

# ASEAS 15(1) 2022

*Advances in Southeast Asian Studies*







# ASEAS



*Advances in Southeast Asian Studies*

## ASEAS

Advances in Southeast Asian Studies (formerly, Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies)

*Advances in Southeast Asian Studies* (ASEAS) is an international, interdisciplinary, and open access social sciences journal covering a variety of topics (cultural and social anthropology, communication, development, geography, cultural studies, regional studies, politics, and tourism) from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Topics are related to Southeast Asia, but are not restricted to the geographical region, when spatial and political borders of Southeast Asia are crossed or transcended, for example, in the case of linguistics, diaspora groups, or forms of socio-cultural transfer. ASEAS publishes two focus issues per year and we welcome out-of-focus submissions at any time. The journal invites both established as well as young scholars to present research results and theoretical and methodical discussions, to report about on-going research projects or field studies, to publish conference reports, to conduct interviews with experts in the field, and to review recently published books.

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# ASEAS

15(1) 2022



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## **ASEAS**

Advances in Southeast Asian Studies 15(1), 2022

ASEAS 15(1) launches the first issue of the Journal under its new title, *Advances in Southeast Asian Studies*. It features a thematically open collection of contributions covering legal issues, historical discourses, and contemporary developments in the region. Drawn from various perspectives, the contributions scrutinize legal regulations, such as, on the placement and protection of Indonesian migrant workers and on agricultural land appropriation in Vietnam, provide gendered analysis on knowledge production, and examine prospects of poverty alleviation of low-income households in Indonesia and remote fishing communities in the Philippines.

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William N. Holden





## Editorial

Dayana Lengauer<sup>a</sup> , Alexander Trupp<sup>b</sup>  & Richard S. Aquino<sup>c</sup> 

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► Lengauer, D., Trupp, A., & Aquino, R. S. (2022). Editorial. *Advances in Southeast Asian Studies*, 15(1), 1-4.

ASEAS 15(1) launches the first issue of the Journal under its new title, *Advances in Southeast Asian Studies*. Since its inaugural issue, which was published 15 years ago in 2008, ASEAS has promoted the emancipation of knowledge and thematic pluralism in Southeast Asian Studies through an open-access and free of paywalls publishing system (Gerstl & Schweitzer, 2008). Issued by the *Society for South-East Asian Studies* (SEAS), based in Vienna, ASEAS initially published in German (and English), and primarily attracted submissions from German-speaking scholars based in Austria and Germany who worked on Southeast Asia from different disciplinary angles. Over the years, the authorship and readership of ASEAS has transformed significantly and now represents a truly global audience. Indexed in Scopus under the general social sciences since 2015, ASEAS is now ranked in additional subject categories, reflecting the journal's interdisciplinary orientation within the social sciences (Table 1). ASEAS continues to critically discuss and examine a variety of issues in the fields of cultural and social anthropology, communication, development, geography, cultural studies, regional studies, politics, and tourism, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. We thus believe that the new journal name *Advances in Southeast Asian Studies* provides a more apt description of the contributions in ASEAS.

Category	Rank	Percentile
Social Sciences – Anthropology	#67/443	84 <sup>th</sup>
Social Sciences – Communication	#135/467	71 <sup>st</sup>
Social Sciences – General Social Science	#80/264	69 <sup>th</sup>
Social Sciences – Development	#111/287	61 <sup>st</sup>
Social Sciences – Geography, Planning and Development	#295/747	60 <sup>th</sup>
Business, Management and Accounting – Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality Management	#80/137	41 <sup>st</sup>

**Table 1.** ASEAS Scopus CiteScore categories and ranking 2021. (<https://www.scopus.com/sourceid/21100405571>)

ASEAS 15(1) features a thematically open collection of contributions covering legal issues, historical discourses, and contemporary developments in the region. Drawn from various perspectives, the contributions scrutinize legal regulations, such as on the placement and protection of Indonesian migrant workers and on

agricultural land appropriation in Vietnam, provide gendered analysis on knowledge production, and examine prospects of poverty alleviation of low-income households in Indonesia and remote fishing communities in the Philippines.

Annisa Ayuningtyas and Mailinda Eka Yuniza investigate the constitutional justification of the latest law on the protection of Indonesian migrant workers, Law 18/2017. This legislation allows the state to intervene in the management of Indonesian migrant workers' remittances. While emphasizing that the Indonesian Constitution is an economic constitution, the authors indicate that there is insufficient constitutional basis for the state intervention in the allocation of human resources. Hence, their main argument is that government intervention in the management of remittances is *not* constitutionally justified. As the authors indicate, additional tension arises in relation to the private nature of migrant workers' remittances and their significance as a component of national income. By making constitutional and administrative laws their main object of discussion, the authors not only evade general skepticism regarding the justification of the government's intervention, but also contribute to other studies of migrant workers' remittances by employing a constitutional and administrative legal perspective. The strength of the paper lies in the analysis and interpretation of different legal documents on the placement and protection of Indonesian migrant workers abroad.

In the background of numerous studies pointing at the positive effects of conditional cash transfers (CCTs), Agus Heruanto Hadna and Media Wahyudi Askar analyze the impact of CCTs on low-income households in Indonesia through a case study based on some of the poorest districts of Yogyakarta. They focus on the Family Hope Program (*Program Keluarga Harapan* [PKH]), which had been shown to positively impact per capita expenditures. By assessing households' consumption expenditures, the authors discover that the current CCT design in Indonesia benefits recipients disproportionately resulting in further inequality among households situated in the lowest section of the wealth ladder. Their examination of the distribution of consumption expenditures casts new insights into why CCTs do not automatically reduce poverty.

In response to studies that point at gender disparities in terms of knowledge production in the disciplinary fields of political sciences and international relations in Western contexts, Ella Prihatini and Wendy Prajuli scrutinize the publication and authorship patterns in international relations journals published in Indonesia, exploring similar tendencies in a non-Western context. In Indonesia, as the authors indicate, the space of women's professorship in the discipline of international relations is marginal, with only two women holding a professorship in about 70 international relations departments in 2021. By analyzing bibliographic data of 783 published journal articles, the authors find that men outnumber women in terms of publishing. They also discover a certain level of gender bias in co-authorship, which additionally limits women's performance. Indonesian women scholars share with their male colleagues a high interest in themes such as security, military, and governance, which indicates that certain sub-fields of the discipline would stimulate a mixed-gendered co-authorship, but also render existing competition stronger.

In the last current research contribution with a focus on Indonesia, Muhammad Yuanda Zara takes us back to the foundation of the Indonesian state, more concretely

to the period between 1945 and 1947, and the incorporation of Indo-Europeans as ‘new citizens’ into an ‘indigenous state’. By employing a historical discourse analysis, Zara explores how Indonesian nationalists publicly imagined, framed, and persuaded Indo-Europeans of their place in the emerging nation. The author shows a systematic attempt to ‘attract’ Indo-Europeans to become part of an Indonesian multicultural nation, which stands in stark contrast to earlier studies emphasizing acts of violence by the native militia towards Indo-Europeans during the Dutch-Indonesian war. The author interprets the attempt of Indonesian nationalists to integrate Indo-Europeans in the new state in the light of their aspirations to construct an Indonesian identity that spans the multi-ethnic archipelago. Convincing support for this argument comes from the extensive review of public documents, including newspaper articles and opinions, but also propaganda booklets, such as the one issued by one of Indonesia’s founding leaders and first prime minister, Sutan Sjahrir.

Still in archipelagic Southeast Asia, Brooke A. Porter, Mark B. Orams, Michael Lück and Enrico Maria Andreini present a qualitative exploration of gleaning by-products in tourism supply chains in remote Filipino fishing communities. Combining their respective expertise in conservation, development, and tourism, the authors indicate potential opportunities for small-scale revenues from the sale of discarded shells in four remote fishing communities sharing certain levels of poverty. By adopting supply chain theory and qualitative interviews as a method of inquiry, the authors investigate the post-consumption use of shells and discover gaps in the supply chain that impede the transition of ‘waste’ shells into souvenir products that have become part of consumptive tourism in many coastal destinations. In line with earlier publications focusing on community-based tourism, local businesses, and sustainable development (Trupp & Dolezal, 2020), this article discusses its findings in the light of tourism development and poverty alleviation through souvenir production.

Moving to mainland Southeast Asia, Tran Tuan Nguyen and Gábor Hegedűs scrutinize land appropriation in Vietnam under the Land Law 2013 by investigating the project of VSIP, situated in the province of Nghe An, through a survey of officials and affected land users. A review of the legal system of land laws in Vietnam since 1986 is complemented with farmers’ opinions in one particular commune. The authors, hence, juxtapose legal regulations on agricultural land appropriation and their implementation to acquire agricultural land-use rights from the perspective of the affected households, showing that it is mostly the indirectly affected households that utter a dissatisfaction with the procedures of land acquisition. The government, however, has no satisfying compensation for households with adjacent farmland, leaving conditions of inequality between directly and indirectly affected families unsettled.

In an interview with Suhono Harso Supangkat – professor of information technologies at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) and leader of the Smart City and Community Innovation Center – Arif Budy Pratama questions the notion of the ‘smart city’ and its apparent equivalence with the operation of information technologies to solve urban problems. Being involved in the Indonesian Government’s project to develop smart cities since 2007, Supangkat explains top-down propensity towards information technologies while stressing the importance of ‘smart’ resource management to improve urban quality of life and sustainability.

In the last section of this issue, William N. Holden contributes a timely review of Vicente L. Rafael's recently published monograph, *The Sovereign Trickster: Death and Laughter in the Age of Duterte* (2022), as the Philippines sees the exit of President Rodrigo R. Duterte as this Editorial is being written. In his critical review, Holden points to the strength of Rafael's work in his explanation of Duterte's war on drugs by looking at the relationship between life and death – two concepts that run as a red thread throughout the book.

Finally, the ASEAS Editorial Board would like to express their gratitude to Vissia Ita Yulianto, Muhadi Sugiono, and Hakimul Ikhwan for their editorial assistance, and Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia for the financial support in this issue. The Editorial Board also thank the contributors, anonymous reviewers, and readers for continuously supporting the Journal.



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# Indonesian Government Intervention in the Management of Indonesian Migrant Workers' Remittances: Is It Constitutionally Justified?

Annisa Ayuningtyasa<sup>a</sup>  & Mailinda Eka Yuniza<sup>a\*</sup> 

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The latest law on the protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (IMWs), Law Number 18 of 2017 (Law 18/2017), obliges the Indonesian government to conduct economic protection through remittance management by involving certain institutions. Nonetheless, there is a lack of clarity about how this intervention would occur. The private nature of migrant workers' remittances leads to the question of constitutional justification essential for the government's authority to intervene – particularly in Indonesia as a constitutional state in the form of a welfare state – besides skepticism concerning the applicability of the norm. This paper emphasizes the constitutional silence with regard to state intervention in human resources allocation, as it makes the deployment of Indonesian workers abroad constitutionally groundless. Consequently, the discretion infiltrates the remittance, a component of national income that is essentially a private transfer in which the management should be fully controlled by the families. Through review of the scientific literature and legal document analysis, this research found that the inclusion of a state intervention provision on human resources into the 1945 Constitution is still required.

**Keywords:** Constitutional Justification; Government Intervention; Indonesia; Migrant Workers; Remittance Management



## INTRODUCTION

In the Indonesian context, migrant workers who originated from the state have been labelled as 'the hero[s] of foreign exchange' (*pahlawan devisa*) for a long time. However, the demand for their protection has been – ironically – a tough and lengthy struggle (see Dewanto, 2020; Eddyono et al., 2020; Setyawati, 2013). Law No. 18 of 2017 on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Law 18/2017) eventually emphasizes the protection aspect, after 47 years of frequent changes of statutory laws that mainly emphasized the placement aspect of

official Indonesian Migrant Workers (IMWs). This relatively significant shift deserves appreciation, but there is something perturbing about one of the protection forms introduced by the law.

This newest law imposes an obligation and gives authority for the central and local governments to conduct economic protection towards IMWs through remittance management by involving banks or non-bank financial institutions within the country and the placement country.<sup>1</sup> This measure is – by the article formulation – meant to be separated from financial and entrepreneurship education.<sup>2</sup> The accessible statutory laws show that the government intervention on IMWs' remittances has actually occurred since 1983 in capricious forms. Examples include the mandatory requirement for IMWs deployed to Saudi Arabia to set aside at least 50% of their income to send to their families through the government's bank;<sup>3</sup> the requirement to attach a savings book for remittance in order to obtain a migrant worker identity card;<sup>4</sup> the obligation to join a remittance program;<sup>5</sup> and remittance monitoring.<sup>6</sup> However, the exact measure of remittance management intervention according to Law 18/2017 remains questionable.

The inclusion of remittance management within the Law 18/2017 seems to show a disparate nuance – compared to the previous formulations of government intervention – as it is stated in the framework of economic protection, but there are several considerations in regards to the norm applicability. First, neither further regulation in another article nor any explanation in the elucidation is provided within this law.<sup>7</sup>

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1 Art. 35 of Law 18/2017

2 Art. 35 of Law 18/2017 reads: "The central and local governments, in accordance with their authorities, are obliged to conduct economic protection for Indonesian Migrant Workers and/or the Candidate through: a. remittance management by involving banks or non-bank financial institutions within the state and the placement state; b. financial education, so as IMWs and their families can manage their remittances result; and c. entrepreneurship education." By dividing this economic protection into three different points, the government intervention on IMWs' remittances is placed as a clearly distinctive measure separated from both financial and entrepreneurship education. This is also affirmed in Art. 28 para. (1) of the Government Regulation No. 59 of 2021 on the Implementation of Indonesian Migrant Workers Protection (Government Regulation 59/2021) that also separates remittance management from financial and entrepreneurship education.

3 Art. 7 para. (1) of the Ministry of Manpower Decree No. PER 149/MEN/1983 on the Procedures for Implementing the Deployment of Indonesian Workers to Saudi Arabia

4 Art. 50 para. (2) of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration Decree No. KEP-104A/MEN/2002 on Indonesian Workers Placement Abroad

5 Art. 33 of the Ministry of Manpower Decree No. PER-01/MEN/1991 on Inter-State Inter-Work, Art. 34 of the Ministry of Manpower Regulation No. PER-02/MEN/1994 on Workers Placement Inside and Outside the State and Art. 47 para. (1) of the Ministry of Manpower Decree No. KEP-44/MEN/1994 on the Implementation Guidelines of Workers Placement Inside and Outside the State

6 Art. 6 para. (4) *jo.* Art. 5 para. (1) point d of the Head of National Authority for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers Regulation (*BNP2TKI*) No. 10 of 2016 on the Organization and Work Procedures of the Technical Implementation Unit for Indonesian Workers Placement and Protection assigns the Protection and Empowerment Section under the Agency for the Service, Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers (*BP3TKI*) to monitor IMWs' remittances, while Art. 8 para. (4) *jo.* Art. 7 para. (1) point d assigns the Protection and Empowerment Officer under *LP3TKI* to do the monitoring.

7 In Indonesian statutory law design – according to the Attachment II of Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Statutory Laws Formation as amended by Law No. 15 of 2019 – elucidation functions as the statutory law-makers' official interpretation of certain norms, and is a means of clarifying the norms contained in the statutory laws' body.

Second, there are some problems with the implementing regulation. The Law 18/2017 has mandated further regulation on economic protection to government regulation, which ought to be stipulated at the latest two years after the promulgation of the law.<sup>8</sup> However, economic protection is not the first priority in the implementing regulation, as the very first government regulation established under this law solely focuses on placement procedure.<sup>9</sup> Now that there is finally a government regulation reaching the economic protection issue, the provision leads to inclusive financial policy – saving, transfer and access to capital – as an option, leaving a space for another measure that is possibly unpredictable.<sup>10</sup> Third, most authorities in the state of origin seem confident that migrant workers’ remittances impact has been 100% positive, yet this actually depends on the specific circumstances under which such migration occurs, as well as the general political and economic conditions within the state (International Labour Office, 2010, pp. 7, 25, 42-43). Fourth, – and most importantly – government authorities over IMWs’ remittances need to be clarified, as migrant workers’ remittances are essentially a private household transfer (International Labour Office, 2010, p. 25). Thus, the state is just bypassed as a consequence of the fact that the remittance receivers are within the jurisdiction of the state.

The private nature of migrant workers’ remittances appears to be the main reason behind the skepticism concerning such norm applicability – leading to the difficulty in formulating any implementation step – and there is a more basic issue involved when juxtaposed with Indonesia’s character as a law state: *the constitutionality of such government intervention*. In the context of Indonesia as a law state with the type of welfare state, the state has a very large discretion in regulating the lives of its people. Nonetheless, this ought to be followed by the constitutionality of the measures taken. A strong constitutional justification is undoubtedly required as the government intervention on IMWs’ remittances has shown that a private law matter is drawn into the public law arena.

This paper discusses the intervention of a welfare state government towards migrant workers’ remittances, wherein the state acts as the migrant workers’ state of origin in the context of international labor migration. It aims to introduce migrant workers’ remittances as a particular object of discussion in constitutional and administrative laws, yet contribute to migrant workers’ remittances studies by taking into account the perspective of constitutional and administrative laws, as academic

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8 Art. 36 in conjunction with Art. 90 of Law 18/2017.

9 Amidst various substances mandated to the government regulation – during- and after-work protection procedures; legal, social and economic protection; one-stop integrated services; central and local governments’ duties and responsibilities; IMW placement procedures by the non-ministerial government institutions in charge as the integrated IMW protection and services policy executor; IMW Placement Company’s duties and responsibilities; crew and fishery sailors’ protection and placement; coaching to institutions related to IMW placement and protection; supervision to IMW placement and protection implementation – procedures of IMW placement by such non-ministerial government institutions are the only matter followed up through the stipulation of Government Regulation No. 10 of 2020 on the Placement Procedures of Indonesian Migrant Workers by Indonesian Migrant Workers Protection Agency, and this is also overdue.

10 Art. 28 para. (2) of Government Regulation 59/2021 reads: “The implementation of economic protection as in paragraph (1) may be conducted through inclusive financial policy in accordance with the statutory laws.”

research on migrant workers' remittances mostly adopts economic development and sociological perspectives,<sup>11</sup> and when the focus is oriented towards policy, the orientation is directed towards maximizing the remittance utilization (see Carling, 2004; O'Neill, 2001). In the Indonesian context, existing research on IMWs' remittances management merely describes the remittance management from the experience of IMWs' families (Yuniarto, 2015, pp. 81-83).

This doctrinal legal research with a more interdisciplinary direction is a positive-law-oriented-research seeking for the justification of the Indonesian government's intervention in the management of IMWs' remittances. The law-in-context approach is used to understand the law. Research materials used in this study comprise of, first, normative resources mostly in the form of statutory laws relevant to IMWs' protection, fund transfer, state finance, and national economic and national development plans; second, authoritative sources in the form of scholarly legal writing, mostly concerning the role of government in a welfare state; third, additional resources consisting of some documents – such as the *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Neraca Pembayaran Indonesia* (Indonesia's Balance of Payment, NPI), and so forth – as well as non-legal writings. These research materials were analyzed qualitatively.

The existence of law in regulating remittances is important because the remittance mechanism is quite complex and requires legal certainty. Fund transfers that are carried out require a different system and are difficult to track compared to simply transferring funds between domestic banks. It is the cross-border transfer of funds that is feared to become a loophole in the breach where this service can be misused, such as financing terrorism, money laundering, or crimes committed between countries ("A Draft Framework for", 2021; Engle, 2004, p. 39). In addition, based on the facts on the ground, migrant workers tend to look for the simplest and cheapest way of sending remittances; if their funds are not channeled by competent and appropriate institutions, the possibility of misuse of funds, as mentioned above, will be even greater. Therefore, Indonesian banking law, with its characteristics as administrative penal law, should accommodate a definite administrative mechanism for regulating remittances in order to prevent such cases.

The Indonesian government recognizes the importance of the existence of a law in the midst of complicated and crime-prone remittances. Therefore, the government issued several regulations related to the protection of migrant workers, especially regarding their remittances. Migrant workers, as the ones who receive work and wages outside the territory of Indonesia, should not necessarily lose their rights as Indonesian citizens. One of these is the right regulated in Art. 28D para. (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (the 1945 Constitution), which regulates the right of everyone to work and to receive fair and proper compensation and treatment in work relations. However, the remuneration obtained by migrant

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11 Much research from an economic development perspective can be found on a national scale (see Adams, 1991; Campbell, 2008; Garip, 2012; Gerber & Torosyan, 2013; Knowles & Anker, 1981; Oberai & Singh, 1980), but there are also studies with a broader scope (Barham & Boucher, 1998; Djajić, 1986; Taylor, 1999). From the sociological perspective, discussions are varied, ranging from the motivations to remit (Lucas & Stark, 1985) to the actors involved in the remittance (Dewi & Yazid, 2017), and to the remittance-use (Chandravarkar, 1980).



workers outside Indonesia who then enter the territory of Indonesia is known as remittances, as discussed above. The remittance itself does not have a clear position in the constitution, but the regulation is found in Law 18/2017 without any authentic definition. The existing law is one of the administrative penal laws that regulates several criminal provisions in it, but its main focus is not on eradicating criminal acts. That existing law focuses on administrative legal matters relating to the protection of migrant workers. Art. 35 *a quo* states that the central government and regional governments, in accordance with their respective authorities, have an obligation to provide economic protection for Prospective Indonesian Migrant Workers and/or Indonesian Migrant Workers, one of which is through the management of remittances by involving domestic banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions and the destination country of placement.

### REMITTANCE AND THE REMITTANCES OF MIGRANT WORKERS: THE ABSENCE OF AUTHENTIC DEFINITION

There are distinctions in what refers to the definitions of migrant workers' remittances and remittance in general. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (n.d.) defines remittance as the money sent by one merchant to another, either in specie, bill of exchange, draft, or otherwise. Black's Law Dictionary provides a broader definition by defining remittance not only as (1) a sum of money sent to another as payment for goods or services, or (2) an instrument – such as a check – used for sending money, but also (3) the action or process of sending money to another person or place (Garner & Black, 2009, p. 1409). Meanwhile, Engle (2004, p. 38) defines migrant remittance specifically in terms of migrant workers, as money and goods generated during work abroad and sent home. Ratha (2020) perceives workers' or migrants' remittances similarly, as part of migrants' earnings in the form of either cash or goods to support their families. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also implies that remittances assume the form of cash or credit transfers and transfers involving transfers of goods (Statistical Office of the European Communities & International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 6). Remittances are, indeed, sent by the majority of migrants, wherein all types of migrants remit funds, and the best understood form of remittance is hence formal money transfer (Engle, 2004, pp. 38-40). However, remittance can also be transferred in the form of physical or social assets – items of health care and basic needs, consumer goods, jewelry, livestock, and items that can be used for marriage dowry. To summarize, (1) remittance does not pay attention to who sends the money, contrary to migrant workers' remittances wherein migrant workers are obviously the subject; and (2) remittance's object is money or the instrument used for sending money, while goods – besides money – can also be the object of migrant workers' remittances.

Amidst these distinctions, there is an absence of authentic definitions in the Indonesian context as no statutory laws define remittance and migrant workers' remittances. The central bank thus discerns remittance in terms of migrant workers as part of IMWs' earnings – either money or goods – sent to Indonesia and/or brought back home by the concerned IMWs (Yudanto et al., 2009, p. 3), while perceiving remittance as part of fund transfer that is generally conducted without underlying economic obligation fulfilment, having low value, and carried out between

individuals (Bank Indonesia, n.d.). Fund transfer itself is authentically defined as a series of activities beginning with the originator's order to transfer certain amounts of funds to the beneficiary mentioned in the fund transfer order and ending with the reception of such fund by the beneficiary.<sup>12</sup>

Consequently, Art. 35 point a of Law 18/2017 mentioning "banks or non-bank financial institutions" in the remittance management indicates a simplification of IMWs' remittances under the term remittance, wherein remittances are considered part of fund transfer. This is because banks and non-bank financial institutions obviously function to mobilize and to channel funds,<sup>13</sup> while fund refers to money, overdraft, or credit facility.<sup>14</sup> In other words, the simplification of migrant workers' remittances through a narrow, formal money transfer-oriented formulation has neglected the non-formal money transfer and transfer of goods as the other forms of migrant workers' remittances. The postal network – as one of the formal channels used by migrant workers to remit (Engle, 2004, pp. 38-39) – is not involved accordingly, as the services provided also cover the transfer of goods besides money transfers ("About UPU", n.d.; "Postal and Telecommunications Services Sector", n.d.). Meanwhile, the postal network is also a popular remittance channel used by IMWs (Dewi & Yazid, 2017, pp. 216-218).

#### **MIGRANT WORKERS' REMITTANCES: A COMPONENT OF NATIONAL INCOME INFILTRATED BY THE GOVERNMENT**

As a private transfer, migrant workers' remittances are a component of secondary income in the balance of payment<sup>15</sup> that can be included in the national income calculation (Ou, 1946, pp. 294-296). There are different ideas reflecting what is meant by national income (see Barna, 1942; Clark, 1948; Kuznets, 1940) as well as different methods of measurement, such as product, income, expenditure, and value-added methods. Neither national income nor other terminologies equal to it are available

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12 This authentic definition is found in Art. 1 point 1 of Law No. 3 of 2011 on Fund Transfer (Law 3/2011) and Art. 1 point 1 of Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 14/23/PBI/2012 on Fund Transfer.

13 This is based on (1) the authentic definition of bank in Art. 1 point 1 of Law No. 7 of 1992 on Banking in which these functions are defined, although the authentic definition has been slightly changed by Law No. 10 of 1998 on the Amendment of Law No. 7 of 1992 on Banking; and on (2) some regulations referring non-bank financial institutions to – among others – insurance companies, pension funds, and financing institutions.

14 Art. 1 point 4 of Law 3/2011 – similarly to Art. 1 point 4 of Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 14/23/PBI/2012 on Fund Transfer – defines fund as (1) cash money turned over by Sender to the Receiving Provider; (2) money saved in Sender's Account on the Receiving Provider; (3) money saved in Receiving Provider's Account on another Receiving Provider; (4) money saved in Beneficiary's Account on the Final Receiving Provider; (5) money saved in Receiving Provider's Account allocated for the purposes of the Beneficiary who does not have Account on such Provider; and/or (6) overdraft or credit facility given by Provider to the Sender.

15 See International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 210. A relatively minor change is made by the *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual*, sixth edition (*BPM6*) – the current basis for Indonesian Balance of Payment arrangement – by replacing 'workers' remittances' known in the fifth edition of the *Balance of Payments Manual* (*BPM5*) with a broader terminology of 'personal transfer'. Nonetheless, the *BPM6* still acknowledges the definition of workers' remittances, and personal transfers – which includes workers' remittances – remain under the secondary income account.

in Indonesian statutory laws. In the 1945 Constitution, which consists of a specific chapter on national economic and social welfare besides financial matters, some aspects of state finance, including the state budget, tax and other levies, central-local governments' financial relations, and audit boards; currency; central bank; principles underlying national economics; state control over land, water, and natural resources as well as important sectors of production are encompassed.<sup>16</sup> Some terminologies – which might seem similar – existing in the statutory laws are state finance, state revenue, state income, and state ownership,<sup>17</sup> but none of them are comparable to national income since both terminologies count heavily on the state as the right holder and/or duty bearer.

By giving a space for the government in the remittance management, Law 18/2017 seems to attract migrant workers' remittances to an area in which the state has an active role, while such remittances are a private transfer in which the management is – logically – fully controlled by the families. The Indonesian government's obligation to give an economic protection towards IMWs through remittance management by involving banks or non-bank financial institutions within the state and the placement state – imposed by Law 18/2017 – triggers a question on whether such remittance management can really be conducted and how this will be conducted because neither further provisions nor explanations are provided in the law, while the implementing regulation is also problematic. Given the unprecise implementing regulation that makes the form of so-called 'economic protection' unclear, the following two sections will show that IMWs' remittance is an area infiltrated by the government beginning from a constitutionally groundless measure.

### **DEPLOYMENT OF INDONESIAN WORKERS ABROAD WITHIN THE ABSENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR STATE INTERVENTION ON HUMAN RESOURCES ALLOCATION**

Economic provisions in the 1945 Constitution have been criticized for being insufficient, including the state's intervention in economic resources allocation that merely covers natural resources and important sectors of production.<sup>18</sup> As the activity

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16 See the Arts. 18A para. (2); 23 para. (1); 23A; 23B; 23D; 33; and the Chapter VIIIA specifically focused on the Audit Board. The principles underlying national economics are explicitly mentioned, and the production sectors necessary for the state as well as natural resources are explicitly stated as 'under the powers by state' (*dikuasai oleh negara*). The other matters might not be treated similarly, but those are mandated to legislation.

17 See Art. 1 points 1, 9 and 13 as well as Art. 2 of Law No. 17 of 2003 on State Finance; General Elucidation of Law No. 31 of 1999 on the Corruption Eradication; Ministry of Finance Decree No. KEP-225/MK/V/4/1971 on Implementing Guidelines for the Inventory of State-Owned Property/State Assets; Ministry of Finance Decree No. 01/KM.12/2001 on Guidelines for the Capitalization of State-Owned Property/State Assets in the Government Accounting System; and Law No. 15 of 2004 on the Examination of State Finance Management and Responsibility. See also "Beda Keuangan Negara" (2014).

18 As documented by the Mahkamah Konstitusi Indonesia (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia) (2010b, pp. 534-536), Bambang Soedibyo – in his capacity as the Expert Team member in the third amendment of the 1945 Constitution – criticized the economic provision within the 1945 Constitution for being insufficient as there are four areas of economic technocracy necessary to be regulated while the regulation is still very minimal. While fiscal matters – the management of state finance and assets – are only half provided with a constitutional basis, the monetary matters are not even regulated; market

producing IMWs' remittances, IMWs' deployment abroad is actually a form of government intervention in human resources – a component of economic resources clearly distinct from natural resources and irrelevant to the interpretation of important sectors of production<sup>19</sup> – lacking a constitutional basis.

However, in response to the high demand for manual and domestic workers in the Middle East in 1970, the Indonesian government declared that it “may agree on exporting Indonesian workers” and even promoted this as a national development program (Dewanto, 2020, p. 509). The number of workers to be deployed abroad was explicitly targeted in the *Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* (Five-Year Development Plan, REPELITA) era, starting from 100,000 workers during the REPELITA III;<sup>20</sup> 225,000 workers during REPELITA IV;<sup>21</sup> 500,000 workers during REPELITA V;<sup>22</sup> and at least 1,250,000 workers during REPELITA VI.<sup>23</sup> Since REPELITA IV<sup>24</sup>, a specific

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institution as well as state intervention on this are also unregulated, and market management and state intervention on economic resources allocation have no constitutional basis at all. These are still relevant, as the Chapter XIV – National Economy and Social Welfare's alterations brought by the fourth amendment of the constitution do not answer these criticisms. Soedibyo even argued that state intervention on economic resources allocation is totally constitutionally groundless (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2010b, p. 536). However, some constitutional bases can actually be seen in Art. 33 para. (2) of the 1945 Constitution addressing state intervention in important sectors of production and in para. (3) addressing state intervention in natural resources.

19 There is still no clarity about what is meant by important sectors of production, but human resources are a production factor rather than a production sector. During the constitution amendment process, Hendi Tjaswadi, in his capacity as the spokesman of the Indonesian National Army faction in the second amendment of the 1945 Constitution, referred “the control by the state” to state companies, by mentioning the State Electricity Company and Telkom – the state-owned information and communications technology enterprise and telecommunications network in Indonesia – as an example (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2010b, pp. 507-508). This was also the concern of the Constitutional Court in 2003 (Constitutional Court Decision No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003, p. 331), but this is also irrelevant to human resources, as the context was on whether electricity is a production sector important to the state and affecting the lives of many people.

20 See the Attachment to Presidential Decree No. 7 of 1979 on the Third Five-Year Development Plan (REPELITA III) 1979/80-1983/84s (Presidential Decree 7/1979), Chapter V on the Expansion of Employment Opportunity, p. 292.

21 Attachment to Presidential Decree No. 21 of 1984 on the Fourth Five-year Development Plan (REPELITA IV) 1984/85-1988/89 (Presidential Decree 21/1984), pp. 341-345, gives more detail as 35.000 workers were planned to be deployed in 1984/1985; 40.000 in 1985/1986; 45.000 in 1986/1987; 50.000 in 1987/1988; and 55.000 in 1988/1989.

22 Attachment to Presidential Decree No. 13 of 1989 on the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (REPELITA V) 1989/90-1993/94 (Presidential Decree 13/1989), pp. 397-398, details that 50.000 workers were planned to be deployed in 1989/1990; 75.000 in 1990/1991; 100.000 in 1991/1992; 125.000 in 1992/1993; and 150.000 in 1993/1994.

23 See the Attachment to Presidential Decree No. 17 of 1994 on the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (REPELITA VI) 1994/94-1998/99 (Presidential Decree 17/1994), Chapter X on Labor and the Expansion of Employment Opportunities, pp. 118, 130.

