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FOCUS GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS

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FOCUS GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS

ASEAS 10(1) features a focus on the interplay of gender, ethnicity, and environmental transformations in Indonesia and beyond. The articles share the general assumption that political and economic decisions always have ecological impacts and that societies have always transformed, (re-)produced, manufactured, and crafted nature along multiple lines of differentiation. The special issue brings together an interdisciplinary collection of conflicts, alliances, and strategies regarding natural resources along ethnic and gendered lines. The contributions range from the analysis of the intertwinement of gender and ethnicity in Indonesia's mining sector, gender-specific environmental transformations among the indigenous Dayak Benuaq in Kalimantan, the impacts of indigenous land titling in a controversial national park case in Sumatra, the contradictions of an indigenous disaster risk management system in the Philippines, or the challenges of transdisciplinary cooperation between farmers and scientists to deal with environmental transformations in Indonesia. The articles highlight that gender, ethnicity, and other categories of differentiation are important in unfolding complex environmental transformations in Indonesia and beyond. Thereby, they also show the challenge of empowering marginalized groups (e.g., indigenous peoples, farmers, and women) without creating new exclusions.

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Kemal Yufri / Greenpeace: Coal Barge in Indonesia

SATZ / LAYOUT
Thomas Gimesi

Inhalt ∼ Contents

Gender, Ethnicity, and Environmental Transformations in Indonesia and Beyond

Kristina Großmann, Martina Padmanabhan & Suraya Afiff

▸ Großmann, K., Padmanabhan, M., & Afiff, S. (2017). Gender, ethnicity, and environmental transformations in Indonesia and beyond. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10*(1), 1-10.

The contributions in this special issue are based on the general assumption that political and economic decisions always have an ecological impact and that societies have always transformed, (re-)produced, manufactured, and crafted nature. Environmental transformations are never socially neutral but are strongly connected to power relations (Görg, 2003). The enforcement of power over nature evolves in a dialectical process with the enforcement of power over humans (Pye, 2015). Furthermore, social, cultural, and political power asymmetries shape the production of knowledge, the definition of problems, and the search for solutions with regard to socio-ecological phenomena. Both gender and ethnicity are decisive factors in societal relations to nature. Gender constitutes a critical variable in human-nature relationships (Resurreccion & Elmhirst, 2008; Rocheleau, Slayter-Thomas, & Wangar, 1996) as does the category of ethnicity with its strong impact on group formation (Afiff & Lowe, 2007; Bertrand, 2004; Li, 2000). In this special issue we address how both categories interact and enforce each other in contested development processes, focusing on access, control, knowledge production, and identity-formation in struggles over land, nature, and natural resources.

INDONESIA'S DEVELOPMENTALIST AND EXTRACTIVIST PARADIGM

During the New Order, Suharto's authoritarian development regime was based on the extraction of the natural resources of the 'Outer Islands' for enhancing progress of the center (Java) (Haug, Rössler, & Grumblies, 2017). Backed by foreign investments, the Outer Islands and especially the uplands were constructed as marginal areas and their inhabitants as 'isolated tribes' (*suku terasing*) which should be 'civilized' in the name of development and modernization (Li, 1999). Following this aim, since the 1980s, transmigration programs have been enforced in order to establish the presence of the Javanese 'center', to strengthen a national identity, and to relieve population pressure in Java (Elmhirst, 1999). Thousands of families have been resettled from Java to the Outer Islands and endowed with land and assets so as to cultivate the land and 'civilize the people'. In the same context, the 1997 implemented village law (UU No. 5/1979) aimed at the homogenization of village governance based on the Javanese model of the *desa*. The law transformed the socio-political and territorial organization of former communities and banned customary rights to land. In the context of

the developmentalist and extractivist agenda, huge forest areas were destroyed, put under state control, or commercialized for extracting natural resources or converting them into agricultural land. The commodification and devastation of nature entails transformations in livelihood strategies and economic structures as well as the weakening and abolishment of the socio-political and territorial organization of local communities. Consequently, conflicts regarding the access and control of land and resources occur (Hall, Hirsch, & Li 2011; Nevins & Peluso, 2008; Pichler & Brad, 2016).

Today, the national model of development still connects economic growth and social development with the extraction of natural resources (for mining, see Großmann, Padmanabhan, & Braun, this issue). The national Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development (*Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia*, MP3EI) for the period of 2011 to 2025, adopted by the former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), stresses this developmentalist paradigm. According to their economic capacities and advantages, the MP3EI divides regions into Economic Corridors to achieve Indonesia's goals of self-sufficiency, advancement, justice, and prosperity (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2011). Subsequently, Sumatra has been defined as a Center for Production and Processing of Natural Resources and as the Nation's Energy Reserves (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2011, p. 51), referring to palm oil, rubber, coal, shipping, and steel. Java, on the contrary, should serve as a Driver for National Industry and Service Provision (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2011, p. 74), stressing the production of food and beverages, textiles, and transportation equipment. Kalimantan should develop to become the Center for Production and Processing of National Mining and Energy Reserves (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2011, p. 96), focusing on oil and gas, coal, palm oil, steel, bauxite, and timber.

As can be observed in his government plan, the current president Joko Widodo follows this developmentalist paradigm (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). He aims at strengthening the national economy by extracting and refining (*hilirisasi*) natural resources, whereas the exploitation of coal and gas should secure the national energy supply and enhance export revenues. At the same time, Joko Widodo takes into account local communities and stresses fair governance. This includes the 'fair distribution' of natural resources aiming at the enhancement of benefits and respect of local communities and a planned moratorium on giving permits for the establishment of oil palm plantations and mining sites. He prolonged these aspects in his speech on 4 January 2017, in which he promulgated equality, the redistribution of assets, and the reform of land rights as his main objectives.

Unsuccessful Attempts to Enhance Fair Distribution and Environmental Protection

Joko Widodo's aim to enhance the fair distribution of natural resources exemplifies a slight change in the relationship between the state and natural resource extraction in respect to policies and regulatory framework. Yet, his attempts to enhance equality, rights, and environmental protection still lack impactful implementation, as he mostly proceeds the ineffective regulations and programs of his predecessors. Since the 1990s, the Indonesian government has tried to limit the negative effects

of commercial use of natural resources for people and the natural environment. For example, national parks in which agricultural activity was prohibited were established to increase environmental protection. However, these policies have caused severe land conflicts between the local population, migrants, and state officials. In this issue, Stefanie Steinebach and Yvonne Kunz elaborate on the establishment of the Bukit Duabelas National Part in Sumatra in 2000 and show that neither 'indigenous' nor 'non-indigenous' people could assert land rights. In 1997, and in an extended version in 2009, a comprehensive environmental protection law was adopted (UU No. 23/1997 and UU No. 32/2009), which includes, among other things, the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment (*Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan*, AMDAL) for all projects affecting the environment. However, the assessment is commissioned and financed by the investor or the company and the results are mostly evaluated by a commission of experts who benefit from the investment as, for example, government representatives. Therefore, compensation payments are often very low or promised but not paid. NGOs and communities see the AMDAL process very critically as it is primarily a formality in which the negative impacts and rehabilitation measures for people and the environment are not taken seriously (see Großmann, Padmanabhan, & Braun, this issue). Overall, the attempts to enhance fair distribution through the establishment of national parks and impact assessments were double-edged. The overlap of areas with community lands, protected areas and indigenous conservation sites cause policy and regulatory uncertainties over land use and property rights. Priorities and interests differ not only vertically between local communities, the national state, and companies but also horizontally between different local groups and local elites (see Steinebach & Kunz; Großmann, Padmanabhan, & Braun, this issue).

The Need for Transdisciplinarity

One response to the challenges of environmental transformations and climate change is a transdisciplinary approach (Christinck & Padmanabhan, 2013). Transdisciplinarity goes beyond the interdisciplinary cooperation between different academic disciplines and recognizes the valuable contribution that practitioners' expertise can bring to problem-oriented research (Jahn, Bergmann, & Keil, 2012). Therefore, an understanding of transformation processes demands an assessment of their relationships with human values and socio-economic development pathways. A transdisciplinary approach is concerned with the reconciliation of the development of human society with the planetary boundaries in which it takes place (Clark & Dickson, 2003) and reflects on power relationships at the heart of current unsustainable socio-ecological interactions. In their contribution, Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter, and Muki T. Wicaksono describe such an inter- and transdisciplinary project, that is, the implementation of Science Field Shops for farmers in Java to learn agrometerology in order to better respond to phenomena related to climate change. The authors argue that through an inter- and transdisciplinary educational commitment in the frame of Science Field Shops, farmers not only develop strategies to cope with environmental change resulting from climate change but also learn to contest conventional national development paradigms.

THE GENDER-ETHNICITY-ENVIRONMENT NEXUS

Indonesia is of specific relevance within the field of gender studies, as scholars have stressed the tendency of only minor stratification of social relations along the category of gender (Colfer, 2008; DeJong, 1998; Metje, 1995; Sanday, 2002; Tsing, 1990). In more recent decades, however, research has pointed towards rising gender inequality in predominantly Muslim regions (Schröter, 2013) which exists side-by-side with gender equal or gender symmetric groups. One of these groups are the Dayak Benuaq in Kalimantan (see Michaela Haug, this issue), which are generally characterized by well-balanced gender relations. However, new gender asymmetries are emerging due to environmental change. Haug indicates that the increasing exploitation of natural resources has led to far reaching social and political transformations which (re) produce, in various ways, gendered economic, political, and social inequalities. As men and women possess different environmental knowledge, roles, and responsibilities, gender plays a crucial role for determining access to and control over natural resources and often influences how men and women are incorporated into new labor systems. Rising inequalities are also illustrated in the contribution by Kristina Großmann, Martina Padmanabhan, and Katharina von Braun, where women's rights and access to and control over land and cash, as well as status within the mining community decrease (see also Byford, 2002; Lahiri-Dutt & Mahy, 2007; Macintyre, 2002). Similar observations are made regarding the exploitation of palm oil where women are described as increasingly marginalized (Julia & White, 2011; Li, 2015).

Most existing literature on environmental change and gender focuses on women rather than on gender relations and tend to depict women as victims, stressing their vanishing access, control, and status. Only recently, Rebecca Elmhirst and Ari Darmastuti (2015) have developed a more nuanced description in their gender specific analysis of environmental change, governance, and power structures, which also takes the materiality of resources into account. They elaborate on the continuing embeddedness of multi-local livelihoods with reference to the use of diverse natural resources. Changing economic systems and social structures, they assert, lead to new (self-)concepts of gender identities, gender roles, work activities, control, and responsibilities. In her contribution to this issue, Michaela Haug follows this approach by describing women's and men's integration in differently gendered socio-economic systems, analyzing inclusions and exclusions of men and women in different contexts. Generally speaking, while there is a great number of studies on gender relationships in Indonesia, there is still a limited body of academic literature on issues of human-nature relationships with a gender focus – a gap which we aim to bridge in this issue.

Much of the contested environmental transformations, as the increasing exploitation of natural resources, deforestation, and expansion of palm oil production, take place within the domains of indigenous communities and in areas of rich biodiversity. Therefore, environmental transformations often entail power struggles between and amongst members of indigenous communities, state officials, representatives of companies, and members of environmental organizations. During the Suharto era, ethnicity was abolished from public and political discourse. Since the 1990s, however, ethnicity has seen a revival in Indonesian politics (Davidson & Henley, 2007;

van Klinken, 2007), which is connected to the strengthening of the concept of indigeneity supported by global indigenous peoples' movements (Hauser-Schäublin, 2013). In struggles over natural resources, indigeneity becomes a means to strengthen community and secure land rights against state and corporate claims (Großmann, 2017; Li, 2000). Major concerns in these struggles circle around land rights and the legitimization of territorial claims in the context of land grabbing and green grabbing (Afiff & Lowe, 2007; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012; Hall, 2011; McCarthy, Vel, & Afiff, 2012; Peluso, 2009, 2011; Pichler, 2015). In this issue, Stefanie Steinebach and Yvonne Kunz reflect on the highly political process of creating ethnicity in the case of local indigenous land rights in the province of Jambi, Sumatra. As they show, the right to land cannot be equally implemented by all indigenous groups, as in the case of the Orang Rimba – an ethnic group in Sumatra that can easily be categorized as 'indigenous people' but that cannot yet assert territorial claims against the state.

Why Combining Gender and Ethnicity?

As already expressed, changes in the environment lead to far reaching changes of local livelihoods, often inducing economic, political, and social inequalities and deprivation due to indigenous peoples' dependency on natural resources. Therefore, both indigenous men and women are negatively affected by the limited access and control to land and resources as well as other forms of political and economic exclusion. Yet, women may experience ethnicity differently than men. Scholars and women's rights organizations document negative effects on indigenous women's well-being, working conditions, their precarious situation of rights, access, and control pertaining to natural resources, as well as their marginalization and exclusion within processes of environmental change (Down to Earth, 2014; International Women and Mining Network, 2004).

Gender-based inequalities are often intersected by inequalities based on class, age, race, and ethnicity. Therefore, environmental changes have different effects on the knowledge, access, benefit, control, and power relations of men and women as well as of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. Intersectional approaches analyze the mutual construction and reinforcement of various categories of stratification, that is, class, race, ethnicity, and gender (Schubert, 2005). In this issue, Michaela Haug argues that in the case of the Dayak Benuaq, next to gender and ethnicity, age and education are constitutional factors when considering the impacts, reactions, involvement, and coping strategies of the group regarding development agendas and environmental changes. Intersectional intertwinements, however, are rarely explored in research on environmental transformations and there is a lack of gender-specific analyses of indigenous peoples' natural resource management and their reaction to environmental transformations.

Strategic Essentialism

The instrumentalization and essentialization of ethnicity and gender is understood as *strategic essentialism* (Spivak, 1988). Based on particular characteristics, indigenous groups distinguish themselves, or are distinguished from others in order to substan-

tiate claims for the restitution of traditional rights to land and other natural resources. One example is the construction of a specific Dayak identity that is utilized for political mobilization (McCarthy, 2004; Schiller, 2007; van Klinken, 2006). In this issue, Angelina Matthies elaborates on an example of strategic essentialism in the Philippines: While the *purok* system is promoted as an indigenous system of self-organization at the sub-village level in the context of community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM), it is embedded in a top-down modus operandi and accompanied by institutional authority and clientelistic structures that disenchant the promoted community-based disaster risk management implemented by self-organized citizens. In another example in this issue, Kristina Großmann, Martina Padmanabhan, and Katharina von Braun show how civil society organizations and development institutions in Indonesia deploy ethnicity- and gender-coded strategic essentialisms in natural resource management discourses as they often depict indigenous women as the 'better' conservers of nature and stress their fundamental role in environmental protection.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS

The contributions to this special issue elaborate on conflicts and alliances concerning struggles over natural resources along ethnic and gendered lines. The authors describe how indigenous men and women perceive, value, and cope with socio-ecological transformations and indicate emerging and sustained gender a/symmetries. Finally, they analyze interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary programs that address environmental transformations caused by climate change.

Stefanie Steinebach and Yvonne Kunz analyze processes and impacts of indigenous land titling in a controversial national park case in Indonesia. Although rights against the state can be enhanced, injustice between local communities emerge and transform local social structures. In her gender-specific analysis of environmental transformation processes among the Dayak Benuaq in Indonesia, Michaela Haug observes emerging asymmetries between men and women due to different ways of inclusion in new economic systems. However, as she argues, gender is interwoven with other kinds of inequalities such as ethnicity, class, age, or education that take effect in different contexts. This is also argued by Kristina Großmann, Martina Padmanabhan, and Katharina von Braun in their literature review on the intertwinement between gender and ethnicity in Indonesia's mining sector. The authors assert that gender, ethnicity, and other categories of differentiation are important in unfolding governance, rights, access, roles, and identities in the complex environmental transformations in the mining sector in Indonesia. In their case study on Science Field Shops in Indonesia, Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter, and Muki T. Wicaksono elaborate on the cooperation between farmers and so-called farmer-learning-focused-scientists. While trans- and interdisciplinary collaboration is seen to enhance positive responses to environmental transformations induced by climate change, future challenges remain particularly in the transdisciplinary collaboration with local universities and governmental authorities.

As the contributions to this issue show, members of local communities are differently affected by Indonesia's national developmentalist and extractivist paradigm.

New power constellations and the strengthening of indigenous groups can result in the rise of new elites that may impact the exclusion and discrimination of others. Therefore, one challenge in current environmental struggles is the empowerment of former marginalized groups without creating new exclusions. The contributions also stress that multiple categories of differentiation, beyond that of gender and ethnicity, should be included in elaborations on power struggles in the context of environmental change. Although, gender and ethnicity are critical variables in human-nature-relationships, age, education, status, descent, and other categories are equally important. Contextualized research which takes various categories of differentiation into account is essential in order to understand the complex impacts of environmental transformations as power and new exclusions set up along these lines.

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Contested Development in Indonesia: Rethinking Ethnicity and Gender in Mining

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This article reviews the literature on the relationship between gender and ethnicity in Indonesia's mining sector and outlines shortcomings and prospects for further research. Recent studies on mining and gender focus predominantly on women and how they are negatively affected by mining. Ethnicity, although a growing asset in struggles on environmental transformations, is hardly included in research on mining. The intertwinement of ethnicity and gender in elaborations on mining is often depicted in literature of development programs and environmental organizations in which indigenous women are homogenized as marginalized victims. We argue, however, for a multidimensional approach on mining that takes into account the institutionalization of gender and ethnicity in mining governance as well as the role of gender and ethnic identities. Feminist political ecology and institutional analysis are pointing the way for such an approach. Furthermore, other relevant categories such as class, age, or status should be considered in the analysis of the complex and multidimensional environmental transformations of the mining sector in Indonesia.

Keywords: Ethnicity; Feminist Political Ecology; Indonesia; Institutions; Mining

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INTRODUCTION

Gender and ethnicity are used to downplay and upgrade particular rights, access, control, and discursive power with regard to natural resources, and shape diverse understandings of development. In research on the masculinized mining industry, gender constitutes a critical variable in human-nature-relationships and related issues of development. As ethnicity also has strong impact on identity and group formation, this category is expected to feature prominently in the literature on mining in Indonesia, but this is not actually the case.

In this article, we discuss, based on a literature review, how researchers and development practitioners elaborate on the intertwinement of gender and ethnicity. In a further step, we frame shortcomings with regard to institutional analysis and give future prospects for further research. With special focus on Indonesia, we focus on gendered roles, access, control, and knowledge on processes of identity-formation and how these are instrumentalized in struggles over mining projects embedded in development discourses. This contributes to an understanding of how research in the field of gender, ethnicity, development and mining analyzes and describes the role and influence of different actors and

discourses, as well as the relationship between ethnic- and gender-coded power relations and socio-ecological transformation in Indonesia.

ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH MINING IN INDONESIA

Indonesia, as many other countries, links development with resource extraction and mining which is directly associated with economic and social development. During the former president Suharto's developmentalist authoritarian regime until 1998, the top-down agenda of development (*pembangunan*) was based on the economic extraction of the peripheries for the sake of the center's progress (Haug, Rössler, & Grumblies, 2017). In most cases, the large-scale exploitation of natural resources was materialized through contracts with foreign companies within the Contract of Work system (*kontrak karya*) which was regulated in Law No. 11 of 1967. A *kontrak karya* is an agreement between the Government of Indonesia as the principal and a foreign company as the contractor, giving the latter a strong position with regard to tax payments, revenue sharing, and dealing with environmental pollution and human rights abuses. In 2009, Law No. 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining replaced the *kontrakt karya* system by a mining permit system (*izin usaha pertambangan*) in the framework of a more protectionist economic approach.

As global demand for scarce energy resources is mounting rapidly, the coal mining sector promises massive revenues (Barma, Kaiser, Le, & Vinuela, 2012). However, the resource curse thesis suggests that natural resource abundance generates a series of economic and political distortions which ultimately undermine the contributions of the extractive industry to development through civil conflict (Sachs & Warner, 2001). The debate on the prospects and dangers of mining can be seen as an exemplification of the debate around the country's development model. The state's strong emphasis on economic growth through resource extraction can be seen in the expansion of Indonesia's coal industry. The mineral resources sector accounts for more than 17% of export revenues of the Indonesian economy (Price Waterhouse Coopers Indonesia, 2013) and globally, Indonesia is the second-largest coal producer and the largest exporter of thermal coal (Devi & Pragoyo, 2013).[1]

The benefit of mining to inhabitants living in resources rich regions – including ethnic groups – can materialize in the contribution to the development of local suppliers and local employment. However, the assessment of the impact of the mining industry on development depends on the definition of development. Multiple concepts of development exist – related to different approaches in the organization of social and production systems, orientations toward the past and the future, and philosophies of science and epistemology. The role of nature in development is a fundamentally distinguishing feature of the different concepts. A rather implicit classification has prevailed, with economics and development on one side, and the conservation of nature and ecology on the other (Colby, 1990). As a result of the negotiations on the Sustainable Development Goals, we may observe a convergence of the two streams in the international arena. Shaping the future in a sustainable way is

1 Between 1998 and 2013, the extraction of coal increased from 4.4 million tons (Lucarelli, 2010, p. 25) to 489 million tons, from which 426 million tons were exported (World Coal Association, 2014).

essentially based on the fair distribution of resources among those living today and future generations, and implies questions of distributive justice, development, future ethics, and causality (Muraca, 2010; Ott & Döring, 2004). Sustainability is thus a predominantly normative concept intended to influence the political and social spheres, and as such collides with the practices of natural resources use, as far as those norms are not respected in the mining sector.

Since the end of the authoritarian New Order regime under president Suharto, the Indonesian mining sector has undergone considerable changes with respect to policies and regulatory frameworks. This is largely due to democratization and decentralization processes resulting in greater regional autonomy (Haug et al., 2017). Although decentralization aims at promoting accountability, transparency, and public participation, conflicts over power and access to resources have increased as new elites strive for power (McCarthy, 2004; van Klinken, 2007). Priorities and interests differ between communities, the state, and mining companies (Resosudarmo, Resosudarmo, Sarosa, & Subiman, 2009). Conflict is caused by illegal mining, pollution, environmental impacts, as well as uncertainties surrounding the livelihoods of local residents after mining closure. Policy and regulatory uncertainties over land use and property rights relate to the overlap of mining areas with community lands, protected areas, and indigenous conservation sites (Ballard, 2001; Ballard & Banks, 2003; Fünfgeld, 2016). Negative impacts on the environment and the people are seen in the case of one of the world's largest gold and copper mines, the Grasberg-Mine in West Papua which is operated by the US-american company Freeport-McMoRan. In 1967, Freeport was the first foreign company to enter a contract on the exploration and production of natural resources with the Indonesian government. Therefore, it has enjoyed broad fiscal privileges as well as protection by the Indonesian military. Immense exclusion and deprivation of the local population, human rights violations, and massive destruction of the environment have led to protests and violent clashes between the Indonesian military and the Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, OPM) (Leith, 2002).

Concerns also relate to the poorly implemented national environmental impact assessment system in Indonesia (*Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan*, AMDAL), the relaxation of controls on environmental performance to stimulate investment, and the provision of increased access to nature reserve areas (Ballard, 2001; Großmann & Tijaja, 2015). Corporate Social Responsibility and Community Development (CSR/CD) could be a means to develop better standards of living for affected populations, if natural resource extraction occurs. However, in Indonesia, CSR predominately focuses on infrastructure projects and tends to exclude vulnerable groups (Welker, 2014). Devi and Prayogo (2013) state that CSR/CD tends to

> be used to secure the mining business and to cover up (or avoid) tensions and conflicts between companies and local communities. In such circumstances, CSR programs are developed in the form of charity, which tends to provide only short term benefit. In some cases, it may even escalate the pre-existing and unresolved issues. (p. 48)

Therefore, communities are disappointed and distrust the implementation of CSR/CD programs. The rapidly expanding Indonesian coal industry is concentrated in Kalimantan where 83% of Indonesia's overall 5,462 million tons of coal reserves are expected (Lucarelli, 2010, p. 40). The national Masterplan for the Acceleration and Development of the Indonesian Economy (*Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia*, MP3EI) from 2011 to 2015 aims at establishing Kalimantan as a "center for production and processing of national mining and energy reserves" (Government of Indonesia, 2011, p. 96). Whereas East and South Kalimantan are already established mining areas, Central Kalimantan is the new frontier for coal exploration. Large coal deposits have been found in the province's Upper Barito River (Kapuas) basins. Much of Indonesia's mineral resources are found in areas of rich biodiversity or within indigenous territories. Therefore, large-scale mining often entails struggles over access, control, and benefit pertaining natural resources. In Central Kalimantan, a number of indigenous groups are experiencing drastic changes in their livelihoods due to the expansion of palm oil plantations, deforestation, and existing mining activities (McCarthy, 2004). The influx of workers from other provinces, rivalry over employment, and competing land-rights pose considerable threats to local communities (Böge, 2007).

In extractive economies, large-scale mining occupies one end of the spectrum whereas artisanal or small-scale mining occupies the other, "with a complex array of informal, mineral-based livelihoods lying in between the two" (Lahiri-Dutt, 2012a, p. 201). Artisanal mining is characterized by non-mechanized and labor intensive mining activities, often in the informal sector, and is associated with visions of chaos and plunder invoking fear and insecurity amongst economists and policy-makers (Lahiri-Dutt, 2006). In fact, small-scale mining operates under hazardous conditions and has negative impacts on environment and health such as land erosion, river pollution as well as intoxication. Frequently, artisanal mining is not formally authorized by the government but has been contributing to the livelihoods of people living in resource rich regions for centuries, even before governments existed (Lahiri-Dutt, 2004; Lestari, 2011; Spiegel, 2011).

ETHNICITY AND MINING

Ethnicity is a crucial issue in Indonesia – given the large population of indigenous peoples and the conflictual history of ethnic relations on the island (Bertrand, 2004; Davidson & Henley, 2007). During the Suharto era, ethnicity, religion, race, and group affiliation, the so-called SARA (*suku, agama, ras, dan antar golongan*) topics, were officially forbidden in political discourse due to fear of national disintegration. On the other hand, Suharto's developmentalist authoritarian regime highly politicized and instrumentalized ethnicity. For example, the connotation of being a Dayak was derogative, associated with living in a remote area and being underdeveloped, backward, primitive, and a member of an 'isolated tribe' (*suku terasing*) and, therefore, subject to discriminative and paternalistic development programs (Duncan, 2007; Li, 1999; Sercombe & Sellato, 2007). With spatial and social dimensions always being connected to power relations, Suharto's regime defined marginality as geographically and socially distant from Jakarta which represented the absolute center (Grumblies,

2017). Therefore, the Outer Islands and especially the uplands were constructed as marginal areas and their inhabitants were expected to give up swidden agriculture and their nomadic mode of subsistence as well as convert to an officially recognized religion in the name of development and modernization (Li, 1999). This led to the rejection of ethnic belonging, identity, and difference amongst members of ethnic groups (for the Bentian ethnic group, see Sillander, 1995, p. 82; for the Meratus, see Tsing, 1984, p. 32).

Since the post-Suharto *reformasi* era, ethnicity has experienced revitalization, predominantly because it has become a central bargaining power in struggles over land and natural resources. The revival of tradition in Indonesian politics (Davidson & Henley, 2007) has also to be seen in the context of the parallel strengthening of indigenous identity supported by the global indigenous movement. New international agreements on the rights of indigenous peoples encouraged the self-assertion of communities that had been oppressed under the New Order Regime (Hauser-Schäublin, 2013). The internationally funded Indonesian organization Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*, AMAN) coined the Indonesian term *masyarakat adat* (people who adhere to customary ways) – now officially used to designate customary law communities (Afiff & Lowe, 2007). With customs (*adat*) playing an important role in communities' self-definition, the concept of masyarakat adat has become central to the rethinking of the relationships between nature and nation. AMAN (2012) classifies 50 to 70 million people of Indonesia's 230 million inhabitants as indigenous.[2] *Masyarakat adat* are defined as a group of people from the same ancestral lineages who inhabit a certain geographical area and have a distinctive set of ideological, economic, political, cultural, and social systems and values as well as a territory (AMAN, 2012, p. 3).[3] AMAN states that indigenous peoples traditionally live on their ancestral land and depend on nature, thereby having accumulated their own knowledge on how to manage this natural environment. They believe the Earth is a common property that deserves protection to maintain sustainability. AMAN indicates that indigenous peoples in Indonesia mostly live in rural environments rich in natural resources but many of them suffer from impoverishment as the government of Indonesia does not acknowledge their rights to land and natural resources. Oftentimes, the transfer of rights to land and natural resources has resulted in the loss of their livelihoods and they suffer from poor education and health, lack of mobility and information (AMAN, 2012).

In struggles over natural resources, indigenous identity has become a means to strengthen community rights over and against state and corporate claims (Li, 2000). In 2013, AMAN won a lawsuit requesting the Constitutional Court to review parts of the 1999 Forestry Law, giving indigenous communities the right for land titling. The

2 Indonesian law uses diverse terms for indigenous peoples, for example, *masyarakat suku terasing* (alien tribal communities), *masyarakat tertinggal* (neglected communities), *masyarakat terpencil* (remote communities), *masyarakat hukum adat* (customary law communities) and, more simply, *masyarakat adat* (people who adhere to customary ways). AMAN states that most of these terms comprise a negative connotation (AMAN, 2012, p. 4).

