there is no elaboration on the system and approaches for the collection and administration of domestic taxation, neither is the access to credits and certification for the rice and livestock sector comprehensively explained. Moreover, the author offers no successful example of tax collection as a substitute for foreign aid from other postconflict and aid-dependent countries. Due to this lack of information, the contribution of taxation to economic development in Cambodia is questionable. Son Chhay, a Sam Rainsy Party parliamentarian, has criticized the tax collection system in Cambodia for its high level of tax leakage and losses. According to him, collected tax goes into the private pockets of the tax collectors. Although rising year by year, tax income therefore does not reflect real payments or collection (Kunmakara, 2012).

Second, as the book is a compilation of previously published articles, particularly Chapter 1 (aid dependence and quality of governance), it is difficult to follow the sequence of the author's rationale.

Third, the author's policy recommendations, such as imposing stronger penalties to tackle corruption problems, collecting more revenues from taxation, and beefing up civil society (pp. 140–141) stand little chance to be implemented effectively in Cambodia due to high levels of corruption. It is also not clear whether an increase in revenue would have a positive impact on governance as an example for such a case is missing.

In sum, it should be noted that the above-mentioned shortcomings of the book do and shall not undermine the weight of the author's arguments. The book is a good source of information for donors, politicians, and civil servants in Cambodia as well as for other highly aid-dependent countries in Africa and Asia to understand that aid dependence impedes good governance and how aid dependence can be avoided. In addition, policymakers, development practitioners, theorists, and political economy students can benefit from this thin and yet instructive book for a better understanding of the inter-connection between foreign aid and governance in Cambodia.

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