24 See the Attachment to Presidential Decree 21/1984 and the Attachment to Presidential Decree 13/1989. The amount recorded in REPELITA IV are USD 4 million in 1978/1979; USD 15 million in 1979/1980; USD 27 million in 1980/1981; USD 39 million in 1981/1982; USD 55 million in 1982/1983; and USD 48 million in 1983/1984, with an average growth rate of 64,4%. REPELITA V records migrant workers' remittances to the amount of USD 46 million in 1983/1984; USD 56 million in 1984/1985; USD 64 million in 1985/1986; USD 75 million in 1986/1987; USD 90 million in 1987/1988; and USD 110 million in 1988/1989, with an average growth rate of 19,0%.

chapter on the balance of payment records of migrant workers' remittance as a component of net factor income included workers deployment as a means to increase foreign exchange income sourced from remittance<sup>25</sup> and estimated the amount of foreign exchange income from IMWs.<sup>26</sup> The *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional* (National Medium Term Development Plan, RPJMN) still realizes the need of opportunities to work overseas due to the huge amount of unemployment within the state, but the number of IMWs to be deployed is no longer visible.<sup>27</sup> The number of IMWs' remittances is also no longer clearly stated as a balance of payment component, but its contribution to foreign exchange income is still acknowledged.<sup>28</sup>

### LAW-BASED STATE, CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY, AND SILENCE IN THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AS AN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION

The dynamic of the 1945 Constitution unequivocally shows that Indonesia is a law-based state. The pre-amended version states that Indonesia is based on law by referring to *rechtsstaat* in opposite to *machtstaat*, but this statement is only placed in the elucidation. The desire to elevate this position has been around since the discussion of the first amendment of the 1945 Constitution (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2010a, pp. 389-477), until the third amendment finally embraced it.<sup>29</sup> The position is now more assertive, but there is another concern as *rechtsstaat* is no longer mentioned. What the best formula would be was obviously the main object of discussion, as it revolved around a number of options, including the "law-based state" (*negara berdasar atas hukum*); "law state" (*negara hukum*); "law state upholding human rights" (*negara hukum yang menjunjung tinggi hak asasi manusia*); and "democratic law state" (*negara hukum yang demokratis*). To mention or not to mention the

25 See the attachments to Presidential Decree 21/1984, 235, 239; Presidential Decree 13/1989, 295; and Presidential Decree 17/1994, 392. REPELITA IV emphasizes the deployment to and remittance from the Middle East. REPELITA V still acknowledges the potency of Indonesian migrant workers' remittances as a source of foreign exchange income. REPELITA IV includes Indonesian migrant workers' remittance as a means to increase foreign exchange income from the services sector to control the deficit in the services sector.

26 REPELITA IV estimates that the remittance will reach USD 48 million in 1983/1984; USD 200 million in 1984/1985; USD 348 million in 1985/1986; USD 530 million in 1986/1987; USD 805 million in 1987/1988; and USD 1230 million in 1988/1999, with an average growth rate of 91,3%. REPELITA V estimates that the remittance will reach USD 110 million in 1988/1989; USD 126 million in 1989/1990; USD 143 million in 1990/1991; USD 157 million in 1991/1992; USD 181 million in 1992/1993; and USD 218 million in 1993/1994, with an average growth rate of 14,7%. REPELITA VI estimates that the remittances are increasing with an average of 26,8% per year from USD 291 million in 1993/1994 to USD 953 million in 1998/1999. REPELITA VI estimates that foreign exchange income from the deployment of Indonesian migrant workers is USD 3,0 billion.

27 See the Attachment to Presidential Regulation 7/2005, Part IV.23, p. 3; the Attachment to Presidential Regulation 5/2010, p. II.3.34.; and the Attachment to Presidential Regulation 2/2015, pp. 3-59.

28 See the Attachment to Presidential Regulation 7/2005, Part V.34, p. 7; the Attachment to Presidential Regulation 2/2015, pp. 3-60, 4-13; and the Attachment to Presidential Regulation 18/2020, pp. II.6-II.7.

29 Art. 1 para. (3) of the 1945 Constitution exactly reads, "The State of Indonesia is a law state" (*Negara Indonesia adalah negara hukum*). Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia (2010a, pp. 389-477) has documented that the debate on what the best formulation would be was driven by, among others, a concern with the world's history, which shows that many states are law states and yet dominated by certain powers – including Indonesia's experience during the New Order regime. However, the notion behind this final formula is to elevate *rechtsstaat*.

word *rechtsstaat* was not specifically addressed. There is no trenchant clue in the discussion, but such a final formula seems to avoid a rigidly bound concept as the 'rule of law' or *rechtsstaat*.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, both *rechtsstaat* and the rule of law investigate what it means for a person to be governed by law as opposed to being subject to the dictates of the powerful, and the narrowest understanding of each concept will require discretionary powers accorded to officials constrained by law (Barber et al., 2003, pp. 444-445). In spite of the fact that these concepts are actually distinctive,<sup>31</sup> these similarities were presumably a matter of high concern during the discussion of the amendment, as the intention to elevate the idea of a law-based state was to explicitly ensure commitment to the supremacy of law.

Such an idea is closely related to constitutionalism that essentially focuses on the regulation and limitation of power, or commonly known as the limited government principle (Asshiddiqie, 2011, pp. 20-23). Constitutionalism is a legal device for the prevention of tyranny and the protection of the rights of man (Patterson, 1948, p. 427). It is defined (1) in a minimal sense, as the existence of norms not only creating legislative, executive, and judicial powers, but also imposing significant limits on these powers; and (2) in a richer sense, as an idea that government can/should be limited in its powers and that its authority depends on its observation of these limitations (Waluchow, 2018).

Both constitutionalism and the terms *rechtsstaat* and rule of law have a basic idea to limit the power and authority of the government, but constitutionalism is more specific as it requires the limitation to be placed in the constitution, in convenience with the ideal of constitutionalism expressed in the concept of constitutional supremacy (Andreescu & Andreescu, 2017, p. 19; Waluchow, 2018). One of the main purposes and functions of a constitution is to both authorize and create limits on the powers of political authorities (Gavison, 2002, p. 90), in which restraints imposed by the constitution to the government are a manifestation of constitutionalism (see "entrenchment" in Waluchow, 2018). Hence, it is very important to assess whether certain government actions have a legal basis in the constitution.

In the Indonesian context, constitutional supremacy has also been explicitly committed by the 1945 Constitution through, among others, (1) the elucidation of the pre-amended version stating that the government is based on the constitutional system; (2) an article regulating that the president holds the power of government in accordance with the constitution;<sup>32</sup> (3) the third amendment establishing a

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30 This can be seen from some opinions documented by Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia (2010a, pp. 451, 447, 466). For example, (1) what is meant by "law state" (*negara hukum*) is "law-based state", also known as *rechtsstaat* in German, or the "rule of law" in Anglo-Saxon, and essentially has the same meaning, although differently explained in the European (*rechtsstaat*) and the American traditions (rule of law); (2) rule of law - along with the constitutional system and human rights protection - is contained in the term law state (*negara hukum*); (3) the formula "Indonesia is a democratic law state" is related to *rechtsstaat* or the rule of law, emphasizing the urgency of the supremacy of law, and so forth.

31 For instance, Barber, et al. (2003) observe that (1) *rechtsstaat* rests on some sort of connection between the legal system and the state, while the rule of law is a quality of - or theory about - a legal order; and (2) *rechtsstaat* brings with such a connection an aspiration to harmony, in contrast to the rule of law that contains no implicit ambition to find a harmonious relationship between law and the state.

32 See Art. 4 para. (1) of the 1945 Constitution. The provision has been around since the creation of the 1945 Constitution and is consistently maintained to date.

Constitutional Court authorized to conduct the constitutional review;<sup>33</sup> and (4) the special procedures required for amending the constitution.<sup>34</sup> As government action is measured according to the 1945 Constitution that is still in force, the absence of provision with regard to state intervention in human resources allocation has rendered IMWs' deployment overseas by the government – that further extends to the government's intervention in IMWs' remittances – neither legitimate nor restricted.

Constitutional supremacy renders a constitution to be the source of all regulations – in political, economic, social, and legal areas – and its most important consequences are the conformity of the entire legal system with the constitutional norms as well as the fundamental obligation for state authorities to perform their attributions within the limit and in the spirit of the constitution (Andreescu & Andreescu, 2017, p. 49). According to developing perspectives concerning the Indonesian Constitution, the existence of economic articles within the 1945 Constitution prior and subsequent to amendments shows that it has been consistently an economic constitution since its emergence,<sup>35</sup> rather than merely a political one.<sup>36</sup> Nonetheless, inadequate economic provisions – even after being amended for the fourth time – should be of high concern. There are many substances commonly covered in an economic constitution (Asshiddiqie, 2013, pp. 19-20), and the absence of a constitutional basis for state intervention on human resources allocation, as an economic resource, should be fully scrutinized, as labor is one of the covered substances. The closest reason for this absence might be because this issue was not anticipated (Dixon, 2015, p. 821; Dixon & Ginsburg, 2011, p. 640), as “human resources” was vaguely mentioned during the discussion of the fourth amendment of the 1945 Constitution, and it seemed neglected afterwards.<sup>37</sup>

Silences in a constitution allow “time and experience” for improvement and completion, as a constitution is an evolutionary achievement (Loughlin, 2018, pp. 922-923). The long practice of IMWs' deployment abroad as constitutionally groundless has shown “time and experience”, but the constitution on this particular issue has not been improved yet. This unfortunately hinders the 1945 Constitution to optimally safeguard the civic virtues of the citizens and to simultaneously impose limits on the abuse of political power and citizens' exploitation (Faria, 1999, p. 177). Yet, this is especially important for the specific issue of IMWs' deployment and remittances – wherein the interventions merely based on ministerial decrees until Law 25/1997

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33 See Art. 24C para. (1) of the 1945 Constitution.

34 See Art. 37 of the 1945 Constitution.

35 See Asshiddiqie, 2013, pp. 8-10. Economic constitution refers to the highest law in the economic field, and a constitution is named as an economic constitution if it contains economic policy. This policy will be an umbrella and provides direction for the development of a country's economic activities.

36 Some economic articles – among others, concerning the principles underlying economic matters as well as state power over the important sectors of production and natural resources – have existed in the original version of the 1945 Constitution, and are maintained – with some additional articles – even after the last amendment.

37 See Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia (2010b, pp. 604-718). There was an interesting opinion from A. M. Lutfi on behalf of the *Reformasi* fraction saying that Chapter XIV on the National Economic and Social Welfare would guide the nation in managing natural and human resources for the welfare of all its inhabitants. However, nothing in the further discussion responds to or addressed the management of human resources.

and Law 18/2017 appear as a strong justification after the policies have been carried out for decades – because placing economic provisions as constitutional norms will make them a standard of reference in all economic policies. Hence, the annulment of economic policies contradictory to the standard can be pursued through a judicial process.

## **INDONESIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION: A WELFARE STATE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD**

Remittance can be considered as the most tangible benefit of international labor migration for developing countries (International Labour Office, 2010, pp. 41-42), and various forms of government intervention on migrant workers' remittances do occur in many states (Puri & Ritzema, n.d., pp. 19-25). For instance, there are foreign currency denominated bonds in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India; a non-repatriable investment scheme in Pakistan, advisory service on investment opportunities as well as supplementary loans for migrant-worker customers of Bangkok Bank in Thailand, training centers in high-migration regions in the Philippines, and so forth (Puri & Ritzema, n.d., pp. 20-21). Some governments – as in the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea – require certain percentages of remittances to be transferred through the domestic banking system of the migrant workers' country of origin, but this has worked effectively only in the Republic of Korea (Puri & Ritzema, n.d., pp. 19-20). Temporary migration programs tend to be advocated, based on the belief that temporary migrants would remit more money, resulting in more advantages for the development of the states of origin (de Haas, 2007, p. 9). However, remittances are actually found to have varied impacts in each region as these critically depend on the specific circumstances under which migration occurs (International Labour Office, 2010, pp. 42-43), and the discussion on remittance impact has essentially changed over time.

In the development and migration optimism before 1973, there was a general expectation that remittance flow – besides experiences, skills, and knowledge – would greatly help developing states' economic take-off (de Haas, 2007, pp. 3-4). In this period, developing countries' governments started to actively encourage emigration due to a consideration that this is a foremost instrument to promote national development (de Haas, 2007, p. 3). In the development and migration pessimism between 1973 and 1990, it was argued that remittances were mainly spent on conspicuous consumption and consumptive investment, yet rarely invested in productive enterprises (de Haas, 2007, pp. 4-5). Besides weakening local economies and increasing dependency, the increasing consumption and land purchases by migrants were then reported as the trigger of inflationary pressures and soaring land prices (de Haas, 2007, p. 5). The main "positive" effect of migration – that is migrants' and their families' welfare improvement – was considered to be artificial and dangerous, as remittances were assumed to be an unstable and temporary source of revenue (de Haas, 2007, p. 5). It was also argued that migration provokes the withdrawal of human capital – and the breakdown of traditional, stable village communities and their economies – leading to the development of passive, non-productive, and remittance-dependent communities (de Haas, 2007, pp. 4-5).



As a response to these contradictory perspectives, the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) emerged in the 1980s and 1990s by offering a more subtle view of migration and development by connecting migration causes and consequences – which remittance is part of – more explicitly instead of determining whether migration affects development positively or negatively (de Haas, 2007, p. 7). NELM opens up the possibility for both positive and negative development responses by questioning (1) why migration has contributed to development in some communities and much less – or even negatively – in others, and (2) what factors explain such different results (de Haas, 2007, p. 6). In essence, the impact of migrant workers' remittances on the development of their states of origin fundamentally depends on more general development conditions in the migrant-sending societies (de Haas, 2007, p. 25). It is rather naïve to expect that government intervention in migrant workers' remittances would be likely to succeed as long as the general political and economic conditions in the state of origin of the migrant workers concerned remain unfavorable (de Haas, 2007, p. 25).

The most plausible justification for the Indonesian government to intervene in the management of IMWs' remittances is that Indonesia aims to advance public welfare and underlies the principle of social justice.<sup>38</sup> An expansion of the government's functions, hence, emerges as a consequence of welfare service demands in the framework of a welfare state (Palguna, 2019, pp. 71-73), but government intervention – in relation to the concepts of democracy and constitutionalism – is only allowed if it is approved by the people, meaning that every attribution shall emerge at least at the legislation level. IMWs' deployment abroad, thus, did not meet this requirement until the Law 25/1997 – that includes the Indonesian government as one of the parties that may conduct workers' placement services both inside and outside Indonesian territory<sup>39</sup> – was enacted. Similarly, the Indonesian government's intervention in IMWs' remittances has also just been justified since 2017 through its inclusion in Law 18/2017. Although these laws appear to act as a justification, there are some points that need to be taken into account.

First, the absence of a provision on state intervention in human resources as an economic resource in the 1945 Constitution is still an obstacle (Ayuningtyas, 2020, p. 49). Human resources are, indeed, granted human rights in the constitution, but how state activities are interlocked with the market and family role in social provision – besides human rights entitlement – must be taken into account in a welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 21). The inclusion of a state intervention provision on human resources into the 1945 Constitution is, therefore, still required. Second, welfare states exist in a global political economy that is increasingly interdependent and yet divided into zones of sharply disparate conditions. Hence, national economies are structurally integrated into a larger system and engaged in systematic exchanges with it – but a welfare state is, by its nature, meant to be an exclusive system (Freeman, 1986, pp. 52-55). Welfare states' logic implies the existence of boundaries distinguishing those who are citizens and those who are not, and such boundaries are required, as welfare states establish a principle of distributive justice

38 See para. 4 of the 1945 Constitution's preamble.

39 Art. 144 of Law 25/1997 gave the same right and opportunity to every laborer to obtain labor placement services within and/or outside Indonesian territory, while Art. 145 mentioned that labor placement services can be executed by the government and/or the people.

that departs from the distributive principles of the free market (Freeman, 1986, pp. 52–53). Accordingly, international labor migration, as the activity producing migrant workers' remittances, intrudes and challenges the endogenous nature of the welfare state (Freeman, 1986, p. 52).

The welfare state as a closed system is essentially inward looking – seeking to take care of its own while its ability to do so is premised on its ability to construct a “safe house” to shelter its members from the outside world (Freeman, 1986, pp. 54-56). Hence, the implications for welfare states playing different roles in the international labor migration process are different. For a welfare state acting as the placement state, migration addresses problems caused by the welfare state's constraints on the flexibility of the labor market only if migrant workers are excluded from the exercise of welfare state rights (Freeman, 1986, pp. 54-56). For a welfare state acting as the state of origin – such as Indonesia in the context of IMWs – the demand to construct such a “safe house” should be translated into a real protection for IMWs as its members (Ayuningtyas, 2020, pp. 51-52).

## CONCLUSION

It is difficult to conclude that the Indonesian government's intervention in the management of IMWs' remittances is constitutionally justified. Silence in the 1945 Constitution has been the main problem. By taking into account the constitutional supremacy and economic constitution applied in Indonesia, the absence of provisions on state intervention in human resources allocation obviously makes IMWs' deployment abroad practiced by the government constitutionally groundless. Most importantly, it imposes no restrictions, so that the intervention eventually infiltrates the financial output generated. It is hard to argue that welfare state's demand and endogenous nature are unconformable, particularly in the context of international labor migration. Meanwhile, Indonesia has to deal with international labor migration, as the lack of employment within the state has been a persistent problem. Legislations, hence, seem to emerge as an effort to give a justification to the government's actions, but they eventually create problematic rules as the most fundamental substruction remains vacant. This is exemplified by the considerable problems coming with the Indonesian government's obligation to conduct “economic protection” through remittance management, including the simplification of migrant workers' remittances' scope and channels as well as the legal vacuum on implementing the regulations.



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## DISCLOSURE

The authors declare no conflict of interest.



# The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Low-Income Individuals in Indonesia

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Most governments claim that Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs benefit poor people. This study aims to analyze the impact of conditional cash transfers on low-income individuals in Indonesia. This study used consumption expenditures as a poverty measure and found that the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) has significant impact on an individual's consumption. However, households in the lowest wealth quantile were found to not take advantage of those benefits due to the current CCT design. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the CCT can generate substantial inequality, as household incomes in the lowest quantile fall. Therefore, governments should be more generous to households in the lowest wealth quantile, and carefully manage the program based on the needs of CCT beneficiaries.

**Keywords:** Conditional Cash Transfer; Indonesia; Inequality; Lowest Wealth Quantile; Program Keluarga Harapan

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## INTRODUCTION

In 2015, *The State of Social Safety Nets*, a World Bank study, concluded that the coverage of social safety net policies in developing countries represents only one-third of the total poorest quantile. As a result, many anti-poverty programs cannot lift people out of poverty and fail to result in more inclusive societies (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Filmer, 1999; Honjo et al., 1997; Squire, 1993). Ravallion (2016) noted that anti-poverty policies in many countries, especially in developing countries, have been ineffective because program interventions are not directly targeted.

One of the preferred programs for reducing poverty is the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT). Some studies found that CCT improves the welfare of the poor. In Indonesia, research conducted by *Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan* (TNP2K) in 2018 showed that the CCT Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) positively impacted per capita expenditures (PCE) in Indonesia by 4.8%

per month. The same Indonesian program raised PCE by 3% per month compared to the CCT program in the Philippines (*Pantawid Familyang Pilipino Program*; Chaudhury et al., 2013; Tutor, 2014). In Nicaragua, the effect of the *Red de Proteccion* was quite significant at 18% (Maluccio & Flores, 2005). Meanwhile, in Colombia, PCE grew by 15% through *Familias de Accion* (Attanasio & Mesnard, 2006).

Research on the impact of CCT also yields positive conclusions on reducing inequality. A study conducted by Soares et al. (2009) concluded that CCTs helped governments in Brazil, Mexico, and Chile reduce inequality in welfare from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. They found CCTs reduced inequality by 21% in Brazil and Mexico, and by 15% in Chile (Soares et al., 2009). Lagarda et al. (2017) implied that institutional weaknesses caused inequality in Latin American countries. Comparing stunting between rich and poor groups of children in Indonesia, Rizal and van Doorslaer (2019) found that PKH decreased the total rate of inequality among people with stunting.

Almost all research examining the effects of CCT has revolved around issues in education, such as school enrolment (Behrman et al., 2005; de Janvry et al., 2006; Schultz, 2004), class attendance (de Janvry et al., 2006; Hadna & Kartika, 2017; World Bank, 2015), inequality of educational opportunities (Ham, 2014), student cognitive capacities (Ponce & Bedi, 2010), and academic outcomes (Juan et al., 2012; Schultz, 2004). Studies on the effects of CCT in improving health outcomes also exist. CCT programs have positively affected infant health, for example, in Mexico (Fernald et al., 2008; Millán et al., 2019), Latin American countries (Owusu-Addo & Cross, 2014), Zimbabwe (Robertson et al., 2013), and other Sub-Saharan countries (Garoma et al., 2017). CCT has also reduced chronic malnutrition (Farrington & Slater, 2006) and stunting prevalence in the Philippines (Kandpal et al., 2016) and Indonesia (Cahyadi et al., 2018). In terms of gender issues, CCT affected neither intra-household gender relations nor the relative position of women within households in Indonesia (Arif et al., 2013) and Latin America (Franzoni & Voorend, 2012; Molyneux & Thomson, 2011). CCT also relates to social inclusion (Rawlings, 2006) and equality between rural and urban populations (Krishnakumar & Juárez, 2012).

Despite those successes, there have been many criticisms of CCT programs, such as the argument that they are paternalistic, and of the ways low-income families spend the transfers (Ravallion, 2016). In addition, many fundamental questions remain unanswered about CCT effectiveness, including long-term welfare impacts, synergies between program components, trade-offs between transfer sizes and beneficiaries, and the balance between short-term transfer objectives and long-term human development objectives (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005).

To date, research has not examined the impact of CCTs on the distribution of consumption expenditures among the poor (Kamakura & Mazzon, 2014), especially among each quantile of low-income groups targeted by CCT. This issue needs to be investigated more deeply because studies show that cash transfers, including CCT, do not automatically reduce poverty (Golan et al., 2017). Critics of CCT claim that most poor households spend cash transfers on overconsumption, encouraging new, unsustainable lifestyles (Kamakura & Mazzon, 2014). Consumption expenditure as a welfare indicator was mainly pioneered by the welfarist (utility) movement in economics, which measures the welfare of the people through their buying and selling



behaviors on the market (Ravallion, 2016). However, a working paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 2018 on PKH in Indonesia could not decisively measure the extent to which the program affects consumption expenditures. In conclusion, the objective of the CCT program remains to direct the spending of low-income families to be more focused on education and health, as a way to break the chain of family poverty (Cahyadi et al., 2018).

Based on this research gap, this paper addresses the following question: What is the impact of PKH on the distribution of consumption expenditures among each quantile of lower-income groups? First, this question focuses on identifying and comparing the impact(s) of PKH on the distribution of consumption expenditures among the highest and lowest quantiles of poverty groups. This paper also discusses the weaknesses of PKH in Indonesia, primarily in reducing inequality among low-income individuals.

The PKH impact indicator of this study is consumption expenditure among the poor because it is easier to describe the welfare levels of those elements, and the results are more valid in terms of size. In addition, some experts have previously warned that poorly managed anti-poverty programs can disproportionately impact clients and lead to greater inequality (Aghion et al., 1999; Beaudoin, 2006; Bergh & Nilsson, 2014; Ravallion, 1995, 1997, 2016). Hence, research on poverty should look more closely at what happens among the poor when they partake in the program. In this case, however, conducting impact assessment studies by grouping the poor into quantiles with similar problems and characteristics can be problematic because the poor also have relatively sharp social and economic stratifications.

Furthermore, this research assumes that households in the lowest wealth quantile may have the most difficulty obtaining consumption expenditure than the next higher quantile. This inability occurs because the CCT program does not fit all, nor do program materials and solutions that do not address the unique problems of the poorest groups. Consequently, CCT inadvertently maintains inequality of consumption expenditure among the poor.

This study offers two significant contributions. First, substantially limited studies have sufficiently analyzed the impact of CCT on each quantile of recipients. Failure to capture this aspect may lead to bias as the models estimate only the conditional means of the responses. Second, most studies have evaluated the impact of CCT using Ordinary Least Square, Average Treatment Effect, or attempted to address endogeneity using the Instrumental Variable approach. While this paper follows the latter approach, we adopted an Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) approach because it is more suitable when capturing and comparing the consumption expenditure impacts of CCT on different quantiles.

This paper closely examines the efficacy of PKH in Indonesia through a case study from 2019 in Yogyakarta. The poverty data is alarming because this province is the most impoverished region on Java Island. In 2019, the data from the Indonesian Statistics Bureau showed that the poverty rate was 10.62%. Moreover, the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in Yogyakarta has always ranged in the lowest category on Java Island. Likewise, the level of inequality measured by the Yogyakarta Gini Ratio in 2019 shows the highest inequality at 0.42 points.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Experts often compare the effectiveness of CCT with Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) (Baird et al., 2014; Schubert & Slater, 2006). They posit that it is easier to implement UCT than CCT (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016): UCT does not reduce recipients' work motivation (Banerjee et al., 2017). Also, UCT has a positive impact on the consumption behavior of beneficiaries, focusing on food consumption, health, and education rather than spending on luxury goods (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016). UCT was found to not increase cigarette and alcohol consumption (Evans & Popova, 2014). However, long-term evidence showed that the impact of CCT on sustainable human development is more significant than that of UCT (Baird et al., 2014). Past research showed that a dollar unit spent on CCT is eight times more effective than a dollar unit spent on UCT (de Janvry et al., 2006). Compared to in-kind assistance, both models of cash transfer are more effective. Studies conclude that cash transfers provide more opportunities for parents to allocate money for their children's health and welfare (Kamakura & Mazzon, 2014 ; Miller & Neanidis, 2015). This study aims to examine CCT because it is considered the most prominent poverty alleviation program.

The basic idea of CCT is that incentives given to households are to keep their children in school and diligently check their health (Ravallion, 2016). However, this strict requirement is seen by critics as a form of paternalism because it ignores poor people's ability to identify the real needs of their families. On the other hand, CCT proponents believe that households remain poor because parents do not give children the right to obtain an adequate education. Instead, they prioritize helping their families meet life's necessities (Ravallion, 2016).

Studies on the effectiveness of CCT show a weakness in targeting or directed marketing. Initially, targeting suppressed program leakage due to incorrectly focused target groups (Ravallion, 2016). However, targeting has weaknesses, such as biases in determining target groups which is more profitable by local elites, and in determining poverty lines to choose the target groups. Mirrlees (1971) highlighted these weaknesses regarding trade-offs between equity and efficiency of administrative capacity (Ravallion, 2016). Equity refers to the right of all poor people to fulfill their needs. In contrast, efficiency refers to the government strategy that prioritizes target groups due to limited resources.

The paternalistic nature of CCT can be studied by comparing its impact across the distribution of consumption expenditures. The comparisons indicate how poor individuals can use the incentives to increase their consumption expenditures. The assumption is that spending on the education and health sectors is the most effective. However, there may also be more effective consumption expenditures outside those sectors. This raises the question of to what extent the poor use CCT incentives.

The targeting issue is also valuable to study when comparing CCT use by different quantiles. The analysis technique measures the correlation of CCT use with consumption expenditure per quantile. The assumption is that the poorest low-income individuals should benefit the same as or more than those in the higher quantiles. Ravallion (2016) explicitly encourages the avoidance of paternalism in poverty alleviation programs. Instead, programs must be straightforward about various low-income people's characteristics and understand the data limitations (one size does not fit all).

Several approaches to measuring the level of people's prosperity include welfare, utilities, abilities, and opportunities. The welfare approach essentially measures people's interests through their ability to buy or sell goods in the market. This approach assesses their perceptions of several well-being indicators, such as fulfilling good nutrition. The question of the people's perceptions of fulfilling good nutrition are what can be achieved, what benefits them, and whatever people maximize in their own choices (Ravallion, 2016; Slesnick, 1996; Stutzer & Frey, 2004). The utility approach considers people as rational beings who seek to maximize profits for themselves (Ravallion, 2016). According to this approach, people will only choose to address those needs that fit their budgets and uses. Sen (1981; 1985) proposed the capabilities approach, considering the varying capacities of people to access available resources. Rather than commodities, he emphasized the minimum standard of living, such as life expectancy, nutrition, education, and health. The opportunity approach adds that unequal outcomes are not problems, as long as equal efforts are considered. Efforts are only possible if the circumstances support them (Ravallion, 2016).

This study uses a welfare approach, which measures welfare with consumption expenditure by looking at income and consumption-based practices. The consumption-based method has been widely used, especially in developing countries (Cutler & Katz, 1992; Ravallion, 1992; Sen, 1981; Slesnick, 1996; Stutzer & Frey, 2004). Theoretically, consumption expenditure is assumed to be a suitable poverty measure because it captures individual living standards via the consumption of goods and services. In addition, some researchers reported a more significant correlation between consumption expenditures and subjective well-being than income and subjective well-being (Meyer & Sullivan, 2011). Consumption expenditures are also more accurate than income when examining the living standards of the poor in the lowest wealth quantile (Meyer & Sullivan, 2011). This consideration is due to the nature of consumption expenditure questions, which appear to be less sensitive for the poor than income questions. Moreover, developing countries rely on the informal sector, often attempting to under-report income as tax avoidance (Schneider & Enste, 2000). Finally, money is not the salary for people who depend primarily on agriculture; instead, agricultural goods are the salary, though turning these goods into cash can be problematic (Coudouel et al., 2013).

Regarding aggregation, measuring welfare should be at the individual level. However, numerous studies attempt to explain how every individual within a household is likely to have different conditions (Duflo, 2003; Quisumbing et al., 1995). Therefore, the actual consumption of the individual is a better indicator of living standards, than the consumption of households, mainly because poor individuals can be part of wealthy households and vice versa (Falkingham & Namazie, 2002). In addition, household-based poverty measures may fail to capture individual living standards when financial shocks hit. For instance, sickness and job displacement may lead to substantial reductions in the well-being of individuals, even when they do not bring reductions in household welfare.

When it comes to methodological issues, the endogeneity of the CCT must obtain robust estimates. As discussed in Zuluaga et al. (2020), the conventional econometrics model to estimate the impact of CCT cannot set aside issues of selectivity, endogeneity, and optimization.

$$CT_i = Z_i' + X_i\beta + \varepsilon$$
$$\ln Y_i = \alpha CT_i + X_i\beta + \varepsilon$$

Where  $CT_i$  is assumed to be exogenous,  $Z_i'$  refers to a vector of instrumental variable that is related to  $CT_i$ , and uncorrelated to poverty,  $\ln Y_i$ . Furthermore,  $X_i\beta$  refers to control variables, and  $\varepsilon$  is the error term.

This study identifies the impact of poverty on different quantiles of our variable interest to estimate the effect of PKH on poverty level. As in the Least Square Regression, conventional techniques are no longer helpful. They only allow us to calculate the link between our explanatory variables and the conditional means of the dependent variable poverty.

On the other hand, quantile regression is an alternative approach that allows us to identify the link between explanatory variables and specific quantiles of dependent variables. In this study, we can estimate the impact(s) of PKH on particular groups of individuals, such as the lowest or highest consumption expenditure groups.

As explained by Koenker and Hallock (2001), conventional Ordinary Least Square techniques allow us to estimate  $\alpha$ , which refers to the impact of variables X on the conditional mean of Y. A Quantile Regression offers an estimation of beta by calculating  $\alpha(\tau)$  for any quantile  $(\tau) \in (0,1)$ , which reflects the impact of variables X on certain quantiles the distribution of Y.

However, it is essential to note that the IVQR should be chosen when endogeneity is the issue. As Hansen (2005) described, IVQR can obtain robust estimates by addressing endogeneity issues. It provides an estimate for any quantiles of the distribution of a dependent variable. Thus, this research goes one step further by calculating an alternative approach, namely the IVQTE. This technique can obtain robust estimates under endogeneity and, at the same time, provide an estimation of quantile treatment effect without functional assumptions.

## DATA AND METHODOLOGY

### Data

The sources for this study were derived from research on poverty in Yogyakarta conducted by the Center for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) at Universitas Gadjah Mada in 2019. The dataset was collected by individuals who assessed respondent characteristics, financial activities, education, employment, and regional infrastructure. This study used this dataset to cover the most comprehensive PKH program, providing specific trends at the Indonesian regional level. There were 3,933 responses used in the research that focused only on low-income individuals. Nine sub-districts out of four districts selected as samples were chosen from the local government's policy for Yogyakarta, which determined the sub-districts as the poorest in Yogyakarta. The nine sub-districts include rural areas, namely Girisubo, Playen, Semin, Nglipar, Samigaluh, Girimulyo, Lendah, Pajangan, and Tempel. These areas have these characteristics in common: populations that rely on the agricultural sector, low education levels, geographic constraints, inadequate infrastructure, and many residents who became labor migrants.

The selection of the low-income individuals as samples in each sub-district was based on the Integrated Database (Basis Data Terpadu [BDT]) issued by the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs. The use of the BDT as a sampling frame guarantees that the entire population in the BDT consisted of low-income individuals. The number of samples per sub-district was 450 with random techniques, and the total number of respondents obtained from random results was 4,050. This amount is approximately 20% of the total of low-income individuals that met the criteria as PKH recipients in the nine sub-districts. After conducting interviews according to a structured questionnaire, the total number of interviewed respondents was 3,933. The number of respondents decreased because some had moved residences, provided incorrect target group data, or died. In addition, some of the low-income people were already in more prosperous categories. As a result, almost 55% of the successfully interviewed respondents were PKH recipients, while the rest were still waiting for PKH assistance. Fifty-five percent of the group received the treatment for this category; the remaining 45% was the control group.