3 Therefore, AMAN characterizes indigenous peoples through their specific way of living and economic activities. They are described as living in forested, mountainous, or coastal regions, being nomadic and/or sedentary, engaged in gathering, rotational swidden farming, agroforestry, fishing, small-scale plantations, and mining for subsistence needs.

legal review states that *adat* forests are no longer categorized as part of state-owned forests and therefore can be owned by indigenous communities. In January 2017, the president Joko Widono enacted the Constitutional Court's decision and announced the recognition of the rights of nine indigenous communities (Mongabay, 2017).

Based on the particular characteristic of their *adat*, indigenous groups distinguish themselves from others in order to substantiate their claims for the restitution of their traditional rights – namely land or other natural resources. In the course of the decentralization process, for example, the indigenous group of the Dayak – a term referring to a heterogeneous population of non-Muslim or non-Malay natives of the island of Borneo (Sercombe & Sellato, 2007) have experienced new power constellations that strengthened the regional elites (Haug et al., 2017; Schulte Nordholt, 2014). The Dayak revitalized their identity in Kalimantan in the course of this process as they experienced an increase in political and economic participation (Duile, 2014; Haug, 2007; Schiller, 2007). Although the formal absence of effective forms of accountability hindered the systematic redistribution of power, some groups were enabled to assert customary *adat* claims, for example, the Muluy Dayak community in East Kalimantan. They try to resist large-scale mining operations by depicting small-scale mining as part of their indigenous customs and identity. Mulut Dayak communities emphasize that some of the rituals and religious ceremonies carried out are intrinsically connected to artisanal mining (Down to Earth, 2001).

GENDER AND MINING

Indonesia is of specific relevance within gender studies as researchers point out the prevalence of communities which are barely stratified along the dimension of gender and tend to lack the domination of men. Gender complementarity is stated amongst the Minangkabau in Sumatra (Sanday, 2002) with matrilineal structures. Symmetric gender relations are found among some ethnic groups, for example, the Dayak (Haug, in this issue; for specific Dayak groups such as the Meratus, see Tsing, 1990; for the Kenyah, see Colfer, 2008). Despite the acknowledgment of complementary and symmetric gender relations, researchers depict mining as an exceptionally masculinized industry in terms of the composition of its workforce and its cultures of production as well as of symbolic exploitation of feminized nature. According to Robinson (1996), mining "is so 'naturally' masculine [that] its gender effects are invisible" (p. 137). Until the beginning of the 21st century, studies on mining have neglected to focus on gender and the social position of women as workers, providers, and wives. Current research on gender and mining asserts that women's land rights and their rights to representation within the mining community are commonly diminished in the context of mining activities. The loss of land and resources to mining projects along with the pollution of the environment impact most heavily upon women in local communities who are seen as key subsistence providers (Down to Earth, 2001, 2014). Furthermore, mining often puts additional pressure on women to perform as the maintainers of kinship networks owing to male absenteeism (Ballard & Banks, 2003). Civil society groups stress augmented domestic violence and transformations in patterns of marriage and sexuality, leading to increases in the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases for women (International Women and Mining Network,

2004). The efforts of companies' CSR programs predominantly concentrate on men and thereby tend to overlook women or homogenize women as victims of mining (Mahy, 2011). Studies also point out that the rapid influx of cash as land compensation or income to indigenous men impacts on gender relations and pushes women further into marginalization (Byford, 2002; Lahiri-Dutt & Mahy, 2007; Macintyre, 2002).

In artisanal mining, women generally play a much larger role than in large-scale mining. They occupy a broad range of activities like crushing, grinding, sieving, and panning. Moreover, they are involved in the hazardous processing of mining products, involving, for example, mercury in the case of gold. Amalgamation is often conducted at home which means great risk of mercury poisoning and silicosis (Hinton, Veiga, & Beinhoff, 2003). Furthermore, women are involved in cooking and running small food and drink stalls.

The gendered impacts of mining often cut across different ethnic groups and classes but poorer women (and men) are described as more negatively affected. Women of some ethnic groups do participate to some extent in small-scale mining when cultural, historical, and legal aspects prevent them as Moretti (2006) shows in his study on the Anga in the Kaindi area of Papua New Guinea. He ascertains that pollution beliefs, land tenure practices, the unequal control of household resources, the gendered division of labor as well as the gendered history of the colonial goldfields, contemporary national law, and company practice marginalize women in the extractive sector.

In summary, the existing literature exhibits a tendency to focus on women rather than on gender relations and tends to represent women as victims, deploying a duality of women as either wives or sex workers and men as either miners or exploiters. In counterbalancing this, Lahiri-Dutt (2012a) argues for a post-capitalist feminist approach which aims to reveal women's agency and involvement in mining. In a recent study, Lahiri-Dutt (2012b) explores the articulations and enactments of race-gender-class in a company town in East Kalimantan and analyzes the performances of differential power enjoyed by women and men, foreigners and Indonesians in different sites of social interactions. In his study on men and masculinity, Cannon (2003) explores the discourses and practices of expatriates in the mining industries of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. He describes that the strongly patriarchal nature of the industry and its workforce fuels a transnational mining labor culture that places a premium on expressions of masculinity, alcohol, and violence.

INTERSECTIONALITY OF ETHNICITY AND GENDER IN MINING

Gender-based inequalities are often intersected with inequalities based on class, age, race, and ethnicity. Intersectional approaches examine how these axes of stratification are mutually constructed and reinforce each other. Ethnicity and gender are two overlapping categories that "bring to the fore the intertwined aspects of economic, ecological and cultural distribution" (Escobar, 2006, p. 10). Both gender and ethnicity are critical variables in shaping access to, knowledge and organization of natural resources (Resurrection & Elmhirst, 2008; Rocheleau, Slayter-Thomas, & Wangar, 1996). Moreover, gender and ethnicity function as markers for identities. Both indi-

vidual and collective identities are (re-)produced in a dialectical process of internal and external identification and have a flexible and situational character (Hall, 2000; Jenkins, 2014). Therefore, multiple identities reflect the coexistence of diverse ethnic or gender identities whose particular meaning depends on situation and context. Identities not only coexist but also intersect. Gendered identity does not necessarily carry the same meanings for members of different ethnic groups. Similarly, women experience ethnic identity differently than men. Drawing on the concept of intersectionality, gender and ethnic identities are complementary or competing and ethnicity disrupts or reinforces the existing gender order.

Strategic Essentialisms: Indigeneity, Women, and Development

The instrumentalization of ethnicity and gender as identity markers can be understood as *strategic essentialism* (Spivak, 1988). Strategic essentialism relates to identity politics, a term signifying political activism founded in the shared experiences of injustice as a social group. With the goal of greater self-determination, groups assert their understanding of distinctiveness to challenge dominant oppressive structures and processes. Oppressed groups deploy strategic essentialism, for example, women may retrieve modes of essentialism to combat the ideological representations of masculine superiority. However, social struggles channeled through a discourse of identity-based rights and law can also be highly problematic. Identities may be reinterpreted or even imposed upon actors, often as a result of inequalities of power and authority, thus becoming divisive and repressive. Just as gender may serve as a strategic tool, different actors may also use ethnicity in an essentialist way to pursue certain interests (McCarthy, 2006). Similarly, ethnicity is not a natural category of difference that precedes social relations but is rather formed by and through contested and historically contingent relations of power. As described above, in the context of the revitalization of Dayak identities, ethnic identity became central in struggles over natural resources. Reasons for rising claims on rights and control are not only to sustain people's livelihood but also to preserve customary rights.

Civil society organizations and development institutions deploy rather frequently strategic essentialisms in the context of gender and ethnicity. The UN Briefing Note 5 on Gender and Indigenous Peoples asserts that

> Indigenous Peoples believe that there is a holistic interconnection among all things on the planet: animals, plants, natural forces, human beings and the supernatural life. The state of environment will predict the health and state of people who depend upon its provisions. The environment is the provider of life for all human beings who depend on its bounty to survive. . . . Indigenous women have played a fundamental role in environmental conservation and protection throughout the history of their peoples. (United Nations, 2010, p. 23)

Another example are the Guidelines on Integrating Indigenous and Gender Aspects in Natural Resource Management that state:

> The draft Platform argues that women, particularly indigenous women, have pivotal roles in environmental conservation. . . . The proposed actions are designed to promote the involvement of women in environmental decision-making at all levels and to ensure the integration of women's needs, concerns, and perspectives in policies and programs for environmental and sustainable development. In most developing countries, women are responsible for obtaining water and fuel and in managing household consumption. As a result, they are especially concerned with the quality and sustainability of the environment. (Kiørboe, Vinding, Salazar, Tuxen, & Munk-Ravnborg, 2005, p. 4)

And The Manukan Declaration of the Indigenous Women's Biodiversity Network (2004) reads:

> We, Indigenous women, secure the health of our Peoples and our environment. We maintain a reciprocal relationship with Mother Earth because she sustains our lives. Indigenous Peoples have developed our own health systems, and Indigenous women are the fundamental conservers of the diversity of medicinal plants, used since the time of our conception. (n.p.)

These examples show that indigenous peoples are often connected to a more monistic conception of human-environment relationship and are seen as entertaining a stronger reciprocal relationship between themselves and the environment. This naturalist approach of women being closer to nature is directly related to ecofeminist perspectives which argue that women and nature have been subject to a shared history of oppression by patriarchy and the domination of Western culture (Biehl, 1991; Mies & Shiva, 1991). They emphasize the 'natural connection' between women and nature and construct women as unrecognized vanguards of the environment (Dankelman, 2003; Dankelman & Davidson, 1988; Rodda, 1991). Ecofeminism is grounded in a form of radical environmentalism and aims at transforming social and environmental injustices by giving women a central role in the process of change. This approach overlaps with the Women, Environment, and Development (WED) framework, which has primarily been applied within development policies since the 1980s, as both put women at the center of environmental action. However, mainstream development agencies have tended to echo ecofeminist discourses in their statements and designs for environmental programs in much less radical ways, thereby depoliticizing them (Leach, 2007).

The naturalist approach of ecofeminism is criticized by a large body of scholarly work because of its essentializing and homogenizing of women and gender relations and concentrating merely on one aspect of oppression in society, namely that of men over women (Agarwal, 1992; Jackson, 1993; Rocheleau et al., 1996). Thus, scholars within the Feminist Political Ecology (FPE) framework analyze the relation between environmental transformations and certain categories of inequality, including gender, and elaborate on multifocal power relations, access and control in political economies, processes of commodification, and changes in women's labor conditions (Elmhirst, 2011; Elmhirst & Resurreccion, 2008). Furthermore, they contribute research on gendered environmental knowledge (Howard, 2003; Jewitt, 2002; Padmanabhan,

2011) as well as on development policy and governmental development programs (Cornwall, Harrison, & Whitehead, 2007; Leach, 2007). FPE re-established a more differentiated and politicized perspective and debate concerning the gender-environment-development nexus.

Despite this critique in academic circles, an essentialist take on women still plays a central role in development programs, both in their ideologies and in their practical applications. For instance, women are often appointed as effective managers of natural resources and constructed as key actors in conservation programs (Suma & Großmann, 2016). References to such approaches are also found within sustainable development policies related to mining where women are either invisible or depicted predominantly as victims to be targeted in economic and social empowerment programs for the enhancement of national development. The Guidelines of Mainstreaming Gender into Extractive Industries Projects by the World Bank (2006) assert that

> improving women's economic and social empowerment is an integral part of the development agenda. It strengthens countries' abilities to grow, reduce poverty, and govern effectively. Improving gains from extractive industries for women stakeholders will not only leverage their untapped potential in increasing growth, reducing poverty, and fostering positive conditions for sustainable development, but also improve the development effectiveness of oil, gas and mining operations for communities and countries as a whole. (n.p.)

MAPPING WAYS OUT: INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER AND ETHNICITY IN MINING

Institutions, understood as providers of norms and rules, regulate government, private sector, and civil society. Similar to *doing gender* (West & Zimmerman, 1987), we may speak of *doing ethnicity* (Groenemeyer, 2003) as an institutional and discursive process. In order to elaborate on the intertwinement of ethnicity and gender as well as to understand the social-ecological dimension of mining, we suggest to unpack what Hagedorn, Arzt, and Peters (2002) consider the "four institutional perspectives", namely (a) the property of the resource, (b) the characteristic of actors, (c) the property rights, and (d) the governance structures.

The *property of the resource* shapes the societal relations to nature, grounded in material expressions of human-nature relations. In the case of mining, the conceptual danger arises to equate the categories of gender and nature/culture, whereby women and nature are seen as both subject to exploitation. It is analytically more rewarding to move beyond the topos of *indigenous women* as victims and critically look into the gendered structures of the mining industry. The symbolism of the sheer size of operations, required technology, and capital refers to an engineering culture that embodies masculinity. Remote sites and dangerous work along with new community patterns give rise to social and institutional change. The properties of mining require enormous investments, resulting in a specific social organization of mining operations. Shift work or shuttling workers in and out of site results in new arrangements intersected by ethnicity and gender. The hierarchy of the enterprise is mirrored in the social hierarchies on the ground and the larger mining towns (Robinson, 2015).

The second institutional perspective refers to the *actors* on mining sites who are subjugated to a vertical and stratified division of labor. In some historical sites, men might have dug and women carried and processed (Lahiri-Dutt, 2012a). In any case, different spaces of work require different physical technologies which eventually become labeled male or female. While open-pit mining has seen more involvement of women and children, shaft-mining resulted in their exclusion. The miner is seen as quintessentially male. According to the doctrine of separate gendered spheres, true womanhood is portrayed in the miner's wife as the only legitimate woman on the mine, creating the dualism of mine versus home (echoing the public-private divide). The alternative model is that of the prostitute, the 'fallen woman', often counted as evidence for victimhood. Rereading sexual services as one of the few strategies open to (unskilled) women to participate in the riches from mining provides a new dimension to the analysis of the resource curse.

The third institutional factor is *property rights*. Property rights to nature's components are outcomes from institutions of environmental and political coordination that decide about gendered and ethnic access to and control over benefit streams. These property rights are embedded in larger governance structures with implicit gendered and ethnic regulations that are subject to changing patterns of participation. Whether women are able to realize economic gains in the wider mining sector depends on formal and informal property rights. In Indonesia, the state is the major formal landowner while land use often follows *adat* rules. Property rights play out in regimes of kinship, rules of inheritance, and layered use rights and result in either agency or powerlessness. As land is a crucial resource in mining, the access to and control over land titles determines participation, for example, through the payment of compensation. Tremendous social change is induced if formal rules contradict informal social organization, for example, the breadwinner concept in relation to equal responsibilities or the discrimination against women in unions. Equal decision-making over and access to budget and investments can then be diminished by insecurity in case of divorce, widowhood, or the absence of men for labor (Li, 2015) in an increasingly commodity based economy. Additionally, the distribution of the costs and benefits of mining and the provision of services – such as social services, income, or skills development and educational facilities through local governments and mining companies – differ between men and women. Especially women's rights organizations assert that through the erosion of subsistence economies by mining, women become marginalized in their position as food producers and their traditional role as gatherers, providers, care givers, and nurturers dissolves (Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development, 2009, p. 108). An institutional approach informed by intersectionality can help to unravel the wo/men-nature relationship embedded in the material interactions around mining sites.

The fourth institutional perspective is *governance structures*. It comprises the complex and dynamic interplay between different institutions like the state, transnational regimes (e.g., the International Monetary Fund), private multinational mining companies, the local businessmen, and local people. Here, crony economies and illegal exploitations (Aspinall & van Klinken, 2011) are strongly intertwined with the state's paternalistic development efforts, whereas government power is often overruled by neoliberal forces (Gellert, 2010). Moreover, the economic spaces of mining

are influenced by the culture and control of international mining. This "corporate machismo" (Lahiri-Dutt, 2012a, p. 197) of a global industry expands from the shareholders in the Global North to the local outplay on gendered and ethnic livelihoods. The emerging new mining communities as a diverse mix of gender, class, and ethnicity reproduce the male-dominated state in company structures, labor organizations, and unions. Representations of the hypermasculine miner and overpaid executives (re)presented in the media establish industrial mining as the only legitimate extraction. This hides women's work in artisanal mining where their labor force is on the rise worldwide.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Recent studies on mining and gender focus mainly on an essentialist category of women and the negative effects of mining on women's well-being, livelihoods, and working conditions. Women's precarious access to and control of natural resources and their marginalization and exclusion within processes of environmental change as well as possibilities and strategies of empowerment in mining are major areas of concern. Ethnicity, although a growing asset in struggles on environmental transformations, is hardly included in research on mining. The intertwinement of ethnicity and gender in elaborations on mining is mostly dealt with in the literature of development programs and environmental organizations in which indigenous women are homogenized and depicted as marginalized victims who should be empowered. As these organizations fight to enhance women's rights, this homogenization as a means of a strategic essentialism may be effective and justified. However, scholars criticizing this approach aim at breaking up simplified notions and depict a rather heterogeneous picture in which women's agency, involvement, and symmetry is stressed. Frameworks like feminist political ecology or institutional perspectives underline the multidimensional complexity of gender, ethnicity, and natural resource extraction. However, the intertwinement of gender and ethnicity as important signifying forces, represented by a polymorph approach to power and acknowledging the complexity of identity formation, is rarely dealt with in existing studies. We therefore suggest a multidimensional approach in future studies on mining in Indonesia, taking into account the institutionalization of gender and ethnicity in mining governance and the role of gender and ethnic identities. Such a new research agenda investigates the norms and rules which regulate decisions, actions, and interactions as well as multifocal power structures in mining governance along the line of ethnicity and gender. Furthermore, elaborations on the (re)production of identities and roles relating to gender and ethnicity may elucidate the disruption or reinforcement of gender/ethnicity orders and regimes in mining activities and facilitate differentiated approaches in development concepts. Moreover, categories beyond gender and ethnicity are relevant to consider (e.g., class, age, status) in order to unravel the complex and multidimensional environmental transformations taking place in the mining sector in Indonesia.

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Men, Women, and Environmental Change in Indonesia: The Gendered Face of Development Among the Dayak Benuaq

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▸ Haug, M. (2017). Men, women, and environmental change in Indonesia: The gendered face of development among the Dayak Benuaq. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, *10*(1), 29-46.

The increasing penetration of global capitalism, ambitious development efforts, and related environmental change have significantly transformed Kalimantan and its indigenous population, commonly referred to as Dayak, during the last decades. This article analyzes these processes from a gendered perspective and explores how gender relations among the Dayak, who generally are characterized by well-balanced gender relations, have been influenced by what is commonly referred to as 'development'. A review of the existing literature shows that new asymmetries between men and women are emerging mainly due to different ways of inclusion in new economic systems. Based on research among the Dayak Benuaq, the article shows that far-reaching gender equality has been so far upheld within Benuaq society while gender gets interwoven with an increasing variety of inequalities. I argue that in order to capture this complexity, research on the gendered impacts of development should a) aim for a better understanding of the intertwinement of gender with other aspects, such as ethnicity, class, age, or education, b) pay more attention to how these aspects play out in different contexts, and c) differentiate more clearly between gender ideals, norms, and actual practice.

Keywords: Development; Environmental Change; Gender; Indigenous Peoples; Kalimantan

INTRODUCTION

Since the last decades, the island of Borneo and its societies have undergone rapid and profound change. Deforestation and the degradation of the natural environment has been accelerated by the increasing integration of even small communities into the global capitalist economy, the expansion of state control, ambitious plans of national and local governments to generate income and to boost economic growth through natural resource extraction, growing mobility, as well as the increasing commodification of land and other natural resources (Cleary & Eaton, 1992; Padoch & Peluso, 1996; Tsing, 2005). For the indigenous population, commonly referred to as Dayak, these changes often imply the loss of land and other natural resources, increasing dependency on wage labor, and a shift towards life in (semi-)urban centers (Cramb et al., 2009; De Koninck & Bissonnette, 2011; Sercombe & Sellato, 2007).

These transformations (re-)produce diverse economic, political, and social inequalities. This occurs, for example, through new processes of exclusion (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011) as well as through the "adverse incorporation" (Hickey & Du Toit, 2007) in new economic systems. So far, the inequalities most extensively

addressed in this context in Kalimantan have been the marginalization of the local population vis-a-vis the state and (trans-)national corporations, increasing economic disparities between local elites and average villagers, and inequalities related to ethnicity (Duncan, 2004; Fried, 1995; Peluso, 2003). The latter are of increasing importance especially since decentralization, when ethnicity gained new prominence within local politics as well as through the revitalization of Dayak culture which has partly been directed against claims and demands of migrants from other parts of Indonesia, thus fueling violent conflicts in some areas of Kalimantan (Davidson, 2003; Oesterheld, 2004; Peluso, 2003; van Klinken, 2002). It has further been described how the integration into global capitalism, mainly in the form of commercial logging, mining, and the expanding oil palm industry, leads to conflicts and various forms of resistance (De Koninck & Bissonnette, 2011; Haug, 2014a; Potter, 2009). However, what remains unclear is, what role gender plays within these processes and how gender intersects with other elements of multiple and fragmented identities such as ethnicity, education, or age in the (re-) production of various kinds of inequalities.

The aim of this contribution is thus to explore these recent processes of environmental and societal change from a gendered perspective. I explore how the lives of men and women have been impacted and how gender relations have been influenced by development. The indigenous groups of Kalimantan, commonly referred to as Dayak, are of particular interest as they are characterized by far reaching gender equality.[1] The limited number of studies documenting the impact of recent economic and environmental change on Dayak gender roles, gender identities, and gender relations reveal heterogeneous outcomes. However, their overall tenor is that new asymmetries between men and women are emerging and that women tend to be more negatively affected by this environmental change than men.

Taking the Dayak Benuaq as an example, I show that the Benuaq have so far upheld far-reaching gender equality despite manifold external influences. I argue that gender is interwoven with a growing variety of inequalities. In order to understand the gendered impacts of development, a complex perspective has to be considered. For example, I view the still prevailing essentialist focus on women as misleading. Research exploring the gendered impacts of development must include male perspectives and aim for a better understanding of the intertwinement of gender with other categories of differentiation, such as ethnicity, age, education, or social status and pay more attention to how these play out in different contexts.

Data for this article was collected during 22 months of field research in Kutai Barat between 2004 and 2007 and during two shorter periods of field research in 2009 and 2011. My initial research was an integral part of a CIFOR-BMZ research project[2], which analyzed the impacts of regional autonomy on the well-being of forest dependent communities. I conducted fieldwork mainly in the three Dayak Benu-

1 Despite the great linguistic and cultural diversity of the various Dayak groups, the available literature supports the general argument that Dayak societies are characterized by rather well-balanced gender relations. This will be further elaborated below.

2 The research project "Making Local Government More Responsive to the Poor: Developing Indicators and Tools to Support Sustainable Livelihood under Decentralization" was financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and carried out by the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in cooperation with the University of Freiburg in Germany.

aq villages Engkuni Pasek, Jontai, and Muara Nayan (Haug, 2010).[3] I used a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods, for example, participatory observation, formal and informal interviews, two comprehensive household surveys, and a wellbeing survey. The wellbeing survey, which I refer to below, covered a total of 300 people with equal proportions of young people, parent and grandparent generations, as well as equal proportions of men and women, all of which were chosen randomly. During my research on poverty and decentralization, gender emerged as an interesting aspect that I start to explore in this article.

In order to locate the discussion on gendered development in Kalimantan within a broader framework, I start this article with a brief overview of the gendered impacts of development in Southeast Asia before summarizing what is known so far about its impacts in Kalimantan. I then turn to my own research among the Dayak Benuaq, and describe their gender relations and how recent economic and environmental developments have impacted them. Finally, I point out relevant questions for further research on the gendered impacts of development in Kalimantan.

GENDER, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The increasing penetration of global capitalism into rural areas of Southeast Asia is supported by national governments as part of ambitious development agendas which often accelerate the extraction of natural resources (e.g., mining, oil palm plantations) and lead to far-reaching environmental transformations. Globalization, development, and environmental change are hence deeply intertwined in the daily experiences of men and women living in the rural areas of Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Three different bodies of literature address the gendered impacts of these processes. First, there is a broad feminist scholarship on *gender and globalization*, which explores how changes implied by globalization impact women, men, families, and gender relations, paying special attention to work relations and the (in)compatibility of productive and reproductive activities (summarized in Acker, 2004). A second body of literature, addressing *gender and development*, can be traced back to Ester Boserup's seminal work *Women's Role in Economic Development* (1970). Despite the broad variety of studies that can be found within this category, a great number focuses on women in the Global South and/or the gendered impacts of specific development measures and development projects (Elson, 1995; Stevens, 2000; Trankell, 1993). The third body of literature has developed around the *gender and environment nexus*. Ecofeminist approaches that related the oppression of women and the exploitation of nature to patriarchal-capitalistic domination (Shiva, 1989) have meanwhile been heavily criticized in academia (Archambault, 1993; Leach, 2008) but they still seem prevalent in the field of practice. Recent work on gender and environment is strongly influenced by feminist political ecology which focuses on gender specific environmental knowledge, the role of gender in determining access to and control over natural resources as well as the gendered nature of environmental politics and social movements (Elmhirst, 2011; Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter, & Wangari, 1996). Inspired

3 As agreed with the villagers I use pseudonyms for the names of informants but regular names for places and locations.

by an increasing attention to the physical, sensory, and functional possibilities and capacities of materials (Miller, 2005), the materiality of the natural environment and human bodies becomes currently included in research on gender and environment (Barad, 2003; Elmhirst, Siscawati, & Basnett, 2015). As development, globalization, and environmental change are intimately intertwined, I do integrate literature from all these strands in my further discussion of gender and development in Southeast Asia in general and Kalimantan in particular.

Research on gender in Southeast Asian societies reveals a great diversity and has contributed to challenging dominant assumptions within the anthropology of women and gender. One of these dominant assumptions is the dichotomy of domestic and public brought forward by Rosaldo (1974). Ethnographies from Southeast Asian societies have shown that the domestic realm of life can be very powerful, as for example, among the Minangkabau in Sumatra (Sanday, 2002). They have also emphasized that control over economic resources is not automatically associated with higher social status (Anderson, 1972; Keeler, 1990), and that there are various societies which simply do not make the distinction between domestic and public, like the Dayak Gerai (Helliwell, 1993, p. 268).

It is thus not surprising that research on the gendered impacts of development in Southeast Asia, which largely focuses on women, also reveals a heterogeneous picture: Industrialization, urbanization, labor migration, and the increasing market integration of rural areas can have both empowering effects on women and (re-)produce and strengthen gender asymmetries (Rydstrom, 2010; Williams, 2007). Several researchers have emphasized that other factors such as class, age, and education highly influence the impact of development on women's lives (Helliwell, 1993; Karim, 1995) and we can assume that the same is the case for men. Aiwa Ong, studying female factory workers in Malaysia, argues that development is very unevenly experienced and distributed; even in the same community some women may benefit while others lose. Also, "for the same women the consequences may be contradictory, opening up new possibilities for social and physical mobility and introducing new freedoms, but also imposing new pressures and constraints" (Ong, 1987, cited in King, 1999, pp. 161-162). Research on agricultural modernization and increasing wage labor also shows great complexity: It is mainly young women who leave rural areas in search of wage labor while married and older women stay in (or return to) the village and are more engaged in agriculture (King, 1999, p. 162). The increasing mechanization seems to have different effects on male and female labor. While the introduction of mechanical harvesting and transplanting methods has often tended to displace women from agriculture (Scott, 1985; Wong, 1987), the mechanization of field preparation has reduced the workload of men (Rigg, 1997).

Ester Boserup (1970) has argued that colonial rule and the advance of capitalism have pushed rural women out of agriculture and confined them to the domestic realm. Such processes have also been documented for Southeast Asian societies. For example, Robinson (1986) shows how men and women were "co-partners in agricultural production" (p. 65) in Soroako, Sulawesi, before nickel mining provided employment predominantly to men. Several researchers argue that also state development programs as well as NGO programs and projects often (re-)produce gender asymmetries (Van Esterick, 1995). Such programs are often ignorant of the respective societ-

ies' understanding of gender or work, customary land tenure systems, and the local gendered division of labor. Consequently, they often locate women in the domestic sphere, while they automatically assume men as local authorities and landowners (King, 1999; Van Esterik, 1995). This ignorance tends to undermine the authority and the rights of women among ethnic minorities and indigenous groups (Klein-Hutheesing, 1995; Siscawati, 2014).

GENDERED IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENT IN KALIMANTAN

Marginalizing Dayak Culture

To understand how development has encompassed Kalimantan, it is crucial to consider the position of Kalimantan and its people within the Indonesian nation state. During pre-colonial times, the Indonesian archipelago was characterized by emerging and declining centers and peripheries. With the advent of colonialism, however, the island of Java emerged as a single center while the surrounding islands were increasingly more transformed into the state's periphery. After Indonesian independence and short debates about federalism during the 1950s, the central position of Java and the capital Jakarta have been further strengthened, culminating in the highly centralistic *Orde Baru* (Haug, Rössler, & Grumblies, 2017). While Java and Javanese culture have been constituted as the "showcase of development" (Tsing, 1993, p. 23), the outer islands, like Kalimantan, have been constructed as the margins of the state, being "in need of 'development'" (Li, 1999, p. 11).