This research used a set of variables that informed the socioeconomic inequality of low-income individuals. The first variables included head of the household, age, gender (Milazzo & van de Walle, 2015; Ravallion, 2016; Rosenhouse, 1994), and marital status (Ravallion, 2016). The second group of variables was the capacity of the household head, namely, the level of education (Abuya et al., 2011; Beal et al., 2018). Others were the number of dependent family members (Geberselassie et al., 2018; Mahmudiono et al., 2017; Olinto et al., 2013; Ravallion, 2016) and the employment of the household head (Handayani et al., 2017). Finally, the third group of variables was the behavior, namely the effort (Gans, 1995), of the household head and ownership of health insurance.

### Methodology

This study investigates the relationship between PKH on poverty on specific, low-income individual quantiles, which allows us to identify the impact of PKH among the lowest quintile of poverty groups compared to the highest using Instrumental Variable Quintile Treatment Effect. The model was based on the conventional potential (latent) framework. As Hansen and Chernozhukov (2005) discussed, a possible outcomes estimate influenced by variation of observation units is calculated against potential treatment called  $t \in (0,1)$  and represented as  $Y_t$ . The potential outcomes of  $Y_t$  are latent, which reflects the chosen treatment  $t$ . Thus, the estimated values of potential outcomes for every observational unit reflect only the impact of possible treatment.

$$Y = Y_t$$

This research estimates the potential outcome of specific quantiles called  $\tau$ -th under potential treatment  $t$ , conditional on some observed characteristics  $X$ , and can be described as follows:

$$q(t, X, \tau)$$

Thus, the effect of quantile treatment is as follows:

$$q(1, X, \tau) - q(0, X, \tau)$$

This formula represents the difference in the impact of treatment on each quantile of potential outcomes.

As the treatment in this study is potentially endogenous, an IV identification strategy is employed to obtain robust estimates. Instrumental variable  $Z$  is to define potential treatment called  $T_Z$  under which the model can estimate the potential outcomes via the nonlinear conditional moment restrictions of quantile regression:

$$P(Y \leq q(t, X, \tau) \parallel X, Z) = \tau$$

$Z$  reflects an instrument that is related to  $t$  but uncorrelated to potential outcomes  $Y$ .

This study estimates exogenous variations in CCT programs in Indonesia.  $Z$  refers to an instrument that is rural municipality officials. Arguably, rural municipalities' officials, who place higher engagement levels on their citizens, may increase the chances of individuals receiving cash under conditional transfer programs. Thus, the variable correlates with CCTs but is mainly beyond the respondents' control and is exogenous to their activities and economic outcomes.

## RESULTS

Table 1 describes the variables included in the model specification and reports the summary statistics. The data suggest that approximately 55% of low-income respondents received CCT programs. Some 43% of the respondents were male, and 17% were single. Most respondents had small families of less than three members. Only 10% of the respondents were gainfully employed. The education level of the sample was relatively low, with most respondents being elementary school graduates and only 1% being university graduates. However, the ownership of healthcare accounts was very high in the sample, with most respondents claiming healthcare program membership.

The IVQTR allowed us to obtain information on how the effects of PKH differed at various quantiles of the consumption expenditure distribution (see Table 2). The findings suggest that the treatment group tended to have a higher consumption expenditure than the control group, meaning a positive effect at every percentile of the distribution—the coefficient increased from the lowest to the highest quantile of the distribution regarding consumption expenditure. At the bottom quantile of consumption expenditure, the size of the effect was the smallest (1.596). It is not significant at the 1% level, indicating that PKH did not impact wealthier people. The impact for the highest quantile doubled the impact corresponding to the lowest quantiles. In other words, these results indicated that the poor with lower-level consumption expenditure were likely to obtain fewer benefits from the PKH initiatives. As a result, the poorest people have less chance of improving their quality of life than the wealthiest. Furthermore, the results indicated that, despite being insignificant at the 1% level, individuals categorized as having paid work, high levels of education (university), and access to healthcare are likely to have high consumption expenditures.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Poverty	3933	10.32	9.94	0	100
CCT	3933	0.55	0.50	0	1
Effort	3933	0.36	0.48	0	1
Age	3933	52.44	79.24	17	98
Gender	3933	0.43	0.49	0	1
Family members	3933	2.16	1.30	1	10
Marital status	3933	0.17	0.91	0	1
Paid work	3933	0.10	0.30	0	1
Unemployed	3933	0.60	0.49	0	1
Diffable	3933	0.09	0.28	0	1
Retired	3933	0.01	0.09	0	1
Student	3933	0.00	0.04	0	1
Housekeeping	3933	0.05	0.22	0	1
No school	3933	0.29	0.46	0	1
Elementary school	3933	0.34	0.47	0	1
Junior high school	3933	0.18	0.39	0	1
Senior high school	3933	0.17	0.38	0	1
University	3933	0.01	0.09	0	1
Healthcare	3933	0.97	0.18	0	1

**Table 1.** Descriptive statistics. (compilation by the authors)

Variables	q10	q20	q30	q40	q50	q60	q70	q80	q90
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
CCT	1.596 (1.309)	2.245* (1.255)	2.839** (1.130)	2.713** (1.143)	2.761** (1.254)	2.832** (1.260)	3.297** (1.636)	4.332** (2.149)	5.951 (4.608)
Effort	-0.255 (1.267)	0.193 (1.284)	0.651 (1.318)	1.237 (1.341)	1.612 (1.585)	2.165 (1.516)	2.336 (1.876)	3.039 (2.732)	4.894 (3.492)
Age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.00** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-0.042 (1.159)	-0.368 (1.136)	-0.324 (1.164)	-0.753 (1.211)	-0.883 (1.288)	-0.793 (1.354)	-0.842 (1.772)	-0.311 (2.368)	-0.790 (3.766)
Family members	0.855 (0.698)	1.031 (0.635)	1.107 (0.775)	1.285* (0.757)	1.401** (0.712)	1.496*** (0.520)	1.522* (0.860)	1.892 (1.151)	2.556 (1.565)
Marital status	-0.236 (0.692)	-0.293 (0.572)	-0.518 (0.571)	-0.722 (0.561)	-0.963 (0.651)	-1.243* (0.639)	-1.542* (0.852)	-1.844* (1.071)	-2.874* (1.516)
Paid work	-1.928 (2.687)	-2.281 (2.343)	-2.197 (2.365)	-1.698 (2.629)	-1.194 (2.825)	-1.089 (3.026)	-1.255 (3.749)	-1.458 (4.743)	0.442 (7.562)
Unemployed	-0.401 (2.169)	-0.158 (1.864)	0.144 (1.819)	0.354 (2.036)	0.536 (2.112)	0.768 (2.462)	0.565 (3.084)	0.599 (4.125)	2.559 (4.827)
Diffable	-2.804 (2.254)	-2.660 (1.881)	-2.670 (1.808)	-2.915 (1.966)	-2.625 (2.164)	-2.784 (2.420)	-3.172 (3.019)	-3.742 (4.262)	-3.377 (4.548)

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Retired	-2.826 (4.174)	-2.940 (4.294)	-3.441 (3.332)	-4.302 (3.922)	-3.907 (5.206)	-4.227 (4.703)	-5.236 (5.177)	-6.986 (5.630)	-7.787 (8.318)
Student	10.615** (4.362)	8.692** (3.802)	7.594* (3.984)	6.638 (4.125)	5.434 (4.159)	4.127 (4.495)	1.705 (5.808)	-2.858 (6.080)	5.554 (11.916)
Housekeeping	2.999 (11.514)	3.055 (14.068)	3.326 (13.871)	3.426 (13.687)	3.878 (21.956)	4.826 (19.000)	5.116 (12.526)	2.881 (14.966)	-0.122 (11.774)
Elementary school	-0.145 (1.356)	-0.248 (1.396)	-0.478 (1.448)	-0.608 (1.446)	-0.597 (1.477)	-0.446 (1.620)	-0.734 (2.007)	-1.065 (2.532)	-0.430 (3.761)
Junior high school	0.206 (1.572)	0.549 (1.660)	0.430 (1.695)	0.332 (1.639)	0.704 (1.653)	0.738 (1.703)	0.538 (2.299)	0.227 (2.728)	-0.065 (4.720)
Senior high school	1.402 (2.100)	1.364 (2.044)	1.151 (2.164)	1.153 (2.296)	1.528 (2.414)	1.793 (2.444)	2.350 (3.563)	4.408 (5.447)	5.686 (11.377)
University	5.077 (16.656)	3.801 (13.355)	2.568 (13.619)	1.475 (18.399)	-0.088 (17.048)	2.134 (42.215)	1.105 (51.145)	-0.026 (55.378)	-2.842 (44.248)
Healthcare	1.202 (1.749)	1.577 (1.533)	2.131 (1.553)	2.560 (1.675)	2.572 (1.782)	2.364 (2.184)	2.582 (2.669)	3.109 (3.072)	4.326 (5.463)
Observations	3924	3924	3924	3924	3924	3924	3924	3924	3924

Notes: A constant is included in regressions but not reported. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors; \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

**Table 2.** Instrumental variable quintile treatment effect on the distribution of total consumption expenditure. (compilation by the authors)

Table 3 reports IVQTE for the distribution of selected consumption expenditures, further identifying the effects of PKH on the consumption expenditures share. Even though the program's impact on main food is not statistically significant for all the quantiles of main food expenditure, the results suggested that the transfer was spent mainly on vegetables, except for the first (lowest) quantile. The program did not significantly affect the first (lowest) quantile of vegetable expenditure. However, the results turned out to be significant for the second through the ninth quantiles, suggesting that PKH increased the distribution of spending on vegetables. The initial impact on vegetables ranged from 2.857% to 9.897% for the highest quantiles. However, the effects are not statistically significant on fruit expenditures. Although the data suggested an insignificant relationship between PKH and expenditures on vegetables and fruits, those in the lowest decile group did not necessarily have low consumption of vegetables or fruit. Overall, these group can provide at least two meals a day. However, they usually did not spend money on vegetables and fruits. Thus, the availability of vegetables and fruits, both self-grown and wild vegetables, is still enough to be consumed. Nonetheless, it is essential to note that the land-use change tendency, which reduces agriculture and forest areas, has threatened the food supplies of the most impoverished communities.

Next, Table 3 shows that the program's impact on education expenditure varied. While the effect is not significant for the first to the third quantiles, the program substantially increased education expenditure from the fourth quantile. The program statistically increased education expenditure from 0.682 to 2.094 percentage points for the second-highest quantile. Again, many of the impacts were quite large and



significant at the mean quantiles, suggesting that the program had more influence on individuals at the mean distribution in terms of education spending.

Variable	Dependent variables								
	q10	q20	q30	q40	q50	q60	q70	q80	q90
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	<b>Main food</b>								
CCT	0.572 (0.739)	0.463 (0.990)	0.494 (0.521)	0.787 (0.629)	1.136 (0.919)	1.384 (1.013)	1.481 (1.312)	0.746 (1.106)	0.297 (1.247)
	<b>Fruits</b>								
CCT	0.000 (0.005)	0.000 (0.011)	0.000 (0.016)	0.000 (0.021)	0.000 (0.028)	-0.000 (0.100)	1.153 (1.092)	1.750 (1.071)	2.544* (1.453)
	<b>Vegetables</b>								
CCT	2.204 (1.378)	2.857* (1.490)	3.577*** (1.385)	3.879*** (1.383)	4.303** (1.996)	5.150*** (1.709)	5.611*** (1.946)	7.562*** (2.150)	9.897*** (3.775)
	<b>Cigarettes</b>								
CCT	0.000 (0.022)	0.000 (0.039)	0.000 (0.056)	0.000 (0.074)	-0.769 (0.763)	-1.419 (1.153)	-3.229 (2.649)	-5.894 (4.092)	-9.617* (5.177)
	<b>Education</b>								
CCT	0.000 (0.058)	0.000 (0.080)	0.000 (0.373)	0.682* (0.409)	1.012** (0.493)	1.303** (0.664)	1.614* (0.948)	2.094* (1.131)	2.624* (1.832)
	<b>Health</b>								
CCT	0.000 (0.012)	0.000 (0.018)	0.000 (0.025)	0.000 (0.033)	-0.000 (0.162)	-0.000 (0.188)	-0.079 (0.234)	-0.543 (0.993)	-3.138 (4.048)
	<b>Housing</b>								
CCT	-0.077 (0.168)	-0.117 (0.204)	-0.178 (0.257)	-0.312 (0.328)	-0.540 (0.382)	-0.666 (0.483)	-0.832 (0.634)	-0.639 (0.902)	-0.791 (1.013)
	<b>Social activities</b>								
CCT	0.000 (0.020)	0.042 (0.253)	0.063 (0.344)	0.133 (0.419)	0.250 (0.648)	0.098 (0.825)	0.373 (1.096)	0.290 (0.994)	-0.073 (1.619)
	<b>Communication</b>								
CCT	0.000 (0.083)	1.285 (1.334)	2.309* (1.260)	3.028** (1.266)	3.514*** (1.301)	4.243*** (1.628)	6.003*** (1.935)	7.325*** (2.207)	11.539*** (4.316)
	<b>Religion</b>								
CCT	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.007)	0.000 (0.009)	0.000 (0.013)	0.000 (0.016)	0.000 (0.022)	0.000 (0.082)	0.762* (0.456)

<b>Transportation</b>									
CCT	0.000	0.002	1.155	1.386	1.782	2.379*	2.947	5.199	6.909**
	(0.047)	(0.486)	(1.035)	(0.970)	(1.256)	(1.406)	(1.967)	(3.191)	(3.053)
<b>Total expenditure</b>									
CCT	1.535	2.055	2.435*	2.399*	2.271	2.308	2.291	2.128	3.182
	(1.741)	(1.583)	(1.420)	(1.412)	(1.468)	(1.445)	(1.636)	(2.346)	(4.327)

Notes: A constant is included in regressions but not reported. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors; \*, \*\* and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All regression includes controls for effort, age, gender, family members, marital status, type of jobs, education, and health care.

**Table 3.** Instrumental variable quintile treatment effect on the distribution of selected consumption expenditure. (compilation by the authors)

The data from the Indonesian Statistics Bureau in 2019 showed that only 14% of household members have not gone to school. This statistic indicates that the burden of low-income people for education expenditures, especially those in the lowest quantile, is minimal. The interpretation of the small percentage of spending on education is that the poorest people, namely those in the lowest quantile, do not have adequate education for their children. Despite government efforts to eliminate primary and secondary education costs, some additional charges attached to children’s education, such as school uniforms, transportation, and learning aids, are still not included in the assistance, preventing the poorest group from accessing education. Even though health is a priority for the intervention of PKH in Indonesia, the program impacts on health expenditure were not statistically significant for all quantiles. The interpretation of the small percentage of health expenditure is that the lowest quantile had inadequate access to a health facility for their children or their pregnant wives.

In addition, this study explored the impacts of PKH on the distribution of communication expenditure. Interestingly, the results significantly affected each quantile, except the first and the second-lowest quantile. The program’s impact on communication expenditure was statistically significant and ranged from about 2.309 percentage points for the third quantiles to 11.539 percentage points for the highest quantile. In 2018, the data from the Indonesian Statistics Bureau showed that the number of internet users in rural areas was 55.45% of the total population. This number was not significantly different from the people who do not own and use cell phones. Here non-internet users were the most disadvantaged group with little or no spending on communication.

Regarding the program’s impact on transportation expenditure, the effect varied and was only significant for the sixth and the highest quantiles. It is also important to note that the program impacted selected expenditures such as cigarettes, housing, social activities, and religion; these were not statistically significant. Overall, this study showed that the PKH program increased consumption expenditure. However, there were heterogeneous impacts of the PKH program. The results indicated that the program’s impact was not significant for the poor at the lowest level of expenditures.

## DISCUSSION

The findings of this study make two main contributions to the current literature. First, this study implies re-evaluating methods of identifying the 'poor.' Second, it suggests the existing poverty lines are ill-suited, as they force us to segregate the population into poor and non-poor groups. Currently, the essential criteria for determining eligibility and registering beneficiaries rely on the regional poverty line and other additional measures (e.g., elderly, number of children, or a combination of categories). Then, the CCT program will be provided with the same amount to beneficiaries regardless of everyone's levels of wealth. This approach may hinder CCT's targeting efficiency by delivering the money to the poor households in the highest quantile of total wealth. This problem is related to the determination of poverty lines (Ravallion, 2016), which is often an obstacle in measuring poverty because it carries significant implications for the beneficiary group.

Hence, there needs to be a better targeting process in CCT distribution to avoid inequality of CCT beneficiaries if the program's criteria and characteristics depend on wealth levels among beneficiaries. Extra effort is needed, especially in this setting, by grouping the poor by wealth. By grouping the recipients (e.g., the lowest, middle, and highest quantiles), we can assign the different level priorities of the program, from the poorest to the wealthiest groups.

Second, this research also implies the need to make CCT programs more agile and based on the needs for different types and forms of poverty. For example, an impoverished household with low levels of education, which includes women and elderly, and has little money left should receive more cash to improve their survival strategy. Furthermore, the data showed that as many as 43.6% of the heads of these low-income households are elementary school graduates. It is also important to note that Yogyakarta had its highest percentage of elderly in Indonesia in 2018 (18.76%). The number of poor people in Yogyakarta over 64 years old (elderly) is 16%. This group can no longer generate substantial income and needs extra cash to fulfill its needs.

Thus, households in the lowest wealth quantile may need to receive payments quickly. Education investments can be the second priority behind eating well for this group. As shown above, the CCT does not improve the share of expenditure on education among impoverished households. Besides, households in the lowest wealth quantile may never expect business to change their lives. Those in the top quantile may quickly expand their business and earn money, but households at the bottom of the quantile choose not to do so.

This research suggests that CCT beneficiaries should not all receive the same amounts of cash. Low-income individuals in the highest wealth quantiles may receive less money than those in the lowest. Other incentives, such as training vouchers, education vouchers, and transportation incentives may be more suitable for these groups. Although they still need some support to avoid further income decline, they are no longer vulnerable to food insecurity. This finding is related to the view of Ravallion (2016) that the CCT program design is highly paternalistic. This outlook places the poor as a CCT object because it cannot understand their needs. The CCT should provide an excellent opportunity for the poor to determine their own family's needs.

This research finding also suggested that we need a new strategy for assisting the poor. Assistance programs for the poorest beneficiaries may focus on improving access to health, education, sanitation, housing facilities, and abilities to optimize financial management. In terms of food security, it is more appropriate to develop programs that are not providing cash and emergency food aid. Assistance for the poorest beneficiaries is an excellent program because the poorest group spends a large share of their income on food. The data showed that the consumption of the food expenditure per capita of the lowest 10% of the population was the lowest on average (IDR 210,000). However, it was the highest in terms of the proportion of expenditures on food (65.4 %). Also, the value of per capita non-food spending in the lowest quantile was only IDR 111,000 or approximately 34.6%, compared to the non-food expenditure per capita in the highest quantile, which was IDR 3,350,000 or approximately 76.3%.

Furthermore, evaluating the program's effectiveness for the poorest beneficiaries should also be carried out in shorter periods of three to six months, given their limited abilities to optimize their minimal resources. On the other hand, for CCT beneficiaries in the highest wealth quantile, the CCT mentoring scheme may raise productivity and employment capacity. Moreover, these CCT beneficiaries can use technology to apply long-term outcome evaluation and mentoring activities.

Third, this research showed an interesting trend in consumption patterns. The target group of the CCT program is comprised of vulnerable communities, with the hope of a substantial impact on school enrollment. Indeed, this study showed an increase in the share of education. Still, some extra spending also increased (e.g., communication and transportation), especially among households in the highest wealth quantile. This study indicated that the probability of wasting money from the CCT program is relatively higher among the upper poor quantile. This data demonstrated that CCT is likely to contribute to increased inequality among low-income individuals. Thus, it is essential to note that the CCT should not pursue the number of CCT beneficiaries, but rather strengthen assistance to the extremely poor groups, and at the same time, increase the amount of funding. A smaller and more precise targeting scheme can potentially increase the effectiveness of CCT.

Together, the evidence presented in this study suggests the significance of CCT programs similar to those described in previous studies (Attanasio & Mesnard, 2006; Lagarda et al., 2017; Maluccio & Flores, 2005; Rizal & van Doorslaer, 2019). However, this study shines a new light on these debates by highlighting the different impacts among CCT beneficiaries. For example, poor people in the lowest wealth quantile may receive fewer benefits than those in the highest, potentially increasing inequality.

Hence, improving targeting mechanisms used by CCTs should be the main priority for policymakers. This improvement requires political will and revolutionary change in the existing tool. Unfortunately, political will has often failed to emerge due to limited scientific evidence on this issue. This study reminds governments that the poor have problems with their welfare levels. Therefore, governments must serve the poor, especially in developing countries, who often experience limited social spending. In this regard, governments should be more generous to households in the lowest wealth quantile, and carefully manage the program based on the needs of CCT beneficiaries.

## CONCLUSION

This study fills the gap in the literature by providing an empirical analysis of the nexus of CCT and inequality in Indonesia. Estimations using the IVQTR ensure the robustness of the findings. The analysis showed that CCT has a positive and statistically significant impact on an individual's consumption. CCT has indeed increased the consumption expenditure of low-income individuals. However, it is essential to note that the coefficient is substantially higher among the highest quantile of the distribution. The lowest quantile of low-income individuals is the slowest to respond to these changes. This means that the program is less effective for relatively more impoverished individuals.

The finding of the impact of CCT on inequality among the poor provides a similar picture of policies at the macro level, which impacts the high Gini Ratio in Yogyakarta. The more prosperous groups have a higher rate of change than those below them in this region. In the end, the novelty of this study is that the current CCT design provides opportunities for gaps between the poor themselves. If the most destitute benefit less from the program and are left behind, the inequalities already experienced will exacerbate.

Given the vital role of CCT in improving an individual's economic welfare, the policy alternative to solving this problem would be readjusting the amount of cash, with the poorest receiving more money than the wealthier recipients. The CCT should not pursue the number of CCT beneficiaries but rather strengthen assistance to the extremely poor groups. The Government of Indonesia may also need to develop tailored economic and social assistance programs for the lowest quantile of CCT recipients. These recipients are likely to have low levels of education and less money in their pockets; most of them are women as well.

This research only examined the impact of CCT in rural areas, and thus, has limitations in terms of scope. Therefore, future research should look at the same issue in urban areas, and make general conclusions regarding the relationship between CCT and the inequality of outcomes among program beneficiaries.



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# Gender in Academic Journals: Experience From Indonesia

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The literature on the gender gap in political science and international relations (IR) has increased significantly in the last couple of decades. However, little is known about how male and female scholars are publishing their works in non-Western-based IR journals. Our study aims to unpack this by examining publications and authorship patterns in IR journals published in Indonesia. The case study represents a non-English speaking country with pivotal roles in international politics and geopolitical aspects, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation and the third largest democracy, located between the Indian Ocean and the China Sea. The country is critical to regional stability and progress in Southeast Asia. Indonesia also has over seventy IR departments in various universities nationwide, and one professional association that aims to support teaching and research on IR. We asked whether men always outnumber women in terms of publishing academic papers. What is the pattern of topics published? And are there any shared interests between the two sexes? Using bibliographic data from seven IR journals published in Indonesia between 2000 and 2019 ( $N = 783$ ), this paper highlights some key similarities with previous studies in Western societies. The findings suggest women produce fewer articles than men, and 'gender homophily' among men limits women's leadership in scholarly publication. Yet, men and women shared equal interest in topics such as 'security', 'military', and 'governance', indicating that gendered preferences may not always be the best evidence to suggest that IR is a masculine discipline.

**Keywords:** Gender; Bibliometric Analysis; Indonesia; International Relations; Publication; Global South



## INTRODUCTION

The gender gap in academia is a persistent global phenomenon, as fewer women work as lecturers and professors than would be expected given the relatively equal numbers of men and women as graduate students (Aiston & Fo, 2020; Aiston & Yang, 2017; Breuning et al., 2018; Knights & Richards, 2003; Monroe & Chiu, 2010). This is, in particular, a continuing challenge for international relations (IR), a subfield of political science, where male academics dominate the professional ladder and academic publications (Atchison, 2018; Breuning,

2010; Hancock et al., 2013; Maliniak et al., 2008; Østby et al., 2013; Phull et al., 2019; Timperley, 2013; Williams et al., 2015).

The literature on gender disparities in IR has increased significantly in the last couple of decades, especially the literature based on Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) surveys of scholars in the United States (Maliniak et al., 2008; Maliniak & Tierney, 2009), Australia, New Zealand (Sharman & True, 2011; Westendorf & Strating, 2020) and 20 other countries, including some from Asia (Maliniak et al., 2012). Moreover, prior studies available on gender, journal authorship, and citation suggest that discussions were dominated by the Global North setting (Breuning, 2010; Breuning & Sanders, 2007; Evans & Moulder, 2011; Hancock et al., 2013; Key & Sumner, 2019; Williams et al., 2015), leaving a vacuum of research about how women fare in IR in non-Western countries.

To date, there has not been a systematic investigation of how male and female scholars are publishing their works in non-Western-based IR journals. Incorporating the insights from quantitative and qualitative analyses, and using Indonesia as a case study, we empirically investigated gender disparity in IR publications. This paper represents a non-English speaking country with pivotal roles in international politics and geopolitical aspects, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation and the third largest democracy, located between the Indian Ocean and the China Sea. The country is critical to regional stability and progress in Southeast Asia. It also has over seventy IR departments in various universities nationwide and one professional association that aims to support teaching and research.

Publishing often determines career advancement in academia. This measurement of achievement continues to play a central role in requirements for tenure and promotion (Breuning, 2010) in almost all sorts of higher educational institutions. In particular, "peer-reviewed journal articles [ . . . ] are the coin of the realm when it comes to tenure and promotion" (Maliniak et al., 2008, p. 131). The significance of publishing in peer-reviewed journals makes it important to understand the patterns of authorship and research themes, which will further explain the careers of women academics in countries including Indonesia. By the time of this writing, the country has only ten professors in IR and one of them is female<sup>1</sup>.

Why are so few IR scholars obtaining full professorships in Indonesia? One possible explanation for this lies in the publication aspect, which plays an important role in Indonesia's higher education sector. Hence, the current paper aims to examine how men and women fare in publishing IR scholarly works in Indonesian journals. Drawing on a bibliographic dataset, which consists of 783 published articles in seven Indonesian IR journals accredited and listed highest in Indonesia's academic journal index, Sinta (Science and Technology Index), our study suggests that the number of publications by solo women is significantly lower (31.4%) than those by solo men (48.4%). This result is predictable as almost 60% of IR lecturers in Indonesia are male (RISTEK DIKTI, 2020a). However, it is worth noting that the productivity gap is not as severe as in the US, where female authors comprise only 14% (1980–2007) and 19% of all published articles in the top 12 IR journals between

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1 Another female IR professor was inaugurated in November 2021 and she had been working as a lecturer for over 25 years (<https://scholar.ui.ac.id/en/persons/evi-fitriani>).

2004 and 2007 (Maliniak et al., 2008). The data also indicates gender homophily in co-authored articles (men co-publishing with men, and women co-publishing with women), which is significantly high among men, limiting women's leadership in scholarly publications.

Expanding from the literature on gender and keyword choices, our study contends that, compared to male scholars, female scholars are more likely to publish research with keywords such as 'workers', 'migrant', 'gender', and 'environment'. On the other hand, male scholars tend to explore topics with keywords that include 'defense', 'theory', 'crisis', and 'trade'. Nevertheless, as both sexes are equally interested in examining 'security', 'Asia', 'military', and 'cooperation', we argue that gendered preferences may not always be the best indicator to strengthen perceptions that suggest IR is a masculine discipline (Kadera, 2013; Tickner & Sjoberg, 2011).

Following this introductory section, the rest of the article proceeds in five subsequent sections. The second section introduces the literature on gender and authorship in IR journals. The third section presents a case study of Indonesia as the representation of the Global South. In the fourth section, we discuss the data and methods used, while in the fifth section, we elaborate on the findings from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Finally, we discuss key conclusions and directions for future research in understanding gendered publication in the IR field.

## LITERATURE REVIEW: GENDER AND AUTHORSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS JOURNALS

Political science is still very much a gendered institution (Acker, 1992), and "far from ideal" as the experiences of women in the discipline differ significantly from those of men (Tolleson-Rinehart & Carroll, 2006, p. 511), and cultural sexism has become an ordinary feature of women's academic lives (Savigny, 2017). Prior studies have demonstrated women are underrepresented in this discipline in the US (Maliniak et al., 2008; Mitchell & Hesli, 2013), Europe (Akhtar et al., 2005; Bates & Savigny, 2015; Bonjour et al., 2016), the UK (Bates et al., 2012; Bennie & Topf, 2003; Knights & Richards, 2003), New Zealand (Curtin, 2013; Timperley, 2013), and Japan (Steele, 2016).

Globally, women comprise less than a third of political scientists (Livingstone-Peters, 2020), as reflected in almost all national political science associations' (PSA) memberships, except in Tunisian and Turkish PSAs, where women made up 57.5% and 53.6% of members, respectively (Abu-Laban et al., 2018). Women are, therefore, working disproportionately in lower levels of the profession; for example, in the US, they made up 67% of non-tenure track positions and merely 18% of full professors (American Political Science Association [APSA], 2005). Furthermore, women are scarcer in IR departments than they are in other fields of political science; one possible explanation for this relates to the masculinism embedded in IR and security professions (Fotaki, 2013; Sjoberg, 2008; Tétreault, 2008).

Based on the TRIP survey of IR scholars in the United States in 2007, women comprise merely 14% of all full professors, and they "are still second-class citizens" within the profession with research differing from that of male scholars (Maliniak et al., 2008, p. 123). A larger TRIP project, which involved 20 countries, five languages,

and nearly 3,500 respondents, corroborates this assertion, highlighting that women's underrepresentation in teaching and research areas of IR is, in fact, a global phenomenon. Similarly, Indonesia experiences the underrepresentation of women at the senior level; this raises the question of what factors contribute to this disparity.

A study by APSA (2005) suggested that women's lack of representation in political science is explained by four obstacles:

- the 'leaking pipeline' of women exiting the profession after undergraduate and graduate programs, dropping out from doctoral programs or pursuing an alternative career outside academia;
- the 'dual burden' of family and tenure track responsibilities;
- the 'institutional climate' that all too frequently remains inhospitable to women; and
- the 'culture of research' in the discipline that often undermines topics related to women's issues.

The final factor significantly hinders the ability of women to advance their careers, since publishing is often the key to career advancement in academia (Weisshaar, 2017).

An observation of 2,055 dissertations in political science published between 2000 and 2013 found that topics disproportionately written by women include race, health-care, narrative and discourse, and branches of government (Key & Sumner, 2019). On the other hand, men dominated the 'big' topics in political science: voting, campaigns, and interstate war. The trend continues to shape the gendered publication as topics favored by women tend to appear at low rates in three top political science journals: *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, and *Journal of Politics*.

Breuning's (2010) study on the literature of international studies highlights that women's presence in prestigious IR journals lags substantially behind their presence in the discipline. She measures gender parity in publishing as women publishing in proportion to their membership in the discipline. For example, out of the eight IR prominent journals observed, *International Studies Review* between 2004 and 2008 performed the best with 85% of parity, while *International Studies Quarterly* between 1999 and 2003 only showed a parity of 53%. The productivity gap further reflects how women are systematically less cited than men even after controlling numerous variables, including the year of publication, methodology, tenure status, and institutional affiliation (Maliniak et al., 2013). By looking at more than 3,000 articles published between 1980 and 2006 in 12 influential peer-reviewed IR journals, Maliniak et al. (2013) found that articles authored by men garnered an average of 4.8 more citations than those authored by women.

A couple of factors help in explaining this gender citation gap. Firstly, women cite themselves less than men. Male-authored articles have 0.4 self-cites on average, while articles authored by one woman self-cite 0.25 articles (Maliniak et al., 2013). The second explanation suggests IR scholars tend to cite along gender lines, as men cite male-authored articles more than female-authored articles, and vice versa (Dion & Mitchell, 2020). This 'homophily effect', therefore, could account for the gender

gap in citations since the number of men in the field is significantly higher than that of women. The disparity in publication productivity and the citation gap combined are two pivotal aspects that make women less successful in climbing the academic ladder (Sjoberg, 2008; Teele & Thelen, 2017).

### WOMEN AND IR IN INDONESIA

Like in many countries, IR in Indonesia is a subfield of political science and is often a department in faculties of social sciences or humanities. We sought to identify universities that offer IR courses from the Indonesian Association for International Relations (*Asosiasi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional Indonesia*) and the Directorate General of Higher Education of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia (DITJEN DIKTI). These two sources provided a list of universities and the details on the establishment, faculty members, and lecturer-student ratio.

An IR program was first offered by the National University (*Universitas Nasional*) in 1949. The field has then expanded, with a total of 73 universities across the country offering IR programs to date (AIHII, 2022a). In line with this growth is the effort both by academics and universities to publish scientific research in scholarly journals. As of the time of writing, there are 27 academic journals run by IR departments in various Indonesian universities.