The New Order regime (*Orde Baru*) consequently represented itself as a government of progress, bringing development to the Indonesian periphery and its inhabitants. Development (*pembangunan*) became a crucial discourse (Arnscheidt, 2009, pp. 117-124) and the indigenous population became one of that doctrine's objects. The Dayak were classified as one of Indonesia's isolated communities (*masyarakat terasing*) whose way of living was considered not in accordance with the standards of modern Indonesia. The goal of the government was to develop these groups and integrate them into the social and cultural mainstream of the country. In practice, this meant that Dayak, as well as other indigenous peoples throughout the Indonesian Archipelago, faced severe discrimination and assimilation policies (Duncan, 2004). These included resettlement schemes, which encouraged Dayak to settle in one family houses and partly forced them to destroy their longhouses as these were considered dirty, unhealthy, dangerous, and a breeding ground for communism. The promulgation of the law UU No. 5/1979 on village administration was of major significance in this process. By standardizing village structures as per the Javanese model, it destroyed local political institutions and traditional forms of leadership and social organization. Further development efforts attempted to eliminate autochthonous Dayak belief systems as these were excluded from the official definition of religion. Thus, the Dayak experienced a heavy pressure to convert either to Islam or Christianity (Henley & Davidson, 2007, p. 10). Finally, a variety of development efforts aimed to persuade Dayak people to abandon swidden agriculture which was considered unproductive and unsustainable. Programs to get Dayak into wet rice cultivation were often combined with transmigration programs, which were aimed at relieving the population

pressure on Java, Bali, Madura, and Lombok while simultaneously expanding central control and a nationalist vision of development (Hoey, 2003, p. 110). Transmigration programs created ecological damage (e.g., the 1 million ha rice project in Central Kalimantan; Kartodiharjo & Jhamtani, 2009, pp. 47-49) and in several cases contributed to tensions between migrants and indigenous groups (Duncan, 2004).

The New Order government increased state control over natural resources through issuing sectoral laws on forestry, mining, oil and natural gas, irrigation, and fisheries, which all facilitated resource exploitation by state and private interests (Lucas & Warren, 2000; Thorburn, 2004). In Kalimantan, natural resources, most notably timber, oil and gas, gold, and coal were extracted to generate national economic growth and to benefit the center (Charras, 2005), while benefits for the local population remained limited. Instead, customary rights to land and forests were increasingly marginalized, and millions of hectares of communal forests, fallow land, and forest gardens were given to logging companies or converted to commercial agriculture, jeopardizing the livelihoods of the local population (Dove, 2006).

With the turn of the century, democratization and regional autonomy have brought manifold changes to Kalimantan. Through the 'blossoming' of new administrative units,[4] many new political and administrative centers were created throughout Kalimantan, endowed with new political authority and new economic opportunities. Dayak people – seen as a whole – have been empowered, with some Dayak groups becoming ruling majorities in newly created regencies (Haug, 2017), and Dayak identities becoming (re-)constructed in various ways (Widen, 2002). The resource-rich regions of Kalimantan further profited from fiscal decentralization and some local governments have undertaken great efforts to improve service provision and local infrastructures. However, not all citizens have benefited equally from these changes. New processes of marginalization on regency and village levels lead to increasing inequalities (Haug, 2017). Furthermore, democratization and decentralization have not automatically reversed ecologically destructive practices of natural resource exploitation that emerged during the New Order (Warren & McCarthy, 2009, p. 227). Development in Kalimantan continues to be focused on the extraction of natural resources and the conversion of forests for commercial agriculture. Mining will be of special importance for the future development as the masterplan for acceleration and expansion of Indonesia's economic development (MP3EI) for the period 2011-2025 designates Kalimantan as the center for the production and processing of national mining and energy reserves (Government of Indonesia, 2011).

Gender (In-)Equality, Development, and Environmental Change among the Dayak

Research on gender among Dayak societies so far remains limited, fragmentary, and often raises more questions than answers (Sutlive & Appell, 1991, p. xi). However, despite the linguistic and cultural diversity of Dayak societies, the available literature documents the broad existence of well-balanced gender relations. Ethnographies describe, for example, far-reaching gender equality among the Iban (Mashman, 1991),

4 Although this phenomenon is found all over Indonesia, it is most striking in the Outer Islands. While between 1996 and 2007 the number of regencies increased by 7.8% in Java and Bali, it rose by 82% in Kalimantan (Brata, 2008).

Rungus (Appell, 1991), Gerai (Helliwell, 2000), Meratus (Tsing, 1990), and Kenyah (Colfer, 1981, 1985, 1991, 2008). This does not mean that Dayak societies are free of gender inequalities, but rather that the gender inequalities, if present, are small and often eclipsed by other categories of differentiation, for example, class in Central Borneo (Rousseau, 1991, p. 409). Gender asymmetries exist to varying degrees among the different Dayak groups and are most often found in the political domain. For example, Schneider and Schneider (1991) describe gender relations among the Selako as rather egalitarian in terms of the social relations between the sexes, however, men tend to be awarded more prestige than women and dominate political and religious positions.

The balance between men and women is produced through different practices. While some Dayak groups tend to minimize differences between men and women, others perceive them as clearly different but complementary. The Ngaju, for example, belong to the latter. For them, 'male' and 'female' are viewed as opposing domains, which together comprise a "unity in duality" (Schiller, 1991, p. 416). Appell (1991) argues that among the Rungus sex roles are not identical, but they are equivalent and both behaviorally and ideologically of equal importance for societal functioning: "for each skill exhibited by a male, there is an equally important one possessed by the female" (p. 10). Tsing (1990), who has worked among the Meratus Dayak in Central Kalimantan, has pointed out the discrepancy that can exist between gender imagery on the one hand, and the realm of practice on the other. Even though gender symmetry is an important aspect of Meratus customary law and no rule or gender stereotype exists that excludes women from political activity, few women hold political office. "The performance standards necessary to create political centrality in Meratus forums privilege male talents. [As a result] women, and less assertive men, become the audience for male 'stars'" (Tsing, 1990, p. 98).

Colfer has conducted research among the Dayak Kenyah in East Kalimantan since the late 1970s (most recently, Elmhirst, Siscawati, & Colfer, 2016) and describes their gender relations as "comparatively egalitarian" (Colfer, 2008, p. 183). The high status of Kenyah women is essentially linked to their "equality or even preeminence in economic matters" (Colfer, 2008, p. 189) and the well-balanced relationship between men and women is further strengthened by the Kenyah's respect for individual autonomy. However, Colfer (2008) describes how the equality of men and women in swidden agriculture has eroded through the introduction of chainsaws and outboard motors, as these have altered the relative contribution of the sexes to rice production and as such undermined an essential basis for the high status of women. Chainsaws are only operated by (some) men and increased the efficiency of male work, while the tasks conducted by women continue to be undertaken with traditional technology. The outboard motors further decreased women's autonomy vis á vis men, as women hardly travel alone with the heavy engines. Furthermore, government officials and extension specialists repeatedly directed agricultural planning and training towards men, ignoring the strong role of Kenyah women in agriculture. While Colfer (1985) has initially expressed the fear that these processes will inevitably lead to increasing gender asymmetries among the Kenyah, she meanwhile expresses some cautious optimism that Kenyah women will retain a relatively high status, mainly due to young women's passion for education (Colfer, 2008).

Migration to urban centers has been an important factor influencing Dayak gender relations. So far, this phenomenon has mainly been explored in the Malaysian part of Borneo as many Dayak have moved to the coastal towns of Sarawak and Sabah. The contributions to the edited volume of Hew (2007) show that the experience of moving to town is ambivalent and "often uneven across class, ethnicity, age, marital status and location" (Hew, 2007, p. 140). Having grown up in relatively gender egalitarian rural environments, many Dayak women experience difficulties with the unfamiliar gender hierarchies in Muslim dominated urban centers. Similarly, Sutlive (1991) described the migration of Iban into the city of Sibu in Sarwak which made traditional inequalities in Iban society more apparent as "traditional prescriptions and opportunities for achievement . . . have given way to economic and political systems with uneven advantages for males" (p. 497). Sutlive also mentions that with urbanization, prostitution has become a new income source for women and that domestic violence seems to have become an issue.[5]

Prostitution and domestic violence are also major issues discussed in a study exploring the gendered impacts of coal mining in East Kalimantan where one of Indonesia's largest coal mines (in Kutai Timur regency) has created far-reaching environmental change, caused processes of urbanization, and lead to an influx of migrants from other parts of Indonesia (Lahiri-Dutt & Mahy, 2008). This study shows that women have profited from employment opportunities and infrastructure improvements in and around the mine, but also that "decreased opportunities from land-based livelihoods [led] to a lowering of women's status within the family and society whilst increasing their work burdens" (Lahiri-Dutt & Mahy, 2008, p. 1). Furthermore, alcoholism and domestic violence against women increased. Several women experienced an increasing dependency on males and complained about a lack of decision-making power at the community level. The study included Dayak communities affected by the mine, but it is notable that the majority of informants seemed to be migrant women.

The expansion of oil palm as a major driver of economic and environmental change in Kalimantan has fostered interest in the gendered dimension of this industry. Research in West Kalimantan (Julia & White, 2012; Li, 2015) and with several Dayak communities in East Kalimantan (Elmhirst et al., 2015) suggests that large investments in oil palm have produced new gender inequalities, mainly due to the weak presence of women in public decision making processes, the exclusion of women from formalizing land rights, and disadvantageous labor regimes. Elmhirst et al. (2015) and Li (2015) further emphasize that the gendered impacts of oil palm can differ highly according to other aspects like age, ethnicity, the availability of land and capital, as well as between smallholdings and plantation schemes.

In sum, the number of studies that explore the rapid economic and environmental changes in Kalimantan from a gendered perspective is still rather small.[6] Despite some variations, the common tenor is that new gender asymmetries tend to emerge because of environmental and economic change.

5 It has been argued that Bornean societies are characterized by an absence of sexual violence (Helliwell, 2001; Sutlive & Appell, 1991).

6 I have limited this literature review to academic publications and have not included reports and so called 'grey literature' from NGOs.

MAINTAINING GENDER EQUALITY IN THE FACE OF CHANGE AMONG THE BENUAQ

The Benuaq belong to the Barito linguistic family of southeastern Borneo. Until the early 20th century, they had a stratified social order which distinguished between nobles, commoners, and slaves. Since then, the increasing integration into the monetary market economy and the Indonesian national administration produced a new dispersion of power and prestige (Gönner, 2002, p. 51; Massing, 1981). Most Benuaq practice an extended subsistence economy (Gönner, 2001, p. 171) which is characterized by a combination of swidden agriculture, extracted and cultivated forest products, and additional wage labor. The religious life of the Benuaq is dominated by their autochthonous religion (Venz, 2012) and Christianity, which are connected in a complementary way.

Gender Among the Dayak Benuaq

Gender equality represents a contested term, and feminist debates about the 'equality' of men and women have produced rather contrary positions. While liberal and Marxist feminists perceive gender equality as the social insignificance of sexual differences, radical feminists insist that there are essential differences between men and women and attempt to increase women's status by reversing those values that favor only masculinity (Du, 2002, p. 3). Spiro (1980) distinguishes between the "identity" and the "equivalence" meaning of equality. According to the latter, men and women are equal as long as their differences are held to be equally valuable. Accordingly, Du (2002) defines "a gender egalitarian society as one whose dominant ideology, institutions, and social practices value its male and female members equally, regardless of the roles they play" (p. 9). Building on this equivalence meaning of equality, I argue that Dayak Benuaq gender relations are characterized by a far-reaching gender equality.[7] This argument is based on the following observations: Specific gender roles do exist in Benuaq society, but they are not strictly followed and often overlap. While women do in general more housework than men and often take care of small children, it is not unusual for men to wash their own clothes, to cook, or to take care of babies, toddlers, and older children. Both men and women make important contributions to economic production. Men and women fulfill equally important roles in swidden agriculture and agroforestry and today both young men and women increasingly seek employment outside the village. Men and women do have equal rights and access to land and other natural resources according to customary law. Furthermore, customary inheritance law neither privileges male nor female children. Similar to the Kenyah (see above), the Benuaq highly value individual autonomy, and personal authority is based more on age and personality than on gender. The autochthonous religion of the Dayak Benuaq encompasses both male and female creator spirits. Healing rituals

7 Gender relations which are not characterized by male dominance have also been termed as gender symmetries when areas of male dominance are opposed by powerful female domains (e.g., DeJong, 1998; Metje, 1995). The term gender complementarity is often used to stress that male and female complement each other to form a unity, while the adjective egalitarian is used to emphasize the absence of institutionalized hierarchies between men and women.

are carried out by female and male specialists, while death rituals are conducted by men only.

The existence of Benuaq terms for polygyny (*penuyaang*) and polyandry (*pemaduq*) suggests that both forms of marriage have been practiced in the past. Standard today is a monogamous marriage. Although sexual relations before marriage are restricted for young men and women, virginity is not valued as among several other Dayak groups of Central Borneo (Rousseau, 1991). Marriages can be divorced with few problems and neither men nor women experience a decline in status by divorce. The Benuaq have a bilateral kinship system. Previously, an uxorilocal post marital residence pattern prevailed. Today, young couples prefer to set up their own household, given that they can afford to do so. There is no preference for children of any sex, many couples express the wish to have at least one child of each sex. Girls and boys have equal access to education, given that parents have the financial means at all to school their children. Education is highly appreciated and has significantly increased with the improved availability of primary as well as higher education since decentralization (Haug, 2010). Female mobility is not restricted but has improved as a consequence of the shift from transportation by river to road. While women seldom travel alone on boats with outboard motors, they enjoy riding motorbikes. During my field work I met several women who use motorbikes to commute on a daily or weekly basis between their workplace and the village.

The most significant imbalances between men and women among the Benuaq can be found in the political realm. Although there are no formal restrictions for women and there are some outstanding female leaders, formal political leadership is mainly in the hands of men. However, women are actively engaged in all kinds of political fora that I attended, for example, the newly created village parliaments (*Badan Perwakilan Kampung*) or village meetings (*musyawarah kampung*). So far, I have not found any satisfying explanation for this imbalance. For the Meratus, Tsing put forward the reason that performance standards necessary to create political centrality privilege male talents (see above), however, this reason seems unsuitable for the Benuaq. Several of my (male and female) informants argued that women rarely want these positions because formal leaders have to spend many hours, especially during the evenings and often late into the nights, away from their families to attend rituals, meetings, and dispute settlements. These (partly not formal but moral) obligations are seen as conflicting with other tasks, primarily their role as (grand)mothers.

The Complex Intertwinement of Gender, Age, and Education

I have argued so far that road construction and the increasing availability of motorbikes have increased female mobility. Taking a closer look reveals that age matters as well. While most young people can drive a motorbike, many of those belonging to the elder generation cannot. Roads and motorbikes have increased primarily the mobility of young (and middle-aged) men and women. It is also the younger generation that most often engages in wage labor. In many households, the parents (or grandparents) concentrate on swidden agriculture and agroforestry activities while their sons and daughters seek jobs to provide for the increasingly important and more regularly needed cash income. In this context, women and men are integrated differently in

the gendered socio-economic systems of logging activities, coal mining, or oil palm plantations. Wage labor for both men and women is often linked to ambiguous experiences. While they are empowered by their earnings and their experiences outside the village, they often find themselves placed in exploitative work arrangements and unfavorable positions within unfamiliar (gendered) hierarchies. Imagining young women spraying pesticides on oil palm plantations and young men working in the logging industry, all of which have minimal security standards, illustrates that health risks are different but equally tangible for male and female bodies.

The importance of age is also reflected in representations of wellbeing. The wellbeing survey which I conducted in the three research sites revealed that wellbeing varied only slightly by gender but widely by age. While the percentage of people enjoying a good life remained relatively stable in all three generations, the proportion of people who felt they suffered a bad life increased from 33% among the young people to 46% in the parent generation to 56% in the grandparent generation (Haug, 2010, p. 153). This trend was extreme in the village of Muara Nayan, where 95% of the grandparent generation stated that they lived a bad life. Instead of providing a better future for their children and grandchildren, the elder generation of Muara Nayan witnesses them faced with more and more problems, for example, the loss of land to oil palm plantations, the loss of gardens through forest fires, and increasing water pollution caused by nearby open-pit coal mining. The elder generation thus feels especially worried that the general condition in the village is spiraling downwards (Haug, 2014c).

Besides age, education and family relations play an important role in the context of newly emerging inequalities. When the regency Kutai Barat came into existence in 2001, a large number of office jobs needed to be filled. This provided a great opportunity for the well-educated community members. For example, in the village of Engkuni Pasek, which has an unusually high level of formal education[8] and is located close to the new administrative center, at least 30% of the households had members who got new jobs in Sendawar, mainly as civil servants or teachers. Men and women enjoyed these new job opportunities equally which were further supported by the close personal links between several families in Engkuni Pasek and the first district leader Rama A. Asia (Haug, 2017).

In Jontai, gender was yet again interwoven with other aspects in the context of the logging boom which followed decentralization. People in this village benefited (temporarily) from fee payments and the opportunity to engage in self-organized logging. However, these benefits were distributed very unevenly. As I have shown elsewhere (Haug, 2014b, 2017), it has been the (mainly male) village leaders and several 'tough' young men who gained the largest profits. Benefits from the logging boom were thus not only gendered but largely influenced by age, formal authority, physical strength, and individual characteristics.

8 This can be explained through a Catholic missionary school which was founded in this village in the 1950s.

CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The situation in the three study sites shows that gender intersects with age, education, and various other aspects. It further reveals that gender relations among the Benuaq have been influenced by state development policies, the growing presence of Indonesian national culture, and Christian proselytization – all of which are characterized by differing gender concepts and different gender hierarchies. The market integration of small and until recently rather remote communities leads to an increasing inclusion of the Dayak Benuaq in new economic and social systems which are characterized by different norms, values, and gender hierarchies. Gender is thus not only intertwined with ethnicity, age, education, and other elements of multiple and fragmented identities but is also negotiated in increasingly varying contexts. Being a man or a woman can have different meanings within one's family, within the village, in a logging camp, or in a local government office.

Insights into indigenous concepts of gender, work, and the complementarity of masculine and feminine identities in Southeast Asia have challenged common notions of gender based on predominantly Western concepts. Indigenous concepts and perspectives should thus be placed center stage of future research on gender in Kalimantan. Already in the 1990s, Van Esterick (1995) argued that women's NGOs in Southeast Asia have embraced Western gender and development discourse (often in order to receive funding) at the expense of local language, concepts, and perceptions. She consequently urged that "terms such as development, work, gender, and equity must all be deconstructed and interpreted through indigenous logic" (p. 257). This is still a cogent demand and should motivate and inspire future ethnographies.

Research at the nexus of gender, development, and environmental change in Kalimantan should pay attention to including men as well. Currently, research on the gendered impacts of development still largely focuses on women, with some recent exceptions (Großmann, 2015). NGO literature tends to depict Dayak women as an especially vulnerable group. This reflects social injustices caused by prevailing gender inequalities in Indonesia, but it also demonstrates the need for activists to often simplify complex relations in order to raise awareness for pressing matters and expose social injustices to an audience not familiar with the issues at hand. Elmhirst et al. (2015), however, show how revealing it is to overcome "overly simple dualisms such as . . . male capacities and female vulnerabilities" (p. 3). By facilitating links among different activist communities, such a perspective may be enriching for campaigns against gendered injustices.

The anthropological interest for the "differences within" (Moore, 1993) has gained new affirmation through the recent popularity of intersectionality (Lykke, 2010) which represents a crucial approach for most recent studies. As almost all studies on gender and development reveal great ambiguities as well as the intertwinement of gender with other categories of differentiation, future research on gender and development in Kalimantan should more consequently address intersectionality and explore the (re-)production of gendered inequalities as intertwined with age, ethnicity, education, class, and other aspects. Drawing on the insights by Tsing (1990), future research should also carefully distinguish between a) the ideational level (What values, qualities, and characteristics are assigned to men and women?), b) the normative

level (Which rights, roles, and responsibilities do men and women have according to a specific normative order?), and c) the level of everyday practice (How are the concepts at the ideational level and the rights and duties expressed at the normative level realized in everyday social practice?). This might lead to an analysis of how new labor arrangements within families and households challenge and change existing gender identities, gender roles, and gender relations, and to what extent this leads to changes in gender ideology, institutions, and social practices.

Calls to pay attention to the differences amongst women and amongst men, to the discrepancy between ideals and practice, as well as to the contextuality of gender relations have been repeatedly voiced. But this does not mean that they have become any less important. Quite the contrary, with the ever more rapid pace of economic, societal, and environmental change, it is of utmost importance to understand the role played by gender in the (re-)production of inequality on one of Southeast Asia's most important development frontiers.

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Separating Sisters From Brothers: Ethnic Relations and Identity Politics in the Context of Indigenous Land Titling in Indonesia

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▸ Steinebach, S., & Kunz, Y. (2017). Separating sisters from brothers: Ethnic relations and identity politics in the context of indigenous land titling in Indonesia. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, *10*(1), 47-64.

Environmental and social transformations in Jambi province, Indonesia, are inextricably interlinked. Large-scale agro-industrial development and nature conservation policies equally alienate local communities from their agricultural lands and turn land into a scarce resource. Consequently, access to agricultural land becomes increasingly contested, not only between communities and state institutions or companies but also among communities themselves. To secure or restore local 'indigenous' land rights against land grabbing and green grabbing by states and companies, indigenous land titling has become a powerful tool all over the world. Ongoing activities of indigenous land titling in Indonesia have been largely perceived as an act of justice by indigenous and land rights activists and affected communities. Yet, a challenging step towards titling is the identification of who is and who is not 'indigenous'. This highly political process creates ethnicity-based identities tied to rights and possibilities around land as a contested resource. Based on a case study of a national park in central Jambi, this paper shows that what is perceived as an act of justice against the state can also produce injustice among local communities by heavily impacting and transforming local social structures and relations.

Keywords: Ethnic Identity; Indigenous Land Titling; Indonesia; Jambi; Land Use Conflicts

INTRODUCTION

The explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions has triggered public and scholarly debates on economic and political strategies of land grabbing, including green grabbing (Borras & Franco, 2012; Stephens, 2011). Large-scale commodification of land for whatever production or conservation purpose is entangled with land reforms, agricultural dispossession, enclosures, and exclusions governed by complex regimes (Borras, Hall, Scoones, White, & Wolford, 2011; Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011; Li, 2010). One focus of public and scholarly land grabbing debates is the emergence of conflicts where companies restrict local communities' access to resources or drive indigenous people off their land (Turner & Caouette, 2009). In Southeast Asia, the agrarian transition has created new sites of struggle in which counter-hegemonic movements and forms of resistance take place in often very novel ways by tapping into collective frames such as ethnicity and identity (Potter, 2009). Worldwide, the transnational con-

cept of indigeneity has become a powerful tool in conflicts over land and restoration between local communities and other stakeholders. The concept itself has advanced from references to doomed or dying tribes to positive, rights-based discourses (Dove, 2006, p. 192; Merlan, 2009; Tyson, 2011, p. 653) and it is often central in reclaiming localities and formulating territorial claims by communities and villages. For instance, the International Labour Organizations' (ILO) *Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989* (*No. 169*) *in Independent Countries* decreed that national governments should give back lands that were traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples and let them set their own priorities (Colchester, Anderson, Firdaus, Hasibuan, & Chao, 2011).

As the concept of indigeneity is related to special rights and entitlements, the identification of indigenous peoples is a demanding process that seemed to be solved by stressing people's right of self-identification (ILO, 1989). Yet, apart from several characteristics suggested in the ILO convention,[1] indigeneity has been taken to imply first-order connections between group and locality (Dove, 2006; Merlan, 2009). Whereas indigenous rights activists often pursue a "strategic essentialism" (Li, 2000, p. 399, see also Großmann, Padmanabhan, & von Braun, this issue) to legitimate territorial claims, there is a broad consensus in scholarly debates on the relational character of indigeneity (Dove, 2006; Li, 2010; Merlan, 2009). Indigenous peoples are defined as much by their relation to the state as by any other intrinsic characteristic they might possess (Merlan, 2009, p. 305). Indigenous peoples, scholars suggest, should be firmly set against the modern nation state which they reside in or are enclosed by (Tyson, 2011, p. 653). At the same time, the category of indigeneity distinguishes 'natives' from others. The self-identification as 'indigenous' is thus a process and a positioning (Li, 2000) that realigns the ways groups and communities relate to the nation, the state, and the 'non-indigenous' population (Steinebach, 2012). Whereas shifting power relations between the state and indigenous groups have been the focus of scholarly and public debates, the relation between the indigenous and non-indigenous population has not received much attention. This applies to the Indonesian context as well, in which land conflicts are virulent and can be found on a total area of 1.28 million ha. The conflicts are mainly related to the plantation sector (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, 2016, p. 5). In such conflicts, the strategic employment of collective frames such as ethnicity and local (indigenous) identity has been essential for legitimating territorial claims (Peluso, 2009) and has proven successful to reclaim "ethnic homeland" (Hall et al., 2011) from the state (Benda-Beckmann, 2005, 2011; Hein et al., 2016; McCarthy, 2005, 2007, 2009). While community-state relations have been in the center of much research (Peluso, 1995; Steinebach, 2012; Thorburn, 2004), the shifting power relations between communities themselves have been paid only little attention (Afiff & Lowe, 2007; Bakker & Moniaga, 2010). In this article, we focus on the process of creating 'indigenous' and 'non-indigenous' communities as an effect of state policies and the ways the state relates to its population. Along the example of a land use conflict and indigenous land titling process in Jambi province in Sumatra, Indonesia, we show that the identification and categorization of indigenous

1 Tyson (2011, p.653) identifies four criteria to form the basis for this special distinction: the principle of first come (descendants of pioneers), non-dominance (people living under alien state structures), cultural difference (being special), and self-ascription.

peoples and related rights can produce both justice and injustice for non-indigenous parts of the population. Empirical data was gathered during altogether 15 months of fieldwork in the Bukit Duabelas area, where a national park was established in 2000. Fieldwork among the Orang Rimba and sedentary villagers surrounding the national park took place between 2003 and 2005, with several restudies in the years 2006, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. These villages are comprised of local pre-colonial villages and transmigration villages. The article is structured as follows: We start by describing the legislative framework of this case study by providing an overview on forestry laws and indigenous land titling in Indonesia. We then continue by introducing the contested national park area and the conflicting parties. From this starting point, we travel back in history to show how colonial and postcolonial land use policies heavily impacted local social structures by setting the basis for differentiating neighboring local communities as indigenous and non-indigenous.

FORESTRY LAWS AND INDIGENOUS LAND TITLING IN INDONESIA

Most land use conflicts registered in Jambi province are rooted in land dispossession of local rural communities during the Suharto era (1965-1998). In 1967, the Forestry Law[2] declared about 70% of Indonesia's territory as forest land under the jurisdiction of the state (Contreras-Hermosilla & Fay, 2005, p. 9; Indrarto et al., 2012, p. 23). The Forestry Law of 1967 was revised in 1999[3] but still decrees that all forest, and the natural richness within it, is under the control of the state (Article 4) and instructs the central government to regulate its management and exploitation. The law then (Article 5) discerns between state forest (*hutan negara*), where no private rights can be obtained, and private forests that are "subject to rights" (*hutan hak*). According to the Forestry Law, customary forest (*hutan adat* or *hutan ulayat*) is classified as a subcategory of state forest and can only be recognized (not owned) when found to be still relevant and not in conflict with national interests. The vague definition of 'national interests' left the state with virtually uncontested power and control (Bakker & Moniaga, 2010, p. 189). Against this background, the Constitutional Court released a remarkable decision in May 2013, causing much cheer among Indonesian indigenous peoples and land rights activists. With this decision, commonly referred to as MK 35 the court accepted the juridical review of some parts of the 1999 Forestry Law requested by the Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara [AMAN], 2013). MK 35 declares that customary forest is no longer categorized as a part of state-owned forest, recognizing customary communities (*masyarakat hukum adat*) as right-bearing subjects (Rachman, 2013, p. 3). This shift of status and categorization resulted from the erasure of the word "state" from Article 1.6 of the Forestry Law No. 41/1999 that now reads: "*Adat* forests are forests located in customary communities' territory".

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2 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 5 Tahun 1967 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kehutanan, Republic of Indonesia, 1967.

3 Law of the Republic of Indonesia Nr. 41 of 1999 regarding Forestry, Republic of Indonesia, 1999.



Figure 1. Revision of Forestry Law No. 41/1999 through MK 35. (own compilation).

This opportunity of land titling for customary groups within forest areas caused unease in the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) which feared losing authority over vast forest areas. The ministry reacted by sending out a curricular (*Surat Edaran*) addressed to all provincial governors and district heads as well as to all heads of regional-level forestry services (Down to Earth, 2014, p. 7). This immediate response to MK 35/2012 by the MoF was a legal regulation (62/2013) which sets out the rules for and stages involved in gazetting (legally determining) the forest zone. The document informed the authorities on MK 35 and, referring to the amended article, asserted that determining the status of customary forests required the legal recognition of indigenous peoples through a regional regulation (*Perda*) (Down to Earth, 2014, p. 8). In an interview, then Minister of Forestry, Zulkifli Hasan, stated that he saw "no problem with MK 35 as long as the customary forests are proposed and legalized by regional regulations". In addition, he asserted that "it should be clear who the community members are" (HuMa, 2013). This question of identification is central in the discussion of this article.