Gender	Number of Lecturers (%)	Educational attainment (in %)		
		PhD	Master's Degree	Bachelor's Degree
Male	496 (59.05)	11.17	82.46	3.33
Female	344 (40.94)	7.98	85.80	3.52

**Table 1.** Registered IR lecturers: Gender and level of education of the lecturers. (RISTEK DIKTI, 2020a)

In terms of the composition of the lecturers, a smaller gender gap exists in the Indonesian context compared to other countries, with women comprising nearly 41% of all registered lecturers (see Table 1). Regarding educational attainment, however, more men than women have doctoral degrees. This could have serious implications because the professional ladder in Indonesian universities is strongly influenced by educational level. This gap partly serves as an explanation as to why Indonesia has only a few IR professors.

The requirements to become a full professor in Indonesia consist of a doctoral degree, reputable international publications, and at least 10 years of teaching experience. However, the last condition can be waived if the person has an outstanding performance in publishing scholarly articles in top journals indexed in Scopus. The publication requirement often becomes the biggest hurdle for academics to get a full professorship. Some academics blame the workloads that heavily focus on teaching rather than research. As a result, in 2009, Indonesian IR scholars launched AIHII to provide support systems for themselves. From the AIHII website ([www.aihii.or.id](http://www.aihii.or.id)), the organization claims it has 80 registered members (72% male and 28% female). The

domination of men in this organization can also be seen in the current committee (2020–2023) members of whom only 36% are female.

### DATA AND METHODS

This study aims to examine the patterns of gendered authorship within peer-reviewed IR journal articles in Indonesia in the last two decades by analyzing seven journals. These journals were purposefully selected from 27 journals registered on AIHII’s website (2022b). The selected articles are written in either Indonesian or English. The authors are not limited to Indonesian citizens, as some journals actively invite works by people affiliated with overseas institutions and universities. We limit our observation by only including journals that have been accredited and listed in Sinta. The Director-General of Strengthening Research and Development, Ministry of Research Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia, initiated Sinta in 2016 in an effort to measure the performance of researchers, institutions, and journals in Indonesia (RISTEK DIKTI, 2020b). As a web-based research information system, Sinta provides benchmarks and analysis, and identification of research strengths of each institution to develop collaborative partnerships.

Sinta has six tiers, which indicate the impact of the journal, with those coded as S1 referring to journals that are also indexed in Scopus. As of April 2021, the *Journal of ASEAN Studies* has been included in Scopus, making it the first Indonesian-based journal focusing on IR indexed in the database. This study also incorporated journals in the next tier, S2 (see Table 2). All the journals selected in this study are published by universities. We accessed articles that are available online from the journals’ websites.

This selection has some limitations, such as the exclusion of articles written in journals ranked lower in Sinta. It also excludes works by Indonesian authors published in international journals. However, this inclusion and exclusion strategy is in line with the aim of the study, which is to examine the gendered patterns in Indonesian IR journals, representing a Global South setting and the dissemination of knowledge in a non-Western country. Yet, it does not give a general picture of the

Journal Title	Publisher	Editor’s Gender	Year Established	5-year citations	Number of Articles
<i>Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional</i>	Universitas Indonesia	Male	1990	101	164
<i>Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional</i>	Universitas Katolik Parahyangan	Female	1997	70	87
<i>Jurnal Hubungan Internasional</i>	Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta	Male	2004	124	149
<i>Global Strategis</i>	Universitas Airlangga	Female	2007	68	200
<i>Andalas Journal of International Studies</i>	Universitas Andalas	Female	2012	43	79
<i>Journal of ASEAN Studies</i>	Universitas Bina Nusantara	Male	2013	62	71
<i>Intermestic: Journal of International Studies</i>	Universitas Padjadjaran	Male	2016	39	33

**Table 2.** List of Indonesian IR journals observed. (authors’ compilation)



publication situation in the Global South. It acknowledges that other regions, such as Latin America, Africa, and other parts of Asia, have different dynamics and contexts.

In the next stage, we manually collected all the bibliographic information of the 783 articles published in seven journals from each journal's year of establishment up to the end of 2019. We collected all articles from each journal's website by searching all volumes available. The collected information includes the gender of the author(s), language used, title, abstract, and keywords. In cases where the articles were written in Indonesian, we provide the English translation for the title, abstract, and keywords in order to make the analysis consistent. We used the online text-analysis tools *Textalyser* and *Datawrapper* to depict the detailed statistics of the bibliographic text and run visualizations.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Most findings presented in this section are descriptive, as the paper examines the patterns of how men and women are published in IR journals in Indonesia. Nevertheless, we intend to incorporate with these findings a discussion to explore the reasons behind the differences, and to compare the Indonesian case with other countries in the world. The first pattern is productivity. Did men always outnumber women in terms of publishing academic papers? If so, what is the trend in the years we observed? Following that is collaboration, which we are interested in examining to determine whether men and women show significant differences in working as a team. Did men tend to publish more collaborative papers than women? And what is the pattern of female authors working as a group?


The next section deals with the use of English and Indonesian in the published articles. We examine if men and women have different levels of preference in publishing in a foreign language and what is the trend in using English for both men and women. Finally, and more importantly, we analyze what topics are discussed by male and female authors. Here, we break down the preferences by observing the title and keywords used in each paper and ask: What topics do women mostly engage in? And are there any shared interests between the two sexes?

### Productivity

As previously discussed in the literature review, men and women published in IR journals with notable gaps in productivity (Maliniak et al., 2008; Østby et al., 2013; Teele & Thelen, 2017). The Indonesian experience aligns with the global trend as solo male authorship has been the most common pattern (Teale & Thelen, 2017); the only exception was between 2009 and 2011 (see Figure 1). Interestingly, in 2002 the percentage of men and women as single authors was equally distributed, while collaborative papers were simply nonexistent.

Although IR departments have been established in 73 universities around the country, delivering study programs for more than 20 years, academic publication only started to flourish in 2012. The clearest indication of this development is the emergence of new journals. This development is due to the Central Government's encouragement policy. Since the mid-2000s, the Indonesian Government, especially

## Gender in Academic Journals: Experience From Indonesia



**Figure 1.** Productivity by gender, 2000–2019. (authors' compilation)

the Directorate General of Higher Education (DIKTI), has encouraged Indonesian academics to establish national academic journals, as well as to publish academic works in national and international journals (see Law No. 14/2005 on Teachers and Lecturers and Law No. 12/2012 on Higher Education).


In 2012, to improve the publication of national journals, the DIKTI released a controversial circular letter that obliged undergraduates to publish their theses in national journals (DIKTI Circular Letter No. 152/E/T/2012). The reason behind the policy was to increase the number of publications by Indonesian academics, which is lower compared to other Southeast Asian countries. The policy of encouragement, therefore, inspired various departments, including IR, to establish their own journals. In return, DIKTI generates national accreditation and ranking systems to improve the quality of the journals.

### Collaboration

Scholarly publications in Indonesia, particularly in the field of IR, are currently in the infancy stage. Therefore, the enthusiasm to conduct research and publish research findings is fresh hope for the advancement of this field of social science in the future. Nevertheless, the following graph suggests that the number of collaborative works remains relatively low. Only one out of seven journals observed has the composition of collaborative articles exceeding 30%, while the overall average sits at 23%.

The low number of collaborative works was caused by a couple of factors. Firstly, interaction among IR scholars is still low. There are no programs or regulations, either from the government or universities, that support academic interactions and communications among scholars, such as fellowship programs. The lack of such support has created limited mobility for interaction and communication among scholars that could lead to ideas for writing collaborative papers.

AIHII holds an annual convention as a forum of interaction for IR scholars in Indonesia. However, large workloads and inadequate funding limit the forum's capacity to provide interaction and communication among IR scholars. Hence, it is not easy for scholars to explore new ideas and find potential co-authors. Another problem is the gap in competency among scholars. Based on our observation, there



**Figure 2.** Percentage of collaborative papers by journal. (authors' compilation)

is a 'culture' among Indonesian academics where they tend to write papers not based on their expertise but on pragmatism. For example, a scholar who has expertise in military security might co-author a paper that discusses political-economy issues. Consequently, such collaborative papers reveal expertise gaps among members of a team: Some are competent on the issues, while others are not. Lastly, due to a heavy workload involving mostly administrative tasks, authors often find it difficult to sit together and discuss their writing plans. This is a major problem among Indonesian scholars in all fields of study, not only in political science and IR, and has become a national issue that is acknowledged by the Minister of Education (Putra, 2020; Sucahyo, 2018).

Our data also demonstrate that the age of the journal and the percentage of collaborative work are strongly correlated (see Figure 2). Younger journals have published more collaborative papers than the older ones; for example, *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, the oldest journal, has the lowest percentage of collaborative papers at 12%. Meanwhile, *Intermestic: Journal of International Studies*, which was established in 2016, has 36% (male-led groups comprise 21%).

Meanwhile, the overall authorship pattern (Table 3) indicates men tend to work and publish with other men, as the percentage of the all-male team is almost double that of the all-female team. This higher gender homophily among men limits

Authorship Pattern	%
Solo Male	48.40
All Male Team	7.79
Male-led Collaboration	4.60
Solo Female	31.42
All Female Team	3.70
Female-led Collaboration	4.09

**Table 3.** Gendered authorship pattern. (authors' compilation)

women’s opportunities for leadership in scholarly publications (Dion & Mitchell, 2020; Teele & Thelen, 2017). In addition, as we look deeper into the patterns of collaboration in each journal, it is evident that men are more inclined to collaborate with other men: 33% to 52% of collaborative papers were published by male-only authors. In contrast, all-female teams range from as low as 5 to 25% (see Figure 3). Hence, the data suggests women’s leadership fares differently in IR journals, with the strongest shown in the *Andalas Journal of International Studies* and the weakest in the *Journal of ASEAN Studies*.





Figure 3. Distribution of collaborative papers by journal. (authors’ compilation)

### Language

All Indonesian IR journals except the *Journal of ASEAN Studies* accept manuscripts both in Indonesian and English. However, the trend suggests that men are more likely than women to write in English (see Figure 4). Male contributors and male-led authors consistently published their articles in both English and Indonesian, except in 2004 when all their articles were in Indonesian. Meanwhile, all papers by female contributors and female-led authors were in Indonesian during 2001–2006 and in 2008.

The graph indicates a gender gap in the level of preference in publishing in English. This lack of preference, then, contributes to the lower share of female authors in the *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, the English-only journal. Nevertheless, female authors are showing promising development as the percentage of English articles has tripled in the last decade. Thus, the overall comparison shows that in some years both genders had published more papers in English than in Indonesian. These trend lines reflect that more papers could be published in English in the future, allowing studies published in Indonesian IR journals to have a wider readership, and potentially increase citations.



**Figure 4.** Percentage of papers in English and Indonesian (2000–2019). (authors’ compilation)

**Topics**

**Titles**

The following table displays the top 10 words used in the titles of articles. Both men and women have written mostly about ‘Indonesia’ and ‘ASEAN’. The latter is quite self-explanatory as the country is one of the major players in the region. It was also evident that both genders are equally interested in observing ‘China’ as a dominant power in Asia. They also shared great interest in the study of ‘security’, ‘policy’, ‘diplomacy’, and ‘development’.

Aside from the similarities in interests, women used words such as ‘environmental’, ‘women’, ‘human’, and ‘Japan’ significantly more than men in their article titles.

Rank	Men		Women	
	Words	%	Words	%
1	Indonesia	2.1	Indonesia	2.4
2	Policy	1.6	International	1.3
3	Security, ASEAN	1.3	ASEAN	1.2
4	International, China	1.2	Policy, Security	1.1
5	Economic, Indonesian	1.1	China, Diplomacy	1
6	Relations, Foreign	1	Foreign, South, Indonesian	0.9
7	Global	0.9	Development, Role, Cooperation, Women	0.8
8	South, Diplomacy, Asia	0.8	Government, Countries, Asia	0.7
9	Development, Conflict, Maritime	0.7	Relations, Economic, Japan	0.6
10	Crisis, Southeast, Political, Analysis	0.6	Conflict, Challenges, Human, Perspective, Environmental, Issues, States, United, Chinese	0.5

**Table 4.** Top 10 words used on title by gender. (authors’ compilation)

This finding from Indonesia is in line with studies in the US and other Western societies, where issues related to women and the environment seem to be less attractive for male authors to engage in (Key & Sumner, 2019). Women tend to write less about 'maritime' than men, indicating the interest gap between the two sexes.

### **Keywords**

In order to further scrutinize the interest gaps between men and women in their scientific writings, we analyzed the keywords from each paper published. We then plotted the words with the point disparities shown in Figure 5. The prevalence of keywords used by female authors is presented in red dots, while those of the male authors are in blue. Topics in which women are strongly dominating include 'public', 'rights', 'culture', 'Japan', 'gender', 'women', 'people', 'environmental', 'trafficking', and 'workers'. The disparity between men and women in these subjects is in a range between 0.5% and 0.6%.

Also used more frequently by women authors, and yet with less disparity, are keywords such as 'migrant', 'identity', 'migration', 'social', and 'cultural'. Meanwhile, male authors are by far more interested than females in writing on topics such as 'global', 'defence', 'theory', 'crisis', and 'trade', with the gap ranging from 0.4% up to 0.9%. Furthermore, although both sexes shared an interest in writing on 'terrorism', 'democracy', 'strategy', and 'conflict', the prevalence of men covering these issues is slightly higher (0.1% to 0.3%).

One important takeaway from this is how men and women are covering some topics with the same level of prevalence. 'Security' comprises 2.1% of all keywords from both camps, suggesting men and women are equally passionate about exploring aspects relevant to security. This is a contrast to the findings of others that suggest men are more likely to write about security issues rather than women (Maliniak et al, 2008). Likewise, the gender gap also does not exist for topics like 'Asia', 'military', 'cooperation', and 'governance'.

These results further indicate that scholars in Indonesia have an inward-looking perspective. This is not surprising because Indonesia has long been known as an inward-looking country in many aspects: economy, security, and foreign policy (Arif & Kurniawan, 2017; Myint, 1984; Scott, 2019). Hence, papers that discuss international politics are influenced by proximity factors, with Asia, ASEAN, and China being the most frequently discussed topics. Lastly, security, in the broadest sense, continues to be the most attractive topic for Indonesian scholars. For the male scholars, security is possibly related to *realism*, because we can see from the chart that men frequently use the keyword 'realism' more than women. This follows the global trend that *realism* is the most attractive paradigm for male scholars (Maliniak et al., 2008).

### **CONCLUSION**

As presented in this article, the data from Indonesia offers an interesting insight into the nature of gendered authorship in a Global South context. Some of the findings corroborate previous studies that highlight the productivity gap between male and female IR scholars (Hancock et al., 2013). However, the gap is not as severe as in the




Figure 5. Prevalence of keywords by gender. (authors' compilation)

US, where female authors comprise only 14% of all published articles in 12 top IR journals between 1980 and 2007 (Maliniak et al., 2008). Another similarity is research interests that tend to divide men and women into so-called masculine and feminine topics (Key & Sumner, 2019). Women dominate conversations that include keywords such as ‘culture’, ‘gender’, ‘environmental’, ‘trafficking’, and ‘workers’. On the other hand, male authors are by far more interested in writing on topics with keywords such as ‘theory’, ‘crisis’, and ‘trade’ than female authors.

However, it is worth noting that there is no gender gap for topics such as ‘security’, ‘military’, and ‘governance’. This finding offers little support to a previous study that suggested that men are more likely than women to write about security issues in an international context (Maliniak et al, 2008). Research on these three issues seems to be a shared interest between both sexes of IR scholars in Indonesia. Therefore, we argued that gendered preferences may not always be the best evidence to suggest that IR is dominated by men (Kadera, 2013; Tickner & Sjoberg, 2011), at least not according to the experience of Indonesian IR scholars.

Some limitations to this study need to be acknowledged. One caveat is that the study focuses only on gendered authorship in academic journals. Future research should consider analysing textbooks and IR curricula in Indonesia and other developing countries. It will also be interesting to observe the citation gap between male and female authors in the Global South setting. Despite the current limitations, this study contributes to an understanding of how gendered authorship takes place in a non-Western setting. More research is needed to unpack the connection between research and foreign policy. Does research influence foreign policymaking, or does it work the other way around? Which foreign policy dictates the themes, narratives, and scientific conversations?



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#### **DISCLOSURE**

The authors declare no conflict of interest.



# Attracting and Educating ‘New Citizens’: Indonesian Public Discourse on the Integration of Indo-Europeans Into Indonesian Society During the Dutch-Indonesian War (1945-1947)

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So far, the study of indigenous people’s attitudes towards Indo-Europeans in the era of decolonization, especially in Indonesia, has focused on native militia violence against Indo-Europeans. Serious studies on the desire of the indigenous people to persuade Indo-Europeans to become part of Indonesian society have been neglected. By employing the historical method, this study examines how Indonesian nationalists publicly imagined, framed, and convinced Indo-Europeans of their place as the most recent members of the nation during the Dutch-Indonesian war (1945-1947). The newly-born nation essentially consisted of indigenous ethnic groups, which in colonial times were socially inferior to Indo-Europeans. This study shows that there was a systematic attempt from the Indonesian side to define Indo-Europeans as ‘new citizens’ of Indonesia and as siblings of native Indonesians rather than a threat to Indonesian nationalism. Indonesian nationalists took various approaches to attract and educate Indo-Europeans. This article demonstrates that the relationship between the birth of the Indonesian nation-state and ethnic minorities is not only marked by violence, as it has been understood so far, but also by Indonesian public discussions about what mixed-race people mean for a multicultural Indonesian society, on how Indo-Europeans influenced the perspective of Indonesian nationalists on the new racial landscape in Indonesia, and on discourse about identity, nation, state and citizenship in the context of the end of European colonialism and the birth of an indigenous state in Southeast Asia.

**Keywords:** Citizenship; Ethnicity; Nationalism; Race; Postcolonial Indonesia



## INTRODUCTION

In the social landscape of Indonesian multicultural society in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Indo-Europeans or Eurasians (also known as the ‘Indo’ among Indonesians) were a group that, although small in number, had an important historical role. The Indo-Europeans had very diverse ethnic backgrounds, but in general the term refers to groups whose fathers were Europeans (usually Dutchmen, but also from other European nations), while their mothers were from

Asia, especially from indigenous ethnic groups in Indonesia, as well as China or other Asian nations (van der Veur, 1968b). The Indo-Europeans were not only distinctive because of their mixed blood, but also their social characteristics, such as the Christian religion they professed, the European culture they practiced, the Dutch language they spoke, and their choice to distance themselves from the natives because they considered their socio-economic position to be higher than that of natives (Hoogervorst & Nordholt, 2017, pp. 453-454, 456; Sjaardema, 1946). However, a few studies emphasize that colonial society was not rigidly divided into two major blocs (ruler and ruled), but ran dynamically, even in defining 'Europeanness'. In colonial times, Indo-Europeans were legally classified as European, but in practice some of them were found in the lower class (a position that pure Europeans in the colony despised), had darker skin than pure Europeans, tended to be ostracized by the European community, interacted more intensively with Indonesians, and had to work very hard to reach important positions in the colonial bureaucracy (Luttikhuis, 2014; Stoler, 1989).

Studies on the existence of Indo-Europeans in Indonesia in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are divided into three historical periods. First, are studies of the origins and dynamics of the social life of the Indo-Europeans in the colonial period, including the birth of the Indo-Europeans and their problematic place in the society of colonial Indonesia from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century (Breman, 2020; Henley, 1995; Sjaardema, 1946; Taylor, 2009; van der Kroef, 1953a,b, 1955a, 1972; van der Veur, 1958, 1968a,b; Wertheim, 1947). Second, are studies of the experience of the Indo-Europeans during the Japanese occupation, which was marked by the exclusion of Indo-Europeans from the Indonesian public sphere at the beginning of the Japanese occupation, followed by the inclusion of Indo-Europeans into Indonesian society when Japan began to lose the war (Touwen-Bouwsmas, 1996). Third, are studies of the Indo-Europeans in the postcolonial era, especially in the 1950s and 60s, when Indonesia was fully sovereign and the Indo-Europeans had to decide their political affiliations. These decisions led to the adoption of citizenship (either Indonesian or Dutch), and were followed by an uneasy assimilation of the Indo-Europeans in Indonesian and Dutch society for generations (Captain, 2014; Goss, 2000; Oostindie, 2010, p. 229; Rodgers, 2005; Tajuddin & Stern, 2015; van der Kroef, 1954a,b, 1955a,b; van der Veur, 1960).

In addition to the three periods mentioned above, another period has also received much attention from scholars in relation to the existence of the Indo-Europeans in Indonesia, namely the Dutch-Indonesian war, also known as the Indonesian revolution (1945-1949). The early months of the Indonesian revolution, particularly between September 1945 and early 1946, were known especially among the Dutch and the Indo-Europeans as the *Bersiap* ('be prepared') period, while Indonesian nationalists considered that during this period Indonesia was an independent and sovereign state. This was a time when the Japanese had already lost, and control of security in the cities was taken over by armed Indonesians, one of the consequences of which was the occurrence of large-scale violence at the expense of thousands of Dutch people and Indo-Europeans who had just come out of Japanese camps (Jacobson, 2018, pp. 51 & 126; Touwen-Bouwsmas, 1996; van der Kroef, 1950; van der Veur, 1968a, p. 207). Armed Indonesians considered that they were disrupting security and hindering Indonesia's independence. As might be expected, academic studies regarding the early period, or

more generally during the Indonesian revolution, focus on the politics of hatred and acts of violence perpetrated by armed Indonesian youths against Indo-Europeans, who were considered to be associated with the Dutch and to support the return of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia as well as to oppose the existence of an Indonesian state (Cribb, 2008; Frederick, 2014; Tajuddin & Stern, 2015, p. 357). W.F. Wertheim even noticed that the Indo-Europeans were the group of people who likely suffered the most from the acts of what he described as "terrorism" in the initial phase of the Indonesian revolution (Wertheim, 1947, p. 297).

Among the many studies about the origins and lives of Indo-European people in Indonesia during the colonial period, and especially the suffering they experienced during the revolution due to the violence exercised by diverse Indonesian ethnicities, scholars have ignored the thoughts, discourses and actions of Indonesian nationalists in framing Indo-Europeans as close friends and even brothers of indigenous ethnic groups, especially in Indonesia's formative years. This study fills this gap in the literature. In this article, I argue that the history of the Indo-Europeans in the Indonesian revolution was not only dominated by the violence of the natives against the Indo-Europeans as so far understood, but also by the endeavors to approach and understand each other, in a process that intended to make the Indo-Europeans part of the Indonesian nation. Violence committed by the natives against the Indo-Europeans during the revolutionary period has been well documented. However, the attempts of the Indonesian government and nationalists to promote Indonesian nationalism among the Indo-Europeans and their positive response to these efforts have been neglected.

In fact, apart from being tainted by violence, the relations between the Indo-Europeans and the Indonesian nationalists during the revolution were also marked by the efforts of Indo-European intellectuals and Indonesian nationalists to approach each other in order to achieve a common goal, namely supporting Indonesian independence and making the Indo-Europeans a part of a new, egalitarian Indonesian society. Indications of this have been made in passing by a few scholars (Earle, 1948; van der Kroef, 1953b, pp. 489-490, 1955, p. 460). In fact, efforts to unite Indonesians with Indo-Europeans had been carried out organizationally during the colonial period, as shown in the birth of the multiracial *Indische Partij* (Party of the Indies) in 1912, whose leaders were two Javanese and an Indo-European. One of its founders, Soewardi Soerjaningrat, wrote a famous pamphlet entitled *Als ik eens Nederlander was* (If I were a Dutchman), in which he criticized the colonial government's plan to gather donations from Europeans, Indo-Europeans and even natives for the centenary celebrations of Dutch liberation from French rule. This pamphlet, according to Benedict Anderson, encouraged the 'imaginary transformation' of natives into Europeans and Europeans into natives (Anderson, 2006, pp. 119-120). However, apart from a cursory mention in some of these writings – which were generally pessimistic about the potential integration of Indo-Europeans into Indonesian society – to my knowledge there has been no serious study of efforts made by Indonesian nationalist fighters and the Indo-European community to collaborate side-by-side in order to convince the Indo-Europeans to be part of the Indonesian nation and to ensure that indigenous Indonesians accepted the Indo-Europeans as new members in Indonesian society.

A few studies have attempted to pinpoint the formation of a close relationship between the Indo-Europeans and Indonesian nationalists. Some suggest it did not happen until March 1947, when E. F. E. Douwes Dekker, the figure of emancipation for the Indo-Europeans, who in the 1920s advocated for the unity of Indo-Europeans and indigenous people, was appointed as a member of the Indonesian semi-parliamentary body Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee, or KNIP) (van der Veur, 1958, p. 565). Others argue it happened when Indonesian sovereignty was recognized by the Dutch in 1949, and the Indonesian community development project could finally be started without Dutch interference (Tajuddin & Stern, 2015, p. 357; van der Veur, 1960). However, in the following period, the relations between Indonesians and Indo-Europeans deteriorated. With the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by the Netherlands in late 1949, the Dutch and Indo-European communities were obliged to choose between Indonesian or Dutch citizenship. Very few of them chose to become Indonesian citizens. The situation worsened for Europeans and Indo-Europeans with the nationalization of the Indonesian economy in the 1950s, which forced tens of thousands of Dutch people and Indo-Europeans to leave Indonesia for the Netherlands (Bosma in Menjívar, 2019, p. 79).

The main overarching question in this paper is why did the Indonesian nationalists try to persuade and educate the Indo-Europeans to become part of the Indonesian nation during the critical years of the Dutch-Indonesian war of 1945-1947? The sub-questions will address three relevant aspects, which also serve to structure the study into separate sections, namely: 1) How did the Indonesian nationalists see the position of the Indo-Europeans in the newly born Indonesia, especially in relation to the project to form the 'Indonesian nation'? 2) How did the Indonesian government formulate the concept of citizenship when facilitating the integration of Indo-Europeans into Indonesian society? 3) What were the strategies used by the Indonesian nationalists to persuade and educate the Indo-Europeans to encourage them to become part of the Indonesian nation?

I have reviewed various publications from the Indonesian government, print media and Indonesian political figures published in 1945-1947 discussing the position of Indo-Europeans in an independent Indonesia. Primary sources, available in Indonesia and the Netherlands, include propaganda booklets from the Indonesian Ministry of Information calling Indo-Europeans to become Indonesian citizens, and an anti-xenophobic propaganda booklet published in October 1945 by a prominent Indonesian socialist figure who one month later was appointed Indonesia's first prime minister, Sutan Sjahrir. Primary sources also include news articles, opinions and photos, which appealed to Indo-Europeans, published by Indonesian nationalist print media in Indonesian and Dutch, especially *De Pionier* (The Pioneer), *Het Inzicht* (The Insight), and *Merdeka* (Independent), and others.<sup>1</sup> While Indo-European circles actually had their own publications, one of them being the *Onze Stem* (Our Voice) magazine published by *Indo-Europeesch Verbond* (IEV, Indo-European Association) between 1919-1956, this study does not rely on such sources but rather focuses on propaganda from the Indonesian side.

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<sup>1</sup> The translations of Indonesian and Dutch texts are mine, unless otherwise stated. The insertions in square brackets are also mine.



While relying almost exclusively on Indonesian nationalist primary sources may give the impression of being one-sided (e.g., the lack of an explanation of counter-propaganda from the Dutch side), there is a larger context to consider here. This study focuses on Indonesian propaganda and sources representing the ideas and actions of Indonesian nationalists. The strong Indonesian perspective here is an innovative contribution to the historiography of Indo-Europeans, which has been dominated by the Dutch and, to a lesser extent, Indo-European viewpoints.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure the reach of magazines, newspapers and propaganda booklets that Indonesian nationalists used to persuade Indo-Europeans. Data on readership and circulation for the print media and booklets that I examined was not available. In rare cases, this reach can be ascertained by searching for information in other newspapers, for example the planned distribution of *De Pionier* newspaper to camps inhabited by Indo-Europeans can be obtained from the nationalist newspaper, *Merdeka*.

I employ the term ‘Indo-Europeans’, an academic term, throughout this article except in direct quotations by Indonesian nationalists and where I discuss such quotations. Here, I use the popular word ‘Indo/Indos’, given that it was usually employed by Indonesian nationalists as a positive umbrella term – equal to other native ethnic groups, such as Javanese and Sundanese – to describe the Indo-Europeans of the period, as primary sources show and despite the derogatory character some Europeans and Indo-Europeans themselves have attributed to it. For this reason, the main method I use in approaching these sources is to use the keyword ‘Indo’, instead of other keywords that are more commonly used in the academic world, such as ‘Indo-Europeans’ and ‘Eurasians’.

I chose 1945 as my starting point because it was in August of that year that Indonesian independence was proclaimed, and in the first months after independence nationalist leaders began to publicly discuss the concept of the ‘Indonesian nation’, including the possibility of the Indo-Europeans as an integral part of it. I chose 1947 as the final year because the efforts of the government and nationalists to convince Indo-Europeans to become Indonesian citizens reached their peak, as shown by various persuasive gestures such as the publication of *Het Inzicht* magazine and the *De Pionier* newspaper (in 1946), and the appointment of a pro-Indonesian Indo-European figure, E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, as a minister of state in May 1947. For the Indonesian state, this move became the greatest evidence that they not only recognized the existence of the Indo-Europeans, but also granted them important political positions in the new republic.

This study also shows that the campaign of the Indonesian nationalists was also directed at the Indonesian natives, with the aim of convincing them to admit the Indo-Europeans as new members of the Indonesian society and nation. This study will be useful to assist us in understanding the contribution and cooperation of Indonesian nationalists and Indo-Europeans in constructing the idea of an Indonesian nation, which is not only multiethnic, but also multiracial, in a time that has been almost always perceived as a time of conflict between the two. This study illustrates that the Indonesian public sphere in the period 1945-1947 was filled by discussions of all-inclusive multiculturalism and equal rights for citizens amidst the most important war in Indonesia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEW RELATIONS AMONG INDO-EUROPEANS AND INDONESIANS

The proclamation of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945 by Soekarno and Hatta (later appointed as president and vice president of Indonesia, respectively) was followed by the efforts of Indonesian nationalists to run the new government. Various government institutions were established in Jakarta and other regions in Indonesia, and this helped to raise confidence among Indonesians that they were capable of administering the former Dutch Indies territory.

In addition to the running of the government, the development carried out by the Indonesian nationalists was also aimed at establishing one of the most important elements in this young country: an Indonesian nation. This was not an easy task, considering that at that time Indonesia consisted of a huge variety of different ethnic groups with different traditions and languages, with a history of conflicts. Building harmonious inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in a country that was tens of times the size of the Netherlands was a significant as well as daunting task. More importantly, the Indonesian government also needed to ensure that the loyalty of all ethnicities in Indonesian-held territory would only be towards the Indonesian government. This task was made even more difficult considering the fact that, during the colonial period, a few ethnic groups in the Dutch East Indies had a strong association with the Dutch due to religious, educational and occupational ties. Moreover, in September 1945, the Allied forces, which were later followed by Dutch troops, began landing on Java and enforced their authority. The hopes of some ethnic groups for the continuation of Dutch rule – as a guarantee of the return of their privileges over the natives as in colonial times – made the task of building ethnic loyalties to the Indonesian government even harder. Moreover, some indigenous ethnic groups, who were known to be close to the Dutch during the colonial period and received semi-European status (Bosma & Raben, 2008, pp. 173-176), for example the Christianized Ambonese and Manado, in the early days of independence had not firmly determined their political stance.

Likewise, *totok* (full blood) and *peranakan* (mixed descent) foreigners, who in the colonial period were at the top level of society, for example the Chinese, the Dutch and the Indo-Europeans, were not clear enough in showing their political orientation in the early days of the revolution. In the view of the Indonesian nationalists, they were more oriented towards their homeland and preferred to wait for the re-establishment of Dutch rule rather than show support for the Indonesian Republic. The birth of an independent Indonesia, run by the natives, triggered negative sentiments towards the ethnic groups who in the colonial period benefited from colonialism, ethnic groups which at the beginning of the revolution did not immediately show a pro-Republican stance. A certain proportion of Dutch and Indo-Europeans who had just been released from the Japanese camps, as well as the Ambonese, were recruited by the Dutch as soldiers in order to support the return of Dutch colonialism in the already independent Indonesia. This negative sentiment hardened into hatred, which later led to violence perpetrated by armed indigenous nationalists against minorities of foreign descent, including the Indo-Europeans.

In the midst of the violence that befell the Indo-Europeans, the Republican government did not remain silent. They took numerous measures to get minorities,

especially those known to be close to the Dutch, to recognize Indonesian independence and support the Indonesian government. One way to do this was by enacting democratic citizenship laws that no longer adopted racially-based social hierarchies as in colonial times. The Republican authority campaigned that in independent Indonesia there was only one nation that existed, namely the Indonesian nation. There were no more social class division based on race. The Indonesian nation in question included both indigenous ethnic groups and Indonesian-born foreigners, such as people of Chinese, Arab or Indian descent (“Oendang2 Dasar Negara”, 1945). Another group deemed fit to be part of the Indonesian nation were the Indo-Europeans, who were labeled by Indonesian nationalists as ‘new citizens’.

A key point advocated by Indonesian nationalists in the first weeks after Indonesian independence was that Indonesia was neither anti-foreigner nor anti-white. President Soekarno rejected accusations that Indonesia was an anti-white nation in an interview with two Australian journalists on 20 September 1945 in Jakarta. Soekarno was initially asked whether Indonesia’s independence was approved by Japanese authority. He replied that the Japanese did not give a firm answer about the news that Japan had surrendered to the Allies, and therefore he emphasized that the Indonesian nationalist leaders took the initiative to proclaim Indonesia’s independence. That implied Indonesia’s rejection of foreign colonialism. However, for Soekarno, the Indonesian nation was not an anti-white movement given that what Indonesia was doing was just defending its independence (“Indonesia Merdeka Adalah Tjiptaan”, 1945). The Indo-Europeans were not specifically mentioned here, but considering that half of the blood of the Indo-Europeans was European, we can interpret Sukarno’s understanding of ‘white people’ such as Europeans, as well as the *peranakan* of foreign origin, as including the Indo-Europeans.

The emphasis on Indonesia’s anti-xenophobic attitude was strengthened by Vice President Mohamad Hatta’s statement on 1 November 1945, which was broadcast by the official government media, *Berita Repoeblik Indonesia*. Hatta again stressed to the Indonesian people that the world’s eyes were on Indonesia before deciding whether to accept it as a new nation. So, said Hatta, violence should not be used as an arbitrary tool targeting foreigners. Hatta said, “we do not hate foreign nations, nor do we hate the Dutch, let alone Indo, Ambon or Menado people who are actually also our nation” (“Makloemat Pemerintah Repoeblik Indonesia”, 1945). The phrase “who are actually also our nation” (*jang sebenarnja bangsa kita djoega*) here first refers to the Ambonese and Menado people, two ethnic minorities in Indonesia who, during the colonial period, because of their religious ties, education and bureaucracy, were known to be affiliated with the colonial government. However, it was clear that Hatta also felt that the Indo-European people had Indonesian blood. For this reason, he placed the Indo-Europeans between the *totok* Dutch and Indonesian indigenous ethnicities, as a sign that the Indo-European group was a mixed group that had an indigenous Indonesian element. This seems to be an implicit call for the Indo-European group to feel closer to their Indonesian heritage than to their Dutch.

Hatta also showed a practical and visionary mind in seeing the need for a friendly attitude with foreigners, including the Indo-Europeans, who in Hatta’s perspective looked more like half-strangers than complete foreigners (such as *totok* Dutch). As semi-foreigners who were also highly educated, worked in middle-level jobs, and had

strong financial capabilities – achievements that were rarely obtained by the majority of natives – Indo-Europeans occupied a special position in the view of the government, especially in the possibility of helping Indonesia carry out development that required professional manpower (“Makloemat Pemerintah Repoeblik Indonesia”, 1945).

Hatta knew very well that as a new ex-colony, Indonesia faced a major problem: a serious lack of educated and skilled personnel. Thus, Hatta emphasized that even though Indonesia was rich in natural resources, this young country still needed foreigners, especially professionals from the more advanced Western countries. In this regard, Indonesia would try to become a member of the United Nations. For this reason, the country also needed to ensure security, safety and the participation of people of foreign descent. Hatta said, “In this country we will exercise the sovereignty of our people with the rules of citizenship which will quickly make all Indo[,] Asian and European groups become true Indonesians, become patriots and Indonesian democrats” (“Makloemat Pemerintah Repoeblik Indonesia”, 1945).

There is another anti-xenophobia view among Indonesian leaders worth mentioning here. A few important points were delivered by Sutan Sjahrir. Known as an anti-fascist, nationalist activist, Sjahrir was an opponent of collaboration with Japan (Mrázek, 1994). At the end of October 1945, he published *Perdjoeangan Kita* (Our Struggle), a booklet that, according to historians, had a profound impact on Indonesian political thought because of his efforts to cleanse the remnants of Japanese influence on the Indonesian nationalists (Bayly & Harper, 2007, p. 183; Kahin, 2003, pp. 164-165; Legge, 2010, p. 159; Turner, 2018, p. 63). However, a section in the booklet actually discusses the right place for foreign-blood minorities, especially the Indo-Europeans, in an independent Indonesia. Sjahrir criticized the long-lasting influence of Japanese propaganda among Indonesian youth, especially for hating foreign nations who were considered enemies of Japan, such as the Allies, the Dutch, the “Indos”, and the Chinese. When referring to the Indo-Europeans in his booklet, he added in brackets that the “Indos” were “our own people” (*bangsa kita sendiri*) (Sjahrir, 1945, p. 4). Here, Sjahrir declares and advocates that the Indo-Europeans were part of Indonesian society, just like other indigenous ethnic groups, such as Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, and Minangkabau. As a consequence, the Indo-Europeans should not be hated, let alone be the targets of acts of violence by Indonesian youth. Sjahrir’s idea also sent a strong message that Indonesian youths who hated Indo-Europeans, and even committed violence against them, were actually still under the guise of Japanese propaganda.

In the booklet, Sjahrir (1945) explains that it was difficult to accept the cruelty and killings that occurred against “the Indos, Ambonese and Menadonese, who are also our own nation” (p. 10). He even reminded Indonesians that hatred towards the Indos, Ambonese and Menadonese would jeopardize the country’s reputation abroad because the international community might consider “national consciousness among the people proven to be very thin or non-existing at all” (p. 10). Sjahrir clearly believed that maintaining security and ensuring the loyalty of the Indo people to the Indonesian state were goals that had to be achieved in order for the international legitimacy of the Indonesian government. This international support was crucial according to Sjahrir because at that time Indonesia’s fate depended on the victors of the war, Britain and the United States (Sjahrir, 1945, p. 15). These two

countries monitored what was happening in Indonesia, and it was clear to Sjahrir that ensuring the safety of the Indos, as people of European origin, was one factor that could shape British and the United States' perceptions of Indonesia. Sjahrir (1945) rejected the politics of hatred against minorities, and he urged that population affairs in Indonesia be regulated democratically and based on the "spirit of humanity and society" (p. 29).

Sjahrir even included a special section in his booklet about people of foreign descent, entitled "*Pembentjian Bangsa Asing*" (Hatred of Foreigners). He claimed that, until then, there had not been a "satisfactory" attitude or political stance from the Indonesian side towards a "somewhat alienated group among the population of our country" (including the Indos). What was worse, he continued, was that there were things that were "wrong and destructive to our popular struggle", which seems to refer to the politics of hatred and violence against minorities including the Indos. The politics of hatred against foreign descendants was very dangerous, he said, because "it will end up facing with the rest of the world and humanity", which would actually be detrimental to the Indonesian struggle. For Sjahrir, xenophobia was not a form of love for the country (Sjahrir, 1945, pp. 31-32).

In line with Sjahrir's urge for Indonesians to be friendly with Indo-Europeans and other minority groups, in the second half of 1945, the Ministry of Information published a propaganda booklet in Indonesian – primarily aimed at Indonesians, but also to Malay-speaking Dutch and Indo-Europeans – emphasizing the same points. The title is *Apakah Negara Itoe?* (What is a State?). The nine-page booklet basically explained the definition of a country, the conditions for the establishment of a country that can be recognized by the world, and examples of modern countries in the globe. Major emphasis here were that the state in the modern era was different from a feudal kingdom, and that the state must fulfill four conditions in order to be recognized internationally, namely 1) having a population, 2) having territory, 3) having a government, and 4) having internationally recognized authority (Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1945).

The first point was crucial. Here, a question that possibly existed in the minds of many Indonesians was discussed: What is the difference between the people and the nation in a country? The ministry explained that the people of a country were usually referred to as the nation of that country. And, more importantly, the ministry emphasized its point by giving an example that "if we name the Swiss nation it does not mean that the Swiss people descended from one lineage or come from one place only" (Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1945). Therefore, according to the ministry, heredity was not a factor that determined a nation; the determining factor was "the history or fate shared by those who live in that society" (Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1945). There was no specific mention here of the Indo-Europeans, but the tone of this explanation was clear, namely convincing Indonesians that what was referred to as the 'Indonesian nation' was not only those who come from indigenous ethnic groups, but also people of foreign descent in Indonesia who met legal requirements to become Indonesian citizens.

Attempts to define 'Indonesian society' had been made since the early weeks after Indonesian independence. One of them can be found in a pro-Republic newspaper published by young nationalists who came from *Ika Daigaku*, a Japanese medical

school in Jakarta, *Berita Indonesia* ("Surat Kabar Indonesia Pada", 1978, p. 131). In an English-language manifesto, the editor of this newspaper explained what he saw as Indonesian society. For him, racial or ethnic equality was not the basis for the formation of Indonesian society. There was a stronger element in the construction of a nation, which facilitated the participation of foreign descendants in Indonesian society. For the editor, the Indonesian people were communities of the same origin who shared the same concepts, language, culture, interests and aspirations ("For the Sake of", 1945).

In October 1945, there were many killings that befell the Indo-Europeans in Surabaya, East Java (Frederick, 2014, pp. 135-140). Feeling of resentment and accusations that the Indo-Europeans supported the Dutch had instigated violence perpetrated by armed Indonesian youths against the Indo-Europeans, including arrests, torture and murder. Violence against the Indo-Europeans continued and even spread beyond Surabaya, including as early as 1946. The perpetrators varied from youth groups to Indonesian soldiers. The Indonesian government did not stand by the violence that was inflicted upon Indo-Europeans. Instead, it tried to deescalate the situation by urging the Indonesian people to avoid violence against minorities, including Indo-Europeans, and foreigners, in this case the *totok* Dutch.

This was evident in an edict issued by President Soekarno where he highlighted two major goals for the new republic: recognition from the international community and the creation of an Indonesian society based on social justice. For the first, the country would need to guarantee the security of the population in Indonesia. Soekarno acknowledged that the Indonesian people had committed acts of violence against the Dutch and the Indos, for example by arresting them for being accused of "*berdosa*" (sinning) against Indonesia. Soekarno understood the reasons behind this action, which according to him occurred as a response to the atrocities committed by NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) troops against the Indonesian people. But he then emphasized that taking the law into one's own hands was wrong and could lead to anarchy. Therefore, he urged that the task of punishing those deemed guilty should be handed over to the state ("Makloemat Pemerintah Repoebluk Indonesia Kepada", 1945). Here, of course, he was also referring to the Indo-Europeans, whom he still considered "foreigners" yet worthy of protection as exemplified in this quote: "The safety of the Dutch, Indo and other groups in our society must be guaranteed, as long as they do not threaten the safety of the Republic of Indonesia" ("Makloemat Pemerintah Repoebluk Indonesia Kepada", 1945).

In fact, the Indo-Europeans had also been asked by the pro-Indonesian regional authority to take part in maintaining security and public order. This can be seen from the efforts made by the Yogyakarta Sultan, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, who a few days after the proclamation of independence met with a number of social groups in Yogyakarta. He met first with the city's youth groups and with other community groups, for example *Masyumi* (representing Muslims), *Hwa Chiao Chung Hui* (representing the Chinese) and delegates from what was known as the *Badan Peranakan Indo-Belanda* (An Organization for *Peranakan* Indo-Dutch) in Yogyakarta. The sultan asked them to help maintain the security of the city, and, according to reports, they expressed their support for the sultan's request ("Daerah Istimewa Djokjakarta", 1946).

The Indonesian government was trying to end unjustified violence against

minorities. In an appeal at the beginning of April 1946, Minister of Home Affairs Soedarsono received news about the frequent, unilateral, punitive actions against “foreigners” such as Chinese and Arabs, as well as to “their own brothers”, in this case the Ambonese and Menadonese (“Seroean Menteri Dalam Negeri”, 1946). They were considered accomplices of the enemy and therefore deserved punishment. However, for Soedarsono, the act of arbitrary punishment was wrong because it could destroy unity in society and weaken the struggle. He even mentioned that there were also Javanese who worked with the enemy. The minister asked that these violent acts be stopped and submitted the matter of punishment to the judiciary body formed by the government. There was no specific mention of the Indo-Europeans, but it is implicit in what was meant by foreigners.

### CONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT THAT INDO-EUROPEANS WERE ‘NEW CITIZENS’

The Indonesian government felt the need to explain the concept of Indonesian citizenship to minorities of foreign descent in Indonesia who had not yet made their choice of citizenship, whether to be foreign citizens based on the origins of a parent (usually the father), or Indonesian citizens. This was particularly aimed at the three minority groups of foreign descent, namely European (the Indo-Europeans), Chinese and Arab. Other groups of foreign descent were also considered (for example, Tamil), but because they were not as numerous as the three groups mentioned earlier, they were not specified and were only included in the section “etc.”. The Indonesian government, through its propaganda machine, the ministry of information, issued a special booklet to explain the Indonesian concept of citizenship to minorities of European, Chinese and Arabic descent, and even call them to eventually become Indonesian citizens by emphasizing the opportunities that they might obtain if they adopted Indonesian citizenship. This was evident in a booklet issued by the ministry in Jakarta in April 1946, entitled *Bagaimana? Apa artinja saja djadi Warga Negara Indonesia? Dan pendoedok Indonesia?* (How? What does it mean that I am an Indonesian citizen? And residents of Indonesia?; see Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1946a). A subtitle indicated that it was intended “for the Indos, Chinese, Arabs and others”.

This was related to the stipulation of the Law on Citizens and Residents of the Republic of Indonesia by the President of the Republic of Indonesia on 10 April 1946. This booklet was an explanation of the law, as well as an effort at persuasion to minorities of foreign descent. The Indonesian government stated that the definition of ‘citizen’ in the law was very broad. Not only that, the law was also said to have received a warm response among groups of foreign descent, who, although not of 100% indigenous blood, were born and lived on Indonesian soil, and felt that they were an integral part of the Indonesian nation and saw Indonesia as their homeland (Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1946a).

The Indonesian government felt the need to define and campaign for a concept of an inclusive nation and hoped that Indo-Europeans, as well as people of Chinese and Arab descent, by seeing Indonesia as their homeland and country, could help build a democratic, all-embracing society in Indonesia:

The Chinese, Arabs, Indos and other groups that are persuaded by this understanding will be able to work together with the native Indonesian nation, as a nation and Indonesian citizens, to build a Republic that guarantees democratic association and life in a shared social justice, in the social environment with other states and nations on the basis of equality of rights, sitting low and standing tall together, independence and freedom of self-determination. Let's do it! (Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1946a)

Using the voices of highly respected pro-Indonesian Indo-Europeans was another method used by the Indonesian government to convince the Indo-Europeans that Indonesia, and not the Netherlands, was their homeland, which they must defend. This can be seen in another booklet issued by the Indonesian Ministry of Information a month after the above-mentioned booklet. This booklet specifically aimed at Indo people in Indonesia, in contrast to the above booklet, which still addressed various minority groups of foreign descent. The title was '*Open brief aan het Indo-Comité "Vrij-Indonesië"*' (An Open Letter to the 'Free Indonesia' Committee).

This was a letter received by a pro-Republic Indo committee, *Indonesia Merdeka* (Free Indonesia). The sender was an important figure, W. Ch. A. Doeve, who was known as a key leader in the IEV. Founded in 1919, IEV was an Indo-European organization loyal to the colonial government, which believed in the colonial system (demonstrated in one way through membership in the *Volksraad*, a people's council formed by the colonial government) and had no alliance with Indonesian nationalists (in contrast to other Indo-European-run organizations, such as *Indische Partij*, which was close to the indigenous nationalists) (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, pp. 184-185; Post et al., 2010, p. 514). IEV was disbanded when Japan occupied Indonesia, but its influence remained even in the early years of Indonesian independence. The proof was the above-mentioned letter. Doeve himself was known as an important figure in the Eurasian League, which in the 1930s sought a mixture of the Dutch (including Indo-Europeans) and the natives, by calling on intellectuals in the Dutch East Indies, both Dutch and non-Dutch, who considered themselves sons of the Indies, to unite to form a new nationality, the citizenship of the Dutch East Indies (Bosma, 2004, p. 680).

This letter opened with a firm statement in support of the integration of Indo-Europeans with Indonesian – rather than with Dutch – society from someone who several decades earlier rejected affiliations between Indo-Europeans and indigenous ethnic groups, a change of mind that was clearly a relief for the Republic in its project of integrating Indo-Europeans as Indonesian citizens. It says, "Following the establishment of your committee, I am quick to inform you that I can fully agree with the goal you have set and that I will gladly support you as far as I can" (Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1946b). Doeve emphasized that in the new era there was little the Dutch could do with the Indo-Europeans. He even confidently said that for Indo-Europeans in Indonesia, they did not want to be repatriated to the Netherlands "*want Nederland is niet hun vaderland*" (because the Netherlands is not their fatherland) (Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1946b).

Doeve sent a strong message to Indo-Europeans in Indonesia, those who were members of the *Indonesia Merdeka* committee, but also those who belonged to other



Indo-European circles, especially those who were still hesitant to choose between returning to the Netherlands and becoming Dutch citizens, or staying in Indonesia and becoming Indonesian citizens. This message was also deemed important for Indo-European circles in the Netherlands. Indo-Europeans in Indonesia must forget the Netherlands as their past and be part of Indonesia as their future. Doeve wrote:

Despite all the pitiful hassle of the colonial reaction in the Netherlands, the Indonesians will eventually become the boss of their own house. That is now in line with evolution. The Indos who want to live and die in Indonesia (because there is their homeland) will have to accept the new situation and adapt. Even if they do not like it, the Indos must understand this as soon as possible. They must become loyal subjects of the Republic of Indonesia if they do not wish to be regarded as an unwanted minority. (Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1946b)

What was also interesting is the Government of Indonesia's efforts to speak directly and engage the Indo-Europeans in the language they understood best: Dutch. A narrative was built, that the Indos were not a new element in the social landscape of the Indonesian nation, and that the seeds of Indonesian nationalism among Indo-Europeans had been present at a relatively similar time as the birth of Indonesian nationalism among other ethnic groups in Indonesia. The creation and spread of this idea was done by the government through a channel with which Indo-Europeans were familiar from the colonial time: print media.

The Indonesian government published a Dutch-language magazine to promote Indonesian independence to those who understood Dutch, in this case the Dutch themselves and the Indo-Europeans. It was a weekly magazine, *Het Inzicht*. The publication order for this magazine was issued by the Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir. The leadership of the magazine was given to his followers, namely Soedjatmoko (later becoming Indonesia's leading intellectual), Soedarpo (who in November 1947 was one of the negotiators between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the Linggajati Agreement) and Sanjoto. Other editorial staff were I. Nasution and M. Wiranatakoesoema. The editorial address was Cikini 70 in Jakarta, but this magazine also had an editorial post at the Indonesian Ministry of Information on Jalan Cilacap 4 in Jakarta ("*Weekblad 'Het Inzicht'*", 1947). The purpose of publishing this magazine was to have an open exchange of ideas with the Dutch in the midst of the deteriorating situation between the two countries (Anwar in Sastromihardjo, 1999, p. xiii).

This magazine was published as counterpropaganda for the publication by the Dutch information service, *Regering Voorlichtings Dienst* (RVD), *Het Uitzicht* (The Outlook). The name was made similar to the Dutch publication. *Het Inzicht's* birth date (16 January 1946) was only a week after the RVD published *Het Uitzicht*. So, the presence of this magazine was indeed part of the Indonesian-Dutch opinion war. The name *Het Inzicht* was given by a Dutchman who was also a close friend of Sjahrir, Jacques de Kadt (interned in Bandung during the Japanese period). De Kadt himself later became a correspondent for the Dutch newspaper *Het Parool* in Indonesia (Anwar in Sastromihardjo, 1999, p. xii). De Kadt was also a member of the editorial staff, thus explaining the magazine's use of Dutch language and rhetoric, as well as its

focus on issues relevant to Dutch-Indonesian relations, including the question of the place of Indo-Europeans in the era of independent Indonesia.

Soedjatmoko and Soedarpo were employees of the Indonesian Ministry of Information, and that meant that through this magazine they voiced the interests of the Indonesian government. *Het Inzicht* was not only distributed in Indonesia, but also sent abroad. If the committee of Indonesian nationalists in Australia received more than one copy of this magazine, they sent it to committees of Indonesian nationalists in other countries in Europe, United States and Africa (Bondan, 2011, p. 151), indicating that this magazine was undeniably aimed at influencing international public opinion, especially for the Dutch-speaking people, to support Indonesia's existence and reject Dutch authority.

One of its key contents was an article containing the most elaborative explanation from the Indonesian press about what Indonesian citizenship was and a call for Indo people to become Indonesian citizens, as well as ideas about how Indo-Europeans might adapt to Indonesia's sociocultural life. The article, entitled '*Een idee-fixe*' (A Fixed Idea), consisted of two pages, including two photos. This particular space, quite large for a 12-page magazine, reflected the importance of the Indo-Europeans. The article and photos were a kind of civic education for Indo-Europeans. The original author was unknown (only the initials H.T. were provided). The article opened with a problem existing among the Indonesian people regarding Indonesian citizenship. The author stated that, in public discussions as well as on radio and in the press, there were misunderstandings about the Indonesian citizenship law. This problem was concerned with "Indonesian citizens", particularly the "Indo-problem", especially from a cultural-sociological aspect ("*Een Idee-Fixe*", 1947). Among the *peranakan* group there was a view that likened the Indonesian citizenship law as "*een poging tot 'Gleichschaltung' van de minderheden*" (an attempt to carry out '*Gleichschaltung*' of the minorities). Readers of this magazine who were knowledgeable about geopolitical developments in Europe, would certainly understand the term *Gleichschaltung*, which was introduced and used by Nazi Germany during its reign. According to Robert Michael and Karin Doerr, the term means "all of the German Volk's social, political, and cultural organizations to be controlled and run according to Nazi ideology and policy" and "all opposition to be eliminated" (Michael & Doerr, 2002, p. 192). So, here in the public sphere in Indonesia, particularly among Indo-Europeans, there seemed to be a fear that the Indonesian state would become an authoritarian, fascist state where minorities were oppressed and were forced to join Indonesian society while their aspirations were ignored.

The writer then cited an ideal example of a person of European-Indonesian descent who could be a role model for the Indo-Europeans during the revolution: E. F. E. Douwes Dekker. Born in East Java in 1879, Douwes Dekker received Dutch blood from his father and German-Javanese blood from his mother. He was known as a journalist and activist, who often criticized Dutch colonialism for its cruel treatment of the natives and encouraged the emancipation of the natives who were colonized by the Dutch and the Indo-Europeans, who were not fully accepted either among the *totok* Dutch or among the indigenous population. Its most influential activity was to form a nationalist party open to everyone, signaling a new chapter in the birth of Indonesia's national consciousness due to its inclusiveness. The party, *Indische*

Partij (1912), which he founded together with two prominent indigenous nationalists, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi Soerjaningrat, had the aim of bringing about Indonesian independence. However, this fast-paced party only existed a year. Their anti-colonial stance, and especially Suwardi's harsh anti-colonial pamphlet, '*Als ik een Nederlander was*' (If I were a Dutchman), resulted in the dissolution of the party while its leaders, including Douwes Dekker, were exiled to the Netherlands. After being exiled in the Netherlands, he took a few different jobs, but his movement was still monitored by the colonial government, which again arrested and exiled him, this time to Suriname, before the Japanese entered Indonesia. He returned to Indonesia after the end of the Pacific War and on 1 May 1947 was appointed as minister of state by Prime Minister Sjahrir.

In this article in *Het Inzicht*, Douwes Dekker was framed as a living icon of a patriotic Indo-European that should be followed by other Indos. He was constructed as an Indo-European figure who has tried to sow an awareness of the new citizens among the Indo-Europeans since the previous decades. Here the Indo-Europeans were called "*nieuwe staatsburgers*" (new citizens). It was explained that the Indonesians realized that there were Indo-Europeans who had tried to absorb indigenous culture in their attempt to assimilate with the majority of Indonesian society. The methods included "publicly renouncing the family name they have had for centuries, sometimes even putting on a sarong, putting on a *pitji* [Muslim cap]". However, although appreciating these efforts, the Indonesian side felt that these were just artificial measures.

The author emphasized that the president and vice president of Indonesia had a firm stance about the inclusion of Indo-Europeans as Indonesian citizens, namely that they were welcome to continue using and preserving their distinctive culture:

The president stated months ago that transition to Indonesian citizenship does not entail a change in name or religion. In the recent Jogja conference of the 'peranakan Belanda', Dr. Douwes Dekker, however, stressed the need for the Indos to change their names. When asked, the Vice President has said emphatically that name change is not a necessary thing. "It is not the change in the name that we want, but the change in the mind," said Dr. Mohamad Hatta. The Indos, as well as Chinese Arab descendants that accept citizenship may keep their names, even if they sound so exotic and un-Indonesian. And as for spiritual liberty, no power in the Republic could compel these people to steal this precious possession from them. This is guaranteed in the Constitution of the Republic, in the Political Manifesto 1 November 1945 and in the Linggajati Agreement. ("Een Idee-Fixe", 1947)

The Indonesian side regretted if the Indo-Europeans in Indonesia felt that they were superior to the native Indonesians. The idea of Indo-Europeans' superiority over the native was evident at the Pangkalpinang Conference (1-12 October 1946, initiated by the Dutch to listen to the aspirations of minorities and to form pro-Dutch federal states), including the idea that minorities, especially Indo-Europeans in Indonesia, should carry out a mass migration to "*het verre en vreemde*" (far and strange) Brazil – an idea that, according to the author, was a "*kinderlijk naiviteit*" (childish nativity), given the enormous cost, even if allowed by the Brazilian government ("Een Idee-Fixe", 1947; "Emigrasi ke Brasilia", 1946). The Indonesians were said to have discouraged

this mass exodus; this proposal was deemed to be put forward by the defeatists as the only way for the minority to survive. To show that minorities in Indonesia disagreed with the idea of exodus, the author gave an example from the Chinese descendants who rejected it, an attitude that "*zijn nuchterder schijnt te zijn*" (seemed to be more sober) ("Een Idee-Fixe", 1947).

In addition to the various feelings of dissatisfaction or worry among Indo-Europeans about Indonesian citizenship, the author stated that there was optimism that the Indo-Europeans will gradually understand that Indonesia was not as cruel as the Indo-Europeans imagined, and that the Indonesian government was very open to welcoming Indo-Europeans as part of Indonesian society:

Fortunately, over time, however, common sense is also beginning to penetrate in broad layers among the Indo group, and people come to realize that the Republic is "not as extremist after all" as was previously thought. Confidence in the democracy of the Republic will grow all the more soon if they keep their eyes open to the future, and start to consider the situation in the Republic more sensitively, free from all kinds of delusions and free from any fixed-idea. ("Een Idee-Fixe", 1947)

In order to reinforce the message above, two relevant and touching photos were displayed. The first was a photo of E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, who wore culturally hybrid clothing (a white shirt with a black tie plus a black Muslim cap). The next photo was of a number of Indo-Europeans, the majority of whom were women, who had obtained Indonesian citizenship. They were seen sitting in a room and listening to a lecture given by President Soekarno. Dressed in urban clothing typical of European ladies in the Dutch East Indies in the pre-war era, they seemed to be looking ahead with full attention, a sign of their serious desire to hear Soekarno ("Een Idee-Fixe", 1947). This photo provided visual evidence that a number of Indo-Europeans were already adopting Indonesian citizenship and that they were being treated with great respect by the Indonesian government.

The inclusion of Douwes Dekker in Sjahrir's cabinet shows the Republican government's recognition of the existence of the Indo-Europeans and their political aspirations. Most importantly, it was the Republican government's way of attracting the attention and participation of the Indo-Europeans in order to prove that the Indo-Europeans also had a place in the Indonesian political stage, not only as citizens, but also as decision makers, even though Douwes Dekker's ministry seat was not a strategic one. As indicated by George McTurnan Kahin, the composition of the third Sjahrir cabinet suggested the most diverse backgrounds up to that time when considering the parties, ideologies, religions, gender, and communities represented (Kahin, 2003, pp. 194-195). With regard to minority communities, Sjahrir proved his anti-xenophobic rhetoric he expressed a few months earlier when he appointed representatives from diverse minority groups in the cabinet, such as A.R. Baswedan (vice-minister of information, representing the Arab community), Tan Po Gwan (minister of state, representing the Chinese community) and Douwes Dekker (written in his Indonesian name: Setiabuddhi) as state ministers representing the Indo-European community.

### DE PIONIER: A SPECIAL NEWSPAPER FOR EDUCATING ‘NEW CITIZENS’

Close to the Pangkalpinang Conference (1-12 October 1946), the Indonesian government was worried that the Dutch could not only gain sympathy, support and cooperation from indigenous local elites in areas outside Java-Sumatra, but also from groups of foreign descent, in this case the Chinese, Arabs, and Indo-Europeans. The Indonesian government persuaded the Indo-Europeans to refuse Dutch propaganda and to consider supporting Indonesia, which rejected the conference because of its divisive nature. The Indonesian government created another propaganda attempt that specifically targeted the Indo-Europeans. This task was given to the Indonesian Ministry of Information. The ministry used a method that suited the abilities and needs of the Indo-Europeans, namely using a Dutch-language newspaper named *De Pionier*.

In order to make Indonesians and especially the Indo-Europeans know about the publication, the ministry promoted this newspaper publicly. This can be seen in a column in the newspaper *Merdeka*, which stated that the newspaper *De Pionier* “is for the New Citizens (Indo group) who do not really understand Indonesian, with the intention of making them more aware of our struggle and more aware of the Republic” (“Soerat Kabar ‘*De Pionier*’”, 1946).

This newspaper was published three times per week, and in the early stages it was to be managed by the ministry and then stand alone when it was sufficiently established. In addition to selling it to general readers, the ministry even took further steps to ensure that the majority of Indo-Europeans read the newspaper by sending it to camps where a number of Indo-Europeans were still staying (“Soerat Kabar ‘*De Pionier*’”, 1946). The slogan of this newspaper was “*van allen, voor allen*” (of all, for all). However, the editorial composition of this Yogyakarta-based newspaper was not known because the newspaper itself did not mention its editorial members. The first edition (and the only edition I could get) was two pages long.

One may wonder how that name originated. Why was this newspaper named *De Pionier*? The reasons were:

Well, the Indos who stay inside [Indonesia] and feel like citizens of the Republic, who live and work within the Republic [area], and who give all their strength to build this country – our Fatherland – must be considered without a doubt as “pioneers”, as those who, by their example and their industry and labor, pave the way along which many Indos still living in the occupied territories will soon return—hopefully in a short time—for finding a place of work and bread in our independent country. Since this paper is compiled by these pioneers, mainly for the other pioneers, it was therefore considered proper to give it the name that appears above, namely, *De Pionier*. (“Een Woord Vooraf”, 1946)

This newspaper attempted to provide Indo-Europeans with information about the latest events in Indonesia – of course from the perspective of the Republic – as well as the latest news from abroad. This newspaper emphasized its importance as a “liaison officer” between the Indonesian government and the Indo-Europeans. And that meant, wrote the editor of this newspaper, that this newspaper also had a role “to inform the [Indonesian] government about everything that lives in the minds of the Indos, of their wishes and desires” (“Een Woord Vooraf”, 1946). In this way, this

newspaper wanted to show that the Indonesian government was a democratic government, which was willing to listen to the aspirations of minority groups.

One of the interesting things was the news quoted by this newspaper from the Dutch news agency, *Aneta*. While at that time the Dutch and the Indo-Europeans considered evacuating themselves to the Netherlands because they were worried about security issues in Indonesia, the news posted on *De Pionier's* first page actually showed the opposite impression. In a brief report, it was stated that the ship *Weltevreden*, at the end of November 1946, would sail from the Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies with 990 men, women and children, who went to the Netherlands for safety (perhaps shortly before the Japanese occupation) and now “*naar Indonesia wensen terug te keren*” (wish to return to Indonesia) (“Korte Berichten”, 1946). Their ethnic backgrounds were mentioned, namely 300 Indonesians and 600 Dutch and Indo people who were born in Indonesia (it was not explained what ethnicity the rest of the 90 passengers were). These huge numbers gave the impression to Indo-European readers that, at least in November 1946, under the Indonesian government, the situation in Indonesian was peaceful, serene, and even evoked memories of good, past times, for which people optimistically returned to from faraway Netherlands. In other words, the purpose of presenting this narrative was to convince Indo-Europeans that there was no need to repatriate to the Netherlands, let alone find a new safe place to live, such as Brazil.

As might be expected, the news presented in it gave more space to the progress achieved by the Republic and, as far as possible, minimized the presence let alone the achievements of the Dutch in Indonesia. Parts of the news were taken from the official Indonesian news agency, which was strongly pro-Republican and anti-Dutch, *Antara*. The use of money is a case in point. A widely-used money in a time of war was a symbol of legitimacy for a government, and in this context *De Pionier* reported that the money that had just been issued by the Indonesian government on 26 October 1946, *Oeang Repoeblik Indonesia* (ORI), was widely accepted, and that people were using it instead of NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) money to buy and sell in Jakarta (“De Koers van Het”, 1946). This news was clearly an attempt to persuade the Indo-Europeans to use Indonesian money, which was illustrated as stronger in value than NICA money.