CONTESTED NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND LOCAL REALITIES IN JAMBI PROVINCE

Jambi province is one of Indonesia's most important locations for the production of rubber and palm oil.[4] The area of agricultural land that is legally available to farmers

4 The province has a total size of 5.3 million ha (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jambi, 2011, p. 3). In 2010, licenses to plant 1.3 million ha with oil palms were issued to several agro-business companies (Rambe, 2014, p. 7). Approximately 800,000 ha are already reserved for mining purposes (Biro Perencanaan Sekretariat Jenderal Kementerian Kehutanan, 2013, p. 86). Another 650.000 ha of the province are planted with rubber trees by independent farmers (Dinas Perkebunan Jambi, 2011) while 2.1 million ha are defined as state forest and are under control of the Ministry of Forestry, including industrial timber plantations and



Figure 2. Map of Bukit Duabelas National Park and Air Hitam. (figure by Carola Beckers).

and communities is limited for the benefit of large-scale plantation business. Nationwide increasing numbers of land use conflicts mirror the heavily contested access to land in Jambi. In 2011, 44 conflicts were reported from Jambi (Priyan, 2012). Bukit Duabelas National Park (*Taman Nasional Bukit Duabelas*, TNBD) is one of these contested areas. The park was established in 2000 and encompasses 65.000 ha of tropical lowland rainforest where any kind of human agricultural activity is prohibited by law. The conservation area falls into the administrative jurisdiction of several regnancies and districts and is surrounded by oil palm plantations and different kinds of villages. In this article, we focus on the southern area of TNBD and its surroundings located in the district of Air Hitam.[5] The district encompasses nine villages, four of which are transmigration settlements established by the Suharto government (see Figure 2) as part of social engineering and development policies as well as nation building programs.

Landless peasants from the densely populated island of Java were allocated huts and approximately 3 ha of land per household, accompanied by a certificate of ownership (*surat hak milik*) which made them official holders of legal land titles (Fearnside, 1997). The remaining five villages already existed before Dutch colonial rule, which came to Jambi province in the year 1906. The Melayu residents of these precolonial villages (Lubuk Kepahiang, Lubuk Jering, Dusun Baru, Sungai Jernih, Semurung, see Figure 2) claim parts of TNBD as customary land and forest (*tanah adat* and *hutan lindung*). Yet, these villagers usually do not hold any *de jure* title for private or communal land.The national park area is additionally inhabited by about 3000 Orang

conservation areas (Biro Perencanaan Sekretariat Jenderal Kementerian Kehutanan, 2013, p. 85).

5 Air Hitam covers an area of 47,100 ha and consists of 9 villages. According to local statistics, the population in 2010 was comprised of 23,650 people with a population density of 50.21 people/km2 (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jambi, 2011).

Rimba (literally people of the forest) – semi-nomadic rainforest dwellers whose ethnic identity is inseparably linked to their rainforest surrounding. The Orang Rimba's livelihood consists of hunting, gathering of forest products as well as shifting cultivation and cultivation of jungle rubber (Steinebach, 2012). Like the non-transmigrant villagers, Orang Rimba claim the national park area as their customary land (*tanah adat*). As there is no agricultural land available outside the national park area, the still forested national park area has turned into a contested island of livelihood security for both groups. Both cultivate cassava or rice and especially rubber as a cash crop and a major source of income.[6]

Both Orang Rimba and the non-transmigrant villages have a long history of cultivating forest gardens consisting of various fruit trees (e.g., *durian*, *rambutan*). The Malay groups in the area practiced shifting cultivation to grew staples like cassava and dryland rice already before Dutch colonization. The Orang Rimba reportedly started the cultivation of rice in the middle of the 20th century. In line with colonial politics, the Malay population started to cultivate rubber as a cash crop in the 19th century, whereas the Orang Rimba adopted rubber cultivation on initiative of their Malay trading partners several decades later. Particularly for the Orang Rimba, the growing of rubber has proven to be a powerful means of land demarcation as – in contrast to forest trees – both villagers and the Orang Rimba regard them as property (of individuals or groups). Thus, others cannot easily fell rubber trees without heavy sanctioning. As a result, the Orang Rimba strategically use the planting of rubber as a proof of territorial authority: In sensitive or contested areas, they plant rubber as a 'living fence' to prevent intruders and illegal land clearing by villagers.

Conflicts mainly occur between the National Park Management (NPM) and the Orang Rimba, but also between the NPM and villagers.[7] Both the Orang Rimba and villagers are at conflict with NPM concerning the rubber plantings which are regarded as illegal by the NPM. Several times, when the NPM felled rubber trees, it was afterwards threatened by armed villagers. The NPM also utilizes the rubber plantings as evidence that the Orang Rimba do not depend on the forest for their livelihood subsistence alone and therefore should be removed from the park area. Based on the same argument, their identity as truly indigenous forest peoples is questioned and resettlement areas are provided in the buffer zones of TNBD. Most of the Orang Rimba actively resist these accusations and resettlement orders. At times, violent conflicts over land and tree tenure inside the TNBD have also evolved between the Orang Rimba and the villagers. Reasons for these conflicts include illegal logging, felling of sacred trees, the destruction of Orang Rimbas' rubber gardens, unauthorized forest clearing, or the trading of forest land or rubber gardens among the villagers. Under such conditions, the possibility of indigenous land titling seemed a promising endeavor for the Orang Rimba communities to regain authority over customary land.

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6 Illegal logging and rubber plantings by the sedentary population impact most of the national park area. Consequently, the Orang Rimba can no longer fulfill their subsistence needs from the forest alone.

7 The forestry department in cooperation with the social department of Jambi province have made various efforts to resettle the Orang Rimba from the park area. For example, the Orang Rimba were offered permanent housing and food supply for the first year of sedentary residence outside the forest. Yet, these measures proved unsuccessful as the Orang Rimba returned to their semi-nomadic lifestyle as soon as the food supply was stopped.

After the court's decision on MK 35, they started to map their claims with the support of local NGOs. According to AMAN, the Orang Rimba could (despite their rubber cultivation) be easily identified as indigenous people in contrast to the Melayu villagers with their competing claims. In order to understand the impact of the court's decision on these groups and in course of the social structure of the Air Hitam region, a look back in history is indispensable.

PRE-COLONIAL LEGITIMATION OF POST-COLONIAL CLAIMS

The current population of the Bukit Duabelas area traces their origin back to the founding of the Islamic sultanate Jambi Melayu II in the 15th century. By that time, different ethnic (*suku*) or cultural (*bangsa*) groups inhabited Jambi, following their own customary laws (*adat*) (Locher-Scholten, 2003, p. 48). *Adat* not only regulates social interaction within society, but also the use of natural resources and land tenure. Settlements were found along the nine main rivers and their tributaries determining Jambi's infrastructure until the 21st century. The Sultan's court was settled at the Batang Hari river. Along this central river and its larger tributaries, the territories (*kalbu*) of the so-called Bangsa Duabelas, or literally the twelve people, were located (see Figure 3).



Figure 3. Villages and rivers in the research area around 1900.
(Hagen, 1908; highlights by the authors).

The Bangsa Duabelas have held genealogical ties with the Sultan's court since the 15th century and, due to their common descents, formed what the Dutch later called "genealogical *adat* communities" (*genealogische rechtsgemeenschappen*; Haga, 1926). The Dutch distinguished them from the "territorialized *adat* communites" (*terri-*

toriale rechtsgemeenschappen; Haga, 1926) which did not hold kinship ties with the Sultan's court and are not of common descent. The Bukit Duabelas area was part of the Bangsa Duabelas territories and Air Hitam was ruled by a line of queens – descendants of the sultan's sister. Land was allocated to the residents for communal use and borders between village communities were defined by the hearing distance of a gong sound (Nasruddin, 1989). The villagers were not able to privately own, sell, or buy land. The inhabitants of Air Hitam were responsible to deliver firewood from the forest – that is the Bukit Duabelas National Park today – to the Sultan's court due to their kinship ties (Guillaud, 1994; Haga, 1926). The Orang Rimba were part of these complex socio-political structures in different ways: They were never direct subjects of the Sultan but they maintained economic relations with the ruler's middlemen (*jenang*) and with the sedentary Melayu population around them. The Orang Rimba also claim genealogical bonds with the Sultan's ruling dynasties. With the local elites, the Orang Rimba maintained a patron-client relationship that lasts until today. Memories of common origin shared by the Orang Rimba and sedentary Jambi-Melayu residents which identify them as descendants of brother and sister legitimate this patron-client relationship:

> A bachelor left his community from shame of not yet being married. He took shelter in the forest where he found a fruit (*buah kelumpang*) that turned into a beautiful maiden and became his wife. The couple had four children: two sons and two daughters. The siblings parted, the female descendants continued to live in the forest and the male descendants started a village life outside the forest. Before their farewell, the siblings swore an oath to be responsible for each other's well-being. Thus, the relationship between the Orang Rimba and the respective village residents is imagined like that of brother and sister with the Orang Rimba holding the female position. (Rio Sayutti & Temenggung Mirak, 13 June 2004)

The Orang Rimba, like the sedentary Melayu, combine matrilinearity with uxorilocal and matrilocal residence patterns and matrilineal inheritance structures of land, forest, and tree tenure. In case of divorce, the man returns to his sister's place as she is held responsible for her brother's livelihood. As the Orang Rimba are regarded as progeny of the female sibling, they are obliged to perform their respective duties in the patron-client relationship with the villagers conceptualized as descendants of the male lineage (Steinebach, 2012).

The intensity of contact between the Orang Rimba and people from outside the national park area has changed due to the socio-economic development in the area, including nature conservation and NGO activities. The patron-client relationships with the residents of surrounding pre-colonial villages, however, have been extended and expressed in the following proverb: "*Pangkol waris Tanah Garo, ujung waris tanah Serengam, Air Hitam tanah berjenang*" [the origin of the waris is Tanah Garo, the leading edge is Serengam and Air Hitam is the land of the jenang]. Tanah Garo and Serengam are names of villages whereas Air Hitam refers to the regions' five hamlets, including Lubuk Jering, which are all related by kinship ties. These three entities in effect formed a triangular external power structure around Bukit Duabelas. In the northern part of Bukit Duabelas, such relations were maintained with the triangular



Figure 4. Kinship relation between Orang Rimba and Melayu villagers. (own compilation).

structure's base (*pangkol*) *waris* (literally lineal heir) in the north central village of Tanah Garo and the top (*ujung*) *waris* located in the northeast village of Serengam Pakuaji. The function of the *waris* is similar to the *jenang* (middleman): They maintain trading relations, are a source of *adat* law, and serve as Orang Rimba's intermediaries to the outside world. The positions, either as *waris* or *jenang*, define differing socio-political and economic bonds between the Orang Rimba and the holders of the respective positions.

THE TRANSFORMATION FROM SOCIAL TO ETHNIC GROUPS

In the first half of the 20th century, far-reaching administrative and juridical changes came with Dutch colonial rule. The Dutch introduced western concepts of nature-culture dichotomies turning socio-cultural landscapes into empty spaces and exploitable resources. Additionally, European concepts of property were applied and all, especially forested, areas that did not show signs of agricultural cultivation to the Dutch were declared as property of the state (*Domein Verklaring*) (Biezeveld, 2004, p. 140). The differentiation of forest and agrarian laws produced different categories of land and land rights. Also after the arrival of the Dutch, ideas about geographically

anchored communities started to circulate on a much larger scale (Goebel, 2013, p. 4). By the early 1870s, the archipelago had been divided into distinct ethnic groups (e.g., Sundanese, Javanese, Madurese), each with their own language and culture (Moriyama, 2005). The complex cultural diversity of the region was put into order through the category of ethnicity, which commonly points to a community that lives in a particular region and speaks a particular regional language. The Dutch captured these ideas about territorial ethnic groups in the legal system with the notion of *adat*, which encompassed concepts concerning custom, law, tradition, and territory (Burns, 2004; Elmhirst, 1999; Goebel, 2013). During colonial administration in Jambi, the territories known as *kalbu* were mutually divided and merged into 30 districts. In their efforts to consolidate state power, the Dutch created *adat* districts called *daerah hokum* (in Dutch, *rechtsgebied*) that erased all differences in status and title between the Bangsa Duabelas and the non-court related groups (Nasruddin, 1989, p. 299) in the Bukit Duabelas area. Instead, the population was divided along the lines of foreigners (*vreemdlingen*) versus indigenous natives (*inlanders*). The latter were subsumed and collectivized as *pribumi*[8] or "sons of the earth/soil" (*oorspronkelijk*). The meaning of kinship and social relations as markers of difference were superseded and subsumed under the homogenous category of *pribumi* – creating indigenous natives with equal rights and obligations towards the state. This social homogenization and formal erasure of social hierarchies impacted and restructured existing power relations among the residents of Jambi.[9] Dutch colonial rule separated sisters from brothers as they replaced kinship-based socio-political structures and land tenure systems with concepts of territory-based ethnicity and legal frameworks based on ideas of the European nation state. In Jambi, it also transformed the population of the Bukit Duabelas region from differentiated ruling dynasties into homogenous native groups.

NATION-BUILDING AND THE CREATION OF CITIZENS AND INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

Following Indonesian independence in 1945, the implementation of the 1976 Forestry Law again changed the local rights of (forest) resource use, land tenure, and concepts of communal ownership (*tanah adat, hutan adat, hutan lindung*, etc.). Sumatra, as one of the "outer islands", was conceptualized by the regime as a remote area that is scarcely inhabited and provided endless 'free' land and unclaimed natural resources that only waited to be exploited. In Jambi, large-scale timber exploitation and infrastructural access by road building projects in the 1980s posed the preconditions for the realization of transmigration projects. These projects were not only for relieving population pressure and poverty on Java but also for fulfilling a political purpose in the context of nation-building that had already been started by Dutch colonial rule.

8 The word *pribumi* combines the Javanese prefix *pri* with the Sanskrit loanword *bumi* (earth, soil) (Siddique & Suryadinata, 1981, p. 663).

9 For example, it is reported that the Arabs (Orang Arab) who had been integrated into Jambinese society for five generations through marriages with Jambinese women and who had always played an important role at the *kraton* of Jambi asked to get the status of *pribumi* from the Dutch in order to acquire the same access and land rights as natives.

Between 1983 and 1997, around 25,000 households, mainly originating from central and eastern Java, were relocated to the Bukit Duabelas area. Each family roughly consisted of four members. The justification for the site selection can be found in a World Bank Report (1979) that states:

> As the proposed settlement sites [in the Bukit Duabelas area] are mainly primary dryland forest, they have practically no indigenous population. Generally, the population density (12-18 persons/sq km) of the two districts (*kabupaten*) in which the project sites are located is low, even when compared to Jambi province (22 persons/sq km) or Sumatra as a whole (44 persons/sq km). (p. 16)

Striking in this formulation is not only the negotiation of the existence of until then privileged subjects of pre-colonial times but also the distinction between categories of indigenous (Jambinese) and non-indigenous (Javanese).

In the Air Hitam region, state transmigration projects heavily impacted land rights. The two villages Pematang Kabau and Lubuk Jering used to share common roots and trace back their origin to pre-colonial times. The founders of Lubuk Jering reportedly belonged to the local elites and shared genealogical ties with the Sultan. Pematang Kabau was a smaller hamlet founded by the same community and therefore administered as part of the village Lubuk Jering. In the wake of transforming and homogenizing local political and administrative structures, Pematang Kabau was administratively split from Lubuk Jering and the area was assigned as a transmigration settlement. This area used to be customary land (*tanah ulayat* or *tanah marga*). In 1986, 323 households were settled in Pematang Kabau. The transmigration areas were situated on a land that had just lost its status as *tanah adat* and turned into state land. It was confusing to the village population that the residents of Pematang Kabau who decided to become part of the transmigration scheme lost their rights to the customary land, whereas the ones who did not take part in the scheme continued to hold their *adat* rights to the land that was designated as a transmigration site.[10] This situation has caused various conflicts because the area used to be forested area which the migrants – as a contribution to receive formal land titles – had to clear first.[11]

Parallel to these transmigration projects, in 1979, another governmental decree[12] restructured the political and social organization of the population in the Bukit Duabelas region. The former village entities (*dusun* or *kampong*) were turned into so-called *desa* and given new political structures, hierarchies, and institutions that should formally replace the customary structures and laws of *adat* (Warren, 1990, p. 24). The former head of the community who, according to the Jambi Melayu political system, had to have close kinship ties to the groups' elders and former political leaders was replaced by an officially appointed village head.[13]

10 In the frame of transmigration settlements, 20% of the utilities (housing, land, subsistence) should be set aside for the local population to facilitate economic development in the respective areas.

11 Today, nine villages in the region Air Hitam claim *ulayat* rights to the area of the former *marga* Air Hitam.

12 Undang Undang Republik Indonesia No. 5/1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa, Republik of Indonesia, 1979.

13 After the fall of Suharto, the existing Village Government Law was replaced with the legislation

The villages in the district of Air Hitam were allocated communal land, village boundaries were redefined, and resident identity cards were issued. Even though the village borders did not match with the communities' former territorial claims, the act of village constitution finally turned the village residents into acknowledged citizens of the Indonesian nation state. The formerly scarcely populated but socially complex and historically rich area suddenly became a place of state activities and control. The resettling of Javanese majority population was seen as a measure to establish state presence and weaken the power of local political elites (Elmhirst, 1999, pp. 813-815). Moreover, the transmigration program was an attempt to create uniformity across different cultural groups and homogenize socio-political structures of organization at village and community as well as at family level. In contrast, forest dwelling groups like the Orang Rimba were defined as "traditionally remote communities" (*Komunitas Adat Terpencil*, KAT) (Direktorat Pemberdayaan Komunitas Adat Terpencil, 2003). The state and public opinion stereotyped them as remote, uncivilized, and backward (Bertrand, 2004, p. 45; Li, 2000, p. 149). The social department of Jambi stated that there is a "big gap and much difference in the aspects of value system between [the Orang Rimba] and local socio-culture" (Direktorat Pemberdayaan Komunitas Adat Terpencil, 2003, p. 10). By categorizing the Orang Rimba as traditionally remote, the state neglected their position in the socio-political system of the Bukit Duabelas area. Instead, they became categorically isolated and turned into a minority group deprived of any rights. Again, state policies and national legislation continued to transform local kinship-based socio-political structures and land tenure systems into administrative categories of citizenship and codified legal rights. The Orang Rimba, like other communities all over Indonesia, became the constituting 'other' of the modern Indonesian villager and citizen. Thus, again 'sisters' were separated from 'brothers' as they were now categorized as a remote community and as non-citizens living next door to their 'brothers' who became fully acknowledged citizens. Yet, at the end, both the Orang Rimba and local villagers were equally deprived of their customary land tenure by the nation state.

GLOBAL DISCOURSES MEETING LOCAL REALITIES

These politics of marginalization, suppression, and dispossession generated smoldering conflicts that erupted after the fall of Suharto and with the beginning of political decentralization and a more NGO-friendly climate in the year 1999, when freedom of speech allowed the questioning of political decisions and articulation of local (indigenous) identities along rights over natural resources. Against the official line of Suharto's regime – which implied that Indonesia is a nation with no indigenous people or that all Indonesians are equally indigenous (Bertrand 2004, p. 45; Li 2000, p. 149) –, growing political freedom facilitated the foundation of AMAN which has mobi-

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No. 2/1999 which reopened the space for local structures of governance and political organization. A significant change was that the village head became accountable to the village representative body (*Badan Perwakilan Desa*, BPD) instead of the district head. UU No. 5/1979 was revised to UU No. 32/2004, which states that each village, district, and province has authority over its internal affairs. Regulation UU No. 32/2004 reinforced the law it replaced, by allowing regional governments to restructure their formal administrative area as long as it did not inhibit economic development.

lized isolated groups in many regions of Indonesia and promotes their interests on a national level. This movement draws its legitimacy from the notion of 'indigenous peoples' as identified by the ILO Convention 169 (Benda-Beckmann, 2011, p. 185). In doing so, it links the local concepts of traditional communities to global discourses of indigeneity and indigenous rights. The convention aims to protect

> tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. (ILO, 1989, Article 1(1))

Along these criteria, self-identification is considered fundamental for the identification of indigenous and tribal peoples.

> Members of the Orang Rimba community from Air Hitam were part of the first congress of indigenous people of the archipelago in 1999, which also marks the birth of AMAN. For them, the categorization as remote *adat* community suddenly offered the chance to join AMAN and to transform this derogatory national categorization into a global category of rights. The acknowledgement as 'indigenous people' marked the Orang Rimba, as Tyson (2011) called it, different and 'special'. While they still formed a constitutional other, discriminating national laws and politics could be challenged by referring to international rights and regulations that often overlapped with national legal orders. This also applies for endeavors of indigenous land titling, as one of AMAN's central fields of activity. The Orang Rimba can now reclaim their customary forest area as *hutan adat*, as they can easily be identified as indigenous people by the forestry department. (Campbell, 2002, p. 114)

Ironically, the Orang Rimba and sedentary Melayu villagers formulate the same historically rooted land claims in the Bukit Duabelas area. Both relate themselves to each other as sisters and brothers. Yet, during Dutch colonial rule, they were separated into different ethnic groups and assigned different administrative territories. After independence and under the Suharto regime, the Orang Rimba were turned into remote non-citizens, without any rights. They were left to live according to their customary *adat*. The Melayu villagers, in contrast, were forced into the category of citizens and their *adat* structures were forcefully replaced by new state-defined socio-political structures. Now after the end of the Suharto regime, due to their 'customary' lifestyle, formerly neglected Orang Rimba were rehabilitated with the support of global indigenous rights discourses and meet the criteria to be identified as indigenous people by the forestry department. Even though the Melayu village communities would fulfil the criteria of indigenous peoples according to the ILO convention, due to the transformation of socio-political structures and the setting of territorial

boundaries by the Suharto regime, the government institutions do not acknowledge their claims. The village communities in Air Hitam cannot formulate claims to *hutan adat* despite their pre-colonial existence. The contradictions between territorial policies of the nation state and the local histories of the people become clear in a statement of Orang Rimba political leader Tenganai Lengkap:

> Yes, the border is now called national park. But we are having a border since former times – this border follows the river Berenai and comes from Sultan Taha, in former times. This is the case, since mankind walks on two legs. The borderline [between the Orang Rimba and the villagers and the national park borders] are not the same. Our borders have existed since ages, since the colonial times. I will say, since the colonial time, this has been a bordered area. In history, the elites used to be the rulers over the territory. This means, the law of the government has not grown in this area, but the law lies within the hands of the people that hold the history. From the beginning until today. This territory lies within the Indonesian state. The history is until today in the hands of the *jenang* local elites. (Tengannai Lengkap, 23 December 2014)

CONCLUSION

The case study in this article presented a situation where the complex interaction of global discourses, international regulations, and national legislations shape local realities and identities that restrict and enlarge people's agency at the same time. The global category of 'indigenous peoples' touches upon political and social dimensions of power relations between citizens and the state. It can be understood as a dispute over the legitimacy of alternative forms of land tenure, and over the value of alternative notions of property tied to local identities and agro-ecological regimes, and finally over who should have privileged access to local resources. To understand land tenure, it is indispensable to fully understand the political and historical context that has shaped it. Cultural differences have been highlighted while territorialized and historical ties with the sedentary population have been erased and replaced by antagonisms of 'specialness' and 'citizenship'. Notably, both categories define relations of local communities to the nation state: either as citizen and therefore the central subject of the state or as constituting 'special' or 'other'. Our case shows that whether a group is defined as one or the other – as citizens or indigenous – is an act of arbitrariness pushed by colonial and postcolonial policy-makers in relation to land use. In effect, state policies not only determine communities' territorial rights but also transform communities' identities and relations among each other. Thus, while indigenous land titling may indeed be seen as an act of justice, if viewed from the perspective of community rights and long neglected communal claims against the state, on the horizontal level – the level of community relations – it can also create social injustice. In our case study, an act of justice from a global perspective creates injustice on the local level as it separates sisters from brothers and produces winners and losers with respect to historically equally rooted land tenure.

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Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change: Institutionalizing Agrometeorological Learning Through Science Field Shops in Indonesia

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Science Field Shops (SFSs) are an example of a transdisciplinary educational commitment where farmers, scientists, and extension staff exchange knowledge on agrometeorology in dialogue form to better respond to climate change. How can scientists, farmers, and extension staff build up this transdisciplinary collaboration? How has the agrometeorological learning environment been institutionalized in several places in Indonesia? An interdisciplinary collaboration between agrometeorology and anthropology serves as basis for developing seven climate services that are provided in the SFSs. Through Knowledge Transfer and Communication Technologies, farmers have become active learners, researchers, and decision makers of their own responses to the consequences of climate change. Although such an approach proves efficient in improving the farmers' knowledge and anticipation capability, the transdisciplinary collaboration with state authority needs to be overhauled to improve the process.

Keywords: Agrometeorology; Climate Change; Indonesia; Science Field Shops; Transdisciplinary Educational Commitment

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> Do not enforce farmers to only focus on achieving the target to increase productivity. Help us with a policy of water allocation from the irrigation canals, and facilitate us in improving our understanding about climate change.[1]

INTRODUCTION

Mobilizing efforts such as technologies and capital to improve agricultural productivity and achieve self-sufficiency in rice constitute a significant part of the Indonesian state's objective to feed the population and to sustain economic growth. In the course of the Green Revolution since the early 1970s, high productivity has become the state's primary objective for agricultural development which was flanked by the introduction of new high-yielding varieties in association with chemical fertilizers and pesticides, large-scale irrigation, and new

1 This request was directed to the government by a group of rainfall observers in East Lombok led by Mastariadi in order to change the government's policies on agricultural development (Mastariadi, 4 November 2015).

technologies (Hansen, 1978; Hardjono, 1983). From the beginning, the Green Revolution has been contested and numerous problems have been reported (Conway & Pretty, 1990; Fox, 1991; Hardjono, 1983; Schiller, 1980; Winarto, 2004a, 2013). Summarizing the criticism, Conway (1985) argues that high productivity was achieved at the expense of agro-ecological sustainability, namely ecosystem stability and equity for local farmers. Farmers as the main producers of food became both the target and the victims of the Green Revolution. Even though they succeeded in increasing agricultural productivity, they have been culturally and ecologically marginalized on 'their own fields'. Many of them did not foresee the consequences of the top-down technology packages which increased productivity but drastically changed their habitat (Chambers, 2009; Fox, 1991; Scoones & Thompson, 2009; Winarto, 2004a, 2013). One devastating consequence was the severe outbreak of brown planthopper (BPH) in 1985,[2] just one year after Indonesia's declaration of rice self-sufficiency. In order to fight the negative consequences of ecosystem instability and empower farmers, a number of international and national multidisciplinary scientists collaborated with the Indonesian government to introduce programs of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) (Fox, 1991; Kenmore, 1992). Referring to Paulo Freire's liberal education philosophy (1972), andragogy (Knowles, 1973; Knowles & Associates, 1985), and the Farmer First paradigm (Chambers, Pacey, & Thrupp, 1989), adult education for farmers as well as people's empowerment and participation became the hallmark of these programs. One strategy was the introduction of Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) (Dilts & Hate, 1996; Fox, 1991; Kenmore, 1992; Pontius, Dilts, & Bartlett, 2002; Wardhana, 1992; Winarto, 2004a, 2004b). Despite the proliferation of IPM, Indonesia faces severe environmental problems as the Green Revolution paradigm is still underlining the country's agricultural policies (Winarto, 2009, 2011; Winarto et al., 2012a). As a result, a devastating outbreak of BPH all over Java from 2010 to 2012 reduced rice production significantly and 1.96 million tons of rice were lost (Bortrell & Schoenly, 2012; Departemen Proteksi Tanaman, 2014; Fox, 2014; Winarto et al., 2012a; Winarto et al., 2012b).

Despite criticism and failures of the Green Revolution condensed in 20 years of the Farmer First movement (Chambers, 2009; Scoones & Thompson, 2009), the research paradigm and the transfer of top-down technology packages are still highly prevalent in the development agenda of many developing countries (Jakku & Thorburn, 2010; Luyet, Schlaepfer, Parlange, & Buttler, 2010; Sumberg, Thompson, & Woodhouse, 2013). Farmers are still kept marginalized without sufficient knowledge to understand and foresee the risk of their agricultural practices. This gains even more importance in the course of recent environmental and climate change (Winarto, 2013). Farmers have always responded to climatic variability, particularly to changes in rainfall distributions and patterns, by adapting their practices throughout the season. In the midst of ongoing climate change, however, farmers in Indonesia do not yet know that climate change is their 'new enemy'. High day-time temperatures

2 The brown planthopper (BPH, *Nilaparvata lugens*) is a miniscule fast breeding insect that lodges in the stalks of rice plants. It feeds directly on the rice plant and in large numbers is capable of sucking the life out of extended fields of rice, causing so-called 'hopperburn'. The BPH is also a carrier of two destructive rice viruses: ragged stunt virus and grassy stunt virus, either of which can be as devastating to a rice crop as the direct feeding by the BPH (Fox, 2014; see also Bortrell & Schoenly, 2012).

in some tropical and subtropical rice growing regions are already close to the maximum levels. The increase in intensity and frequency of heat waves coinciding with sensitive reproductive stages can result in serious damage of rice production (Stigter & Winarto, 2013; Thornton & Cramer, 2012). Stigter, Winarto, and Wicaksono (2016) highlight the increased average annual temperature in Indonesia, the changes in the seasonality of precipitation (wet and dry seasons), the increased wet season rainfall in southern regions of Indonesia, and the decline of southern Indonesia rainfall up to 15% (Aldrian & Djamil, 2008; Case, Ardiansyah, & Spector, 2007). Based on these data, farmers in Indonesia do suffer and will continue to suffer from increasing temperatures as well as from decreasing rainfall (for the strong relationship between the El-Niño Southern Oscillation [ENSO] and rainfall variability in most of Indonesia, see Boer & Suharnoto, 2012; for the changing starts of the rainy season, see Marjuki et al., 2014). For many farmers in Indonesia, these phenomena related to climate change are relatively new (Winarto & Stigter, 2011). Unfortunately, extension facilitation by intermediaries fails to provide farmers with knowledge and strategies (Lubis, 2013) or is not working as effectively as it should (Cahyono, 2014). In this article, we propose the concept of Science Field Shops (SFSs) to address this missing link. SFSs provide dialogic exchange of knowledge amongst farmers, scientists, extension staff, and policy makers, through which farmers learn agrometeorology, in order to better respond to climate change and challenge the agricultural paradigm associated with the Green Revolution. Thereby, we propose a new approach to learning and practicing agriculture in a more sustainable way. One important basis for developing the transdisciplinary project of SFSs is interdisciplinary collaboration across two disciplines, namely agrometeorology and anthropology. This article aims to examine how the transdisciplinary project of SFSs has been introduced and developed in several places in Indonesia and to elaborate on the results on farmers' capability in responding to the consequences of climate change in agriculture. The structure of the article is organized as follows: We first discuss the transdisciplinary educational commitment which includes policy and social learning. We then describe the establishment of SFSs through the provision of climate services and the institutionalization of agrometeorological learning in two locations in Java and Lombok (Indramayu, West Java; East Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara), following the first initiative in Gunungkidul, Yogyakarta. Finally, we elaborate on the challenges of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary work not only within the farming communities but also regarding the effort to involve other academic institutions and government agencies. We conclude with success factors and future challenges.