Other news gave a strong impression to the Indo-Europeans about the legitimacy of the Indonesian government in the eyes of the international community in the hopes of strengthening the trust of Indo-Europeans in the Indonesian government. This was evident from the news about the visit of K. L. Punjabi, a delegation of the Indian government, at the end of October 1946, at a number of ports to be used to deliver rice from Java to India (“K.L. Punjabi van Zijn Tournee”, 1946). In April 1946, Prime Minister Sjahrir offered 500,000 tons of rice to India, and in return India would send textiles to Indonesia. The Dutch clearly rejected the Indonesian offer because they judged that there was not much rice available in Indonesia and there were still many starving people there, but the Republic went ahead with its plan and India itself welcomed the offer, one of which was followed by the Punjabi visit above (Zara, 2020). This news was clearly an important matter that the Republican side needed to pose to the Indo-Europeans to show that the Indonesian government had received recognition, albeit informally, from a foreign country, and more importantly, that Indonesia

had contributed to solving post-war world problems, especially among fellow colonized countries in Asia.

Also crucial in this first edition was the view of an anonymous author (possibly the editorial staff of *De Pionier*, which was affiliated with the ministry of information, because its content reflected the perspective of the Indonesian government) placed on the first page at the top side of the page; this placement signified its importance to the readers. This was a long elaboration on a number of big questions and dilemmas the Indo-Europeans faced in thinking about being Indonesian citizens: What was an Indonesian citizen? Can an Indo become an Indonesian citizen? How did Indo people become citizens of Indonesia? And, the most important thing, whether Indo people must completely remove their long-held identities (tradition, religion, culture, and language) in order to be accepted as part of the Indonesian nation (“Wat Betekent het ‘Indonesisch’”, 1946)

The answers to these fundamental questions about identity began by conveying two views in the public at that time regarding Indonesian citizenship, namely those who did not know and did not understand the concept of Indonesian citizenship and those who knew but were suspicious of the idea. The author explained that the requirements for becoming an Indonesian citizen were clear in the Indonesian Citizenship Law, namely that a person who was born in Indonesia and lived in Indonesia for the last five consecutive years was eligible and would automatically become an Indonesian citizen. The important part here was that Indo-Europeans could also automatically become Indonesian citizens if they met the above requirements. Only if a person had accepted another nationality did he need to make an application to become an Indonesian citizen. The status of which nationality a person had is of paramount importance, wrote the authors, especially when one was looking for work, an important issue in those difficult times. Even if someone had good qualifications, the employer tended to give a job to someone with the same nationality. And, the author continued, it was possible that people could simply answer that they were “citizens”, but the employer needed written documents that proved that the job applicant was a citizen of a certain country. Therefore, a message was conveyed to the Indo-Europeans who read the newspaper and wanted to obtain Indonesian citizenship: “Now, to get such a piece of paper, you can turn to the police office in Yogyakarta, who will be happy to help you” (“Wat Betekent het ‘Indonesisch’”, 1946).

Then, the author posed an important question, a question that must have been on the minds of every Indo-European who was repeatedly persuaded to become an Indonesian citizen: what were the consequences, rights and obligations of becoming an Indonesian? The answer, first of all, wrote the author, was “[o]nly this, that you recognize Indonesia as your homeland, [and] the Government of the Republic as the legal government of this country” (“Wat Betekent het ‘Indonesisch’”, 1946). In addition, Indo-Europeans who become Indonesian citizens also had the same rights and obligations as those of “*autochtone Indonesiers*” (native Indonesians). Obligations, according to the author, were not too difficult at that time: paying taxes or participating in maintaining security. As for the rights of Indonesian citizens, they were innumerable, “*vele en velerlei*” (many and varied), for example “buy, sell, rent and rent land and estates”. In short, “*kies u maar uit*” (take your pick) said the author. The few obligations and the many rights above illustrated how easy it was to become an

Indonesian citizen, with very few obligations and so many benefits and opportunities, which were almost unlimited, and thus Indo people had the freedom to choose.

This was followed by another important question that would have been on the minds of Indo-Europeans: did they have to change their religion, culture, or name if they become Indonesians? The answer was: "Do you need to change your religion? No. Do you need to change costumes? No. Should you adopt another name? No. Do you need to speak another language? No. Short and correct, "*you don't have to do anything that you don't feel like doing*" ("Wat Betekent het 'Indonesisch'", 1946). The last part above was written in italics in the original text, so it emphasized the general freedom that was obtained by Indo-Europeans who wanted to become Indonesian citizens.

The concluding part of this persuasive article should also be noted. The author understood that for the Indo-Europeans half of their blood was Dutch. This meant that they also had strong ties with the Netherlands. So, then the question arose, did being an Indonesian citizen (which meant choosing to be part of their Indonesian heritage) mean hating the Dutch (which meant hating the other half of their heritage?). The writer explained that they did not need to hate the Dutch, because Indonesians did not hate the Dutch. What Indonesians hated, wrote the author, were those who were among the Dutch, or from any country, "*die geen onafhankelijk Indonesia wensen*" (who do not want an independent Indonesia). The author conveyed a sentence that symbolized the steadfastness of Indonesia's principles to defend its independence as well as its virtue not to use the politics of hate: "Indonesia fights only against all who threaten its independence, but without hatred and without bitterness" ("Wat Betekent het 'Indonesisch'", 1946). He even convinced the Indo-Europeans that in the Netherlands itself there were many people who sympathized with Indonesian independence so that for Indonesians there was no reason to be in antipathy with the Dutch people.

The writer hoped that what he said could influence and ultimately convince the Indo-Europeans to choose to become Indonesian citizens. By becoming an Indonesian citizen, it was hoped that Indo people could also support the ideals of other Indonesian ethnic groups, namely to support Indonesian independence and the existence of the Indonesian government. Unity between indigenous Indonesians and Indo-Europeans was desirable. The writer wrote, "*samen met de Indonesiers worden tot een groot, vrij en geeerd volk*" (together with the Indonesians, you will become a great, free and honored people) ("Wat Betekent het 'Indonesisch'", 1946).

## CONCLUSION

For Indonesian nationalists, the Indo-Europeans occupied an important position in the socio-cultural landscape of the Indonesian nation whose independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945. Indonesian blood that flowed in the body of the Indo-Europeans was considered a link between the Indo-Europeans and other indigenous ethnic groups. Indonesian nationalists, including the Indonesian government, political figures and the mass media, actively participated in constructing several main ideas in relation to the Indo-Europeans. First, it was always emphasized to the Indo-Europeans that, considering that half of their blood was Indonesian, their homeland should be Indonesia. Secondly, the Indonesian nationalists highlighted that the



Indonesian society they built would abolish the segregation of society based on race, as in the colonial era, by adopting democracy, inclusiveness and free choice, values compatible with the post-war world. Thirdly, Indonesian nationalists convinced the Indo-Europeans that, by becoming Indonesian citizens, they could get many benefits.

The discourse on Indo-Europeans was not only aimed at the Indo-Europeans themselves. The campaign carried out by Indonesian nationalists was also directed at the indigenous Indonesian ethnicities, with whom the Indo-Europeans would interact and hopefully be absorbed. There were particular themes constructed by the nationalist leaders as well as the Indonesian mass media for Indonesian society in general, and especially for armed Indonesian youth – who in various cases used violence to punish the Indo-Europeans. The government was trying to build a sense of security among the Indo-Europeans so that they wanted to settle in Indonesia, and eliminate their desire to migrate to other safer countries. The Indonesian government hoped the international community knew that it could control the domestic situation, including protecting minorities of foreign descent. Indonesian leaders, such as Soekarno, Hatta and Sjahrir called on the Indonesian people to refrain from committing arbitrary violence and tried to convince them that the Indos were actually a legitimate part of the Indonesian nation and that they should not be made targets of violence.

The mass media played a crucial role in disseminating discourse about the Indo-Europeans during the Indonesian revolution. The supply of paper at that time was limited, but the Indonesian government believed that print campaign was indispensable, so it published two print media in Dutch, one of which was specifically aimed at the Indo-Europeans. This showed the strong commitment of the Indonesian nationalists to the efforts to persuade Indo-Europeans to support Indonesia's existence, to become Indonesian citizens, and at the same time to reject the Dutch presence in Indonesia and its recolonisation projects. Despite so many obstacles, including the rarity of paper, the limited reach of the media, the lack of facilities, and security-related issues, this print media provided a substantive space to discuss the dynamics of the Indo-Europeans at that time. Photographs were used to emphasize the written ideas as well as to highlight the visual evidence of the pioneering role of the Indo-Europeans in adopting and progressing Indonesian nationalism.

It is also crucial to note here the important role of the ministry of information. Print media do have advantages in terms of the diversity of information that can be conveyed in one publication, but there are also disadvantages in such medium, namely the lack of depth in the news or opinions published. A booklet may fill this gap, given that it consists of more pages to elaborate concepts of citizenship in more depth. With its booklets, the ministry had the opportunity to explain more basic concepts, for example on the question of who was a citizen, what were the conditions for becoming citizens, whether foreigners can become Indonesian citizens, and the importance of cooperation between Indo-Europeans and Indonesian ethnicities to create a democratic and egalitarian Indonesian society and for the benefits of both parties.

This study sheds light on how the Indo-Europeans influenced the ways the Indonesian nationalists redefined the meaning of the Indonesian nation at a time when the Dutch-Indonesian war occurred. It elaborates on the history of how Indonesian identity, which is in essence very closely related to the rise of indigenous

ethnic groups to the historical stage, was constructed, debated, and compromised in order to form a broader sociocultural landscape, by involving – and seeking legitimacy for that involvement – people of foreign ancestry. This study almost exclusively discusses the ideas, media and propaganda techniques of the Indonesian side to the Indo-Europeans. Therefore, it does not specifically look at the impact of the discourse on Indo-Europeans' decision-making to be part of Indonesian society or on Indonesia's reputation internationally, as detailed examination of these is beyond its scope. Finally, this study elucidates how Indonesia promoted its adoption of democracy and egalitarianism in the development of its identity amidst critical political situations when minorities were vulnerable to being targets of violence.

This is the history of Indonesian multiculturalism in the formative phase and one of the most deciding periods in modern Indonesian history. In contrast to most studies on Indo-Europeans during the Indonesian revolution, which almost exclusively focus on Indo-Europeans as victims of indigenous people's violence, I explain the experiences of how Indonesian nationalists Indonesianized the Indo-Europeans, and how the Indo-Europeans chose to become Indonesians. These two aspects have been nearly forgotten in the historiography. The struggle of Indonesian nationalists to realize an all-inclusive, egalitarian and democratic concept of Indonesian nationalism for minorities was in line with postwar expectations where racially-based citizenship under the banner of colonialism and fascism was removed and a recognition was given to racial, ethnic and cultural diversity.



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# Trash or Treasure? A Qualitative Exploration of Gleaning By-Products in Tourism Supply Chains in Remote Filipino Fishing Communities

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Souvenirs have become an integral part of consumptive tourism with marine curios being a common offering in coastal destinations. The Philippines, an emerging coastal destination is also a large exporter of marine shells. There is some overlap in the species exported as shell souvenirs and those that serve as an important protein source for coastal residents. In some such communities, following consumption of the mollusc, the shell by-products are discarded. Given the state of poverty common to many remote artisanal fishing communities coupled with the tourism demand for shell curio and handicraft, it is expected that potential opportunities exist for small-scale revenue generation from the sale of discarded shells. Using supply chain theory, this paper investigates the post-consumption use of shells obtained via gleaning activities in four remote Filipino fishing communities. Qualitative interviews revealed potential gaps and breakages in the supply chain that currently limit the potential for transitioning shells as waste/by-products to souvenir products in the tourism sector. The findings are discussed in terms of potential applications for environmental management and social development. The results suggest the potential for the transformation of an existing practice – gleaning and its by-products – into an in-demand curio product as a supplemental livelihood for impoverished fishing communities.

**Keywords:** Gleaning; Shell Handicrafts; Souvenir; Supplemental Livelihoods; Tourism Development



## INTRODUCTION

In the Philippines, a rapidly growing population and increasing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing places Filipino fisher-folk among the most economically vulnerable (Castro & D'Agnes, 2008; Green et al., 2003). The incidence of poverty among fishing households in the Philippines is twice that of the national rate (Castro & D'Agnes, 2008), though it is noted that income-associated challenges cannot necessarily be equated to quality of life and occupation satisfaction (cf., Knudsen, 2016; Pollnac, 2001; Porter & Orams, 2014). As fishing households struggle to meet their daily needs, resource over-exploitation becomes common (Turner et al., 2007). Globally, near-shore fisheries are already

in decline (FAO, 2018) and previous research suggests that the degradation and decline of capture fisheries will continue (Belton & Thilsted, 2014). In the Philippines, the use of by-products for economic gain has been pushed to extremes. Especially in cities, it is common for poorer families to survive on *pagpag*, or food scraps scavenged from trash piles or waste facilities that are recooked and resold (cf., Pilario, 2014). While surviving on *pagpag* is less common in coastal areas where residents can supplement their diet with leftover catches or through gleaning, *pagpag* is an example of the use of by-products to, albeit grossly, extend or add value to a market supply chain. In coastal areas of the Philippines, gleaning, the collection of small molluscs for consumption purposes, is practiced by many households. Some of the same species used for consumption can also be found as parts of shell souvenirs throughout the country, and in other coastal locations across the globe. For those dependent on marine resources for livelihoods, the continued degradation of the near shore marine environment will likely result in the pursuit of alternative economic activities.

The Philippines is an example of a country with a highly developed shell trade (Floren, 2003). In the context of remote artisanal fishing communities, small marine molluscs obtained from gleaning practices are currently valued as protein or sold intact as a source of financial revenue for local members of fishing communities (Porter, 2014). The potential use of the discarded shells in the curio trade has been largely overlooked. This paper explores practices related to the harvest of small, shelled invertebrates from coastal communities in the Philippines. Supply chain theory is used to examine the potential overlap of gleaning of small marine-shelled organisms as a sustenance fishery and the potential for the shell by-products to be used in the souvenir trade. This research seeks to uncover issues impacting the current lack of engagement with the shell souvenir and handicraft production and trade in coastal communities where economic resources and opportunities are marginal. In doing so, it aims to address a current gap in the literature on poverty alleviation through souvenir production (Thirumaran et al., 2014), as well as the social implications and potential benefits of tourism development as they relate to production of souvenirs (cf., Swanson & Timothy, 2012).

## OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

### Significance of Souvenirs

Research on souvenirs, though not new, continues to be sporadic. Swanson and Timothy's (2012) comprehensive review of literature on souvenirs identified three major themes: "souvenirs as holders of meaning, souvenirs as tradable commodities, and souvenirs as products of commodification" (p. 491). Trihnh et al. (2014) found similar themes regarding souvenirs when researching the perspectives of the retailers. Decrop and Masset (2014) proposed a typology of souvenirs defining four types of souvenirs and their associated role or function: (1) tourist trinkets: categorisation; (2) destination stereotypes: self-expression; (3) paper mementoes: connection; and (4) picked-up objects: self-creation. As general examples, these four categories incorporate cheap souvenir mugs or t-shirts, models of the place (e.g., a miniature Eiffel Tower), ticket stubs, and shell artefacts (e.g., gifted piece of coral), respectively



(Decrop & Masset, 2014). Cater and Cater (2007) noted that even rubbish, such as washed-up flip-flops, is being converted into innovative souvenirs such as key rings, bracelets, necklaces, cushions and mosaic pictures. More recently, Haldrup (2017) explored the ‘magic’ of the souvenir, noting that anything can become a souvenir; he describes the souvenir as an actant or ‘shape-shifter’ with the ability to transform, integrate, perform, and even manipulate spaces. Shifting from the importance of the souvenir in the tourism experience, there is increasing support from the literature on the role of souvenir development as it relates to host communities. For example, Swanson and Timothy (2012) suggest the need to better understand how communities may benefit from participation as souvenir producers. Similarly, Thirumaran et al. (2014) push for the inclusion of souvenirs in larger scale tourism development plans, suggesting souvenirs as a means of [economically] supporting rural handicraft producers. Despite its existence since the concept of ‘travel’, the souvenir remains a complex phenomenon (Thirumaran et al., 2014).

### Marine Organisms as Souvenirs

The ideas presented by Decrop and Masset (2014), Cater and Cater (2007), and Haldrup (2017) postulate that any object found by a visitor can become a souvenir. This idea is especially relevant to the discussion of marine shells as souvenirs and souvenir materials given the popularity of beachcombing as a tourist activity (Kenchington, 1993). Just as collected shell specimens can become a treasured souvenir to a beachcomber, they also serve as materials in the production of more complex handicrafts (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1.** Shell chandeliers being sold at a souvenir booth on White Beach, Bolinao, Pangasinan, Luzon, Philippines. Bottles of small shells are also being sold as souvenirs (bottom right of photo). The shells used to craft these souvenirs are representative of the different shell organisms consumed by many coastal residents. (photo by Brooke Porter).

The use of marine organisms and by-products (e.g., sea turtle shells) for handicrafts have a long history as souvenirs and have been traded for centuries (Gössling et al., 2004). Mollusc shells are a predominant source of these ‘curio’ and souvenir products (Grey et al., 2005; Salvador et al., 2015; Wood & Wells, 1995). New and emerging coastal destinations have responded to significant tourism growth, and resulting increased demand for souvenirs and handicrafts, with an increased harvest of marine shells (Dias et al., 2011; Gössling et al., 2004; Shyam et al., 2017). Other research has indicated souvenir-related markets, such as the shell trade, offer direct access opportunities for members of fishing communities (Shyam et al., 2017). In addition, coastal areas that are not currently considered tourism destinations are taking advantage of the economic opportunities through the export of shells and shell-based products to be sold in other locales where tourism is present (cf., Dias et al., 2011). Notably, many of today’s souvenirs are sourced from regions where the shells, labour, and other supplies involved in creating the souvenir products are affordable (Notar, 2006).

Given that the economic utilisation of marine shells for the purpose of the souvenir/curio trade often extends well beyond the initial harvest site, there has been an associated commodification of shells. Such a use of ‘foreign’ marine resources, resulting from the globalisation of shell-based souvenirs, has an obvious environmental footprint; however, it may also impact the authenticity of the touristic experience. An example of this begins in the Philippines and ends in Hawai’i. The shells used in the iconic ‘Hawai’ian’ shell *lei* (necklace) are commonly imported from the Philippines (e.g., Natural Shell Jewellery, n.d.). The idea of being greeted with a *lei* is part of the iconic Hawai’ian tourist experience (Linnekin, 1997); yet these imported shell *lei*, manufactured in the Philippines (or elsewhere), are neither authentic nor representative of the host culture. This example of shell *lei*, beginning in Southeast Asia and ending in Hawai’i is indicative of what Chutia and Sarma (2016) refer to as sponsored commercialisation; in other words, the intermediaries are responsible for the decisions related to the product rather than the artisans. Similarly related to the context of souvenir out-sourcing, Notar (2006) describes this loss of authenticity, explaining that “a souvenir should carry the spirit of the place where it was purchased (or found, or taken)” (p. 65). It is important to note that in the wake of a global pandemic, communities are reconsidering their roles in creating tourism. Considering previously overlooked aspects of communities’ roles in tourism, such as pride in place and product (see also, Porter et al., 2014), may become increasingly important. Finally, in addition to the loss of destination-associated authenticity, and negative environmental impacts of out-sourced souvenirs (Appukuttan & Ramadoss, 2000; Kowalewski et al., 2014; Newton et al., 1993; Notar, 2006), the removal of mollusc species may impact the food security of coastal residents in lesser-developed regions.

### **Souvenirs or Sustenance?**

Some of the smaller mollusc species harvested and removed for trade into the souvenir market are considered an important source of sustenance for many coastal residents in lesser-developed regions (Dias et al., 2011; Wood & Wells, 1995). While such marine by-products may provide an important trade/economic activity in the tourism sphere or elsewhere, the sale of marine by-products is influenced by the

comparative economic value of their potential as a source of food (Wood & Wells, 1995). In the Philippines, the shell trade is a well-established and important economy (Dolorosa & Dangan-Galon, 2014; Floren, 2003), with over 1,000 documented species of molluscs being exported (Woods & Wells, 1995). Similarly, in India, Shyam et al. (2017) found that small molluscs as bycatch generated an important product for fishers. In addition to providing economic opportunities, many of the described smaller molluscs also serve as an essential food and protein source for coastal residents (Appukuttan & Ramadoss, 2000; Floren, 2003). In the Philippines, as well as other coastal areas, smaller-shelled invertebrates are gathered in coastal fishing referred to as 'gleaning'. Gleaning is considered a subset of artisanal fishing (see Figure 2) and is practiced commonly by both women and men in coastal areas of the Philippines and in other coastal communities in the Coral Triangle region (Kleiber et al., 2014; Nieves et al., 2015; Weeratunge et al., 2010).



**Figure 2.** Women gleaning on the coast of Dimipac Island, Coron, Philippines. (photo by Brooke Porter).

In remote artisanal fishing communities in the Philippines, it is common for coastal residents to utilise gleaning activities as an important food source (cf., Porter, 2014). Despite this widespread practice of gleaning and the associated by-products of shells and an established market for them (Dolorosa & Dangan-Galon, 2014), it is unclear why more coastal residents do not participate in the sale of these shells, as previous research suggests that members of such fishing communities consider their situation as impoverished (Porter & Orams, 2014).


## RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS USED

### A Supply Chain Lens

Both formal and informal economies are important in the lesser developed regions (Bacchetta et al., 2009). Bacchetta et al. (2009) estimated that up to 60% of workers in lesser-developed regions are employed in informal economies. Fisheries and other artisanal-level activities (e.g., handicrafts, souvenirs) often go undocumented and, thus, are considered informal activities. Swanson and Timothy (2012, p. 493) define the souvenir supply chain, saying that:

The souvenir supply chain represents the flow of goods from point of production to point of consumption, or the distribution of the souvenir product from producer/manufacturer to final tourist consumer. The supply chain includes producers who convert raw materials into souvenir products; manufacturers who mass produce souvenir products on a large-scale; wholesalers who facilitate distribution by buying larger quantities of souvenir goods and reselling smaller quantities to other suppliers; and retailers who sell products to consumers-tourists who derive personal benefits from the object and the experiences it represents.

Thus, we approach this study through a supply chain lens with emphasis on the producers while noting the relevance of supply chain theory, which applies to and often combines both formal and informal economies (e.g., Holt & Littlewood, 2014). In addition, supply chain theory is a well-understood and commonly applied concept in small-scale rural markets and entrepreneurial processes in lesser-developed nations (Holt & Littlewood, 2014); it is also a common approach used by international development and aid agencies (cf., e.g., Chorn et al., 2015). Rural product supply chains may be established opportunistically or may occur in a more organised manner. A common characteristic of these supply chains are the opportunities at each stage for value extraction (see Figure 3).




**Figure 3.** Example of a marine product supply chain. The product journeys through varied and multiple stages before arriving at the consumer/customer. (adapted from Holt & Littlewood, 2014, p. 203).

This paper explores such scenarios associated with gleaning in four coastal fishing communities in the Philippines. It has been argued that fisher-folk should be considered central persons in coastal and fisheries research (Grafton et al., 2006), because they are permanent residents, have familiarity with their local resources, and are able to accurately describe the fisheries and accompanying processes (Bunce et al., 2000; Turner et al., 2007). Building on this idea of fisher-folk as gatekeepers of important fisheries and environmental knowledge, semi-structured group interviews were used to collect qualitative data. Members of fishing households from four coastal communities in the Luzon region of the Philippines were interviewed by the primary researcher (see Figure 3). The locations were chosen out of convenience based on availability of local guides, translators, and in-kind support (e.g., accommodation). In all locations, interviews were supported by the help of translators and local guides. Interviewee responses were immediately translated from Bolinay, Visaya, or Tagalog to English. Due to the larger sizes of group interviews at Natipuan (fourth research site), the recorded interviews were transcribed by a native Tagalog speaker. Semi-structured interviews are considered important in social fisheries research to generate detailed qualitative information (cf., Bunce et al., 2000). In all locations, purposive and snowball sampling were used to recruit participants. Participation was voluntary and confidentiality was maintained. Participation in the group interviews was restricted to persons at least 16 years of age residing in a household where fishing was an important activity undertaken by themselves or other members of that household.

Group interviews occurred in two main stages. The first stage of data collection included three research sites bound primarily by *barangays*, which are the smallest administrative divisions in the Philippines: (1) Barangay Victory; (2) Barangay Decabobo; and (3) Dimipac Island (Barangay Quezon) (see Figure 4).

The first stage of fieldwork focused primarily on understanding fishing activities and livelihoods. As part of these interviews, participants were asked about their gleaning activities and their practices using shell by-products. Data from the first stage revealed the discarding of shell by-products as a frequent practice. As a consequence, the second stage of interviews was designed to gain a better understanding of why shell by-products were often being discarded rather than used in the shell souvenir industry. The second stage of fieldwork was conducted



**Figure 4.** Map of the research sites. The research sites are indicated by black dots. The entire region of Luzon has been shaded light grey, while the provinces of the research sites appear in a darker shade of grey. (authors' compilation).


in the coastal community of Natipuan, in the Luzon region (see Figure 4). During this stage, interview questions were developed to collect exploratory data on gleaning activities and to investigate in more detail the community members' use or non-use of shell by-products in the shell souvenir trade. Results from the two stages of field-work are presented below. Table 1 provides a summary of the interviews undertaken at the four study sites.

Research site	Number of participants	Total number of interviews
Victory	21	12
Decabobo	7	4
Dimipac	16	3
Natipuan	12	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>21</b>

**Table 1.** Summary of interviews undertaken. (authors' compilation).

### RESULTS

Gleaning was considered a 'way of life' for most participants. In total, 49 participants reported they regularly undertook gleaning for gastropods (see Figure 5). Participants reported eating the meat (average size 1 cm<sup>3</sup>) collected from these shells using a small pin or needle. During the interviews from Stage 1 of the study, it was common to observe large piles of discarded shells (primarily small gastropods) near or around participants' homes. At each of the research sites, the majority of, and in some cases all, residents reported discarding the shells collected from their gleaning activities as opposed to selling them into the souvenir trade (see Figure 5).



**Figure 5.** Gleaning activities and shell economies in four Philippines coastal communities. The stacked bars in each column are representative of the four research sites/communities. (authors' compilation).

The gender representation in gleaning was near equal with slightly more male ( $n = 27$ ) than female gleaners ( $n = 22$ ). In Natipuan, participants specified that gleaning is done by both genders: “It can be either men or women. There are also children”. Figure 5 highlights the number of respondents participating in gleaning. Nearly 90% of respondents reported participation in gleaning activities. Only 14% of gleaners reported active or partial participation in the sale of empty shells. A common response was that gleaning catches were “only for meat”. It was slightly more common for participants to sell shells with meat for profit (22%). A representative statement of this was, “sometimes we eat the meat, sometimes sell it [shell with meat]. But [when we eat the meat] we throw away the shells”. It is also worth noting that most of the respondents participating in the sale of shells related to souvenirs came from Barangay Victory. Likewise, the majority of those selling shells with meat came from Victory; however, two similar cases were reported in Decabobo and two in Natipuan. Whereas most participants stated that their gleaning catches were for “eating only”, two women from Victory declared an active participation in the souvenir trade, with one of these women stating the buying and selling of shells for shell craft as her primary occupation (see Figure 6). She stated, “I sell the shells and eat the meat”. The other woman, who identified her primary occupation as a housewife, reported sometimes making shell crafts saying that “I use them [the leftover shells] for crafts.”



**Figure 6.** Barangay Victory resident (woman with hand on chair) selling shell necklaces to visitors. (photo by Brooke Porter).

### *Natipuan*

Interview questions in Natipuan focused on better understanding gleaning waste. Barangay Natipuan community is a coastal town situated in close vicinity to tourist resorts. Many of its members actively participate in the fisheries to supplement their

incomes. A total of 12 community members were interviewed in two interview groups. All participants were female as this research was combined with a separate inquiry. The all-female sample was thought to have positively impacted the data as it is generally women who are responsible for shell handicraft production. Interview questions related to gleaning and shells as by-products focused on participation in the gleaning fishery, the use and sale of gleaning catches, and participation (or lack thereof) in the souvenir trade/industry. All of the Natipuan participants reported being members of gleaning households who regularly relied upon gleaning catches for protein sustenance. None of these participants reported active participation in the souvenir trade, including the processing or selling of shells leftover from gleaning catches. One woman reported the occasional and opportunistic sale of shells stating that she will sell the shells as souvenirs, “if someone will buy it”. However, in Natipuan, it was common for participants to decorate their homes with the shell by-products. Participants described the various uses, mostly as outdoor decor, of washed shells post-consumption: “We put it [the shells] in the plants, ... in the garden, ... inside a vase, ... in the pots, ... on the side of the pots”. Still others recognised that, although shell handicraft was not common in Natipuan, “in other places they are doing that [creating souvenirs] ... they are creating lamps, curtains”. When asked why this does not happen in Natipuan, some felt there were only enough shells for consumption: “We don’t have enough shells here ... only enough for food”, or that the shells were too small and too few: “We don’t have much shells here”. Other participants, responding to the question as to why they don’t make handicrafts to sell with the shells post-consumption (e.g., shell chandeliers, necklaces), felt they did not have the knowledge or skill necessary to produce shell handicrafts or souvenirs. A consistent response regarding knowledge-base was, “we don’t know how”, accompanied by embarrassed laughter.

## DISCUSSION

The combined data sets from face-to-face, semi-structured interviews showed that many participants were reliant upon gleaning as a staple food and protein source. Despite a large and globally significant shell trade in the Philippines, many participants (43 in total) reported discarding rather than selling the leftover shells. While some reported selling gleaning catches (shells with meat) for supplemental income, few regularly sold empty shells post consumption. Specific to Natipuan, some participants reported washing and using the shells post consumption as decorative ornaments for personal households. The results from Natipuan, where the practice of decorating gardens and houses with shells was common, suggest that, in some cases, participants are associating an aesthetic value with shelled organisms used for sustenance. This finding is loosely supported by Swanson and Timothy (2012) who described the utilitarian uses of handicrafts in traditional societies; however, their research found that in many places ‘kitsch’ items desired by tourists, despite their lack of relevance to the host culture, were being produced due to a demand by tourists (e.g., carved masks). Remarkably, the consumption of the gastropods requires the removal of meat, resulting in a ‘clean’ and potentially market-ready shells. Thus, it could be argued that they are missing supplemental livelihood opportunities associated with the production of handicraft and souvenirs.



The souvenir industry is worth billions of dollars globally, and souvenirs have become an inseparable part of the consumptive tourism experience (Swanson & Timothy, 2012; Thiruaman et al., 2014). Previous research has documented the importance of the shell souvenir industry in the Philippines (cf., Floren, 2003). Participant responses demonstrated the existence of rural supply chains for marine resource-based products, such as gleaning catches (meat included), with some selling catches; however, the supply chain typically ends post-consumption. The data from the second stage of the research provide insight into such potential issues. In general, there are numerous factors that may influence the efficacy of a supply chain. We simplify these into two broad categories: product-related and market-related. Examples of the first category include product quality and available quantities. Examples of the latter category include market saturation and market linkages. Data from this study indicate particular issues with market linkages. Factors are discussed individually below.


### **Product-Related Issues**

With regard to product-related factors, product quality, both structure and colour, are concerns within the shell trade (Nijman et al., 2015). However, the smaller sizes of the shells collected by gleaners (e.g., *cikad*) makes them less susceptible to breakage and colour-type imperfections. Thus, quality, in the case of gleaning by-products, is considered to have a negligible influence on the supply chain. Further, given that the shells under discussion are the result of a subsistence practice and an existing by-product, it would be possible for participants to discard poor quality shells while still building up a stock of premium-quality specimens. This suggestion is further supported by researcher observation: During the first stage of fieldwork, metre-high piles of discarded shells, seemingly suitable for shell handicrafts, were observed around participants' homes. Kleiber et al. (2014) demonstrated the frequency and importance of gleaning as a fisheries subset and, similar to this study, they showed that both women and men frequently participated in gleaning. Given the importance of gleaning for sustenance and the frequency with which it occurs (Floren, 2003; Kleiber et al., 2014), a surplus of shell by-products would be expected at a collective community level. Again, given the establishment of the gleaning as a mostly subsistence fishery, it is unlikely that fishing effort would need to change to utilise discarded shells as handicrafts for what would be a theoretically supplemental livelihood. Thus, our findings and interpretations indicate that product-related factors are unlikely to impact the participation of remote artisanal fishers in the shell souvenir trade.

### **Market-Related Issues**

Although product-related issues were not apparent, it is likely that there are potential issues with market-related factors. The Philippines has a substantial influence on the global shell trade; however, despite consistent collection efforts, reported catches are in decline (Floren, 2003). This decline in catch indicates that stock depletion is more likely to influence the supply chain than market saturation. Thus, we attribute that market-related issues such as gaps in market linkages may be present. For example, the geographical remoteness of a location may affect participation in a supply chain;

another potential limiting factor is economic capability (Holt & Littlewood, 2014). Geographical remoteness is an issue for many remote fishing communities; given that the four research sites could be considered remote, location may impact the ability of a community to participate in the shell souvenir trade. However, participation in other fisheries-related supply chains (e.g., live reef fish trade, aquarium trade, food fisheries) found in the four communities surveyed present evidence of efficient and functioning options for the transportation of goods. Economic capability was not thought to be a limiting factor as the ‘supplies’ necessary to participate are already on-hand as by-products of an existing practice. Instead, our findings suggest that the most likely limiting factor is a lack of awareness of market opportunities and a lack of perceived skill (Palmer, 2007; Thirumaran et al., 2014). This was emphasised by participants indicating their lack of knowledge and skill in transforming shell by-products into desired souvenirs (e.g., necklaces, chandeliers, lamps, and sculptures). Participant responses explaining this lack of knowledge, such as “We don’t know how to [create curtains or lamps]”, were often marked by embarrassed laughter. Indeed, while souvenirs such as shell chandeliers require some skill to create (see Figure 1), the skills needed to create many types of shell souvenirs are basic (e.g., the single-strand necklaces being sold in Figure 6). Figure 7 focuses on issues within the first stage of the supply chain (expanded upon from Figure 3). The first stage, marine resource-based products, has been expanded to include product- and market-related issues based on our findings.



**Figure 7.** A closer look at the product and production in a marine resource-based supply chain. The dashed lines indicate issues impacting the supply chain. (authors’ compilation).

The results from this study indicate the presence of problems in the first stage of this rural supply chain. Many participants simply did not have the knowledge and/or confidence to transform the shells from gleaning by-products into shell handicrafts or souvenirs. It is noted that some participant responses indicate market-related issues (e.g., finding a buyer); however, it is likely that problems with the creation and production of shell products are more pressing. Thus, on-the-ground efforts, as well as future research, should focus on education and training in handicraft production. Whereas learning exchanges with communities actively involved in the shell souvenir trade may seek to resolve some market-related issues (Dolorosa & Dangan-Galon, 2014), previous research suggests that market-related issues be successfully addressed through the inclusion of souvenir development in broader tourism planning (cf., Thirumaran et al., 2014).

## CONCLUSIONS

The importance of the souvenir in travel is unlikely to wane. This research explored issues related to production in the shell-souvenir supply chain in four impoverished coastal fishing communities in the Philippines. In doing so, it provided an interdisciplinary look at the economic, environmental, and social role of souvenirs. The findings contribute to previously identified gaps in the literature, such as rural/souvenir supply chain (Swanson & Timothy, 2012) and the nexus of tourism souvenir development (Swanson & Timothy, 2012; Thirumaran et al., 2014). In addition, this research advances the discussion on the potential for tourism and tourism-associated activities, such as shell-handicraft production, as a potential supplemental livelihood for fishing communities (Porter & Orams, 2014; Shyam et al., 2017; Swanson & Timothy, 2012; Thirumaran et al., 2014; Trihnh et al., 2014). Finally, it also provides insight on potential future response strategies for the degradation of near-shore marine resources associated with souvenir-related shell harvest (Floren, 2003).

With the notable existing market for shell souvenir products originating from the Philippines, our data revealed a lack of participation in this sector from the four communities. This was attributed to a poor understanding of market opportunities in the souvenir supply chain, rather than a lack of desire to engage in the sector. Feasible efforts, such as training and knowledge sharing (Dolorosa & Dangan-Galon, 2014), may address these market-related issues by creating a value-added benefit to an existing waste product of gleaning. Such skills trainings, combined with a change in current practices from discarding shell by-products to building raw product reserves, have the potential to provide sufficient stock, both in quantity and quality, for participation at a cottage industry level in the shell souvenir tourism trade.

On a larger scale, the issues revealed in this research may be addressed at various governmental levels through future inclusion of souvenir development in tourism planning efforts (Thirumaran et al., 2014). The findings of this study also suggest a lack of linkage between commercial and sustenance fisheries in the context of molluscs (shelled organisms). While, currently, the fisheries are functioning in separate capacities, a continued decline in commercial harvest coupled with a consistent or increased demand in shell souvenirs may force stakeholders to source products from communities, such as the ones described in this research.

We agree with previous scholars that issues surrounding souvenir production are in need of more research (Swanson & Timothy, 2012; Thirumaran et al., 2014). The results from this study emphasise a need to better understand if and how education (e.g., artisanal skills to create shell souvenirs) impacts participation in the shell souvenir supply chain at a rural level. An additional area of consideration for those working on ecosystem management and resilience would be exploring how the use of post-consumption waste from gleaning could serve to alleviate some direct commercial fishing pressure on shelled marine invertebrates through the use of any already harvested resources. Souvenirs, in general, are a consumptive part of the tourism experience. Ideally, this sector needs to be formally recognised and subsequently organised to promote social, economic, and environmental benefits, especially at the cottage level. This research demonstrated the potential of

transforming existing post-consumption (by-product) waste from a coastal fishery into a consumptive souvenir product that is synonymous with the tourism experience.



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# Land Acquisition Under Land Law 2013: A Case Study of Vinh City, Nghe An Province

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After implementing a comprehensive reform in 1986, Vietnam witnessed change in many aspects. One of these changes is that agricultural land has been converted into industrial and urban land. Increasing land demand, leading to land acquisition, is inevitable. Over time, land laws and policies have been developed to address various problems. However, land acquisition and compensation procedures still have many issues to be solved. This paper outlines changes in Vietnam's legal system related to land acquisition, followed by land acquisition forms and procedures. Responses to this process were inquired through a survey of 170 landless households in Vinh city. Ten face-to-face interviews were also conducted to collect qualitative data. The results show that the authorities have followed the land acquisition procedures in the Vietnamese context. However, directly affected households do not feel satisfied with the compensation that the state has paid to them, while indirectly affected families rated the current policy as unfair to them.

**Keywords:** Land Acquisition; Land Law 2013; Nghe An Province; Vietnam; VSIP

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## INTRODUCTION

There have been extended debates on land acquisition<sup>1</sup> (Ahmed et al., 2019; Boamah, 2014; Schutter, 2011). It is also a fundamental phenomenon because it strongly affects private ownership (Kontgis et al., 2014; Kusiluka et al., 2011; Ngo, 2012). This phenomenon is particularly emphasized in countries that recognize private ownership of land. In addition to economic values, the land also has social, cultural, and religious values (Admasu et al., 2019; Clover & Eriksen, 2009). Therefore, land acquisition poses a complex issue with many aspects: legal, economic, social, environmental, ethical, and cultural (FAO, 2014; Nguyen, 2021). This issue is precarious for communities that are not identified with land rights (Nicholas, 2017). One of the other drivers of risk is weak governance. This weakness is often related to land acquisition and compensation

<sup>1</sup> Land acquisition is a land management system used by the state for several purposes. It is a tool to provide land for social purposes (Kombe, 2010) or large projects (Keith et al., 2008).

for the people. This process calls for fairness and a guarantee of ownership for those who lose land.

If the compulsory land acquisition is not made effectively, it could lead to homelessness or to people not having land to live. In other words, they do not have access to the necessary resources or community support to make a living. It creates severe injustice (FAO, 2009). If the process of land acquisition and compensation is prolonged, it could affect people's livelihood (Nguyen et al., 2019). The reason for prolonging this process involves determining land prices, which is the most crucial element of the land acquisition procedure (Lim, 1985). According to the World Bank (2015), in most developing countries, the process for ensuring compulsory land acquisition is still limited. For example, Brazil's legal framework shows restrictions on land compensation (World Bank, 2015). It requires restoring or even improving people's livelihoods. Consequently, land acquisition disadvantages are often more significant than some benefits to local communities (FAO, 2014).

Vietnam is undergoing urbanization and industrialization at a rapid rate, since the "Doi Moi" reform policy was implemented in 1986. In 1999, Vietnam had only 629 cities (the urbanization rate was 23.7%), but by the end of 2018, the total number of urban areas was 819 (the urbanization rate was 38.4%). In 1986, there were less than 13 million Vietnamese people (accounting for 20% of the population) living in urban areas. In 2017, that number increased to 30 million, or 35% of the population (World Bank, 2020). The structure of economic sectors has had an increasing shift towards industrialization. The agriculture sector's GDP share gradually decreased, from 38.1% in 1986 to 16.8% in 2015. Meanwhile, the proportion of industry and construction in GDP increased from 28.9% in 1986 to 39% in 2015 (World Bank, 2020). To perform well in the industrialization process, the demand for land for infrastructure and real estate development is great (Do & Iyer, 2003; Truong et al., 2017). In response to land needs, the government has acquired substantial farmland from farmers (Marsh & MacAulay, 2003; Le & Nguyen, 2020). In 2014, a summary data of 34 provinces and cities sent to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) showed that they made compensation and ground clearance for 6,810 ha of agricultural land, affecting 79,738 households and individuals (MoNRE, 2016)<sup>2</sup>. Hence, land acquisition policies have many impacts on the lives and livelihoods of households, especially agricultural households.

Several studies have exposed the limitations of the legal system on land acquisition in Vietnam under the 2013 Land Law (which is being applied in Vietnam). The first is that regulations on the order of land recovery are scattered in many legal documents (including laws, decrees, circulars) (Than, 2016). This makes it difficult for law enforcement and the public to follow and understand the process. The second is that the land recovery order does not specify the step of recording the status of the acquired land at the time of the land recovery notice (Hung, 2021). Recording the status of the acquired land at the time of the announcement of land acquisition is vital in compensation. It helps reduce complaints when land is acquired from the people. Finally, the regulations on consultation during the preparation of compensation,

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<sup>2</sup> In Vietnam, land acquisition data is not collected and disclosed. Therefore, it is difficult for researchers to obtain an overview or quantitative data on the recovered area in this country.



support, and resettlement plans are unclear and difficult to implement (Hansen, 2013). It becomes necessary to determine that the person whose land is acquired is only one object among others in the area whose land is acquired, while the remaining objects have not yet been specified. This leads to inconsistency in determining the object of consultation and affects the interests of the people. These are also the main reasons for the increasing number of complaints about land acquisition in Vietnam (Tuan, 2021a).

Therefore, this article reviews the legal system of land in general, and the process of land acquisition in Vietnam in particular. The authors then examine the land acquisition process under the 2013 Land Law through a survey in Nghe An province. The main questions this paper seeks to answer are:

- a. What are the improvements of the 2013 Land Law compared to the previous land law on land acquisition?
- b. How do the households who lost their land and the households affected by land acquisition in the study area assess the land acquisition process under the 2013 land law?

The remainder of this article is structured as follows: First, the authors present the legal system related to land acquisition in Vietnam, and the forms and procedures of land acquisition being applied in this country. Second, a survey in Vinh city, Nghe An province, conveys people's opinions on their family's agricultural land acquisition process. The last part is dedicated to the results of this survey.

## METHODOLOGY


### Study Area

Nghe An province, which has the largest area in Vietnam (16,490 km<sup>2</sup>), is located on the East-West economic corridor connecting the South China Sea and several regions. Based on its favorable location, Nghe An attracted a total investment of nearly USD 6.1 billion for 690 projects in four years, from 2014 to 2018 (Tho & Thang, 2019). According to statistics, Nghe An has 11 major industrial zones and 17 industrial clusters planned to be built. In particular, the Southeast Economic Zone, with 20,776.5 ha, is considered one of Vietnam's most significant economic zones (Thai, 2019). The VSIP industrial park project in Nghe An is especially outstanding. Before building this industrial park project in Nghe An, VSIP had nearly 20 years of development and success in Vietnam with leading industrial-urban-service complex projects. VSIP has attracted a total investment of up to USD 10 billion from 750 companies in 30 countries and territories (Van, 2018).

According to statistics, from 2015 to 2019, Nghe An recovered 15,801.2 ha to build 5,401 projects. In Vinh city, this number was 1,748.85 ha for 639 projects<sup>3</sup>. Globally, coastal areas hold a large and increasing proportion of the world's population (Liz, 2003). This spatial distribution is similar in Nghe An province. Agricultural land

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<sup>3</sup> The authors collected these data from the Resolutions of land acquisition through the People's Council of Nghe An province.



**Figure 1.** Land cover change in Nghe An province. (authors' compilation by using raw data from JAXA)

conversion to non-agricultural land is highly concentrated in the north and tends to occur more in Nghe An province's coastal areas (cf. Figure 1). The conversion rate of different land types to construction land also differs between districts in Nghe An province, where the land taken for this conversion consisted mainly of orchards. For other land types, the western districts have an extensive conversion of forest land, whereas the northeast is converting cropland. In contrast, the southern part of Nghe An province witnessed a significant conversion of rice land. According to Nghe An province's statistics, from 2014 to 2018, the annual cropland area decrease was 5,000 ha. Specifically, the rice cultivation land decreased by more than 2,000 ha. The yearly decrease of other land was over 3,000 ha. Unused land has also been exploited, having decreased from 284,000 ha in 2010 to 53,000 ha in 2018<sup>4</sup>. This transition is a common trend in Vietnam.


In recent years, several large land acquisition projects have also taken place in Vinh city (cf. Figure 2). Residential projects are being implemented within urban areas, while other projects, such as transportation and industrial zones, are being built on the city's edge. The VSIP Nghe An Industrial Park project is located west of Vinh city, in Hung Nguyen district and one of the city's communes. According to the plan, this industrial park was established in 2015 with an area of 750 ha. The total investment of this project is estimated at USD 76.4 million, while the land for the industrial zone amounts to 367.6 ha. With the goal of economic development in Nghe An province and the

<sup>4</sup> Data compiled from Nghe An province's annual land statistics report.

north-central region, this project acquired land in a compulsory form. After five years of implementation, the project recovered nearly 430 ha, of which 90% was agricultural land (interview with officials of Vinh City Land Fund Development Center), with the majority being rice and cropland converted (cf. Figure 2). The land acquisition process was divided into two phases. In Phase 1, the project focused on land acquisition in the north, east, and southern areas. Phase 2 of the project will acquire the remaining area in the coming time. As of December 15, 2021, VSIP Nghe An Industrial Park has almost completed the land acquisition as planned. The project has also attracted 30 investment projects with a leased land area of 131.34 ha (Chau, 2022).

### Data Analysis

To answer the first research question of this paper, the authors collected secondary data from articles and reports in two languages, Vietnamese and English. Meanwhile, the data to answer the second research question were collected by combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Quantitative data were collected through questionnaires with information on surveyed households' demographics and their assessment of the local authorities' land acquisition process. In August 2019, 170 questionnaires were collected in four villages in the commune of Hung Chinh. However, the questionnaire also contains some open-ended questions to exploit more of these households' opinions. To obtain a list of surveyed households, the authors relied on the stratified random and snowball methods. Therefore, the stratification method was carried out first to select the study site. The questionnaire data came from the heads of households, who were also our main targets in the survey.



**Figure 2.** Land cover change in Vinh city and Hung Nguyen district 2007-2017 and VSIP Nghe An project. (authors' compilation by using raw data from JAXA)

Meanwhile, the interviews aimed to collect qualitative data from the perspectives of the interviewees. The authors conducted five key informant interviews, and five interviews with households having agricultural land located next to the project. We conducted interviews with the officers directly implementing the land acquisition decisions and local authorities at all levels. The company headquartered in VSIP Nghe An industrial zone also provided some additional data during fieldwork. One interviewee is an expert specializing in research and teaching related to land acquisition. These interviews were conducted using semi-structured and in-depth questions. However, these interviews were not allowed to be recorded<sup>5</sup> since the participants feared it could bring adverse effects to their future work. Interviews were conducted twice in August 2019 and October 2020 to track the process.

After quantitative research, SPSS software was used to process the primary data from the questionnaires. QGIS 3.10 software was used to create maps for the research project. Raw data were collected from Japan's Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS) organization. This satellite image is used with a resolution of 10m. The overall accuracy of the maps for 2007 and 2017 is 90.5% and 90.6%, respectively. The authors also used data from Google Earth software to check the progress of land acquisition and project construction. Data were used for two years: 2017 and 2020.

## LAND ACQUISITION IN VIETNAM: LAND LAWS, FORMS, AND PROCEDURES

### Definition of Some Terms From the Perspective of the Vietnamese State

In this section, the authors will clarify some definitions used in this article. These definitions are primarily defined in the current land law in Vietnam. *Land acquisition* means the state's decision to regain land use rights from persons granted land use rights by the state, or regain land from land users in violation of the land law (Land Law 2013 Art. 3 cl. 12). It is considered a form of compulsory land occupation under the law implemented by the state. This definition is often used in Vietnam based on the entire people-owned land system with another term, *land recovery* (World Bank, 2011). Meanwhile, the state can allocate land use rights (briefly referred to as *land allocation*) to those wishing to use land (Land Law 2013 Art. 3 cl. 7). *Land transformation* means the transfer of land use rights<sup>6</sup> from one person to another through forms of conversion, transfer, inheritance, donation of land use rights, and capital contribution (Land Law 2013 Art. 3 cl. 10). Another important term that is used heavily in this article is *compensation*. It is a form of civil liability to compel the party who has caused the damage to compensate for physical and mental injuries to the aggrieved party (Keith et al., 2008). In the Land Law of 2013, there is a clear explanation of the term *land compensation*, which means the return of the value of land use rights by the state to users (Land Law 2013 Art. 3 cl. 12).

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<sup>5</sup> Although the data provided by the interviewees was not recorded, they still agreed for it to be used as the source of information for research purposes.

<sup>6</sup> In Vietnam, land users are only entitled to exchange, purchase, and sell land use rights, because land itself belongs to the state. Hence, land market refers to the land use right market in this country (Tuan, 2021b).

## The Recent Developments of Legislation on Land Expropriation

Vietnam is a country with a socialist-oriented market economy. The philosophical basis and the economic-political system are the foundations of all laws. Karl Marx's rent theory is the foundation for building the economic and political theory concerning land. Consequently, legal provisions on compensation for land and resettlement for people are made according to arguments about land value that are consistent with Marx's political economy. These regulations have been gradually revised to suit the market economy mechanism (World Bank, 2011). From Table 1, it can be seen that, in the period from 1993 to 1998, Vietnam's land law stipulated that enterprises could only lease land to implement investment projects (leasehold), and they did not have the right to use land in the form of land allocation (freehold). This regulation is consistent with Marx's political-economic theory and in line with capitalist political-economic thought. The essence here is to eliminate absolute rent and direct investors to create profitability in the investment process that cannot be profitable in trading raw (uninvested) land. Due to the pressure of the development process of the real estate market, the original provisions of the 1993 Land Law and the Ordinance on the rights and obligations of domestic organizations for land allocated or leased by the state in 1994 had to step back, step by step. The Law on Amending and Supplementing some Articles of the Land Law of 1998 accepted the mechanism of state allocation of land for some types of investment projects.

The Land Law of 2003 took another step back when regulations allowed domestic investors to choose whether to be allocated land by the state or leased land by the state with an annual payment. Foreign investors might choose to be leased land by the state with either a lump-sum or annual payment. Therefore, the Land Law of 2003 was the first time the state accepted voluntary land acquisition. This mechanism was founded on the actions of users and investors where the land is converted for carrying out domestic investment projects that do not belong to a compulsory land acquisition. Another situation is when the investor wants to implement voluntary land transfer (World Bank, 2011). Meanwhile, mandatory land recovery was also implemented through competent state agencies' decisions, like the Land Law of 1998. Nevertheless, it still caused many difficulties, as well as incurring unofficial costs for investors.

According to Art. 38 of the Land Law of 2003, there were 12 situations of land acquisition. However, this content has been divided into four groups in the Land Law of 2013. Group 1 concerns land acquisition for defense and security purposes (Art. 61). Group 2 refers to land acquisition for socio-economic development for both national and public benefit. According to our interpretation, the Land Law of 2013 has become narrower with this regard. The state will only recover land for projects ratified by the National Assembly, or the Prime Minister. The provincial-level People's Councils only consider cases for the implementation of the land recovery policy (Art. 62). Group 3 relates to land acquisition due to violation of the law, primarily when the land has been allocated or leased, but not used or delayed in being put into use (Art. 64). Finally, Group 4 concerns land recovery due to stopping the land use by law, voluntarily returning the land, or risking human life (Art. 65).

Voluntary land transformation is also specified in Vietnam, and investors highly appreciate these procedures. The early years of implementation minimized 'arbitrary'

land acquisition (meaning that land is acquired regardless of the purpose), affecting land users' rights. However, there are still many shortcomings in the process of land acquisition. These shortcomings lead to households that do not comply with the decisions of the state to acquire their land. This problem arises from the land compensation (land price) and the policies before and after land recovery, which do not correspond with the market and the actual benefits of the recovered land. This is a significant inadequacy for the implementation of the law on land acquisition over time.




Figure 3. The illustration of compulsory and voluntary land acquisition. (authors' compilation)

Figure 3 describes the compulsory and voluntary land acquisition mechanism in Vietnam. The state management system in Vietnam is generally divided into four levels. The highest Government is followed by the People's Committees at all levels from province to commune. Each government level has its functions and duties in land allocation, but the Provincial People's Committee (PPC) is considered the most responsible agency for land use planning. Therefore, depending on geographical location and the locality's economic development goals, each province would have different development paths for the land. Before establishing the Land Law of 2003, the PPC was almost the ultimate agency for the approval of small to large land acquisition projects. However, to speed up project approval and boost the economy, the Land Law of 2003 allowed the District People's Committee (DPC) to approve several small projects. The state has the right to allocate land to land users and the right to compulsorily acquire land with these entities. This fact shows that the government's power in Vietnam is strong, and it quickly leads to resolving disputes regarding land acquisition.

Table 1 presents Vietnam's land law development process related to land acquisition. Since the creation of the 1993 Land Law in Vietnam, the land market has begun to appear (Labbé & Musil, 2013). This was also the first time the word "compensation"

appeared (World Bank, 2011). The legal land policy has offered a completer and more consistent socialist-oriented market mechanism compared to before. The rights of land users are increasingly guaranteed to create more favorable conditions. It also gives investors a sense of security in their investment in the field of land. However, there are still many shortcomings related to land acquisition that need to be revised (Tuan, 2021b). Current legislation only defines the concept of land compensation, but does not have a concept for other assets, such as buildings, plants, and livestock. Thus, lawmakers in Vietnam still focus on the manager's point of view rather than the people's reduced circumstances. In essence, the object of the acquisition is land, and not any other asset. Meanwhile, land users' losses will include both land use rights and property rights on the land. This situation is a cause of inconsistency in land law enforcement when the state recovers land (Nguyen et al., 2018).

Policy documents	Year	Important points regarding land
<b>1st constitution</b>	<b>1946</b>	According to Art. 12: "The right of private ownership of property by the Vietnamese people is secured."
<b>Agricultural revolution</b>	<b>1953</b>	Ownership of land was transferred from the owner to the renters.
<b>Second constitution</b>	<b>1959</b>	State, collective, and individual proprietorships were recognized (Art. 11). Farmers' land ownership was also identified but cooperative ownership is encouraged.
<b>Third constitution</b>	<b>1980</b>	The State manages the land (Art. 20), so it only recognizes the entire people (Art. 19). The State allocates and acquires land as planned. Agricultural cooperatives utilize the land.
<b>Doi Moi (Reform)</b>	<b>1986</b>	Land is allocated to individuals by the State for use in the long term. The Government established the land administration system.
<b>First Land Law</b>	<b>1987</b>	Individuals' land use rights are guaranteed. All land transactions are carried out according to the State's decision. Land had no value. The land market was not recognized.
<b>Fourth constitution</b>	<b>1992</b>	The market economy with State management is accepted. "Land is owned by all people" (Art. 17). The State acts as the representative of the owner and allocates land to users (Art. 18).
<b>Second Land Law</b>	<b>1993</b>	Land prices are recognized and regulated by the State. People have the right to own and use the land but no right to dispose of it. The land is only recovered when investing in developing projects. Economic organizations can only access land through the form of land leased from the State.
<b>Amend and supplement land law</b>	<b>1998</b>	(i) Land allocated by the State to domestic economic organizations is to implement housing business projects and projects in exchange of land for infrastructure; (ii) These organizations may obtain capital contribution by land use rights from land users; (iii) Improve the land expropriation mechanism and settling compensation and resettlement for people.
	<b>2001</b>	
<b>Third Land Law</b>	<b>2003</b>	All entire people's ownership is still recognized. This law specifies the rights and responsibilities of users and management agencies on land. The State accepted the market land price and improved the equality of domestic and foreign investors. Organizations may choose the form of allocated or leased land from the State. The law restricts compulsory land grabbing and recognizes voluntary land transformation. Specific provisions on settling compensation and resettlement issues are made.

<b>Decree 84</b>	<b>2007</b>	There are specific provisions for using land without legal documents to be recognized as land use rights. Foreign investors can implement housing projects. Transparent regulations and procedures were promulgated for compulsory land recovery mechanisms and ensuring benefits for those affected.
<b>Fourth Land Law</b>	<b>2013</b>	The State clearly defines rights to land (8 rights). The law specifically and entirely stipulates that land acquisition, compensation, and resettlement support will ensure openness, transparency, and people's rights having recovered the land. State releases the announcement of the land price list on January 1 every year.
<b>Decree 01</b>	<b>2017</b>	Decree amends and supplements several contents related to compensation when the land is reclaimed by the State, such as support to stabilize productive life, and support for training, changing, and searching for work.

**Table 1.** The development of land laws and policies in Vietnam. (World Bank, 2011, extended by the authors)


### The Forms and Procedures of Land Acquisition in Vietnam

According to the 2013 Land Law, there are two forms of land acquisition in Vietnam for implementing a project. In the first form, the state acquires land when the projects relate to national defense, economic development, or national and public interests. In the other form, investors directly negotiate to get people's land-use rights for ground clearance and project implementation after the project has been approved (outside the state budget).

These regulations define two kinds of state-owned projects that depend on the project's scale. Large-scale projects are called provincial projects, decided by the PPC, which directly provides concrete guidance. By comparison, a small project is called a district project, which the PPC will authorize the DPC to command directly. After that, the PPC or DPC will set up a ground clearance compensation group to perform tasks, such as negotiating with the people on compensation. The PPC approves projects outside the state budget. Then, the investors can directly agree with the people on the compensation costs. Investors, especially international investors, usually hire brokerage companies to work with households whose land is recovered.

In theory, these forms of land recovery have harmoniously resolved benefits among entities: the state, investors, and the people whose land is acquired. However, there are still many shortcomings in the implementation process, causing social conflicts. According to current Vietnamese land law, all citizens own the land, and the state represents the people as the landowner. Land users can only exercise power after the state recognizes them through granting land-use rights certificates. Land-use rights transactions are only legally significant after approval by competent state agencies through the adjustment of cadastral files. In any case, as land is state-owned, only a government-regulated agency can implement acquisition. As a result, with projects outside the state budget, if the land user does not agree to transfer or demands a high price that the investor cannot afford, the government also has no right to recover land. Figure 4 provides more details on compulsory land acquisition procedures in Vietnam.





**Figure 4.** Procedure of compulsory land acquisition and compensation in Vietnam following the Land Law of 2013. (authors' compilation)

## RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

In the Hung Chinh commune, the VSIP Nghe An project acquired 49 ha of 260 households with a total compensation amount of 101 billion VND (about USD 4.4 million)<sup>7</sup>. This is a project that brings high expectations for creating a breakthrough


<sup>7</sup> Data compiled from land acquisition decisions of the People's Committee of Vinh city in 2016-2018.

for Nghe An province's industry. By February 2021, 28 customers signed an investment commitment in VSIP Nghe An Industrial Park (including 12 foreign direct investment and 16 domestic projects), with a total registered capital of about USD 500 million, and attracted 45,000 to 50,000 workers (Phong, 2021). Table 2 shows that the land acquired for the project implementation in this locality is mainly agricultural, accounting for 86.3%. Rice land accounts for the highest proportion, at 71.7%. This acquisition has a significant impact on the lives of households who lose land. Therefore, local authorities need to strictly implement compensation and support for the people to minimize the harmful effects of land acquisition.

No	Type of acquired land	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	Percent (%)
<b>1</b>	<b>Agricultural land</b>	<b>423,416.8</b>	<b>86.34</b>
1.1	Land for rice cultivation (LUC)	351,417.4	71.66
1.2	Plainland with other annual crops (BHK)	66,022.4	13.46
1.3	Upland with other annual crops (NHK)	240.0	0.05
1.4	Freshwater aquaculture land (TSN)	5,737.0	1.17
<b>2</b>	<b>Non-agricultural land</b>	<b>62,076.4</b>	<b>12.66</b>
2.1	Traffic land (DGT)	49,809.4	10.16
2.2	Irrigation land (DTL)	8,238.8	1.68
2.3	Cemetery land (NTD)	945.5	0.19
2.4	Land of rivers, canals (SON)	203.2	0.04
2.5	Land of energy work (DNL)	1.2	0
2.6	Specialized water surface land (MNC)	2,878.3	0.59
<b>3</b>	<b>Unused land</b>	<b>4,889.6</b>	<b>1</b>
3.1	Unused bare land (BCS)	4,889.6	1
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>490,382.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>

From September 2015 to September 2020, the Compensation and Site Clearance **Table 2.** Types of recovered land for the VSIP Nghe An project in Hung Chinh commune until the end of 2018. (synthesis from land acquisition decisions of Vinh City People's Committee)

Council of VSIP Nghe An Industrial Park had acquired and compensated about 430 ha (interview with land acquisition staff, 15 October 2020). In Phase 1, VSIP Nghe An Urban and Service Area is being gradually completed. The investor has leveled about 246 ha of industrial zone land, and the main road, internal roads, and related technical infrastructure have been built. Thereby, by the end of 2020, this Industrial Park had 27 valid projects and 14 projects in operation. Figure 5 shows the progress of project implementation. The land area that has not been acquired is still significant, requiring the government and investors to speed up the project construction process. This requirement should avoid prolonged construction delays and wasteful land use. As the project is being delayed in the clearance process, the demand for leveling is not being met. Some new investor proposals, such as land rental exemption and technical infrastructure for several industrial zone areas, have not been resolved. These proposals are also the cause of the prolonged land acquisition process in the project. The project extension can also cause impediments on investors to building factories, as the land has not yet been cleared. It creates pressure on local labor when productive land has been taken away.



**Figure 5.** Construction area changes in VSIP Nghe An Industrial Park, 2017-2020. (authors' compilation by using Google Earth)

The loss of large amounts of land requires a level of compensation and assistance to be commensurate with these losses. Table 3 shows the amount of compensation and allowances that households receive when their land is acquired. Two problems were evident at these support levels. The first is the compensation amount for agricultural land. This project was revoked by the state and directly implemented by the People's Committee of Nghe An province. Therefore, the price that households receive depends on the state's land price list, which is VND 85,000 per m<sup>2</sup> (USD 3.7 per m<sup>2</sup>)<sup>8</sup>. However, the fee assessed by domestic investors and real estate brokers on the market is estimated at VND 4 million per m<sup>2</sup> (USD 173 per m<sup>2</sup>). This shows a massive difference between the actual price that households receive and the market price. This disparity brings injustice to landless families. There are similarities with research results in other localities, such as Da Nang and Quang Binh, regarding the difference in compensation rates caused by the two-price land mechanism in Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2019; Tuan, 2021a).

<sup>8</sup>Land price in this period is applied according to Decision 108/2014 of Nghe An Provincial People's Committee.

No	Compensation categories	Cost
1	Farmland pricing	85,000 VND/m <sup>2</sup> (3.7 USD/m <sup>2</sup> )
2	Support for employment transformation	Double the agricultural land compensation
3	Wet rice (2 crops/year)	4,500 VND/m <sup>2</sup> (0.19 USD/m <sup>2</sup> )
4	Support for livelihood stabilization	1,320,000 VND/person (57 USD/person)

**Table 3.** The compensation price list for VSIP Nghe An project. (authors' compilation)

The second issue concerns funding to support job change for land-expropriated households. According to the state regulations, this support level amounts to twice the household's agricultural land compensation price. This level of support demonstrates the state's concern for households' employment, but it is ineffective, as it does not distinguish between the age of workers and does not acknowledge that older farmers will find it harder to find jobs after land acquisition. This issue also results in inequalities between households whose lands are acquired. It is understandable that families prefer this form of support because they would receive more money. Nevertheless, it is hard to bring lasting benefit when work is not guaranteed.

Table 4 illustrates some general characteristics of the surveyed households. According to Vietnamese social traditions, men are the family's breadwinners, so most of them are heads of households and this percentage accounts for 81.2% of the respondents. The level of education of the surveyed heads of the household is relatively low, with 72.9% graduated from secondary school, followed by high school graduates with 16.5%. Only a few heads of household have a higher education level and have stable jobs in state agencies (2.4%). In comparison, households with low academic levels and living in suburban areas chose agriculture as their family's primary source of livelihood.


No	Categories	Frequency	Percent	
1	Sex	Female	32	18.8%
		Male	138	81.2%
2	Education level	No grade	3	1.8%
		Primary	10	5.9%
		Secondary	124	72.9%
		High school	28	16.5%
		College	1	0.6%
		Bachelor	4	2.4%
3	Job before the land loss	Farming	139	81.8%
		Governmental	4	2.4%
		Wage-worker	5	2.9%
		Casual labor	15	8.8%
		Old/Retired	7	4.1%
4	Job after the land loss	Farming	124	72.9%
		Business	2	1.2%
		Governmental	4	2.4%
		Wage-worker	5	2.9%
		Casual labor	19	11.2%
		Old/Retired	16	9.4%

**Table 4.** Information of surveyed respondents. (authors' compilation)

Over 80% of households were directly involved in agricultural production before land acquisition. According to interviews with local officials, households lost about 50% of their farmland, but this decrease did not change many households' livelihood options. Most of them still chose agriculture as their primary livelihood. Furthermore, the proportion of people choosing to retire is higher than before (nearly 10%). The cause for this choice is their high age and that they would not know what else to choose for a living, as they only know farming. In other words, although agricultural land has declined, households do not have diversified options regarding livelihood. Their lives continue to depend on agricultural production as before.