A TRANSDISCIPLINARY APPROACH FOR POLICY AND SOCIAL LEARNING

Since the late 1980s, andragogy and experiential discovery learning, which was developed in the Integrated Pest Management Farmer Field Schools (IPM FFSs), has slowly spread throughout Indonesia and became a model for the initiation of various kinds of 'schools', including the Climate Field Schools (CFSs). Since 2003, government officials have carried out CFSs to provide farmers with new knowledge on weather and climate in various regions in Indonesia. Based on our observation of the implementation of a CFS in Gunungkidul, Yogyakarta province, however, we criti-

cized the prevailing paradigm of simply teaching over a limited period of time instead of providing a mutual and enduring learning situation (Anantasari, Winarto, & Stigter, 2011). Based on their observation in Indramayu, West Java province, Siregar and Crane (2011) also argue that activities in the frame of CFSs lack to identify, enhance, and build on farmers' knowledge, capacities, and institutional processes.

A transdisciplinary educational commitment would be a necessary means to meet the needs of local farmers in the current dynamic situation of high complexity and uncertainty resulting from climate change. Scholars increasingly ascertain the importance of transdisciplinary research in development cooperation for addressing social-environmental problems (Brutschin & Wiesmann, 2002; Christinck & Padmanabhan, 2013; Cronin, 2008; Lang et al., 2012; Pohl & Hadorn, 2008). Cronin (2008) defines transdisciplinary research (TDR) as

> a practice that transcends the narrow scope of disciplinary views. It challenges existing boundaries and 'redraws the map'. . . . It is an approach in which researchers from a wide range of disciplines work together with stakeholders. TDR aims to overcome the gap between knowledge production on the one hand and the demand for knowledge to contribute to the solution of social problems, on the other. (pp. 2-3)

As socio-ecological research focuses on the solution of real-world problems, the involvement of actors from outside academia in the research process is of utmost importance (Cronin, 2008; Lang et al., 2012). Thus, "transdisciplinarity combines interdisciplinarity with a participatory approach" (Cronin, 2008, p. 4). Transdisciplinary educational commitment then moves beyond transdisciplinary research by producing knowledge together to contribute to the solution of problems people face in their immediate environment. The above-mentioned criticism of CFSs makes it clear that a transdisciplinary educational commitment was absent in the state's CFSs. The state's CFSs 'curricula' were designed by agrometeorologists and delivered by agricultural officials. Therefore, no direct relationship between scientists and farmers, which would have enabled a process of intersubjectivity, was established. As there were no social scientists involved in CFSs, the examination of socio-cultural factors regarding the above-described contested agricultural development was also not tackled. However, both the challenge of climate change and the need for farmers to respond to the dynamics of this change require the collaboration of scientists from different fields (in this case agrometeorology and anthropology) and the active participation of farmers on the ground. In anthropology, such an approach is called collaborative ethnography. Lassiter (2005) defines it as "an approach to ethnography that *deliberately* and *explicitly* emphasizes collaboration at every point in the ethnographic process, without veiling it – from project conceptualization, to fieldwork, and especially through the writing process" (p. 16). In a later article, he advises anthropologists to use that approach in developing "community-based collaborative action" (Lassiter, 2008, p. 74-75). In collaborative research, ethnographers move away from the investigators' realm of definition, purpose, and authority. In contrast, collaboration entails joint production by scientists and the community. In SFSs, the anthropologist initiates transdisciplinary collaboration and acts as a mediator and cultural

translator between two domains of knowledge: the scientific and the local (Winarto, Stigter, Dwisatrio, Nurhaga, & Bowolaksono, 2013; Winarto & Stigter, 2013). However, the anthropologists have to move beyond just being cultural translators as one important task is to introduce new habits to the farmers. Thereby, interacting directly with farmers inter-subjectively becomes the main role of the anthropologists. The establishment of SFSs was the first step to move into 'public-anthropology' by directly addressing issues beyond conventional anthropological concerns (Lassitter, 2005, 2008). In this unique process, we exercise and experience immersion into the farmers' lives in order to enable us to build up a close relationship with them. At the same time, we detach ourselves from the intimate relationship to provide room for continuously reflecting on the transdisciplinary collaboration. Detailed documentation of both visual and inscription data as well as analyzing and processing farmers' rainfall data and agroecosystem observation become integral parts of our work.

Policy Learning and Social Learning

Two challenges need to be addressed for the institutionalization of SFSs among farmers and policy makers, namely policy learning and social learning. According to Albright and Crow (2015), policy learning is about "changes of beliefs, attitudes, goals, or behaviors – in response to new information" (p. 80). Agrometeorological learning is then about such changes due to new meteorological and climatological knowledge acquired by farmers (Stigter & Winarto, 2016). Therefore, the establishment and institutionalization of new mutual participative educational commitments, for example observation and analysis of rainfall, enable policy learning in the field of agrometeorology among farmers. As a result, farmers are able to make decisions that enhance their capability to adapt to climate change. In a further step, a social learning process among the rest of the community members is expected to occur. Luks and Siebenhüner (2006, p. 419) assert that the process of social learning is highly interrelated with the generation, construction, and representation of scientific knowledge as well as with the openness and flexibility of the governance system. One challenge is to ensure the maintenance of the social learning process. Generally, farmers are used to and willing to share what they learn and know to their fellow farmers (Winarto, 2004a, 2004b). For farmers who have not personally experienced the observation and analysis of rainfall patterns, it is, however, difficult to follow the outcomes and advice of the rainfall observers in the community. For the rainfall observer, agrometeorological learning is a direct way of observing and analyzing emerging problems and opportunities related to meteorological and ecological phenomena. Even so, for a social learning process to take place among the rest of the community members, a larger movement of scaling-up the SFSs is necessary, and this also requires support from state authorities. One rainfall observer in Indramayu complained that "my neighbors would not listen to me (to change their farming strategies) since nobody from the government backed me up" (Condra, 5 August 2015). Without the state's support, the extent to which social learning could take place within and beyond the community is still a prevailing problem.

SCIENCE FIELD SHOPS IN PRACTICE: KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

In general, farmers are aware of changes to their environment due to climate change and they have strategies and knowledge as the basis for their work to enhance resilience. Improving farmers' knowledge and decision making to cope with climate change are the main objectives of our transdisciplinary collaboration. This process takes place via Knowledge Transfer and Communication Technologies (KTCT) in the frame of SFSs (Winarto, Stigter, Ariefiansyah, & Prihandiani, 2016; Stigter, 2016a). Knowledge transfer refers to the practical problem of transferring knowledge from one part of an organization to another. Knowledge transfer seeks to organize, create, capture, or distribute knowledge and ensure its availability for future users. Farmers have their own ways and habits of transferring knowledge among themselves using their own communication technologies (Winarto, 2004a, 2004b). How could this knowledge be used and improved in SFSs? We examine this process in the following sub-section.

Introducing and Establishing Science Field Shops

SFSs are a new extension approach in which knowledge is exchanged or transferred for operational use by farmers. The scientists (agrometeorologists and anthropologists) have been working collaboratively on an interdisciplinary basis to introduce seven climate services (see list below) to farmers who have become active learners and researchers throughout the establishment of the SFSs on a transdisciplinary basis. After establishing the first SFS in a hamlet in Gunungkidul, Yogyakarta, from 2008 to 2009, we introduced agrometeorological learning processes among farmers in other regencies, namely Indramayu in West Java in 2009 and East Lombok in West Nusatenggara in late 2014. Various donor agencies funded the SFSs and academic institutions and (inter)national agencies supported the operational costs of both scientists and farmers. In the early stage of its establishment, the collaborative work focused on policy learning among the rainfall observers who joined the SFSs by providing the seven climate services for farmers. Gradually, we introduced the SFSs to local and national government agencies as an alternative extension approach to assist farmers in the midst of ongoing climate change. At a later stage, the scientists gradually addressed social learning through the informal scaling-up of SFSs among farmers and by formally establishing new satellite groups as well as inviting agricultural officials to participate. In this transdisciplinary process of knowledge transfer and communication between farmers, scientists, and at a later stage also extension intermediaries (Winarto et al., 2016), the farmers are active learners. They carry out their daily observations of rainfall and agroecosystems, document their findings, and analyze and discuss them together in monthly meetings. They play an active role in analyzing the impacts of particular rainfall patterns to the ecosystem and reporting on the most vulnerable situations. Scientists and extension workers have the role of establishing climate services which provide (new) operational knowledge in agrometeorology. The aim is the establishment of KTCTs in Science Field Shops in order to improve farmers' anticipation capability in decision making that enables them to

better cope with the consequences of climate change. We have learned that what is missing in almost all extension attempts in developing countries is a mutual dialogue for knowledge transfer. For that reason, SFSs are organized as a flexible mutual commitment between farmers, scientists, and any extension intermediary who wants to join to hold dialogues on climate problems. Agrometeorological learning should lead to policy learning such as changes of beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and goals due to the transfer of new knowledge (see Albright & Crow, 2015). The new knowledge is obtained through KTCTs on the basis of seven climate services (Stigter, 2016b; Winarto et al., 2016):

1. Daily measurement of rainfall by all rainfall observers in their plots by using rain gauges

The first thing all participating farmers have to learn is measuring the rainfall on their plots on a daily basis. This quantitative data is exchanged and discussed on a monthly basis in the SFSs meeting. Thereby, farmers understand how the rainfall varies through time and space. Rain gauges serve as KTCTs as they are used to exchange and discuss the data gathered (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. A farmer is measuring rainfall. (photo by Aria S. Handoko).

Figure 2. A farmer is observing the agroecosystem condition of his field.
(photo by Muki T. Wicaksono).

2. Daily or weekly observation of agroecological aspects (soil, plants, water, biomass, pests, climate extremes)

On pre-printed data sheets, on a daily or weekly basis, farmers fill in observations on crop stages and how their plants look, including colors due to fertilizer treatments and drought. From the nursery stage onwards, they also record detailed observations on pests and diseases (if any) and any consequences found or suspected. Farmers may also list soil treatments prior to sowing and include the sowing and planting methods they have used. They list the varieties they have sown and keep records of fertilizers (organic and/or inorganic) used at specific crop phases. Treatments involve irrigations and withholding irrigations at specific crop phases as well as the spraying of pesticides, organic and/or inorganic, at specific conditions of pest/disease infestation. The data sheets serve as KTCTs and are the basis for exchange, discussions, and the development of strategies during SFSs (see Figure 2 and 3).

3. Measuring of yields and analysis of the correlation to rainfall and inputs (amount & timing)

Farmers focus on expected and measured yields. Moreover, they explain differences in yields in relation to rainfall and other agroecologial inputs (amounts and timing) available, affordable and used (varieties, water, fertilizers, pesticides, labor, machin-

Figure 3. Group of rainfall observers discussing their agrometeorological observations. (photo by Yunita T. Winarto).

ery, and knowledge). Farmers communicate and discuss the procurement of yields among themselves. Moreover, they compare yield, rainfall, and other data with those from previous seasons. The analysis, understanding, and comparison of yields are part of KTCTs.

4. Organization of the SFSs themselves

The continuation of the SFSs among farmers needs to be entirely in the hands of the farmers. In both Indramayu and East Lombok, we helped farmers to form a core group of rainfall observers consisting of the first batch and a number of satellite groups with new rainfall observers. The leaders of the groups organize farmers' meetings to exchange and discuss knowledge amongst each other or with extension intermediaries.

5. Development and exchange of monthly updated seasonal climate predictions in the form of seasonal rainfall scenarios

We send farmers monthly climate scenarios in order to provide them with new knowledge that can be combined and discussed with their gathered data. We explained and discussed the terminology of the climate scenarios in advance so that farmers know how to interpret the data.

6. Delivering new knowledge related to the above listed points

Scientists deliver new knowledge, including the provision and discussion of answers to all agricultural/climatological questions raised by participants throughout the year.

7. Guidance on the establishment of farmer field experiments to get on-farm answers on urgent local questions

Farmers are encouraged to carry out experiments on their own plots. For example, scientists guided farmers to find out the most effective strategies for mitigating methane emissions – released from the plowing of wet biomass in an aerobic condition – while also sustaining and/or increasing yields and reducing costs. Such reports on experiments aiming to prevent climate change and sustain or increase yields while reducing costs are an important part of KTCTs and constitute 'win-win solutions' for both the environment and the farmers.

Another aspect of KTCTs is the training of farmer facilitators which the farmers choose themselves. The scientists trained these facilitators in train-the-trainer workshops to improve their climate literacy and agrometeorological learning skills and knowledge to enable them to facilitate other farmers and new members. Other forms of KTCTs used by farmers to exchange knowledge are daily or regular informal discussions, mobile telephones, rural radio, and television. Information is also spread through existing state agricultural extension services where farmers keep track on how the ongoing season is progressing. The up-scaling of all these KTCTs and the reporting on the up-scaling process are also exchanged and discussed in the SFSs and therefore are part of KTCTs themselves.

In transdisciplinary research, the role of farming communities is significant. Based on our experience, we learned that the implementation of SFSs in different places and farming cultures/systems has to address the peculiarities of each community. Agrometeorological learning in the framework of climate change needs to include and address local socio-cultural aspects and the specific ecological landscapes. We reflect on the gradual learning processes in the transdisciplinary setting of SFSs in the following section.

Institutionalizing Agrometeorological Learning: A Gradual Learning Process

For both farmers and scientists, the most important experiences throughout their collaborative work, are the farmers' significant changes in attitude and strategies and the scientists' improvement in the SFSs materials and approaches. When looking back at the starting point of the SFSs, the farmers describe significant changes they have been experiencing gradually over time. Through ongoing intersubjectivity with the farmers in the past years and daily reflection on what was missing in farmers' learning, the scientists improved the farmers' new habits of measuring daily rainfall and taking notes of their agroecosystem observation over time (Prahara, Winarto, & Kristiyanto, 2011; Winarto & Stigter, 2011). Based on farmers' reports and evaluations, the scientists gradually improved the template for documenting these data (Winarto & Stigter, 2016). For the farmers, quantifying rainfall and writing down the



Figure 4. Annual rainfall graph. (photo by Muki T. Wicaksono).

results were new skills. In the beginning, they produced incomplete data. Writing down knowledge based on their observations meant simplifying very complex phenomena into a few words or short sentences (Prahara et al., 2011; Winarto & Stigter, 2016). Thus, scientists had to repeat explanations, revise the template, and correct farmers' mistakes from time to time. Eventually, once the farmers understood the benefits of their data, they could do the documentation on their own initiative. Carrying out the data collection on a daily basis, the farmers realized how significant and valuable it was. They were able to compare rainfall patterns between years and to produce hypothetical assumptions on particular agrometeorological phenomena such as the relation between certain rainfall patterns and the infestation of particular pests/diseases. Based on our dialogues, we collaboratively produced monthly and annual rainfall graphs (Winarto & Stigter, 2016). These graphs (see Figure 4) can be considered a new form of KTCTs. With the graphs, farmers can visually depict their analyses on rainfall, pest/disease populations/infestations, and the plants' age in one graph. The graph can be used by the farmers themselves and distributed to others in their community.

Another significant achievement by the farmers was monthly-organized evaluation meetings. In Indramayu, these meetings have been held since 2009 by rotation principle. Visiting places far away from their villages and discussing data became a strong communicative event, strengthening the network, and establishing friendships (Giller, 2013). Such meetings are significant KTCTs to support the learning process. Farmers share and exchange their data, discoveries, ideas, problems, and solu-

tions. Learning from one another and from the scientists is the most valuable thing that they missed in formal extension meetings. Farmers are used to observing and interpreting phenomena in their fields, but not as detailed as in SFSs. However, their observations also depend on what is considered significant in local settings. In Indramayu, pest/disease infestations have always been a threat. Thus, in the early years of the learning process, they particularly used to share and discuss ideas of how to treat a particular pest or disease. By using various components of agrometeorology, the farmers were gradually motivated to analyze yields and the differences found between farmers, different planting seasons, and the same planting season in different years. From 2013 onwards, farmers were stimulated to carry out simple standardized 'win-win solution experiments'. They had to discover the most effective strategies for mitigating methane emission that would not reduce yields but only costs. Farmers learned that for farmer-led field experiments, they had to prepare and compare one 'field as usual' and one experimental field with only one variable differing from the usual field. This is an example of how farmers gradually learn to incorporate scientific premises in their own trial-and-error activities (Winarto & Stigter, 2016). Throughout the intersubjective relationship, it is crucial that farmers themselves sustain the objective of institutionalizing agrometeorological learning. Yet, without a common goal to achieve, it would be difficult to reach a consensus or compromise on the diverse values, norms, and rules between the different parties (Brutschin & Wiesmann, 2002). Therefore, it was a pleasant surprise for us and other parties that up to 2016, the SFSs in Indramayu could be carried out under the leadership of farmers, thereby highlighting the benefits of SFSs. The rainfall observers in that region have become the source of climate scenarios for other farmers and regency authorities. For the farmers in East Lombok, the SFSs were the first opportunity to come into contact with agrometeorological knowledge and learning that could help them to understand puzzling phenomena. Over a relatively short time, the East Lombok farmers, just as the Indramayu farmers from 2010 onwards, gained confidence in the new learning process and started to 'trust' the monthly rainfall scenarios provided by the scientists. In comparison to their own traditional cosmology (*warigé*), which became out of line with the recent weather and climate conditions, "the seasonal scenarios contained truth", as the rainfall observers argued (Zulkarnaen and Mastariadi, 4 November 2015). Gradually, other farmers in East Lombok perceived the rainfall observers as *mangku hujan*.[3]

Gaining trust, enriching knowledge, proving the advantages, having freedom to speak, and obtaining a feeling of ownership for the learning activities and outcomes are important elements for a sustainable transdisciplinary collaboration. Yet, only through strong dedication, mutual trust, and ongoing intersubjectivity between all parties over time, can the institutionalization of SFSs as an educational commitment take place.

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3 *Mangku hujan* was a traditional informal leader in the old social structure of the *Sasak* ethnic group in Lombok having the capability to define and determine local regulations and provide guidance about farming.

MOVING FORWARD: INTER- AND TRANSDISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES

Institutionalizing agrometeorological learning in a transdisciplinary collaboration is not possible without establishing an interdisciplinary foundation among scientists on different scales. Without the involvement, organization, and education of scientists from local universities and/or other institutions, the materialization of such an educational commitment to assist farmers is doomed to fail. However, breaking the 'walls' between different faculties, disciplines, and scales in establishing the research team is not an easy task. The most important thing to begin with is to seek scientists from different disciplines: natural sciences (e.g., agrometeorology, agronomy) and social sciences (e.g., anthropology, sociology) who agree to cross the boundaries of their own disciplines. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, this is not an easy task due to the traditional boundaries of faculties and the virtual absence of scientists who are interested to initiate and pursue an inter- and transdisciplinary research project. Building a 'common language' between different disciplines needs the high motivation, stamina, patience, and passion of the scientists to learn from one another. All parties have to set up common goals and institutionalize values, norms, and rules for establishing new habits in a collaborative process. Without the willingness for continuous reflection and learning at every stage of the collaboration, the necessary intersubjective relationship is not possible. Only on such an interdisciplinary basis, KTCTs can be developed in a learning arena such as the SFSs. However, one remaining constraint is how to sustain the work, especially with regard to local universities where agrometeorologists and social scientists have not been ready to work collaboratively in providing climate services to farmers.

Although it is not easy to change farmers' habits and culture, they are seen to internalize new habits easily through direct experiences of what is happening in the fields and gaining confidence in the advantages of their agrometeorological learning. This stands in contrast to changing bureaucrats' culture and perspectives. Our experience in establishing transdisciplinary work with both farmers and local/regional authorities in the two regencies shows that it is much easier to gain the farmers' trust and willingness to collaborate than that of government officials. Facilitating policy learning among the farmers has been the major accomplishment of our transdisciplinary work. The strategies developed by rainfall observers in collaboration with local village officials to avoid harvest failures due to the strong El-Niño in 2015 (which lasted up to April 2016) exemplify this accomplishment. In a village meeting in Indramayu, the rainfall observers developed the strategy to adopt the schedule for preparing lands and nurseries by anticipating the expected short rainy season, the lack of rainfalls throughout the rainy season, the availability of irrigation water, and the population and life-cycle of white rice stemborer. They calculated the time of making the nursery bed, the type of nursery, and the maturing age of rice variety to be cultivated. Although they experienced severe water scarcity in the middle of the rainy season planting, the farmers could still gain their harvests by relying on the groundwater resources at the time when the paddy did not need much water. Another benefit was their successful strategy in avoiding pest infestation. In this case, the policy learning and the social learning took place once the local officials understood the need to appropriately define the preparatory stage of the forthcoming

planting season to avoid harvest failures. In contrast, farmers experienced hardships and harvest failures without any timely guidance and assistance by the agricultural officials even though some rainfall observers were able to anticipate the long drought of the 2015/2016 rainy season. Instead of working on a flexible planting scheme, the government expected farmers to keep planting rice to reach the state's annual target of boosting up rice production (Winarto, Stigter, & Ariefiansyah, 2015). Without any governmental support, the rest of the community members that have not experienced any agrometeorological learning would follow their previous strategies. The long drought trapped them in a harsh situation without any water supply during the growth of rice. This is illustrated by the complaint of a rainfall observer in Indramayu who experienced harvest failure in 2015 when planting rice in the dry season with normally sufficient irrigation water.

> We are having a long drought this season [dry season of 2015], but why did the government force us to plant rice without taking into account that there would be a strong El-Niño this season? Now we have lost our harvest. If the government had advised us and helped us planting another commodity, we would not have experienced this harvest failure. (Condra, 5 August 2015)

These cases highlight that the main aim is to implement a sustainable long-term educational commitment and not only a short-period training such as in the state introduced Climate Field Schools. In this process, the biggest challenge is to stimulate a policy learning process among government officials. Differences between the two research sites are prevalent here as the East Lombok regency authorities supported the up-scaling of the SFSs in a relatively shorter period than the Indramayu regency authorities. Recently, the local and regency governments in Indramayu and East Lombok agreed to facilitate the establishment of the SFSs at the village and/or district levels. However, the top-down approach which focuses only on achieving the national rice production target has continued without any focus on educating farmers to be responsive to the uncertain consequences of climate change. Finding an appropriate approach to invite, motivate, and involve local and regional state authorities in developing SFSs in their regions is now becoming a significant part of scientists' responsibility.

CONCLUSION

This article has shown that the collaborative work between scientists from different disciplinary backgrounds such as agrometeorology and anthropology proves to be useful in initiating, introducing, and institutionalizing a transdisciplinary collaboration with farmers. Only by positioning farmers as main partners and active learner-researchers and not merely as receivers of technology, Science Field Shops could be established on the basis of Knowledge Transfer and Communication Technologies. However, changing farmers' habits, knowledge, and practices to be rainfall observers, researchers, and responsive decision makers of their own fields takes time. Gaining confidence, belief, and trust that the new learning and habits are beneficial for improving their anticipation capability and decision making over time constitutes a sig-

nificant part of the entire process of institutionalizing agrometeorological learning. Incrementally, farmers realized that only the combined process of gathering rainfall data, understanding their field agroecosystem conditions, and receiving monthly seasonal scenarios enabled them to better anticipate future requirements. The major challenge, however, is to initiate and establish transdisciplinary collaboration with state authorities. Agricultural development programs in Indonesia still refer to the Green Revolution paradigm. Therefore, high productivity is still the main objective of the state's agricultural policy, whereas adaptation to the increasing uncertainty and consequences of climate change on agriculture has not been seriously addressed. We propose that state representatives should be collaborative in developing new agendas and strategies in agricultural production that consider climate change and sustain the livelihood of farmers.

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"Only if You Really, Really Need It": Social Rights Consciousness in the Philippines

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This article argues that communitarianism, as the prevalent citizenship paradigm in the Philippines, observable also in modest expectations towards government services among Filipinos and a high emphasis on individual and community action, can be used to explain the lack of political change in the Philippines. In its first part, the article presents data on the sense of citizenship and concepts of social rights and obligations among Filipinos by combining findings from a series of problem-centered interviews with young urban professionals and quantitative data collected within annual surveys by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on government, social inequality, and citizenship. The second part of the article attributes these findings to everyday concepts of citizenship as ideal-typical state responsibility theories and modern citizenship paradigms. By including ethnographic data, it discovers significant traits of communitarianism in Philippine everyday life. This section goes on to present how communitarianism (with its inherent character of exclusivity) impedes a democratic culture and moreover, how it is unable to serve as a guiding social philosophy in unifying a large-scale society mainly consisting of citizens who are strangers (*ibang tao*) to each other. Nevertheless, in conclusion, the article suggests the possibility of deepening and broadening the sense of citizenship in the Philippine society and its respect for the stranger by drawing on elements of Filipino culture.

Keywords: Citizenship; Communitarianism; Philippines; Political Culture; Social Rights

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INTRODUCTION

Poverty persists in the Philippines despite economic growth. Political patronage and oligarchic rule remain the order of the day. On the other hand, the rhetoric of change is pervasive in civil society discourse (Department of Political Science [DPC], 2010). This article draws on research with a focus on the *sense of citizenship* in the Philippines (Reese, 2015) asking to which extent Filipinos and Filipinas are willing to stand up for their political beliefs and personal goals (active citizenship) and which role they allot to the public, the government, and the state to provide for or at least support these beliefs and goals.

The first part of the article focuses on the extent of social rights that respondents feel entitled to and whether they consider the government to be the main duty bearer to fulfill these rights. Utilizing a qualitative approach and backing it up with quantitative data reveals Filipinos' general readiness to take political action (active citizenship) as well as their general expectations towards the state

(passive citizenship). However, when respondents are asked to spell out these expectations (for instance, in terms of actual and concrete services), these are comparably modest and very basic. Here, I show that most Filipinos have modest expectations regarding government service and that most place high emphasis on individual and community action as the source of change in their lives.

The second part of the article attributes these empirical findings to ideal-typical state responsibility theories and modern citizenship paradigms (e.g., liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism). Here, I argue that communitarianism is the prevalent "state responsibilization theory" (Zintl, 1996, p. 306) amongst Filipinos, which is further supported by ethnographic data. Communitarianism (with its inherent character of exclusivity), however, is proven to impede a democratic culture and is unable to serve as a guiding social philosophy in unifying large-scale societies mainly consisting of citizens who are strangers (in the Philippines, *ibang tao*) to each other.

The qualitative data employed in the article was gathered within a series of problem-centered interviews conducted between 2010 and 2012 with 28 young urban professionals from Manila, Davao, and Dumaguete, chosen by theoretical sampling.[1] Variables used for the theoretical sampling were, among others, age, gender, years in college visited, place of origin (city or countryside), as well as occupation of the parents (socio-economic background). However, the only variable which turned out to be significant for their sense of citizenship was the organizational background of the respondents. Those who had been involved in a structurally transformative (left) activism had a much stronger sense of citizenship than those who had been involved in non-transformative activism or even those who had never been involved in any political organization at all.

My research focused on the political attitudes of urban professionals in precarious (*prekarisierte*) work settings, in this case, agents working in international call centers. They can be understood as part of the lower middle class.[2] The 28 respondents were interviewed three times: An introductory biographical interview was followed by two problem-centered interviews. While the first problem-centered interview focused on the question of how they solve problems at work (enterprise-level citizenship), the latter focused on citizenship activities and their sense of entitlement towards the government and other duty bearers (such as family and friends). The questionnaires were comprised of semi-structured and open questions, but also included several items which were to be answered within an ordinal scale.[3] Following a dual research strategy, the findings of these interviews were compared with quantitative data mainly by triangulating the qualitative data with the results of surveys done by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on government, social inequality, and

1 In the following text, short phrases and statements from interviews are used randomly to illustrate respondents' attitudes and general concerns.

2 To identify which attitudes may be considered specifically middle-class, the study conducted control interviews with people classified as lower class.

3 The interviews were conducted in a mix of English, Tagalog, and Cebuano, the dominant language in the Southern Philippines. This is why some quotes are in English, while others are in Filipino vernaculars. Furthermore, I indicated the Tagalog phrases used in the ISSP surveys.

citizenship (ISSP, 2008; ISSP, 2012a; ISSP, 2012b). The analysis was further enriched by a validation process undertaken in the form of focus group discussions with the respondents and expert interviews.[4]

Why a Sense of Citizenship?

Gaventa and Barrett (2010) define *citizenship* as "the ability to exercise voice and claim rights from states and political authorities" (p. 57). Citizenship is therefore made up of two dimensions – an active dimension (exercising voice) and a passive one (claiming rights and demanding accountability). Both dimensions are considered core elements of good governance – next to elements such as government effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, absence of violence, regulatory quality, and control of corruption (Kabeer & Haq Kabir, 2009). Moreover, a pronounced sense of citizenship is considered necessary for political change to happen. Even if political institutions (such as an independent judiciary and a strong legislature) have developed, they are likely to eventually weaken if not inhabited by politically-minded citizens. *Righting institutions*, which is at the center of the debate around good governance, is thus not sufficient. "There is no lack of laws . . . the problem is enforcement", as Michael Tan (2014b) resonates a widespread sentiment in the Philippines. The sense of citizenship used in this article can thus be defined as (a) considering oneself or others to be rightfully entitled to something (a passive sense of citizenship, or a sense of entitlement) and (b) being ready to stand up for what one considers 'right' (active sense of citizenship and readiness to political action). In the absence of a sense of having claims and rights (a sense of passive citizenship) towards the government, there is no demand for rights or political change, and those in charge will not be held accountable (a sense of active citizenship). To understand the persistence of inequality and oligarchy in the Philippines, it might therefore be a useful endeavor to investigate the cognitive structures of ordinary citizens that facilitate (or impede) their readiness to act.

Citizenship in its active and passive dimension is a strongly normative concept as it is closely connected to the notion of modern statehood, which is built on the participation of its members (democracy) as well as on the government's provision of social services to its citizens (Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability [DRC], 2011). Active citizenship for emancipatory ends is tacitly presumed as the only (legitimate) form of citizenship (Claussen & Geissler, 1996), denying 'ugly citizenship' (for example political action limiting rather than expanding universal democracy as witnessed within the current rise of right-wing populism) to be a form of citizenship as well as denying people the option of not connecting to civic affairs. Likewise, such passive citizenship (Amna, 2010), however, is included into the formal working definition of this research, as is 'ugly citizenship'. The research thus avoided equating citizenship with "professional citizenship . . . [of

4 Such a procedure is recommended in a research setting as the Philippines, where quantitative data are even more in need of communicative validation often considerably contradicting common sense, as Randy David, one of the leading sociologists of the Philippines, pointed out during a validation interview undertaken with him as part of this study (Quezon City, 13 August 2014). David considers quantitative research as foreign to the oral and personalized culture prevalent in the Philippines and suggests that quantitative data, should, if at all, only be used for validating qualitative or ethnographic data.

an] ever-vigilant civic individual", which Amna (2010, p. 200) identified as the predominant model in citizenship studies.

Why the Philippine Case?

In political theory, as much as in public discourse, concepts of ideal statehood which emerged in the West (and have precipitated in the Philippine legal system) have been used as benchmarks and are often contrasted with lacking Philippine realities (DPC, 2010). This often sets off a negative narrative, referring to the Philippines as a "failing state" (Romero, 2014). Comparing "democratic ideals and [Philippine] realities" – as the title of an introduction into Philippine politics by the Department of Political Science of the Ateneo de Manila University goes (DPC, 2010) – yet calls for some caveats. Like in many other post-colonial countries, constitutional norm and constitutional reality are far apart – a situation activists have likened to an "*ampaw* republic" comparing the Philippine political system to the rice crispies – "tasty but all it has inside is air" (Santiago, 2014). Social and political rights, even if codified, may only be selectively enforced. A study by the International Textile Garment and Leather Workers' Federation on working conditions in the Philippines conducted in early 2011 arrived at the finding that violations of national as well as international labor laws "were the rule" ("Labor Abuses Exposed", 2011). Neoliberal-inspired policies have furthermore 'pinched' the developing state in the Philippines by bringing its expansion to a halt. These policies expect people to increasingly fend for themselves, thereby eroding the idea of citizens' entitlement towards the government as duty bearer. Where the state takes on a negligible role in shaping entitlements in everyday life, non-state actors such as families, communities, and enterprises are expected to play the bigger role as service providers and addressees of accountability. Lastly, participation of citizens in political affairs is largely taken as money and pedigree dominated decision-making in an oligarchic state of affairs. This setting of a contested and precarious statehood is the 'habitat' from which the data this article builds on were collected. Nevertheless, the (nation) state remains the significant space of active as well as passive citizenship. Furthermore, the state has been awarded the role of the main rights guarantor in modern political theory and draws much of its legitimacy from this claim. This explains why a research focused on citizenship within the state sphere is not an anachronistic endeavor.

PART ONE: PREVALENT CONCEPTS ON SOCIAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

Findings from Problem-Centered Interviews on Citizenship: Public Problem Solving as Predominant Understanding of Citizenship

Asking what Filipinos expect from the government and in how far they are ready to get involved in taking citizenship action, the problem-centered interviews could identify significant differences between respondents who have been active in a political or a community organization and those who have not. Three subgroups of respondents emerged: the *non-activists* or those who have never been active in a political or community organization (12 of 28 research participants); the *left activists*

or those who have been a member of an organization with a left orientation (8 of 28); and the *non-left activists* or those who have been a member of other organizations (also 8 of 28). Despite the differences between the three subgroups, there are significant attitudes which point in one direction, no matter which organizational background the respondents belong to. These basic congruencies serve as the basis to identify general traits of a sense of citizenship in the Philippines. In general, all respondents expressed expectations from the government when it comes to social and public services. Among those who had no left organizational socialization, however, these expectations are more or less limited to times of dearth or, as one respondent put it, "only if you really, really need it". Especially respondents without any organizational background (non-activists) strongly promote local activism. They have a good understanding of civil obligations and are willing to perform these, but they rather tend to act on problems concretely, while shying away from 'big politics' on a national scale. Instead of changing the set-up, they try to make the system work. This is manifested by strong moral orientations and by expressing attitudes that governmentality studies term as "responsibilization" (Bröckling, 2007), for example highlighting a "do-it-yourself" attitude and considering the government as the "last resort", as termed by one non-activist. When asked to define citizenship, respondents without an organizational background assert that it "starts with your family" and that it is everyone's duty to "help each other". Another non-activist says that it is "not only [about] helping others but also helping yourself". When asked what is needed to make the Philippines a better place, especially non-activists merely identify personal change and see individual improvement ("moral recovery") as the only remedy. This strongly person-centered and morally-charged political discourse most often displaces the idea of setting the structures and rules right. One non-activist puts this general sentiment into a nutshell, stating that "each one of us has a contribution to what is happening to the entire society . . . . If you eat candy and it's just okay to throw your candy on the road, that's already a speck of contribution to the whole garbage".

Non-activists strongly believe that "if everybody leads a moral life, the public world of wider society should be in good order" (with a prevalence index [PI] of .85), while activists without a left background are more skeptical about this (PI = .57) and left activists largely reject this statement (PI = .38).[5] However, while non-activists consider moral values (be it neglect for the fellow human being, greed, or the lack of honesty) as the overarching reason for poverty, these factors are also highlighted by respondents with an organizational experience. Nevertheless, like in many other items here,

5 The prevalence index is computed by weighing the responses to an item. With five options, the answer "totally agree" is weighed with 1 and "don't agree at all" with 0. An "agree more or less" is weighed with .75; a "no idea/neither nor etc." with .5; and "actually don't agree" with .25. When everyone totally agreed, the prevalence index thus would be 1; if no one had agreed at all, it would be 0. Quantitative methods such as computing a prevalence index here are used in the first instance to describe the sample and illustrate relations within the survey group, as suggested by Prein, Kelle, and Kluge (1993) in their landmark article on strategies for the integration of quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods. I undertook simple quantitative evaluation (and beforehand made use of quantitative survey methods), assuming that the calculated figures at least allow for stating trends. Here, I follow Lamnek (2005) who aims for at least "a modest level of generalization" (p. 186) of qualitative data: "A sociologist should not stop with being amazed by 'what's out there (Was es nicht alles gibt!)', but rather move on in searching for the 'typical' and 'significance' of a single case" (p. 187). In the case of results that are obtained in such manner, Lamnek speaks of "representation" or "typical" (but not of representativeness in a statistical sense).

the differences between those with and those without organizational background are merely of a gradual nature.

Non-activists prefer to act as individuals and less by joining organizations. Evangeline Sucgang (2006) termed such concept of citizenship as "public problem solving", distinguishing it from an attitude of "proactive citizenship". The study could identify an attitude of proactive citizenship especially among those who have spent some time of their formative years in an organization with a left orientation (the so called *aktibistas*). Proactive citizens, defines Sucgang (2006), are those who understand political citizenship as proactive engagement in the public arena, for example by running for public office or joining political rallies and street demonstrations. Citizenship theory usually only considers proactive citizenship as a form of citizenship (ISSP, 2012b). However, both approaches (the individual model behavior stressed in the interviews, and the pressing for structural change) express a strong sense of agency. Instead of being apolitical per se, those termed non-activists are in fact rather supporting and performing a different kind of citizenship.

Correlating with the prevalent community orientation, the research could detect a pronounced focus on hard work (*maningkamot*, as termed by those respondents speaking Cebuano, the main language in the Southern Philippines). When asked to rate the importance of selected factors of *umangat sa buhay* (literally, getting ahead in life) – an item taken from ISSP (2012a) –, hard work was considered "essential" by non-activists (PI = .97) and activists without a left background (PI = .95) and still as "very important" by left activists (PI = .79). Next to education and ambition, hard work is thus considered a panacea for "getting ahead in life", while societal determinants such as political connections (PI = .43), coming from a wealthy family (PI = .38), or giving bribes (PI = .21) are considered of much lesser importance.

Such focus on individual aspiration is confirmed by the ISSP on social inequality (ISSP, 2012a) for the Philippines in general: While education, hard work, and ambition receive a prevalence index of > .80, knowing the right people, coming from a wealthy family, or political connections wither only between .43 and .55, and giving bribes is even considered irrelevant (PI = .24) for "getting ahead in life". In the same way, people from the lower classes seem to be influenced by the principle of merit (which serves as *the* integration mode of modern-capitalist societies), as they did not show lower returns on such meritocratic items.

Finally, when asked what makes a "good citizen", especially non-activists underline the performance of civil duties more than the exercising of citizen rights as the important traits. Even activists with leftist backgrounds do not demand rights without obligations: To a lesser extent they also believe that when rights are fulfilled (such as that to free college education), corresponding duties are called for (like public service after graduation). The realization of rights is seemingly seen as a cooperation between the government and the individual citizen, as evidenced by several respondents emphasizing the idea that availing of government services should be based on the giving of a counterpart.

Most respondents also tend to understand the government as an enabler and less as a provider. For them, people should first try to help themselves (and their family) before turning to the government. Matuschek, Krähnke, Kleemann, and Ernst (2011) term such a mode of referring to a state order as "subsidiarity . . . [for example

the] acceptance of the existing social order, while its deficits must be compensated by initiative of members of society" (p. 145). The ISSP survey on government (ISSP, 2008) mostly supports the findings gathered from the qualitative data, which implies that while most Filipinos do not support the idea of a laissez-faire state (which leaves most to the private), they also do not support what Matuschek et al. (2011) call "social etatism", that is the "awareness of the benefits of a providing, paternalistic society with extensive social systems and regulations of economic life" (p. 145). While it is acknowledged that the government has social obligations, these are considered as subsidiary, which also follows the understanding of the government as the "last resort". The fact that civic duties are defined as "helping yourself" might be the reason why most respondents do not favor benefits for the unemployed but rather approve of increasing employment opportunities. In this regard, the respondents (except the left activists) overwhelmingly believe the poor can escape poverty, "if they only try hard enough" (16 of 20 non-left respondents believe so, with only one ruling this out).

Additionally, the respondents do not even expect the government to be able to fully provide them with their needs: While 20 of 28 respondents think that it makes sense to turn to the government for services, only 8 of 27 said they expect help from the government: "Somehow, *gamay nag-expect ko* (I expect a little)", one respondent explained. Non-activists are very lenient with the government, not expecting much and willing to recognize its good will. They also (more than others) believe that the government is at least partly fulfilling its job. Among the respondents to the qualitative study, only the left activists considerably think of holding the government accountable instead of simply sighing "*government kasi* (it's government, that's why)".

The sense of entitlement turned out much stronger when respondents consider public service as a service in return, for example for taxes or contributions. One respondent even termed government service as "customer service" in return for taxes paid. Such an understanding of the state is transactional rather than rights-based.[6] This resonates with an inimical attitude to the idea of passive citizenship (benefits through citizenship) among the middle class (i.e., taxpayers) in general. Jemy Gatdula (2012) summarizes such an attitude in a nutshell as he criticizes pro-poor legislation as one that "merely encourage[s] people's sense of entitlement [and] also ridiculously abandon[s] the idea that rewards should be based on merit".

Validation with the Quantitative Data: Modest and Very Basic Expectations

The observations made in the problem-centered interviews with young urban professionals are largely supported by data from the ISSP. The ISSP on social inequality (ISSP, 2012a), for instance, shows that Filipinos less favor redistributive measures (such as progressive taxation), but give more importance to creating opportunities for a decent income. Social rights such as the right to housing (PI = .75) or to a decent living standard (*disenteng pamumuhay*) for the unemployed (PI = .73) get widely affirmed but are essentially restricted to a basic definition of these rights (ISSP, 2012a). This, however, is not proof that Filipinos do not appreciate the idea of social equality.

6 Whenever it comes to the right of state services, this is rather justified by mercy-related terms such as *luoy* or *kawawa* (literally, pitiful) for those in need. The respondents, most of whom consider themselves to be middle-class, at the same time clearly rule out to claim state services for themselves on such a basis.

For example, according to the ISSP on citizenship (ISSP, 2012b), 69.2% of the Filipino respondents, agree that it is "definitely" or "probably" the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (PI = .67). However, at the same time, Filipinos widely agree with social inequality (or have come to terms with it): 64.3% find it "just" that people with higher incomes can buy better health care (PI = .68) and roughly the same number consider it "just" that people with higher incomes can buy better education (PI = .68). For comparison, in Germany, only 12.3% give such a response (PI = .28).

The government is expected to create equal opportunities (provide job opportunities, help indigent students, but also keep prices low) but at the same time, is not seen to have the task of creating social equality by redistributive measures. Such focus on personal initiative is also shown in the strong emphasis given to the responsibility of the family, especially when it comes to personal care: 96.8% of the Filipino respondents said that they expect family members to primarily take care of children under school age and they do not even expect the government to support them financially in this regard. At the same time, a majority of the Filipino respondents to the ISSP on government (ISSP, 2008) said that they consider public service to be very committed (*talagang seryoso*) to serving the people (PI = .61). The satisfaction rates with government programs on unemployment, providing health care for the sick, or providing a decent living standard for the elderly, all showed PIs of at least > .5. (The high approval rates received by general statements regarding this topic however drop as soon as concrete examples of government performance are being rated.)

This leniency might be explained as the result of a weak sense of entitlement to public service qua citizenship. Everyday observations on the interactions between people and the government confirm that Filipinos seem to consider welfare policies less as obligations of an impersonal state but more as something one must request or ask for (*hingi*). It is quickly considered *bastos* (literally, improper) to insist on one's right but advisable to appeal to the generosity (*pagkamapagbigay*) and goodness (*kabaitan*) of a government official. Or as Randy David (2009) framed it: "The ideal citizen is loyal and grateful, rather than informed and assertive of his rights".[7]

Limited Spaces of Imagination

The general conclusion that can be drawn from the data presented is that (a) there is a high approval for social services in the Philippines, (b) however, the actual expectations towards the state lag far behind. In explaining these modest imaginative spaces of what a government could be good for, one might draw on Bourdieu and Foucault and their concept of normality (Bröckling, 2007). For instance, despite objectively rudimentary and purchasing power-biased social services in the Philippines, the ISSP surveys found hardly any other country where more respondents were satisfied with its public health care system, with 49% of the Filipino respondents being (very) satisfied (ISSP, 2008). In Germany, for comparison, the satisfaction rating is lower by 9%, despite its more extensive and more universal health care system. In many post-

7 The Tagalog terms indicated in brackets are everyday concepts (see Zintl, 1996) which are considered specific for the Philippine political political thinking and which are also drawn upon in media and political discourse, even when English remains the prevalent language.

socialist countries like Bulgaria, Hungary, or Russia, where public service was curbed after the breakdown of state socialism, only 14-24% are (very) satisfied with government performance on health care. Such contingencies can also be observed in many other items of government service and usually surpass determinants such as class, age, or urban-rural differences, assuming that the country of origin is the most significant determinant for citizenship attitudes.

It is apparent that satisfaction rates are less connected to the real extent of public service, but more to subjective expectations. This is shown by the fact that the extent of public service varies much among countries with similar satisfaction rates in the ISSP surveys. Satisfaction (or fulfillment of expectations) seems to rather depend on what one has already experienced, what one is familiar with, and what one considers as 'reasonable' to expect. Such findings show that historical experiences and path dependencies seem to matter. While citizens in post-socialist countries tend to compare the performance of today's government with the extensive social service during state socialism, Filipino respondents explain their low expectations in the context of the underdeveloped state of public service delivery in the Philippines, by counter-asking: "What would you expect, the Philippines is a Third World country, we could not expect more". In the absence of divergent experiences, the given structures and ways of living are considered normal. "People who do not know what they should be getting are always happy with what they have. Ignorance is bliss, after all", Carmelle Harrow and Jereco Paloma (2011) sigh in reference to the poor state of public education.

A history of colonialism, feudalism, capitalism, traditional Catholicism, and finally, neoliberal structural adjustment programs – all of which are connected to a partisan and low-intensity governance accompanied by a pronounced social inequality and largely communitarian ideas – have been virtually embodied by Filipinos in a culturally specific form of "social habitus" (Elias, 1976). People then "tend to consider the possible for the only possible, the achievable for the appropriate and to conform to the given social order without much reflection" (Bourdieu, 1982, pp. 734-735). As the welfare (and participatory) dimensions of the state expansion in the Philippines have been experienced only incompletely, its people still seem to consider the government mainly not as the provider of public service but as an "encumbrance" (Teodoro, 2014). In explaining the continuous high approval ratings of the administration of president Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016), Teodoro (2014) assumes that the government is more appreciated for "not what it has done, but what it hasn't: compared to past administrations, it hasn't killed as many, for example; been involved in as many scandals; or has been as corrupt".

Left Organizations as Schools of Citizenship

Among the respondents to the qualitative study, mainly those who were involved for some time in a left political organization have broader spaces of imagination with regard to government service. They not only show the highest dissatisfaction with the current political and economic system, but are also the only ones who expect

more than basic services from the government and who aim to hold it accountable.[8] It appears that mainly 'leftists' are influenced by an understanding of the state often assumed in the citizenship discourse: One that is not reduced to providing safety nets and equal opportunities, but that also takes the role of correcting social inequalities and securing broad social rights – a state surpassing what Matuschek et al. (2011) termed "subsidiarity".[9] The rights-based approach on which much advocacy of civil society is buttressed seems to have mainly taken root among the left respondents.

PART TWO: COMMUNITARIANISM AS A PREVALENT STATE RESPONSIBILIZATION THEORY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Reinhard Zintl (1996) differentiates between three ideal-typical state responsibility theories as everyday theories. The empirical findings show that Filipinos in general favor neither what Zintl terms *state interventionism* where "the economy only works with constant state intervention", nor a *laissez-faire state* where "the economy operates without single state interventions, [and where] at the most, the state creates an acceptable general set-up" (p. 306). Rather, the data shows that among most respondents (a) a community and family orientation is prevalent and (b) expectations towards the government are only modest. While the government is considered to have social obligations, these are taken to be merely subsidiary. Thus, (c) civil duties are more pronounced than citizen rights and (d) hard work and education are considered the main means of "getting ahead in life". All of these features can be attributed to Zintl's third state responsibilization theory, which he somewhat unfavorably names *patronage*: Here,

> the economy is experienced as a network in which the state appears as one actor among others. While not able to steer it, it is influential enough to favor or limit individual opportunities. One can only watch out how to save one's own skin. (Zintl, 1996, p. 308)

This is similar to what Matuschek et al. (2011, p. 145) termed "subsidiarity", or what in political theory is known widely as communitarianism, differentiating it from two other basic paradigms of modern citizenship, namely the liberal and the republican (Reese, 2015, pp. 272-278; also Jones & Gaventa, 2002).

While liberalism considers society a cold project among monadic individuals resulting in the state's main function to provide institutions for the settling of competing interests, communitarianism has a strong community orientation. It is a political order that relies on moral virtue wherein concrete others (like family and parents) are considered to be mainly responsible for the advancement of an individual (like children). Most barriers to a democratic culture in the Philippines, identified by Fernando Zialcita's contribution to the benchmark compendium on *Democracy and*

8 As the socio-economic variables collected in the ISSP surveys do not offer a meaningful indicator for political affiliation, this assumption however can only be based on the qualitative data and not backed up by the ISSP-data.

9 However, even the left activist respondents do not expect the state to simply just provide, but are also ready to give their counterpart.

Citizenship in Filipino Political Culture (Diokno, 1997), directly or indirectly reflect a communitarian orientation. Clearly, this applies to the traits which Zialcita (1997) terms "familialism", "personalism" (with the prevalence of loyalty to persons over the obedience to norms), and the "weak sense of public good" (p. 41). All these traits express a focus on the concrete other or not-stranger (*hindi ibang tao*, or literally, not another person) and on the immediate community as typical for communitarianism.

Applying an ethnographic approach makes it even easier to track this weak sense of public good and familialism in the Philippine society. It manifests itself in a pronounced delineation between the public and the private. The public space seems to be neglected, conceived as dirty and chaotic (Borchgrevenik, 2014), with the street being an arena of competition, rivalry, and the world of the undetermined. On the other hand, private spaces, such as the family, the *barkada* (peer group), gated communities, and other forms of *Gemeinschaft*, are given high relevance. The house is considered the space where everything has to be in place. Such divide also leads to a kind of legal pluralism (Franco, 2011), in which private rules (be it those that the parents set, or company rules) compete with public law. Government intervention is then often considered as trespassing; and in the case of a company, it cannot be taken for granted that the Labor Code is accepted as the overriding legal principle (Reese & Carreon, 2013). This makes the Philippines a territory dotted by millions of tiny kingdoms with their private set of rules, interrupted by public spaces which are considered the responsibility of the government – "and government is not you", as Randy David explains (Quezon City, 13 August 2014).

Such dichotomy of public and private is also reflected in the strict division between *hindi ibang tao* (one of us) and *ibang tao* (stranger), which Enriquez (1992) considers as basic for social understandings in the Philippines. While family and community values among those considered *hindi ibang tao* are well developed in the Philippines, a culture of encounters (*Begegnungskultur*) with strangers (*ibang tao*) seems to be largely absent. Sociologist Randy David (2012a) observed that "forms of solidarity are rooted in a sense of duty to people with whom we share personal space . . . . In the anonymous setting of the modern city, we no longer feel so obligated".

Poverty, another barrier listed by Zialcita (1997), also shows a strong connection to communitarianism as it leads people to favor communitarian solutions. The immediate vicinity is globally the preferred space of activity for poor people as this is where they feel more in control than in middle and upper class biased politics (Berner, 1997). Being treated in a derogatory way in their work life or when dealing with government bureaucracy and people of higher ranking, only friends, neighbors, or the family offer a level of reliability. The space outside of one's own community is furthermore considered to be *terra incognita*, or a foreign territory: There, others have the say, make the rules, and decide how these are to be interpreted – in a language that is highly incomprehensible for the poor and those with no formal education, be it the legal language or English, as is the case in the Philippines. Politics is not only *up there* but also *out there*.

However, activities within one's vicinity, this is the sphere in between the family (the private) and formal politics (the public), not only play an important role for service delivery, but also serve as building blocks of democracy where "members learn about their rights, and develop more effective citizenship skills and practices" (DRC,

2011, p. 21). Communitarianism thus is not pre-democratic but a different kind of democracy – just like "public problem solving" (Sucgang, 2006) is a different form of citizenship. Yet, it is a limited form of democracy – one that is based on selective association and parochialism, a democracy of "a thousand petty fortresses" (Walzer, 1998, p. 348). In Filipino terms: The attitude of *tayo-tayo* (amongst us) or *barrio-barrio* (amongst our village) prevails; extending the exclusive "me/we" (*kami*) to an inclusive "we" (*tayo*), but only including those who are identified to be one of "us" (*namin*). It is a space where "we" are not alone, but at the same time where "we" can stay just among ourselves. *Tayo-tayo* is more than the liberal *kanya-kanya* (everyone for themselves or for their loved ones), but it is an exclusive inclusivity nevertheless. Here, there might be tolerance but no hospitality towards the other (*ibang tao*), as Rodriguez (2009) explains.

As shown above, communitarianism is closely entangled with the barriers to a democratic culture that are related to space or, as Zialcita (1997) points out, to the inclination towards the concrete and proximate. The other barriers that Zialcita identifies – these are the hierarchical relations (leading to a lack of discourse culture) or a limited discourse on democracy and its meaning in the vernacular – are less obviously connected to communitarianism. Nevertheless, communitarianism facilitates the persistence of these barriers.

As the identity of the individual – and, within a rudimentary welfare regime such as the Philippines, also social security – is strongly linked to membership in a family or community, and there is the tendency to let collective needs and communal solidarities prevail over individual rights. Individuals are expected to be empathetic (*pakiramdam*), to give in, and to get along with the group (*pakikisama*), which often means: to comply with the group. From a very young age, people experience that those who are questioning and objecting (*hirit*, or literally, talking back) are labeled as *disturbo* (troublemaker) or as *makulit* (pushy).

Likewise, it is still considered as *walang respeto* (disrespectful) by many parents if their children (merely) answer back (*sumasagot*). Not used to a critique-friendly culture, many Filipinos take criticisms personally and then react easily *pikon* (touchy) – even if these criticisms are aired out in relation to their function (for example, as public official) and not to them as an individual, as Randy David explains (Quezon City, 13 August 2014). This attitude complicates the emergence of a public discourse. "Our political culture is not used to frank talk", says the editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer: "Between political bombast (or bomba) . . . and political praise or promise (or *bola* [to flatter someone] as everyone still says) . . . , there is hardly anything" ("Candid Talk", 2012).

Such tendency towards *pakikisama* (to comply with a group) might also be partly responsible for the lack of reflection and discourse – values which Zialcita (1997) considers as further barriers to the development of a democratic culture in the Philippines. The Management Association of the Philippines complained that, in 2010, 4 out of 10 new graduates were not hired because they lacked "soft" competencies, among them critical thinking, initiative, and effective communication skills ("Not All Sunlight", 2010). Citizenship theory, however, considers the ability to be critical – this is post-conventional thinking – and to question the given (*hirit*) as essential for developing citizenship attitudes (Claussen & Geissler, 1996). Yet, the mainstream Philip-

pine educational system is considered to largely produce pre-conventional fear and incentive-driven characters (Tan, 2014a) or "good girls and boys" – compliant persons within a conventional moral system in the terms of Lawrence Kohlberg (1971).

Overlooking the individual and focusing instead on the community (families or households) as the smallest unit of accountability and responsibility also makes communitarianism prone to idealizing communities and neglect inequalities and power asymmetries within the community (Berner & Philipps, 2004). Furthermore, there is a connivance of communitarianism with a feudal setting: While communitarianism in its ideal type is based on a society of equals, it shares with feudalism a similar concept of public service, which they both conceptualize more as benevolence and less as a right – even though resulting from a different logic. While communitarianism stresses sympathy, feudalism builds on the idea of asymmetrical rights. Both social systems, however, are not supportive of claim-making by commoners. Both in communitarianism and feudalism, claims are framed as personal requests (*hingi*), asking for favors. Attitudes such as *mabait* (generous), *madaling lapitan* (approachable), or *malapit sa mahihirap* (pro-poor), which David (2012b) considers "the most common words one hears when Filipino voters talk about the politicians they like", are consistent with the communitarian logic of proximity (*lapit*) although "proceed[ing] from the standpoint of the subjugated in a sharply hierarchical society". In such a context, citizen's charters and citizenship education tend to stay rather *ampaw* (see the analogy to rice crispies), as they are merely symbolic and do not (yet) figure as an integral part of the social order. The hidden curriculum of everyday culture, such as for instance considering it as *bastos* (improper) to contradict (*hirit*) a person of authority, is then more influential on political action than the manifest content of formal citizenship education.

Connivance of Communitarianism and Neoliberalism

Communitarianism not only connives with feudalism but also with liberalism and its current specification, neoliberalism. Even if communitarianism is based on different premises than neoliberalism (the political theory most equivalent to the state responsibility theory of laissez-faire), they meet in their promotion of a lean state and in considering the government as the "last resort". Both focus on responsibilization and are biased towards voluntarism. Those pushing for neoliberal reforms can therefore make use of communitarian ideas to propagate their agenda. Both approaches result in a kind of proto-welfare state that does not offer more than basic provisions and contribute to the persistence of a weak state/strong society dichotomy. The legal pluralism mentioned as characteristic for Philippine legal culture is an example for this. In a framework of responsibilization/voluntarism, economic problems are constructed as personal problems, suggesting the use of individual survival strategies like *maningkamot* (hard work) and making people responsible for their own unfortunate situation. Instead of calling for concerted state action, socially developed circumstances are framed into personal failure, thereby becoming politically defused: "It's up to you", a remark one often hears in the Philippines.