Figure 6 presents thoughts and assessments of surveyed households on implementing the land acquisition policy for the VSIP Nghe An project. These thoughts express the feelings of the households when they found out that their agricultural land had been acquired. More than half of the households (50.6%) felt anxious to hear about land acquisition for the VSIP Nghe An project. They worried because agricultural land was their family's only means of livelihood. These households wondered what they would do to survive after the land is lost. Moreover, they worried about whether there was an agreement by the state on compensation amounts or not, and they also feared that the compensation would not be satisfactory. Meanwhile, many households were indifferent to this information (34.7%). The reason given by these households was that they trusted the decisions of the authorities. Household concerns have been addressed along the following indicators: 81.2% of families said that there had been a negotiation on compensation rates between the leaders and the people, and 97.6% had received monetary support from the local government. These costs include money for job changes and support for stabilizing life after losing land.

Despite the negotiation meetings, affected households (47.6%) were still not satisfied with the government's compensation price. When asked about compensation amounts, villagers compared the compensation of a nearby project. They questioned



**Figure 6.** Assessment of households' viewpoint on land acquisition and compensation. (authors' compilation)

why land-recovered households in a project entirely located in the city of Vinh were compensated at a higher rate. Although this comparison is not reasonable from the point of the nature of the real estate market, it created some disagreement among households. We found that 2.9% and 11.2% of households saw a contradiction with the agreements before land acquisition and disagreed with the VSIP Nghe An project's land acquisition, respectively. As a result, some homes have delayed the allocation of land to the government as they felt dissatisfied with the government's compensation price. However, this project is part of a regional plan and directly recovered by the People's Committee of Nghe An province, so these households and the provincial government have also found a familiar voice to reach final agreements.

To obtain a high level of consensus, a notification to each affected household is necessary. This notification is a prerequisite step for landless families to have detailed information about the purpose of land acquisition and the benefits they would receive when transferring land-use rights. According to results of the interviews with local authorities, from the first days of proposing to build VSIP Nghe An Industrial Park, the investor directly led the representative of the people in the cleared area in Binh Duong to witness the industrial stature of VSIP. They were also shown the values that VSIP creates for the community there in terms of economy, society, and environment:

Land-expropriated people have a high consensus about the state taking land to build an industrial park. Local officials and some household representatives were invited to visit VSIP Industrial Park in Binh Duong province. Since then, households losing land have an essential understanding of the purpose and the potential of the industrial park to the locality. (government official, 20 August 2019)

Hereafter, there seem to be no households that did not have land acquisition information (Table 5). Community meetings and public announcements from local authorities were provided to bring the most specific information (67.1%). Those who could not attend these meetings also received an official notification from Vinh City People's Committee (27.6%). Hence, the government has tried to provide helpful information and ensure fairness for households.

During this research, we also conducted five face-to-face interviews with households whose agricultural land is next to the industrial park, but not on the list for land acquisition. They said that even though their land was not acquired, it also affected production: "Our family has lost our crop and [we have] not enough to eat" (female, 54 years old). When the industrial zone was built, the irrigation system changed, resulting in no water for irrigation and production purposes. Mice are also

No	Categories	Frequency	Households	Percent
1	Official notice from the People Committee	47	170	27.6%
2	Your neighbors/ cousins/ friends	6	170	3.5%
3	Public announcements posted at the local People Committee	15	170	8.8%
4	Community meetings and public announcements from local authorities	114	170	67.1%
5	You know nothing until the land acquisition is implemented	0	170	0%

**Table 5.** How affected households know about land acquisition. (authors' compilation)

more prevalent due to loss of surrounding agricultural land: “Irrigation water for the field is not enough, along with rat infestation<sup>9</sup>, it makes productivity not as high as before” (male, 48 years old). Therefore, rice productivity has decreased.

Furthermore, these households show aspirations towards land acquisition. According to one respondent, “our family is also looking forward to recovering land for other purposes, while the land is still available but cannot be produced” (female, 42 years old). The reason is that, although there is still land for production, the productivity is lower than before the industrial zone was built. These households feel unfairly treated when they are also indirectly affected by the project but without government support: “I feel annoyed and inequitably treated” (female, 41 years old). Some people also feel displeased when their neighbors repair their houses or buy new things from compensation money. These injustices also cause psychological pressure on these households: “I feel sad and sleepless for many days” (male, 49 years old).

Despite the economic and emotional effects, several other aspects of the lives of the interviewed households do not seem to have experienced any change. As the project has been running for more than three years from its inception to when this research was implemented, the environment’s quality (air and water sources) was expected to be impacted: “Currently, I have not noticed any pollution. However, I still have concerns that the quality of the environment will deteriorate in the future” (female, 41 years old). Another factor is that ‘social evils’, such as drugs, prostitution, and theft, have not yet appeared in this area<sup>10</sup>: “Security is still guaranteed. I have yet to see a heist take place. However, there is still the phenomenon of gambling, but not much” (male, 48 years old). Security is better than before, now that communal roads have lights to travel at night. This situation shows that local facilities have also witnessed improvement: “Newly built roads and more street lights make it more convenient to travel at night” (female, 42 years old). It is concluded that the process of land acquisition for the VSIP Nghe An project mainly causes negative impacts on agricultural production and therefore households’ economy and morale in the affected area. The social and environmental factors are still under control while facilities have improved.

From the analysis above, the government needs to be concerned with both land-acquired households and those affected indirectly. There are currently no regulations relating to compensation for indirectly affected people in legal documents relating to land in Vietnam: “Vietnamese law does not have specific regulations on compensation in this case” (expert, 9 April 2020). To measure the negative impacts of land acquisition on such adjacent areas is not easy. This also shows limitations in land acquisition and compensation laws. Thus, the Vietnamese government needs to adjust to ensure fairness for households. For households losing land, the state needs to offer a reasonable compensation price as agreed by the people. In addition, the mental and emotional damage should also be considered. For indirectly affected households, the state needs to provide practical support to avoid dissonance between families.

9 In the past, when the rice land was still abundant, the rats harmed the crops, but because of the large area, the yield was still guaranteed. However, the agricultural land area is narrowed. With the remaining land, the rats will do more harm to the rice plants (as explained by the farmers).

10 Such forms of petty crime, strictly prohibited in Vietnam, usually occur in industrial zones (Ngoc et al., 2019).

## CONCLUSION

In Vietnam, the accelerating industrialization, modernization, socio-economic development, and international integration have led to increasing land acquisition for project implementation. However, land acquisition is an activity with not only immediate but also long-term effects on many subjects and aspects. A project that requires land use often has various purposes. Sometimes, the boundary defining the project's goals, or defining its primary purpose, is not a simple matter. For example, projects in hi-tech parks, economic zones, or new urban areas are geared towards public interests. Still, they pay more attention to economic benefits when dealing with real estate or manufacturing. Meanwhile, people have their land acquired at a compensation price lower than the market price and are less likely to be resettled on the spot to benefit from the project.

Based on the Land Law of 2013, this study summarized the regulations and procedures for land acquisition in Vietnam. In Vinh city, Nghe An province, a study was conducted with 170 households to inquire whether the state and authorities have implemented the land acquisition process according to the law. It also considered people's own assessments of the acquisition of their land. Overall, the study shows positive results regarding the state's land acquisition and compensation procedures for landless households. However, several questions raised by those directly and indirectly affected about the fairness of these two subjects still need to be answered by functional agencies. This will help to resolve litigation issues between indirectly affected households and local authorities as well as conflicts between directly and indirectly affected households.

In Vietnam, land acquisition is divided into two forms: compulsory and voluntary land acquisition. These two forms differ in methods and compensation costs (different compensation land prices). In theory, with these forms and procedures of acquisition, land acquisition should be settled by respecting the interests of all stakeholders: the state, investors, and households. However, there have been differences in policy implementation regarding land ownership and land use rights transactions. Following the procedures for land acquisition and compensation, most households reported to have received notices of land acquisition. They also had received information about the purpose of land acquisition and details of the state's payment and support for their families. However, people were still concerned about differences in compensation. This is not a new problem, and the state needs to find solutions to ensure fairness for the people. If resolved, this problem would not impede site clearance, thereby enhancing socio-economic growth. Upon land acquisition, both households that lose land and households with farmland adjacent to the project are affected. Hence, the government needs solutions for both groups. Such support would avoid situations and perceptions of inequality between households that are both directly and indirectly affected by land acquisition.



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## DISCLOSURE

The authors declare no conflict of interest.



# “Smart is not Equal to Technology”: An Interview With Suhono Harso Supangkat on the Emergence and Development of Smart Cities in Indonesia

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In 2017, the Indonesian government launched the ‘100 Smart Cities’ initiative to mark the rise of smart city concepts in urban development. Rather than replicating what has been done by developed countries, Indonesia has experienced somewhat different pathways in developing its smart cities. This piece records an expert interview with Suhono Harso Supangkat, a professor of information technology at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) and one of the pioneers of Indonesia’s smart cities program. He leads the Smart City and Community Innovation Center (SCCIC), which facilitates cities’ implementations of smart solutions to urban problems. He advises and assists many government agencies and industries, especially on information technology regulations and governance. He has also developed the Indonesian Smart City Rating (RKCI), which aims to survey and map Indonesian smart city development; it has been published every two years since 2015. This interview was conducted in Indonesian on 10 September 2020 via telephone call. For the purposes of this paper, the interview transcript was translated by the author. The interview relates to the emergence, prospects, and challenges of Indonesian smart cities and their development.

**Keywords:** Indonesia; Information Technology; Smart Cities; Urban Development; Urban Governance

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**ARIF BUDY PRATAMA:** *Thank you, Professor Supangkat, for giving me this opportunity to interview you. In your perspective, how do you see Smart Cities as an urban development concept in Indonesia?*

**SUHONO HARSO SUPANGKAT:** In essence, whatever it is, the main objective is to improve the quality of life for citizens. Today should be better than yesterday; tomorrow should be better than today. That is the principle. A city should become better over time. In general, we cannot enjoy cities in Indonesia. Maybe it will be different if you have experienced Western cities, in Europe, Bonn, your place

of residence, for instance. Urbanization<sup>1</sup> in Indonesia has resulted in social transformation and population shifts. For example, due to education purposes, people may need to travel from Sleman to Yogya[karta] City and then move on again to Bandung. In the 1960s, only 30% of people lived in the cities; now it is closer to 60%. While urbanization is continuing, the capacity of cities cannot follow the pace of urbanization. As a result, the quality of life in cities has been diminishing. The primary needs of urban areas, such as energy, food, health, education facilities, and employment, should be addressed by local governments. In the last 15 years, or say, since the 2000s, it has become uncomfortable (living) in Bandung or Jakarta due to traffic congestion.<sup>2</sup> Well, we need to govern the cities in better ways. Technologies are needed to help us, especially city surveillance, which would help mayors and regents oversee their cities more accurately and rapidly. In 2005, many local politicians did *blusukan*<sup>3</sup> to accommodate citizens’ aspirations – an average of eight hours per day. Can you imagine how many places they visited? Say eight sites per day. In reality, there are hundreds or even thousands of problems in the city that cannot be understood through *blusukan*. In short, there are likely to be as many problems as there are people living there and infrastructures therein. Well, technologies like artificial intelligence, big data, the internet of things, and so forth are needed.

PRATAMA: *Could you please elaborate: How does technology play a role in urban development?*

SUPANGKAT: How do mayors or regents grasp these urban problems? This is where technologies take part. As Muslims, we know *iqra*,<sup>4</sup> which means ‘to read or understand problems’. We must understand existing problems: hospitals, urban poor, schools, agriculture, industries, security, waste, etc. Mayors are assisted by office heads, aren’t they? Since city governance includes many actors, including civil servants, community members, industry leaders, and the private sector, technology is necessary to facilitate interactions between differing actors and other components.

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1 Indonesia faces a high rate of urbanization, as many people move from rural or sub-urban to urban areas. The latest data from Statistics Indonesia projects urbanization rates as follows: 53% (2015), 55% (2018), 66.6% (2035), 67% (2045), and 70% (2050) with average growth of 2.3% per annum (Statistics Indonesia, 2018).

2 Bandung and Jakarta are popular destinations due to their employment potential, and are regarded as the economic epicenters of Indonesia (Farda & Balijepalli, 2018). This has caused their populations to grow rapidly. In Jakarta alone, the National Development Planning Agency (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional*, BAPPENAS) estimates that economic loss due to traffic congestion has reached more than IDR 65 trillion (The Jakarta Post, 2019). This number reaches IDR 100 trillion if the value of lost time is included (Tempo.co, 2019).

3 *Blusukan* is a Javanese word derived from the root *blusuk*, which means ‘roaming into’. In the political realm, it refers to politicians door-to-door and direct visits with citizens. This concept was popularized by President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, during his time as Mayor of Surakarta. In the literature, *blusukan* is sometimes translated as ‘street visits’ (Tapsell, 2020), ‘impromptu visits’ (Juwono & Cindra, 2020), or ‘two-way direct communication with citizens’ (Zulham, 2020). There is a debate regarding whether *blusukan* is aimed for political image-making, or an effective means of accommodating citizens’ aspirations.

4 *Iqra*’ is a word of Arabic origin meaning ‘to read’. It refers not only to the shallow interpretation of a text or narrative, but also to the ability to understand them in context.

Take command centers<sup>5</sup> as instruments for city surveillance through which city governments can monitor the condition of the city. They use technology. Here, technology is regarded as enabling smart city projects, but not their main objectives.

PRATAMA: *The relationship between technology and urban development seems to follow a simple linear logic. How do you find it to work in your real-world experience?*

SUPANGKAT: There is a misperception regarding this. Many mayors and regents assume that, if they buy the technology, they buy the smart city. As such, we have worked to monitor the progress of smart city development in Indonesia. Smart cities are not simply cities with sophisticated technological applications, but ones that can manage their resources efficiently and effectively by harnessing smart solutions. Once more, smart is not equal to technology. Technology must be utilized to improve residents' quality of life and environment sustainably.

PRATAMA: *If we compare [smart cities in Indonesia] with smart cities in developed countries, what is the main difference?*

SUPANGKAT: According to our surveys, there is no real smart city in Indonesia, I would say. Some mayors have been mocked by their citizens, told that their smart cities are just self-aggrandization. To be more objective, there should be a standard measurement. What makes [smart cities in Indonesia] different from smart cities in developed countries may be the education level and city space. In Singapore, for instance, Singaporeans are disciplined; here, people are far from disciplined, aren't they? It depends on how people behave as well. In this regard, people and processes are very important. Especially processes related to culture.

PRATAMA: *Could you please tell us how the smart city initiative emerged in Indonesia?*

SUPANGKAT: Well, in the beginning – according to my research – the smart city concept was developed within an Indonesian context around 2003. I was a special staff member for the Minister of Communication and Informatics from 2007 to 2009. In 2010, I returned to ITB. The preliminary concept was e-government, in which information technology was used in government activities. While the concept of e-government leans on back-office features, the concept of a smart city is different, broader, as cities are at its crux.<sup>6</sup> Since 2013, we have rated smart city development in Indonesia,

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5 A command center is an integrative instrument (usually a room with information technology applications) that facilitates data-driven decision-making processes. Many cities in Indonesia, such as Surabaya, Jakarta, Bandung, and Makassar, have used command centers in their decision-making processes (Kompas, 2018).

6 One recent smart city project is 'Bandung Smart Food', which has been designed to achieve Sustainable Development Goals 3 and 12 (zero hunger; responsible consumption and production) by integrating food supply/distribution and waste management. Bandung produces more than 1,300 tons of waste every day, 45% of which is organic waste and left-over food (Prasetyo et al., 2019). To reduce food waste, an online platform called BADAMI has been developed in accordance with Bandung's smart city program and COVID-19 response. Collaborating with small-and-medium enterprises (SMES), this mobile application offers a marketplace for fresh, surplus, and waste foods (Badami, 2021). Its main feature is 'food rescue',

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and we have published our findings every two years. Later, in 2017, the Ministry of Communication and Informatics made a move by launching the ‘100 Smart Cities’ initiative.<sup>7</sup> In this regard, the Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Informatics followed our initiatives. Conceptually, we developed the Garuda Smart City model<sup>8</sup> as an academic and practical reference for smart city development. The Garuda Smart City model tries to break down detailed dimensions and indicators of how cities develop smart projects and incorporate them in their urban development agendas. Recently, the ministry developed another model, one that includes smart branding as a substitute for smart mobility. In my opinion, branding is not a main dimension of smart cities.

PRATAMA: *How does your institute deal with smart city development in Indonesia?*

SUPANGKAT: We facilitate cities in developing their master plans and implementing these plans sustainably. As I told you before, no city in Indonesia has reached 80 points, the threshold for being identified as a smart city.<sup>9</sup> They get 60 to 70 on average, which indicates that they are becoming smart, but not yet smart, I would say.

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which facilitates food sharing among city inhabitants, allowing those who have excess food to deliver food to those who need it. Another project related to waste management is the massive *Kang Pisman* movement. The project, deriving its name from an abbreviation for *kurangi* (‘reduce’), *pisahkan* (‘separate’), and *manfaatkan* (‘utilize’), has created 143 zero-waste regions where communities apply – aided by information and communication technology – integrated waste management. Organic waste is further processed and integrated into urban agriculture, such as gardening, fisheries, and farming in Bandung. Both BADAMI and *Kang Pisman* were showcased by the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (MUFPP) and received the Milan Pact Award 2020 (MUFPP Secretariat, 2021).

7 This program was supported by the central government through the Ministry of Communication and Informatics, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Public Works and Housing, Ministry of National Development Planning, and the Presidential Office (Ministry of Communication and Informatics, 2018). Its main activity is providing technical assistance and facilitating smart city development in Indonesia’s cities and regencies. As of late 2019, 93 cities in Indonesia have received smart city status (Davy, 2019).

8 The Garuda Smart City framework was initially developed by the Smart City and Community Innovation Center (SCCIC), Bandung Institute of Technology, to assess smart city development (Supangkat, 2015). It comprises three characteristics (economic, social, and environmental), three enablers (people, governance, and technology), and twelve factors (economy, industry, education, natural resources, disaster mitigation, health, transport, public services, socio-digital, energy, environment, and spatial planning). These three characteristics, consisting of twelve factors, are service domains delivered to citizens. In doing so, cities need to enhance their local resources – such as natural resources, local governments, private sector actors, academics, non-government organizations, city buildings/infrastructures, information technology, and city inhabitants – and transform them into the main beneficiaries. The enablers, characteristics, and factors in the framework are all interrelated, and used to achieve a locally-adapted ecosystem that delivers smart services to citizens. Recently, the Garuda Smart City framework was revised into the Garuda Smart City model, which consists of three layers: (1) resources, (2) enablers, and (3) services. This revision was made to emphasize cities’ tangible and intangible resources as baselines of urban development, and transform them into enablers. Another change can be seen in the service domains, which also include service clusters and items – the end product of smart cities (Supangkat et al., 2018; Tay et al., 2018).

9 The grading scale was developed by *Rating Kota Cerdas Indonesia* (Rating Smart Cities Indonesia, or RKCI). It focuses on measuring different components of smart city maturity, including smart and innovative services; quality of life; citizen perceptions; resource utilization, management, integration, and sustainability; digital government; and city management strategies and plans. The scale recognizes five levels of smart city implementation: ad hoc (0-20), initial (20-40), scattered (40-60), integrated (60-80), and smart (80-100). To be classified as smart, a city should score 80 points or higher (Supangkat et al., 2018); most Indonesian cities, however, are still at the scattered or integrated level.



Take, for instance, the city of Magelang. We helped it formulate its master plan in 2016. As you can see, good progress has been made in many aspects of development. We have also assisted other cities, including Semarang, Bandung, and Surabaya.

*PRATAMA: Talking about smart cities, one of the most interesting aspects is the question of who really initiates smart city initiatives. According to your research and practical experience, who are the main actors in smart city development in Indonesia?*

*SUPANGKAT: The main actors are the local government (the mayor/regent and his administration).<sup>10</sup> Recently, supporting actors have emerged, for instance industrialists and youths. In the field, a new segment – the so-called millennial generation – acts as a prime mover in smart city projects.<sup>11</sup> As you know, the older people in the bureaucracy and in society cannot follow recent technological developments.*

*PRATAMA: How do you see the prospects of smart city development in Indonesia?*

*SUPANGKAT: Regardless of whether or not the Ministry of Communication and Informatics will continue the smart city project, many Indonesian cities will still experiment and try to implement suitable projects for their cities. This means that cities are not dependent on the central government program in developing smart cities. For instance, we have assisted and provided technical assistance to the city of Semarang to help them deal with urban challenges using a smart solutions perspective, and, eventually, they are still trying to find the best solution, in accordance with their local context.*

*PRATAMA: Is there any role model for developing smart cities in Indonesia? If yes, which city/cities?*

*SUPANGKAT: We cannot talk about role models, especially those from abroad. Yes, we can find ideas about developing smart cities, but we have many differences in terms of our urban characteristics and our resources in urban development. What*

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<sup>10</sup> The crucial role of local government (city and regency) has been reported in previous studies since it acts as the spearhead of urban development in the implementation of decentralization policy adopted by Indonesian public administration system (Offenhuber, 2019; Pratama & Imawan, 2020). The local autonomy system, as a manifestation of decentralization policy, has shifted local planning from the central government to local authorities. It is through this framework that certain cities and regencies have initiated their smart city programs. Additionally, charismatic local leaders play an important role in developing smart cities. The cases of Jakarta and Bandung demonstrate how the development of smart cities is strongly driven by local leaders who act as policy entrepreneurs (Pilsudski et al., 2018).

<sup>11</sup> Youths – or, more specifically, the millennial generations – are often identified as ‘digital natives’ to designate their familiarity and savvy with technology (Hargittai, 2010). According to Utomo & Noormega (2020), there are 63.5 million Indonesian millennials. In smart city projects, in which technology plays an important role, youth engagement contributes relevantly to the operationalization and application of smart projects in urban development. Several youth communities have emerged at the national and local levels. *Rumah Millennials* (House of Millennials, rumahmillennials.com), for instance, has helped millennials with social networking and a learning hub platform; some of these activities have been related to smart city programs. A local-level example is *Kelompok Harmonis Digital* (Digital Harmony Group) based in Kota Batu, East Java, which has become actively engaged in regional budget and financial monitoring practices by applying information technology (Prasetyo, 2019).

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we call locality is still evident, which affects how we develop unique smart cities suited to the Indonesian condition or, let’s say, the Indonesian way. Some of the literature may recognize the North American or West European smart city models. For instance, Barcelona can be used as the role model, but this may not be appropriate in an Indonesian setting. Although the technology may be the same, or at least similar, the people and the processes are diverse. I emphasize that, by technology, I refer not only to information technology; any technologies, especially locally-adapted technologies suited to specific localities, can be harnessed to facilitate smart city development.

PRATAMA: *Now we are nearly at the end of interview. What will be the challenges of smart city development in Indonesia in the future?*

SUPANGKAT: I would note at least two aspects, namely people and processes (or governance). Let’s say we are about to start digitalization in the cities: Are all people ready for it? I mean, the local governments, legislative bodies, and citizens in the broader scope. The people aspect includes leadership (from the mayor), and how he/she integrates and synchronizes resources. It also deals with how citizens are educated to attain what we call smart citizenship. In short, the challenge is managing people, processes, and technologies, thereby integrating the components shaping smart cities. In reality, technological determinism is still present, resulting in misconceptions of how policymakers interpret smart cities as technological intervention.



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## Book Review: Rafael, V. L. (2022). *The Sovereign Trickster: Death and Laughter in the Age of Duterte.*

Duke University Press. ISBN 978-14-7801-779-0. 173 pages.

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Since his 2016 election, and the commencement of the war on drugs (a campaign waged through extrajudicial killings), Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has become a global sensation. Winn (2019) declared the war on drugs to be “among the bloodiest massacres in recent Southeast Asian history” (p. 25) and a phenomenon “racking up a body count seldom seen outside large-scale land battles” (p. 128). Among many outside the Philippines, the Duterte phenomenon is poorly understood and is another example of how, according to Mishra (2017), “unable to discern a rational design in worldwide mayhem, many intellectuals seem as lost as politicians today” (p. 39).

Rafael *explains* the causes of Duterte’s war on drugs as opposed to simply *decrying* it as an act of savagery. In Rafael’s book there are no normatively charged statements, such as Winn’s 2019 declaration “the Philippines is run by an elected leader with the bloodlust and dangerous unpredictability of a dictator” (p. xvi), or Miller’s 2018 description of the war on drugs as a “daily bloodbath splashed across the headlines” (p. 3). As Rafael states at the outset of the book, “I try to recast Duterte from the unforgiving authoritarian and over-masculinized figure that many see him as into a more complex, fragile, and ambiguous character” (p. 5). Rafael’s explanation of Duterte’s rise, acquisition, and consolidation of power is useful for Philippine scholars as well as those interested in the global growth of authoritarianism; as Mishra (2017) states, “Authoritarian leaders, anti-democratic backlashes and right-wing extremism define the politics of Austria, France and the United States as well as India, Israel, Thailand, the Philippines and Turkey” (p. 9).

Rafael attempts to explain the Duterte regime, and the drug war, by looking at the relationship between life and death under Duterte. Rafael does this by using the concepts of biopower (power over life) developed by Foucault (2010), and necropower (power to kill) developed by Mbembe (2003). Consequently, the book’s theme is, “What is the relationship between life and death under Duterte” (p. 3)? This “thematic thread”, as Rafael describes it, runs as the red thread connecting all chapters (p. 3). Rafael continually discusses how the Duterte regime

acts to have power over life and to, simultaneously, exert its power to kill. The book consists of an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusion. Between the chapters are a series of short essays, which Rafael calls 'sketches', dealing with topics related to the book's theme. Rafael cautions the book "is far from being a definitive history of the age of Duterte" (p. 4). In terms of methods, the book is based on an extensive, thorough examination of secondary sources. There are no fieldwork interviews, such as those conducted by Warburg (2017). This may appear to be a weakness, but conducting fieldwork research on the war on drugs is dangerous for both the researcher and participants (Holden, 2021). Also, the book was published six years into the Duterte regime, and, by this time, an extensive body of literature had been published on Duterte's government, which Rafael effectively utilizes.

Rafael begins by discussing the historical conditions facilitating Duterte. Throughout Philippine history, elections have enabled the proliferation of armed vigilantes and death squads to coerce political rivals. According to Rafael, "death squads, vigilantes, and paramilitary volunteers of all sorts have long been an integral, though disavowed, feature of the state" (p. 16). While the 1986 People Power protests may have ended the Marcos dictatorship, many of its institutions remained in place and succeeding administrations resorted to extrajudicial killings of criminals, leftists, journalists, activists, and Muslim secessionists.

Rafael discusses Duterte's background as mayor of Davao City on Mindanao. In 1986, as Corazon Aquino replaced Marcos, Aquino replaced all governors and mayors, and Duterte, a prosecutor, was appointed Vice Mayor and Officer in Charge of Davao City. In 1988, Duterte was elected Mayor – a position he held, subject to term limits, until elected President in 2016. While mayor, Duterte incorporated elements of both anti-communist vigilantes and former New People's Army members into his regime, creating the Davao Death Squad, which mercilessly dealt with drug personalities (people using or selling drugs) and petty criminals, while earning Duterte the nickname 'the Punisher'. To Rafael, Duterte's time in Davao gave him a Hobbesian worldview, where life is in a state of "perpetual civil war" (p. 58). "For Duterte", wrote Rafael, "justice means revenge. It is about the right to seek satisfaction for an injury" (p. 58). In Duterte's worldview, human rights are an abstract Western imposition infringing on Philippine sovereignty.

Following Kusaka (2017a, 2017b, 2020), Rafael uses the concept of moral politics to explain the Duterte regime and the war on drugs. Starting with Fidel Ramos' presidency (1992-1998), successive Philippine governments have been committed to neoliberalism – a paradigm eschewing income and wealth redistribution (Holden, 2021). With neoliberal doctrine preventing income and wealth redistribution, society is differentiated into 'deserving' and 'undeserving' citizens. The former are hard working, decent, upright people engaged in "contractual service jobs such as overseas work, tourism, construction, and call centers"; the latter are "drunks, drug addicts, or criminals, [and] they are liable to be ostracized, arrested, jailed, and in some cases, killed" (p. 31). To Rafael, this demonstrates the stark difference between biopolitics (the politics of life) and necropolitics (the politics of death) and the "biopolitics of neoliberalism thus requires a necropolitics of moral cleansing" (p. 31). Moral politics is an effective strategy for Duterte's strongest supporters, members of the aspirational middle class. These people want to move up socially while fearing being forced

to move down. The drug war assures these people something is *being done* and it “assuages the fears of precarity and displacement among his supporters” (p. 82).

Rafael discusses Duterte’s scientifically unfounded views of methamphetamine (Hart, 2014, 2021), which regards methamphetamine “as thoroughly destructive, driving users into acts of extreme violence” (p. 67). In Duterte’s mind, methamphetamine users “have no qualms about raping children and killing innocent people”, and consequently “they cannot be considered human, let alone claim to have any rights” (p. 67). Rafael explains an important component of Duterte’s contempt for drug users, which is his resentment of their enjoyment of drugs (known in French as *jouissance*). To Duterte, drug users enjoy something illicitly and he wants to stop this illicit enjoyment by destroying them. This exemplifies how “drug policy”, to Proudfoot (2019), “revolves around a concern with the *jouissance* of others” (p. 223).

Rafael examines how the war on drugs resembles a counterinsurgency campaign. This is a point made by Linnemann (2016) who wrote, “Counterterrorism projects are best understood as counterinsurgency projects, aiming to pacify certain territories and populations” (p. 186). Rafael discusses how, in 2016, the Philippine National Police issued Command Memorandum Circular number 16 calling for “a ‘drug clearing policy’ entailing the ‘neutralization’ and ‘negation’ of ‘drug personalities nationwide’” (p. 68). *Neutralization* is a term frequently used in counterinsurgency and is a euphemism for *killing* (Holden, 2009; McCoy, 2009). By discussing drug personalities as those needing to be *neutralized*, Rafael demonstrates how the war on drugs is conducted as a counterinsurgency campaign. “In Duterte’s Philippines”, writes Rafael, “the drug addict currently occupies the position of the most dangerous insurgent” (p. 70).

Rafael provides an intellectual discussion of one of the drug war’s most notorious aspects – the public disposal of victims’ bodies after being killed either by the police (in ‘buy bust’ operations) or by unknown killers. Rafael examines Foucault’s concept of punishment, and the importance of marking the body of the condemned to demonstrate the power of the sovereign (Foucault, 1975). To Rafael, when victims’ bodies are publicly disposed of they constitute “gruesome reminders of their putative crime” and “fearsome signs of the sovereign’s power” (p. 72). This demonstrates what McCoy (2017) calls “performative violence” with “scattered corpses written upon and read as virtual political texts” (p. 517). When bodies are disposed of in this manner and then photographed by the night crawlers (a group of photojournalists documenting the war on drugs), they become “a stage to perform the basis of the president’s authority” (p. 111), or what McCoy (2009) calls “a proscenium of psychological terror” (p. 407). The police, by leaving bodies behind to be photographed, are demonstrating “the fearsome power of the state delivering a kind of justice as cruel as it [is] inescapable” (p. 127). Rafael also points out how the photojournalists publicizing the killings have also pushed back against the drug war by turning “the nightly occurrence of violence into a narrative of injustice meant to indict the powerful” (p. 120), and this has directed global, negative attention to Duterte’s regime. Intimately related to the public disposal of bodies is the Republic’s weak legal system “where courts are backed up, and where judges, as well as the police, are badly paid” (p. 75). By forgoing “the uncertain, and time-consuming process of court trials,” extrajudicial killings provide swift, visible, and unassailable punishment (p. 75). To Rafael, extrajudicial killings are

sold to the public as a remedy for the weak legal system, normalizing mass murder (especially of the poor), foregrounding fear as a governance technique.

In the final chapter, Rafael examines urban poor support for the war on drugs even though the vast majority of those killed are from the urban poor. Despite mixed feelings regarding the killings, writes Rafael, the drug war “continues to enjoy widespread approval, especially among the poor” (p. 140). Rafael addresses Duterte’s popularity in urban poor communities by discussing how their tight quarters cause people to live in “a community of intimacy” (p. 136). This forces people to get along, but when people engage in antisocial behavior, such as abusing drugs, they threaten this community of intimacy. These disruptors are then identified for execution and killed in what Rafael describes as “a kind of regenerative violence necessary for the removal of the undeserving who endanger community” (p. 139). Rafael refers to this process of removing disruptive community members as “autoimmunity” (p. 139). When a disruptor is killed, their death confirms their lack of belonging and means they no longer threaten community safety.

In conclusion, the book provides a detailed, intellectual, historically-grounded explanation of the Duterte regime and its war on drugs. The book ends on a pessimistic note as Rafael writes, “With Duterte’s scheduled exit in 2022, the drug war, and its authoritarian appeal, will not end but will most likely continue by other means and through other figures” (p. 142). Elements of Duterte’s governing style, which some have described as ‘Dutertismo’, will “continue to be emulated by his followers” (p. 4).



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