Furthermore, communitarianism is not a functional solution to ensure the institutionalization of the principle of rights and dignity to every human being. While

kindness (*bait*), charity (*awa*), and intersubjectivity (*pakikipagkapwa*) are mainly situated within a space where people can see and know each other, such communitarian *Gemeinschaft* cannot serve as a model in highly differentiated, pluralistic mass societies (Reese, 2015, pp. 529-533). As Zialcita (1997) identifies, "one major problem in the Philippines [is that] the rights of the anonymous stranger continue to be disregarded. . . . Although we are extremely helpful towards those whom we have met face-to-face and whom we trust, we tend to ignore the rights of those whom we do not know and will never meet" (p. 42). *Pakikiisa*, or "being one with another", cannot assure the rights of the *ibang tao* which others are considered to be within anonymous large-scale societies. Furthermore, *pakikiisa* requires that the involved are "nearly equal in social status, i.e. in money, power, and influence", as Enriquez (1992, p. 66) points out. While compassion might be a necessary requirement for rights to be respected and granted as moral action theory assumes (Reese, 2015, pp. 84-86), at the same time, it is not a sufficient basis for a rights-based approach since it builds on and even reinforces social asymmetries (as the prevalence of drawing on pity (*kawawa*) as the basis for one's social action towards the poor, as the qualitative research amongst middle-class respondents illustrates). Compassion and moral discernment are too unreliable and selective to serve as the basis for rights claims, and they eventually overwhelm resources of solidarity.

The prevalence of communitarianism in the Philippines leads to the reign of two dichotomist social philosophies in society: While the *Gemeinschaft* of the *hindi ibang tao* (the concrete other or non-stranger) is governed by communitarian principles, the *Gesellschaft* is de facto ruled by a vulgar liberalism bordering to the pre-contractual natural state in liberalism. In such a state of society, where *kanya-kanya* (everyone for themselves or for their loved ones) serves as the overriding principle, indifference is the normal state of affairs, and interest in the other only comes up in looming win-win situations, as conflict arises when there is competition over scarce resources (David, 2012a). Eventually, many features that categorize a society as liberal are thus characteristic of the Philippine society: Employers have de facto extensive dispositional rights as economic citizens in their own company; the taxation of income and wealth is moderate; the social system is based considerably on self-responsibility, while education privileges children of the propertied and educated classes.

OUTLOOK: DEEPENING THE SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP BY TRANSCENDING COMMUNITARIANISM

One of the challenges for those interested in consolidating the sense of citizenship in the Philippines lies in broadening the definition of *concrete* state responsibilities, that is making claims towards the government *thinkable* as much as considering "big politics" to be *shapeable* by common citizens (and not prerogative of the oligarchy). However, deepening citizenship does not imply the need of resorting to liberalism as citizenship paradigm. Several elements of Filipino culture might as well support a *republican* set-up for a society (as elaborated in Reese, 2015), in which no one is left behind even if one is of no use to others (as in liberalism) nor loved by others (as in communitarianism). Here the social philosophy which Jones and Gaventa (2002) identify as *republicanism* might be a way out: It aims to synthesize communitarian

and liberal elements by "attempt(ing) to incorporate the liberal notion of the self-interested individual within the communitarian framework of egalitarianism and community belonging" (p. 4). It is similar to communitarianism in so far as it is based on the anthropology of an embedded self (*kapwa*). But it is also like liberalism since it sticks to the idea of universal understanding of rights and follows liberalism in situating the human rights conceptually and ontologically as prior to society, therefore not compromising individual for group rights.

Striving for republicanism suggests a creative reinterpretation of basic concepts of Filipino political culture that underpin communitarianism. It is essential in deepening a rights-based perspective that rights are not only accorded and asserted for those one identifies as *hindi ibang tao* (the concrete other) but that every single individual is acknowledged and recognized as a rights bearer. Concepts such as *pakikisama* (joining and complying with others in a group) and *bayanihan* (mutual support) or concepts such as *malasakit* (compassion) and *pakikiramdam* (empathy) may also serve as resources. Likewise, traits such as respect (*respeto*), recognition (*pagpapahalaga*), dignity (*dangal*), and pride (*amor proprio/garbo*) might also be tapped as resources to develop the recognition of the rights of others. At the same time, these traits can serve as important ingredients for citizenship action. This can be done by developing a consciousness to "have the right to have rights", as Hannah Arendt (1949, p. 7) once put the concept of human rights in a nutshell. Attitudes such as acting *tampo* (sulky), *kulit* (persistent), or *pasaway* (defiant) as well as making *reklamo* (complain) to get what one believes one is entitled to, at least show that the rights-consciousness in the Philippines goes beyond merely being *masunurin* (obedient) and the overriding preference for conflict avoidance and smooth interpersonal relations (abbreviated as SIR) that are often considered typical for Philippine society.

In the end, it is not the Filipino culture per se, but feudalism, social inequality, and the hierarchical and authoritarian elements dominant in society which are major stumbling blocks to the development of a kind of citizenship that is grounded on the fundamental idea of equality among all citizens. Not falling for a voluntarist shortcoming, this paper does not mainly blame the lack of citizenship action on the Filipino citizens themselves. Instead of supporting moralism (that is focusing on value formation and individual redemption), which is identified as a typical trait of communitarianism, the paper supports the perspective of Jemy Gatdula (2010) that "we are not definitely a damaged culture. . . . If our electorate has not matured, it's precisely because the economic circumstances of our citizens did not allow such maturity to happen and the elite, by maintaining protectionist attitudes and patronage system in business and politics, ensures that such maturity did not happen".

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Community-Based Disaster Risk Management in the Philippines: Achievements and Challenges of the *Purok* System

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▸ Matthies, A. (2017). Community-based disaster risk management in the Philippines: Achievements and challenges of the *purok* system. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, *10*(1), 101-108.

The *purok* system in the Philippines is promoted as a voluntary self-organization at the sub-village level which strengthens community resilience to natural hazards. In 2011, the system received the UN Sasakawa Award and gained prominence among the practitioner community. Based on a qualitative study in the municipality of San Francisco (Cebu province) from December 2014 to March 2015, the article elaborates on the achievements and challenges of the *purok* system. Striking merits encompass efficient and effective information dissemination and evacuation measurements between all levels of political administration that stem from the system's remarkable enforcement of human and social capital. This is underpinned by a clear determination of roles and responsibility that is subsumed under the concept of accountability. However, the *purok* system faces internal challenges of maintenance and implies profound conceptual ambiguities regarding the notion of voluntarism and capabilities that favor clientelism. Nevertheless, the *purok* system clearly distinguishes itself from conventional community-based disaster risk management practices and implies potentials that are highly beneficial for strengthening resilience in disaster prone areas.

Keywords: Community-Based Disaster Risk Management; *Purok* System; Resilience; Social Capital; Voluntarism

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INTRODUCTION

Due to its geographic location as well as its socio-economic conditions, the Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world and ranks third out of 171 countries in the World Risk Report 2016 (Welle & Birkmann, 2016, p. 49). Consequently, efficient strategies at national, regional, and local level that cope with, resist, and enable the recovery from such events are constantly in demand. This article presents an effort to respond to this demand by means of illuminating community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) in the Philippines with special reference to the *purok* system[1].

The article is based on a two-pillar problem statement. First, prevalent CBDRM approaches imply certain difficulties that require further explanation and proposals for solution. Second, the *purok* system might imply incentives for the

1 *Purok* is a subdivision of a barangay and thus signifies a sub-village in the Philippines. *Barangay* is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines and refers to districts or villages (Allen, 2003, p. 7, 39). It serves as the administrative arm of the government and functions as part of the delivery system of goods and services at the community level (Guillermo & Win, 2005, p. 60).

sought-after alternative approach but lacks systematically gathered data. Hence, the main purpose of this research was to capture tacit knowledge about the system and make it accessible to scientists as well as practitioners who draw on such incentives in order to overcome shortcomings within CBDRM.

The *purok* system is promoted as an indigenous system of self-organization at the sub-village level. It proved its relevance particularly when typhoon Haiyan, locally named Yolanda, made landfall on 8 November 2013 as the strongest typhoon ever recorded. At that time, the prompt evacuation of the small island Tulang Diyot, located in the municipality of San Francisco (Cebu province), saved the entire island population as the aftermath revealed that all 500 houses were totally destroyed (Mc Elroy, 2013). Such efficient and effective evacuation merits pertain to strong community participation measures and a salient disaster risk reduction (DRR) knowledge transfer which is underpinned by a close linkage between *purok*, *barangay*, and municipality, thus highly increasing the resilience[2] of San Francisco. In 2011, the system received the UN Sasakawa Award[3] and gained prominence among the practitioner community since local government units (LGUs)[4] and NGOs have been striving to duplicate the system in other regional areas. However, opposed to scientifically ascertained data, data about the *purok* system pertain to short online articles (Mc Elroy, 2013; Ranada, 2014) and lack an in depth examination.

Overall, community-based approaches to DRR that build on existing knowledge, resources, coping, and adaptive strategies are highly appreciated by communities, people's organizations, NGOs, and government agencies for strengthening coping and adaptive capacities at the local community level (Allen, 2006, p. 83; Victoria, 2003, p. 1). However, they contain particular shortcomings as they are based in communities but are run and implemented by numerous external actors, leading to difficulties and dependencies with regard to their realization. Problems, for instance, show the CBDRM project's neglect of social heterogeneity within communities which often leads to the neglect of those community members that may already find themselves in marginalized positions. Moreover, participation processes can appear challenging to communities due to an attitude stemming from the history of oppression or dole-out policies. Especially in rural areas in the Philippines, the government has left the people incapable of making decisions. Moreover, years of solely being receivers of relief goods bring about a form of lethargy and as a consequence a lack of the personal initiative needed in order to implement CBDRM. Referring to that, Alfredo Arquillano Jr. who conceptualized and still maintains the *purok* system in San Francisco noted:

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2 Although definitions of resilience vary in numerous ways, most definitions describe it as a capacity for successful adaptation in the face of disturbance, stress, or adversity and the ability to resist damage (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Eyche, & Pfefferbaum., 2008, p. 129).

3 The United Nations Sasakawa Award for Disaster Reduction recognizes excellence in innovation, outreach, and collaboration to improve resilience of nations and communities. It is awarded to an individual or an institution for taking active efforts in reducing disaster risk in their communities.

4 A common definition of local government refers to it as "state administration at a level closest to the population within its area of jurisdiction" (O'Brien, Bhatt, Saunders, Gaillard, & Wisner, 2012, p. 629). It unveils the diversity and complexity of local governments around the globe. Within this article, it refers to the government of the municipality.

> When I started the *purok* system, I started only one community. You know why? Because of the negative attitude of people. . . . You know for them it is a waste of time and money and effort (A. Arquillano Jr., 16 December 2014).

Consequently, 'real' community participation appears as a concept that is easier to promote than to implement (Delica-Willison & Gaillard, 2012, p. 721). Besides, a project-based approach within CBDRM accompanied by short-term funding leads to dissolutions of community-based teams after projects have been completed.

Within the frame of a two-month fieldtrip to the municipality of San Francisco from December 2014 to March 2015, the article examines achievements and challenges of the *purok* system regarding DRR. Methods include semi-structured individual and group interviews as well as participant observation, explicitly referred to the attendance of monthly and annual *purok* meetings, weekly *purok* coordinator meetings, and DRR trainings.

The article introduces the development and organizational structure of the *purok* system as well as its achievements and challenges by means of an illumination of the notion of human and social capital – concepts which adequately capture the striking merits of the *purok* system. It concludes with the discussion of the systems' relevance as an alternative to conventional CBDRM and as well as an outlook for further research.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE *PUROK* SYSTEM

In 2004, the *purok* system was conceptualized by Alfredo Arquillano Jr., the former mayor of San Francisco who describes the *purok* system as the smallest unit of governance that is located at the sub-village level, basically making up 50 to 100 households. The administrative division into *purok*s exists all over the Philippines. However, its systemized use for CBDRM started in San Francisco and is still unique to this municipality. Within two years, Arquillano Jr. and the municipal *purok* coordination team established about 120 *purok*s comprising several *purok*s in each barangay. The *purok* system is delineated as "the smaller version of a barangay" (Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Management Office, 6 January 2015) as it includes an arrangement of committees similar to the organizational structure of the barangay. The following organigram gives an example of the average organizational structure (see Figure 1).

At the beginning of its establishment, it aimed to solve problems of solid waste management and took on additional tasks over time, such as planting vegetable gardens and starting livelihood projects until it developed its own DRR strategies. This development took place in response to the implementation of the new disaster management law in 2010 (National Disaster Risk Reduction & Management Council Philippines, 2016) that officially adopted CBDRM as a model to engage communities in DRR (Fernandez, Uy, & Shaw, 2012, p. 209; Shaw, 2009, p. 138). It was Alfredo Arquillano Jr. who encouraged the communities to build *purok* halls (see Figure 2) for the purpose of monthly meetings. Such meetings gather at least one representative of each household as well as the responsible district coordinators and *purok* chairmen (appointed counselor of the barangay) who are required to attend and act as a bridge between communities and LGUs. If a *purok* member is prevented from joining the



Figure 1: Organizational chart of a Purok. (own illustration).

Figure 2. Left: Light material purok hall of purok Bagakay (San Isidro, South District).
Right: Concrete purok hall of purok Cantuwak (Union, North District).
(photos by Angelina Matthies).

monthly meeting for any reason, s/he can either send a representative or pay a penalty ranging from PHP 20 to 50 (EUR 0.38 to 0.94). During such meetings, the *purok* members are informed and briefed about municipal projects, evacuation measures, and adaptation mechanisms.

Pintakasi[5] is assumed as the heart and reason for portraying the *purok* system as a system of self-organization based on voluntarism. Within the scope of the *purok* system, it entails a voluntary activity which takes place on a regular basis and aims to clean surroundings through, for example, garbage collection or the maintenance of a community garden. Similar to the meeting policy, non-participating members must pay a penalty. Combined with other membership fees, such penalties form the capital build up system (CBU) that serves as a deposit for micro-financing procedures. Opposed to its promotion as a post disaster fund (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2012), the field research revealed that the CBU takes the role of

5 *Pintakasi* is referred to as *bayanihan* in Tagalog. Originally, it is related to the practice of mutual help stemming from the common tradition among neighbours in Philippine towns and villages who together move an entire house to a new place (Devuyst, 2001, pp. 118-119).

financial help for general emergencies like illness or overdue electric bills. However, the low livelihood situation of *purok* members often prevents them from repayment.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SOCIAL COHESION

Within the scope of the *purok* system and its role within DRR, the idea of social capital proves to be of high importance and acts as a useful tool for illustrating its achievements and challenges. Putnam (1995) defines social capital as "features of social life – network, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (pp. 664-665). Moreover, he distinguishes between "bonding" and "bridging" social capital and describes the first as "reinforcing the identity of a homogenous group" whereas the latter encompasses "socializing across diverse social cleavages" (Putnam, 2000, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, Szreter and Woolcock (2004) refer to a third kind of social capital namely "linking capital" (p. 655) that they define as relationships aiming to bridge individuals across institutional boundaries. Especially linking and bonding capital proved to be of utmost significance for evacuation procedures.

Due to a well-functioning social network based on particular assigned roles within the *purok*, *barangay*, and municipality, everybody within the *purok* is accountable for a certain task, thereby improving efficiency of evacuation processes. Since *purok* communities are strongly linked to the *barangay* level via *kagawads* and to the municipality via *purok* coordinators, they experience a profound enhancement in their social network which can be seen as reinforcement of linking capital. This especially comes into force in cases of information dissemination ahead of natural hazards. The MDRRMO staff constantly monitors weather forecasts, initiates emergency meetings in case of potential hazards, and informs the *barangay* captains about evacuation plans. They subsequently inform the *puroks*. Furthermore, the *purok* coordinators ensure that each *purok* receives the information by virtue of their additional visits. Moreover, it is perceived that the *purok* system reinforces a sense of unity among the *purok* members which was noted by several interviewees during the conversation about the advantages of the *purok* system (Chairman of Health in Sungkayao, 10 December 2014). Similar to the *barangay* structure, *purok* communities are organized through a DRR committee including assigned persons who ensure that every household is informed of an upcoming hazard. More precisely, such a committee requires that there be *purok* members especially assigned to take care of vulnerable community members. In cases of natural hazards, *purok* communities gather and wait for the transportation to evacuation centers. If some households, that experience a higher risk due to houses with light building materials, are affected by an upcoming hazard, other households who inhabit more resilient concrete houses accommodate them. Such forms of community cohesion can be identified as bonding social capital according to Putnam's definition.

Overall, the strengthening of human capital mentioned above that happens through imparting DRR knowledge and skills, paves the way for effective evacuation procedures, ensures its maintenance due to knowledge refreshments, and aims at long-term resiliency and autonomy due to the encouragement of self-sufficiency.

CHALLENGES FOR THE SYSTEM'S MAINTENANCE

Concerning the maintenance of the system, challenges mainly appear internally (i.e., within the community). One of the main obstacles to successful performance of the system is the inactivity of members. Their inactivity is due to multiple motives that I classified into three types. The first relates to the upper social stratum comprising individuals with a high level of education who often perform time-consuming jobs that overlap with the monthly meetings. The second reason behind inactivity is based on attitudes of certain citizens who do not believe in or do not want to invest in the *purok* system. This is moreover underpinned by an attitude of lethargy given that inactive members are often deemed as the first to demand relief goods during calamities (DRR advocator head, 16 February 2015). The third type of motive behind inactivity refers to political opponents or political rivals. These community members are opposed to the *purok* system due to their political position against government representatives and strive to discourage people from the system by initiating 'black propaganda'. Furthermore, the system faces profound conceptual ambiguities with regard to the notion of voluntarism. It became clear in the course of the research that voluntarism is a somehow misdirecting term since active participation of each citizen in the *purok* system is prescribed by the Municipal Ordinance No. 2007-045. Even more, the legal regulation holds that inactive members who do not pay the penalty are not allowed to receive a *purok* clearance. A missing *purok* clearance restricts community members from obtaining a *barangay* clearance which in turn is required in order to assert the rights of a Philippine citizen and thus signifies a symbolic form of leverage. Overall, the research showed that voluntarism in the case of the *purok* system is embedded in power relations and restricted by the instrumental way in which it is realized given that voluntary participation is bound to law. *Pintakasi* is perceived as a voluntary activity since nobody is overtly forced to participate but abstinence clearly brings about severe disadvantages. The system's power of instrumentality also becomes evident during elections through clientelistic structures. *Purok* groupings highly alleviate vote-buying processes since a whole group of votes can be acquired, for instance, by visiting only one *purok.* Moreover, missing political commitment by particular *purok* communities may result in the redirection of relief goods.

THE *PUROK* SYSTEM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONVENTIONAL CBDRM?

The gathered data shows ambiguous findings that identify the *purok* system as a strikingly efficient system with regard to DRR, but at the same time, highlight fundamental challenges within processes of maintenance and volunteering. On the one hand, the *purok* system triggers the enforcement of social and human capital which promotes a process of resilience and empowerment. The improvement of resilience takes place at every administrative level and comes especially into force by means of efficient and effective information dissemination and evacuation procedures which are based on the close linkage between *purok*, *barangay*, and municipality. Moreover, the PDRRMC plays a crucial role during evacuation situations as it distributes tasks within the *purok*s and ensures accelerated procedures. It clearly distinguishes itself from conventional CBDRM since it involves a fundamental and sustainable restruc-

turing of communities that counteracts the project-based approach that often implies a structural dissolution after CBDRM projects are completed. The involvement of vulnerable people is one of the *purok* system's priorities. The determination of roles and responsibilities before, during, and after natural hazards ensures that especially vulnerable people (pregnant women, disabled, older persons, or people living in light material houses) are protected. Moreover, the self-determined process of election and internal policies increase decision-making power and levels of participation.

On the other hand, the gathered data lead to disenchantments based on various challenges. As opposed to the expected autonomous indigenous method of self-organization that is promoted in the available literature, the *purok* system is initiated and maintained by the local government. Considering the statutory anchoring, penalty or clearance policies, the system is embedded in a top-down modus operandi. This somehow employs *purok* communities as executive authorities and increases the system's susceptibility to political instrumentalization. Despite its remarkable achievements, the present research warns against treating the *purok* system as a panacea to disaster risk management problems as it is always accompanied by institutional authority and embedded in prevalent power relations that embrace difficulties in its effective realization. The *purok* system is only capable of realizing its full potential if *barangay* and municipality incorporate sufficient capacity to train the PDRRMC. In addition, the municipality as well as the *barangay* require a well-functioning structure including sufficient staff and a clear allocation of tasks in order to distribute relevant information and provide essential help within the evacuation process.

Since main problems such as the practice of a 'forced voluntarism' pertain to its municipal anchoring, it will be highly conducive to conduct further comparative research in *puroks* of adjacent municipalities like Liloan (Cebu Mainland) that are maintained without statutory anchoring (Training Officer at the PDRRMC, 18 February 2015). This will especially be interesting in terms of maintenance and motivation of the community. As suggested by a non-active *purok* member, it might be contributive to bring about a far more participatory approach during meetings, for instance, by allowing members to define visions, goals, and content themselves.

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"I Don't Want to Limit Myself to Binary Thinking": An Interview With the Indonesian Artist Arahmaiani

Gunnar Stange

▸ Stange, G. (2017). "I don't want to limit myself to binary thinking." An interview with the Indonesian artist Arahmaiani. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10*(1), 109-116.

Arahmaiani is one of the best known contemporary Indonesian women artists. Her works, performances, and installations have been exhibited at 7 biennials and in a total of 29 countries. She has taught at universities in Australia, China, Indonesia, Germany, the United States, and the Netherlands. Arahmaiani is a politically committed artist. In her works, she addresses the reduction of human beings to consumers, which is on the rise all over the globe, as well as the discrimination against people on the grounds of gender, religion, and ethnicity. While the phenomena addressed in her art are always of a global nature, the majority of her works deal with cultural, social, and political realities of Indonesia. She views these as being threatened by an increasing politicization and essentialization of Islam, whose protagonists supplant the country's diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious heritage with a purely Islamic interpretation of the Indonesian past. In this interview, conducted by Gunnar Stange in December 2016, Arahmaiani elaborates on the main themes she addresses in her art works as well as on current political, social, and environmental challenges in Indonesia.

Keywords: Engaged Art; Environmentalism; Indonesia; Political Activism; Religious Extremism

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Gunnar Stange: *You have been active in the Indonesian and international art scene for some thirty years now. What were the drivers for your decision to set off on the precarious journey to become an artist?*

Arahmaiani: Indeed, time flies fast. I see myself as an artist and at the same time I want to give meaning to life. This is not an easy path. Yet, I consider this a call of my conscience that I simply can't resist. My feet keep carrying me towards that direction. I follow my intuition. Besides that, I have loved to draw, paint, dance, and play music since I was a little child. So, already from that time on, I believed that I should become an artist. Even though some people discouraged me in the beginning (including my parents), I was sure that art is what I love and I wanted to become a good artist!

Gunnar: *What are the main themes or questions that you are dealing with in your work?*

Arahmaiani: I think that the main theme of my works is power relations. But not limited to a narrow mind frame along binary oppositions. Only a free imagination makes it possible to explore fields that couldn't be reached within the

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boundaries of a binary thinking. I ask very simple questions, for example: 'What does our life on this planet actually mean?' In my quest for answers, I am particularly interested in norms and values that we inherited from our ancestors. In my work, I try to reinterpret these philosophies in the context of contemporary conditions.

Gunnar: *You have been given many 'names' by the international art scene. Some call you an engaged artist. Others say that you are a political artist. How would you describe yourself?*

Arahmaiani: As antiquated as it may sound, I understand my work as duty and responsibility. If I put it in a modern or contemporary context that is characterized by individualism, I might simply say I do what I do because I have the right to do it, and I claim it. My way of thinking departs from ancient Asian traditions of thought. At the same time, I study and try to understand modern ways of thought, too. As I said earlier, I don't want to limit myself to a binary thinking. In my way of thinking, two opposing things are actually related to each other. Thus, you can't choose one over the other. This would be a simplification which ultimately leads to a 'black and white' categorization, which may look simple but actually causes many problems. In Asian traditions of thought, opposing principles had always been juxtaposed and were considered to be part of reality. Yet, this doesn't mean that such a way of thinking doesn't know the value of truth. It is about understanding reality as it is and dealing with it in a wise way. No easy endeavor, indeed. In principle, art is open and there are many things it can express. And it is easy to share it in public space. In this way, art can function as a bridge between different disciplines and lifestyles. This perfectly fits my multi- or transdisciplinary approach as an efficient way to express ideas.

Gunnar: *We had the wonderful opportunity to work together on your retrospective exhibition "Violence No More" in Frankfurt am Main in autumn 2015. The exhibition was a journey through the last 30 years of your work, much of it regarding Indonesia. What are the most pressing political, societal, and environmental challenges in Indonesia these days?*

Arahmaiani: We are facing many problems in Indonesia: problems that are related to the past, the present, and the future. First of all, there is the trauma of colonization that has not been properly addressed. Then, there are the blind spots of Indonesian history that are still waiting to see a truthful portrayal, such as the genocide of 1965/66.[1] Dealing with the past in such a way has shaped the mentality, the way of thinking, and a certain attitude of Indonesians that is [still] problematic up until today. It is the very reason for the fact that corruption and hypocrisy have become epidemic in a country that is so rich in culture and in natural as well as human resources. This, again, has led to other problems like the ever-widening social asymmetry between the rich and the

1 After an attempted, yet failed, coup to overthrow the Sukarno government in September 1965, powerful parts within the Indonesian military accused the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) of being behind the coup. In its aftermath, the Indonesian military, aided by thugs and civil society mass organization, killed between 500,000 and 1,500,000 alleged members and sympathizers of Indonesia's communist movement. Whether or not these gross human rights violations should be categorized as a genocide is still being debated among scholars.

poor. We can see that values like plurality and tolerance are less and less respected. Groups that claim to represent the Muslim majority increasingly treat minorities in a barbaric and inhumane way. This is true for non-Muslim religious groups in general, and the Chinese minority in particular. Women are also highly affected by these developments. Traditional and religious conservative values consider women not as equals to men. Still, there are movements of critical women who try to change this condition. But, if we look at the recent strengthening of conservative and even radical voices within the Muslim community, we can observe a backlash regarding the situation of women in Indonesia. It has become a normal thing that a member of parliament, who most likely is also a rich entrepreneur, has more than one wife.[2] Things like this have become socially acceptable again.

Also, our consumerist and materialist lifestyle increasingly erodes the consciousness that is needed to protect the environment. It seems that the government and corporations have an easy time getting rid of customary and traditional values that actually respect and protect the environment. This is how customary and traditional communities are marginalized and their lands transformed for industrial use that only benefits private businesses. Forced eviction and land grabbing by private businesses or the government are common practice all over the archipelago. The enormous tropical forest fires of 2015 and 2016 were, of course, the most visible example. These fires, purposely set by palm oil entrepreneurs, were the worst in a century.[3] They have not only destroyed thousands of hectares of forest. They have also caused severe air pollution with heavy impacts on the health of local communities that often lose their land and livelihoods due to the fires. The forest fauna was also highly affected. Many animals died in the flames, got injured, and lost their habitat.

Another serious environmental issue is the pollution of water and soil as a result of the extensive use of chemical fertilizers. This farming system was introduced during the Suharto era in the context of the Green Revolution. Seeds, fertilizers, and even farming equipment had to be imported, rendering the farmers highly dependent on the producers. Up until today, the Ministry for Agriculture negotiates farming goods contracts with corporations like Monsanto. Another reason for the worsening of environmental pollution is the absence of an efficient waste management system. Rivers, arable and non-arable land, and even the sea are full of waste, mostly plastic waste that takes a very long time to decompose. The result is an increasing number of natural disasters such as floods and landslides.

All these problems have to be seen in the context of a poor education system. According to a survey, Indonesia has the worst education system in Southeast Asia. It is no surprise that Indonesians in general have a unique problem or, if you want to put it another way, difficulty: the ability to think logically.

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2 A Muslim man may marry up to four women if he is able to treat them equally. On the other hand, Islam does not provide for polyandry. Whether or not this traditional practice is compatible with the idea of universal human rights is being hotly debated within the Islamic scholarly community and beyond.

3 Forest fires are a seasonal phenomenon in Indonesia. Purposely set fires are used as a cheap method to clear land for new planting. Most of the affected areas contain highly flammable peat soil, which causes the fires to spread quickly and makes it highly difficult to stop them.

Gunnar: *As you said, Indonesia has experienced increasing levels of discrimination and violence against religious minorities in recent years. What are the drivers behind these developments and do you see any signs of change for the better?*

Arahmaiani: There are a couple of interest groups involved in that issue – at the local, the national, and even the international level. This includes politicians, entrepreneurs, and certain religious groups that are ambitious, have a limited knowledge, and want to prove that religion holds a superior truth. This makes the issue quite complex. The root problem of today's global 'political game' is the wish to control all kinds of resources. But this must also be seen in the context of an international 'political game' in which international corporations and even governments with all kinds of agendas have an interest in stigmatizing the Muslim community. At the same time, international radical Islamic groups develop their very own strategies to reach their goals. Conservative and radical groups on the local and national levels try to capitalize on this situation by claiming that Islam as a religion and a specific group of people is being oppressed and colonialized by the West. These groups use this kind of rhetoric to legitimate their claims and to condemn everyone not in line with their way of life and thinking. Usually, they call them infidels. On the other hand, politicians at all levels try to capitalize on this situation and on the leaders of these radical groups for their own benefits. After the end of the so-called New Order of Suharto, it became evident that his regime 'created' radical groups in order to spread chaos and terror in society. Politicians used this atmosphere to their own advantage, for example, by portraying themselves as guarantors of the public order. To cut it short, the elites determine the rules of the game and, if need be, create disasters (like war or terrorist attacks) and willingly sacrifice people. These kinds of injustices are still practiced – through the economy, the manipulation of culture, the instrumentalization of religion, or the absence of the rule of law in everyday life. In other words: law can be bought. If you ask me whether I see a change for the better, I must honestly tell you that I don't see any reason for optimism at the moment.

Gunnar: *Back in 2014, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was elected president of Indonesia. His constituency considered him the Indonesian Barack Obama and had high hopes regarding the rule of law and human rights protection. Yet, under his presidency, the human rights situation seems to be worsening. Would you say that Indonesia's relatively young democratization process is experiencing a crisis of political representation?*

Arahmaiani: In the beginning, Jokowi was considered a light of hope by many Indonesians, especially by the poorer strata that suffer from injustices. Most important for this perception was his background as a small entrepreneur who came from a poor family. Additionally, he had no connection with the New Order whatsoever. He was the embodiment of the promise and the hope for a new type of leader that would bring welfare to the Indonesian people. But after he took office, it turned out that in reality he could not live up to these expectations. So, very disappointing. Injustice is still going on, corruption is becoming even more rampant, and human rights seem to be a mere slogan without any meaning. One example for the inhumane treatment of people is the fact that drug couriers receive the death penalty and are being executed

whereas the real bosses are at large. Also, corrupt politicians who are clearly guilty are not punished. The weakness of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is very disappointing. Other examples are, of course, connected to the dark history of the 1965 genocide. Although there are demands for justice and official apologies for the victims from many sides, nothing substantial has happened up until today. It seems that the more time passes by the less hope there is.

Gunnar: *Do artists play a significant role in political and environmental activism in Indonesia? And, are there any governmental or private institutions that provide support and/or funding for politically engaged artists?*

Arahmaiani: The movement of art activism already started during the Indonesian independence revolution.[4] So, there is quite a long tradition in this field. And even under the New Order, this art activism was strong and played a role in the political and social life of Indonesia. Actually, up until today there are artists in Indonesia that are active in this field. They are quite loyal and strong. Although the international art scene has changed a lot, the art market is becoming stronger and stronger. Besides the positive effect that more artists can actually make a living, the negative side is that the art world is increasingly focusing on the market which is more and more becoming an arena for business and investment. With a poor infrastructure, for example, the absence of publicly financed museums, and a critics scene that is half dead, market domination with all its games becomes stronger. The effect is that it is more about whether an artwork is a good investment than about the artwork itself. Art that has social-political or environmental messages is usually done on the artists' own initiative, or as endorsed by NGOs. Of course, there had already been a trend in the painting market that considered engaged art as something fancy. Yet, it was simply a trend that was soon replaced by another trend, and so on. The problem with the support of NGOs is actually that it is usually temporary and project-based. The rationale is usually that the NGOs can communicate their agenda. Additionally, sometimes NGOs are involved in corruption cases, which also constitutes a risk for artists working with them. In principle, there is no public institution in Indonesia that supports the activities of engaged artists. I'm completely on my own as I have to finance my activities myself.

Gunnar: *For more than five years, you have been working with Tibetan monks in the Yushu region. The core focus of your work is to raise awareness for environmental protection. Among other things, you have initiated a tree planting campaign that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of newly planted trees.[5] How is your Tibetan experience influencing you ethically and on a conceptual level?*

Arahmaiani: Actually, it has been already more than six years. Yes, my first aim is to develop a consciousness for the environment and to remind people how important

4 After the declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, the Indonesians fought a war of independence against the Dutch, the former colonial power, between 1945 and 1949.

5 The trees make an important contribution to the reduction of soil erosion.

the Tibet Plateau is in this context. The Tibet Plateau is also known as the '3rd pole' as it is the world's third-largest area of ice. It is also called the 'water tower' of Asia, with Asia's seven largest rivers originating there: the Mekong, the Yangtze, the Yellow River, the Brahmaputra, the Ganges, the Indus, and the Salween. Global warming has severe effects on that area, as it causes the melting of the glaciers as well as the thawing of the permafrost. At the same time, there is an increase in flood disasters in Asian countries. And, of course, we can't allow this to continue. Until now, we have been working on the problem from different angles. This includes waste management, planting trees, re-starting collective organic farming, revitalizing the tradition of nomadic livestock farming with a revolving fund for Yaks (called the 'Yak Bank'), and the management of water sources for everyday use, energy generation, and medication. We got very lucky when two years ago the local government finally started to like the projects and started to support and even finance them. That's why the projects developed really fast. When I visited Tibet last summer, they estimated that already more than one million trees had been planted since we started the project.

My experiences from working and interacting with as well as learning from Tibetan Buddhists strengthened my belief in what I'm feeling and thinking. Although, I'm not completely free of doubt. Since I was a teenager, my thinking and understanding of reality has been grounded in ancient philosophy. Most people in Indonesia find that funny, especially from the Muslim community. Yet, in Tibet I received support and even confirmation for my way of thinking. I had the chance to deepen my understanding together with my friends and teachers, lamas from Tibet, both in the Lab Monastery in Tibet and the Sera Jey Monastery in India. Of course, that has deeply influenced my understanding of ethical concepts and ideas. I understood that, for a long time, the principle ideas of my art works and writings have been grounded in Buddhism. I simply wasn't aware of it. It also deepened my knowledge of pre-Indonesian history. It's very important to revive this knowledge because many Indonesians don't understand their own history anymore. They have lost that knowledge. The most important influence on me from all of this is that I understand so much more and am so much more conscious of what I actually want to express in my works. A deeper understanding of ethical principles, for example, the principle of non-violence, allows me to comprehend humanitarian problems with regard to social politics, culture, and the environment in a more holistic way.

Gunnar: *You are one of the busiest travelers I know, going from one artist in residence program to another, having exhibitions, and giving classes all around the world. Has being a 'modern nomad' been a conscious decision and how has constantly being on the move influenced your worldview?*

Arahmaiani: I have been living a nomadic life for more than thirty years now. It all started when I left Indonesia for Sydney in 1983 after I was threatened by the Suharto regime. Before I left, I had been imprisoned for a month. I was finally released but not allowed to perform in public. On top of that, I was thrown out of Bandung University where I was studying fine arts back then. Living on the move gave me the chance to get to know many kinds of cultural practices and beliefs. It also helped me to understand how the global economy with all its effects actually works. I'm mainly interested

in its negative effects, such as injustice and the widening gap and asymmetry between the poor majority and the rich minority. It also helped me to understand how deeply intertwined the world actually is or, even, that everything is connected to everything. This has allowed me to learn and see the underlying norms and structures of the problems which we can find in human life. Yes, I believe we are all humans regardless of skin color, culture, or belief. Humans with all their abilities have certain strengths – as compared to other beings like animals – that can be used to achieve positive but also negative ends. For example, if power ambitions or negative emotions are not controlled, it can cause catastrophes and a lot of suffering for humans as well as the environment. In a global system that is increasingly interconnected, people should really open up to get to know and understand each other as well as cooperate in addressing the global problems that are threatening the continuation of life. Only if we appreciate and respect difference, will we be able to understand that all humans are related to each other and be able to co-exist. War and fighting are things that only lead to destruction and need to be critically questioned and prevented. The same applies to the weapons industry, which only profits a few but kills and destroys many people. The best would be to shut them down. Seriously, we have to strengthen intercommunity relations in order to achieve peace and prosperity together to make sure that the future of the coming generations will be a bright one.

Gunnar: *Arahmaiani, thank you very much!*

Arahmaiani: You are welcome.

Translation from the Indonesian: Gunnar Stange

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Das politische Lesebuch *Indonesien 1965ff. Die Gegenwart eines Massenmordes*, herausgegeben von Anett Keller im Auftrag der Südostasien-Informationsstelle, versammelt Stimmen, die sich mit den Massenmorden in Indonesien ab 1965 und deren Aufarbeitung auseinandersetzen: Beiträge von indonesischen WissenschaftlerInnen unterschiedlicher Disziplinen, Protokolle von Überlebenden, Darstellungen von Akteuren, die sich der Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung widmen, sowie Werke zeitgenössischer indonesischer KünstlerInnen. Der übergreifende Ansatz des Buches ist es, die Kontinuität der Massenmorde herauszuarbeiten und damit nicht nur einen Einblick in Indonesiens Vergangenheit zu geben, sondern die Ereignisse ab 1965 als prägendes Moment der indonesischen Gegenwart zu beschreiben.

Im Oktober 1965 wurden in Jakarta sechs Generäle und ein Leutnant der indonesischen Armee entführt und ermordet. Die Täter, die sich „Bewegung 30. September" (G30S) nannten, handelten eigenen Angaben zufolge, um einen Putsch rechter Generäle gegen den Präsidenten Sukarno zu verhindern. Noch bevor die Hintergründe der Tat geklärt waren – sie sind es bis heute nicht –, wurde die Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens (PKI) als Drahtzieher der Angriffe beschuldigt. In den folgenden Wochen und Monaten wurden Mitglieder oder (vermeintliche) SympathisantInnen der PKI verhaftet, gefoltert und ermordet. Schätzungen zufolge wurden 500.000 bis 3 Millionen Menschen getötet, was die Gewalttaten ab 1965 zu einem der größten Massenmorde des 20. Jahrhunderts macht. Hunderttausende Menschen wurden zum Teil jahrelang inhaftiert und auch nach ihrer Entlassung diskriminiert, ausgegrenzt und entmenschlicht. Als Grundlage dafür diente die jahrzehntelang dominierende Geschichtsschreibung der „Neuen Ordnung" (*Orde Baru*) unter General Suharto, der sich nach den Ereignissen um den Oktober 1965 an die Spitze des Staates geputscht hatte: Die Opfer der Massenmorde wurden als Täter dargestellt.

Dieser *einen* Version der Geschichte eine *Vielzahl* von Geschichten und alternative Thesen entgegenzustellen ist das Anliegen des Sammelbandes: Indonesien 1965 als „Schauplatz des Kalten Krieges" (Baskara T. Wardaya SJ), als „Folge staatlichen Handelns" (Stanley Adi Prasetyo), als „Wendepunkt der indonesischen Geschichte" (Hilmar Farid), als „Wendepunkt der Geschichte von Indonesiens Frauenbewegung" (I Gusti Agung Ayu Ratih); um nur einige zu nennen. Der Fokus auf einzelne Aspekte der Gewalt, deren Fortwirken und die Strukturen, in die die Gewalttaten eingebettet sind, trägt in der Gesamtheit der Beiträge zu einem differenzierten Bild bei, das Widersprüchlichkeiten zwischen

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den Texten ebenso zulässt wie Wiederholungen. Hilmar Farid beschreibt das Jahr 1965 weniger als menschliche Tragödie, sondern vielmehr als Wendepunkt der indonesischen Geschichte und als „Siegeszug des Kapitalismus" (S. 71-82). Die Protokolle von Überlebenden (S. 29-40, S. 59-64, S. 83-88, S. 137-152, S. 183-192) beschreiben die menschliche Tragödie in all ihren Facetten – was als LeserIn oft schwer zu ertragen ist. Die individuelle Dimension der Gewalt für die Opfer und deren Familien (auch der Generationen nach 1965) zeigen sowohl die Unvergleichbarkeit der Schicksale als auch eine mögliche Konzeptualisierung der Gewalt und strukturelle Bezüge (z.B. zu sexualisierter Gewalt). Die Protokolle der Opfer sind Übersetzungen von Beiträgen aus indonesischen Sammelbänden, die die Geschichte nicht aus der Perspektive der Sieger, sondern der Opfer erzählen. Damit stehen sie stellvertretend für viele Akteure der Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung, deren Arbeit auf Interviews mit Opfern seit 1965. basiert (z.B. *Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan* 1965/66 (YPKP), *Institut Sejarah Sosial Indonesia* (ISSI) oder *Lembaga Kreatifitas untuk Kemanusiaan)*. In den Darstellungen von Akteuren der Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung (S. 41-46, S. 65-70, S. 89-94, S. 117-122, S. 153-164, S. 193-198) werden auch die Schwierigkeiten sichtbar: „Die öffentliche Meinung tendiert aus den verschiedensten Gründen eher zu einer Ablehnung der Aufarbeitung von 1965. Hier zeigt sich, wie Suhartos Geschichtsschreibung bis heute nachwirkt. Ein Teil der Gesellschaft hat Angst, dass die Wahrheitssuche alte Wunden aufreißt und wieder zu Konflikten führt. Ein anderer Teil sieht im Ruf nach Aufarbeitung das Bemühen von Kommunisten mit dem Ziel, die Macht zu ergreifen" (S. 81).

Auf welchen Ebenen und mit welchen Mitteln die Geschichtsschreibung durchgesetzt wurde, zeigt der Beitrag „Film als Mittel der Propaganda" von Wijaya Herlambang (S. 123-136). Filme spielten als Massenkommunikationsmedien eine Schlüsselrolle für den Aufbau von Denkstrukturen der Neuen Ordnung. Wissenschaftliche Studien wie jene des Militärhistorikers Nugroho Notosusanto, bildeten das ideologische Fundament der Dokumentationen und zeugen von der Verflechtung von Wissenschaft und politischer Macht in der Ära Suharto. Auch auf internationaler Ebene gab es – auch aufgrund des geopolitischen Kontexts – über einen langen Zeitraum nur wenige Beispiele für wissenschaftliche Analysen der Ereignisse von 1965, die sich von der Neuen Ordnung und den machtpolitischen Verstrickungen emanzipierten (z.B. die *Cornell Papers*).

Der Historiker Baskara T. Wardaya SJ beschreibt in seinem Beitrag „Schauplatz des Kalten Krieges" (S. 17-28) die Ereignisse von 1965 als „logische Konsequenz" (S. 20) der innen- und außenpolitischen Konstellationen. Er arbeitet insbesondere die Rolle der USA heraus, die anti-kommunistische Politik im blockfreien Indonesien der 1960er Jahre unterstützte und „aktiv in die Pläne der Beseitigung der PKI und zur Entmachtung von Präsident Sukarno beteiligt" (S. 24) war. Seiner Analyse zufolge ist die internationale Machtkonstellation nicht nur mitverantwortlich für die Gewalt, sondern auch für ihre fehlende Aufarbeitung. Einen möglichen Weg für eine solche glaubhafte Aufarbeitung auf internationaler Ebene beschreitet die Organisation YPKP, die zu den Initiatoren des Volkstribunals in Den Haag im Herbst 2015 zählt und auf den internationalen Druck zur juristischen und politischen Aufarbeitung setzt.

„Dem Puzzle fehlen . . . noch viele Teile“ (S. 14), argumentiert die Herausgeberin Anett Keller und es bleibt fragwürdig, warum es gerade außerhalb Indonesiens kaum Wissen über das unvorstellbare Ausmaß an Gewalt gibt. Der Sammelband schließt hier eine Lücke, indem er sich erstmals in deutscher Sprache mit den Ereignissen von 1965/1966 und deren Fortwirken bis heute auseinandersetzt. Weitere Auseinandersetzungen sollten folgen, so zum Beispiel zum Verhältnis von Indonesien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die besondere Beziehungen zu Indonesien unter Suharto (bis hin zu persönlicher Freundschaft zwischen Helmut Kohl und Suharto) pflegte. Ob auf nationaler oder internationaler Ebene, die Wissensproduktion über die Massenmorde im Oktober 1965 und ihre Hintergründe spielte eine zentrale Rolle, die massenhafte Gewalt zu legitimieren und bis in die Gegenwart hinein fortzuführen. Die kritische Aufarbeitung bedarf gerade deshalb einer kritischen Wissensproduktion im Sinne vielfältiger Perspektiven.

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freie Autorin

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▸ O'Rourke, I. (2017). Book review: Chandler, D., Cribb, R., & Narangoa, L. (Eds.). (2016). End of empire. 100 days in 1945 that changed Asia and the world. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, *10*(1), 121-124.

On 5 August 1945, the B-29 bomber 'Enola Gay' was loaded with 'Little Boy', the US atomic bomb that was to destroy the Japanese city of Hiroshima the following day. A hundred days later, on 12 November 1945, Indonesian regional commanders elected Sudirman as Indonesian army commander. He immediately ordered an assault on British and Dutch forces in Ambarawa, Java, marking a turning point towards more forceful military resistance, which eventually led to their withdrawal. In between these two dates, the world order was changed in East and Southeast Asia in a way that is formative up to this day. Over this time period, colonialist powers were defeated, but later took back territories, only to be eventually expelled, independence movements rose and fragmented, power struggles ensued between and among members of different ethnic groups as well as of different political ideologies, and empires ended. Division was easier reached than unity.

As 2015 marked the 70-year anniversary of the end of World War II, Scandinavian publisher NIAS Press developed the idea of balancing the focus on Asia in light of the commemorations, which usually focused more on Europe and the US. In *End of Empire*, general editors David P. Chandler, Robert Cribb, and Li Narangoa combine textual and visual contributions by nearly a hundred historians, lawyers, political scientists, cultural and social anthropologists, and scholars on Korean, Japanese, Chinese, Russian, Southeast Asian, and East Asian studies.

The volume fittingly illustrates that, generally, the end of war does not mean the end of conflict, and specifically, that the end of World War II brought peace to "almost nowhere in eastern Asia" (back cover). This point, which is too often overlooked from a Eurocentric perspective on World War II, is vigorously brought home. Through combining voices from all across Asia as well as the US and Europe, the study shows that not only was the war transnational and global, but also the efforts to end it as well as the consequences of those efforts. The developments of those 100 days fundamentally changed East and Southeast Asia and laid the groundwork for the way the affected countries are governed today as well as for ongoing conflicts, which in turn have a global impact. In the eponymous *100 days that changed Asia and the world*, the Indonesian and Vietnamese independence movements took shape, the wartime truce between Chinese Communists and Nationalists frayed, and Japan made first steps towards a new democratic order. The focus on Asian events and politics is also fitting as World War II began and ended in Asia, with the Japanese invasion of China in

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July 1937 and with Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945, respectively. The end of the war also "marked the end of the Japanese empire", but the events in the following days "foreshadowed the demise of other empires and set into motion developments that transformed the post-war world" (p. 1).

Following the introduction, a prelude sets the stage and background for the events unfolding in the next 100 days. Short case studies of countries or regions enable the reader to contextualize the following information snippets. Regionally, *End of Empire* broadly focuses on Burma, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Korea, Malaya, Mongolia-Manchuria, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, though over the course of the 100 days as well as the preceding and subsequent periods described in the introductory and concluding chapters, borders and names are prone to change. Not unusually, the volume is chronological. Quite unusually, however, it has entries for every single day, reminiscent of a diary or a daily. These entries span anything between half a page and 17 pages and are peppered with photographs, maps, propaganda posters, political cartoons, and other visual material. In addition to the short newspaper-style paragraphs outlining current events – usually several a day, covering several countries and perspectives – about 80 approximately two-page vignettes explore specific aspects and topics, like forced laborers (pp. 90-92), the Great Vietnam Famine (pp. 103-105), or Prisoners of War (pp. 106-107). Personal statements like diary entries, opinion pieces, and reflections by contemporary witnesses complete the picture.

Regrettably, the volume offers quite an androcentric perspective and consequently, the focus on women's role during and after the conflicts is mostly lacking. In this collection on military history, other than as 'comfort women' and civilian victims – though Tessa Morris-Suzuki's exploration of the Japanese military and the 'comfort women' (pp. 92-94) is as sensitive as it is concise and contextualizes an ongoing debate – women's agency is highlighted only in a few cases. Considering the breadth of topics, regions, and events, in too few, though notable, cases: Vera Hildenbrand explores the 1943 recruitment of women into the Indian National Army's all-female Rani of Jhansi Regiment. They spanned all religions, castes, and social classes and were raised in the Indian diaspora in Malaya, Burma, and Thailand (p. 119). The regiment's namesake Rani Lakshmibai of Jhansi was a rebellion leader and symbol of resistance to British rule who died in battle in 1858, thus drawing several parallels to their situation, as the Jhansi Regiment was also battling the British. Another example of women playing a part in the war is Kumander Liwaway, though little more is offered than a photo. The caption does recognize that "women played a central role in the Hukbalahap rebellion", one of the most significant peasant-based revolutions in modern Philippine history, and names their roles as "spies, organizers, nurses, couriers, soldiers and *even* military commanders" (emphasis added; p. 307). Hiromi Sasamoto-Collins draws attention to the way the post-war Japanese constitution was drafted as well as to Beate Sirota's influence and contribution to the implementation of gender equality (p. 244).

The publisher, NIAS Press, wanted to produce a volume on the end of World War II in the Pacific that transcends mere Eurocentric attention to the war in Europe as well as the US American inclination to think the war ended with and because of atomic bombs (Stuligross, 2016). Not only did the editors collect and connect the

knowledge of academics and experts of different fields from a variety of academic institutions from around the world, they managed to expose a diverse variety of inter- and transnational connections and impacts that continue to shift. *End of an Empire* portrays a variety of sides and perspectives of the complexities of World War II and the post-war period in truly inspiring and enriching ways, without falling into nationalistic or patronizing traps.

Though the timeline at times may seem frantic or chaotic, this is not inappropriate for such a turbulent period, innovatively demonstrates the complexities of the post-World War II period, and is a refreshing take. More conventionally, the same breadth of topics could have been covered in several volumes in a more distant or clinical voice. This, however, would probably not serve to reach and engage as large an audience as *End of Empire* can and should. After finishing learning about the eponymous *100 days*, the reader may wish for an even more in-depth analysis of preceding and subsequent events. She or he may be relieved, then, to learn from the Editors' Note that more publications are planned as well as a "broader, less frenetic project" to "commemorate the 75th anniversary of the war's end in 2020" (p. 310). In addition, an accompanying Facebook page[1] and website[2] provide relief.

The impacts of the events that happened in the 100 days portrayed continue to shape current international relations and policy. In addition to reading like a thriller one just cannot put down until finished in one go, surely every reader will learn something new from engaging with this unusual collection.

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1 See https://www.facebook.com/endofempire1945/

2 See http://www.endofempire.asia/

Book Review: Aspinall, E. & Sukmajati, M. (Eds.). (2016). Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia. Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots.

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▸ Stange, G. (2017). Book review: Aspinall, E. & Sukmajati, M. (2016). Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia. Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, *10*(1), 125-128.

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In 2018, Indonesia will celebrate the 20th anniversary of its democratization process that was augmented after the fall of long-term authoritarian president Suharto in May 1998. Since then, Indonesia has witnessed four legislative elections (1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014), which were generally welcomed as largely free and fair. However, the extent to which Indonesian politics in general – and elections specifically – are being dominated by money politics, patronage, and clientelism remains one of the main concerns of many scholars and observers (e.g., Aspinall, 2013; Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Mietzner, 2013; Robertson-Snape, 1999; Simandjuntak, 2012; van Klinken, 2009). In this respect, it appears that the 2014 legislative elections marked a disturbing peak. In the introduction to their edited volume *Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia*[1], Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati describe the role money politics played in the 2014 elections as "the most 'massive' it had ever been" (p. 2).

The research presented in Aspinall's and Sukmajati's volume aims at "identifying the chief mechanisms that Indonesian legislative candidates used to appeal to voters [in the 2014 legislative elections]" (p. ix). The volume originates from an impressive collaborative research project comprising 50, mostly Indonesian, researchers who observed the lead up to the 2014 national legislative elections in 20 of Indonesia's 34 provinces.[2] All in all, 1,500 interviews with candidates and campaigners were conducted and hundreds of campaign events observed.

The book comprises 23 chapters – a comprehensive introduction and 22 case studies that present empirical data from across Indonesia. In their introduction "Patronage and Clientelism in Indonesian Electoral Politics", Aspinall and Sukmajati give a brief overview of relevant works on patronage and clientelism in Indonesian politics, explain the research design and goals, summarize the main findings of the case studies, and last but not least, hint to limitations of the volume while pointing out desiderates for further research.

In reviewing the literature on the role of patronage and clientelism in Indonesian politics, the authors cite a wide range of publications that stress the key role of patronage and clientelist practices in Indonesian electoral as well as

1 An Indonesian version of the edited volume was published in 2014.

2 The research was conducted in the frame of a larger research project on money politics in Southeast Asia, comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

party politics. At the same time, the authors criticize the limited knowledge that exists regarding the actual workings and functioning of such mechanisms as compared to other Southeast Asia countries (e.g., Thailand). Accordingly, the case studies presented in Chapters 13 to 16, describe in detail how vote buying actually works for the first time.

Although the research underpinning the volume did not exclusively focus on patronage politics by legislative candidates, the authors conclude that "patronage distribution is the central mode of political campaigning in Indonesian legislative elections" (p. 5). This is not only supported by the findings of all 22 case studies presented in the volume but also illustrated by statements of candidates quoted in the introduction who, after the elections, publicly regretted their decision to refrain from handing out monetary incentives. But, what is it that actually made patronage feature so prominently in the 2014 elections? Aspinall and Sukmajati go into depth to find answers to this question – which also is the main argument of the volume – by looking into the legal changes in the Indonesian elections legislation over the past 15 years. In its second[3] democratic elections in 1999, Indonesia used a fully closed proportional representation system. In this system, the place of a candidate on the party list, and on the ballot paper accordingly, decided whether or not he or she would win a seat in an electoral district. Then, starting in 2009, Indonesia's election legislation changed to a fully open-list proportional representation, which meant that the candidate who was able to accumulate the most individual votes in an electoral district would win the seat, provided that the party surpassed the electoral threshold. This led to the paradox that suddenly legislative candidates no longer see candidates from other parties as their main competitors but those coming from their own party ranks. In this logic, it became more rational for candidates to rely on highly individualist, not party-based campaign strategies and to pursue as many individual votes as possible.

In their analysis of the case studies assembled in the volume, Aspinall and Sukmajati offer a typology of different kinds of patronage that featured as reoccurring patterns in the elections. They distinguish between (1) vote buying, (2) individual gifts, (3) services and activities, (4) club goods, and (5) pork barrel projects. Vote buying (1), here, is understood as the distribution of money or goods to voters with the expectation that beneficiaries would repay the favor with their vote. The case studies presented in Chapter 14 to 17 on rural East and Central Java not only describe thickly the actual practice of vote buying but also reveal that, in these areas, it seemed to be more common as well as more socially accepted than in other researched areas. Individual gifts (2) consisted of different categories such as 'election merchandise' like calendars showing the candidate's picture and name, food items like rice, clothing, or household items. These goods were both distributed on house-to-house visits and campaign events, either by the candidate him- or herself or by campaign teams. The authors admit that it is difficult to sharply distinguish between vote buying and individual gifts. What is more important, though, is that many of the interviewed candidates did not consider individual gift distribution as part of money politics. Services and activities (3) that were provided by candidates included sports competitions, community parties, prayer meetings, and cooking demonstrations, to name just a

3 The first democratic Indonesian legislative elections were held in 1955 (Feith, 1957).

few. This also included the 'distribution' of free health insurance or the assistance for voters to access government services such as health or scholarship programs. Club goods (4) were a kind of patronage that targeted social groups in a certain locality rather than individuals. They included, inter alia, donations for the renovation of public infrastructure or farming equipment. In many cases, candidates used community leaders as vote brokers to ensure the electoral support of their communities. Based on these insights, the authors conclude that many candidates considered club goods morally and legally superior to other forms of patronage but less reliable in garnering voters' actual support. As opposed to all other forms of patronage, pork barrel projects are not funded privately but are "geographically targeted and publicly funded benefits in repayment of, or expectation of, political support" (p. 24). This meant that candidates promised to fund public programs in their electoral district paid by the so-called aspiration funds (*dana aspirasi*) that Indonesian legislators have on their disposal to respond to their constituencies' 'aspirations'.

The 22 case studies in the volume are mapped out like a 'legislative journey' from Aceh, the westernmost province of Indonesia, to the central highlands of Papua in the east of the archipelago state. All in all, they cover seven election campaigns on Sumatra, ten on Java, one on Kalimantan, two on Sulawesi, one in East Nusa Tenggara, and two in Papua. The editors decided to group the case studies geographically rather than thematically as similar patterns of election campaigning emerged in all of them. Furthermore, the research project focused especially on the effects of different social, political, and economic factors as well as constituency size on campaigning strategies. Accordingly, the case study sites vary not only regarding ethnic, religious, and social composition but also in terms of scale and scope: While some of them closely observed campaigning in only one or two electoral districts of a city (*kota*) or a district (*kabupaten*), others looked at dynamics in a whole district or even province. In addition, while some focused on the legislative races for a district parliament only, others compared races for all three legislative levels (national, provincial, district/city) in one locality.

Although the book appears to present an inventory of cases rather than a deep comparative analysis, without doubt its value lies in the thick description and documentation of vote buying, patronage, and clientelist dynamics in Indonesian elections at the grassroots in highly heterogeneous localities. The case studies are well structured and profoundly rich in original research material as well as references. Also, the book convincingly demonstrates that there seems to exist what could be termed a 'unity in diversity' when it comes to the question of how prominently money politics, patronage, and clientelism actually feature in contemporary Indonesian politics. All studies assembled in this edited volume clearly conclude that money politics is considered to be a legitimate means to the end of electoral victory. Although no promise of winning the race exists for whoever spends most on the campaign, the findings of the case studies clearly indicate that there is a widespread believe all over Indonesia that electoral campaigns cannot be won without employing money politics, at least to a certain extent. Last but not least, although the richness of original and highly interesting fieldwork data assembled in this book speaks for itself, it becomes obvious to the reader that the volume comprises preliminary results of a larger research project, the outcomes of which are yet to be analyzed more comprehensively. It is

particularly these future insights, which everyone interested in Indonesia's highly dynamic democratization process should definitely look forward to.

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